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II. Dissertation concerning the end for which God created the World.
III. Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue.
IV. Doctrine of Original Sin defended.
V. Miscellaneous Observations concerning the Divine Decrees in general and Election in particular.
VI. Remarks on Efficacious Grace.
VII. Observations concerning Faith.

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A CAREFUL AND STRICT INQUIRY

INTO THE

MODERN PREVAILING NOTIONS

OF THAT

FREEDOM OF THE WILL,

WHICH IS

SUPPOSED TO BE ESSENTIAL TO MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE AND VICE, REWARD AND PUNISHMENT, PRAISE AND BLAME.

ROM. IX. 16. IT IS NOT OF HIM THAT WILLETH.

FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

PART I.

WHEREIN ARE EXPLAINED AND STATED VARIOUS TERMS AND THINGS BELONGING TO THE SUBJECT OF THE ENSUING DISCOURSE.

SECTION I.

Concerning the Nature of the WILL.

IT may possibly be thought, that there is no great need of going about to define or describe the Will; this word being generally as well understood as any other words we can use to explain it: and so perhaps it would be, had not philosophers, metaphysicians and polemic divines brought the matter into obscurity by the things they have said of it. But since it is so, I think it may be of some use, and will tend to the greater clearness in the following discourse to say a few things concerning it.

And therefore I observe, that the Will (without any metaphysical refining) is plainly, that by which the mind chooses any thing. The faculty of the Will is that faculty or power or principle of mind by which it is capable of choosing an act of the Will is the same as an act of choosing or choice.

If any think it is a more perfect definition of the Will, to say, that it is that by which the soul either chooses or refuses; I am content with it: though I think that it is enough to say, it is that by which the soul chooses: for in every act of Will whatsoever, the mind chooses one thing rather than another; it chooses something rather than the contrary, or rather than the want or non-existence of that thing. So in every act of refusal, the mind chooses the absence of the thing refused; the positive and the negative are set before the mind for its choice, and it chooses the negative; and the mind's making its choice in that case is properly the act of the Will; the Will's determining between the two is a voluntary determining; but that is the same thing as making a choice. So that whatever names we call the act of the Will by, choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, inclining or being averse, a being pleased or displeased with; all may be reduced to this of choosing. For the soul to act voluntarily, is evermore to act electively.

Mr. Locke* says, "the Will signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose." And in the foregoing page says, "the word preferring seems best to express the act of volition;" but adds, that "it does it not precisely;

* Human Understanding. Edit. 7. vol. i. p. 197

for (says he) though a man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can say he ever wills it ?" But the instance he mentions does not prove that there is any thing else in willing, but merely preferring : for it should be considered what is the next and immediate object of the Will, with respect to a man's walking, or any other external action ; which is not being removed from one place to another ; on the earth, or through the air ; these are remoter objects of preference ; but such or such an immediate exertion of himself. The thing nextly chosen or preferred when a man wills to walk, is not his being removed to such a place where he would be, but such an exertion and motion of his legs and feet, &c. in order to it. And his willing such an alteration in his body in the present moment, is nothing else but his choosing or preferring such an alteration in his body at such a moment, or his liking it better than the forbearance of it. And God has so made and established the human nature, the soul being united to a body in proper state, that the soul preferring or choosing such an immediate exertion or alteration of the body, such an alteration instantaneously follows. There is nothing else in the actions of my mind, that I am conscious of while I walk, but only my preferring or choosing, through successive moments, that there should be such alterations of my external sensations and motions ; together with a concurring habitual expectation that it will be so ; having ever found by experience, that on such an immediate preference, such sensations and motions do actually, instantaneously, and constantly arise. But it is not so in the case of flying : though a man may be said remotely to choose or prefer flying ; yet he does not choose or prefer, incline to or desire, under circumstances in view, any immediate exertion of the members of his body in order to it ; because he has no expectation that he should obtain the desired end by any such exertion ; and he does not prefer or incline to any bodily exertion or effort under this apprehended circumstance, of its being wholly in vain. So that if we carefully distinguish the proper objects of the several acts of the Will, it will not appear by this, and such like instances, that there is any difference between volition and preference ; or that a man's choosing, liking best, or being best pleased with a thing, are not the same with his willing that thing ; as they seem to be according to those general and more natural notions of men, according to which language is formed. Thus an act of the Will is commonly expressed by its pleasing a man to do thus or thus ; and a man's doing as he wills, and doing as he pleases, are the same thing in common speech.

Mr. Locke* says, "the Will is perfectly distinguished from Desire ; which in the very same action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our Wills set us upon. A man (says he) whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which, at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this case it is plain the Will and Desire run counter." I do not suppose, that Will and Desire are words of precisely the same signification : Will seems to be a word of a more general signification, extending to things present and absent. Desire respects something absent. I may prefer my present situation and posture, suppose, sitting still, or having my eyes open, and so may will it. But yet I cannot think they are so entirely distinct, that they can ever be properly said to run counter. A man never, in any instance wills any thing contrary to his desires, or desires any thing contrary to his Will. The forementioned instance, which Mr. Locke produces, does not prove that he ever does. He may, on some consideration or other, will to utter speeches which have a tendency to persuade another, and still may desire that they may not persuade him : but yet his Will and Desire do not run counter. The thing which he wills,

* Human Understanding, vol. i. p. 203 20

the very same he desires; and he does not will a thing, and desire the contrary in any particular. In this instance, it is not carefully observed, what is the thing willed, and what is the thing desired: if it were, it would be found that Will and Desire do not clash in the least. The thing willed on some consideration, is to utter such words; and certainly, the same consideration, so influences him, that he does not desire the contrary: all things considered, he chooses to utter such words, and does not desire not to utter them. And so as to the thing which Mr. Locke speaks of as desired, viz., that the words, though they tend to persuade, should not be effectual to that end; his Will is not contrary to this; he does not will that they should be effectual, but rather wills that they should not, as he desires. In order to prove that the Will and Desire may run counter, it should be shown that they may be contrary one to the other in the same thing, or with respect to the very same object of Will or Desire: but here the objects are two; and in each, taken by themselves, the Will and Desire agree. And it is no wonder that they should not agree in different things, however little distinguished they are in their nature. The Will may not agree with the Will, nor Desire agree with Desire, in different things. As in this very instance which Mr. Locke mentions, a person may, on some consideration, desire to use persuasions, and at the same time may desire they may not prevail; but yet nobody will say, that Desire runs counter to Desire; or that this proves that Desire is perfectly a distinct thing from Desire.—The like might be observed of the other instance Mr. Locke produces, of a man's desiring to be eased of pain, &c.

But not to dwell any longer on this, whether *Desire* and *Will* and whether *Preference* and *Volition* be precisely the same things or no; yet, I trust it will be allowed by all, that in every act of Will there is an act of choice; that in every volition there is a preference, or a prevailing inclination of the soul, whereby the soul, at that instant, is out of a state of perfect indifference, with respect to the direct object of the volition. So that in every act, or going forth of the Will, there is some preponderation of the mind or inclination, one way rather than another; and the soul had rather *have* or *do* one thing than another, or than not have or do that thing; and that there, where there is absolutely no preferring or choosing, but a perfect continuing equilibrium, there is no volition.

SECTION II.

Concerning the Determination of the Will.

By *determining the Will*, if the phrase be used with any meaning, must be intended, causing that the act of the Will or choice should be thus, and not otherwise: and the Will is said to be determined, when, in consequence of some action or influence, its choice is directed to, and fixed upon a particular object. As when we speak of the determination of motion, we mean causing the motion of the body to be such a way, or in such a direction, rather than another.

To talk of the determination of the Will, supposes an effect, which must have a cause. If the Will be determined, there is a determiner. This must be supposed to be intended even by them that say, the Will determines itself. If it be so, the Will is both determiner and determined; it is a cause that acts and produces effects upon itself, and is the object of its own influence and action.

With respect to that grand inquiry, What determines the Will? it would be very tedious and unnecessary at present to enumerate and examine all the various opinions which have been advanced concerning this matter; nor is it needful

that I should enter into a particular disquisition of all points debated in disputes on that question, whether the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. It is sufficient to my present purpose to say, it is that motive, which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the Will But it may be necessary that I should a little explain my meaning in this.

By *motive*, I mean the whole of that which moves, excites or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur and unite their strength to induce the mind; and, when it is so, all together are as it were one complex motive. And when I speak of the *strongest motive*, I have respect to the strength of the whole that operates to induce to a particular act of volition, whether that be the strength of one thing alone, or of many together.

Whatever is a motive, in this sense, must be something that is extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding, or perceiving faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will or act any thing, any further than it is perceived, or is some way or other in the mind's view; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the mind's view, cannot affect the mind at all. It is most evident, that nothing is in the mind, or reaches it, or takes any hold of it, any otherwise than as it is perceived or thought of.

And I think it must also be allowed by all, that every thing that is properly called a motive, excitement or inducement to a perceiving, willing agent, has some sort and degree of *tendency* or *advantage* to move or excite the Will, previous to the effect, or to the act of the Will excited. This previous tendency of the motive is what I call the strength of the motive. That motive which has a less degree of previous advantage or tendency to move the Will, or that appears less inviting, as it stands in the view of the mind, is what I call a *weaker motive*. On the contrary, that which appears most inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it to the understanding or apprehension, the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite and induce the choice, is what I call the *strongest motive*. And in this sense, I suppose the Will is always determined by the strongest motive.

Things that exist in the view of the mind have their strength, tendency or advantage to move or excite its Will, from many things appertaining to the nature and circumstances of the thing viewed, the nature and circumstances of the mind that views, and the degree and manner of its view; of which it would perhaps be hard to make a perfect enumeration. But so much I think may be determined in general, without room for controversy, that whatever is perceived or apprehended by an intelligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and influence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or viewed as good; nor has it any tendency to invite or engage the election of the soul in any further degree than it appears such. For to say otherwise, would be to say, that things that appear have a tendency by the appearance they make, to engage the mind to elect them, some other way than by their appearing eligible to it; which is absurd. And therefore it must be true, in some sense, that the Will always is as the greatest apparent good is. For the right understanding of this, two things must be well and distinctly observed.

1. It must be observed in what sense I use the term *good;* namely, as of the same import with *agreeable*. To appear good to the mind, as I use the phrase, is the same as to *appear agreeable*, or *seem pleasing* to the mind. Certainly nothing appears inviting and eligible to the mind, or tending to engage its inclination and choice, considered as evil or disagreeable; nor, indeed, as indifferent, and neither agreeable nor disagreeable. But if it tends to draw the

inclination, and move the Will, it must be under the notion of that which suits the mind. And therefore that must have the greatest tendency to attract and engage it, which, as it stands in the mind's view, suits it best, and pleases it most; and in that sense, is the greatest apparent good: to say otherwise, is little, if any thing, short of a direct and plain contradiction.

The word *good*, in this sense, includes in its signification, the removal or avoiding of evil, or of that which is disagreeable and uneasy. It is agreeable and pleasing to avoid what is disagreeable and displeasing, and to have uneasiness removed. So that here is included what Mr. Locke supposes determines the Will. For when he speaks of uneasiness as determining the Will, he must be understood as supposing that the end or aim which governs in the volition or act of preference, is the avoiding or removal of that uneasiness; and that is the same thing as choosing and seeking what is more easy and agreeable.

2. When I say, the Will is as the greatest apparent good is, or (as I have explained it) that volition has always for its object the thing which appears most agreeable; it must be carefully observed, to avoid confusion and needless objection, that I speak of the *direct* and *immediate* object of the act of volition; and not some object that the act of Will has not an immediate, but only an indirect and remote respect to. Many acts of volition have some remote relation to an object, that is different from the thing most immediately willed and chosen. Thus, when a drunkard has his liquor before him, and he has to choose whether to drink it or no; the proper and immediate objects, about which his present volition is conversant, and between which his choice now decides, are his own acts, in drinking the liquor, or letting it alone; and this will certainly be done according to what, in the present view of his mind, taken in the whole of it, is most agreeable to him. If he chooses or wills to drink it, and not to let it alone; then this action, as it stands in the view of his mind, with all that belongs to its appearance there, is more agreeable and pleasing than letting it alone.

But the objects to which this act of volition may relate more remotely, and between which his choice may determine more indirectly, are the present pleasure the man expects by drinking, and the future misery which he judges will be the consequence of it: he may judge that this future misery when it comes, will be more disagreeable and unpleasant, than refraining from drinking now would be. But these two things are not the proper objects that the act of volition spoken of is nextly conversant about. For the act of Will spoken of is concerning present drinking or forbearing to drink. If he wills to drink, then drinking is the proper object of the act of his Will; and drinking, on some account or other, now appears most agreeable to him, and suits him best. If he chooses to refrain, then refraining is the immediate object of his Will, and is most pleasing to him. If in the choice he makes in the case, he prefers a present pleasure to a future advantage, which he judges will be greater when it comes; then a lesser present pleasure appears more agreeable to him than a greater advantage at a distance. If, on the contrary, a future advantage is preferred, then that appears most agreeable, and suits him best. And so still the present volition is as the greatest apparent good at present is.

I have rather chosen to express myself thus, that the Will always is as the greatest apparent good, or, as what appears most agreeable, is, than to say that the Wil is determined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and the mind's preferring and choosing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct. If strict propriety of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be

said, that the voluntary action which is the immediate consequence and fruit of the mind's volition or choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, than that the preference or choice itself is; but that the act of volition itself is always determined by that in or about the mind's view of the object, which causes it to appear most agreeable. I say, in or about the mind's view of the object, because what has influence to render an object in view agreeable, is not only what appears in the object viewed, but also the manner of the view, and the state and circumstances of the mind that views. Particularly to enumerate all things pertaining to the mind's view of the objects of volition, which have influence in their appearing agreeable to the mind, would be a matter of no small difficulty, and might require a treatise by itself, and is not necessary to my present purpose. I shall therefore only mention some things in general.

I. One thing that makes an object proposed to choice agreeable, is the apparent nature and circumstances of the object. And there are various things of this sort, that have a hand in rendering the object more or less agreeable; as,

1. That which appears in the object, which renders it beautiful and pleasant, or deformed and irksome to the mind; viewing it as it is in itself.

2. The apparent degree of pleasure or trouble attending the object, or the consequence of it. Such concomitants and consequences being viewed as circumstances of the object, are to be considered as belonging to it, and as it were parts of it; as it stands in the mind's view, as a proposed object of choice.

3. The apparent state of the pleasure or trouble that appears, with respect to distance of time; being either nearer or farther off. It is a thing in itself agreeable to the mind, to have pleasure speedily; and disagreeable to have it delayed; so that if there be two equal degrees of pleasure set in the mind's view, and all other things are equal, but only one is beheld as near, and the other far off; the nearer will appear most agreeable, and so will be chosen. Because, though the agreeableness of the objects be exactly equal, as viewed in themselves, yet not as viewed in their circumstances; one of them having the additional agreeableness of the circumstance of nearness.

II. Another thing that contributes to the agreeableness of an object of choice, as it stands in the mind's view, is the manner of the view. If the object be something which appears connected with future pleasure, not only will the degree of apparent pleasure have influence, but also the manner of the view, especially in two respects.

1 With respect to the degree of judgment, or firmness of assent, with which the mind judges the pleasure to be future. Because it is more agreeable to have a certain happiness, than an uncertain one; and a pleasure viewed as more probable, all other things being equal, is more agreeable to the mind, than that which is viewed as less probable.

2. With respect to the degree of the idea of the future pleasure. With regard to things which are the subject of our thoughts, either past, present, or future, we have much more of an idea or apprehension of some things than others; that is, our idea is much more clear, lively and strong. Thus the ideas we have of sensible things by immediate sensation, are usually much more lively than those we have by mere imagination, or by contemplation of them when absent. My idea of the sun, when I look upon it, is more vivid than when I only think of it. Our idea of the sweet relish of a delicious fruit, is usually stronger when we taste it, than when we only imagine it. And sometimes the ideas we have of things by contemplation, are much stronger and clearer, than at other times. Thus, a man at one time has a much stronger idea of the pleasure which is to be enjoyed in eating some sort of food that he loves, than at

another. Now the degree, or strength of the idea or sense that men have of future good or evil, is one thing that has great influence on their minds to excite choice or volition. When of two kinds of future pleasure, which the mind considers of, and are presented for choice, both are supposed exactly equal by the judgment, and both equally certain, and all other things are equal, but only one of them is what the mind has a far more lively sense of, than of the other; this has the greatest advantage by far to affect and attract the mind, and move the Will. It is now more agreeable to the mind, to take the pleasure it has a strong and lively sense of, than that which it has only a faint idea of. The view of the former is attended with the strongest appetite, and the greatest uneasiness attends the want of it; and it is agreeable to the mind to have uneasiness removed, and its appetite gratified. And if several future enjoyments are presented together, as competitors for the choice of the mind, some of them judged to be greater, and others less; the mind also having a greater sense and more lively idea of the good of some of them, and of others a less; and some are viewed as of greater certainty or probability than others; and those enjoyments that appear most agreeable in one of these respects, appear least so in others; in this case, all other things being equal, the agreeableness of a proposed object of choice will be in a degree some way compounded of the degree of good supposed by the judgment, the degree of apparent probability or certainty of that good, and the degree of the view or sense, or liveliness of the idea the mind has of that good; because all together concur to constitute the degree in which the object appears at present agreeable; and accordingly volition will be determined.

I might further observe, the state of the mind that views a proposed object of choice, is another thing that contributes to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of that object; the particular temper which the mind has by nature, or that has been introduced and established by education, example, custom, or some other means; or the frame or state that the mind is in on a particular occasion. That object which appears agreeable to one, does not so to another. And the same object does not always appear alike agreeable, to the same person, at different times. It is most agreeable to some men, to follow their reason; and to others, to follow their appetites: to some men it is more agreeable to deny a vicious inclination, than to gratify it; others it suits best to gratify the vilest appetites. It is more disagreeable to some men than others, to counteract a former resolution. In these respects, and many others which might be mentioned, different things will be most agreeable to different persons; and not only so, but to the same persons at different times.

But possibly it is needless and improper, to mention the frame and state of the mind, as a distinct ground of the agreeableness of objects from the other two mentioned before, viz., the apparent nature and circumstances of the objects viewed, and the manner of the view; perhaps if we strictly consider the matter, the different temper and state of the mind makes no alteration as to the agreeableness of objects, any other way than as it makes the objects themselves appear differently beautiful or deformed, having apparent pleasure or pain attending them; and as it occasions the manner of the view to be different, causes the idea of beauty or deformity, pleasure or uneasiness to be more or less lively.

However, I think so much is certain, that volition, in no one instance that can be mentioned, is otherwise than the greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has been explained. The choice of the mind never departs from that which at that time, and with respect to the direct and immediate objects of

that decision of the mind, appears most agreeable and pleasing, all things considered. If the immediate objects of the Will are a man's own actions, then those actions which appear most agreeable to him he wills. If it be now most agreeable to him, all things considered, to walk, then he wills to walk. If it be now, upon the whole of what at present appears to him, most agreeable to speak, then he chooses to speak: if it suits him best to keep silence, then he chooses to keep silence. There is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind, than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what suits them best, or what is most agreeable to them. To say, that they do what they please, or what pleases them, but yet do not do what is agreeable to them, is the same thing as to say they do what they please, but do not act their pleasure; and that is to say, that they do what they please, and yet do not do what they please.

It appears from these things, that in some sense, the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. But then the understanding must be taken in a large sense, as including the whole faculty of perception or apprehension, and not merely what is called reason or judgment. If by the dictate of the understanding is meant what reason declares to be best or most for the person's happiness, taking in the whole of his duration, it is not true, that the Will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. Such a dictate of reason is quite a different matter from things appearing now most agreeable; all things being put together which pertain to the mind's present perceptions, apprehensions or ideas, in any respect. Although that dictate of reason, when it takes place, is one thing that is put into the scales, and is to be considered as a thing that has concern in the compound influence which moves and induces the Will; and is one thing that is to be considered in estimating the degree of that appearance of good which the Will always follows; either as having its influence added to other things, or subducted from them. When it concurs with other things, then its weight is added to them, as put into the same scale; but when it is against them, it is as a weight in the opposite scale, where it resists the influence of other things: yet its resistance is often overcome by their greater weight, and so the act of the Will is determined in opposition to it.

The things which I have said, may, I hope, serve in some measure, to illustrate and confirm the position I laid down in the beginning of this section, viz., that the will is always determined by the strongest motive, or by that view of the mind which has the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite volition. But whether I have been so happy as rightly to explain the thing wherein consists the strength of motives, or not, yet my failing in this will not overthrow the position itself; which carries much of its own evidence with it, and is the thing of chief importance to the purpose of the ensuing discourse: and the truth of it, I hope, will appear with great clearness, before I have finished what I have to say on the subject of human liberty.

SECTION III.

Concerning the meaning of the terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, &c., and of Contingence.

The words necessary, impossible, &c., are abundantly used in controversies about Free Will and moral agency; and therefore the sense in which they are used, should be clearly understood.

Here I might say, that a thing is then said to be necessary, when it must be and cannot be otherwise. But this would not properly be a definition of Necessity, or an explanation of the word, any more than if I explained the word *must*, by there being a necessity. The words *must*, *can*, and *cannot*, need explication, as much as the words *necessary* and *impossible ;* excepting that the former are words that children commonly use, and know something of the meaning of earlier than the latter.

The word *necessary*, as used in common speech, is a relative term ; and relates to some supposed opposition made to the existence of the thing spoken of, which is overcome, or proves in vain to hinder or alter it. That is necessary, in the original and proper sense of the word, which is, or will be, notwithstanding all supposable opposition. To say, that a thing is necessary, is the same thing as to say, that it is impossible it should not be : but the word *impossible* is manifestly a relative term, and has reference to supposed power exerted to bring a thing to pass, which is insufficient for the effect ; as the word *unable* is relative, and has relation to ability or endeavor which is insufficient ; and as the word *irresistible* is relative, and has always reference to resistance which is made, or may be made to some force or power tending to an effect, and is insufficient to withstand the power or hinder the effect. The common notion of necessity and impossibility implies something that frustrates endeavor or desire.

Here several things are to be noted.

1. Things are said to be necessary in general, which are or will be notwithstanding any supposable opposition from us or others, or from whatever quarter. But things are said to be necessary to us, which are or will be notwithstanding all opposition supposable in the case from us. The same may be observed of the word *impossible*, and other such like terms.

2. These terms *necessary*, *impossible*, *irresistible*, &c., do especially belong to the controversy about liberty and moral agency, as used in the latter of the two senses now mentioned, viz., as necessary or impossible to us, and with relation to any supposable opposition or endeavor of ours.

3. As the word *Necessity* in its vulgar and common use, is relative, and has always reference to some supposable insufficient opposition ; so when we speak of any thing as necessary to us, it is with relation to some supposable opposition of our Wills, or some voluntary exertion or effort of ours to the contrary ; for we do not properly make opposition to an event, any otherwise than as we voluntarily oppose it. Things are said to be what must be, or necessarily are, as to us, when they are, or will be, though we desire or endeavor the contrary, or try to prevent or remove their existence : but such opposition of ours always either consists in, or implies, opposition of our Wills.

It is manifest that all such like words and phrases, as vulgarly used, are used and accepted in this manner. A thing is said to be necessary, when we cannot help it, let us do what we will. So any thing is said to be impossible to us, when we would do it, or would have it brought to pass, and endeavor it ; or at least may be supposed to desire and seek it ; but all our desires and endeavors are, or would be vain. And that is said to be irresistible, which overcomes all our opposition, resistance, and endeavors to the contrary. And we are said to be unable to do a thing, when our supposable desires and endeavors to do it are insufficient.

We are accustomed, in the common use of language, to apply and understand these phrases in this sense ; we grow up with such a habit ; which by the daily use of these terms, in such a sense, from our childhood, becomes fixed and settled ; so that the idea of a relation to a supposed will, desire and endeavor

of ours, is strongly connected with these terms, and naturally excited in our minds, whenever we hear the words used. Such ideas, and these words, are so united and associated, that they unavoidably go together; one suggests the other, and carries the other with it, and never can be separated as long as we live. And if we use the words, as terms of art, in another sense, yet, unless we are exceeding circumspect and wary, we shall insensibly slide into the vulgar use of them, and so apply the words in a very inconsistent manner: this habitual connection of ideas will deceive and confound us in our reasonings and discourses, wherein we pretend to use these terms in that manner, as terms of art

4. It follows from what has been observed, that when these terms *necessary*, *impossible*, *irresistible*, *unable*, &c., are used in cases wherein no opposition, or insufficient will or endeavor, is supposed, or can be supposed, but the very nature of the supposed case itself excludes and denies any such opposition, will or endeavor, these terms are then not used in their proper signification, but quite beside their use in common speech. The reason is manifest; namely, that in such cases we cannot use the words with reference to a supposable opposition, will or endeavor. And therefore, if any man uses these terms in such cases, he either uses them nonsensically, or in some new sense, diverse from their original and proper meaning. As for instance; if a man should affirm after this manner, that it is necessary for a man, and what must be, that a man should choose virtue rather than vice, during the time that he prefers virtue to vice; and that it is a thing impossible and irresistible, that it should be otherwise than that he should have this choice, so long as this choice continues; such a man would use the terms *must*, *irresistible*, &c., with perfect insignificance and nonsense; or in some new sense, diverse from their common use; which is with reference, as has been observed, to supposable opposition, unwillingness and resistance; whereas, here, the very supposition excludes and denies any such thing: for the case supposed is that of being willing and choosing.

5. It appears from what has been said, that these terms *necessary*, *impossible*, &c., are often used by philosophers and metaphysicians in a sense quite diverse from their common use and original signification: for they apply them to many cases in which no opposition is supposed or supposable. Thus they use them with respect to God's existence before the creation of the world, when there was no other being but He: so with regard to many of the dispositions and acts of the Divine Being, such as his loving himself, his loving righteousness, hating sin, &c. So they apply these terms to many cases of the inclinations and actions of created intelligent beings, angels and men; wherein all opposition of the Will is shut out and denied, in the very supposition of the case.

Metaphysical or Philosophical Necessity is nothing different from their certainty. I speak not now of the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty that is in things themselves, which is the foundation of the certainty of the knowledge of them; or that wherein lies the ground of the infallibility of the proposition which affirms them.

What is sometimes given as the definition of philosophical Necessity, namely, that by which a thing cannot but be, or whereby it cannot be otherwise, fails of being a proper explanation of it, on two accounts: first, the words *can*, or *cannot*, need explanation as much as the word *Necessity*; and the former may as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by the former. Thus, if any one asked us what we mean, when we say, a thing cannot but be, we might explain ourselves by saying, we mean, it must necessarily be so; as well as explain Necessity, by saying, it is that by which a thing cannot but be. And secondly, this definition is liable to the forementioned great inconvenience: the words

cannot, or *unable*, are properly relative, and have relation to power exerted, or that may be exerted, in order to the thing spoken of; to which, as I have now observed, the word *Necessity*, as used by philosophers, has no reference.

Philosophical Necessity is really nothing else than the full and fixed connection between the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms something to be true. When there is such a connection, then the thing affirmed in the proposition is necessary, in a philosophical sense; whether any opposition, or contrary effort be supposed, or supposable in the case, or no. When the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms the existence of any thing, either substance, quality, act or circumstance, have a full and certain connection, then the existence or being of that thing is said to be necessary in a metaphysical sense. And in this sense I use the word *Necessity*, in the following discourse, when I endeavor to prove that Necessity is not inconsistent with liberty.

The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms existence of something, may have a full, fixed, and certain connection several ways.

(1.) They may have a full and perfect connection in and of themselves; because it may imply a contradiction, or gross absurdity, to suppose them not connected. Thus many things are necessary in their own nature. So the eternal existence of being, generally considered, is necessary in itself; because it would be in itself the greatest absurdity, to deny the existence of being in general, or to say there was absolute and universal nothing; and is as it were the sum of all contradictions; as might be shown, if this were a proper place for it. So God's infinity, and other attributes are necessary. So it is necessary in its own nature, that two and two should be four; and it is necessary, that all right lines drawn from the centre of a circle to the circumference should be equal. It is necessary, fit and suitable, that men should do to others, as they would that they should do to them. So innumerable metaphysical and mathematical truths are necessary in themselves; the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms them, are perfectly connected of themselves.

(2.) The connection of the subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms the existence of something, may be fixed and made certain, because the existence of that thing is already come to pass; and either now is, or has been; and so has as it were made sure of existence. And therefore, the proposition which affirms present and past existence of it, may by this means be made certain, and necessarily and unalterably true. The past event has fixed and decided the matter, as to its existence; and has made it impossible but that existence should be truly predicated of it. Thus the existence of whatever is already come to pass, is now become necessary; it is become impossible it should be otherwise than true, that such a thing has been.

(3.) The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be, may have a real and certain connection consequentially; and so the existence of the thing may be consequentially necessary; as it may be surely and firmly connected with something else, that is necessary in one of the former respects. As it is either fully and thoroughly connected with that which is absolutely necessary in its own nature, or with something which has already received and made sure of existence. This Necessity lies in, or may be explained by the connection of two or more propositions one with another. Things which are perfectly connected with other things that are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a Necessity of consequence.

And here it may be observed, that all things which are future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are necessary only in

of ours, is strongly connected with these terms, and naturally excited in our minds, whenever we hear the words used. Such ideas, and these words, are so united and associated, that they unavoidably go together; one suggests the other, and carries the other with it, and never can be separated as long as we live. And if we use the words, as terms of art, in another sense, yet, unless we are exceeding circumspect and wary, we shall insensibly slide into the vulgar use of them, and so apply the words in a very inconsistent manner: this habitual connection of ideas will deceive and confound us in our reasonings and discourses, wherein we pretend to use these terms in that manner, as terms of art

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The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms existence of something, may have a full, fixed, and certain connection several ways.

(1.) They may have a full and perfect connection in and of themselves; because it may imply a contradiction, or gross absurdity, to suppose them not connected. Thus many things are necessary in their own nature. So the eternal existence of being, generally considered, is necessary in itself; because it would be in itself the greatest absurdity, to deny the existence of being in general, or to say there was absolute and universal nothing; and is as it were the sum of all contradictions; as might be shown, if this were a proper place for it. So God's infinity, and other attributes are necessary. So it is necessary in its own nature, that two and two should be four; and it is necessary, that all right lines drawn from the centre of a circle to the circumference should be equal. It is necessary, fit and suitable, that men should do to others, as they would that they should do to them. So innumerable metaphysical and mathematical truths are necessary in themselves; the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms them, are perfectly connected of themselves.

(2.) The connection of the subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms the existence of something, may be fixed and made certain, because the existence of that thing is already come to pass; and either now is, or has been; and so has as it were made sure of existence. And therefore, the proposition which affirms present and past existence of it, may by this means be made certain, and necessarily and unalterably true. The past event has fixed and decided the matter, as to its existence; and has made it impossible but that existence should be truly predicated of it. Thus the existence of whatever is already come to pass, is now become necessary; it is become impossible it should be otherwise than true, that such a thing has been.

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And here it may be observed, that all things which are future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are necessary only in

this last way. Their existence is not necessary in itself; for if so, they always would have existed. Nor is their existence become necessary by being made sure, by being already come to pass. Therefore, the only way that any thing that is to come to pass hereafter, is or can be necessary, is by a connection with something that is necessary in its own nature, or something that already is, or has been; so that the one being supposed, the other certainly follows. And this also is the only way that all things past, excepting those which were from eternity, could be necessary before they came to pass, or could come to pass necessarily; and therefore the only way in which any effect or event, or any thing whatsoever that ever has had, or will have a beginning, has come into being necessarily, or will hereafter necessarily exist. And therefore this is the Necessity which especially belongs to controversies about the acts of the Will.

It may be of some use in these controversies, further to observe concerning metaphysical Necessity, that (agreeably to the distinction before observed of Necessity, as vulgarly understood) things that exist may be said to be necessary, either with a general or particular Necessity. The existence of a thing may be said to be necessary with a general Necessity, when all things whatsoever being considered, there is a foundation for certainty of its existence; or when in the most general and universal view of things, the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms its existence, would appear with an infallible connection.

An event, or the existence of a thing, may be said to be necessary with a particular necessity, or with regard to a particular person, thing, or time, when nothing that can be taken into consideration, in or about that person, thing, or time, alters the case at all, as to the certainty of that event, or the existence of that thing; or can be of any account at all, in determining the infallibility of the connection of the subject and predicate in the proposition which affirms the existence of the thing; so that it is all one, as to that person, or thing, at least at that time, as if the existence were necessary with a Necessity that is most universal and absolute. Thus there are many things that happen to particular persons, which they have no hand in, and in the existence of which no will of theirs has any concern, at least at that time; which, whether they are necessary or not, with regard to things in general, yet are necessary to them, and with regard to any volition of theirs at that time; as they prevent all acts of the will about the affair. I shall have occasion to apply this observation to particular instances in the following discourse. Whether the same things that are necessary with a particular Necessity, be not also necessary with a general Necessity, may be a matter of future consideration. Let that be as it will, it alters not the case, as to the use of this distinction of the kinds of Necessity.

These things may be sufficient for the explaining of the terms *necessary* and *necessity*, as terms of art, and as often used by metaphysicians, and controversial writers in divinity, in a sense diverse from, and more extensive than their original meaning in common language, which was before explained.

What has been said to show the meaning of the terms *necessary* and *necessity*, may be sufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms *impossible* and *impossibility*. For there is no difference, but only the latter are negative, and the former positive. Impossibility is the same as negative Necessity, or a Necessity that a thing should not be. And it is used as a term of art in a like diversity from the original and vulgar meaning with Necessity.

The same may be observed concerning the words *unable* and *inability*. It has been observed, that these terms, in their original and common use, have relation to will and endeavor, as supposable in the case, and as insufficient for

the bringing to pass the thing willed and endeavored. But as these terms are often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers on controversies about free will, they are used in a quite different, and far more extensive sense, and are applied to many cases wherein no will or endeavor for the bringing of the thing to pass, is or can be supposed, but is actually denied and excluded in the nature of the case.

As the words *necessary*, *impossible*, *unable*, &c., are used by polemic writers, in a sense diverse from their common signification, the like has happened to the term *contingent*. Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connection with its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of things, is not discerned; and so is what we have no means of the foresight of. And especially is any thing said to be contingent or accidental with regard to us, when any thing comes to pass that we are concerned in, as occasions or subjects, without our foreknowledge, and beside our design and scope.

But the word contingent is abundantly used in a very different sense; not for that whose connection with the series of things we cannot discern, so as to foresee the event, but for something which has absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has any fixed and certain connection.

SECTION IV

Of the Distinction of Natural and Moral Necessity, and Inability.

That Necessity which has been explained, consisting in an infallible connection of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, as intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is distinguished into *moral* and *natural* Necessity.

I shall not now stand to inquire whether this distinction be a proper and perfect distinction; but shall only explain how these two sorts of Necessity are understood, as the terms are sometimes used, and as they are used in the following discourse.

The phrase, *moral* Necessity, is used variously; sometimes it is used for a Necessity of moral obligation. So we say, a man is under Necessity, when he is under bonds of duty and conscience, which he cannot be discharged from. So the word Necessity is often used for great obligation in point of interest. Sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that apparent connection of things, which is the ground of moral evidence; and so is distinguished from absolute Necessity, or that sure connection of things, that is a foundation for infallible certainty. In this sense, moral Necessity signifies much the same as that high degree of probability, which is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy, and be relied upon by mankind, in their conduct and behavior in the world, as they would consult their own safety and interest, and treat others properly as members of society. And sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that Necessity of connection and consequence, which arises from such moral causes, as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connection which there is in many cases between these, and such certain volitions and actions. And it is in this sense, that I use the phrase, *moral Necessity*, in the following discourse.

By natural Necessity, as applied to men, I mean such Necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes; as distinguished from what are called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral

motives and inducements. Thus men placed in certain circumstances, are the subjects of particular sensations by Necessity; they feel pain when their bodies are wounded; they see the objects presented before them in a clear light, when their eyes are opened; so they assent to the truth of certain propositions, as soon as the terms are understood; as that two and two make four, that black is not white, that two parallel lines can never cross one another; so by a natural Necessity men's bodies move downwards, when there is nothing to support them.

But here several things may be noted concerning these two kinds of Necessity.

1. Moral Necessity may be as absolute, as natural Necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause. Whether the Will in every case is necessarily determined by the strongest motive, or whether the Will ever makes any resistance to such a motive, or can ever oppose the strongest present inclination, or not; if that matter should be controverted, yet I suppose none will deny, but that, in some cases, a previous bias and inclination, or the motive presented, may be so powerful, that the act of the Will may be certainly and indissolubly connected therewith. When motives or previous biases are very strong, all will allow that there is some *difficulty* in going against them. And if they were yet stronger, the difficulty would be still greater. And therefore, if more were still added to their strength, to a certain degree, it would make the difficulty so great, that it would be wholly *impossible* to surmount it; for this plain reason, because whatever power men may be supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that power is not infinite; and so goes not beyond certain limits. If a man can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of this kind with twenty degrees of strength, because the degrees of strength are beyond the degrees of difficulty; yet if the difficulty be increased to thirty, or a hundred, or a thousand degrees, and his strength not also increased, his strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the difficulty. As therefore it must be allowed, that there may be such a thing as a sure and perfect connection between moral causes and effects; so this only is what I call by the name of moral Necessity.

2. When I use this distinction of moral and natural Necessity, I would not be understood to suppose, that if any thing comes to pass by the former kind of Necessity, the nature of things is not concerned in it, as well as in the latter. I do not mean to determine, that when a moral habit or motive is so strong, that the act of the Will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the nature of things. But these are the names that these two kinds of Necessity have usually been called by; and they must be distinguished by some names or other; for there is a distinction or difference between them, that is very important in its consequences; which difference does not lie so much in the nature of the connection, as in the two terms connected. The cause with which the effect is connected, is of a particular kind, viz., that which is of moral nature; either some previous habitual disposition, or some motive exhibited to the understanding. And the effect is also of a particular kind; being likewise of a moral nature; consisting in some inclination or volition of the soul or voluntary action.

I suppose, that Necessity which is called natural, in distinction from moral necessity, is so called, because *mere nature*, as the word is vulgarly used, is concerned, without any thing of *choice*. The word nature is often used in opposition to choice; not because nature has indeed never any hand in our choice; but this probably comes to pass by means that we first get our notion

of nature from that discernible and obvious course of events, which we observe in many things that our choice has no concern in; and especially in the material world; which, in very many parts of it, we easily perceive to be in a settled course; the stated order and manner of succession being very apparent. But where we do not readily discern the rule and connection, (though there be a connection, according to an established law, truly taking place,) we signify the manner of event by some other name. Even in many things which are seen in the material and inanimate world, which do not discernibly and obviously come to pass according to any settled course, men do not call the manner of the event by the name of *nature*, but by such names as *accident*, *chance*, *contingence*, &c. So men make a distinction between nature and choice; as though they were completely and universally distinct. Whereas, I suppose none will deny but that choice, in many cases, arises from nature, as truly as other events. But the dependence and connection between acts of volition or choice, and their causes, according to established laws, is not so sensible and obvious. And we observe that choice is as it were a new principle of motion and action, different from that established law and order of things which is most obvious, that is seen especially in corporeal and sensible things; and also the choice often interposes, interrupts and alters the chain of events in these external objects, and causes them to proceed otherwise than they would do, if let alone, and left to go on according to the laws of motion among themselves. Hence it is poken of as if it were a principle of motion entirely distinct from nature, and properly set in opposition to it. Names being commonly given to things, according to what is most obvious, and is suggested by what appears to the senses without reflection and research.

3. It must be observed, that in what has been explained, as signified by the name of moral Necessity, the word Necessity is not used according to the original design and meaning of the word; for, as was observed before, such terms, *necessary*, *impossible*, *irresistible*, &c., in common speech, and their most proper sense, are always relative; having reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavor, that is insufficient. But no such opposition, or contrary will and endeavor, is supposable in the case of moral Necessity; which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself; which does not admit of the supposition of a will to oppose and resist it. For it is absurd to suppose the same individual will to oppose itself, in its present act; or the present choice to be opposite to, and resisting present choice; as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions, in the same moving body, at the same time. And therefore the very case supposed never admits of any trial whether an opposing or resisting will can overcome this Necessity.

What has been said of natural and moral Necessity, may serve to explain what is intended by natural and moral *Inability*. We are said to be *naturally* unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most commonly called *nature* does not allow of it, or because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will, either in the faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects. *Moral* Inability consists not in any of these things; but either in the want of inclination, or the strength of a contrary inclination, or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of the will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be said in one word, that moral Inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination. For when a person is unable to will or choose such a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the same thing as his being unable through the want of an inclination,

or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such circumstances, and under the influence of such views.

To give some instances of this moral Inability. A woman of great honor and chastity may have a moral Inability to prostitute herself to her slave. A child of great love and duty to his parents, may be unable to be willing to kill his father A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and temptations, and in the absence of such and such restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his lust. A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear taking of strong drink. A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent acts to an ememy, or to desire his prosperity; yea, some may be so under the power of a vile disposition, that they may be unable to love those who are most worthy of their esteem and affection. A strong habit of virtue, and a great degree of holiness may cause a moral Inability to love wickedness in general, may render a man unable to take complacence in wicked persons or things; or to choose a wicked life, and prefer it to a virtuous life. And on the other hand, a great degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under an inability to love and choose holiness; and render him utterly unable to love an infinitely holy being, or to choose and cleave to him as his chief good.

Here it may be of use to observe this distinction of moral Inability, viz., of that which is general and habitual, and that which is particular and occasional. By a general and habitual moral Inability, I mean an Inability in the heart to all exercises or acts of will of that nature or kind, through a fixed and habitual inclination, or an habitual and stated defect, or want of a certain kind of inclination. Thus a very ill natured man may be unable to exert such acts of benevolence, as another, who is full of good nature, commonly exerts; and a man, whose heart is habitually void of gratitude, may be unable to exert such and such grateful acts, through that stated defect of a grateful inclination. By particular and occasional moral Inability, I mean an Inability of the will or heart to a particular act, through the strength or defect of present motives, or of inducements presented to the view of the understanding, on this occasion. If it be so, that the will is always determined by the strongest motive, then it must always have an Inability, in this latter sense, to act otherwise than it does; it not being possible, in any case, that the will should, at present, go against the motive which has now, all things considered, the greatest strength and advantage to excite and induce it. The former of these kinds of moral Inability, consisting in that which is stated, habitual and general, is most commonly called by the name of Inability, because the word *Inability*, in its most proper and original signification, has respect to some *stated defect*.

And this especially obtains the name of *Inability* also upon another account: I before observed, that the word Inability in its original and most common use, is a relative term; and has respect to will and endeavor, as supposable in the case, and as insufficient to bring to pass the thing desired and endeavored. Now there may be more of an appearance and shadow of this, with respect to the acts which arise from a fixed and strong habit, than others that arise only from transient occasions and causes. Indeed will and endeavor against, or diverse from present acts of the will, are in no case supposable, whether those acts be occasional or habitual; for that would be to suppose the will, at present, to be otherwise than, at present, it is. But yet there may be will and endeavor against future acts of the will, or volitions that are likely to take place, as viewed at a distance. It is no contradiction to suppose that the acts of the will at one time, may be against the acts of the will at another time; and there may be desires and endeavors to prevent or excite future acts of the will; but such desires and

endeavors are, in many cases, rendered insufficient and vain, through fixedness of habit: when the occasion returns, the strength of habit overcomes, and baffles all such opposition. In this respect, a man may be in miserable slavery and bondage to a strong habit. But it may be comparatively easy to make an alteration with respect to such future acts as are only occasional and transient; because the occasion or transient cause, if foreseen, may often easily be prevented or avoided. On this account, the moral Inability that attends fixed habits, especially obtains the name of Inability. And then, as the will may remotely and indirectly resist itself, and do it in vain, in the case of strong habits; so reason may resist present acts of the will, and its resistance be insufficient; and this is more commonly the case also, when the acts arise from strong habit.

But it must be observed concerning moral Inability, in each kind of it, that the word *Inability* is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The word signifies only a natural Inability, in the proper use of it; and is applied to such cases only wherein a present will or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said to be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said, according to the ordinary use of language, that a malicious man, let him be ever so malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to show his neighbor kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be ever so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his election: and a man cannot be truly said to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will. It is improperly said, that a person cannot perform those external actions which are dependent on the act of the will, and which would be easily performed, if the act of the will were present. And if it be improperly said, that he cannot perform those external voluntary actions, which depend on the will, it is in some respect more improperly said, that he is unable to exert the acts of the will themselves; because it is more evidently false, with respect to these, that he cannot if he will: for to say so, is a downright contradiction: it is to say, he cannot will, if he does will. And in this case, not only is it true, that it is easy for a man to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing; when once he has willed, the thing is performed; and nothing else remains to be done. Therefore, in these things to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or ability, is not just; because the thing wanting is not a being able, but a being willing. There are faculties of mind, and capacity of nature, and every thing else sufficient, but a disposition: nothing is wanting but a will.

SECTION V.

Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of Moral Agency.

The plain and obvious meaning of the words *Freedom* and *Liberty*, in common speech, is *power, opportunity or advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleases.* Or in other words, his being free from hinderance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any respect, as he wills.* And the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a person's being hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise.

* I say not only doing, but conducting; because a voluntary forbearing to do, sitting still, keeping silence, &c., are instances of persons' conduct, about which Liberty is exercised; though they are not so properly called doing.

If this which I have mentioned be the meaning of the word Liberty, in the ordinary use of language; as I trust that none that has ever learned to talk, and is unprejudiced, will deny; then it will follow, that in propriety of speech, neither Liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be ascribed to any being or thing, but that which has such a faculty, power or property, as is called will. For that which is possessed of no such thing as will, cannot have any power or opportunity of doing according to its will, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor be restrained from acting agreeably to it. And therefore to talk of Liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very will itself, is not to speak good sense; if we judge of sense, and nonsense, by the original and proper signification of words. For the will itself is not an agent that has a will: the power of choosing itself, has not a power of choosing. That which has the power of volition or choice is the man or the soul, and not the power of volition itself. And he that has the Liberty of doing according to his will, is the agent or doer who is possessed of the will; and not the will which he is possessed of. We say with propriety, that a bird let loose has power and Liberty to fly; but not that the bird's power of flying has a power and Liberty of flying. To be free is the property of an agent, who is possessed of powers and faculties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous. But these qualities are the properties of men or persons and not the properties of properties.

There are two things that are contrary to this which is called Liberty in common speech. One is constraint; the same is otherwise called force, compulsion, and coaction; which is a person's being necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is restraint; which is his being hindered, and not having power to do according to his will. But that which has no will, cannot be the subject of these things. I need say the less on this head, Mr. Locke having set the same thing forth, with so great clearness, in his *Essay on the Human Understanding*.

But one thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly called Liberty; namely, that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the meaning of the word any thing of the cause or original of that choice; or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition; whether it was caused by some external motive or internal habitual bias; whether it was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause; whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his volition or choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is fully and perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom.

What has been said may be sufficient to show what is meant by Liberty, according to the common notions of mankind, and in the usual and primary acceptation of the word: but the word, as used by Arminians, Pelagians and others, who oppose the Calvinists, has an entirely different signification. These several things belong to their notion of Liberty. 1. That it consists in a self-determining power in the will, or a certain sovereignty the will has over itself, and its own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions; so as not to be dependent in its determinations, on any cause without itself, nor determined by any thing prior to its own acts. 2. Indifference belongs to Liberty in their notion of it, or that the mind, previous to the act of volition, be in equilibrio. 3. Contingence is another thing that belongs and is essential to it; not in the common acceptation of the word, as that has been already explained, but as opposed to

all necessity, or any fixed and certain connection with some previous ground or reason of its existence. They suppose the essence of Liberty so much to consist in these things, that unless the will of man be free in this sense, he has no real freedom, how much soever he may be at Liberty to act according to his will.

A moral Agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a moral quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a moral faculty, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishment; and a capacity which an agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty.

The sun is very excellent and beneficial in its action and influence on the earth, in warming it, and causing it to bring forth its fruits; but it is not a moral Agent. Its action, though good, is not virtuous or meritorious. Fire that breaks out in a city, and consumes great part of it, is very mischievous in its operation; but is not a moral Agent. What it does is not faulty or sinful, or deserving of any punishment. The brute creatures are not moral Agents. The actions of some of them are very profitable and pleasant; others are very hurtful; yet, seeing they have no moral faculty, or sense of desert, and do not act from choice guided by understanding, or with a capacity of reasoning and reflecting, but only from instinct, and are not capable of being influenced by moral inducements, their actions are not properly sinful or virtuous; nor are they properly the subjects of any such moral treatment for what they do, as moral Agents are for their faults or good deeds.

Here it may be noted, that there is a circumstantial difference between the moral Agency of a ruler and a subject. I call it circumstantial, because it lies only in the difference of moral inducements they are capable of being influenced by, arising from the difference of circumstances. A ruler, acting, in that capacity only, is not capable of being influenced by a moral law, and its sanctions of threatenings and promises, rewards and punishments, as the subject is; though both may be influenced by a knowledge of moral good and evil. And therefore the moral agency of the Supreme Being, who acts only in the capacity of a ruler towards his creatures, and never as a subject, differs in that respect from the moral Agency of created intelligent beings. God's actions, and particularly those which are to be attributed to him as moral governor, are morally good in the highest degree. They are most perfectly holy and righteous; and we must conceive of Him as influenced in the highest degree, by that which, above all others, is properly a moral inducement, viz., the moral good which He sees in such and such things: and therefore He is, in the most proper sense, a moral Agent, the source of all moral ability and Agency, the fountain and rule of all virtue and moral good; though by reason of his being supreme over all, it is not possible He should be under the influence of law or command, promises or threatenings, rewards or punishments, counsels or warnings. The essential qualities of a moral Agent are in God, in the greatest possible perfection; such as understanding, to perceive the difference between moral good and evil; a capacity of discerning that moral worthiness and demerit, by which some things are praiseworthy, others deserving of blame and punishment; and also a capacity of choice, and choice guided by understanding, and a power of acting according to his choice or pleasure, and being capable of doing those things which are in the highest sense praiseworthy. And herein does very much consist that image of God wherein he made man, (which we read of Gen. i. 26, 27, and chapter

ix. 6,) by which God distinguishes man from the beasts, viz., in those faculties and principles of nature, whereby He is capable of moral Agency. Herein very much consists the natural image of God; as his spiritual and moral image, wherein man was made at first, consisted in that moral excellency, that he was endowed with.

PART II.

WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED WHETHER THERE IS OR CAN BE ANY SUCH SORT OF FREEDOM OF WILL, AS THAT WHEREIN ARMINIANS PLACE THE ESSENCE OF THE LIBERTY OF ALL MORAL AGENTS; AND WHETHER ANY SUCH THING EVER WAS OR CAN BE CONCEIVED OF.

SECTION I.

Showing the manifest Inconsistence of the Arminian Notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in the WILL's Self-determining Power.

HAVING taken notice of those things which may be necessary to be observed, concerning the meaning of the principal terms and phrases made use of in controversies, concerning human Liberty, and particularly observed what Liberty is, according to the common language and general apprehension of mankind, and what it is as understood and maintained by Arminians; I proceed to consider the Arminian notion of the Freedom of the Will, and the supposed necessity of it in order to moral agency, or in order to any one's being capable of virtue or vice, and properly the subject of command or counsel, praise or blame, promises or threatenings, rewards or punishments; or whether that which has been described, as the thing meant by Liberty in common speech, be not sufficient, and the only Liberty which makes or can make any one a moral agent, and so properly the subject of these things. In this Part, I shall consider whether any such thing be possible or conceivable, as that Freedom of Will which Arminians insist on; and shall inquire, whether any such sort of Liberty be necessary to moral agency, &c., in the next Part.

And first of all, I shall consider the notion of a self-determining Power in the Will; wherein, according to the Arminians, does most essentially consist the Will's Freedom; and shall particularly inquire, whether it be not plainly absurd, and a manifest inconsistence, to suppose that the Will itself determines all the free acts of the Will.

Here I shall not insist on the great impropriety of such phrases and ways of speaking as the Will's determining itself; because actions are to be ascribed to agents, and not properly to the powers of agents; which improper way of speaking leads to many mistakes, and much confusion, as Mr. Locke observes. But I shall suppose that the Arminians, when they speak of the Will's determining itself, do by the Will mean the soul willing. I shall take it for granted, that when they speak of the Will, as the determiner, they mean the soul in the exercise of a power of willing, or acting voluntarily. I shall suppose this to be

their meaning, because nothing else can be meant, without the grossest and plainest absurdity. In all cases when we speak of the powers or principles of acting, as doing such things, we mean that the agents which have these Powers of acting, do them in the exercise of those Powers. So when we say, valor fights courageously, we mean, the man who is under the influence of valor fights courageously. When we say, love seeks the object loved, we mean, the person loving seeks that object. When we say, the understanding discerns, we mean the soul in the exercise of that faculty So when it is said, the Will decides or determines, the meaning must be, that the person in the exercise of a Power of willing and choosing, or the soul acting voluntarily, determines.

Therefore, if the Will determines all its own free acts, the soul determines all the free acts of the Will in the exercise of a Power of willing and choosing; or which is the same thing, it determines them of choice; it determines its own acts by choosing its own acts. If the Will determines the Will, then choice orders and determines the choice; and acts of choice are subject to the decision, and follow the conduct of other acts of choice. And therefore if the Will determines all its own free acts, then every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act of choice, choosing that act. And if that preceding act of the Will or choice be also a free act, then by these principles, in this act too, the Will is self-determined; that is, this, in like manner, is an act that the soul voluntarily chooses; or, which is the same thing, it is an act determined still by a preceding act of the Will, choosing that. And the like may again be observed of the last mentioned act, which brings us directly to a contradiction; for it supposes an act of the Will preceding the first act in the whole train, directing and determining the rest; or a free act of the Will, before the first free act of the Will. Or else we must come at last to an act of the Will, determining the consequent acts, wherein the Will is not self-determined, and so is not a free act, in this notion of freedom; but if the first act in the train, determining and fixing the rest, be not free, none of them all can be free; as is manifest at first view, but shall be demonstrated presently.

If the Will, which we find governs the members of the body and determines and commands their motions and actions, does also govern itself, and determine its own motions and actions, it doubtless determines them the same way, even by antecedent volitions. The Will determines which way the hands and feet shall move, by an act of volition or choice; and there is no other way of the Will's determining, directing or commanding any thing at all. Whatsoever the Will commands, it commands by an act of the Will. And if it has itself under its command, and determines itself in its own actions, it doubtless does it the same way that it determines other things which are under its command. So that if the freedom of the Will consists in this, that it has itself and its own actions under its command and direction, and its own volitions are determined by itself, it will follow, that every free volition arises from another antecedent volition, directing and commanding that; and if that directing volition be also free, in that also the Will is determined; that is to say, that directing volition is determined by another going before that, and so on, until we come to the first volition in the whole series; and if that first volition be free, and the Will self-determined in it, then that is determined by another volition preceding that, which is a contradiction; because by the supposition, it can have none before it to direct or determine it, being the first in the train. But if that first volition is not determined by any preceding act of the Will, then that act is not determined by the Will, and so is not free in the *Arminian* notion of freedom, which consists in the Will's self-determination. And if that first act of the Will,

which determines and fixes the subsequent acts, be not free, none of the following acts, which are determined by it, can be free. If we suppose there are five acts in the train, the fifth and last determined by the fourth, and the fourth by the third, the third by the second, and the second by the first; if the first is not determined by the Will, and so not free, then none of them are truly determined by the Will; that is, that each of them is as it is, and not otherwise, is not first owing to the Will, but to the determination of the first in the series, which is not dependent on the Will, and is that which the Will has no hand in the determination of. And this being that which decides what the rest shall be, and determines their existence; therefore the first determination of their existence is not from the Will. The case is just the same, if instead of a chain of five acts of the Will, we should suppose a succession of ten, or a hundred, or ten thousand. If the first act be not free, being determined by something out of the Will, and this determines the next to be agreeable to itself, and that the next, and so on; they are none of them free, but all originally depend on, and are determined by some cause out of the Will; and so all freedom in the case is excluded, and no act of the Will can be free, according to this notion of freedom. If we should suppose a long chain of ten thousand links, so connected, that if the first link moves, it will move the next, and that the next, and so the whole chain must be determined to motion, and in the direction of its motion, by the motion of the first link, and that is moved by something else. In this case, though all the links but one, are moved by other parts of the same chain; yet it appears that the motion of no one, nor the direction of its motion, is from any self-moving or self-determining power in the chain, any more than if every link were immediately moved by something that did not belong to the chain. If the Will be not free in the first act, which causes the next, then neither is it free in the next, which is caused by that first act; for though indeed the Will caused it, yet it did not cause it freely, because the preceding act, by which it was caused, was not free. And again, if the Will be not free in the second act, so neither can it be in the third, which is caused by that; because in like manner, that third was determined by an act of the Will that was not free. And so we may go on to the next act, and from that to the next; and how long soever the succession of acts is, it is all one. If the first on which the whole chain depends, and which determines all the rest, be not a free act, the Will is not free in causing or determining any one of those acts, because the act by which it determines them all, is not a free act, and therefore the Will is no more free in determining them, than if it did not cause them at all. Thus, this *Arminian* notion of Liberty of the Will, consisting in the Will's *self-determination*, is repugnant to itself, and shuts itself wholly out of the world

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SECTION II.

Several supposed ways of Evading the foregoing Reasoning, considered.

If to evade the force of what has been observed, it should be said, that when the *Arminians* speak of the Will's determining its own acts, they do not mean that the Will determines its acts by any preceding act, or that one act of the Will determines another; but only that the faculty or power of Will, or the soul in the use of that power, determines its own volitions; and that it does

it without any act going before the act determined; such an evasion would be full of gross absurdity.—I confess, it is an evasion of my own inventing, and I do not know but I should wrong the *Arminians*, in supposing that any of them would make use of it. But it being as good a one as I can invent, I would observe upon it a few things.

First. If the faculty or power of the Will determines an act of volition, or the soul in the use or exercise of that power, determines it, that is the same thing as for the soul to determine volition by an act of the Will. For an exercise of the power of Will, and an act of that power, are the same thing. Therefore to say, that the power of Will, or the soul in the use or exercise of that power, determines volition, without an act of Will preceding the volition determined, is a contradiction.

Secondly. If a power of Will determines the act of the Will, then a power of choosing determines it. For, as was before observed, in every act of Will, there is a choice, and a power of willing is a power of choosing. But if a power of choosing determines the act of volition, it determines it by choosing it. For it is most absurd to say, that a power of choosing determines one thing rather than another, without choosing any thing. But if a power of choosing determines volition by choosing it, then here is the act of volition determined by an antecedent choice, choosing that volition.

Thirdly. To say, the faculty, or the soul, determines its own volitions, but not by any act, is a contradiction. Because, for the soul to direct, decide, or determine any thing, is to act; and this is supposed; for the soul is here spoken of as being a cause in this affair, bringing something to pass, or doing something; or which is the same thing, exerting itself in order to an effect, which effect is the determination of volition, or the particular kind and manner of an act of Will. But certainly this exertion or action is not the same with the effect, in order to the production of which it is exerted, but must be something prior to it.

Again. The advocates for this notion of the freedom of the Will, speak of a certain sovereignty in the Will, whereby it has power to determine its own volitions. And therefore the determination of volition must itself be an act of the Will; for otherwise it can be no exercise of that supposed power and sovereignty.

Again. If the Will determine itself, then either the Will is *active* in determining its volitions, or it is not. If it be active in it, then the determination is an act of the Will; and so there is one act of the Will determining another But if the Will is not *active* in the determination, then how does it *exercise* any liberty in it? These gentlemen suppose that the thing wherein the Will exercises liberty, is in its determining its own acts. But how can this be, if it be not active in determining? Certainly the Will, or the soul, cannot exercise any liberty in that wherein it doth not act, or wherein it doth not exercise itself. So that if either part of this dilemma be taken, this scheme of liberty, consisting in self-determining power, is overthrown. If there be an act of the Will in determining all its own free acts, then one free act of the Will is determined by another; and so we have the absurdity of every free act, even the very first, determined by a foregoing free act. But if there be no act or exercise of the Will in determining its own acts, then no liberty is exercised in determining them. From whence it follows, that no liberty consists in the Will's power to determine its own acts; or, which is the same thing, that there is no such thing as liberty consisting in a self-determining power of the Will.

If it should be said, that although it be true, if the soul determines its own

volitions, it must be active in so doing, and the determination itself must be an act; yet there is no need of supposing this act to be prior to the volition determined; but the Will or soul determines the act of the Will in willing; it determines its own volition, *in* the very act of volition; it directs and limits the act of the Will, causing it to be so and not otherwise, in exerting the act, without any preceding act to exert that. If any should say after this manner, they must mean one of these two things: either, 1. That the determining act, though it be before the act determined in the order of nature, yet is not before it in order of time. Or, 2. That the determining act is not before the act determined, either in the order of time or nature, nor is truly distinct from it; but that the soul's determining the act of volition is the same thing with its exerting the act of volition; the mind's exerting such a particular act, is its causing and determining the act. Or, 3. That volition has no cause, and is no effect; but comes into existence, with such a particular determination, without any ground or reason of its existence and determination. I shall consider these distinctly.

1. If all that is meant, be, that the determining act is not before the act determined in order of time, it will not help the case at all, though it should be allowed. If it be before the determined act in the order of nature, being the cause or ground of its existence, this as much proves it to be distinct from it, and independent of it, as if it were before in the order of time. As the cause of the particular motion of a natural body in a certain direction, may have no distance as to time, yet cannot be the same with the motion effected by it, but must be as distinct from it as any other cause that is before its effect in the order of time; as the architect is distinct from the house which he builds, or the father distinct from the son which he begets. And if the act of the Will determining be distinct from the act determined, and before it in the order of nature, then we can go back from one to another, till we come to the first in the series, which has no act of the Will before it in the order of nature, determining it; and consequently is an act not determined by the Will, and so not a free act, in this notion of freedom. And this being the act which determines all the rest, none of them are free acts. As when there is a chain of many links, the first of which only is taken hold of and drawn by hand; all the rest may follow and be moved at the same instant, without any distance of time; but yet the motion of one link is before that of another in the order of nature; the last is moved by the next, and so till we come to the first; which not being moved by any other, but by something distinct from the whole chain, this as much proves that no part is moved by any self-moving power in the chain, as if the motion of one link followed that of another in the order of time.

2. If any should say, that the determining act is not before the determined act, either in order of time, or of nature, nor is distinct from it; but that the exertion of the act is the determination of the act; that for the soul to exert a particular volition, is for it to cause and determine that act of volition; I would on this observe, that the thing in question seems to be forgotten or kept out of sight, in darkness and unintelligibleness of speech; unless such an objector would mean to contradict himself. The very act of volition itself is doubtless a determination of mind; i. e. it is the mind's drawing up a conclusion, or coming to a choice between two things or more, proposed to it. But determining among external objects of choice, is not the same with determining the act of choice itself, among various possible acts of choice. The question is, what influences, directs, or determines the mind or Will to come to such a conclusion or choice as it does? Or what is the cause, ground or reason, why it concludes thus, and not other

wise? Now it must be answered, according to the *Arminian* notion of freedom, that the Will influences, orders and determines itself thus to act. And if it does, I say, it must be by some antecedent act. To say, it is caused, influenced and determined by something, and yet not determined by any thing antecedent, either in order of time or of nature, is a contradiction. For that is what is meant by a thing's being prior in the order of nature, that it is some way the cause or reason of the thing, with respect to which it is said to be prior.

If the particular act or exertion of Will, which comes into existence, be any thing properly determined at all, then it has some cause of its existing, and of its existing in such a particular determinate manner, and not another; some cause, whose influence decides the matter; which cause is distinct from the effect, and prior to it. But to say, that the Will or mind orders, influences and determines itself to exert such an act as it does, by the very exertion itself, is to make the exertion both cause and effect; or the exerting such an act, to be a cause of the exertion of such an act. For the question is, What is the cause and reason of the soul's exerting such an act? To which the answer is, the soul exerts such an act, and that is the cause of it. And so, by this, the exertion must be prior in the order of nature to itself, and distinct from itself.

3. If the meaning be, that the soul's exertion of such a particular act of Will, is a thing that comes to pass of itself, without any cause; and that there is absolutely no ground or reason of the soul's being determined to exert such a volition, and make such a choice rather than another, I say, if this be the meaning of Arminians, when they contend so earnestly for the Will's determining its own acts, and for liberty of Will consisting in self-determining power; they do nothing but confound themselves and others with words without meaning. In the question, What determines the Will? and in their answer, that the Will determines itself, and in all the dispute about it, it seems to be taken for granted, that something determines the Will; and the controversy on this head is not, whether any thing at all determines it, or whether its determination has any cause or foundation at all; but where the foundation of it is, whether in the Will itself, or somewhere else. But if the thing intended be what is above-mentioned, then all comes to this, that nothing at all determines the Will; volition having absolutely no cause or foundation of its existence, either within or without. There is a great noise made about self-determining power, as the source of all free acts of the Will; but when the matter comes to be explained, the meaning is, that no power at all is the source of these acts, neither self-determining power, nor any other, but they arise from nothing; no cause, no power, no influence being at all concerned in the matter.

However, this very thing, even that the free acts of the Will are events which come to pass without a cause, is certainly implied in the Arminian notion of liberty of Will; though it be very inconsistent with many other things in their scheme, and repugnant to some things implied in their notion of liberty. Their opinion implies, that the particular determination of volition is without any cause; because they hold the free acts of the Will to be contingent events; and contingence is essential to freedom in their notion of it. But certainly, those things which have a prior ground and reason of their particular existence, a cause which antecedently determines them to be, and determines them to be just as they are, do not happen contingently. If something foregoing, by a causal influence and connection, determines and fixes precisely their coming to pass, and the manner of it, then it does not remain a contingent thing whether they shall come to pass or no.

And because it is a question, in many respects, very important in this con-

troversy about the freedom of Will, whether the free acts of the Will are events which come to pass without a cause, I shall be particular in examining this point in the two following sections.

SECTION III.

Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition in particular, can come to pass without a Cause of its existence.

Before I enter on any argument on this subject, I would explain how I would be understood, when I use the word *Cause* in this discourse: since, for want of a better word, I shall have occasion to use it in a sense which is more extensive, than that in which it is sometimes used. The word is often used in so restrained a sense as to signify only that which has a positive efficiency or influence to produce a thing, or bring it to pass. But there are many things which have no such positive productive influence; which yet are Causes in that respect, that they have truly the nature of a ground or reason why some things are, rather than others; or why they are as they are, rather than otherwise. Thus the absence of the sun in the night, is not the Cause of the falling of the dew at that time, in the same manner as its beams are the Cause of the ascending of the vapors in the day time: and its withdrawment in the winter, is not in the same manner the Cause of the freezing of the waters, as its approach in the spring is the Cause of their thawing. But yet the withdrawment or absence of the sun is an antecedent, with which these effects in the night and winter are connected, and on which they depend; and is one thing that belongs to the ground and reason why they come to pass at that time, rather than at other times; though the absence of the sun is nothing positive, nor has any positive influence.

It may be further observed, that when I speak of connection of Causes and Effects, I have respect to moral Causes, as well as those that are called natural in distinction from them. Moral Causes may be Causes in as proper a sense, as any causes whatsoever; may have as real an influence, and may as truly be the ground and reason of an Event's coming to pass.

Therefore I sometimes use the word *Cause*, in this inquiry, to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an Event, either a thing, or the manner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground and reason, either in whole, or in part, why it is, rather than not; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise; or, in other words, any antecedent with which a consequent Event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the reason why the proposition which affirms that Event, is true; whether it has any positive influence or not. And in agreeableness to this, I sometimes use the word Effect for the consequence of another thing, which is perhaps rather an occasion than a Cause, most properly speaking.

I am the more careful thus to explain my meaning, that I may cut off occasion, from any that might seek occasion to cavil and object against some things which I may say concerning the dependence of all things which come to pass, on some Cause, and their connection with their Cause.

Having thus explained what I mean by Cause, I assert that nothing ever comes to pass without a Cause. What is self-existent must be from eternity, and must be unchangeable; but as to all things that begin to be, they are not self-existent, and therefore must have some foundation of their existence without

themselves; that whatsoever begins to be which before was not, must have a Cause why it then begins to exist, seems to be the first dictate of the common and natural sense which God hath implanted in the minds of all mankind, and the main foundation of all our reasonings about the existence of things, past, present, or to come.

And this dictate of common sense equally respects substances and modes, or things and the manner and circumstances of things. Thus, if we see a body which has hitherto been at rest, start out of a state of rest, and begin to move, we do as naturally and necessarily suppose there is some Cause or reason of this new mode of existence, as of the existence of a body itself which had hitherto not existed. And so if a body, which had hitherto moved in a certain direction, should suddenly change the direction of its motion; or if it should put off its old figure, and take a new one; or change its color: the beginning of these new modes is a new Event, and the mind of mankind necessarily supposes that there is some Cause or reason of them.

If this grand principle of common sense be taken away, all arguing from effects to Causes ceaseth, and so all knowledge of any existence, besides what we have by the most direct and immediate intuition. Particularly all our proof of the being of God ceases: we argue His being from our own being and the being of other things, which we are sensible once were not, but have begun to be; and from the being of the world, with all its constituent parts, and the manner of their existence; all which we see plainly are not necessary in their own nature, and so not self-existent, and therefore must have a Cause. But if things, not in themselves necessary, may begin to be without a Cause, all this arguing is vain.

Indeed, I will not affirm, that there is in the nature of things no foundation for the knowledge of the Being of God without any evidence of it from His works. I do suppose there is a great absurdity in the nature of things simply considered, in supposing that there should be no God, or in denying Being in general, and supposing an eternal, absolute, universal nothing; and therefore that here would be foundation of intuitive evidence that it cannot be; and that eternal, infinite, most perfect Being must be; if we had strength and comprehension of mind sufficient, to have a clear idea of general and universal Being, or, which is the same thing, of the infinite, eternal, most perfect Divine Nature and Essence. But then we should not properly come to the knowledge of the Being of God by arguing; but our evidence would be intuitive: we should see it, as we see other things that are necessary in themselves, the contraries of which are in their own nature absurd and contradictory; as we see that twice two is four; and as we see that a circle has no angles. If we had as clear an idea of universal infinite entity, as we have of these other things, I suppose we should most intuitively see the absurdity of supposing such Being not to be; should immediately see there is no room for the question, whether it is possible that Being, in the most general abstracted notion of it, should not be. But we have not that strength and extent of mind, to know this certainly in this intuitive independent manner; but the way that mankind come to the knowledge of the Being of God, is that which the apostle speaks of, Rom. i. 20. "The invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen; being understood by the things that are made; even his eternal power and Godhead." We first ascend, and prove *a posteriori*, or from effects, that there must be an eternal Cause; and then secondly, prove by argumentation, not intuition, that this Being must be necessarily existent; and then thirdly, from the proved necessity of his existence, we may descend, and prove many of his perfections *a priori*.*

* To the inquirer after truth it may here be recommended, as a matter of some consequence, to keep in mind the precise difference between an argument *a priori* and one *a posteriori*, a distinction of consid-

But if once this grand principle of common sense be given up, that what is not necessary in itself, must have a Cause; and we begin to maintain, that things may come into existence, and begin to be, which heretofore have not been, of themselves without any Cause; all our means of ascending in our arguing from the creature to the Creator, and all our evidence of the Being of God, is cut off at one blow. In this case, we cannot prove that there is a God, either from the Being of the world, and the creatures in it, or from the manner of their being, their order, beauty and use. For if things may come into existence without any Cause at all, then they doubtless may without any Cause answerable to the effect. Our minds do alike naturally suppose and determine both these things; namely, that what begins to be has a Cause, and also that it has a Cause proportionable and agreeable to the effect. The same principle which leads us to determine, that there cannot be any thing coming to pass without a Cause, leads us to determine that there cannot be more in the effect than in the Cause.

Yea, if once it should be allowed, that things may come to pass without a Cause, we should not only have no proof of the Being of God, but we should be without evidence of the existence of any thing whatsoever, but our own immediately present ideas and consciousness. For we have no way to prove any thing else, but by arguing from effects to causes: from the ideas now immediately in view, we argue other things not immediately in view: from sensations now excited in us, we infer the existence of things without us, as the Causes of these sensations; and from the existence of these things, we argue other things, which they depend on, as effects on Causes. We infer the past existence of ourselves, or any thing else, by memory; only as we argue, that the ideas, which are now in our minds, are the consequences of past ideas and sensations.—We immediately perceive nothing else but the ideas which are this moment extant in our minds. We perceive or know other things only by means of these, as necessarily connected with others, and dependent on them. But if things may be without Causes, all this necessary connection and dependence is dissolved, and so all means of our knowledge is gone. If there be no absurdity nor difficulty in supposing one thing to start out of non-existence into being, of itself without a Cause; then there is no absurdity nor difficulty in supposing the same of millions of millions. For nothing, or no difficulty multiplied, still is nothing, or no difficulty, nothing multiplied by nothing, does not increase the sum.

And indeed, according to the hypothesis I am opposing, of the acts of the Will coming to pass without a Cause, it is the case in fact, that millions of millions of Events are continually coming into existence contingently, without any cause or reason why they do so, all over the world, every day and hour, through all ages. So it is in a constant succession, in every moral agent. This contingency, this efficient nothing, this effectual No Cause, is always ready at hand, to produce this sort of effects, as long as the agent exists, and as often as he has occasion.

erable use, as well as of long standing, among divines, metaphysicians, and logical writers. An argument from either of these, when *legitimately* applied, may amount to a demonstration, when used, for instance, relatively to the being and perfections of God; but the one should be confined to the *existence* of Deity, while the other is applicable to his *perfections*. By the argument *a posteriori* we rise *from* the effect to the cause, from the stream to the fountain, from what is *posterior* to what is prior, in other words, from what is contingent to what is absolute, from number to unity; that is, from the *manifestation* of God to his *existence*. By the argument *a priori* we descend *from* the cause to the effect, from the fountain to the stream, from what is *prior* to what is posterior; that is, from the necessary existence of God we safely infer certain properties and perfections. To attempt a demonstration of the existence of a first cause, or the Being of God, *a priori*, would be most absurd; for it would be an attempt to prove a *prior* ground or cause of existence of a *first* cause; or, that there is some cause *before* the very *first*. The argument *a priori*, therefore, is not *applicable* to prove the divine existence. For *this* end, the argument *a posteriori* alone is legitimate; and its conclusiveness rests on the axiom, that "there can be no *effect* without a cause." The absurdity of denying this axiom is abundantly demonstrated by our author. W.

If it were so, that things only of one kind, viz., acts of the Will, seemed to come to pass of themselves; but those of this sort in general came into being thus; and it were an event that was continual, and that happened in a course, wherever were capable subjects of such events; this very thing would demonstrate that there was some Cause of them, which made such a difference between this Event and others, and that they did not really happen contingently. For contingence is blind, and does not pick and choose for a particular sort of events. Nothing has no choice. This No Cause, which causes no existence, cannot cause the existence which comes to pass, to be of one particular sort only, distinguished from all others. Thus, that only one sort of matter drops out of the heavens, even water, and that this comes so often, so constantly and plentifully, all over the world, in all ages, shows that there is some Cause or reason of the falling of water out of the heavens; and that something besides mere contingence has a hand in the matter.

If we should suppose nonentity to be about to bring forth; and things were coming into existence, without any Cause or antecedent, on which the existence, or kind, or manner of existence depends; or which could at all determine whether the things should be stones, or stars, or beasts, or angels, or human bodies, or souls, or only some new motion or figure in natural bodies, or some new sensations in animals, or new ideas in the human understanding, or new volitions in the Will; or any thing else of all the infinite number of possibles; then certainly it would not be expected, although many million of millions of things are coming into existence in this manner, all over the face of the earth, that they should all be only of one particular kind, and that it should be thus in all ages, and that this sort of existences should never fail to come to pass where there is room for them, or a subject capable of them, and that constantly, whenever there is occasion for them.

If any should imagine, there is something in the sort of Event that renders possible for it to come into existence without a Cause, and should say, that the free acts of the Will are existences of an exceeding different nature from other things; by reason of which they may come into existence without any previous ground or reason of it, though other things cannot; if they make this objection in good earnest, it would be an evidence of their strangely forgetting themselves; for they would be giving an account of some ground of the existence of a thing, when at the same time they would maintain there is no ground of its existence. Therefore I would observe, that the particular nature of existence, be it ever so diverse from others, can lay no foundation for that thing's coming into existence without a Cause; because to suppose this, would be to suppose the particular nature of existence to be a thing prior to the existence; and so a thing which makes way for existence, with such a circumstance, namely, without a cause or reason of existence. But that which in any respect makes way for a thing's coming into being, or for any manner or circumstance of its first existence, must be prior to the existence. The distinguished nature of the effect, which is something belonging to the effect, cannot have influence backward, to act before it is. The peculiar nature of that thing called volition, can do nothing, can have no influence, while it is not. And afterwards it is too late for its influence; for then the thing has made sure of existence already, without its help.

So that it is indeed as repugnant to reason, to suppose that an act of the Will should come into existence without a Cause, as to suppose the human soul, or an angel, or the globe of the earth, or the whole universe, should come into existence without a Cause. And if once we allow, that such a sort of effect as

a Volition may come to pass without a Cause, how do we know but that many other sorts of effects may do so too? It is not the particular kind of effect that makes the absurdity of supposing it has been without a Cause, but something which is common to all things that ever begin to be, viz., that they are not self-existent, or necessary in the nature of things

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SECTION IV.

Whether Volition can arise without a Cause through the Activity of the Nature of the Soul.

The author of the *Essay on the Freedom of the Will in God and the Creatures*, in answer to that objection against his doctrine of a self-determining power in the Will, (p. 68, 69,) "That nothing is, or comes to pass, without a sufficient reason why it is, and why it is in this manner rather than another," allows that it is thus in *corporeal things*, which are, properly and philosophically speaking, passive beings; but denies that it is thus in spirits, which are beings of an active nature, who have the spring of action within themselves, and can determine themselves. By which it is plainly supposed, that such an event as an act of the Will, may come to pass in a spirit, without a sufficient reason why it comes to pass, or why it is after this manner, rather than another; by reason of the activity of the nature of a spirit.—But certainly this author, in this matter, must be very unwary and inadvertent. For,

1. The objection or difficulty proposed by this author, seems to be forgotten in his answer or solution. The very difficulty, as he himself proposes it, is this: How an event can come to pass without a sufficient reason why it is, or why it is in this manner rather than another? Instead of solving this difficulty, or answering this question with regard to Volition, as he proposes, he forgets himself, and answers another question quite diverse, and wholly inconsistent with this, viz., What is a sufficient reason why it is, and why it is in this manner rather than another? And he assigns the active being's own determination as the Cause, and a Cause sufficient for the effect; and leaves all the difficulty unresolved, and the question unanswered, which yet returns, even, how the soul's own determination, which he speaks of, came to exist, and to be what it was without a Cause? The activity of the soul may enable it to be the Cause of effects, but it does not at all enable or help it to be the subject of effects which have no Cause, which is the thing this author supposes concerning acts of the Will. Activity of nature will no more enable a being to produce effects, and determine the manner of their existence, within itself, without a Cause, than out of itself, in some other being. But if an active being should, through its activity, produce and determine an effect in some external object, how absurd would it be to say, that the effect was produced without a Cause!

2. The question is not so much, how a spirit endowed with activity comes to act, as why it exerts such an act, and not another; or why it acts with such a particular determination: if activity of nature be the Cause why a spirit (the soul of man for instance) acts, and does not lie still; yet that alone is not the Cause why its action is thus and thus limited, directed and determined. Active nature is a general thing; it is an ability or tendency of nature to action, generally taken; which may be a Cause why the soul acts as occasion or reason is given; but this alone cannot be a sufficient Cause why the soul exerts such a

particular act, at such a time, rather than others. In order to this, there must be something besides a general tendency to action; there must also be a particular tendency to that individual action. If it should be asked, why the soul of man uses its activity in such a manner as it does, and it should be answered, that the soul uses its activity thus, rather than otherwise, because it has activity, would such an answer satisfy a rational man? Would it not rather be looked upon as a very impertinent one?

3. An active being can bring no effects to pass by his activity, but what are consequent upon his acting. He produces nothing by his activity, any other way than by the exercise of his activity, and so nothing but the fruits of its exercise; he brings nothing to pass by a dormant activity. But the exercise of his activity is action; and so his action, or exercise of his activity, must be prior to the effects of his activity. If an active being produces an effect in another being, about which his activity is conversant, the effect being the fruit of his activity, his activity must be first exercised or exerted, and the effect of it must follow. So it must be, with equal reason, if the active being is his own object, and his activity is conversant about himself, to produce and determine some effect in himself; still the exercise of his activity must go before the effect, which he brings to pass and determines by it. And therefore his activity cannot be the Cause of the determination of the first action, or exercise of activity itself, whence the effects of activity arise, for that would imply a contradiction; it would be to say, the first exercise of activity is before the first exercise of activity, and is the Cause of it.

4. That the soul, though an active substance, cannot diversify its own acts, but by first acting; or be a determining Cause of different acts, or any different effects, sometimes of one kind, and sometimes of another, any other way than in consequence of its own diverse acts, is manifest by this; that if so, then the same Cause, the same causal power, force or influence, without variation in any respect, would produce different effects at different times. For the same substance of the soul before it acts, and the same active nature of the soul before it is exerted, i. e. before in the order of nature, would be the Cause of different effects, viz., different Volitions at different times. But the substance of the soul before it acts, and its active nature before it is exerted, are the same without variation. For it is some act that makes the first variation in the Cause, as to any causal exertion, force, or influence. But if it be so, that the soul has no different causality, or diverse causal force or influence, in producing these diverse effects; then it is evident, that the soul has no influence, no hand in the diversity of the effect; and that the difference of the effect cannot be owing to any thing in the soul; or, which is the same thing, the soul does not determine the diversity of the effect; which is contrary to to the supposition. It is true, the substance of the soul before it acts, and before there is any difference in that respect, may be in a different state and circumstance; but those whom I oppose, will not allow the different circumstances of the soul to be the determining Causes of the acts of the Will, as being contrary to their notion of self-determination and self-motion.

5. Let us suppose, as these divines do, that there are no acts of the soul, strictly speaking, but free Volitions; then it will follow, that the soul is an active being in nothing further than it is a voluntary or elective being; and whenever it produces effects actively, it produces effects voluntarily and electively. But to produce effects thus, is the same thing as to produce effects in consequence of, and according to its own choice. And if so, then surely the soul does not by its activity produce all its own acts of Wil. or choice themselves; for this,

by the supposition, is to produce all its free acts of choice voluntarily and elective, or in consequence of its own free acts of choice, which brings the matter directly to the forementioned contradiction, of a free act of choice before the first free act of choice. According to these gentlemen's own notion of action, if there arises in the mind a Volition without a free act of the Will or choice to determine and produce it, the mind is not the active, voluntary Cause of that Volition, because it does not arise from, nor is regulated by choice or design. And therefore it cannot be, that the mind should be the active, voluntary, determining Cause of the first and leading Volition that relates to the affair. The mind's being a designing Cause, only enables it to produce effects in consequence of its design; it will not enable it to be the designing Cause of all its own designs. The mind's being an elective Cause, will only enable it to produce effects in consequence of its elections, and according to them; but cannot enable it to be the elective Cause of all its own elections; because that supposes an election before the first election. So the mind's being an active Cause enables it to produce effects in consequence of its own acts, but cannot enable it to be the determining Cause of all its own acts; for that is still in the same manner a contradiction; as it supposes a determining act conversant about the first act, and prior to it, having a causal influence on its existence, and manner of existence.

I can conceive of nothing else that can be meant by the soul's having power to cause and determine its own Volitions, as a being to whom God has given a power of action, but this; that God has given power to the soul, sometimes at least, to excite Volitions at its pleasure, or according as it chooses. And this certainly supposes, in all such cases, a choice preceding all Volitions which are thus caused, even the first of them; which runs into the forementioned great absurdity.

Therefore the activity of the nature of the soul affords no relief from the difficulties which the notion of a self-determining power in the Will is attended with, nor will it help, in the least, its absurdities and inconsistencies.

SECTION V.

Showing, that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the cause of Arminian liberty and how (this being the state of the case) Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently.

What was last observed in the preceding section may show, not only that the active nature of the soul cannot be a reason why an act of the Will is, or why it is in this manner, rather than another; but also that if it could be so, and it could be proved that Volitions are contingent events, in that sense, that their being and manner of being is not fixed or determined by any cause, or any thing antecedent; it would not at all serve the purpose of the Arminians, to establish the freedom of the Will, according to their notion of its freedom as consisting in the Will's *determination of itself;* which supposes every free act of the Will to be determined by some act of the Will going before to determine it; inasmuch as for the Will to determine a thing, is the same as for the soul to determine a thing by *Willing;* and there is no way that the Will can determine an act of the Will, but by willing that act of the Will; or, which is

the same thing, *choosing* it. So that here must be two acts of the Will in the case, one going before another, one conversant about the other, and the latter the object of the former, and chosen by the former. If the Will does not cause and determine the act by choice, it does not cause or determine it at all; for that which is not determined by choice, is not determined voluntarily or willingly: and to say, that the Will determines something which the soul does not determine willingly, is as much as to say, that something is done by the Will, which the soul doth not with its Will.

So that if Arminian liberty of Will, consisting in the Will's determining its own acts, be maintained, the old absurdity and contradiction must be maintained, that every free act of the Will is caused and determined by a foregoing free act of Will; which doth not consist with the free acts arising without any cause, and being so contingent, as not to be fixed by any thing foregoing. So that this evasion must be given up, as not at all relieving, and as that which, instead of supporting this sort of liberty, directly destroys it.

And if it should be supposed, that the soul determines its own acts of Will some other way, than by a foregoing act of Will; still it will not help the cause of their liberty of Will. If it determines them by an act of the understanding, or some other power, then the Will does not determine itself; and so the self-determining power of the Will is given up. And what liberty is there exercised according to their own opinion of liberty, by the soul's being determined by something besides its own choice? The acts of the Will, it is true, may be directed, and effectually determined and fixed; but it is not done by the soul's own will and pleasure: there is no exercise at all of choice or Will in producing the effect: and if Will and choice are not exercised in it, how is the liberty of the Will exercised in it?

So that let Arminians turn which way they please with their notion of liberty, consisting in the Will's determining its own acts, their notion destroys itself. If they hold every free act of Will to be determined by the soul's own free choice, or foregoing free act of Will; foregoing, either in the order of time, or nature; it implies that gross contradiction, that the first free act belonging to the affair, is determined by a free act which is before it. Or if they say, that the free acts of the Will are determined by some other act of the soul, and not an act of Will or choice; this also destroys their notion of liberty, consisting in the acts of the Will being determined by the Will itself; or if they hold that the acts of the Will are determined by nothing at all that is prior to them, but that they are contingent in that sense, that they are determined and fixed by no cause at all; this also destroys their notion of liberty, consisting in the Will's determining its own acts.

This being the true state of the Arminian notion of liberty, it hence comes to pass, that the writers that defend it are forced into gross inconsistencies, in what they say upon this subject. To instance in Dr. Whitby; he, in his discourse on the freedom of the Will,* opposes the opinion of the Calvinists, who place man's liberty only in a power of doing what he will, as that wherein they plainly agree with Mr. Hobbes. And yet he himself mentions the very same notion of liberty, as the dictate of *the sense and common reason of mankind, and a rule laid down by the light of nature*, viz., that *liberty is a power of acting from ourselves, or* DOING WHAT WE WILL.† This is indeed, as he says, a thing agreeable to *the sense and common reason of mankind;* and therefore it is not so much to be wondered at, that he unawares acknowledges it against himself:

* In his Book on the five Points, Second Edit. p. 250, 251, 252. Ibid. p. 325, 326.

for if liberty does not consist in this, what else can be devised that it should consist in? If it be said, as Dr. Whitby elsewhere insists, that it does not only consist in liberty of doing what we will, but also a liberty of willing without necessity; still the question returns, what does that liberty of willing without necessity consist in, but in a power of willing as we please, without being impeded by a contrary necessity? Or in other words, a liberty for the soul in its willing to act according to its own choice? Yea, this very thing the same author seems to allow, and suppose again and again, in the use he makes of sayings of the Fathers, whom he quotes as his vouchers. Thus he cites the words of Origen, which he produces as a testimony on his side: * *The soul acts by* HER OWN CHOICE, *and it is free for her to incline to whatever part* SHE WILL. And those words of Justin Martyr: † *The doctrine of the Christians is this, that nothing is done or suffered according to fate, but that every man doth good or evil* ACCORDING TO HIS OWN FREE CHOICE. And from Eusebius these words: ‡ *If fate be established, philosophy and piety are overthrown. All these things depending upon the necessity introduced by the stars, and not upon meditation and exercise* PROCEEDING FROM OUR OWN FREE CHOICE. And again, the words of Maccarius: § *God, to preserve the liberty of man's Will, suffered their bodies to die, that it might be* IN THEIR CHOICE *to turn to good or evil. They who are acted by the Holy Spirit, are not held under any necessity, but have liberty to turn themselves, and* DO WHAT THEY WILL *in this life.*

Thus, the doctor in effect comes into that very notion of liberty, which the Calvinists have; which he at the same time condemns, as agreeing with the opinion of Mr. Hobbes, namely, *the soul's acting by its own choice, men's doing good or evil according to their own free choice, their being in that exercise which proceeds from their own free choice, having it in their choice to turn to good or evil, and doing what they will.* So that if men exercise this liberty in the acts of the Will themselves, it must be in exerting acts of Will as they will, or according to their own *free* choice; or exerting acts of Will that proceed from their choice. And if it be so, then let every one judge whether this does not suppose a free choice going before the free act of Will, or whether an act of choice does not go before that act of the Will which proceeds from it.—And if it be thus with all free acts of the Will, then let every one judge, whether it will not follow that there is a free choice or Will going before the first free act of the Will exerted in the case. And then let every one judge, whether this be not a contradiction. And finally, let every one judge whether in the scheme of these writers there be any possibility of avoiding these absurdities.

If liberty consists, as Dr. Whitby himself says, in a man's doing what he will; and a man exercises this liberty, not only in external actions, but in the acts of the Will themselves; then so far as liberty is exercised in the latter, it consists in willing what he wills: and if any say so, one of these two things must be meant, either, 1. That a man has power to Will, as he does Will; because what he Wills, he Wills; and therefore has power to Will what he has power to Will. If this be their meaning, then this mighty controversy about freedom of the Will and self-determining power, comes wholly to nothing; all that is contended for being no more than this, that the mind of man does what it does, and is the subject of what it is the subject of, or that what is, is; wherein none has any controversy with them. Or, 2. The meaning must be, that a man has power to Will as he pleases or chooses to Will; that is, he has power by one act of choice, to choose another; by an antecedent act of Will to choose a con-

* In his Book on the five Points. Second Edit. p. 342. † Ibid. p. 360. ‡ Ibid. p. 363. § Ibid. p. 369, 370

sequent act; and therein to execute his own choice. And if this be their meaning, it is nothing but shuffling with those they dispute with, and baffling their own reason. For still the question returns, wherein lies man's liberty in that antecedent act of Will which chose the consequent act? The answer, according to the same principles, must be, that his liberty in this also lies in his willing as he would, or as he chose, or agreeably to another act of choice preceding that. And so the question returns *in infinitum* and the like answer must be made *in infinitum*. In order to support their opinion, there must be no beginning, but free acts of Will must have been chosen by foregoing free acts of Will in the soul of every man, without beginning; and so before he had a being, from all eternity.

SECTION VI.

Concerning the Will's determining in Things which are perfectly indifferent in the View of the Mind.

A GREAT argument for self-determining power, is the supposed experience we universally have of an ability to determine our Wills, in cases wherein no prevailing motive is presented: the Will (as is supposed) has its choice to make between two or more things, that are perfectly equal in the view of the mind; and the Will is apparently altogether indifferent; and yet we find no difficulty in coming to a choice; the Will can instantly determine itself to one, by a sovereign power which it has over itself, without being moved by any preponderating inducement.

Thus the forementioned author of an *Essay on the Freedom of the Will*, &c., p. 25, 26, 27, supposes, "That there are many instances, wherein the Will is determined neither by present uneasiness, nor by the greatest apparent good, nor by the last dictate of the understanding, nor by any thing else, but merely by itself as a sovereign, self-determining power of the soul; and that the soul does not will this or that action, in some cases, by any other influence but because it will. Thus (says he) I can turn my face to the South, or the North; I can point with my finger upward, or downward. And thus, in some cases, the Will determines itself in a very sovereign manner, because it will, without a reason borrowed from the understanding; and hereby it discovers its own perfect power of choice, rising from within itself, and free from all influence or restraint of any kind." And in pages 66, 70, and 73, 74, this author very expressly supposes the Will in many cases to be determined by no motive at all, but to act altogether without motive, or ground of preference.—Here I would observe,

1. The very supposition which is here made, directly contradicts and overthrows itself. For the thing supposed, wherein this grand argument consists, is, that among several things the Will actually chooses one before another, at the same time that it is perfectly indifferent; which is the very same thing as to say, the mind has a preference, at the same time that it has no preference. What is meant cannot be, that the mind is indifferent before it comes to have a choice, or until it has a preference; or, which is the same thing, that the mind is indifferent until it comes to be not indifferent: for certainly this author did not think he had a controversy with any person in supposing this. And then it is nothing to his purpose, that the mind which chooses, was indifferent once; unless it chooses, remaining indifferent; for otherwise, it does not choose at all in that

case of indifference, concerning which is all the question. Besides, it appears in fact, that the thing which this author supposes, is not that the Will chooses one thing before another, concerning which it is indifferent before it chooses; but also is indifferent when it chooses; and that its being otherwise than indifferent is not until afterwards, in consequence of its choice; that the chosen thing's appearing preferable and more agreeable than another, arises from its choice already made. His words are, (p. 30,) "Where the objects which are proposed, appear equally fit or good, the Will is left without a guide or director; and therefore must take its own choice by its own determination; it being properly a self-determining power. And in such cases the Will does as it were make a good to itself by its own choice, i. e. creates its own pleasure or delight in this self-chosen good. Even as a man by seizing upon a spot of unoccupied land, in an uninhabited country, makes it his own possession and property, and as such rejoices in it. Where things were indifferent before, the Will finds nothing to make them more agreeable, considered merely in themselves; but the pleasure it feels ARISING FROM ITS OWN CHOICE, and its perseverance therein. We love many things we have chosen, AND PURELY BECAUSE WE CHOSE THEM."

This is as much as to say, that we first begin to prefer many things, now ceasing any longer to be indifferent with respect to them, purely because we have preferred and chosen them before. These things must needs be spoken inconsiderately by this author. Choice or preference cannot be before itself in the same instance, either in the order of time or nature: it cannot be the foundation of itself, or the fruit or consequence of itself. The very act of choosing one thing rather than another, is preferring that thing, and that is setting a higher value on that thing. But that the mind sets a higher value on one thing than another, is not, in the first place, the fruit of its setting a higher value on that thing.

This author says, p. 36, "The Will may be perfectly indifferent, and yet the Will may determine itself to choose one or the other." And again, in the same page, "I am entirely indifferent to either; and yet my Will may determine itself to choose." And again, "Which I shall choose must be determined by the mere act of my Will." If the choice is determined by a mere act of Will, then the choice is determined by a mere act of choice. And concerning this matter, viz., that the act of the Will itself is determined by an act of choice, this writer is express, in page 72. Speaking of the case, where there is no superior fitness in objects presented, he has these words: "There it must act by its own CHOICE, and determine itself as it PLEASES." Where it is supposed that the very determination, which is the ground and spring of the Will's act, is an act of choice and pleasure, wherein one act is more agreeable and the mind better pleased in it than another; and this preference and superior pleasedness is the ground of all it does in the case. And if so, the mind is not indifferent when it determines itself, but had rather do one thing than another, had rather determine itself one way than another. And therefore the Will does not act at all in indifference; not so much as in the first step it takes, or the first rise and beginning of its acting. If it be possible for the understanding to act in indifference, yet to be sure the Will never does; because the Will's beginning to act is the very same thing as its beginning to choose or prefer. And if in the very first act of the Will, the mind prefers something, then the idea of that thing preferred, does at that time preponderate, or prevail in the mind: or, which is the same thing, the idea of it has a prevailing influence on the Will. So that this wholly destroys the thing supposed, viz., that the mind can, by a sovereign power, choose one of two or more things, which in the view of the mind

are, in every respect, perfectly equal, one of which does not at all preponderate, nor has any prevailing influence on the mind above another.

So that this author, in his grand argument for the ability of the Will to choose one of two or more things, concerning which it is perfectly indifferent, does at the same time, in effect, deny the thing he supposes, and allows and asserts the point he endeavors to overthrow; even that the Will, in choosing, is subject to no prevailing influence of the idea, or view of the thing chosen. And indeed it is impossible to offer this argument without overthrowing it; the thing supposed in it being inconsistent with itself, and that which denies itself. To suppose the Will to act at all in a state of perfect indifference, either to determine itself, or to do any thing else, is to assert that the mind chooses without choosing. To say that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleases, is to say that it can follow its pleasure when it has no pleasure to follow. And therefore if there be any difficulty in the instances of two cakes, two eggs, &c., which are exactly alike, one as good as another; concerning which this author supposes the mind in fact has a choice, and so in effect supposes that it has a preference; it as much concerned himself to solve the difficulty, as it does those whom he opposes. For if these instances prove any thing to his purpose, they prove that a man chooses without choice. And yet this is not to his purpose; because if this is what he asserts, his own words are as much against him, and do as much contradict him, as the words of those he disputes against can do.

2. There is no great difficulty in showing, in such instances as are alleged, not only that it must needs be so, that the mind must be influenced in its choice, by something that has a preponderating influence upon it, but also how it is so. A little attention to our own experience, and a distinct consideration of the acts of our own minds, in such cases, will be sufficient to clear up the matter.

Thus, supposing I have a chess-board before me; and because I am required by a superior, or desired by a friend, or to make some experiment concerning my own ability and liberty, or on some other consideration, I am determined to touch some one of the spots or squares on the board with my finger; not being limited or directed in the first proposal, or my own first purpose, which is general, to any one in particular; and there being nothing in the squares, in themselves considered, that recommends any one of all the sixty-four, more than another: in this case, my mind determines to give itself up to what is vulgarly called *accident*,* by determining to touch that square which happens to be most in view, which my eye is especially upon at that moment, or which happens to be then most in my mind, or which I shall be directed to by some other such like accident. —Here are several steps of the mind's proceeding (though all may be done as it were in a moment); the first step is its general determination that it will touch one of the squares. The next step is another general determination to give itself up to accident, in some certain way; as to touch that which shall be most in the eye or mind at that time, or to some other such like accident. The third and last step is a particular determination to touch a certain individual spot, even that square, which, by that sort of accident the mind has pitched upon, has actually offered itself beyond others. Now it is apparent that in none of these several steps does the mind proceed in absolute indifference, but in each of them is influenced by a preponderating inducement. So it is in the first step; the mind's general determination to touch one of the sixty-four spots: the mind is

* I have elsewhere observed what that is which is vulgarly called *accident*; that it is nothing akin to the *Arminian* metaphysical notion of *contingence*, something not connected with any thing foregoing: but that it is something that comes to pass in the course of things, in some affair that men are concerned in, unforeseen, and not owing to their design.

not absolutely indifferent whether it does so or no; it is induced to it, for the sake of making some experiment, or by the desire of a friend, or some other motive that prevails. So it is in the second step, the mind's determining to give itself up to accident, by touching that which shall be most in the eye, or the idea of which shall be most prevalent in the mind, &c. The mind is not absolutely indifferent whether it proceeds by this rule or no; but chooses it because it appears at that time a convenient and requisite expedient in order to fulfil the general purpose aforesaid. And so it is in the third and last step, it is determining to touch that individual spot which actually does prevail in the mind's view. The mind is not indifferent concerning this; but is influenced by a prevailing inducement and reason; which is, that this is a prosecution of the preceding determination, which appeared requisite, and was fixed before in the second step.

Accident will ever serve a man, without hindering him a moment, in such a case. It will always be so among a number of objects in view, one will prevail in the eye, or in idea beyond others. When we have our eyes open in the clear sunshine, many objects strike the eye at once, and innumerable images may be at once painted in it by the rays of light; but the attention of the mind is not equal to several of them at once; or if it be, it does not continue so for any time. And so it is with respect to the ideas of the mind in general: several ideas are not in equal strength in the mind's view and notice at once; or at least, do not remain so for any sensible continuance. There is nothing in the world more constantly varying, than the ideas of the mind: they do not remain precisely in the same state for the least perceivable space of time; as is evident by this, that all perceivable time is judged and perceived by the mind only by the succession or the successive changes of its own ideas: therefore while the views or perceptions of the mind remain precisely in the same state, there is no perceivable space or length of time, because no sensible succession.

As the acts of the Will, in each step of the forementioned procedure, do not come to pass without a particular cause, every act is owing to a prevailing inducement; so the accident, as I have called it, or that which happens in the unsearchable course of things, to which the mind yields itself, and by which it is guided, is not any thing that comes to pass without a cause; and the mind, in determining to be guided by it, is not determined by something that has no cause; any more than if it determined to be guided by a lot, or the casting of a die. For though the die's falling in such a manner be accidental to him that casts it, yet none will suppose that there is no cause why it falls as it does. The involuntary changes in the succession of our ideas, though the causes may not be observed, have as much a cause, as the changeable motions of the motes that float in the air, or the continual, infinitely various, successive changes of the unevennesses on the surface of the water.

There are two things especially, which are probably the occasions of confusion in the minds of those who insist upon it, that the Will acts in a proper indifference, and without being moved by any inducement, in its determination in such cases as have been mentioned.

1. They seem to mistake the point in question, or at least not to keep it distinctly in view. The question they dispute about, is, Whether the mind be indifferent about the objects presented, one of which is to be taken, touched, pointed to, &c., as two eggs, two cakes, which appear equally good. Whereas the question to be considered, is, Whether the person be indifferent with respect to his own actions; whether he does not, on some consideration or other, prefer one act with respect to these objects before another. The mind in its determination and choice, in these cases, is not most immediately and directly conversant

about the objects presented; but the acts to be done concerning these objects The objects may appear equal, and the mind may never properly make any choice between them: but the next act of the Will being about the external actions to be performed, taking, touching, &c., these may not appear equal, and one action may properly be chosen before another. In each step of the mind's progress, the determination is not about the objects, unless indirectly and improperly, but about the actions, which it chooses for other reasons than any preference of the objects, and for reasons not taken at all from the objects.

There is no necessity of supposing, that the mind does ever properly choose one of the objects before another; either before it has taken, or afterwards. Indeed the man chooses to take or touch one rather than another; but not because it chooses the thing taken, or touched; but from foreign considerations. The case may be so, that of two things offered, a man may, for certain reasons, choose and prefer the taking of that which he undervalues, and choose to neglect to take that which his mind prefers. In such a case, choosing the thing taken, and choosing to take, are diverse; and so they are in a case where the things presented are equal in the mind's esteem, and neither of them preferred. All that fact makes evident, is, that the mind chooses one action rather than another. And therefore the arguments which they bring, in order to be to their purpose, ought to be to prove that the mind chooses the action in perfect indifference, with respect to that action; and not to prove that the mind chooses the action in perfect indifference with respect to the object: which is very possible, and yet the Will not act without prevalent inducement, and proper preponderation.

2. Another reason of confusion and difficulty in this matter, seems to be, not distinguishing between a general indifference, or an indifference with respect to what is to be done in a more distant and general view of it, and a particular indifference, or an indifference with respect to the next immediate act, viewed with its particular and present circumstances. A man may be perfectly indifferent with respect to his own actions, in the former respect; and yet not in the latter. Thus, in the foregoing instance of touching one of the squares of a chessboard; when it is first proposed that I should touch one of them, I may be perfectly indifferent which I touch; because as yet I view the matter remotely and generally, being but in the first step of the mind's progress in the affair. But yet, when I am actually come to the last step, and the very next thing to be determined is which is to be touched, having already determined that I will touch that which happens to be most in my eye or mind, and my mind being now fixed on a particular one, the act of touching that, considered thus immediately, and in these particular present circumstances, is not what my mind is absolutely indifferent about.

SECTION VII.

Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, consisting in Indifference.

What has been said in the foregoing section, has a tendency in some measure to evince the absurdity of the opinion of such as place Liberty in Indifference, or in that equilibrium whereby the Will is without all antecedent determination or bias, and left hitherto free from any prepossessing inclination

to one side or the other; that so the determination of the Will to either side may be entirely from itself, and that it may be owing only to its own power, and that sovereignty which it has over itself, that it goes this way rather than that.*

But inasmuch as this has been of such long standing, and has been so generally received, and so much insisted on by *Pelagians*, *Semipelagians*, *Jesuits*, *Socinians*, *Arminians* and others, it may deserve a more full consideration. And therefore I shall now proceed to a more particular and thorough inquiry into this notion.

Now, lest some should suppose that I do not understand those that place Liberty in Indifference, or should charge me with misrepresenting their opinion, I would signify, that I am sensible, there are some, who, when they talk of the Liberty of the Will as consisting in Indifference, express themselves as though they would not be understood of the Indifference of the inclination or tendency of the Will, but of, I know not what, Indifference of the soul's power of willing; or that the Will, with respect to its power or ability to choose, is indifferent, can go either way indifferently, either to the right hand or left, either act or forbear to act, one as well as the other. However, this seems to be a refining only of some particular writers, and newly invented, and which will by no means consist with the manner of expression used by the defenders of Liberty of Indifference in general. And I wish such refiners would thoroughly consider, whether they distinctly know their own meaning, when they make a distinction between Indifference of the soul as to its *power* or *ability* of willing or choosing, and the soul's Indifference as to the preference or choice itself; and whether they do not deceive themselves in imagining that they have any distinct meaning. The Indifference of the soul as to its ability or power to Will, must be the same thing as the Indifference of the state of the power or faculty of the Will, or the Indifference of the state which the soul itself, which has that power or faculty, hitherto remains in, as to the exercise of that power, in the choice it shall by and by make.

But not to insist any longer on the abstruseness and inexplicableness of this distinction; let what will be supposed concerning the meaning of those that make use of it, thus much must at least be intended by *Arminians* when they talk of Indifference as essential to Liberty of Will, if they intend any thing, in any respect to their purpose, *viz.*, that it is such an Indifference as leaves the Will not determined already; but free from, and vacant of predetermination, so far, that there may be room for the exercise of the *self-determining power* of the Will; and that the Will's freedom consists in, or depends upon this vacancy and opportunity that is left for the Will itself to be the determiner of the act that is to be the free act.

And here I would observe in the *first* place, that to make out this scheme of Liberty, the Indifference must be *perfect* and *absolute;* there must be a per-

* Dr. Whitby, and some other *Arminians*, make a distinction of different kinds of freedom; one of God, and perfect spirits above; another of persons in a state of trial. The former Dr. Whitby allows to consist with necessity; the latter he holds to be without necessity: and this latter he supposes to be requisite to our being the subjects of praise or dispraise, rewards or punishments, precepts and prohibitions, promises and threats, exhortations and dehortations, and a covenant treaty. And to this freedom he supposes *Indifference* to be requisite. In his Discourse on the five Points, p. 299, 300, he says, "It is a freedom (speaking of a freedom not only from coaction, but from necessity) requisite, as we conceive, to render us capable of trial or probation, and to render our actions worthy of praise or dispraise, and our persons of rewards or punishments." And in the next page, speaking of the same matter, he says, "Excellent to this purpose, are the words of Mr. Thorndike: *We say not that Indifference is requisite to all freedom, but to the freedom of man alone in this state of travail and proficience: the ground of which is God's tender of a treaty, and conditions of peace and reconcilement to fallen man, together with those precepts and prohibitions, those promises and threats, those exhortations and dehortations, it is enforced with.*"

fect freedom from all antecedent preponderation or inclination. Because if the Will be already inclined, before it exerts its own sovereign power on itself, then its inclination is not wholly owing to itself: if when two opposites are proposed to the soul for its choice, the proposal does not find the soul wholly in a state of Indifference, then it is not found in a state of Liberty for mere self-determination.—The least degree of antecedent bias must be inconsistent with their notion of Liberty. For so long as prior inclination possesses the Will, and is not removed, it binds the Will, so that it is utterly impossible that the Will should act or choose contrary to a remaining prevailing inclination of the Will. To suppose otherwise, would be the same thing as to suppose, that the Will is inclined contrary to its present prevailing inclination, or contrary to what it is inclined to. That which the Will chooses and prefers, that, all things considered, it preponderates and inclines to. It is equally impossible for the Will to choose contrary to its own remaining and present preponderating inclination, as it is to prefer contrary to its own present preference, or choose contrary to its own present choice. The Will, therefore, so long as it is under the influence of an old preponderating inclination, is not at Liberty for a new free act, or any act that shall now be an act of self-determination. The act which is a self-determined free act, must be an act which the Will determines in the possession and use of such a Liberty, as consists in a freedom from every thing which, if it were there, would make it impossible that the Will, at that time, should be otherwise than that way to which it tends.

If any one should say, there is no need that the Indifference should be perfect: but although a former inclination and preference still remain, yet, if it be not very strong and violent, possibly the strength of the Will may oppose and overcome it:—this is grossly absurd; for the strength of the Will, let it be ever so great, does not enable it to act one way, and not the contrary way, both at the same time. It gives it no such sovereignty and command, as to cause itself to prefer and not to prefer at the same time, or to choose contrary to its own present choice.

Therefore, if there be the least degree of antecedent preponderation of the Will, it must be perfectly abolished, before the Will can be at liberty to determine itself the contrary way. And if the Will determines itself the same way, it is not a free determination, because the Will is not wholly at Liberty in so doing: its determination is not altogether from itself, but it was partly determined before, in its prior inclination; and all the freedom the Will exercises in the case, is in an increase of inclination which it gives itself, over and above what it had by the foregoing bias; so much is from itself, and so much is from perfect Indifference. For though the Will had a previous tendency that way, yet as to that additional degree of inclination, it had no tendency. Therefore the previous tendency is of no consideration, with respect to the act wherein the Will is free. So that it comes to the same thing which was said at first, that as to the act of the Will, wherein the Will is free, there must be *perfect Indifference*, or *equilibrium*.

To illustrate this; if we should suppose a sovereign, self-moving power in a natural body, but that the body is in motion already, by an antecedent bias; for instance, gravitation towards the centre of the earth; and has one degree of motion already, by virtue of that previous tendency; but by its self-moving power it adds one degree more to its motion, and moves so much more swiftly towards the centre of the earth than it would do by its gravity only: it is evident, that all that is owing to a self-moving power in this case, is the additional degree of motion; and that the other degree of motion which it had

from gravity, is of no consideration in the case, does not help the effect of the free self-moving power in the least; the effect is just the same, as if the body had received from itself one degree of motion from a state of perfect rest. So if we should suppose a self-moving power given to the scale of a balance, which has a weight of one degree beyond the opposite scale; and we ascribe to it an ability to add to itself another degree of force the same way, by its self-moving power; this is just the same thing as to ascribe to it a power to give itself one degree of preponderation from a perfect equilibrium; and so much power as the scale has to give itself an overbalance from a perfect equipoise, so much self-moving self-preponderating power it has, and no more. So that its free power this way is always to be measured from perfect equilibrium.

I need say no more to prove, that if Indifference be essential to Liberty, it must be perfect Indifference; and that so far as the Will is destitute of this, so far it is destitute of that freedom by which it is its own master, and in a capacity of being its own determiner, without being in the least passive, or subject to the power and sway of something else, in its motions and determinations.

Having observed these things, let us now try whether this notion of the Liberty of Will consisting in Indifference and equilibrium, and the Will's self-determination in such a state be not absurd and inconsistent.

And here I would lay down this as an axiom of undoubted truth; that every free act is done *in* a state of freedom, and not *after* such a state. If an act of the Will be an act wherein the soul is free, it must be exerted in a *state of freedom*, and in the *time of freedom*. It will not suffice, that the act immediately follows a state of Liberty; but Liberty must yet continue, and coexist with the act; the soul remaining in possession of Liberty. Because that is the notion of a free act of the soul, even an act wherein the soul uses or exercises Liberty. But if the soul is not, in the very time of the act, in the possession of Liberty, it cannot at that time be in the use of it.

Now the question is, whether ever the soul of man puts forth an act of Will, while it yet remains in a state of Liberty, in that notion of a state of Liberty, viz., as implying a state of Indifference, or whether the soul ever exerts an act of choice or preference, while at that very time the Will is in a perfect equilibrium, not inclining one way more than another. The very putting of the question is sufficient to show the absurdity of the affirmative answer; for how ridiculous would it be for any body to insist, that the soul chooses one thing before another, when at the very same instant it is perfectly indifferent with respect to each This is the same thing as to say, the soul prefers one thing to another, at the very same time that it has no preference. Choice and preference can no more be in a state of Indifference, than motion can be in a state of rest, or than the preponderation of the scale of a balance can be in a state of equilibrium. Motion may be the next moment after rest; but cannot coexist with it, in any, even the least part of it. So choice may be immediately after a state of Indifference, but has no coexistence with it; even the very beginning of it is not in a state of Indifference. And therefore if this be Liberty, no act of the Will, in any degree, is ever performed in a state of Liberty, or in the time of Liberty. Volition and Liberty are so far from agreeing together, and being essential one to another, that they are contrary one to another, and one excludes and destroys the other, as much as motion and rest, light and darkness, or life and death. So that the Will does not so much as begin to act in the time of such Liberty; freedom is perfectly at an end, and has ceased to be, at the first moment of action; and therefore

Liberty cannot reach the action, to affect, or qualify it, or give it a denomination, or any part of it, any more than if it had ceased to be twenty years before the action began. The moment that Liberty ceases to be, it ceases to be a qualification of any thing. If light and darkness succeed one another instantaneously, light qualifies nothing after it is gone out, to make any thing lightsome or bright, any more at the first moment of perfect darkness, than months or years after. Life denominates nothing *vital* at the first moment of perfect death. So freedom, if it consists in, or implies Indifference, can denominate nothing free, at the first moment of preference or preponderation. Therefore it it is manifest, that no Liberty of which the soul is possessed, or ever uses, in any of its acts of volition, consists in Indifference; and that the opinion of such as suppose, that Indifference belongs to the very essence of Liberty, is in the highest degree absurd and contradictory.

If any one should imagine, that this manner of arguing is nothing but trick and delusion; and to evade the reasoning, should say, that the thing wherein the Will exercises its Liberty, is not in the act of choice or preponderation itself, but in determining itself to a certain choice or preference; that the act of the Will wherein it is free, and uses its own sovereignty, consists in its causing or determining the change or transition from a state of Indifference to a certain preference, or determining to give a certain turn to the balance, which has hitherto been even; and that this act the Will exerts in a state of Liberty, or while the Will yet remains in equilibrium, and perfect master of itself.—I say, if any one chooses to express his notion of Liberty after this, or some such manner, let us see if he can make out his matters any better than before.

What is asserted is, that the Will, while it yet remains in perfect equilibrium, without preference, determines to change itself from that state, and excite in itself a certain choice or preference. Now let us see whether this does not come to the same absurdity we had before. If it be so, that the Will, while it yet remains perfectly indifferent, determines to put itself out of that state, and give itself a certain preponderation; then I would inquire, whether the soul does not determine this of choice; or whether the Will's coming to a determination to do so, be not the same thing as the soul's coming to a choice to do so. If the soul does not determine this of choice, or in the exercise of choice, then it does not determine it voluntarily. And if the soul does not determine it voluntarily, or of its own *Will*, then in what sense does its *Will* determine it? And if the Will does not determine it, then how is the *Liberty of the Will* exercised in the determination? What sort of Liberty is exercised by the soul in those determinations, wherein there is no exercise of choice, which are not voluntary, and wherein the Will is not concerned?—But if it be allowed, that this determination is an act of choice, and it be insisted on, that the soul, while it yet remains in a state of perfect Indifference, chooses to put itself out of that state, and to turn itself one way; then the soul is already come to a choice, and chooses that way. And so we have the very same absurdity which we had before. Here is the soul in a state of choice, and in a state of equilibrium, both at the same time: the soul already choosing one way, while it remains in a state of perfect Indifference, and has no choice of one way more than the other.—And indeed this manner of talking, though it may a little hide the absurdity in the obscurity of expression, is more nonsensical, and increases the inconsistence. To say, the free act of the Will, or the act which the Will exerts in a state of freedom and Indifference, does not imply preference in it, but is what the Will does in order to causing or producing a preference, is as much as to say, the soul chooses (for to Will and to choose are the same thing) without choice, and

prefers without preference in order to cause or produce the beginning of a preference, or the first choice. And that is, that the first choice is exerted without choice, in order to produce itself.

If any, to evade these things, should own, that a state of Liberty, and a state of Indifference are not the same thing, and that the former may be without the latter; but should say, that Indifference is still *essential to* the freedom of an act of Will, in some sort, namely, as it is necessary to go immediately before it; it being essential to the freedom of an act of Will that it should directly and immediately arise out of a state of Indifference: still this will not help the cause of *Arminian* Liberty, or make it consistent with itself. For if the act springs immediately out of a state of Indifference, then it does not arise from antecedent choice or preference. But if the act arises directly out of a state of Indifference, without any intervening choice to choose and determine it, then the act not being determined by choice, is not determined by the Will; the mind exercises no free choice in the affair, and free choice and free Will have no hand in the determination of the act. Which is entirely inconsistent with their notion of the freedom of Volition.

If any should suppose, that these difficulties and absurdities may be avoided, by saying that the Liberty of the mind consists in a power to suspend the act of the Will, and so to keep it in a state of Indifference, until there has been opportunity for consideration; and so shall say that, however Indifference is not essential to Liberty in such a manner, that the mind must make its choice in a state of Indifference, which is an inconsistency, or that the act of Will must spring immediately out of Indifference; yet Indifference may be essential to the Liberty of acts of the Will in this respect, viz., that Liberty consists in a Power of the mind to forbear or suspend the act of Volition, and keep the mind in a state of Indifference for the present, until there has been opportunity for proper deliberation: I say, if any one imagines that this helps the matter, it is a great mistake: it reconciles no inconsistency, and relieves no difficulty with which the affair is attended.—For here the following things must be observed:

1. That this *suspending* of Volition, if there be properly any such thing, is itself an act of Volition. If the mind determines to suspend its act, it determines it voluntarily; it chooses, on some consideration, to suspend it. And this choice or determination, is an act of the Will: and indeed it is supposed to be so in the very hypothesis; for it is supposed that the Liberty of the Will consists in its Power to do this, and that its doing it is the very thing wherein the Will exercises its Liberty. But how can the Will exercise Liberty in it, if it be not an act of the Will? The Liberty of the Will is not exercised in any thing but what the Will does.

2. This determining to suspend acting is not only an act of the Will, but it is supposed to be the only free act of the Will; because it is said, that this is the thing wherein the Liberty of the Will consists.—Now if this be so, then this is all the act of Will that we have to consider in this controversy, about the Liberty of Will, and in our inquiries, wherein the Liberty of man consists. And now the forementioned difficulties remain: the former question returns upon us, viz., Wherein consists the freedom of the Will in those acts wherein it is free? And if this act of determining a suspension be the only act in which the Will is free, then wherein consists the Will's freedom with respect to this act of suspension? And how is Indifference essential to this act? The answer must be, according to what is supposed in the evasion under consideration, that the Liberty of the Will in this act of suspension, consists in a Power to suspend even this act, until there has been opportunity for thorough deliberation.

But this will be to plunge directly into the grossest nonsense: for it is the act of suspension itself that we are speaking of; and there is no room for a space of deliberation and suspension in order to determine whether we will suspend or no. For that supposes, that even suspension itself may be deferred: which is absurd; for the very deferring the determination of suspension to consider whether we will suspend or no, will be actually suspending. For during the space of suspension, to consider, whether to suspend, the act is *ipso facto* suspended. There is no medium between suspending to act, and immediately acting: and therefore no possibility of avoiding either the one or the other one moment.

And besides, this is attended with ridiculous absurdity another way: for now it is come to that, that Liberty consists wholly in the mind's having Power to suspend its determination whether to suspend or no; that there may be time for consideration, whether it be best to suspend. And if Liberty consists in this only, then this is the Liberty under consideration. We have to inquire now, how Liberty with respect to this act of suspending a determination of suspension, consists in Indifference, or how Indifference is essential to it. The answer, according to the hypothesis we are upon, must be, that it consists in a Power of suspending even this last mentioned act, to have time to consider whether to suspend that. And then the same difficulties and inquiries return over again with respect to that; and so on for ever. Which if it would show any thing, would show only that there is no such thing as a free act. It drives the exercise of freedom back *in infinitum;* and that is to drive it out of the world.

And besides all this, there is a delusion, and a latent gross contradiction in the affair another way; inasmuch as in explaining how, or in what respect the Will is free with regard to a particular act of Volition, it is said that its Liberty consists in a Power to determine to suspend that act, which places Liberty not in that act of Volition which the inquiry is about, but altogether in another antecedent act. Which contradicts the thing supposed in both the question and answer. The question is, wherein consists the mind's Liberty in any particular act of Volition? And the answer, in pretending to show wherein lies the mind's Liberty in that act, in effect says, it does not lie in that act, but in another, viz., a Volition to suspend that act. And therefore the answer is both contradictory, and altogether impertinent and beside the purpose. For it does not show wherein the Liberty of the Will consists in the act in question; instead of that, it supposes it does not consist in that act, but in another distinct from it, even a Volition to suspend that act, and take time to consider it. And no account is pretended to be given wherein the mind is free with respect to that act, wherein this answer supposes the Liberty of the mind indeed consists, viz., the act of suspension, or of determining the suspension.

On the whole, it is exceedingly manifest, that the Liberty of the mind does not consist in Indifference, and that Indifference is not essential or necessary to it, or belonging to it, as the *Arminians* suppose; that opinion being full of absurdity and self-contradiction.

SECTION VIII.

Concerning the supposed Liberty of the Will, as opposite to all Necessity.

It is a thing chiefly insisted on by *Arminians*, in this controversy, as a thing most important and essential in human Liberty, that volitions, or the acts of the

Will, are contingent events; understanding contingence as opposite, not only to constraint, but to all necessity. Therefore I would particularly consider this matter. And,

1. I would inquire, whether there is, or can be any such thing, as a volition which is contingent in such a sense, as not only to come to pass without any Necessity of constraint or coaction, but also without a *Necessity of consequence*, or an infallible connection with any thing foregoing.

2. Whether, if it were so, this would at all help the cause of Liberty.

I. I would consider whether volition is a thing that ever does, or can come to pass, in this manner, contingently.

And here it must be remembered, that it has been already shown, that nothing can ever come to pass without a cause, or reason why it exists in this manner rather than another; and the evidence of this has been particularly applied to the acts of the Will. Now if this be so, it will demonstrably follow, that the acts of the Will are never contingent, or without necessity in the sense spoken of; inasmuch as those things which have a cause, or reason of their existence, must be connected with their cause. This appears by the following considerations.

1. For an event to have a cause and ground of its existence, and yet not to be connected with its cause, is an inconsistence. For if the event be not connected with the cause, it is not dependent on the cause; its existence is as it were loose from its influence, and may attend it or may not; it being a mere contingence, whether it follows or attends the influence of the cause, or not: and that is the same thing as not to be dependent on it. And to say the event is not dependent on its cause is absurd: it is the same thing as to say, it is not its cause, nor the event the effect of it: for dependence on the influence of a cause is the very notion of an effect. If there be no such relation between one thing and another, consisting in the connection and dependence of one thing on the influence of another, then it is certain there is no such relation between them as is signified by the terms *cause* and *effect*. So far as an event is dependent on a cause and connected with it, so much causality is there in the case, and no more. The cause does, or brings to pass no more in any event, than it is dependent on it. If we say the connection and dependence is not total, but partial, and that the effect, though it has some connection and dependence, yet it is not entirely dependent on it; that is the same thing as to say, that not all that is in the event is an effect of that cause, but that only a part of it arises from thence, and part some other way.

2. If there are some events which are not necessarily connected with their causes, then it will follow, that there are some things which come to pass without any cause, contrary to the supposition. For if there be any event which was not necessarily connected with the influence of the cause under such circumstances, then it was contingent whether it would attend or follow the influence of the cause, or no; it might have followed, and it might not, when the cause was the same, its influence the same, and under the same circumstances. And if so, why did it follow rather than not follow? There is no cause or reason of this. Therefore here is something without any cause or reason why it is, viz., the following of the effect on the influence of the cause, with which it was not necessarily connected. If there be not a necessary connection of the effect on any thing antecedent, then we may suppose that sometimes the event will follow the cause, and sometimes not, when the cause is the same, and in every respect in the same state of circumstances. And what can be the cause and reason of this strange phenomenon, even this diversity, that in one instance, the effect should follow, in another, not? It is evident by the supposition, that this is wholly without

any cause or ground. Here is something in the present manner of the existence of things, and state of the world that is absolutely without a cause; which is contrary to the supposition, and contrary to what has been before demonstrated.

3. To suppose there are some events which have a cause and ground of their existence, that yet are not necessarily connected with their cause, which is to suppose that they have a cause which is not their cause. Thus if the effect be not necessarily connected with the cause, with its influence and influential circumstances; then, as I observed before, it is a thing possible and supposable, that the cause may sometimes exert the same influence, under the same circumstances, and yet the effect not follow. And if this actually happens in any instance, this instance is a proof, in fact, that the influence of the cause is not sufficient to produce the effect. For if it had been sufficient, it would have done it. And yet, by the supposition, in another instance, the same cause, with perfectly the same influence, and when all circumstances which have any influence, were the same, it *was followed* with the effect. By which it is manifest, that the effect in this last instance was not owing to the influence of the cause, but must come to pass some other way. For it was proved before, that the influence of the cause was not sufficient to produce the effect. And if it was not sufficient to produce it, then the production of it could not be owing to that influence, but must be owing to something else, or owing to nothing. And if the effect be not owing to the influence of the cause, then it is not the cause, which brings us to the contradiction of a cause, and no cause, that which is the ground and reason of the existence of a thing, and at the same time is not the ground and reason of its existence, nor is sufficient to be so.

If the matter be not already so plain as to render any further reasoning upon it impertinent, I would say, that that which seems to be the cause in the supposed case, can be no cause; its power and influence having, on a full trial, proved insufficient to produce such an effect: and if it be not sufficient to produce it, then it does not produce it. To say otherwise, is to say, there is power to do that which there is not power to do. If there be in a cause sufficient power exerted and in circumstances sufficient to produce an effect, and so the effect be actually produced at *one time;* these things all concurring, will produce the effect at *all times.* And so we may turn it the other way; that which proves not sufficient at one time, cannot be sufficient at another, with precisely the same influential circumstances. And therefore if the effect follows, it is not owing to that cause; unless the different time be a circumstance which has influence: but that is contrary to the supposition; for it is supposed that all circumstances that have influence, are the same. And besides, this would be to suppose the time to be the cause; which is contrary to the supposition of the other thing's being the cause. But if merely diversity of time has no influence, then it is evident that it is as much of an absurdity to say, the cause was sufficient to produce the effect at one time, and not at another; as to say, that it is sufficient to produce the effect at a certain time, and yet not sufficient to produce the same effect at the same time.

On the whole, it is clearly manifest, that every effect has a necessary connection with its cause, or with that which is the true ground and reason of its existence. And therefore if there be no event without a cause, as was proved before, then no event whatsoever is contingent in the manner, that *Arminians* suppose the free acts of the Will to be contingent.

SECTION IX.

Of the Connection of the Acts of the Will with the Dictates of the Understanding

It is manifest, that the acts of the Will are none of them contingent in such a sense as to be without all necessity, or so as not to be necessary with a necessity of consequence and Connection; because every act of the Will is some way connected with the Understanding, and is as the greatest apparent good is, in the manner which has already been explained; namely, that the soul always wills or chooses that which, in the present view of the mind, considered in the whole of that view, and all that belongs to it, appears most agreeable. Because, as was observed before, nothing is more evident than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what appears most agreeable to them; and to say otherwise, would be as much as to affirm, that men do not choose what appears to suit them best, or what seems most pleasing to them; or that they do not choose what they prefer. Which brings the matter to a contradiction.

As it is very evident in itself, that the acts of the Will have some Connection with the dictates or views of the Understanding, so this is allowed by some of the chief of the Arminian writers; particularly by Dr. Whitby and Dr. Samuel Clark. Dr. Turnbull, though a great enemy to the doctrine of necessity, allows the same thing. In his Christian Philosophy, (p. 196,) he with much approbation cites another philosopher, as of the same mind, in these words: "No man (says an excellent philosopher) sets himself about any thing, but upon some view or other, which serves him for a reason for what he does; and whatsoever faculties he employs, the Understanding, with such light as it has, well or ill formed, constantly leads; and by that light, true or false, all her operative powers are directed. The Will itself, how absolute and incontrollable soever it may be thought, never fails in its obedience to the dictates of the Understanding. Temples have their sacred images; and we see what influence they have always had over a great part of mankind; but in truth, the ideas and images in men's minds are the invisible powers that constantly govern them; and to these they all pay universally a ready submission."

But whether this be in a just consistence with themselves, and their own notions of liberty, I desire may now be impartially considered.

Dr. Whitby plainly supposes, that the acts and determinations of the Will always follow the Understanding's apprehension or view of the greatest good to be obtained, or evil to be avoided; or, in other words, that the determinations of the Will constantly and infallibly follow these two things in the Understanding: 1. The *degree of good* to be obtained, and evil to be avoided, proposed to the Understanding, and apprehended, viewed, and taken notice of by it. 2. The *degree of the Understanding's view*, notice or apprehension of that good or evil, which is increased by attention and consideration. That this is an opinion he is exceeding peremptory in (as he is in every opinion which he maintains in his controversy with the Calvinists), with disdain of the contrary opinion as absurd and self-contradictory, will appear by the following words of his, in his Discourse on the Five Points.*

"Now, it is certain, that what naturally makes the Understanding to perceive, as evidence proposed, and apprehended, considered or adverted to: for nothing

* Second Edit. p. 211, 212, 213.

else can be requisite to make us come to the knowledge of the truth. Again, what makes the Will choose, is something approved by the Understanding; and consequently appearing to the soul as good.—And whatsoever it refuseth, is something represented by the Understanding, and so appearing to the Will, as evil. Whence all that God requires of us is and can be only this; to refuse the evil, and choose the good. Wherefore, to say that evidence proposed, apprehended and considered, is not sufficient to make the Understanding approve; or that the greatest good proposed, the greatest evil threatened, when equally believed and reflected on, is not sufficient to engage the Will to choose the good and refuse the evil, is in effect to say, that which alone doth move the Will to choose or to refuse, is not sufficient to engage it so to do; which being contradictory to itself, must of necessity be false. Be it then so, that we naturally have an aversion to the truths proposed to us in the gospel; that only can make us indisposed to attend to them, but cannot hinder our conviction, when we do apprehend them, and attend to them. Be it, that there is also a renitency to the good we are to choose; that only can indispose us to believe it is, and to approve it as our chiefest good. Be it, that we are prone to the evil that we should decline; that only can render it the more difficult for us to believe it is the worst of evils. But yet, what we do really believe to be our chiefest good, will still be chosen; and what we apprehend to be the worst of evils, will, whilst we do continue under that conviction, be refused by us. It therefore can be only requisite, in order to these ends, that the Good Spirit should so illuminate our Understandings, that we, attending to, and considering what lies before us, should apprehend, and be convinced of our duty; and that the blessings of the gospel should be so propounded to us, as that we may discern them to be our chiefest good; and the miseries it threateneth, so as we may be convinced that they are the worst of evils; that we may choose the one, and refuse the other."

Here let it be observed, how plainly and peremptorily it is asserted, that the greatest good proposed, and the greatest evil threatened, when equally believed and reflected on, is sufficient to engage the Will to choose the good and refuse the evil, and is that alone which doth move the Will to choose or to refuse; and that it is contradictory to itself, to suppose otherwise; and therefore must of necessity be false; and then what we do really believe to be our chiefest good, will still be chosen, and what we apprehend to be the worst of evils, will, whilst we continue under that conviction, be refused by us.—Nothing could have been said more to the purpose, fully to signify and declare, that the determinations of the Will must evermore follow the illumination, conviction and notice of the Understanding, with regard to the greatest good and evil proposed, reckoning both the degree of good and evil understood, and the degree of Understanding, notice and conviction of that proposed good and evil; and that it is thus necessarily, and can be otherwise in no instance: because it is asserted, that it implies a contradiction, to suppose it ever to be otherwise.

I am sensible the Doctor's aim in these assertions is against the Calvinists; to show, in opposition to them, that there is no need of any physical operation of the Spirit of God on the Will, to change and determine that to a good choice, but that God's operation and assistance is only moral, suggesting ideas to the Understanding; which he supposes to be enough, if those ideas are attended to infallibly to obtain the end. But whatever his design was, nothing can more directly and fully prove, that every determination of the Will, in choosing and refusing, is necessary; directly contrary to his own notion of the liberty of the Will. For if the determination of the Will, evermore, in this manner, follows the light, conviction and view of the Understanding, concerning the greatest

good and evil, and this be that alone which moves the Will, and it be a contradiction to suppose otherwise; then it is necessarily so, the Will necessarily follows this light or view of the Understanding, and not only in some of its acts, but in every act of choosing and refusing. So that the Will does not determine itself in any one of its own acts; but all its acts, every act of choice and refusal depends on, and is necessarily connected with some antecedent cause; which cause is not the Will itself, nor any act of its own, nor any thing pertaining to that faculty, but something belonging to another faculty, whose acts go before the Will, in all its acts, and govern and determine them.

Here, if it should be replied, that although it be true, that, according to the Doctor, the final determination of the Will always depends upon, and is infallibly connected with the Understanding's conviction, and notice of the greatest good; yet the acts of the Will are not necessary; because that conviction and notice of the Understanding is first dependent on a preceding act of the Will, in determining to attend to, and take notice of the evidence exhibited; by which means the mind obtains that degree of conviction, which is sufficient and effectual to determine the consequent and ultimate choice of the Will; and that the Will, with regard to that preceding act, whereby it determines whether to attend or no, is not necessary; and that in this, the liberty of the Will consists, that when God holds forth sufficient objective light, the Will is at liberty whether to command the attention of the mind to it.

Nothing can be more weak and inconsiderate than such a reply as this. For that preceding act of the Will, in determining to attend and consider, still is an *act of the Will* (it is so to be sure, if the *liberty of the Will* consists in it, as is supposed); and if it be an act of the Will, it is an act of *choice* or *refusal*. And therefore, if what the Doctor asserts be true, it is determined by some antecedent light in the Understanding concerning the greatest apparent good or evil. For he asserts, it is that light *which alone doth move the Will to choose or refuse.* And therefore the Will must be moved by that in choosing to attend to the objective light afforded in order to another consequent act of choice; so that this act is no less necessary than the other. And if we suppose another act of the Will, still preceding both these mentioned, to determine both, still that also must be an act of the Will, and an act of choice; and so must, by the same principles, be infallibly determined by some certain degree of light in the Understanding concerning the greatest good. And let us suppose as many acts of the Will, one preceding another, as we please, yet they are every one of them necessarily determined by a certain degree of light in the Understanding, concerning the geatest and most eligible good in that case; and so, not one of them free according to Dr. Whitby's notion of freedom. - And if it be said, the reason why men do not attend to light held forth, is because of ill habits contracted by evil acts committed before, whereby their minds are indisposed to attend to, and consider the truth held forth to them by God, the difficulty is not at all avoided: still the question returns, What determined the Will in those preceding evil acts? It must, by Dr. Whitby's principles, still be the view of the Understanding concerning the greatest good and evil. If this view of the Understanding be *that alone which doth move the Will to choose or refuse*, as the Doctor asserts, then every act of *choice* or *refusal*, from a man's first existence, is moved and determined by this view; and this view of the Understanding, exciting and governing the act, must be before the act: and therefore the Will is necessarily determined, in every one of its acts, from a man's first existence, by a cause beside the Will, and a cause that does not proceed from, or depend on any act of the Will at all. Which at once utterly abolishes the Doctor's whole scheme

of liberty of Will; and he at one stroke, has cut the sinews of all his arguments from the goodness, righteousness, faithfulness and sincerity of God in his commands, promises, threatenings, calls, invitations, expostulations; which he makes use of, under the heads of reprobation, election, universal redemption, sufficient and effectual grace, and the freedom of the Will of man; and has enervated and made vain all those exclamations against the doctrine of the *Calvinists*, as charging God with manifest unrighteousness, unfaithfulness, hypocrisy, fallaciousness, and cruelty; which he has over, and over, and over again, numberless times in his book.

Dr. Samuel Clark, in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God,* to evade the argument to prove the necessity of volition, from its necessary Connection with the last dictate of the Understanding, supposes the latter not to be diverse from the act of the Will itself. But if it be so, it will not alter the case as to the evidence of the necessity of the act of the Will. If the dictate of the Understanding be the very same with the determination of the Will or choice, as Dr. Clark supposes, then this determination is no *fruit* or *effect of choice:* and if so, no liberty of choice has any hand in it; as to volition or choice, it is necessary; that is, choice cannot prevent it. If the last dictate of the Understanding be the same with the determination of volition itself, then the existence of that determination must be necessary as to volition; inasmuch as volition can have no opportunity to determine whether it shall exist or no, it having existence already before volition has opportunity to determine any thing. It is itself the very rise and existence of volition. But a thing after it exists, has no opportunity to determine as to its own existence; it is too late for that.

If liberty consists in that which Arminians suppose, viz., in the Will's determining its own acts, having free opportunity, and being without all necessity; this is the same as to say, that liberty consists in the soul's having power and opportunity to have what determinations of the Will it pleases or chooses. And if the determinations of the Will, and the last dictates of the Understanding, be the same thing, then liberty consists in the mind's having power to have what dictates of the Understanding it pleases, having opportunity to choose its own dictates of Understanding. But this is absurd; for it is to make the determination of choice prior to the dictate of the Understanding, and the ground of it, which cannot consist with the dictate of Understanding's being the determination of choice itself.

There is no way to do in this case, but only to recur to the old absurdity of one determination before another, and the cause of it; and another before that, determining that; and so on *in infinitum*. If the last dictate of the Understanding be the determination of the Will itself, and the soul be free with regard to that dictate, in the Arminian notion of freedom; then the soul, before that dictate of its Understanding exists, voluntarily and according to its own choice determines, in every case, what that dictate of the Understanding shall be; otherwise, that dictate, as to the Will, is necessary, and the acts determined by it must also be necessary. So that there is a determination of the mind prior to that dictate of the Understanding; an act of choice going before it, choosing and determining what that dictate of the Understanding shall be: and this preceding act of choice, being a free act of Will, must also be the same with another last dictate of the Understanding: and if the mind also be free in that dictate of Understanding, that must be determined still by another; and so on for ever.

Besides, if the dictate of the Understanding, and determination of the Will,

* Edition V. p. 92.

be the same, this confounds the Understanding and Will, and makes them the same. Whether they be the same or no, I will not now dispute; but only would observe, that if it be so, and the Arminian notion of liberty consists in a self-determining power in the Understanding, free of all necessity; being independent, undetermined by any thing prior to its own acts and determinations; and the more the Understanding is thus independent, and sovereign over its own determinations, the more free. By this therefore the freedom of the soul, as a moral agent, must consist in the independence of the Understanding on any evidence or appearance of things, or any thing whatsoever, that stands forth to the view of the mind, prior to the Understanding's determination. And what a sort of liberty is this! consisting in an ability, freedom and easiness of judging, either according to evidence, or against it; having a sovereign command over itself at all times, to judge, either agreeably or disagreeably to what is plainly exhibited to its own view. Certainly it is no liberty that renders persons the proper subjects of persuasive reasoning, arguments, expostulations, and such like moral means and inducements. The use of which with mankind is a main argument of the Arminians, to defend their notion of liberty without all necessity. For according to this, the more free men are, the less they are under the government of such means, less subject to the power of evidence and reason, and more independent of their influence, in their determinations.

And whether the Understanding and Will are the same or no, as Dr. Clark seems to suppose, yet, in order to maintain the Arminian notion of liberty without necessity, the free Will must not be determined by the Understanding, nor necessarily connected with the Understanding; and the further from such connection, the greater the freedom. And when the liberty is full and complete, the determinations of the Will have no connection at all with the dictates of the Understanding. And if so, in vain are all the applications to the Understanding, in order to induce to any free virtuous act; and so in vain are all instructions, counsels, invitations, expostulations, and all arguments and persuasives whatsoever; for these are but applications to the Understanding, and a clear and lively exhibition of the objects of choice to the mind's view But if, after all, the Will must be self-determined, and independent of the Understanding, to what purpose are things thus represented to the Understanding, in order to determine the choice?

SECTION X.

Volition necessarily connected with the Influence of Motives; with particular Observations on the great Inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's Assertions and Reasonings, about the Freedom of the Will.

That every act of the Will has some cause, and consequently (by what has been already proved) has a necessary connection with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity of connection and consequence, is evident by this, that every act of the Will whatsoever is excited by some Motive: which is manifest, because, if the Will or mind, in willing and choosing after the manner that it does, is excited so to do by no motive or inducement, then it has no end which it proposes to itself, or pursues in so doing; it aims at nothing, and seeks nothing. And if it seek nothing, then it does not go after any thing or exert any inclination or preference towards any thing: which brings the matter to a

contradiction; because for the mind to Will something, and for it to go after something by an act of preference and inclination, are the same thing.

But if every act of the Will is excited by a Motive, then that Motive is the cause of the act of the Will. If the acts of the Will are excited by motives, then Motives are the causes of their being excited; or, which is the same thing, the cause of their being put forth into act and existence. And if so, the existence of the acts of the Will is properly the effect of their motives. Motives do nothing as Motives or inducements, but by their influence; and so much as is done by their influence is the effect of them. For that is the notion of an effect, something that is brought to pass by the influence of another thing.

And if volitions are properly the effects of their Motives, then they are necessarily connected with their Motives.—Every effect and event being, as proved before, necessarily connected with that, which is the proper ground and reason of its existence. Thus it is manifest, that volition is necessary, and is not from any self-determining power in the Will: the volition, which is caused by previous Motive and inducement, is not caused by the Will exercising a sovereign power over itself, to determine, cause and excite volitions in itself. This is not consistent with the Will's acting in a state of indifference and equilibrium, to determine itself to a preference; for the way in which Motives operate, is by biasing the Will, and giving it a certain inclination or preponderation one way.

Here it may be proper to observe, that Mr. Chubb, in his Collection of Tracts on various subjects, has advanced a scheme of liberty, which is greatly divided against itself, and thoroughly subversive of itself; and that many ways.

1. He is abundant in asserting, that the Will, in all its acts, is influenced by Motive and excitement; and that this is the previous ground and reason of all its acts, and that it is never otherwise in any instance. He says (p. 262), "No action can take place without some motive to excite it." And in page 263, "Volition cannot take place without some PREVIOUS reason or Motive to induce it." And in page 310, "Action would not take place without some reason or Motive to induce it; it being absurd to suppose, that the active faculty would be exerted without some PREVIOUS reason to dispose the mind to action." So also page 257. And he speaks of these things, as what we may be absolutely certain of, and which are the foundation, the only foundation we have of a certainty of the moral perfections of God. Page 252, 253, 254, 255, 261, 262, 263, 264.

And yet at the same time, by his scheme, the influence of Motives upon us to excite to action, and to be actually a ground of volition, is consequent on the volition or choice of the mind. For he very greatly insists upon it, that in all free actions, before the mind is the subject of those volitions, which Motives excite, it chooses to be so. It chooses, whether it will comply with the Motive, which presents itself in view, or not; and when various Motives are presented, it chooses which it will yield to, and which it will reject. So page 256, "Every man has power to act, or to refrain from acting agreeably with, or contrary to, any Motive that presents." Page 257, "Every man is at liberty to act, or refrain from acting agreeably with, or contrary to, what each of these Motives considered singly, would excite him to. Man has power, and is as much at liberty to reject the Motive that does prevail, as he has power, and is at liberty to reject those Motives that do not." And so, page 310, 311, "In order to constitute a moral agent, it is necessary, that he should have power to act, or to refrain from acting, upon such moral Motives as he pleases." And to the

like purpose in many other places.—According to these things, the Will acts first, and chooses or refuses to comply with the Motive, that is presented, before it falls under its prevailing influence: and it is first determined by the mind's pleasure or choice, what Motives it will be induced by, before it is induced by them.

Now, how can these things hang together? How can the mind first act, and by its act of volition and choice determine what Motive shall be the ground and reason of its volition and choice? For this supposes the choice is already made, before the Motive has its effect; and that the volition is already exerted before the Motive prevails, so as actually to be the ground of the volition; and makes the prevailing of the Motive, the consequence of the volition, which yet it is the ground of. If the mind has already chosen to comply with a Motive, and to yield to its excitement, it does not need to yield to it after this: for the thing is effected already, that the Motive would excite to, and the Will is beforehand with the excitement; and the excitement comes in too late, and is needless and in vain afterwards. If the mind has already chosen to yield to a Motive which invites to a thing, that implies, and in fact is a choosing the thing invited to; and the very act of choice is before the influence of the Motive which induces, and is the ground of the choice; the son is beforehand with the father that begets him: the choice is supposed to be the ground of that influence of the Motive, which very influence is supposed to be the ground of the choice.—And so *vice versa*, the choice is supposed to be the consequence of the influence of the Motive, which influence of the Motive is the consequence of that very choice.

And besides, if the Will acts first towards the Motive before it falls under its influence, and the prevailing of the Motive upon it to induce it to act and choose, be the fruit and consequence of its act and choice, then how is the Motive *a* PREVIOUS *ground and reason of the act and choice*, so that *in the nature of the thing, volition cannot take place without some* PREVIOUS *reason and motive to induce it;* and that this act is consequent upon, and follows the Motive? Which things Mr. Chubb often asserts, as of certain and undoubted truth.—So that the very same Motive is both previous and consequent, both before and after, both the ground and fruit of the very same thing!

II. Agreeable to the forementioned inconsistent notion of the Will's first acting towards the Motive, choosing whether it will comply with it, in order to its becoming a ground of the Will's acting, before any act of volition can take place, Mr. Chubb frequently calls Motives and excitements to the action of the Will the passive ground or reason of that action: which is a remarkable phrase; than which I presume there is none more unintelligible, and void of distinct and consistent meaning, in all the writings of Duns Scotus, or Thomas Aquinas. When he represents the Motive to action or volition as passive, he must mean—passive in that affair, or passive with respect to that action which he speaks of; otherwise it is nothing to his purpose, or relating to the design of his argument: he must mean (if that can be called a meaning), that the Motive to volition, is first acted *upon* or *towards* by the volition, choosing to yield to it, making it a ground of action, or determining to fetch its influence from thence; and so to make it a previous ground of its own excitation and existence. Which is the same absurdity as if one should say, that the soul of man, or any other thing, should, previous to its existence, choose what cause it would come into existence by, and should act upon its cause, to fetch influence from thence, to bring it into being; and so its cause should be a passive ground of its existence!

Mr. Chubb does very plainly suppose Motive or excitement to be the ground of the being of volition. He speaks of it as the ground or reason of the EXERTION of an act of the Will, p. 391, and 392, and expressly says, that *volition cannot* TAKE PLACE without some *previous ground or Motive to induce to it*, p. 363. And he speaks of the act as *from the* MOTIVE, and FROM THE INFLUENCE *of the Motive*, p. 352, and from *the influence that the Motive has on the man for the* PRODUCTION *of an action*, p. 317. Certainly there is no need of multiplying words about this; it is easily judged, whether Motive can be the ground of volition's being exerted and taking place, so that the very production of it is from the influence of the Motive, and yet the Motive, before it becomes the ground of the volition, is passive, or acted upon by the volition. But this I will say, that a man, who insists so much on clearness of meaning in others, and is so much in blaming their confusion and inconsistence, ought, if he was able, to have explained his meaning in this phrase of passive ground of action, so as to show it not to be confused and inconsistent.

If any should suppose, that Mr. Chubb, when he speaks of Motive as a passive ground of action, does not mean passive with regard to that volition which it is the ground of, but some other antecedent volition, (though his purpose and argument, and whole discourse, will by no means allow of such a supposition,) yet it would not help the matter in the least. For, (1.) If we suppose there to be an act of volition or choice, by which the soul chooses to yield to the invitation of a Motive to another volition, by which the soul chooses something else; both these supposed volitions are in effect the very same. A volition, or choosing to yield to the force of a Motive inviting to choose something, comes to just the same thing as choosing the thing, which the Motive invites to, as I observed before. So that here can be no room to help the matter, by a distinction of two volitions. (2.) If the Motive be passive with respect, not to the same volition that the Motive excites to, but one truly distinct and prior; yet, by Mr. Chubb, that prior volition cannot take place, without a Motive or excitement, as a previous ground of its existence. For he insists, that it is absurd to suppose any volition should take place without some previous Motive to induce it. So that at last it comes to just the same absurdity: for if every volition must have a previous Motive, then the very first in the whole series must be excited by a previous Motive; and yet the Motive to that first volition is passive; but cannot be passive with regard to another antecedent volition, because by the supposition, it is the very first: therefore if it be passive with respect to any volition, it must be so with regard to that very volition that it is the ground of, and that is excited by it.

III. Though Mr. Chubb asserts, as above, that every volition has some Motive, and that in the nature of the thing, no volition can take place without some Motive to induce it; yet he asserts, that volition does not always follow the strongest Motive; or, in other words, is not governed by any superior strength of the Motive that is followed, beyond Motives to the contrary, previous to the volition itself. His own words, p. 258, are as follow: "Though with regard to physical causes, that which is strongest always prevails, yet it is otherwise with regard to moral causes. Of these, sometimes the stronger, sometimes the weaker, prevails. And the ground of this difference is evident, namely, that what we call moral causes, strictly speaking, are no causes at all, but barely passive reasons of, or excitements to the action, or to the refraining from acting: which excitements we have power, or are at liberty to comply with or reject, as I have showed above." And so throughout the paragraph, he, in a variety of phrases, insists, that the Will is not always determined by the strongest Motive, unless by strongest we preposterously mean actually prevail-

ing in the event; which is not in the Motive, but in the Will; so that the Will is not always determined by the Motive, which is strongest, by any strength previous to the volition itself. And he elsewhere does abundantly assert, that the Will is determined by no superior strength or advantage, that Motives have, from any constitution or state of things, or any circumstances whatsoever, previous to the actual determination of the Will. And indeed his whole discourse on human liberty implies it, his whole scheme is founded upon it.

But these things cannot stand together.—There is such a thing as a diversity of strength in Motives to choice previous to the choice itself. Mr. Chubb himself supposes, that they do *previously invite, induce, excite*, and *dispose the mind to action*. This implies, that they have something in themselves that is *inviting*, some tendency to *induce* and *dispose* to volition previous to volition itself. And if they have in themselves this nature and tendency, doubtless they have it in certain limited degrees, which are capable of diversity; and some have it in greater degrees, others in less; and they that have most of this tendency, considered with all their nature and circumstances, previous to volition, are the strongest Motives; and those that have least, are the weakest Motives.

Now if volition sometimes does not follow the Motive which is strongest, or has most previous tendency or advantage, all things considered, to induce or excite it, but follows the weakest, or that which as it stands previously in the mind's view, has least tendency to induce it; herein the Will apparently acts wholly without Motive, without any previous reason to dispose the mind to it, contrary to what the same author supposes. The act, wherein the Will must proceed without a previous Motive to induce it, is the act of preferring the weakest Motive. For how absurd is it to say, the mind sees previous reason in the Motive, to prefer that Motive before the other; and at the same time to suppose, that there is nothing in the Motive, in its nature, state, or any circumstances of it whatsoever, as it stands in the previous view of the mind, that gives it any preference; but on the contrary, the other Motive that stands in competition with it, in all these respects, has most belonging to it, that is inviting and moving, and has most of a tendency to choice and preference. This is certainly as much as to say, there is previous ground and reason in the Motive, for the act of preference, and yet no previous reason for it. By the supposition, as to all that is in the two rival Motives, which tends to preference, previous to the act of preference, it is not in that which is preferred, but wholly in the other: because appearing superior strength, and all appearing preferableness is in that; and yet Mr. Chubb supposes, that the act of preference is from *previous ground and reason* in the Motive which is preferred. But are these things consistent? Can there be previous ground in a thing for an event that takes place, and yet no previous tendency in it to that event? If one thing follow another, without any previous tendency to its following, then I should think it very plain, that it follows it without any manner of previous reason, why it should follow.

Yea, in this case, Mr. Chubb supposes, that the event follows an antecedent or a previous thing, as the ground of its existence, not only that has *no tendency* to it, but *a contrary tendency*. The event is the preference, which the mind gives to that Motive, which is weaker, as it stands in the previous view of the mind; the immediate antecedent is the view the mind has of the two rival Motives conjunctly; in which previous view of the mind, all the preferableness, or previous tendency to preference, is supposed to be on the other side, or in the contrary Motive; and all the unworthiness of preference, and so previous tendency to comparative neglect, rejection or undervaluing, is on that side which is preferred and yet in this view of the mind is supposed to be the *previous*

ground, or reason of this act of preference, *exciting it, and disposing the mind to it.* Which, I leave the reader to judge, whether it be absurd or not. If it be not, then it is not absurd to say, that the previous tendency of an antecedent to a consequent, is the ground and reason why that consequent does not follow; and the want of a previous tendency to an event, yea, a tendency to the contrary, is the true ground and reason why that event does follow.

An act of choice or preference is a comparative act, wherein the mind acts with reference to two or more things that are compared, and stand in competition in the mind's view. If the mind in this comparative act, prefers that which appears inferior in the comparison, then the mind herein acts absolutely without Motive, or inducement, or any temptation whatsoever. Then, if a hungry man has the offer of two sorts of food, both which he finds an appetite to, but has a stronger appetite to one than the other; and there be no circumstances or excitements whatsoever in the case to induce him to take either the one or the other, but merely his appetite: if in the choice he makes between them, he chooses that, which he has the least appetite to, and refuses that, to which he has the strongest appetite, this is a choice made absolutely without previous Motive, excitement, reason or temptation, as much as if he were perfectly without all appetite to either: because his volition in this case is a comparative act, attending and following a comparative view of the food, which he chooses, viewing it as related to, and compared with the other sort of food, in which view his preference has absolutely no previous ground, yea, is against all previous ground and Motive. And if there be any principle in man, from whence an act of choice may arise after this manner, from the same principle, volition may arise wholly without Motive on either side. If the mind in its volition can go beyond Motive then it can go without Motive: for when it is beyond the Motive, it is out of the reach of the Motive, out of the limits of its influence, and so without Motive. If volition goes beyond the strength and tendency of Motive, and especially if it goes against its tendency, this demonstrates the independence of volition or Motive. And if so, no reason can be given for what Mr. Chubb so often asserts, even that *in the nature of things volition cannot take place without a Motive to induce it.*

If the Most High should endow a balance with agency or activity of nature, in such a manner, that when equal weights are put into the scales, its agency could enable it to cause that scale to descend, which has the least weight, and so to raise the greater weight; this would clearly demonstrate, that the motion of the balance does not depend on weights in the scales, at least as much as if the balance should move itself, when there is no weight in either scale. And the activity of the balance which is sufficient to move itself against the greater weight, must certainly be more than sufficient to move it when there is no weight at all.

Mr. Chubb supposes, that the Will cannot stir at all without some Motive; and also supposes, that if there be a Motive to one thing, and none to the contrary, volition will infallibly follow that Motive.—This is virtually to suppose an entire dependence of the Will on Motives: if it were not wholly dependent on them, it could surely help itself a little without them, or help itself a little against a Motive, without help from the strength and weight of a contrary Motive. And yet his supposing that the Will, when it has before it various opposite Motives, can use them as it pleases, and choose its own influence from them, and neglect the strongest, and follow the weakest, supposes it to be wholly independent on Motives.

It further appears, on Mr. Chubb's supposition, that volition must be without

any previous ground in any Motive, thus: if it be, as he supposes, that the Will is not determined by any previous superior strength of the Motive, but determines and chooses its own Motive, then when the rival Motives are exactly equal in strength and tendency to induce, in all respects, it may follow either; and may in such a case, sometimes follow one, and sometimes the other.—And if so, this diversity which appears between the acts of the Will, is plainly without previous ground in either of the Motives; for all that is previously in the Motives, is supposed precisely and perfectly the same, without any diversity whatsoever. Now perfect identity, as to all that is previous in the antecedent, cannot be the ground and reason of diversity in the consequent. Perfect identity in the ground cannot be the reason why it is not followed with the same consequence. And therefore the source of this diversity of consequence must be sought for elsewhere.

And lastly, it may be observed, that however Mr. Chubb does much insist that no volition can take place without some Motive to induce it, which previously disposes the mind to it; yet, as he also insists that the mind, without reference to any previous superior strength of Motives, picks and chooses for its Motive to follow; he himself herein plainly supposes, that with regard to the mind's preference of one Motive before another it is not the Motive that disposes the Will, but the Will disposes itself to follow the Motive.

IV. Mr. Chubb supposes necessity to be utterly inconsistent with *agency;* and that to suppose a being to be an agent in that which is necessary, is a plain contradiction. P. 311, and throughout his discourses on the subject of liberty, he supposes, that necessity cannot consist with agency or freedom; and that to suppose otherwise, is to make liberty and necessity, action and passion, the same thing. And so he seems to suppose, that there is no action, strictly speaking, but volition; and that as to the effects of volition in body or mind, in themselves considered, being necessary, they are said to be free, only as they are the effects of an act that is not necessary.

And yet, according to him, volition itself is the *effect of volition;* yea, every act of free volition: and therefore every act of free volition must, by what has now been observed from him, be necessary.—That every act of free volition is itself the effect of volition, is abundantly supposed by him. In p. 341, he says, "If a man is such a creature as I have proved him to be, that is, if he has in him a power or liberty of doing either good or evil, and either of these is the subject of his own free choice, so that he might, IF HE HAD PLEASED, have CHOSEN and done the contrary." Here he supposes, all that is good or evil in man is the effect of his choice; and so that his good or evil choice itself, is the effect of his pleasure or choice, in these words, *he might, if he had* PLEASED, *have* CHOSEN *the contrary.* So in p. 356, "Though it be highly reasonable, that a man should always choose the greater good—yet he may if he PLEASE, CHOOSE otherwise." Which is the same thing as if he had said, he may, if he chooses, choose otherwise." And then he goes on—"that is, he may, *if he pleases, choose* what is good for himself," &c. And again, in the same page, "The Will is not confined by the understanding, to any particular sort of good, whether greater or less; but is at liberty *to choose* what kind of good *it pleases.*"—If there be any meaning in the last words, the meaning must be this, that *the Will is at liberty to choose what kind of good it chooses to choose;* supposing the act of choice itself determined by an antecedent choice. The liberty Mr. Chubb speaks of, is not only a man's having power to move his body agreeably to an antecedent act of choice, but to use or exert the faculties of his soul. Thus, in p. 379, speaking of the faculties of his mind, he says, "Man has power, and is at liberty to neglect these faculties, to use them aright,

or to abuse them, as he pleases." And that he supposes an act of choice, or exercise of pleasure, properly distinct from, and antecedent to those acts thus chosen, directing, commanding and producing the chosen acts, and even the acts of choice themselves, is very plain in p. 283, "He can *command his actions;* and herein consists his liberty; he can give or deny himself that pleasure as he pleases." And p. 377, "If the actions of men are not the produce of a free choice, or election, but spring from a necessity of nature, he cannot in reason be the object of reward or punishment on their account. Whereas, if action in man, whether good or evil, is the produce of Will or free choice; so that a man in either case, had it in his power, and was at liberty to have CHOSEN the contrary, he is the proper object of reward or punishment, according as he CHOOSES to behave himself." Here, in these last words, he speaks of liberty of CHOOSING, according as he CHOOSES. So that the behavior which he speaks of as subject to his choice, is his choosing itself, as well as his external conduct consequent upon it. And therefore it is evident, he means not only external actions, but the acts of choice themselves, when he speaks of *all free actions, as the* PRODUCE *of free choice.* And this is abundantly evident in what he says in p. 372, 373.

Now these things imply a twofold great absurdity and inconsistence.

1. To suppose, as Mr. Chubb plainly does, that every free act of choice is *commanded by,* and is the *produce of free choice,* is to suppose the first free act of choice belonging to the case, yea, the first free act of choice that ever man exerted, to be the produce of an antecedent act of choice. But I hope I need not labor at all to convince my readers, that it is an absurdity to say, the very first act is the produce of another act that went before it.

2. If it were both possible and real, as Mr. Chubb insists, that every free act of choice were the produce or the effect of a free act of choice; yet even then, according to his principles, no one act of choice would be free, but every one necessary; because, every act of choice being the effect of a foregoing act, every act would be necessarily connected with that foregoing cause. For Mr. Chubb himself says, p. 389, "When the self-moving power is exerted, it becomes the necessary cause of its effects." So that his notion of a free act, that is rewardable or punishable, is a heap of contradictions. It is a free act, and yet, by his own notion of freedom, is necessary; and therefore by him it is a contradiction to suppose it to be free. According to him, every free act is the produce of a free act; so that there must be an infinite number of free acts in succession, without any beginning, in an agent that has a beginning. And therefore here is an infinite number of free acts, every one of them free; and yet not one of them free, but every act in the whole infinite chain a necessary effect. All the acts are rewardable or punishable, and yet the agent cannot, in reason, be the object of reward or punishment, on account of any one of these actions. He is active in them all, and passive in none; yet active in none, but passive in all, &c.

V. Mr. Chubb does most strenuously deny, that Motives are causes of the acts of the Will; or that the moving principle in man is moved, or caused to be exerted by Motives.—His words, pages 388 and 389, are, "If the moving principle in man is MOVED, or CAUSED TO BE EXERTED, by something external to man, which all Motives are, then it would not be a self-moving principle, seeing it would be moved by a principle external to itself. And to say, that a self-moving principle is MOVED, or CAUSED TO BE EXERTED, by a cause external to itself, is absurd and a contradiction," &c. And in the next page, it is particularly and largely insisted, that motives are causes in no case, that *they are merely passive in the production of action, and have no causality in the production of it; no causality, to be the cause of the exertion of the Will.*

Now I desire it may be considered, how this can possibly consist with what he says in other places. Let it be noted here,

1. Mr Chubb abundantly speaks of Motives as *excitements of the acts of the Will;* and says, that *Motives do excite volition, and induce it,* and that they are necessary to this end; that *in the reason and nature of things, volition cannot take place without Motives to excite it.* But now, if Motives *excite* the Will, they *move* it; and yet he says, it is absurd to say, the Will is moved by Motives And again (if language is of any significancy at all), if Motives excite volition, then they are the cause of its being excited; and to cause volition to be excited. is to cause it to be put forth or exerted. Yea, Mr. Chubb says himself, p. 317 Motive is necessary to the exertion of the active faculty. To excite, is positively to do something; and certainly that which does something, is the cause of the thing done by it. To create, is to cause to be created; to make, is to cause to be made; to kill, is to cause to be killed; to quicken, is to cause to be quickened; and *to excite,* is *to cause to be excited.* To excite, is to be a cause, in the most proper sense, not merely a negative occasion, but a ground of existence by positive influence. The notion of exciting, is exerting influence to cause the effect to arise or come forth into existence.

2. Mr. Chubb himself, page 317, speaks of Motives as the ground and reason of action BY INFLUENCE, and BY PREVAILING INFLUENCE. Now, what can be meant by a cause, but something that is the ground and reason of a thing by its influence, an influence that is prevalent and so effectual?

3. This author not only speaks of Motives as the ground and reason of action, by prevailing influence; but expressly of their influence as prevailing FOR THE PRODUCTION of an action, in the same page 317: which makes the inconsistency still more palpable and notorious. The production of an effect is certainly the causing of an effect; and productive influence is causal influence, if any thing is; and that which has this influence prevalently, so as thereby to become the ground of another thing, is a cause of that thing, if there be any such thing as a cause. This influence, Mr. Chubb says, Motives have to produce an action; and yet, he says, it is absurd and a contradiction, to say they are causes.

4. In the same page, he once and again speaks of Motives as disposing the agent to action, by their influence. His words are these: "As Motive, which takes place in the understanding, and is the product of intelligence, is NECESSARY to action, that is, to the EXERTION of the active faculty, because that faculty would not be exerted without some PREVIOUS REASON to DISPOSE the mind to action; so from hence it plainly appears, that when a man is said to be disposed to one action rather than another, this properly signifies the PREVAILING INFLUENCE that one Motive has upon a man FOR THE PRODUCTION of an action, or for the being at rest, before all other Motives, for the production of the contrary.—For as Motive is the ground and reason of any action, so the Motive that prevails, DISPOSES the agent to the performance of that action."

Now, if Motives dispose the mind to action, then they cause the mind to be disposed; and to cause the mind to be disposed is to cause it to be willing; and to cause it to be willing is to cause it to Will; and that is the same thing as to be the cause of an act of the Will. And yet this same Mr. Chubb holds it to be absurd, to suppose Motive to be a cause of the act of the Will.

And if we compare these things together, we have here again a whole heap of inconsistencies. *Motives are the previous ground and reason* of the acts of the Will; yea, the *necessary* ground and reason of *their exertion, without which they will not be exerted, and cannot, in the nature of things, take place;* and they do *excite* these acts of the Will, and do this by *a prevailing influence;* yea, *an influ-*

ence which prevails for the production of the act of the Will, and for *the disposing of the mind to it;* and yet it is *absurd* to suppose *Motive to be a cause* of an act of the Will, or that *a principle of Will is moved or caused to be exerted by it,* or that it has *any causality in the production of it,* or *any causality to be the cause of the exertion of the Will.*

A due consideration of these things which Mr. Chubb has advanced, the strange inconsistencies which the notion of liberty, consisting in the Will's power of self-determination void of all necessity, united with that dictate of common sense, that there can be no volition without a Motive, drove him into, may be sufficient to convince us, that it is utterly impossible ever to make that notion of liberty consistent with the influence of Motives in volition And as it is in a manner self-evident, that there can be no act of Will, choice, or preference of the mind, without some Motive or inducement, something in the mind's view, which it aims at, seeks, inclines to, and goes after; so it is most manifest, there is no such liberty in the universe as Arminians insist on; nor any such thing possible, or conceivable.

SECTION XI.

The Evidence of God's certain Foreknowledge of the Volitions of moral Agents.

That the acts of the Wills of moral agents are not contingent events, in that sense, as to be without all necessity, appears by God's certain foreknowledge of such events.

In handling this argument, I would in the first place prove, that God has a certain foreknowledge of the voluntary acts of moral agents; and secondly, show the consequence, or how it follows from hence, that the volitions of moral agents are not contingent, so as to be without necessity of connection and consequence.

First, I am to prove, that God has an absolute and certain foreknowledge of the free actions of moral agents.

One would think, it should be wholly needless to enter on such an argument with any that profess themselves Christians: but so it is; God's certain foreknowledge of the free acts of moral agents, is denied by some that pretend to believe the Scriptures to be the word of God; and especially of late. I therefore shall consider the evidence of such a prescience in the Most High, as fully as the designed limits of this essay will admit of; supposing myself herein to have to do with such as own the truth of the Bible.

Arg. I. My first argument shall be taken from God's *prediction* of such events. Here I would, in the first place, lay down these two things as axioms.

(1.) If God does not foreknow, he cannot foretell such events; that is, he cannot peremptorily and certainly foretell them. If God has no more than an uncertain guess concerning events of this kind, then he can declare no more than an uncertain guess. Positively to foretell, is to profess to foreknow, or to declare positive foreknowledge.

(2.) If God does not certainly foreknow the future volitions of moral agents, then neither can he certainly foreknow those events which are consequent and dependent on these volitions. The existence of the one depending on the existence of the other; the knowledge of the existence of the one depends on the

knowledge of the existence of the other; and the one cannot be more certain than the other.

Therefore, how many, how great and how extensive soever the consequences of the volitions of moral agents may be; though they should extend to an alteration of the state of things through the universe, and should be continued in a series of successive events to all eternity, and should in the progress of things branch forth into an infinite number of series, each of them going on in an endless line or chain of events; God must be as ignorant of all these consequences, as he is of the volitions whence they take their rise: all these events, and the whole state of things depending on them, how important, extensive and vast soever, must be hid from him.

These positions being such as, I suppose, none will deny, I now proceed to observe the following things.

1. Men's moral conduct and qualities, their virtues and vices, their wickedness and good practice, things rewardable and punishable, have often been foretold by God. Pharaoh's moral conduct, in refusing to obey God's command, in letting his people go, was foretold. God says to Moses, Exod. iii. 19, "I am sure, that the king of Egypt will not let you go." Here God professes not only to guess at, but to know Pharaoh's future disobedience. In chap. vii. 4, God says, *but Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you; that I may lay mine hand upon Egypt*, &c. And chap. ix. 30, Moses says to Pharaoh, *as for thee, and thy servants, I know that ye will not fear the Lord.* See also chap. xi. 9 The moral conduct of Josiah, by name, in his zealously exerting himself in opposition to idolatry, in particular acts of his, was foretold above three hundred years before he was born and the prophecy sealed by a miracle, and renewed and confirmed by the words of a second prophet, as what surely would not fail, 1 Kings xiii. 1—6, 32. This prophecy was also in effect a prediction of the moral conduct of the people, in upholding their schismatical and idolatrous worship until that time, and the idolatry of those priests of the high places, which it is foretold Josiah should offer upon that altar of Bethel.—Micaiah foretold the foolish and sinful conduct of Ahab, in refusing to hearken to the word of the Lord by him, and choosing rather to hearken to the false prophets, in going to Ramoth Gilead to his ruin, 1 Kings xxi. 20—22. The moral conduct of Hazael was foretold, in that cruelty he should be guilty of; on which Hazael says, *What, is thy servant a dog, that he should do this thing!* The prophet speaks of the event as what he knew, and not what he conjectured, 2 Kings viii. 12. *I know the evil that thou wilt do unto the children of Israel: Thou wilt dash their children, and rip up their women with child.* The moral conduct of Cyrus is foretold, long before he had a being, in his mercy to God's people, and regard to the true God, in turning the captivity of the Jews, and promoting the building of the Temple, Isaiah xliv. 28, xlv. 13. Compare 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22, 23, and Ezra i. 1—4. How many instances of the moral conduct of the *Kings of the North and South*, particular instances of the wicked behavior of the Kings of Syria and Egypt, are foretold in the xith chapter of Daniel? Their corruption, violence, robbery, treachery and lies. And particularly, how much is foretold of the horrid wickedness of Antiochus Epiphanes, called there a *vile person*, instead of Epiphanes, or illustrious. In that chapter, and also in chap. viii. verses 9, 14, 23, to the end, are foretold his flattery, deceit and lies, his having *his heart set to do mischief*, and *set against the holy covenant*, his *destroying and treading under foot the holy people*, in a marvellous manner, his *having indignation against the holy covenant, setting his heart against it*, and *conspiring against it*, his *polluting the sanctuary of strength, treading it under foot, taking away the daily sacrifice, and placing*

the abomination that maketh desolate; his great pride, *magnifying himself against God*, and *uttering marvellous blasphemies against him*, until God in *indignation should destroy him.* Withal, the moral conduct of the Jews, on occasion of his persecution, is predicted. It is foretold, that *he should corrupt many by flatteries*, chap. xi. 32—34. But that others should behave with a glorious constancy and fortitude in opposition to him, ver. 32. And that some good men should fall and repent, ver. 35. Christ foretold Peter's sin, in denying his Lord, with its circumstances, in a peremptory manner. And so that great sin of Judas, in betraying his master, and its dreadful and eternal punishment in hell, was foretold in the like positive manner, Matth. xxvi. 21—25, and parallel places in the other Evangelists.

2. Many events have been foretold by God, which were consequent and dependent on the moral conduct of particular persons, and were accomplished, either by their virtuous or vicious actions.—Thus, the children of Israel's going down into Egypt to dwell there, was foretold to Abraham, Gen. xv., which was brought about by the wickedness of Joseph's brethren in selling him, and the wickedness of Joseph's mistress, and his own signal virtue in resisting her temptation. The accomplishment of the thing prefigured in Joseph's dream, depended on the same moral conduct. Jotham's parable and prophecy, Judges ix. 15—20, was accomplished by the wicked conduct of Abimelech, and the men of Shechem. The prophecies against the house of Eli, 1 Sam. chap. ii. and iii., were accomplished by the wickedness of Doeg the Edomite, in accusing the priests; and the great impiety, and extreme cruelty of Saul in destroying the priests at Nob, 1 Sam. xxii. Nathan's prophecy against David, 2 Sam. xii. 11, 12, was fulfilled by the horrible wickedness of Absalom, in rebelling against his father, seeking his life and lying with his concubines in the sight of the sun. The prophecy against Solomon, 1 Kings xi. 11—13, was fulfilled by Jeroboam's rebellion and usurpation, which are spoken of as his wickedness, 2 Chron. xiii. 5, 6, compare verse 18. The prophecy against Jeroboam's family, 1 Kings xiv., was fulfilled by the conspiracy, treason, and cruel murders of Baasha, 1 Kings xv. 27, &c. The predictions of the prophet Jehu against the house of Baasha, 1 Kings xvi. at the beginning, were fulfilled by the treason and parricide of Zimri, 1 Kings xvi. 9, 13, 20.

3. How often has God foretold the future moral conduct of nations and people, of numbers, bodies, and successions of men; with God's judicial proceedings, and many other events consequent and dependent on their virtues and vices; which could not be foreknown, if the volitions of men, wherein they acted as *moral agents*, had not been foreseen? The future cruelty of the Egyptians in oppressing Israel, and God's judging and punishing them for it, was foretold long before it came to pass, Gen. xv. 13, 14. The continuance of the iniquity of the Amorites, and the increase of it until it *should be full*, and they ripe for destruction, was foretold above four hundred years beforehand, Gen. xv. 16, Acts vii. 6, 7. The prophecies of the destruction of Jerusalem, and the land of Judah, were absolute, 2 Kings xx. 17—19, chap. xxii. 15 to the end. It was foretold in Hezekiah's time, and was abundantly insisted on in the book of the prophet Isaiah, who wrote nothing after Hezekiah's days. It was foretold in Josiah's time, in the beginning of a great reformation, 2 Kings xxii. And it is manifest by innumerable things in the predictions of the prophets, relating to this event, its time, its circumstances, its continuance and end; the return from the captivity, the restoration of the temple, city and land, and many circumstances and consequences of *that*; I say, these show plainly, that the prophecies of this great event were *absolute*. And yet this event was connected with, and dependent on

two things in men's moral conduct: First, the injurious rapine and violence of the king of Babylon and his people, as the efficient cause; which God often speaks of as what he highly resented, and would severely punish; and 2dly, the final obstinacy of the Jews. That great event is often spoken of as suspended on this, Jer. iv. 1, and v. 1, vii. 1—7, xi. 1—6, xvii. 24 to the end, xxv. 1—7, xxvi. 1—8, 13, and xxxviii. 17, 18. Therefore this destruction and captivity could not be foreknown, unless such a moral conduct of the Chaldeans and Jews had been foreknown. And then it was foretold, that the people *should be finally obstinate*, to the destruction and utter desolation of the city and land, Isa. vi. 9—11, Jer. i. 18, 19, vii. 27—29, Ezek. iii. 7, and xxiv. 13, 14.

The final obstinacy of those Jews who were left in the land of Israel, in their idolatry and rejection of the true God was foretold, by God, and the prediction confirmed with an oath, Jer. xliv. 26, 27. And God tells the people, Isa. xlviii. 3, 4—8, that he had predicted those things which should be consequent on their treachery and obstinacy, because he knew they would be obstinate, and that he had declared these things beforehand for their conviction of his being the only true God, &c.

The destruction of Babylon, with many of the circumstances of it, was foretold, as the judgment of God for the exceeding pride and haughtiness of the heads of that monarchy, Nebuchadnezzar and his successors, and their wickedly destroying other nations, and particularly for their exalting themselves against the true God and his people, before any of these monarchs had a being; Isa. chap. xiii. xiv. xlvii, compare Hab. ii. 5 to the end, and Jer. chap. i. and li. That Babylon's destruction was to be a *recompense, according to the works of their own hands*, appears by Jer. xxv. 14. The immorality which the people of Babylon, and particularly her princes and great men, were guilty of, that very night that the city was destroyed, their revelling and drunkenness at Belshazzar's idolatrous feasts, was foretold, Jer. li. 39, 57.

The return of the Jews from the Babylonish captivity is often very particularly foretold with many circumstances, and the promises of it are very peremptory, Jer. xxxi. 35—40, and xxxii. 6—15, 41—44, and xxxiii. 24—26. And the very time of their return was prefixed, Jer. xxv. 11—12, and xxix. 10—11, 2 Chron. xxxvi. 21, Ezek. iv. 6, and Dan. ix. 2. And yet the prophecies represent their return as consequent on their repentance. And their repentance itself is very expressly and particularly foretold, Jer. xxix. 12, 13, 14, xxxi. 8, 9, 18—31, l. 4, 5, Ezek. vi. 8, 9, 10, vii. 16, xiv. 22, 23, and xx. 43, 44.

It was foretold under the Old Testament, that the Messiah should suffer greatly through the malice and cruelty of men; as is largely and fully set forth, Psal. xxii., applied to Christ in the New Testament, Matth. xxvii. 35, 43, Luke xxiii. 34, John xix. 24, Heb. ii. 12. And likewise in Psal. lxix., which, it is also evident by the New Testament, is spoken of Christ; John ii. 17, xv. 25, &c. and Rom. xv. 3, Matth. xxvii. 34, 48, Mark xv. 23, John xix. 29. The same thing is also foretold, Isa. liii. and l. 6. and Mic. v. 1. This cruelty of men was their sin, and what they acted as moral agents. It was foretold, that there should be an union of Heathen and Jewish rulers against Christ, Psal ii. 1, 2, compared with Acts iv. 25—28. It was foretold, that the Jews should generally reject and despise the Messiah, Isa. xlix. 5, 6, 7, and liii. 1—3, Psal. xxii. 6, 7, and lxix. 4, 8, 19, 20. And it was foretold, that the body of that nation should be rejected in the Messiah's days, from being God's people, for their obstinacy in sin; Isa. xlix. 4—7, and viii. 14, 15, 16, compared with Rom. ix. 33, and Isa. lxv. at the beginning, compared with Rom. x. 20, 21. It was foretold, that Christ should be rejected by the chief priests and rulers

among the Jews, Psal. cxviii. 22, compared with Matth. xxi. 42, Acts iv. 11, 1 Pet. ii. 4, 7

Christ himself foretold his being delivered into the hands of the elders, chief priests and scribes, and his being cruelly treated by them, and condemned to death; and that he, by them, should be *delivered to the Gentiles;* and that he should be *mocked* and *scourged* and *crucified*, (Matth. xvi. 21, and xx. 17—19, Luke ix. 22, John viii. 28,) and that the people should be concerned in, and consenting to his death, (Luke xx. 13—18,) especially the inhabitants of Jerusalem, Luke xiii. 33—35. He foretold, that the disciples should all be offended because of him that night that he was betrayed, and should forsake him, Matth. xxvi. 31, John xvi. 32. He foretold, that he should be rejected of that generation, even the body of the people, and that they should continue obstinate, to their ruin, Matth. xii. 45, xxi. 33—42, and xxii. 1—7, Luke xiv. 16, 21, 24, xvii. 25, xix. 14, 27, 41—44, xx. 13—18.

As it was foretold in both Old Testament and New, that the Jews should reject the Messiah, so it was foretold that the Gentiles should receive Him, and so be admitted to the privileges of God's people; in places too many to be now particularly mentioned. It was foretold in the Old Testament, that the Jews should envy the Gentiles on this account, Deut. xxxii. 21, compared with Rom. x. 19. Christ himself often foretold, that the Gentiles would embrace the true religion, and become his followers and people, Matth. viii. 10, 11, 12, xxi. 41—43, and xxii. 8—10, Luke xiii 28, xiv. 16—24, and xx. 16, John x. 16. He also foretold the Jews' envy of the Gentiles on this occasion, Matth. xx. 12—16, Luke xv. 26 to the end. He foretold, that they should continue in this opposition and envy, and should manifest it in cruel persecutions of his followers, to their utter destruction, Matth. xxi. 33—42, xxii. 6, and xxiii. 34—39, Luke xi. 49—51. The Jews' obstinacy is also foretold, Acts xxii. 18. Christ often foretold the great persecutions his followers should meet with, both from Jews and Gentiles; Matth. x. 16—18, 21, 22, 34—36, and xxiv. 9, Mark xiii. 9, Luke x. 3, xii. 11, 49—53, and xxi. 12, 16, 17, John xv. 18—21, and xvi. 1—4. He foretold the martyrdom of particular persons, Matth. xx. 23. John xiii. 36, and xxi. 18, 19, 22. He foretold the great success of the Gospel in the city of Samaria, as near approaching; which afterwards was fulfilled by the preaching of Philip, John iv. 35—38. He foretold the rising of many deceivers after his departure, Matth. xxiv. 4, 5, 11, and the apostasy of many of his professed followers, Matth. xxiv. 10—12.

The persecutions, which the Apostle Paul was to meet with in the world, were foretold, Acts ix. 16, xx. 23, and xxi. 11. The apostle says to the Christian Ephesians, Acts xx. 29, 30, *I know that after my departure shall grievous wolves enter in among you, not sparing the flock; also of your own selves shall men arise, speaking perverse things, to draw away disciples after them.* The apostle says, He knew this; but he did not know it, if God did not know the future actions of moral agents.

4. Unless God foreknows the future actions of moral agents, all the prophecies we have in Scripture concerning the great Antichristian apostasy; the rise, reign, wicked qualities, and deeds of the man of sin, and his instruments and adherents; the extent and long continuance of his dominion, his influence on the minds of princes and others, to corrupt them, and draw them away to idolatry, and other foul vices; his great and cruel persecutions; the behavior of the saints under these great temptations, &c. &c. I say, unless the volitions of moral agents are foreseen, all these prophecies are uttered without knowing the things foretold.

The predictions relating to this great apostasy are all of a moral nature, relat

ing to men's virtues and vices, and their exercises, fruits and consequences, and events depending on them; and are very particular; and most of them often repeated, with many precise characteristics, descriptions, and limitations of qualities, conduct, influence, effects, extent, duration, periods, circumstances, final issue, &c., which it would be tedious to mention particularly. And to suppose, that all these are predicted by God, without any certain knowledge of the future moral behavior of free Agents, would be to the utmost degree absurd.

5. Unless God foreknows the future acts of men's wills, and their behavior as moral Agents, all those great things which are foretold both in the Old Testament and the New, concerning the erection, establishment and universal extent of the kingdom of the Messiah, were predicted and promised while God was in ignorance whether any of these things would come to pass or no, and did but guess at them. For that kingdom is not of this world, it does not consist in things external, but is within men, and consists in the dominion of virtue in their hearts, in righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost; and in these things made manifest in practice, to the praise and glory of God. The Messiah came to save men from their sins, and deliver them from their spiritual enemies; "that they might serve him in righteousness and holiness before him: He gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works." And therefore his success consists in gaining men's hearts to virtue, in their being made God's willing people in the day of his power. His conquest of his enemies consists in his victory over men's corruptions and vices. And such a victory, and such a dominion is often expressly foretold: that his kingdom should fill the earth; that all people, nations and languages should serve and obey him; and so that all nations should go up to the mountain of the house of the Lord, that he might teach them his ways, and that they might walk in his paths; and that all men should be drawn to Christ, and the earth be full of the knowledge of the Lord (by which, in the style of Scripture, is meant true virtue and religion) as the waters cover the seas; that God's law should be put into men's inward parts, and written in their hearts; and that God's people should be all righteous, &c. &c.

A very great part of the prophecies of the Old Testament is taken up in such predictions as these. And here I would observe, that the prophecies of the universal prevalence of the kingdom of the Messiah, and true religion of Jesus Christ, are delivered in the most peremptory manner, and confirmed by the oath of God. Isa. xlv. 22 to the end, "Look to me and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth; for I am God, and there is none else. I have SWORN by myself, the word is gone out of my mouth in righteousness, and shall not return, that unto Me every knee shall bow; and every tongue shall swear. SURELY, shall one say, in the Lord have I righteousness and strength; even to Him shall men come," &c. But here this peremptory declaration, and great oath of the Most High, are delivered with such mighty solemnity, to things which God did not know, if he did not certainly foresee the volitions of moral agents.

And all the predictions of Christ and his apostles, to the like purpose, must be without knowledge; as those of our Saviour comparing the kingdom of God to a grain of mustard seed, growing exceeding great, from a small beginning; and to leaven, hid in three measures of meal, until the whole was leavened, &c. And the prophecies in the epistles concerning the restoration of the nation of the Jews to the true church of God, and the bringing in the fulness of the Gentiles, and the prophecies in all the Revelation concerning the glorious change in the moral state of the world of mankind, attending the destruction of Antichrist, the kingdoms of the world becoming the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ

and its being granted to the church to be arrayed in that fine linen, white and clean, which is the righteousness of saints, &c.

Corol. 1. Hence that great promise and oath of God to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, so much celebrated in Scripture, both in the Old Testament and New, namely, *That in their seed all the nations and families of the earth should be blessed*, must have been made on uncertainties, if God does not certainly foreknow the volitions of moral agents. For the fulfilment of this promise consists in that success of Christ in the work of redemption, and that setting up of his spiritual kingdom over the nations of the world, which has been spoken of. Men are blessed in Christ no otherwise than as they are brought to acknowledge Him, trust in him, love and serve Him, as is represented and predicted in Psal. lxxii. 11, "All kings shall fall down before Him; all nations shall serve Him." With verse 17, "Men shall be blessed in Him; all nations shall call Him blessed." This oath to Jacob and Abraham is fulfilled in subduing men's iniquities; as is implied in that of the prophet Micah, chap. vii. 19, 20.

Corol. 2. Hence also it appears, that the first gospel promise that ever was made to mankind, that great prediction of the salvation of the Messiah, and His victory over Satan, made to our first parents, Gen. iii. 15, if there be no certain prescience of the volitions of moral agents, must have had no better foundation than conjecture. For Christ's victory over Satan consists in men's being saved from sin, and in the victory of virtue and holiness, over that vice and wickedness, which Satan, by his temptation has introduced, and wherein his kingdom consists.

6. If it be so, that God has not a prescience of the future actions of moral agents, it will follow, that the prophecies of Scripture in general are without foreknowledge. For Scripture prophecies, almost all of them, if not universally without any exception, are either predictions of the actings and behavior of moral agents, or of events depending on them, or some way connected with them; judicial dispensations, judgments on men for their wickedness, or rewards of virtue and righteousness, remarkable manifestations of favor to the righteous or manifestations of sovereign mercy to sinners, forgiving their iniquities, and magnifying the riches of divine Grace; or dispensations of Providence, in some respect or other, relating to the conduct of the subjects of God's moral government, wisely adapted thereto; either providing for what should be in a future state of things, through the volitions and voluntary actions of moral agents, or consequent upon them, and regulated and ordered according to them. So that all events that are foretold, are either moral events, or other events which are connected with, and accommodated to moral events.

That the predictions of Scripture in general must be without knowledge, if God does not foresee the volitions of men, will further app if it be considered, that almost all events belonging to the future state of the w of kind, the changes and revolutions which come to pass in empires, kin ms and nations, and all societies, depend innumerable ways on the acts of men's Wills: yea, on an innumerable multitude of millions of millions of volitions of mankind. Such is the state and course of things in the world of mankind, that one single event, which appears in itself exceeding inconsiderable, may, in the progress and series of things, occasion a succession of the greatest and most important and extensive events; causing the state of mankind to be vastly different from what it would otherwise have been, for all succeeding generations.

For instance, the coming into existence of those particular men, who have been the great conquerors of the world, which, under God, have had the main hand in all the consequent state of the world, in all after ages; such as Nebu-

chadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander, Pompey, Julius Cæsar, &c., undoubtedly depended on many millions of acts of the Will, which followed, and were occasioned one by another, in their parents. And perhaps most of these volitions depended on millions of volitions of hundreds and thousands of others, their contemporaries of the same generation; and most of these on millions of millions of volitions of others in preceding generations. As we go back, still the number of volitions, which were some way the occasion of the event, multiply as the branches of a river, until they come at last, as it were, to an infinite number. This will not seem strange to any one who well considers the matter; if we recollect what philosophers tell us of the innumerable multitudes of those things which are, as it were, the *principia*, or *stamina vitæ*, concerned in generation; the *animalcula* in *semine masculo*, and the *ova* in the womb of the female; the impregnation, or animating of one of these in distinction from all the rest, must depend on things infinitely minute, relating to the time and circumstances of the act of the parents, the state of their bodies, &c., which must depend on innumerable foregoing circumstances and occurrences; which must depend, infinite ways, on foregoing acts of their Wills; which are occasioned by innumerable things that happen in the course of their lives, in which their own, and their neighbor's behavior, must have a hand, an infinite number of ways. And as the volitions of others must be so many ways concerned in the conception and birth of such men; so, no less, in their preservation, and circumstances of life, their particular determinations and actions, on which the great revolutions they were the occasions of, depended. As, for instance, when the conspirators in Persia, against the Magi, were consulting about a succession to the empire, it came into the mind of one of them, to propose, that he whose horse neighed first, when they came together the next morning, should be king. Now such a thing's coming into his mind, might depend on innumerable incidents, wherein the volitions of mankind had been concerned. But, in consequence of this accident, Darius, the son of Histaspes, was king. And if this had not been, probably his successor would not have been the same, and all the circumstances of the Persian empire might have been far otherwise. And then perhaps Alexander might never have conquered that empire. And then probably the circumstances of the world, in all succeeding ages, might have been vastly otherwise. I might further instance in many other occurrences; such as those on which depended Alexander's preservation, in the many critical junctures of his life, wherein a small trifle would have turned the scale against him; and the preservation and success of the Roman people, in the infancy of their kingdom and commonwealth, and afterwards; which all the succeeding changes in their state, and the mighty revolutions that afterwards came to pass in the habitable world, depended upon. But these hints may be sufficient for every discerning considerate person, to convince him, that the whole state of the world of mankind, in all ages, and the very being of every person who has ever lived in it, in every age, since the times of the ancient prophets, has depended on more volitions, or acts of the Wills of men, than there are sands on the sea shore.

And therefore, unless God does most exactly and perfectly foresee the future acts of men's Wills, all the predictions which he ever uttered concerning David, Hezekiah, Josiah, Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander; concerning the four monarchies, and the revolutions in them; and concerning all the wars, commotions, victories, prosperities and calamities, of any of the kingdoms, nations or communities of the world, have all been without knowledge.

So that, according to this notion of God's not foreseeing the volitions and free actions of men, God could foresee nothing appertaining to the state of the

world of mankind in future ages; not so much as the being of one person that should live in it; and could foreknow no events, but only such as He would bring to pass himself by the extraordinary interposition of his immediate power; or things which should come to pass in the natural material world, by the laws of motion, and course of nature, wherein that is independent on the actions or works of mankind; that is, as he might, like a very able mathematician and astronomer, with great exactness calculate the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, and the greater wheels of the machine of the external creation.

And if we closely consider the matter, there will appear reason to convince us, that he could not, with any absolute certainty, foresee even these. As to the first, namely, things done by the immediate and extraordinary interposition of God's power, these cannot be foreseen, unless it can be foreseen when there shall be occasion for such extraordinary interposition. And that cannot be foreseen, unless the state of the moral world can be foreseen. For whenever God thus interposes, it is with regard to the state of the moral world, requiring such divine interposition. Thus God could not certainly foresee the universal deluge, the calling of Abraham, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the plagues on Egypt, and Israel's redemption out of it, the expelling the seven nations of Canaan, and the bringing Israel into that land; for these all are represented as connected with things belonging to the state of the moral world. Nor can God foreknow the most proper and convenient time of the day of judgment and general conflagration; for that chiefly depends on the course and state of things in the moral world.

Nor, secondly, can we on this supposition reasonably think, that God can certainly foresee what things shall come to pass, in the course of things, in the natural and material world, even those which, in an ordinary state of things, might be calculated by a good astronomer. For the moral world is the end of the natural world; and the course of things in the former, is undoubtedly subordinate to God's designs with respect to the latter. Therefore he has seen cause, from regard to the state of things in the moral world, extraordinarily to interpose, to interrupt and lay an arrest on the course of things in the natural world; and even in the greater wheels of its motion; even so as to stop the sun in its course. And unless he can foresee the volitions of men, and so know something of the future state of the moral world, he cannot know but that he may still have as great occasion to interpose in this manner, as ever he had; nor can he foresee how, or when he shall have occasion thus to interpose.

Corol. 1. It appears from the things which have been observed, that unless God foresees the volitions of moral agents, that cannot be true which is observed by the Apostle James, Acts xv. 18, "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world."

Corol. 2. It appears from what has been observed, that unless God foreknows the volitions of moral agents, all the prophecies of Scripture have no better foundation than mere conjecture; and that, in most instances, a conjecture which must have the utmost uncertainty; depending on an innumerable, and, as it were, infinite multitude of volitions, which are all, even to God, uncertain events: however, these prophecies are delivered as absolute predictions, and very many of them in the most positive manner, with asseverations; and some of them with the most solemn oaths.

Corol. 3. It also follows, from what has been observed, that if this notion of God's ignorance of future volitions be true, in vain did Christ say (after uttering many great and important predictions, concerning God's moral king

dom, and things depending on men's moral actions), Matthew xxiv 35, "Heaven and earth shall pass away; but my word shall not pass away."

Corol. 4. From the same notion of God's ignorance, it would follow, that in vain has God Himself often spoke of the predictions of his word, as evidences of his Foreknowledge; and so as evidences of that which is his prerogative as GOD, and his peculiar glory, greatly distinguishing Him from all other beings; as in Isa. xli. 22—26, xliii. 9, 10, xliv. 8, xlv. 21, xlvi. 10, and xlviii. 14.

Arg. II. If God does not foreknow the volitions of moral agents, then he did not foreknow the fall of man, nor of angels, and so could not foreknow the great things which are consequent on these events; such as his sending his Son into the world to die for sinners, and all things pertaining to the great work of redemption; all the things which were done for four thousand years before Christ came, to prepare the way for it; and the incarnation, life, death, resurrection and ascension of Christ; and the setting Him at the head of the universe, as King of heaven and earth, angels and men; and the setting up his church and kingdom in this world, and appointing Him the Judge of the world; and all that Satan should do in the world in opposition to the kingdom of Christ: and the great transactions of the day of judgment, that men and devils shall be the subjects of, and angels concerned in; they are all what God was ignorant of before the fall. And if so, the following scriptures, and others like them, must be without any meaning, or contrary to truth. Eph. i. 4, "According as he hath chosen us in Him before the foundation of the world." 1 Pet. i. 20, "Who verily was foreordained before the foundation of the world." 2 Tim. i. 9, "Who hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling; not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began." So, Eph. iii. 11 (speaking of the wisdom of God in the work of redemption), "According to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus." Tit. i. 2, "In hope of eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, promised before the world began." Rom. viii. 29, "Whom he did foreknow, them he also did predestinate," &c. 1 Pet. i. 2, "Elect, according to the foreknowledge of God the Father."

If God did not foreknow the fall of man, nor the redemption by Jesus Christ, nor the volitions of man since the fall; then he did not foreknow the saints in any sense; neither as particular persons, nor as societies or nations; either by election, or mere foresight of their virtue or good works; or any foresight of any thing about them relating to their salvation; or any benefit they have by Christ, or any manner of concern of theirs with a Redeemer.

Arg. III. On the supposition of God's ignorance of the future volitions of free agents, it will follow, that God must in many cases truly repent what he has done, so as properly to wish he had done otherwise: by reason that the event of things, in those affairs which are most important, viz., the affairs of his moral kingdom, being uncertain and contingent, often happens quite otherwise than he was aware beforehand. And there would be reason to understand, that in the most literal sense, in Gen. vi. 6, "It repented the Lord, that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart." And that, 1 Sam. xv. 11, contrary to that, Numb. xxiii. 19, "God is not the Son of man, that He should repent." And, 1 Sam. xv. 29, "Also the strength of Israel will not lie, nor repent; for He is not a man that he should repent." Yea, from this notion it would follow, that God is liable to repent and be grieved at his heart, in a literal sense, continually; and is always exposed to an infinite number of real disappointments in his governing the world; and to manifold, constant, great

perplexity and vexation; but this is not very consistent with his title of *God over all, blessed forever more;* which represents Him as possessed of perfect, constant and uninterrupted tranquillity and felicity, as God over the universe, and in his management of the affairs of the world, as supreme and universal Ruler. See Rom. i. 25, ix. 5, 2 Cor. xi. 31, 1 Tim. vi. 15.

ARG. IV. It will also follow from this notion, that as God is liable to be continually repenting what he has done; so he must be exposed to be constantly *changing* his mind and intentions, as to his future conduct; altering his measures, relinquishing his old designs, and forming new schemes and projections. For his purposes, even as to the main parts of his scheme, namely, such as belong to the state of his moral kingdom, must be always liable to be broken, through want of foresight; and he must be continually putting his system to rights, as it gets out of order through the contingence of the actions of moral agents; he must be a Being, who, instead of being absolutely immutable, must necessarily be the subject of infinitely the most numerous acts of repentance, and changes of intention, of any being whatsoever; for this plain reason, that his vastly extensive charge comprehends an infinitely greater number of those things which are to him contingent and uncertain. In such a situation, he must have little else to do, but to mend broken links as well as he can, and be rectifying his disjointed frame and disordered movements; in the best manner the case will allow. The Supreme Lord of all things must needs be under great and miserable disadvantages, in governing the world which he has made and has the care of, through his being utterly unable to find out things of chief importance, which, hereafter shall befall his system; which, if he did but know, he might make seasonable provision for. In many cases, there may be very great necessity that he should make provision, in the manner of his ordering and disposing things, for some great events which are to happen, of vast and extensive influence, and endless consequence to the universe; which he may see afterwards, when it is too late, and may wish in vain that he had known beforehand, that he might have ordered his affairs accordingly. And it is in the power of man, on these principles, by his devices, purposes and actions, thus to disappoint God, break his measures, make Him continually to change his mind, subject him to vexation, and bring him into confusion.

But how do these things consist with reason, or with the word of God? Which represents, that *all God's works*, all that he has ever to do, the whole scheme and series of his operations, are *from the beginning* perfectly in his view; and declares, that *whatever devices* and designs "are in the hearts of men, the counsel of the Lord is that which shall stand, and the thoughts of his heart to all generations," Prov. xix. 21, Psal. xxxiii. 10, 11, "And that which the Lord of Hosts hath purposed, none shall disannul," Isa. xiv. 27. And that he cannot be frustrated *in one design or thought*, Job xlii. 2. "And that which God doth, it shall be forever, that nothing can be put to it, or taken from it," Eccl. iii. 14. The stability and perpetuity of God's counsels are expressly spoken of as connected with the foreknowledge of God, Isa. xlvi. 10, "Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times, the things that are not yet done; saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure."—And how are these things consistent with what the Scripture says of God's immutability, which represents Him as "without variableness, or shadow of turning;" and speaks of Him most particularly as unchangeable with regard to his purposes, Mal. iii. 6, "I am the Lord; I change not; therefore ye sons of Jacob are not consumed," Exod. iii. 14, AM THAT AM, Job xxiii. 13, 14, "He is in

one mind; and who can turn Him? And what his soul desireth, even that he doth: for he performeth the thing that is appointed for me."

ARG. V. If this notion of God's ignorance of the future volitions of moral agents be thoroughly considered in its consequences, it will appear to follow from it, that God, after he had made the world, was liable to be wholly *frustrated of his end* in the creation of it; and so has been, in like manner, liable to be frustrated of his end in all the great works he hath wrought. It is manifest, the moral world is the end of the natural: the rest of the creation is but a house which God hath built, with furniture, for moral agents: and the good or bad state of the moral world depends on the improvement they make of their natural agency, and so depends on their volitions. And therefore, if these cannot be foreseen by God, because they are contingent, and subject to no kind of necessity, then the affairs of the moral world are liable to go wrong, to any assignable degree; yea, liable to be utterly ruined. As on this scheme, it may well be supposed to be literally said, when mankind, by the abuse of their moral agency, became very corrupt before the flood, "that the Lord repented that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved Him at his heart;" so, when He made the universe, He did not know but that he might be so disappointed in it, that it might grieve Him at his heart that he had made it. It actually proved, that all mankind became sinful, and a very great part of the angels apostatized: and how could God know beforehand, that all of them would not? And how could God know but that all mankind, notwithstanding means used to reclaim them, being still left to the freedom of their own Will, would continue in their apostasy, and grow worse and worse, as they of the old world before the flood did?

According to the scheme I am endeavoring to confute, neither the fall of men or angels, could be foreseen, and God must be greatly disappointed in these events; and so the grand scheme and contrivance for our redemption, and destroying the works of the devil, by the Messiah, and all the great things God has done in the prosecution of these designs, must be only the fruits of his own disappointment, and contrivances of his to mend and patch up, as well as he could, his system, which originally was all very good, and perfectly beautiful; but was marred, broken and confounded by the free Will of angels and men. And still he must be liable to be totally disappointed a second time: He could not know, that He should have his desired success, in the incarnation, life, death, resurrection and exaltation of his only begotten Son, and other great works accomplished to restore the state of things: He could not know, after all, whether there would actually be any tolerable measure of restoration; for this depended on the free Will of man. There has been a general great apostasy of almost all the Christian world, to that which was worse than heathenism; which continued for many ages. And how could God without foreseeing men's volitions, know whether ever Christendom would return from this apostasy? And which way could He tell beforehand how soon it would begin? The apostle says, it began to work in his time; and how could it be known how far it would proceed in that age? Yea, how could it be known that the gospel, which was not effectual for the reformation of the Jews, would ever be effectual for the turning of the heathen nations from their heathen apostasy, which they had been confirmed in for so many ages?

It is represented often in Scripture, that God, who made the world for Himself, and created it for his pleasure, would infallibly obtain his end in the creation, and in all his works; that as all things are of Him, so would all be to Him; and that in the final issue of things, it would appear that He is *the first*,

and the last, Rev. xx. 6, "And he said unto me, It is done. I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last." But these things are not consistent with God's being so liable to be disappointed in all his works, nor indeed with his failing of his end in any thing that he has undertaken or done.

SECTION XII.

God's certain Foreknowledge of the future Volitions of moral Agents, inconsistent with such a Contingence of those Volitions as is without all Necessity.

HAVING proved that GOD has a certain and infallible prescience of the act of the Will of moral agents, I come now, in the *second* place, to show the consequence; to show how it follows from hence, that these events are *necessary*, with a Necessity of connection or consequence.

The chief Arminian divines, so far as I have had opportunity to observe, deny this consequence; and affirm, that if such Foreknowledge be allowed, it is no evidence of any Necessity of the event foreknown. Now I desire, that this matter may be particularly and thoroughly inquired into. I cannot but think that, on particular and full consideration, it may be perfectly determined, whether it be indeed so or not.

In order to a proper consideration of this matter, I would observe the following things.

I. It is very evident, with regard to a thing whose existence is infallibly and indissolubly connected with something which already hath or has had existence, the existence of that thing is necessary. Here may be noted:

1. I observed before, in explaining the nature of Necessity, that in things which are past, their past existence is now necessary: having already made sure of existence, it is too late for any possibility of alteration in that respect: it is now impossible that it should be otherwise than true, that that thing has existed.

2. If there be any such thing as a divine Foreknowledge of the volitions of free agents, that Foreknowledge, by the supposition, is a thing which already *has*, and long ago *had*, existence; and so, now its existence is necessary; it is now utterly impossible to be otherwise than that this Foreknowledge should be, or should have been.

3. It is also very manifest, that those things which are indissolubly connected with other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary. As that proposition whose truth is necessarily connected with another proposition, which is necessarily true, is itself necessarily true. To say otherwise, would be a contradiction: it would be in effect to say, that the connection was indissoluble, and yet was not so, but might be broken. If that, whose existence is indissolubly connected with something whose existence is now necessary, is itself not necessary, then it may *possibly not exist*, notwithstanding that indissoluble connection of its existence.— Whether the absurdity be not glaring, let the reader judge.

4. It is no less evident, that if there be a full, certain, and infallible Foreknowledge of the future existence of the volitions of moral agents, then there is a certain infallible and indissoluble connection between those events and that Foreknowledge; and that therefore, by the preceding observations, those events

are necessary events; being infallibly and indissolubly connected with that whose existence already is, and so is now necessary, and cannot but have been.

To say the Foreknowledge is certain and infallible, and yet the connection of the event with that Foreknowledge is not indissoluble, but dissoluble and fallible, is very absurd. To affirm it, would be the same thing as to affirm that there is no necessary connection between a proposition's being infallibly known to be true, and its being true indeed. So that it is perfectly demonstrable, that if there be any infallible knowledge of future volitions, the event is *necessary;* or, in other words, that it is *impossible* but the event should come to pass. For if it be not impossible but that it may be otherwise, then it is not impossible but that the proposition which affirms its future coming to pass, may not now be true. But how absurd is that, on the supposition that there is now an infallible knowledge (i. e. knowledge which it is impossible should fail) that it is true. There is this absurdity in it, that it is not impossible but that there now should be no truth in that proposition which is now infallibly known to be true.

II. That no future event can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent, and without all necessity, may be proved thus; it is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect without *evidence.* To suppose otherwise, implies a contradiction: because, for a thing to be certainly known to any understanding, is for it to be *evident* to that understanding: and for a thing to be *evident* to any understanding, is the same thing as for that understanding to *see evidence* of it: but no understanding, created or uncreated, can *see evidence* where there is none: for that is the same thing as to see that to be which is not. And therefore, if there be any truth which is absolutely without evidence, that truth is absolutely unknowable, insomuch that it implies a contradiction to suppose that it is known.

But if there be any future event, whose existence is contingent, without all necessity, the future existence of the event is absolutely *without evidence.* If there be any evidence of it, it must be one of these two sorts, either *self-evidence* or *proof;* for there can be no other sort of evidence but one of these two: an evident thing must be either evident *in itself,* or evident *in something else;* that is, evident by connection with something else. But a future thing, whose existence is without all necessity, can have neither of these sorts of evidence. It cannot be *self-evident;* for if it be, it may be now known, by what is now to be seen in the thing itself; either its present existence, or the necessity of its nature: but both these are contrary to the supposition. It is supposed, both that the thing has no present existence to be seen, and also that it is not of such a nature as to be necessarily existent for the future: so that its future existence is not self-evident. And, *secondly,* neither is there any *proof,* or evidence *in any thing else,* or evidence of connection with something else that is evident; for this is also contrary to the supposition. It is supposed, that there is now nothing existent, with which the future existence of the *contingent* event is connected. For such a connection destroys its *contingence,* and supposes necessity. Thus it is demonstrated, that there is in the nature of things absolutely no evidence at all of the future existence of that event, which is contingent, without all necessity (if any such event there be), neither self-evidence nor proof. And therefore the thing in reality is not evident; and so cannot be seen to be evident, or, which is the same thing, cannot be known.

Let us consider this in an example. Suppose that five thousand seven hundred and sixty years ago there was no other being but the Divine Being; and then this world, or some particular body or spirit, all at once starts out of nothing into being, and takes on itself a particular nature and form; all in *absolute*

contingence, without any concern of God, or any other cause, in the matter, without any manner of ground or reason of its existence; or any dependence upon, or connection at all with, any thing foregoing: I say, that if this be supposed, there was no evidence of that event beforehand. There was no evidence of it to be seen *in the thing itself;* for the thing itself as yet was not. And there was no evidence of it to be seen *in any thing else;* for *evidence in* something else, is *connection with* something else: but such connection is contrary to the supposition. There was no evidence before, that this thing *would happen;* for, by the supposition, there was no reason why *it should happen*, rather than something else, or rather than nothing. And if so, then all things before were exactly equal, and the same with respect to that and other possible things; there was no preponderation, no superior weight or value; and therefore nothing that could be of any weight or value to determine any understanding. The thing was absolutely without evidence, and absolutely unknowable An increase of understanding, or of the capacity of discerning, has no tendency, and makes no advance, to a discerning any signs or evidences of it, let it be increased never so much; yea, if it be increased infinitely. The increase of the strength of sight may have a tendency to enable to discern the evidence which is far off, and very much hid, and deeply involved in clouds and darkness; but it has no tendency to enable to discern evidence where there is none. If the sight be infinitely strong, and the capacity of discerning infinitely great, it will enable to see all that there is, and to see it perfectly, and with ease: yet it has no tendency at all to enable a being to discern that evidence which is not; but, on the contrary, it has a tendency to enable to discern with great certainty that there is none.

III. To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be necessary events; or, which is the same thing, events which it is not impossible but that they may not come to pass; and yet to suppose that God certainly foreknows them, and knows all things, is to suppose God's knowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say, that God certainly, and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be, which at the same time he knows to be so *contingent* that it may possibly not be, is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself; or that one thing that he knows, is utterly inconsistent with another thing that he knows. It is the same thing as to say, he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth, which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth. If a future volition is so without all necessity, that there is nothing hinders but that it may not be, then the proposition which asserts its future existence, is so uncertain, that there is nothing hinders but that the truth of it may entirely fail. And if God knows all things, he knows this proposition to be thus uncertain. And that is inconsistent with his knowing that it is infallibly true, and so inconsistent with his infallibly knowing that it is true. If the thing be indeed contingent, God views it so, and judges it to be contingent, if he views things as they are. If the event be not necessary, then it is possible may never be: and if it be possible it may never be, God knows it may possibly never be; and that is to know that the proposition which affirms its existence, may possibly not be true; and that is to know that the truth of it is uncertain; which surely is inconsistent with his knowing it as a certain truth. If volitions are in themselves contingent events, without all necessity, then it is no argument of perfection of knowledge in any being to determine peremptorily that they will be; but, on the contrary, an argument of ignorance and mistake, because it would argue, that he supposes that proposition to be certain, which in its own nature, and all things considered, is uncertain and contingent. To

say, in such a case, that God may have ways of knowing contingent events which we cannot conceive of, is ridiculous; as much so, as to say that God may know contradictions to be true, for aught we know, or that he may know a thing to be certain, and at the same time know it not to be certain, though we cannot conceive how; because he has ways of knowing, which we cannot comprehend.

Corol. 1. From what has been observed, it is evident that the absolute *decrees* of God are no more inconsistent with human liberty, on account of any necessity of the event which follows from such decrees, than the absolute *Foreknowledge* of God. Because the connection between the event and certain Foreknowledge, is as infallible and indissoluble as between the event and an absolute decree. That is, it is no more impossible, that the event and decree should not agree together, than that the event and absolute knowledge should disagree. The connection between the event and Foreknowledge is absolutely perfect, by the supposition; because it is supposed, that the certainty and infallibility of the knowledge is absolutely perfect. And it being so, the certainty cannot be increased; and therefore the connection between the knowledge and the thing known, cannot be increased; so that if a decree be added to the Foreknowledge, it does not at all increase the connection, or make it more infallible and indissoluble. If it were not so, the certainty of knowledge might be increased by the addition of a decree; which is contrary to the supposition, which is, that the knowledge is absolutely perfect, or perfect to the highest possible degree.

There is as much of an impossibility but that the things which are infallibly foreknown should be, or (which is the same thing) as great a necessity of their future existence, as if the event were already written down, and was known and read by all mankind, through all preceding ages, and there was the most indissoluble and perfect connection possible between the writing and the thing written. In such a case, it would be as impossible the event should fail of existence, as if it had existed already; and a decree cannot make an event surer or more necessary than this.

And therefore, if there be any such Foreknowledge, as it has been proved there is, then necessity of connection and consequence is not at all inconsistent with any liberty which man or any other creature enjoys. And from hence it may be inferred, that absolute decrees of God, which do not at all increase the necessity, are not at all inconsistent with the liberty which man enjoys, on any such account, as that they make the event decreed necessary and render it utterly impossible but that it should come to pass. Therefore, if absolute decrees are inconsistent with man's liberty as a moral agent, or his liberty in a state of probation, or any liberty whatsoever that he enjoys, it is not on account of any necessity which absolute decrees infer.

Dr. Whitby supposes that there is a great difference between God's Foreknowledge, and his decrees, with regard to necessity of future events. In his "Discourse on the Five Points," p. 474, &c., he says, "God's prescience has no influence at all on our actions.—Should God, (says he,) by immediate revelation, give me the knowledge of the event of any man's state or actions, would my knowledge of them have any influence upon his actions? Surely none at all—our knowledge doth not effect the things we know, to make them more certain, or more future, than they would be without it. Now, Foreknowledge in God is knowledge. As therefore knowledge has no influence on things that are, so neither has Foreknowledge on things that shall be. And, consequently, the Foreknowledge of any action that would be otherwise free, cannot alter or diminish that freedom. Whereas God's decree of election is powerful and

active, and comprehends the preparation and exhibition of such means as shall unfrustrably produce the end. Hence God's prescience renders no actions necessary." And to this purpose, p. 473, he cites Origen, where he says, "God's prescience is not the cause of things future, but their being future is the cause of God's prescience that they will be:" and Le Blanc, where he says, "This is the truest resolution of this difficulty, that prescience is not the cause that things are future; but their being future is the cause they are foreseen." In like manner, Dr. Clark, in his "Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God," pp. 95—99. And the author of the "Freedom of Will in God and the Creature," speaking to the like purpose with Dr. WLitby, represents "Foreknowledge as having no more influence on things known, to make them necessary, than afterknowledge," or to that purpose.

To all which I would say, that what is said about knowledge, its not having influence on the thing known to make it necessary, is nothing to the purpose, nor does it in the least affect the foregoing reasoning. Whether prescience be the thing that *makes* the event necessary or no, it alters not the case. Infallible Foreknowledge may *prove* the Necessity of the event foreknown, and yet not be the thing which *causes* the Necessity. If the Foreknowledge be absolute, this *proves* the event known to be necessary, or proves that it is impossible but that the event should be, by some means or other, either by a decree, or some other way, if there be any other way; because, as was said before, it is absurd to say, that a proposition is known to be certainly and infallibly true, which yet may possibly prove not true.

The whole of the seeming force of this evasion lies in this; that, inasmuch as certain Foreknowledge does not *cause* an event to be necessary, as a decree does; therefore it does not *prove* it to be necessary, as a decree does. But there is no force in this arguing: for it is built wholly on this supposition, that nothing can *prove*, or *be an evidence* of a thing's being necessary, but that which has *a causal influence to make it so*. But this can never be maintained. If certain Foreknowledge of the future existing of an event, be not the thing which first *makes* it impossible that it should fail of existence; yet it may, and certainly does, *demonstrate* that it is impossible it should fail of it, however that impossibility comes. If Foreknowledge be not the cause, but the effect, of this impossibility, it may prove that there is such an impossibility, as much as if it were the cause. It is as strong arguing from the effect to the cause, as from the cause to the effect. It is enough, that an existence, which is infallibly foreknown, cannot fail, whether that impossibility arise from the Foreknowledge, or is prior to it. It is as evident, as it is possible any thing should be, that it is impossible a thing which is infallibly known to be true, should prove not to be true: therefore there is a *Necessity* connected with such knowledge; whether the knowledge be the cause of this Necessity, or the Necessity the cause of the knowledge.

All certain knowledge, whether it be Foreknowledge or afterknowledge, or concomitant knowledge, proves the thing known now to be necessary, by some means or other; or proves that it is impossible it should now be otherwise than true. I freely allow that Foreknowledge does not prove a thing to be necessary any more than afterknowledge: but then afterknowledge, which is certain and infallible, proves that it is now become impossible but that the proposition known should be true. Certain afterknowledge, proves that it is now, in the time of the knowledge, by some means or other, become impossible but that the proposition, which predicates *past* existence on the event, should be true. And so does certain Foreknowledge prove, that now, in the time of the

knowledge, it is, by some means or other, become impossible but that the proposition, which predicates *future* existence on the event, should be true. The Necessity of the truth of the propositions, consisting in the present impossibility of the nonexistence of the event affirmed, in both cases, is the immediate ground of the certainty of the knowledge; there can be no certainty of knowledge without it.

There must be a certainty in things themselves, before they are certainly known, or (which is the same thing) known to be certain. For certainty of knowledge is nothing else but knowing or discerning the certainty there is in the things themselves, which are known. Therefore there must be a certainty in things to be a ground of certainty of knowledge, and to render things capable of being known to be certain.—And this is nothing but the Necessity of the truth known, or its being impossible but that it should be true; or, in other words, the firm and infallible connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition that contains that truth. All certainty of knowledge consists in the view of the firmness of that connection. So God's certain Foreknowledge of the future existence of any event, is his view of the firm and indissoluble connection of the subject and predicate of the proposition that affirms its future existence. The subject is that possible event; the predicate is its future existing: but if future existence be firmly and indissolubly connected with that event, then the future existence of that event is necessary. If God certainly knows the future existence of an event which is wholly contingent, and may possibly never be, then He sees a firm connection between a subject and predicate that are not firmly connected; which is a contradiction

I allow what Dr. Whitby says to be true, *That mere knowledge does not affect the thing known, to make it more certain or more future.* But yet, I say, it *supposes* and *proves* the thing to be *already*, both *future* and *certain;* i. e. necessarily future. Knowledge of *futurity*, supposes *futurity;* and a *certain knowledge* of futurity, supposes *certain futurity*, antecedent to that certain knowledge. But there is no other certain futurity of a thing, antecedent to certainty of knowledge, than a prior impossibility but that the thing should prove true; or (which is the same thing) the Necessity of the event.

I would observe one thing further concerning this matter; it is this; that if it be as those forementioned writers suppose, that God's Foreknowledge is not the cause, but the effect of the existence of the event foreknown; this is so far from showing that this Foreknowledge doth not infer the Necessity of the existence of that event, that it rather shows the contrary the more plainly. Because it shows the existence of the event to be so settled and firm, that it is as if it had already been; inasmuch as *in effect* it actually exists already; its future existence has already had actual *influence*, and *efficiency*, and has *produced an effect*, viz., Prescience: the effect exists already; and as the effect supposes the cause, is connected with the cause, and depends entirely upon it, therefore it is as if the future event, which is the cause, had existed already. The effect is as firm as possible, it having already the possession of existence, and made sure of it. But the effect cannot be more firm and stable than its cause, ground and reason. The building cannot be firmer than the foundation.

To illustrate this matter, let us suppose the appearances and images of things in a glass; for instance, a reflecting telescope to be the real effects of heavenly bodies (at a distance, and out of sight) which they resemble: if it be so, then as these images in the telescope have had a past actual existence, and it is become utterly impossible now that it should be otherwise than that they have existed; so they, being the true effects of the heavenly bodies

they resemble, this proves the existing of those heavenly bodies to be as real, infallible, firm and necessary, as the existing of these effects; the one being connected with, and wholly depending on the other. Now let us suppose future existences some way or other to have influence back, to produce effects beforehand, and cause exact and perfect images of themselves in a glass, a thousand years before they exist, yea, in all preceding ages; but yet that these images are real effects of these future existences, perfectly dependent on, and connected with them as their cause; these effects and images, having already had actual existence, rendering that matter of their existing perfectly firm and stable, and utterly impossible to be otherwise; this proves in like manner, as in the other instance, that the existence of the things, which are their causes, is also equally sure, firm and necessary; and that it is alike impossible but that they should be, as if they had been already, as their effects have. And if, instead of images in a glass, we suppose the antecedent effects to be perfect ideas of them in the Divine Mind, which have existed there from all eternity, which are as properly effects, as truly and properly connected with their cause, the case is not altered.

Another thing which has been said by some *Arminians* to take off the force of what is urged from God's Prescience, against the contingence of the volitions of moral agents, is to this purpose: "That when we talk of Foreknowledge in God, there is no strict propriety in our so speaking; and that although it be true, that there is in God the most perfect knowledge of all events from eternity to eternity, yet there is no such thing as *before* and *after* in God, but he sees all things by one perfect unchangeable view, without any succession."

To this I answer,

1. It has been already shown, that all certain knowledge proves the Necessity of the truth known; whether it be *before*, *after*, or *at the same time*. Though it be true, that there is no succession in God's knowledge, and the manner of his knowledge is to us inconceivable, yet thus much we know concerning it, that there is no event, past, present, or to come, that God is ever uncertain of: he never is, never was, and never will be without infallible knowledge of it: he always sees the existence of it to be certain and infallible And as he always sees things just as they are in truth; hence there never is in reality any thing contingent in such a sense, as that possibly it may happen never to exist. If, strictly speaking, there is no Foreknowledge in God, it is because those things, which are future to us, are as present to God, as if they already had existence: and that is as much as to say, that future events are always in God's view as evident, clear, and necessary, as if they already were. If there never is a time wherein the existence of the event is not present with God, then there never is a time wherein it is not as much impossible for it to fail of existence, as if its existence were present, and were already come to pass.

God's viewing things so perfectly and unchangeably as that there is no succession in his ideas or judgment does not hinder but that there is properly now, in the mind of God, a certain and perfect knowledge of moral actions of men, which to us are a hundred years hence: yea the objection supposes this, and therefore it certainly does not hinder but that, by the foregoing arguments, it is now impossible these moral actions should not come to pass.

We know, that God knows the future voluntary actions of men in such a sense beforehand, as that he is able particularly to declare, and foretell them, and write them, or cause them to be written down in a book, as He often has done; and that therefore the necessary connection which there is between God's knowledge and the event known, does as much prove the event to be

necessary beforehand, as if the Divine Knowledge were in the same sense before the event, as the prediction or writing is. If the knowledge be infallible, then the expression of it in the written prediction is infallible; that is, there is an infallible connection between that written prediction and the event. And if so, then it is impossible it should ever be otherwise, than that that prediction and the event should agree: and this is the same thing as to say, it is impossible but that the event should come to pass: and this is the same as to say that its coming to pass is necessary.—So that it is manifest, that there being no proper succession in God's mind, makes no alteration as to the Necessity of the existence of the events which God knows. Yea,

2. This is so far from weakening the proof, which has been given of the impossibility of the not coming to pass of future events known, as that it establishes that, wherein the strength of the foregoing arguments consists, and shows the clearness of the evidence. For,

(1.) The very reason why God's knowledge is without succession, is because it is absolutely perfect, to the highest possible degree of clearness and certainty: all things, whether past, present, or to come, being viewed with equal evidence and fulness; future things being seen with as much clearness, as if they were present; the view is always in absolute perfection; and absolute constant perfection admits of no alteration, and so no succession; the actual existence of the thing known, does not at all increase, or add to the clearness or certainty of the thing known: God calls the things that are not as though they were; they are all one to him as if they had already existed. But herein consists the strength of the demonstration before given, of the impossibility of the not existing of those things, whose existence God knows; that it is as impossible they should fail of existence, as if they existed already. This objection, instead of weakening this argument, sets it in the clearest and strongest light; for it supposes it to be so indeed, that the existence of future events is in God's view so much as if it already had been, that when they come actually to exist, it makes not the least alteration or variation in his view or knowledge of them.

(2.) The objection is founded on the *immutability* of God's knowledge: for it is the immutability of knowledge which makes his knowledge to be without succession. But this most directly and plainly demonstrates the thing I insist on, viz., that it is utterly impossible the known events should fail of existence. For if that were possible, then it would be possible for there to be a change in God's knowledge and view of things. For if the known event should fail of existence, and not come into being as God expected, then God would see it, and so would change his mind, and see his former mistake; and thus there would be change and succession in his knowledge. But as God is immutable, and so it is utterly impossible that his view should be changed; so it is, for the same reason, just so impossible that the foreknown event should not exist: and that is to be impossible in the highest degree: and therefore the contrary is necessary. Nothing is more impossible than that the immutable God should be changed, by the succession of time; who comprehends all things, from eternity to eternity, in one, most perfect, and unalterable view; so that his whole eternal duration is *vitæ interminabilis, tota, simul, et perfecta possessio.*

On the whole, I need not fear to say, that there is no geometrical theorem or proposition whatsoever, more capable of strict demonstration, than that God's certain prescience of the volitions of moral agents is inconsistent with such a contingence of these events, as is without all Necessity; and so is inconsistent with the *Arminian* notion of liberty.

Corol. 2 Hence the doctrine of the *Calvinists*, concerning the absolute decrees of God, does not at all infer any more *fatality* in things, than will demonstrably follow from the doctrine of most *Arminian* divines, who acknowledge God's omniscience, and universal prescience. Therefore all objections they make against the doctrine of the *Calvinists*, as implying Hobbes' doctrine of Necessity, or the *stoical* doctrine of *fate*, lie no more against the doctrine of *Calvinists*, than their own doctrine: and therefore it doth not become those divines, to raise such an outcry against the *Calvinists*, on this account.

Corol. 3. Hence all arguing from Necessity, against the doctrine of the inability of unregenerate men to perform the conditions of salvation, and the commands of God requiring spiritual duties, and against the *Calvinistic* doctrine of efficacious grace; I say, all arguings of *Arminians* (such of them as own God's omniscience) against these things, on this ground, that these doctrines, though they do not suppose men to be under any constraint or coaction, yet suppose them under Necessity, with respect to their moral actions, and those things which are required of them in order to their acceptance with God; and their arguing against the Necessity of men's volitions, taken from the reasonableness of God's commands, promises, and threatenings, and the sincerity of his counsels and invitations; and all objections against any doctrines of the *Calvinists* as being inconsistent with human liberty, because they infer Necessity; I say, all these arguments and objections must fall to the ground, and be justly esteemed vain and frivolous, as coming from them; being maintained in an inconsistence with themselves, and in like manner levelled against their own doctrine, as against the doctrine of the *Calvinists*.

SECTION XIII.

Whether we suppose the volitions of moral agents to be connected with any thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian Liberty.

Every act of the Will has a cause, or it has not. If it has a cause, then, according to what has already been demonstrated, it is not contingent, but necessary; the effect being necessarily dependent and consequent on its cause; and that let the cause be what it will. If the cause is the Will itself, by antecedent acts choosing and determining; still the *determined* and *caused* act must be a necessary effect. The act, that is the determined effect of the foregoing act which is its cause, cannot prevent the efficiency of its cause; but must be wholly subject to its determination and command, as much as the motions of the hands and feet. The consequent commanded acts of the Will are as passive and as necessary, with respect to the antecedent determining acts as the parts of the body are to the volitions which determine and command them. And therefore if all the free acts of the Will are thus, if they are all determined effects, determined by the Will itself, that is, determined by antecedent choice, then they are all necessary; they are all subject to, and decisively fixed by the foregoing act, which is their cause: yea, even the determining act itself; for that must be determined and fixed by another act, preceding that, if it be a free and voluntary act; and so must be necessary. So that by this all the free acts of the Will are necessary, and cannot be free unless they are necessary.

because they cannot be free, according to the *Arminian* notion of freedom, unless they are determined by the Will; which is to be determined by antecedent choice; which being their cause, proves them necessary. And yet they say, Necessity is utterly inconsistent with Liberty. So that, by their scheme, the acts of the Will cannot be free unless they are necessary, and yet cannot be free if they be necessary!

But if the other part of the dilemma be taken, and it be affirmed that the free acts of the Will have no cause, and are connected with nothing whatsoever that goes before them and determines them, in order to maintain their proper and absolute contingence, and this should be allowed to be possible; still it will not serve their turn. For if the volition come to pass by perfect contingence, and without any cause at all, then it is certain, no act of the Will, no prior act of the soul was the cause, no determination or choice of the soul, had any hand in it. The Will, or the soul, was indeed the subject of what happened to it accidentally, but was not the cause. The Will is not active in causing or determining, but purely the passive subject; at least, according to their notion of action and passion. In this case, contingence does as much prevent the determination of the Will, as a proper cause; and as to the Will, it was necessary, and could be no otherwise. For to suppose that it could have been otherwise, if the Will or soul had pleased, is to suppose that the act is dependent on some prior act of choice or pleasure; contrary to what is now supposed: it is to suppose that it might have been otherwise, if its cause had made it or ordered it otherwise. But this does not agree to its having no cause or orderer at all. That must be necessary as to the soul, which is dependent on no free act of the soul: but that which is without a cause, is dependent on no free act of the soul: because, by the supposition, it is dependent on nothing, and is connected with nothing. In such a case, the soul is necessarily subjected to what accident brings to pass, from time to time, as much as the earth, that is inactive, is necessarily subjected to what falls upon it. But this does not consist with the *Arminian* notion of Liberty, which is the Will's power of determining itself in its own acts, and being wholly active in it, without passiveness, and without being subject to Necessity.—Thus Contingence belongs to the *Arminian* notion of Liberty, and yet is inconsistent with it.

I would here observe, that the author of the *Essay on the Freedom of Will, in God and the Creature*, page 76, 77, says as follows: "The word *Chance* always means something done without design. Chance and design stand in direct opposition to each other: and chance can never be properly applied to acts of the will, which is the spring of all design, and which designs to choose whatsoever it doth choose, whether there be any superior fitness in the thing which it chooses, or no; and it designs to determine itself to one thing, where two things, perfectly equal, are proposed, merely because it will." But herein appears a very great inadvertence in this author. For, *if the Will be the spring of all design*, as he says, then certainly it is not always the *effect* of design; and the acts of the Will themselves must sometimes come to pass, when they do not *spring from* design; and consequently come to pass by chance, according to his own definition of chance. And if *the Will designs to choose whatsoever it does choose*, and *designs to determine itself*, as he says, then it designs to determine all its designs. Which carries us back from one design to a foregoing design determining that, and to another determining that; and so on *in infinitum* The very first design must be the effect of foregoing design, or else it must be by chance, in his notion of it.

Here another alternative may be proposed, relating to the connection of the acts of the Will with something foregoing that is their cause, not much unlike to the other; which is this; either human liberty is such, that it may well stand with volitions being necessarily connected with the views of the understanding, and so is consistent with Necessity; or it is inconsistent with, and contrary to, such a connection and Necessity. The former is directly subversive of the *Arminian* notion of liberty, consisting in freedom from all Necessity. And if the latter be chosen, and it be said that liberty is inconsistent with any such necessary connection of volition with foregoing views of the understanding, it consisting in freedom from any such Necessity of the Will as that would imply; then the liberty of the soul consists (in part at least) in freedom from restraint, limitation and government, in its actings, by the understanding, and in liberty and liableness to act contrary to the understanding's views and dictates; and consequently the more the soul has of this disengagedness, in its acting, the more liberty. Now let it be considered what this brings the noble principle of human liberty to, particularly when it is possessed and enjoyed in its perfection, viz., a full and perfect freedom and liableness to act altogether at random, without the least connection with, or restraint or government by, any dictate of reason, or any thing whatsoever apprehended, considered or viewed by the understanding; as being inconsistent with the full and perfect sovereignty of the Will over its own determinations. The notion mankind have conceived of liberty, is some dignity or privilege, something worth claiming. But what dignity or privilege is there, in being given up to such a wild contingence as this, to be perfectly and constantly liable to act unintelligently and unreasonably, and as much without the guidance of understanding, as if we had none, or were as destitute of perception, as the smoke that is driven by the wind!

PART III.

WHEREIN IS INQUIRED, WHETHER ANY SUCH LIBERTY OF WILL AS ARMINIANS HOLD, BE NECESSARY TO MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE AND VICE, PRAISE AND DISPRAISE, ETC.

SECTION I.

God's Moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy.

Having considered the *first* thing that was proposed to be inquired into, relating to that freedom of Will which *Arminians* maintain; namely, Whether any such thing does, ever did, or ever can exist, or be conceived of; I come now to the *second* thing proposed to be the subject of inquiry, viz., Whether any such kind of liberty be requisite to moral agency, virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment, &c.

I shall begin with some consideration of the virtue and agency of the Supreme moral agent, and fountain of all agency and virtue.

Dr. Whitby, in his discourses on the Five Points, p. 14, says, "If all human actions are necessary, virtue and vice must be empty names; we being capable of nothing that is blameworthy, or deserveth praise; for who can blame a person

for doing only what he could not help, or judge that he deserveth praise only for what he could not avoid?" To the like purpose he speaks in places innumerable; especially in his discourse on the *Freedom of the Will;* constantly maintaining, that a *freedom not only from coaction, but necessity,* is absolutely requisite, in order to actions being either worthy of blame, or deserving of praise. And to this agrees, as is well known, the current doctrine of *Arminian* writers, who, in general, hold, that there is no virtue or vice, reward or punishment, nothing to be commended or blamed, without this freedom. And yet Dr Whitby, p. 300, allows, that God is without this freedom; and *Arminians,* so far as I have had opportunity to observe, generally acknowledge that God is necessarily holy, and his Will necessarily determined to that which is good.

So that putting these things together, the infinitely holy God, who used always to be esteemed by God's people not only virtuous, but a Being in whom is all possible virtue, and every virtue in the most absolute purity and perfection, and in infinitely greater brightness and amiableness than in any creature; the most perfect pattern of virtue, and the fountain from whom all others' virtue is as beams from the sun; and who has been supposed to be, on the account of his virtue and holiness, infinitely more worthy to be esteemed, loved, honored, admired, commended, extolled and praised, than any creature: and He, who is thus everywhere represented in Scripture; I say, this Being, according to this notion of Dr. Whitby, and other *Arminians,* has no virtue at all: virtue, when ascribed to him, is but *an empty name;* and he is deserving of no commendation or praise: because he is under necessity. He cannot avoid being holy and good as he is; therefore no thanks to him for it. It seems, the holiness, justice, faithfulness, &c., of the Most High, must not be accounted to be of the nature of that which is virtuous and praiseworthy. They will not deny, that these things in God are good; but then we must understand them, that they are no more virtuous, or of the nature of any thing commendable, than the good that is in any other being that is not a moral agent; as the brightness of the sun, and the fertility of the earth, are good, but not virtuous, because these properties are necessary to these bodies, and not the fruit of self-determining power.

There needs no other confutation of this notion of God's not being virtuous or praiseworthy, to Christians acquainted with the Bible, but only stating and particularly representing it. To bring texts of Scripture, wherein God is represented as in every respect, in the highest manner virtuous, and supremely praiseworthy, would be endless, and is altogether needless to such as have been brought up in the light of the gospel.

It were to be wished, that Dr. Whitby, and other divines of the same sort, had explained themselves, when they have asserted, that *that* which is necessary, is *not deserving of praise;* at the same time that they have owned God's perfection to be necessary, and so in effect representing God as not deserving praise. Certainly, if their words have any meaning at all, by *praise,* they must mean the exercise or testimony of some sort of esteem, respect and honorable regard. And will they then say, that men are worthy of that esteem, respect and honor for their virtue, small and imperfect as it is, which yet God is not worthy of, for his infinite righteousness, holiness and goodness? If so, it must be, because of some sort of peculiar excellency in the virtuous man, which is his prerogative, wherein he really has the preference; some dignity, that is entirely distinguished from any excellency, amiableness, or honorableness in God: not in imperfection and dependence, but in pre-eminence: which therefore he does not receive from God, nor is God the fountain or pattern of it; nor can God, in that respect, stand

in competition with him, as the object of honor and regard; but man may claim a peculiar esteem, commendation and glory, that God can have no pretension to. Yea, God has no right, by virtue of his necessary holiness, to intermeddle with that grateful respect and praise due to the virtuous man, who chooses virtue, in the exercise of a freedom *ad utrumque;* any more than a precious stone, which cannot avoid being hard and beautiful.

And if it be so, let it be explained what that peculiar respect is, that is due to the virtuous man, which differs in nature and kind, in some way of pre-eminence from all that is due to God. What is the name or description of that peculiar affection? Is it esteem, love, admiration, honor, praise or gratitude? The Scripture everywhere represents God as the highest object of all these: there we read of the *soul's magnifying the Lord, of loving Him with all the heart, with all the soul, with all the mind, and with all the strength; admiring* Him, *and his righteous acts,* or greatly regarding them, as *marvellous and wonderful; honoring, glorifying, exalting, extolling, blessing, thanking* and *praising* Him; *giving unto Him all the glory* of the good which is done or received, rather than unto men; *that no flesh should glory in his presence;* but that He should be regarded as the Being to whom all glory is due. What then is that respect? What passion, affection or exercise is it, that *Arminians* call *praise,* diverse from all these things, which men are worthy of for their virtue, and which God is not worthy of, in any degree?

If that necessity which attends God's moral perfections and actions, be as inconsistent with a being worthy of praise as a necessity of coaction; as is plainly implied in, or inferred from Dr. Whitby's discourse; then why should we thank God for his goodness, any more than if he were forced to be good, or any more than we should thank one of our fellow creatures who did us good, not freely, and of good will, or from any kindness of heart, but from mere compulsion, or extrinsical necessity? *Arminians* suppose, that God is necessarily a good and gracious Being: for this they make the ground of some of their main arguments against many doctrines maintained by *Calvinists;* they say, these are *certainly* false, and it is *impossible* they should be true, because they are not consistent with the goodness of God. This supposes, that it is *impossible* but that God should be good: for if it be possible that he should be otherwise, then that impossibility of the truth of these doctrines ceases, according to their own argument.

That virtue in God, in the most proper sense, *rewardable,* is not for want of merit in his moral perfections and actions, sufficient to deserve rewards from his creatures; but because he is infinitely above all capacity of receiving any reward or benefit from the creature: He is already infinitely and unchangeably happy, and we cannot be profitable unto him. But still he is worthy of our supreme benevolence for his virtue; and would be worthy of our beneficence, which is the fruit and expression of benevolence, if our goodness could extend to him. If God deserves to be thanked and praised for his goodness, he would, for the same reason, deserve that we should also *requite* his kindness, if that were possible. *What shall I render to the Lord for all his benefits?* is the natural language of thankfulness; and so far as in us lies, it is our duty to recompense God's goodness, and *render again according to benefits received.* And that we might have opportunity for so natural an expression of our gratitude to God, as beneficence, notwithstanding his being infinitely above our reach: He has appointed others to be his receivers, and to stand in his stead, as the objects of our beneficence; such are especially our indigent brethren

SECTION II.

The Acts of the Will of the human Soul of Jesus Christ necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous, praiseworthy, rewardable, &c.

I have already considered how Dr. Whitby insists upon it, that a freedom, not only from coaction, but necessity, is *requisite either to virtue or vice, praise or dispraise, reward or punishment.* He also insists on the same freedom as absolutely requisite to a person's being the subject of a *law*, of *precepts* or *prohibitions;* in the book before mentioned, (p. 301, 314, 328, 339, 340, 341, 342, 347, 361, 373, 410.) And of *promises* and *threatenings*, (p. 298, 301, 305, 311, 339, 340, 363.) And as requisite to *a state of trial*, (p. 297, &c.)

Now therefore, with an eye to these things, I would inquire into the moral conduct and practice of our Lord Jesus Christ, which he exhibited in his human nature here, in his state of humiliation. And *first*, I would show, that his holy behavior was *necessary;* or that it was *impossible* it should be otherwise, than that he should behave himself holily, and that he should be perfectly holy in each individual act of his life. And *secondly*, that his holy behavior was properly of the nature of *virtue* and was *worthy of praise;* and that he was the subject of *law, precepts* or *commands, promises* and *rewards;* and that he was *in a state of trial.*

I. It was *impossible*, that the acts of the Will of the human soul of Christ should, in any instance, degree or circumstance, be otherwise than holy, and agreeable to God's nature and will. The following things make this evident.

1. God had promised so effectually to preserve and uphold Him by his Spirit, under all his temptations, that he could not fail of reaching the end for which he came into the world; which he would have failed of, had he fallen into sin. We have such a promise, Isa. xlii. 1, 2, 3, 4, "Behold my Servant, whom I uphold; mine Elect, in whom my soul delighteth: I have put my Spirit upon him: He shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles: He shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street. He shall bring forth judgment unto truth. He shall not fail nor be discouraged, till He have set judgment in the earth; and the isles shall wait for his law." This promise of Christ's having God's Spirit put upon Him, and his not crying and lifting up his voice, &c., relates to the time of Christ's appearance on earth; as is manifest from the nature of the promise, and also the application of it in the New Testament, Matthew xii. 18. And the words imply a promise of his being so upheld by God's Spirit, that he should be preserved from sin; particularly from pride and vainglory, and from being overcome by any of the temptations he should be under to affect the glory of this world, the pomp of an earthly prince, or the applause and praise of men: and that he should be so upheld, that he should by no means fail of obtaining the end of his coming into the world, of bringing forth judgment unto victory, and establishing his kingdom of grace in the earth. And in the following verses, this promise is confirmed, with the greatest imaginable solemnity. "Thus saith the Lord, he that created the heavens, and stretched them out: He that spread forth the earth, and that which cometh out of it: He that giveth breath unto the people upon it, and spirit to them that walk therein: I the Lord have called Thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand; and will keep thee and give thee for a covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles, to open

the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison house. I am JEHOVAH, that is my name," &c.

Very parallel with these promises is that, Isa. xlix. 7, 8, 9, which also has an apparent respect to the time of Christ's humiliation on earth. "Thus saith the Lord, the Redeemer of Israel, and his Holy One, to him whom man despiseth, to him whom the nation abhorreth, to a servant of rulers; kings shall see and arise, princes also shall worship; because of the Lord that is faithful, and the Holy One of Israel, and he shall choose Thee. Thus saith the Lord, in an acceptable time have I heard Thee; in a day of salvation have I helped Thee; and I will preserve Thee, and give Thee for a covenant of the people, to establish the earth," &c.

And in Isa. l. 5—9, we have the Messiah expressing his assurance, that God would help Him, by so opening his ear, or inclining his heart to God's commandments that He should not be rebellious, but should persevere, and not apostatize, or turn his back; that through God's help, He should be immovable, in a way of obedience, under the great trials of reproach and suffering he should meet with; setting his face like a flint: so that he knew, he should not be ashamed, or frustrated in his design, and finally should be approved and justified, as having done his work faithfully. "The Lord hath opened mine ear; so that I was not rebellious, neither turned away my back: I gave my back to the smiters, and my cheeks to them that plucked off the hair; I hid not my face from shame and spitting. For the Lord God will help me; therefore shall I not be confounded; therefore have I set my face as a flint, and I know that I shall not be ashamed. He is near that justifieth me: who will contend with me? Let us stand together. Who is mine adversary? Let him come near to me. Behold the Lord God will help me; who is he that shall condemn me? Lo, they shall all wax old as a garment, the moth shall eat them up."

2. The same thing is evident from all the promises which God made to the Messiah, of his future glory, kingdom and success, in his office and character of a Mediator: which glory could not have been obtained, if his holiness had failed, and he had been guilty of sin. God's absolute promise of any thing, makes the things promised *necessary*, and their failing to take place absolutely *impossible:* and, in like manner, it makes those things necessary, on which the things promised depend, and without which they cannot take effect. Therefore it appears, that it was utterly impossible that Christ's holiness should fail, from such absolute promises as those, Psal. cx. 4, "The Lord hath sworn, and will not repent, Thou art a Priest forever, after the order of Melchizedeck." And from every other promise in that psalm, contained in each verse of it. And Psal. ii. 7, 8, "I will declare the decree: the Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten Thee: ask of me, and I will give Thee the Heathen for thine inheritance, &c." Psal. xlv. 3, 4, &c., Gird thy sword on thy thigh, O most Mighty, with thy Glory and thy Majesty; and in thy Majesty ride prosperously." And so every thing that is said from thence to the end of the psalm. And those promises, Isa. lii. 13, 14, 15, and liii. 10, 11, 12. And all those promises which God makes to the Messiah, of success, dominion and glory in the character of Redeemer, in Isa. chap. xlix.

3. It was often promised to the Church of God of old, for their comfort, that God would give them a righteous, sinless Saviour. Jer. xxiii. 5, 6, "Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise up unto David a righteous Branch; and a King shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth. In his days shall Judah be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely. And this is the name whereby He shall be called, the Lord our Righteousness." So,

Jer. xxxiii. 15, "I will cause the Branch of Righteousness to grow up unto David; and he shall execute judgment and righteousness in the land." Isa. ix. 6, 7, "For unto us a child is born; upon the throne of David and upon his kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and justice, from henceforth, even forever: the zeal of the Lord of Hosts will do this." Chap. xi. at the beginning, "There shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots; and the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him—the spirit of knowledge, and of the fear of the Lord:—with righteousness shall He judge the poor, and reprove with equity;—Righteousness shall be the girdle of his loins, and faithfulness the girdle of his reins." Chap. lii. 13, "My servant shall deal prudently." Chap. liii. 9, "Because He had done no violence, neither was any deceit in his mouth." If it be impossible that these promises should fail, and it be easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than for one jot or tittle of these promises of God to pass away, then it was impossible that Christ should commit any sin. Christ himself signified, that it was impossible but that the things which were spoken concerning Him, should be fulfilled. Luke xxiv. 44, "That all things must be fulfilled, which were written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the Psalms concerning Me." "Matth. xxvi. 54, "But how then shall the Scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be?" Mark. xiv. 49, "But the Scriptures must be fulfilled." And so the apostle, Acts i. 16, "This Scripture must needs have been fulfilled."

4. All the promises, which were made to the Church of old, of the Messiah as a future Saviour, from that made to our first parents in paradise, to that which was delivered by the prophet Malachi, show it to be impossible that Christ should not have persevered in perfect holiness. The ancient predictions given to God's church of the Messiah as a Saviour, were of the nature of promises; as is evident by the predictions themselves, and the manner of delivering them. But they are expressly, and very often called *promises* in the New Testament; as in Luke i. 54, 55, 72, 73, Acts xiii. 32, 33, Rom. i. 1, 2, 3, and chap. xv. 8, Heb. vi. 13, &c. These promises were often made with great solemnity, and confirmed with an oath; as in Gen. xxii. 16, 17, 18, "By myself have I sworn, saith the Lord, that in blessing, I will bless thee, and in multiplying, I will multiply thy seed, as the stars of heaven, and as the sand which is upon the sea shore. —And in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed." Compare Luke i. 72, 73, and Gal. iii. 8, 15, 16. The apostle in Heb. vi. 17, 18, speaking of this promise to Abraham, says, "Wherein God, willing more abundantly to show to the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath; that by two IMMUTABLE things, in which it was IMPOSSIBLE for God to lie, we might have strong consolation."—In which words, the *necessity* of the accomplishment or (which is the same thing) the *impossibility* of the contrary, is fully declared So God confirmed the promise of the great salvation of the Messiah, made to David, by an oath; Psal. lxxxix. 3, 4, "I have made a covenant with my chosen, I have sworn unto David my servant; thy seed will I establish forever, and build up thy throne to all generations." There is nothing that is so abundantly set forth in Scripture, as sure and irrefragable, as this promise and oath to David. See Psalm lxxxix. 34, 35, 36, 2 Sam. xxiii. 5, Isa. lv. 3, Acts ii. 29, 30, and xiii. 34. The Scripture expressly speaks of it as utterly *impossible* that this promise and oath to David, concerning the everlasting dominion of the Messiah of his seed, should fail. Jer. xxxiii. 15, &c., "In those days, and at that time, I will cause the Branch of Righteousness to grow up unto David.—For thus saith the Lord, David shall never want a Man to sit upon the throne of the House of Israel." Ver. 20, 21, "If you can break my covenant of the day,

and my covenant of the night, and that there should not be day and night in their season ; then may also my covenant be broken with David my servant, that he should not have a son to reign upon his throne." So in verse 25, 26.—Thus abundant is the Scripture in representing how *impossible* it was, that the promises made of old concerning the great salvation and kingdom of the Messiah should fail ; which implies, that it was impossible that this Messiah, the second Adam, the promised seed of Abraham, and of David, should fall from his integrity, as the first Adam did.

5. All the promises that were made to the church of God under the Old Testament, of the great enlargement of the church, and advancement of her glory, in the days of the gospel, after the coming of the Messiah; the increase of her light, liberty, holiness, joy, triumph over her enemies, &c., of which so great a part of the Old Testament consists ; which are repeated so often, are so variously exhibited, so frequently introduced with great pomp and solemnity, and are so abundantly sealed with typical and symbolical representations · I say, all these promises imply, that the Messiah should perfect the work of redemption; and this implies, that he should persevere in the work, which the Father had appointed him, being in all things conformed to his Will. These promises were often confirmed by an oath. (See Isa. liv. 9, with the context; chap. lxii. 8.) And it is represented as utterly impossible that these promises should fail. (Isa. xlix. 15, with the context ; chap. liv. 10, with the context ; chap. li. 4—8 ; chap. xl. 8, with the context.) And therefore it was *impossible* that the Messiah should fail, or commit sin.

6. It was *impossible* that the Messiah should fail of persevering in integrity and holiness, as the first Adam did, because this would have been inconsistent with the promises, which God made to the blessed Virgin, his mother, and to her husband ; implying, that *He should save his people from their sins*, that God *would give him the throne of his Father David*, that *He should reign over the house of Jacob forever ;* and that *of his kingdom there should be no end.* These promises were sure, and it was *impossible* they should fail.—And therefore the Virgin Mary, in trusting fully to them, acted reasonably, having an immovable foundation of her faith ; as Elizabeth observes, Luke i. 45, "And blessed is she that believeth ; for there shall be a performance of those things, which were told her from the Lord."

7. That it should have been possible that Christ should sin, and so fail in the work of our redemption, does not consist with the eternal purpose and decree of God, revealed in the Scriptures, that He would provide salvation for fallen man in and by Jesus Christ, and that salvation should be offered to sinners through the preaching of the gospel. Such an absolute decree as this, *Arminians* do not deny.—Thus much at least (out of all controversy) is implied in such Scriptures, as 1 Cor. ii. 7, Eph. i. 4, 5, and chap. iii. 9, 10, 11, 1 Pet. i. 19, 20. Such an absolute decree as this, *Arminians* allow to be signified in these texts. And the *Arminians'* election of nations and societies, and general election of the Christian Church, and conditional election of particular persons, imply this. God could not decree before the foundation of the world, to save all that should believe in, and obey Christ, unless he had absolutely decreed, that salvation should be provided, and effectually wrought out by Christ. And since (as the *Arminians* themselves strenuously maintain) a decree of God infers *necessity ;* hence it became *necessary*, that Christ should persevere, and actually work out salvation for us, and that he should not fail by the commission of sin.

8. That it should have been possible for Christ's holiness to fail, is not consistent with what God promised to his Son, before all ages. For, that salvation

should be offered to men through Christ, and bestowed on all his faithful followers, is what is at least implied in that certain and infallible promise spoken of by the apostle, Tit. i. 2, "In hope of eternal life; which God, that cannot lie, promised before the world began." This does not seem to be controverted by *Arminians.**

9. That it should be possible for Christ to fail of doing his Father's Will, is inconsistent with the promise made to the Father by the Son, by the *Logos* that was with the Father from the beginning, before he took the human nature: as may be seen in Psal. xl. 6, 7, 8 (compared with the Apostle's interpretation, Heb. x. 5—9), "Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire; mine ears hast thou opened [or bored]; burnt-offering and sin-offering thou hast not required. Then said I, Lo, I come: in the volume of the book it is written of me, I delight to do thy Will, O my God, and thy law is within my heart." Where is a manifest allusion to the covenant, which the willing servant, who loved his master's service, made with his master, to be his servant forever, on the day wherein he had his ear bored; which covenant was probably inserted in the public records, called the *Volume of the Book*, by the judges, who were called to take cognizance of the transaction; Exod. xxi. If the *Logos*, who was with the Father, before the world, and who made the world, thus engaged in covenant to do the Will of the Father in the human nature, and the promise was as it were recorded, that it might be made sure, doubtless it was *impossible* that it should fail; and so it was *impossible* that Christ should fail of doing the Will of the Father in the human nature.

10. If it was possible for Christ to have failed of doing the Will of his Father, and so to have failed of effectually working out redemption for sinners, then the salvation of all the saints, who were saved from the beginning of the world, to the death of Christ, was not built on a firm foundation. The Messiah, and the redemption which he was to work out by his obedience unto death, was the foundation of the salvation of all the posterity of fallen man, that ever were saved. Therefore, if when the Old Testament saints had the pardon of their sins, and the favor of God promised them, and salvation bestowed upon them, still it was possible that the Messiah, when he came, might commit sin, then all this was on a foundation that was not firm and stable, but liable to fail; something which it was possible might never be. God did as it were trust to what his Son had engaged and promised to do in future time; and depended so much upon it, that He proceeded actually to save men on the account of it, as though it had been already done. But this trust and dependence of God, on the supposition of Christ's being liable to fail of doing his Will, was leaning on a staff that was weak, and might possibly break.—The saints of old trusted in the promises of a future redemption to be wrought out and completed by the Messiah, and built their comfort upon it: Abraham saw Christ's day and rejoiced; and he and the other Patriarchs died in the faith of the promise of it.—(Heb. xi. 13.) But on this supposition, their faith and their comfort, and their salvation, was built on a movable, fallible foundation; Christ was not to them a tried stone, a sure foundation: as in Isa. xxviii. 16. David entirely rested on the covenant of God with him, concerning the future glorious dominion and salvation of the Messiah, of his seed; and says it was *all his salvation, and all his desire:* and comforts himself that this covenant was an "everlasting covenant, ordered in all things and sure," 2 Sam. xxiii. 5. But if Christ's virtue might fail, he was mistaken: His great comfort was not built so sure as he thought it was, being founded entirely on the determinations of

* See Dr. Whitby on the Five Points, p. 48, 49, 50.

the Free Will of Christ's human Soul; which was subject to no necessity, and might be determined either one way or the other. Also the dependence of those, who looked for redemption in Jerusalem, and waited for the consolation of Israel, (Luke ii. 25 and 38,) and the confidence of the disciples of Jesus, who forsook all and followed Him, that they might enjoy the benefits of his future kingdom, were built on a sandy foundation.

11. The man Christ Jesus, before he had finished his course of obedience, and while in the midst of temptation and trials, was abundant in positively predicting his own future glory in his kingdom, and the enlargement of his church, the salvation of the Gentiles through him, &c., and in promises of blessings he would bestow on his true disciples in his future kingdom; on which promises he required the full dependence of his disciples, (John xiv.,) But the disciples would have had no ground for such dependence, if Christ had been liable to fail in his work: and Christ Himself would have been guilty of presumption, in so abounding in peremptory promises of great things, which depended on a mere contingence, viz., the determinations of his Free Will, consisting in a freedom *ad utrumque*, to either sin or holiness, standing in indifference, and incident, in thousands of future instances, to go either one way or the other.

Thus it is evident, that it was *impossible* that the Acts of the Will of the human soul of Christ should be otherwise than holy, and conformed to the Will of the Father; or, in other words, they were necessarily so conformed.

I have been the longer in the proof of this matter, it being a thing denied by some of the greatest *Arminians*, by Episcopius in particular; and because I look upon it as a point clearly and absolutely determining the controversy between *Calvinists* and *Arminians*, concerning the necessity of such a freedom of Will as is insisted on by the latter, in order to moral agency, virtue, command or prohibition, promise or threatening, reward or punishment, praise or dispraise, merit or demerit. I now therefore proceed,

II. To consider whether CHRIST, in his holy behavior on earth, was not thus a *moral agent*, subject to *commands, promises*, &c.

Dr. Whitby very often speaks of what he calls a freedom *ad utrumlibet*, without necessity, as requisite to *law and commands;* and speaks of necessity as entirely inconsistent with *injunctions and prohibitions.* But yet we read of Christ's being the subject of the commands of his Father, John x. 18, and xv. 10. And Christ tells us, that every thing he *said*, or *did*, was in compliance with *commandments he had received of the Father;* John xii. 49, 50, and xiv. 31. And we often read of Christ's *obedience* to his Father's commands, Rom. v. 19, Phil. ii. 8, Heb. v. 8.

The forementioned writer represents *promises offered as motives* to persons to do their duty, or *a being moved and induced by promises*, as utterly inconsistent with a state wherein persons have not a liberty *ad utrumlibet*, but are necessarily determined to one. (See particularly, p. 297, 311.) But the thing which this writer asserts, is demonstrably false, if the Christian religion be true. If there be any truth in Christianity or the holy Scriptures, the man Christ Jesus had his Will infallibly, unalterably and unfrustrably determined to good, and that alone; but yet he had promises of glorious rewards made to Him, on condition of his persevering in, and perfecting the work which God had appointed Him; Isa. liii. 10, 11, 12, Psal. ii. and cx., Isa. xlix. 7, 8, 9. In Luke xxii. 28, 29, Christ says to his disciples, "Ye are they which have continued with me in my temptations; and I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed unto me." The word most properly signifies to

appoint by covenant or promise. The plain meaning of Christ's words is this. "As you have partook of my temptations and trials, and have been steadfast, and have overcome, I promise to make you partakers of my reward, and to give you a kingdom; as the Father has promised me a kingdom for continuing steadfast, and overcoming in those trials." And the words are well explained by those in Rev. iii. 21, "To him that overcometh, will I grant to sit with me in my throne; even as I also overcame, and am set down with my Father in his throne." And Christ had not only promises of glorious success and rewards made to his obedience and sufferings, but the Scriptures plainly represent him as using these promises for motives and inducements to obey and suffer; and particularly that promise of a kingdom which the Father had appointed Him, or sitting with the Father in his throne; as in Heb. xii. 1, 2, "Let us lay aside every weight, and the sin which doth so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus, the Author and finisher of our faith; who, for the joy that was set before Him, endured the cross, despising the shame, and is set down at the right hand of the throne of God."

And how strange would it be to hear any Christian assert, that the holy and excellent temper and behavior of Jesus Christ, and that obedience which he performed under such great trials, was not *virtuous* or *praiseworthy;* because his Will was not free *ad utrumque*, to either holiness or sin, but was unalterably determined to one; that upon this account there is no virtue at all, in all Christ's humility, meekness, patience, charity, forgiveness of enemies, contempt of the world, heavenly-mindedness, submission to the will of God, perfect obedience to his commands, (though he was obedient unto death, even the death of the cross,) his great compassion to the afflicted, his unparalleled love to mankind, his faithfulness to God and man, under such great trials; his praying for his enemies, even when nailing him to the cross; that *virtue*, when applied to these things, *is but an empty name;* that there was no merit in any of these things; that is, that Christ was *worthy* of nothing at all on account of them, worthy of no reward, no praise, no honor, or respect from God or man; because his Will was not indifferent, and free, either to these things, or the contrary; but under such a strong inclination or bias to the things that were excellent, as made it *impossible* that he should choose the contrary; that upon this account (to use Dr. Whitby's language) *it would be sensibly unreasonable* that the human nature should be rewarded for any of these things.

According to this doctrine, that creature who is evidently set forth in Scripture as the *first born of every creature*, as having *in all things the pre-eminence*, and as the highest of all creatures in virtue, honor, and worthiness of esteem, praise and glory, on the account of his virtue, is less worthy of reward or praise, than the very least of saints; yea, no more worthy than a clock or mere machine, that is purely passive, and moved by natural necessity.

If we judge by Scriptural representations of things, we have reason to suppose, that Christ took upon him our nature, and dwelt with us in this world, in a suffering state, not only to satisfy for our sins, but that He, being in our nature and circumstances, and under our trials, might be our most fit and proper example, leader and captain, in the exercise of glorious and victorious virtue, and might be a visible instance of the glorious end and reward of it; that we might see in Him the beauty, amiableness, and true honor and glory, and exceeding benefit, of that virtue, which it is proper for us human beings to practise; and might thereby learn, and be animated, to seek the like glory and honor, and to obtain the like glorious reward. See Heb. ii. 9—14, with v 8,

9, and xii. 1, 2, 3, John xv. 10, Rom. viii. 17, 2 Tim. ii. 11, 12, 1 Pet. ii. 19, 20, and iv. 13. But if there was nothing of any virtue or merit, or worthiness of any reward, glory, praise or commendation at all, in all that he did, because it was all necessary, and he could not help it; then how is here any thing so proper to animate and excite us, free creatures, by patient continuance in well doing, to seek for honor, glory, and immortality?

God speaks of Himself as peculiarly well pleased with the righteousness of this servant of his. Isa. xlii. 21, "The Lord is well pleased for his righteousness' sake." The sacrifices of old are spoken of as a sweet savor to God, but the obedience of Christ as far more acceptable than they. Psal. xl. 6, 7, "Sacrifice and offering Thou didst not desire: mine ear hast Thou opened" [as thy servant performing willing obedience]; "burnt-offering and sin-offering hast thou not required. Then said I, Lo, I come" [as a servant that cheerfully answers the calls of his master]: "I delight to do thy will, O my God, yea, thy law is within mine heart." Matth. xvii. 5, "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." And Christ tells us expressly, that the Father loves him for that wonderful instance of his obedience, his voluntary yielding himself to death, in compliance with the Father's command. John x. 17, 18, "Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life: no man taketh it from me; but I lay it down of myself.—This commandment received I of my Father."

And if there was no merit in Christ's obedience unto death, if it was not worthy of praise, and of the most glorious rewards, the heavenly hosts were exceedingly mistaken, by the account that is given of them, in Rev. v. 8—12: "The four beasts and the four and twenty elders fell down before the Lamb, having every one of them harps, and golden vials full of odors. And they sung a new song, saying, Thou art WORTHY to take the book, and to open the seals thereof; for thou wast slain.—And I beheld, and I heard the voice of many angels round about the throne, and the beasts, and the elders, and the number of them was ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands, saying with a loud voice, "WORTHY is the Lamb that was slain, to receive power and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing."

Christ speaks of the eternal life which he was to receive, as the reward of his obedience to the Father's commandments. John xii. 49, 50, "I have not spoken of myself; but the Father which sent me, He gave me a commandment what I should say, and what I should speak; and I know that his commandment is life everlasting: whatsoever I speak therefore, even as the Father said unto me, so I speak." God promises to divide him a portion with the great, &c. for his being his righteous servant, for his glorious virtue under such great trials and sufferings. Isa. liii. 11, 12, "He shall see the travail of his soul and be satisfied: by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many; for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a portion with the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong, because he hath poured out his soul unto death." The Scriptures represent God as rewarding him far above all his other servants. Phil. ii. 7, 8, 9, "He took on him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross; wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above every name." Psal. xlv. 7, "Thou lovest righteousness, and hatest wickedness; therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows.

There is no room to pretend, that the glorious benefits bestowed in conse-

quence of Christ's obedience, are not properly of the nature of a reward. What is a reward, in the most proper sense, but a benefit bestowed in consequence of something morally excellent in quality or behavior, in testimony of well pleasedness in that moral excellency, and respect and favor on that account? If we consider the nature of a reward most strictly, and make the utmost of it, and add to the things contained in this description, proper merit or worthiness, and the bestowment of the benefit in consequence of a promise; still it will be found, there is nothing belonging to it, but that the Scripture is most express as to its belonging to the glory bestowed on Christ, after his sufferings; as appears from what has been already observed: there was a glorious benefit bestowed in consequence of something morally excellent, being called *Righteousness* and *Obedience;* there was great favor, love and well pleasedness, for this righteousness and obedience, in the bestower; there was proper merit, or worthiness of the benefit, in the obedience; it was bestowed in fulfilment of promises made to that obedience; and was bestowed therefore, or because he had performed that obedience.

I may add to all these things, that Jesus Christ, while here in the flesh, was manifestly in a state of trial. The last Adam, as Christ is called, Rom. v. 14, 1 Cor. xv. 45, taking on Him the human nature, and so the form of a servant, and being under the law, to stand and act for us, was put into a state of trial, as the first Adam was.—Dr. Whitby mentions these three things as evidences of persons being in a state of trial (on the Five Points, p. 298, 299), namely, their afflictions being spoken of as their trials or temptations, their being the subjects of promises, and their being exposed to Satan's temptations. But Christ was apparently the subject of each of these. Concerning promises made to him, I have spoken already. The difficulties and afflictions he met with in the course of his obedience, are called his *temptations* or *trials.*" Luke xxii. 28, "Ye are they which have continued with me in my *temptations* [or *trials*]." Heb. ii. 18, "For in that he himself hath suffered, being *tempted* [or *tried*], He is able to succor them that are tempted." And chap. iv. 15, "We have not an high priest, which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points *tempted* like as we are, yet without sin." And as to his being tempted by Satan, it is what none will dispute.

SECTION III.

The Case of such as are given up of God to Sin, and of fallen Man in general, proves moral Necessity and Inability to be consistent with blameworthiness.

Dr. Whitby asserts freedom, not only from coaction, but Necessity, to be essential to any thing deserving the name of Sin, and to an action's being *culpable*, in these words (Discourse on the Five Points, edit. iii. p. 348): "If they be thus necessitated, then neither their sins of omission or commission could deserve that name; it being essential to the nature of Sin, according to St. Austin's definition, that it be an action *a quo liberum est abstinere.* Three things seem plainly necessary to make an action or omission culpable. 1. That it be in our power to perform or forbear it; for, as Origen, and all the Fathers say, no man is blameworthy for not doing what he could not do." And elsewhere the Doctor insists, that "when any do evil of Necessity, what

they do is no vice, that they are guilty of no fault,* are worthy of no blame, dispraise,† or dishonor,‡ but are unblamable."§

If these things are true, in Dr. Whitby's sense of Necessity, they will prove all such to be blameless, who are given up of God to sin, in what they commit after they are thus given up. That there is such a thing as men's being judicially given up to sin is certain, if the Scripture rightly informs us; such a thing being often there spoken of; as in Psal. lxxxi. 12, "So I gave them up to their own hearts' lust, and they walked in their own counsels." Acts vii. 42, "Then God turned, and gave them up to worship the host of heaven." Rom. i. 24, "Wherefore God also gave them up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonor their own bodies between themselves." Ver. 26, "For this cause God gave them up to vile affections." Ver. 28, "And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things that are not convenient."

It is needless to stand particularly to inquire, what God's *giving men up to their own hearts' lusts* signifies: it is sufficient to observe, that hereby is certainly meant God's so ordering or disposing things, in some respect or other, either by doing or forbearing to do, as that the consequence should be men's continuing in their sins. So much as men are given up to, so much is the consequence of their being given up, whether that be less or more. If God does not order things so, by action or permission, that sin will be the consequence, then the event proves that they are not given up to that consequence. If good be the consequence, instead of evil, then God's mercy is to be acknowledged in that good; which mercy must be contrary to God's judgment in giving up to evil. If the event must prove, that they are given up to evil as the consequence, then the persons, who are the subjects of this judgment, must be the subjects of such an event, and so the event is necessary.

If not only *coaction*, but all *Necessity*, will prove men blameless, then Judas was blameless, after Christ had given him over, and had already declared his certain damnation, and that he should *verily* betray him. He was guilty of no sin in betraying his master, on this supposition; though his so doing is spoken of by Christ as the most aggravated sin, more heinous than the sin of Pilate in crucifying him. And the Jews in Egypt, in Jeremiah's time, were guilty of no sin, in their not worshipping the true God, after God had *sworn by his great name, that his name should be no more named in the mouth of any man of Judah, in all the land of Egypt.* Jer. xliv. 26.

Dr. Whitby (Discourse on Five Points, p. 302, 303) denies, that men, in this world, are ever so given up by God to sin, that their Wills should be necessarily determined to evil; though he owns, that hereby it may become *exceeding difficult* for men to do good, having a strong bent, and powerful inclination, to what is evil.—But if we should allow the case to be just as he represents, the judgment of giving up to sin will no better agree with his notions of that liberty, which is essential to praise or blame, than if we should suppose it to render the avoiding of Sin *impossible*. For if an *impossibility* of avoiding Sin wholly excuses a man; then, for the same reason, its being difficult to avoid it, excuses him in part; and this just in proportion to the degree of difficulty.—If the influence of moral impossibility or inability be the same, to excuse persons in not doing, or not avoiding any thing, as that of *natural* inability (which is supposed), then undoubtedly, in like manner, *moral difficulty* has the same influence to excuse with *natural difficulty*. But all allow, that natural impossi-

* Discourse on the Five Points, p. 347, 360, 377.
† 303, 326, 329, and many other places.
‡ 371.
§ 304 361

bility wholly excuses, and also that *natural difficulty* excuses in part, and make the act or omission less blamable in proportion to the difficulty. All *natural difficulty* according to the plainest dictate of the light of nature, excuses in some degree, so that the neglect is not so blamable, as if there had been no difficulty in the case: and so the greater the difficulty is, still the more excusable, in proportion to the increase of the difficulty. And as *natural* impossibility wholly excuses and excludes all blame, so the nearer the difficulty approaches to impossibility, still the nearer a person is to blamelessness in proportion to that approach. And if the case of moral impossibility or necessity, be just the same with natural necessity or coaction, as to influence to excuse a neglect, then also, for the same reason, the case of natural difficulty, does not differ in influence, to excuse a neglect, from moral difficulty, arising from a strong bias or bent to evil, such as Dr. Whitby owns in the case of those that are given up to their own hearts' lusts. So that the fault of such persons must be lessened, in proportion to the difficulty, and approach to impossibility. If ten degrees of moral difficulty make the action quite impossible, and so wholly excuse, then if there be nine degrees of difficulty, the person is in great part excused, and is nine degrees in ten less blameworthy, than if there had been no difficulty at all: and he has but one degree of blameworthiness. The reason is plain on *Arminian* principles, viz., because as difficulty by antecedent bent and bias on the Will, is increased, liberty of indifference, and self-determination in the Will, is diminished; so much hinderance and impediment is there, in the way of the Will's acting freely, by mere self-determination. And if ten degrees of such hinderance take away all such liberty, then nine degrees take away nine parts in ten, and leave but one degree of liberty. And therefore there is but one degree of blamableness, *cæteris paribus*, in the neglect; the man being no further blamable in what he does, or neglects, than he has liberty in that affair: for blame or praise (say they) arises wholly from a good use or abuse of liberty.

From all which it follows, that a strong bent and bias one way, and difficulty of going the contrary, never causes a person to be at all more exposed to sin, or any thing blamable: because, as the difficulty is increased, so much the less is required and expected. Though in one respect, exposedness to sin or fault is increased, viz., by an increase of exposedness to the evil action or omission; yet it is diminished in another respect, to balance it; namely, as the sinfulness or blamableness of the action or omission is diminished in the same proportion. So that, on the whole, the affair, as to exposedness to guilt or blame, is left just as it was.

To illustrate this, let us suppose a scale of a balance to be intelligent, and a free agent, and indued with a self-moving power, by virtue of which it could act and produce effects to a certain degree, *ex. gr.* to move itself up or down with a force equal to a weight of ten pounds; and that it might therefore be required of it, in ordinary circumstances, to move itself down with that force; for which it has power and full liberty, and therefore would be blameworthy if it failed of it. But then let us suppose a weight of ten pounds to be put in the opposite scale, which in force entirely counterbalances its self-moving power, and so renders it impossible for it to move down at all; this therefore wholly excuses it from any such motion. But if we suppose there to be only nine pounds in the opposite scale, this renders its motion not impossible, but yet more difficult: so that it can now only move down with the force of one pound: but however this is all that is required of it under these circumstances; it is wholly excused from nine parts of its motion: and if the scale, under these circumstan-

ces, neglects to move, and remains at rest, all that it will be blamed for, will be its neglect of that one tenth part of its motion; which it had as much liberty and advantage for, as in usual circumstances it has for the greater motion, which in such a case would be required. So that this new difficulty, does not at all increase its exposedness to any thing blameworthy.

And thus the very supposition of difficulty in the way of a man's duty, or proclivity to sin, through a being given up to hardness of heart, or indeed by any other means whatsoever, is an inconsistence, according to Dr. Whitby's notions of liberty, virtue and vice, blame and praise. The avoiding sin and blame, and the doing what is virtuous and praiseworthy, must be always equally easy. Dr. Whitby's notions of liberty, obligation, virtue, sin, &c., led him into another great inconsistence. He abundantly insists, that necessity is inconsistent with the nature of sin or fault. He says in the forementioned treatise, p. 14, "Who can blame a person for doing what he could not help?" And p. 15, "It being sensibly unjust, to punish any man for doing that which was never in his power to avoid." And in p. 341, to confirm his opinion, he quotes one of the Fathers, saying, "Why doth God command, if man hath not free Will and power to obey?" And again in the same and the next page, "Who will not cry out, that it is folly to command him, that hath not liberty to do what is commanded; and that it is unjust to condemn him, that has it not in his power to do what is required?" And in p. 373, he cites another saying: "A law is given to him that can turn to both parts, i. e. obey or transgress it: but no law can be against him who is bound by nature."

And yet the same Dr. Whitby asserts, that fallen man is not able to perform perfect obedience. In p. 165, he has these words: "The nature of Adam had power to continue innocent, and without sin; whereas it is certain our nature never had."—But if we have not power to continue innocent and without sin, then sin is inconsistent with Necessity, and we may be sinful in that which we have not power to avoid; and these things cannot be true which he asserts elsewhere, namely, "That if we be necessitated, neither sins of omission nor commission, would deserve that name," (p. 348.) If we have it not in our power to be innocent, then we have it not in our power to to be blameless: and if so, we are under a necessity of being blameworthy.—And how does this consist with what he so often asserts, that necessity is inconsistent with blame or praise? If we have it not in our power to perform perfect obedience, to all the commands of God, then we are under a necessity of breaking some commands, in some degree; having no power to perform so much as is commanded. And if so, why does he cry out of the unreasonableness and folly of commanding beyond what men have power to do?

And Arminians in general are very inconsistent with themselves in what they say of the inability of fallen Man in this respect. They strenuously maintain, that it would be unjust in God, to require any thing of us beyond our present power and ability to perform; and also hold, that we are now unable to perform perfect obedience, and that Christ died to satisfy for the *imperfections of our obedience*, and has made way, that our imperfect obedience might be accepted instead of perfect: wherein they seem insensibly to run themselves into the grossest inconsistence. For (as I have observed elsewhere), "they hold, that God, in mercy to mankind, has abolished that rigorous constitution or law, that they were under originally; and instead of it, has introduced a more mild constitution, and put as under a new law, which requires no more than imperfect sincere obedience, in compliance with our poor, infirm, impotent circumstances since the fall."

Now, how can these things be made consistent? I would ask, what law these imperfections of our obedience are a breach of? If they are a breach of no law that we were ever under, then they are not sins. And if they be not sins, what need of Christ's dying to satisfy for them? But if they are sins, and the breach of some law, what law is it? They cannot be a breach of their new law; for that requires no other than imperfect obedience, or obedience with imperfections: and therefore to have obedience attended with imperfections, is no breach of it; for it is as much as it requires. And they cannot be a breach of their old law; for that, they say, is entirely abolished; and we never were under it. They say, it would not be just in God to require of us perfect obedience, because it would not be just to require more than we can perform, or to punish us for failing of it. And therefore, by their own scheme, the imperfections of our obedience do not deserve to be punished. What need therefore of Christ's dying, to satisfy for them? What need of his *suffering* to satisfy for that which is no fault, and in its own nature deserves no *suffering*? What need of Christ's dying, to purchase, that our *imperfect* obedience should be accepted, when, according to their scheme, it would be unjust in itself, that any other obedience than *imperfect* should be required? What need of Christ's dying to make way for God's accepting such an obedience, as it would be unjust in him not to accept? Is there any need of Christ's dying, to prevail with God not to do unrighteously? If it be said, that Christ died to so satisfy that old law for us, that so we might not be under it, but that there might be room for our being under a more mild law: still I would inquire, what need of Christ's dying, that we might not be under a law, which (by their principles) it would be in itself unjust that we should be under, whether Christ had died or no, because, in our present state, we are not able to keep it?

So the *Arminians* are inconsistent with themselves, not only in what they say of the need of Christ's satisfaction to atone for those imperfections, which we cannot avoid, but also in what they say of the grace of God, granted to enable men to perform the sincere obedience of the new law. "I grant (says Dr. Stebbing*), indeed, that by reason of original sin, we are utterly disabled for the performance of the condition, without new grace from God. But I say then, that he gives such grace to all of us, by which the performance of the condition is truly possible: and upon this ground he may, and doth most righteously require it." If Dr. Stebbing intends to speak properly, by *grace* he must mean, that assistance which is of grace, or of free favor and kindness. But yet in the same place he speaks of it as very *unreasonable*, *unjust* and *cruel*, for God to acquire that, as the condition of pardon, that is become impossible by original Sin. If it be so, what *grace* is there in giving assistance and ability to perform the condition of pardon? Or why is that called by the name of grace, that is an absolute debt, which God is bound to bestow, and which it would be unjust and cruel in Him to withhold, seeing he requires that, *as the condition of pardon*, which we cannot perform without it.

* Treatise of the Operations of the Spirit, second edition, p. 112, 113.

SECTION IV.

Command and Obligation to Obedience, consistent with moral Inability to obey.

It being so much insisted on by *Arminian* writers, that necessity is inconsistent with Law or Command, and particularly, that it is absurd to suppose God by his command should require that of men which they are unable to do; not allowing in this case for any difference that there is between natural and moral Inability; I would therefore now particularly consider this matter.

And, for the greater clearness, I would distinctly lay down the following things.

I. The Will itself, and not only those actions which are the effects of the Will, is the proper object of precept or Command. That is, such or such a state or acts of men's Wills, is in many cases, properly required of them by Command; and not those alterations in the state of their bodies or minds only that are the consequences of volition. This is most manifest: for it is the soul only that is properly and directly the subject of precepts or commands; that only being capable of receiving or perceiving commands. The motions or state of the body are matter of command, only as they are subject to the soul, and connected with its acts. But now the soul has no other faculty whereby it can, in the most direct and proper sense, consent, yield to, or comply with any command, but the faculty of the Will; and it is by this faculty only, that the soul can directly disobey, or refuse compliance; for the very notions of *consenting*, *yielding*, *accepting*, *complying*, *refusing*, *rejecting*, &c., are, according to the meaning of the terms, nothing but certain acts of the Will. Obedience, in the primary nature of it, is the submitting and yielding of the Will of one to the Will of another. Disobedience is the not consenting, not complying of the Will of the commanded to the manifested Will of the commander. Other acts that are not the acts of the Will, as certain motions of the body and alterations in the soul, are obedience or disobedience only indirectly as they are connected with the state or acts of the Will, according to an established law of nature. So that it is manifest, the Will itself may be required, and the being of a good Will is the most proper, direct and immediate subject of command; and if this cannot be prescribed or required by command or precept, nothing can; for other things can be required no otherwise than as they depend upon, and are the fruits of a good Will.

Corol. 1. If there be several acts of the Will, or a series of acts, one following another, and one the effect of another, the first and determining act is properly the subject of command, and not the consequent acts only, which are dependent upon it. Yea, it is this more especially, which is that which command or precept has a proper respect to; because it is this act that determines the whole affair: in this act the obedience or disobedience lies, in a peculiar manner; the consequent acts being all subject to it, and governed and determined by it. This determining, governing act must be the proper subject of precept, or none.

Corol. 2. It also follows, from what has been observed, that if there be any sort of act, or exertion of the soul, prior to all free acts of the Will or acts of choice in the case directing and determining what the acts of the Will shall be; that act or exertion of the soul cannot properly be subject to command or precept, in any respect whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely. Such acts cannot be subject to commands *directly*, because they are

no acts of the Will; being by the supposition prior to all acts of the Will, determining and giving rise to all its acts: they not being acts of the Will, there can be in them no consent to, or compliance with, any command. Neither can they be subject to command or precept, *indirectly* or *remotely*; for they are not so much as the *effects* or *consequences* of the Will, being prior to all its acts. So that if there be any obedience in that original act of the soul, determining all volitions, it is an act of obedience wherein the Will has no concern at all; it preceding every act of Will. And therefore, if the soul either obeys or disobeys in this act, it is wholly involuntarily; there is no willing obedience or rebellion, no compliance or opposition of the Will in the affair: and what sort of obedience or rebellion is this?

And thus the Arminian notion of the freedom of the Will consisting in the soul's determining its own acts of Will, instead of being essential to moral agency, and to men's being the subjects of moral government is utterly inconsistent with it. For if the soul determines all its acts of Will, it is therein subject to no command or moral government, as has been now observed; because its original determining act is no act of Will or choice, it being prior, by the supposition, to *every act* of Will. And the soul cannot be the subject of command in the act of the Will itself which depends on the foregoing determining act, and is determined by it; inasmuch as this is necessary, being the necessary consequence and effect of that prior determining act, which is not voluntary. Nor can the man be a subject of command or government in his external actions; because these are all necessary, being the necessary effects of the acts of the Will themselves. So that mankind, according to this scheme, are subjects of command or moral government in nothing; and all their moral agency is entirely excluded, and no room for virtue or vice in the world.

So that it is the Arminian scheme, and not the scheme of the Calvinists, that is utterly inconsistent with moral government, and with the use of laws, precepts, prohibitions, promises or threatenings. Neither is there any way whatsoever to make their principles consist with these things. For if it be said, that there is no prior determining act of the soul, preceding the acts of the Will, but that volitions are events that come to pass by pure accident, without any determining cause, this is most palpably inconsistent with all use of laws and precepts; for nothing is more plain than that laws can be of no use to direct and regulate perfect accident; which, by the supposition of its being pure accident, is in no case regulated by any thing preceding; but happens, this way or that, perfectly by chance, without any cause or rule. The perfect uselessness of laws and precepts also follows from the *Arminian* notion of indifference, as essential to that liberty, which is requisite to virtue or vice. For the end of laws is to *bind to one side;* and the end of commands is to turn the Will one way; and therefore they are of no use, unless they turn or bias the Will that way. But if liberty consists in indifference, then their biassing the Will one way only, destroys liberty; as it puts the Will out of equilibrium. So that the Will, having a bias, through the influence of binding law, laid upon it, is not wholly left to itself, to determine itself which way it will, without influence from without.

II. Having shown that the Will itself, especially in those acts, which are original, leading and determining in any case, is the proper subject of precept and command, and not only those alterations in the body, &c., which are the effects of the Will; I now proceed, in the *second* place, to observe that the very opposition or defect of the Will itself, in that act, which is its *original and determining act* in the case; I say the Will's opposition *in this act* to a thing proposed or commanded, or its failing of compliance, implies a moral Inability to that thing.

or, in other words, whenever a command requires a certain state or act of the Will, and the person commanded, notwithstanding the command and the circumstances under which it is exhibited, still finds his Will opposite or wanting, in *that*, belonging to its state or acts, *which is original and determining in the affair*, that man is morally unable to obey that command.

This is manifest from what was observed in the first part, concerning the nature of *moral* Inability, as distinguished from *natural;* where it was observed, that a man may then be said to be morally unable to do a thing, when he is under the influence or prevalence of a contrary inclination, or has a want of inclination, under such circumstances and views. It is also evident, from what has been before proved, that the Will is always, and in every individual act, necessarily determined by the strongest motive; and so is always unable to go against the motive, which, all things considered, has now the greatest strength and advantage to move the Will.— But not further to insist on these things, the truth of the position now laid down, viz., that when the Will is opposite *to*, or, failing of a compliance with a thing *in its original, determining inclination or act*. it is not able to comply, appears by the consideration of these two things.

1. The Will in the time of that diverse or opposite leading act or inclination, and when actually under the influence of it, is not able to exert itself to the contrary, to make an alteration, in order to a compliance. The inclination is unable to change itself: and that for this plain reason, that it is unable to *incline* to change itself. Present choice cannot at present choose to be otherwise: for that would be *at present* to choose something diverse from what is *at present* chosen. If the Will, all things now considered, inclines or chooses to go that way, then it cannot choose, all things now considered, to go the other way, and so cannot choose to be made to go the other way. To suppose that the mind is now sincerely inclined to change itself to a different inclination, is to suppose the mind is now truly inclined otherwise than it is now inclined. The Will may oppose some future remote act that it is exposed to, but not its own present act.

2. As it is impossible that the Will should comply with the thing commanded, with respect to its *leading act*, by any act of its own, in the time of that diverse or opposite *leading and original act*, or after it has actually come under the influence of that *determining choice or inclination;* so it is impossible it should be determined to a compliance by any foregoing act; for, by the very supposition, there is no foregoing act; the opposite or noncomplying act being that act which is *original* and *determining* in the case. Therefore it must be so, that if this *first determining act* be found noncomplying, on the proposal of the command, the mind is morally unable to obey. For to suppose it to be able to obey, is to suppose it to be able to determine and cause its *first determining act* to be otherwise, and that it has power better to govern and regulate its *first governing and regulating act*, which is absurd; for it is to suppose a prior act of the Will, determining its first determining act; that is, an act prior to the first, and leading and governing the original and governing act of all; which is a contradiction.

Here if it should be said, that although the mind has not any ability to Will contrary to what it does Will, in the original and leading act of the Will, because there is supposed to be no prior act to determine and order it otherwise, and the Will cannot immediately change itself, because it cannot at present incline to a change; yet the mind has an ability for the present to *forbear* to proceed to action, and to take time for deliberation; which may be an occasion of the change of the inclination,

I answer, (1.) In this objection that seems to be forgotten which was ob-

served before, viz., that the determining to take the matter into consideration, is itself an act of the Will; and if this be all the act wherein the mind exercises ability and freedom, then this, by the supposition, must be all that can be commanded or required by precept. And if this act be the commanded act, then all that has been observed concerning the commanded act of the Will remains true, that the very want of it is a moral Inability to exert it, &c. (2.) We are speaking concerning the first and leading act of the Will in the case, or about the affair; and if a determining to deliberate, or on the contrary, to proceed immediately without deliberating, be the first and leading act; or whether it be or no, if there be another act before it, which determines that; or whatever be the original and leading act; still the foregoing proof stands good, that the noncompliance of the leading act implies moral Inability to comply.

If it should be objected, that these things make all moral Inability equal, and suppose men morally unable to Will otherwise than they actually do Will, in all cases, and equally so in every instance:

In answer to this objection, I desire two things may be observed. *First*, That if by being *equally* unable, be meant as *really* unable; then, so far as the Inability is merely moral, it is true, the Will, in every instance, acts by moral necessity and is morally unable to act otherwise, as truly and properly in one case as another; as I humbly conceive has been perfectly and abundantly demonstrated by what has been said in the preceding part of this Essay. But yet, in some respect, the Inability may be said to be greater in some instances than others; though the man may be truly unable (if moral Inability can truly be called Inability), yet he may be further from being able to do some things than others. As it is in things, which men are naturally unable to do.—A person, whose strength is no more than sufficient to lift the weight of one hundred pounds, is as truly and really unable to lift one hundred and one pounds, as ten thousands pounds; but yet he is further from being able to lift the latter weight than the former; and so, according to common use of speech, has a greater Inability for it. So it is in moral Inability. A man is truly morally unable to choose contrary to a present inclination, which in the least degree prevails; or, contrary to that motive, which, all things considered, has strength and advantage now to move the Will, in the least degree, superior to all other motives in view; but yet he is further from ability to resist a very strong habit, and a violent and deeply rooted inclination, or a motive vastly exceeding all others in strength. And again, the Inability may, in some respects, be called greater in some instances than others, as it may be more general and extensive to all acts of that kind So men may be said to be unable in a different sense, and to be further from moral ability, who have that moral Inability which is *general* and *habitual*, than they who have only that Inability which is *occasional* and *particular*.* Thus in cases of natural Inability; he that is born blind may be said to be unable to see, in a different manner, and is, in some respects, further from being able to see, than he whose sight is hindered by a transient cloud or mist.

And besides, that which was observed in the first part of this discourse, concerning the Inability which attends a *strong and settled habit*, should be here remembered, viz, that fixed habit is attended with this peculiar moral Inability, by which it is distinguished from *occasional volition*, namely, that endeavors to avoid future volitions of that kind, which are agreeable to such a habit, much more frequently and commonly prove vain and insufficient. For though it is impossible there should be any true, sincere desires and endeavors against a

* See this distinction of moral Inability explained in Part I. Sect. IV.

present volition or choice, yet there may be against volitions of that kind, when viewed at a distance. A person may desire and use means to prevent future exercises of a certain inclination; and, in order to it, may wish the habit might be removed; but his desires and endeavors may be ineffectual. The man may be said in some sense to be unable; yea, even as the word *unable* is a *relative term*, and has relation to ineffectual endeavors; yet not with regard to present, but remote endeavors.

Secondly, It must be borne in mind, according to what was observed before, that indeed no Inability whatsoever, which is merely moral, is properly called by the name of *Inability*; and that in the strictest propriety of speech, a man may be said to have a thing in his power, if he has it at his election; and he cannot be said to be unable to do a thing, when he can, if he now pleases, or whenever he has a proper, direct and immediate desire for it. As to those desires and endeavors, that may be against the exercises of a strong habit, with regard to which men may be said to be unable to avoid those exercises, they are remote desires and endeavors in two respects. *First*, as to *time*; they are never against present volitions, but only against volitions of such a kind, when viewed at a distance. *Secondly*, as to their *nature*; these opposite desires are not directly and properly against the habit and inclination itself, or the volitions in which it is exercised; for these, in themselves considered, are agreeable; but against something else, that attends them, or is their consequence; the opposition of the mind is levelled entirely against this; the inclination or volitions themselves are not at a opposed directly, and for their own sake; but only indirectly and remotely on the account of something alien and foreign.

III. Though the opposition of the Will itself, or the very want of Will to a thing commanded, implies a moral Inability to that thing; yet, if it be, as has been already shown, that the being of a good state or act of Will, is a thing most properly required by command; then, in some cases, such a state or act of Will may properly be required, which at present is not, and which may also be wanting after it is commanded. And therefore those things may properly be commanded, which men have a moral Inability for.

Such a state, or act of the Will, may be required by command, as does not already exist. For if that volition only may be commanded to be which already is, there could be no use of precept; commands in all cases would be perfectly vain and impertinent. And not only may such a Will be required, as is wanting before the command is given, but also such as may possibly be wanting afterwards; such as the exhibition of the command may not be effectual to produce or excite.—Otherwise, no such things as disobedience to a proper and rightful command is possible in any case; and there is no case supposable or possible, wherein there can be an inexcusable or faulty disobedience; which *Arminians* cannot affirm consistently with their principles: for this makes obedience to just and proper commands always *necessary*, and Disobedience impossible. And so the *Arminian* would overthrow himself, yielding the very point we are upon, which he so strenuously denies, viz., that law and command are consistent with necessity.

If merely that Inability will excuse disobedience, which is implied in the opposition or defect of inclination, remaining after the command is exhibited, then wickedness always carries that in it which excuses it. It is evermore so, that by how much the more wickedness there is in a man's heart, by so much is his inclination to evil the stronger, and by so much the more, therefore, has he of moral Inability to the good required. His moral Inability, consisting in the strength of his evil inclination, is the very thing wherein his wickedness

consists; and yet, according to *Arminian* principles, it must be a thing inconsistent with wickedness; and by how much the more he has of it, by so much s he the further from wickedness.

Therefore, on the whole, it is manifest, that moral Inability alone (which consists in disinclination) never renders any thing improperly the subject matter of precept or command, and never can excuse any person in disobedience, or want of conformity to a command

Natural Inability, arising from the want of natural capacity, or external hinderance (which alone is properly called Inability), without doubt wholly excuses, or makes a thing improperly the matter of command. If men are excused from doing or acting any good thing, supposed to be commanded, it must be through some defect or obstacle that is not in the Will itself, but extrinsic to it; either in the capacity of understanding, or body, or outward circumstances.

Here two or three things may be observed:

1. As to spiritual duties or acts, or any good thing in the state or immanent acts of the Will itself, or of the affections (which are only certain modes of the exercise of the Will), if persons are justly excused, it must be through want of capacity in the natural faculty of understanding. Thus the same spiritual duties, or holy affections and exercises of heart, cannot be required of men, as may be of angels; the capacity of understanding being so much inferior. So men cannot be required to love those amiable persons, whom they have had no opportunity to see, or hear of, or come to the knowledge of, in any way agreeable to the natural state and capacity of the human understanding. But the insufficiency of motives will not excuse; unless their being insufficient arises not from the moral state of the Will or inclination itself, but from the state of the natural understanding. The great kindness and generosity of another may be a motive insufficient to excite gratitude in the person, that receives the kindness, through his vile and ungrateful temper: in this case, the insufficiency of the motive arises from the state of the Will or inclination of heart, and does not at all excuse. But if this generosity is not sufficient to excite gratitude, being unknown, there being no means of information adequate to the state and measure of the person's faculties, this insufficiency is attended with a natural Inability which entirely excuses.

2. As to such motions of body, or exercises and alterations of mind, which do not consist in the immanent acts or state of the Will itself, but are supposed to be required as effects of the Will; I say, in such supposed effects of the Will, in cases wherein there is no want of a capacity of understanding; that Inability, and that only excuses, which consists in want of connection between them and the Will. If the Will fully complies, and the proposed effect does not prove, according to the laws of nature, to be connected with his volition, the man is perfectly excused; he has a natural Inability to the thing required. For the Will itself, as has been observed, is all that can be directly and immediately required by Command; and other things only indirectly, as connected with the Will. If, therefore, there be a full compliance of Will, the person has done his duty; and if other things do not prove to be connected with his volition, that is not owing to him.

3. Both these kinds of natural Inability that have been mentioned, and so all Inability that excuses, may be resolved into one thing, namely, want of natural capacity or strength; either capacity of understanding, or external strength. For when there are external defects and obstacles, they would be no obstacles, were it not for the imperfection and limitations of understanding and strength.

Corol. If things for which men have a moral Inability, may properly be the matter of precept or command, then they may also of invitation and counsel. Commands and invitations come very much to the same thing; the difference is only circumstantial: commands are as much a manifestation of the Will of him that speaks, as invitations, and as much testimonies of expectation of compliance. The difference between them lies in nothing that touches the affair in hand. The main difference between command and invitation consists in the enforcement of the Will of him who commands or invites. In the latter it is his *kindness*, the goodness which his Will arises from: in the former it is his *authority*. But whatever be the ground of the Will of him that speaks, or the enforcement of what he says, yet, seeing neither his Will nor expectation is any more testified in the one case than the other; therefore a person's being known to be morally unable to do the thing to which he is directed *by Invitation*, is no more an evidence of insincerity in him that directs in manifesting either a Will, or expectation which he has not, than his being known to be morally unable to do what he is directed to *by command*. So that all this grand objection of *Arminians* against the Inability of fallen men to exert faith in Christ, or to perform other spiritual gospel duties, from the sincerity of God's counsels and invitations, must be without force.

SECTION V.

That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavors, which is supposed to excuse in the Nonperformance of Things in themselves good, particularly considered.

It is what is much insisted on by many, that some men, though they are not able to perform spiritual duties, such as repentance of sin, love of God, a cordial acceptance of Christ as exhibited and offered in the gospel, &c., yet they may sincerely desire and endeavor these things; and therefore must be excused; it being unreasonable to blame them for the omission of those things, which they sincerely desire and endeavor to do, but cannot do.

Concerning this matter, the following things may be observed:

1. What is here supposed, is a great mistake and gross absurdity; even that men may sincerely choose and desire those spiritual duties of love, acceptance, choice, rejection, &c., consisting in the exercise of the Will itself, or in the disposition and inclination of the heart; and yet not be able to perform or exert them. This is absurd, because it is absurd to suppose that a man should directly, properly and sincerely incline to have an inclination, which at the same time is contrary to his inclination: for that is to suppose him not to be inclined to that, to which he is inclined. If a man, in the state and acts of his Will and inclination, does properly and directly fall in with those duties, he therein performs them: for the duties themselves consist in that very thing; they consist in the state and acts of the Will being so formed and directed. If the soul properly and sincerely falls in with a certain proposed act of Will or choice, the soul therein makes that choice its own. Even as when a moving body falls in with a proposed direction of its motion, that is the same thing as to move in that direction.

2. That which is called a *desire* and *willingness* for those inward duties, in such as do not perform them, has respect to these duties only indirectly and remotely, and is improperly represented as a willingness for them; not only because (as was observed before) it respects those good volitions only in a

distant view, and with respect to future time; but also because evermore, not these things themselves, but something else, that is alien and foreign, is the object that terminates these volitions and desires.

A drunkard, who continues in his drunkenness, being under the power of a love, and violent appetite to strong drink, and without any love to virtue; but being also extremely covetous and close, and very much exercised and grieved at the diminution of his estate, and prospect of poverty, may in a sort *desire* the virtue of temperance; and though his present Will is to gratify his extravagant appetite, yet he may wish he had a heart to forbear future acts of intemperance, and forsake his excesses, through an unwillingness to part with his money: but still he goes on with his drunkenness; his wishes and endeavors are insufficient and ineffectual: such a man has no proper, direct, sincere willingness to forsake this vice, and the vicious deeds which belong to it: for he acts voluntarily in continuing to drink to excess: his desire is very improperly called a willingness to be temperate; it is no true desire of that virtue; for it is not that virtue, that terminates his wishes; nor have they any direct respect to it. It is only *the saving his money*, and avoiding poverty, that terminates and exhausts the whole strength of his desire. The virture of temperance is regarded only very indirectly and improperly, even as a necessary means of gratifying the vice of covetousness.

So a man of an exceeding corrupt and wicked heart, who has no love to God and Jesus Christ, but, on the contrary, being very profanely and carnally inclined, has the greatest distaste of the things of religion, and enmity against them; yet being of a family, that from one generation to another, have most of them died, in youth, of an hereditary consumption; and so having little hope of living long; and having been instructed in the necessity of a supreme love to Christ, and gratitude for his death and sufferings, in order to his salvation from eternal misery; if under these circumstances he should, through fear of eternal torments wish he had such a disposition: but his profane and carnal heart remaining, he continues still in his habitual distaste *of*, and enmity *to* God and religion, and wholly without any exercise of that love and gratitude (as doubtless the very devils themselves, notwithstanding all the devilishness of their temper, would wish for a holy heart, if by that means they could get out of hell): in this case, there is no sincere willingness to love Christ and choose him as his chief good: these holy dispositions and exercises are not at all the direct object of the Will: they truly share no part of the inclination or desire of the soul; but all is terminated on deliverance from torment: and these graces and pious volitions, notwithstanding this forced consent, are looked upon as undesirable; as when a sick man desires a dose he greatly abhors, to save his life.—From these things it appears,

3. That this indirect willingness which has been spoken of, is not that exercise of the Will which the command requires; but is entirely a different one; being a volition of a different nature, and terminated altogether on different objects; wholly falling short of that virtue of Will, which the command has respect to.

4. This other volition, which has only some indirect concern with the duty required, cannot excuse for the want of that good will itself, which is commanded; being not the thing which answers and fulfils the command, and being wholly destitute of the virtue which the command seeks.

Further to illustrate this matter.—If a child has a most excellent father, that has ever treated him with fatherly kindness and tenderness, and has every way in the highest degree merited his love and dutiful regard, being withal very

wealthy; but the son is of so vile a disposition, that he inveterately hates his father; and yet, apprehending that his hatred of him is like to prove his ruin, by bringing him finally to poverty and abject circumstances, through his father's disinheriting him, or otherwise; which is exceeding cross to his avarice and ambition; he therefore wishes it were otherwise: but yet, remaining under the invincible power of his vile and malignant disposition, he continues still in his settled hatred of his father. Now, if such a son's indirect willingness to have love and honor towards his father, at all acquits or excuses before God, for his failing of actually exercising these dispositions towards him, which God requires, it must be on one of these accounts. (1) Either that it answers and fulfils the command. But this it does not by the supposition; because the thing commanded is love and honor to his worthy parent. If the command be proper and just, as is supposed, then it obliges to the thing commanded; and so nothing else but that can answer the obligation. Or, (2.) It must be at least, because there is that virtue or goodness in his indirect willingness, that is equivalent to the virtue required; and so balances or countervails it, and makes up for the want of it. But that also is contrary to the supposition. The willingness the son has merely from regard to money and honor, has no goodness in it, to countervail the want of the pious filial respect required.

Sincerity and reality, in that indirect willingness which has been spoken of, does not make it the better. That which is real and hearty is often called sincere; whether it be in virtue or vice. Some persons are sincerely *bad*; others are sincerely *good*; and others may be sincere and hearty in things, which are in their own nature *indifferent*; as a man may be sincerely desirous of eating when he is hungry. But a being sincere, hearty and in good earnest, is no virtue, unless it be in a thing that is virtuous. A man may be sincere and hearty in joining a crew of pirates, or a gang of robbers. When the devils cried out, and besought Christ not to torment them, it was no mere pretence; they were very hearty in their desires not to be tormented; but this did not make their Will or desires virtuous.—And if men have sincere desires, which are in their kind and nature no better, it can be no excuse for the want of any required virtue.

And as a man's being sincere in such an indirect desire or *willingness* to do his duty, as has been mentioned, cannot excuse for the want of performance; so it is with *endeavors* arising from such a willingness. The endeavors can have no more goodness in them, than the Will which they are the effect and expression of. And, therefore, however sincere and real, and however great a person's endeavors are; yea, though they should be to the utmost of his ability; unless the Will which they proceed from be truly good and virtuous, they can be of no avail, influence or weight to any purpose whatsoever, in a moral sense or respect. That which is not truly virtuous, in God's sight, is looked upon, by him, as good for nothing; and so can be of no value, weight or influence in his account, to recommend, satisfy, excuse or make up for any moral defect. For nothing can counterbalance evil, but good. If evil be in one scale, and we put a great deal into the other, sincere and earnest desires, and many and great endeavors; yet, if there be no real goodness in all, there is no weight in it; and so it does nothing towards balancing the real weight, which is in the opposite scale. It is only like the subtracting a thousand noughts from before a real number, which leaves the sum just as it was.

Indeed such endeavors may have a *negatively* good influence. Those things, which have no positive virtue have no positive moral influence; yet they may be an occasion of persons avoiding some positive evils. As if a man were in the water

with a neighbor, that he had ill will to, who could not swim, holding him by his hand; which neighbor was much in debt to him; and should be tempted to let him sink and drown; but should refuse to comply with the temptation; not from love to his neighbor, but from the love of money, and because by his drowning he should lose his debt; that which he does in preserving his neighbor from drowning, is nothing good in the sight of God; yet hereby he avoids the greater guilt that would have been contracted, if he had designedly let his neighbor sink and perish. But when *Arminians*, in their disputes with *Calvinists*, insist so much on sincere desires and endeavors, as what must excuse men, must be accepted of God, &c., it is manifest they have respect to some positive moral weight or influence of those desires and endeavors. Accepting, justifying or excusing on the account of sincere honest endeavors (as they are called), and men's doing what they can, &c., has relation to some moral value, something that is accepted as good, and as such, countervailing some defect.

But there is a great and unknown deceit arising from the ambiguity of the phrase, *sincere endeavors*. Indeed there is a vast indistinctness and unfixedness in most, or at least very many of the terms used to express things pertaining to moral and spiritual matters. Whence arise innumerable mistakes, strong prejudices, inextricable confusion, and endless controversy.

The word *sincere*, is most commonly used to signify something that is good: men are habituated to understand by it the same as *honest* and *upright*; which terms excite an idea of some good thing in the strictest and highest sense; good in the sight of him, who sees not only the outward appearance, but the heart. And, therefore, men think that if a person be *sincere*, he will certainly be accepted. If it be said that any one is sincere in his endeavors, this suggests to men's minds as much, as that his heart and Will is good, that there is no defect of duty, as to virtuous inclination; he *honestly* and *uprightly* desires and endeavors to do as he is required; and this leads them to suppose, that it would be very hard and unreasonable to punish him, only because he is unsuccessful in his endeavors, the thing endeavored being beyond his power.—Whereas it ought to be observed, that the word *sincere* has these different significations:

1. *Sincerity*, as the word is sometimes used, signifies no more than *reality of Will and endeavor*, with respect to any thing that is professed or pretended; without any consideration of the nature of the principle or aim, whence this real Will and true endeavor arises. If a man has some real desire to obtain a thing, either direct or indirect, or does really endeavor after a thing, he is said sincerely to desire or endeavor it; without any consideration of the goodness or virtuousness of the principle he acts from, or any excellency or worthiness of the end he acts for. Thus a man who is kind to his neighbor's wife, who is sick and languishing, and very helpful in her case, makes a show of desiring and endeavoring her restoration to health and vigor; and not only makes such a show, but there is a reality in his pretence, he does heartily and earnestly desire to have her health restored and uses his true and utmost endeavors for it; he is said sincerely to desire and endeavor it; because he does so truly or really; though perhaps the principle he acts from, is no other than a vile and scandalous passion; having lived in adultery with her, he earnestly desires to have her health and vigor restored, that he may return to his criminal pleasures with her. Or,

2. By *sincerity* is meant, not merely a *reality* of Will and endeavor of some sort or other, and from some consideration or other, but a *virtuous sincerity*. That is, that in the performance of those particular acts, that are the matter of virtue or duty, there be not only the matter, but the form and essence of virtue, consisting in the aim that governs the act, and the principle exercised in it.

There is not only the reality of the act, that is as it were the *body* of the duty; but also the soul, which should properly belong to such a body. In this sense, a man is said to be sincere, when he acts with a *pure intention*; not from sinister views, or by-ends: he not only in reality desires and seeks the thing to be done, or qualification to be obtained, for some end or other; but he wills the thing directly and properly, as neither forced nor bribed; the virtue of the thing is properly the object of the Will.

In the former sense, a man is said to be sincere, in opposition to a mere pretence, and *show of the particular thing to be done or exhibited*, without any real desire or endeavor at all. In the latter sense, a man is said to be sincere, in opposition to that *show of virtue there is in merely doing the matter of duty*, without the reality of the virtue itself in the soul, and the essence of it, which there is a show of. A man may be sincere in the former sense, and yet in the latter be in the sight of God, who searches the heart, a vile hypocrite.

In the latter kind of sincerity only, is there any thing truly valuable or acceptable in the sight of God. And this is the thing, which in Scripture is called *sincerity, uprightness, integrity, truth in the inward parts*, and a *being of a perfect heart*. And if there be such a sincerity, and such a degree of it as there ought to be, and there be any thing further that the man is not able to perform, or which does not prove to be connected with his sincere desires and endeavors, the man is wholly excused and acquitted in the sight of God; his Will shall surely be accepted for his deed; and such a sincere Will and endeavor is all that in strictness is required of him, by any command of God. But as to the other kind of sincerity of desires and endeavors, it having no virtue in it (as was observed before), can be of no avail before God, in any case, to recommend, satisfy, or excuse, and has no positive moral weight or influence whatsoever.

Corol. 1. Hence it may be inferred, that nothing in the reason and nature of things appears, from the consideration of any moral weight of that former kind of sincerity, which has been spoken of, at all obliging us to believe, or leading us to suppose, that God has made any positive promises of salvation, or grace, or any saving assistance, or any spiritual benefit whatsoever, to any *desires, prayers, endeavors, striving* or *obedience* of those, who hitherto have no true virtue or holiness in their hearts; though we should suppose all the sincerity, and the utmost degree of endeavor, that is possible to be in a person without holiness.

Some object against God's requiring, as the condition of salvation, those holy exercises, which are the result of a supernatural renovation: such as a supreme respect to Christ, love to God, loving holiness for its own sake, &c., that these inward dispositions and exercises are above men's power, as they are by nature; and therefore that we may conclude, that when men are brought to be sincere in their endeavors, and do as well as they can, they are accepted; and that this must be all that God requires, in order to men's being received as the objects of his favor, and must be what God has appointed as the condition of salvation. Concerning which, I would observe, that in such a manner of speaking of men's being accepted, because they are sincere, and do as well as they can, there is evidently a supposition of some virtue, some degree of that which is truly good; though it does not go so far as were to be wished For if men do what they can, unless their so doing be from some good principle, disposition, or exercise of heart, some virtuous inclination or act of the Will; their so doing what they can, is in some respects not a whit better than if they did nothing In such a case, there is no more positive moral goodness in a

man's doing what he can, than in a windmill's doing what it can; because the action does no more proceed from virtue; and there is nothing in such sincerity of endeavor, or doing what we can, that should render it any more a proper or fit recommendation to positive favor and acceptance, or the condition of any reward or actual benefit, than doing nothing; for both the one and the other are alike nothing, as to any true moral weight or value.

Corol. 2. Hence also it follows, that there is nothing that appears in the reason and nature of things, which can justly lead us to determine, that God will certainly give the necessary means of salvation, or some way or other bestow true holiness and eternal life on those *Heathen*, who are sincere (in the sense above explained) in their endeavors to find out the Will of the Deity, and to please him, according to their light, that they may escape his future displeasure and wrath, and obtain happiness in the future state through his favor.

SECTION VI.

Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious Habits or Inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian Notions of Liberty and moral Agency.

To suppose such a freedom of Will, as *Arminians* talk of, to be requisite to virtue and vice, is many ways contrary to common sense.

If indifference belongs to liberty of Will, as *Arminians* suppose, and it be essential to a virtuous action, that it be performed in a state of liberty, as they also suppose; it will follow, that it is essential to a virtuous action, that it be performed in a state of indifference; and if it be performed in a state of indifference, then doubtless it must be performed in the time of indifference. And so it will follow, that in order to the virtuousness of an act, the heart must be indifferent in the time of the performance of that act, and the more indifferent and cold the heart is with relation to the act which is performed, so much the better; because the act is performed with so much the greater liberty. But is this agreeable to the light of nature? Is it agreeable to the notions, which mankind, in all ages, have of virtue, that it lies in that, which is contrary to indifference, even in the tendency and inclination of the heart to virtuous action; and that the stronger the inclination, and so the further from indifference, the more virtuous the heart, and so much more praiseworthy the act which proceeds from it?

If we should suppose (contrary to what has been before demonstrated) that there may be an act of Will in a state of indifference; for instance, this act, viz., the Will's determining to put itself out of a state of indifference, and give itself a preponderation one way, then it would follow, on *Arminian* principles, that this act or determination of the Will is that alone wherein virtue consists, because this only is performed, while the mind remains in a state of indifference and so in a state of liberty: for when once the mind is put out of its equilibrium, it is no longer in such a state; and therefore all the acts, which follow afterwards, proceeding from bias, can have the nature neither of virtue nor vice. Or if the thing, which the Will can do, while yet in a state of indifference, and so of liberty, be only to suspend acting, and determine to take the matter into consideration, then this determination is that alone wherein virtue consists, and

not proceeding to action after the scale is turned by consideration. So that it will follow, from these principles, that all that is done after the mind, by any means, is once out of its equilibrium and already possessed by an inclination, and arising from that inclination, has nothing of the nature of virtue or vice, nd is worthy of neither blame nor praise. But how plainly contrary is this the universal sense of mankind, and to the notion they have of sincerely virous actions? Which is, that they are actions, which proceed from a heart *ll disposed* and *inclined;* and the *stronger*, and the more *fixed* and *determin*- the good disposition of the heart, the greater the sincerity of virtue, and so the ore of the truth and reality of it. But if there be any acts, which are done a state of equilibrium, or spring immediately from perfect indifference and coldness of heart, they cannot arise from any good principle or disposition in the heart; and, consequently, according to common sense, have no sincere goodness in them, having no virtue of heart in them. To have a virtuous heart, is to have a heart that favors virtue, and is friendly to it, and not one perfectly cold and indifferent about it.

And besides, the actions that are done in a state of indifference, or that arise immediately out of such a state, cannot be virtuous, because, by the supposition, they are not determined by any preceding choice. For if there be preceding choice, then choice intervenes between the act and the state of indifference; which is contrary to the supposition of the act's arising immediately out of indifference. But those acts which are not determined by preceding choice, cannot be virtuous or vicious by *Arminian* principles, because they are not determined by the Will. So that neither one way, nor the other, can any actions be virtuous or vicious, according to *Arminian* principles. If the action *be determined* by a preceding act of choice, it cannot be virtuous; because the action is not done in a state of indifference, nor does immediately arise from such a state; and so is not done in a state of liberty. If the action be *not determined* by a preceding act of choice, then it cannot be virtuous; because then the Will is not self-determined in it. So that it is made certain, that neither virtue nor vice can ever find any place in the universe.

Moreover, that it is necessary to a virtuous action, that it be performed in a state of indifference, under a notion of that being a state of liberty, is contrary to common sense; as it is a dictate of common sense, that indifference itself, in many cases, is vicious, and so to a high degree. As if when I see my neighbor or near friend, and one who has in the highest degree merited of me, in extreme distress, and ready to perish, I find an indifference in my heart with respect to any thing proposed to be done, which I can easily do, for his relief. So if it should be proposed to me to blaspheme God, or kill my father, or do numberless other things, which might be mentioned, the being indifferent, for a moment, would be highly vicious and vile.

And it may be further observed, that to suppose this liberty of indifference essential to virtue and vice, destroys the great difference of degrees of the uilt of different crimes, and takes away the heinousness of the most flagitious, orrid iniquities; such as adultery, bestiality, murder, perjury, blasphemy, &c. For, according to these principles, there is no harm at all in having the mind in a state of perfect indifference with respect to these crimes: nay, it is absolutely necessary in order to any virtue in avoiding them, or vice in doing them. But for the mind to be in a state of indifference with respect to them, is to be next door to doing them: it is then infinitely near to choosing, and so committing the fact: for equilibrium is the next step to a degree of preponderation; and one, even the least degree of preponderation (all things considered), is choice.

And not only so, but for the Will to be in a state of perfect equilibrium with respect to such crimes, is for the mind to be in such a state, as to be full as likely to choose them as to refuse them, to do them as to omit them. And if our minds must be in such a state, wherein it is as near to choosing as refusing, and wherein it must of necessity, according to the nature of things, be as likely to commit them, as to refrain from them; where is the exceeding heinousness of choosing and committing them? If there be no harm in often being in such a state, wherein the probability of doing and forbearing are exactly equal, there being an equilibrium, and no more tendency to one than the other; then, according to the nature and laws of such a contingence, it may be expected, as an *inevitable* consequence of such a disposition of things, that we should choose them as often as reject them: that it should generally so fall out is necessary, as equality in the effect is the natural consequence of the equal tendency of the cause, or of the antecedent state of things from which the effect arises. Why then should we be so exceedingly to blame, if it does so fall out?

It is many ways apparent, that the *Arminian* scheme of liberty is utterly inconsistent with the being of any such things as either virtuous or vicious habits or dispositions. If liberty of *indifference* be essential to moral agency, then there can be no virtue in any habitual inclinations of the heart; which are contrary to indifference, and imply in their nature the very destruction and exclusion of it. They suppose nothing can be virtuous, in which no liberty is exercised; but how absurd is it to talk of exercising indifference under bias and preponderation!

And if *self-determining power* in the Will be necessary to moral agency, praise, blame, &c., then nothing done by the Will can be any further praise or blameworthy, than so far as the Will is moved, swayed and determined by itself, and the scales turned by the sovereign power the Will has over itself. And therefore the Will must not be put out of its balance already, the preponderation must not be determined and effected beforehand; and so the self-determining act anticipated. Thus it appears another way, that habitual bias is inconsistent with that liberty, which *Arminians* suppose to be necessary to virtue or vice; and so it follows, that habitual bias itself cannot be either virtuous or vicious.

The same thing follows from their doctrine concerning the inconsistence of *necessity* with liberty, praise, dispraise, &c. None will deny, that bias and inclination may be so strong as to be invincible, and leave no possibility of the Will's determining contrary to it; and so be attended with necessity. This Dr. Whitby allows concerning the Will of God, Angels, and glorified Saints, with respect to good; and the Will of Devils with respect to evil. Therefore if necessity be inconsistent with liberty; then, when fixed inclination is to such a degree of strength, it utterly excludes all virtue, vice, praise or blame. And if so, then the nearer habits are to this strength, the more do they impede liberty, and so diminish praise and blame. If very strong habits destroy liberty, the less ones proportionably hinder it, according to their degree of strength. And therefore it will follow, that then is the act most virtuous or vicious, when performed without any inclination or habitual bias at all; because it is then performed with most liberty.

Every prepossessing, fixed bias on the mind, brings a degree of moral inability for the contrary; because so far as the mind is biassed and prepossessed, so much hinderance is there of the contrary. And therefore if moral inability be inconsistent with moral agency, or the nature of virtue and vice, then, so far as there is any such thing as evil disposition of heart, or habitual depravity of inclination; whether covetousness, pride, malice, cruelty, or whatever else; so

much the more excusable persons are; so much the less have their evil acts of this kind the nature of vice. And on the contrary, whatever excellent dispositions and inclinations they have, so much are they the less virtuous.

It is evident that no habitual disposition of heart, whether it be to a greater or less degree, can be in any degree virtuous or vicious; or the actions which proceed from them *at all* praise or blameworthy.—Because, though we should suppose the habit not to be of such strength, as wholly to take away all moral ability and self-determining power; or hinder but that, although the act be partly from bias, yet it may be in part from self-determination; yet in this case, all that is from antecedent bias must be set aside, as of no consideration; and in estimating the degree of virtue or vice, no more must be considered than what arises from self-determining power, without any influence of that bias, because liberty is exercised in no more; so that all that is the exercise of habitual inclination, is thrown away, as not belonging to the morality of the action. By which it appears, that no exercise of these habits, let them be stronger or weaker, can ever have any thing of the nature of either virtue or vice.

Here if any one should say, that notwithstanding all these things, there may be the nature of virtue and vice in habits of the mind; because these habits may be the effects of those acts, wherein the mind exercised liberty; that however the forementioned reasons will prove that no habits, which are natural, or that are born or created with us can be either virtuous or vicious; yet they will not prove this of habits, which have been acquired and established by repeated free acts.

To such an objector I would say, that this evasion will not at all help the matter. For if freedom of Will be essential to the very *nature* of virtue and vice, then there is no virtue or vice, but only in that very thing, wherein this liberty is exercised. If a man in one or more things, that he does, exercises liberty, and then by those acts is brought into such circumstances, that his Liberty ceases, and there follows a long series of acts or events that come to pass necessarily; those consequent acts are not virtuous or vicious, rewardable or punishable; but only the free acts that established this necessity; for in them alone was the man free. The following effects, that are necessary, have no more of the nature of virtue or vice, than health or sickness of body have properly the nature of virtue or vice, being the effects of a course of free acts of temperance or intemperance; or than the good qualities of a clock are of the nature of virtue, which are the effects of free acts of the artificer; or the goodness and sweetness of the fruits of a garden are moral virtues, being the effects of the free and faithful acts of the gardener. If liberty be absolutely requisite to the morality of actions and necessity wholly inconsistent with it, as *Arminians* greatly insist; then no necessary effects whatsoever, let the cause be ever so good or bad, can be virtuous or vicious; but the virtue or vice must be only in the *free cause*. Agreeably to this, Dr. Whitby supposes, the necessity that attends the good and evil habits of the saints in heaven, and damned in hell, which are the consequence of their free acts in their state of probation, are not rewardable or punishable.

On the whole, it appears, that if the notions of *Arminians* concerning liberty and moral agency be true, it will follow, that there is no virtue in any such habits or qualities as humility, meekness, patience, mercy, gratitude, generosity, heavenly-mindedness; nothing at all praiseworthy in loving Christ above father and mother, wife and children, or our own lives; or in delight in holiness, hungering and thirsting after righteousness, love to enemies, universal benevolence to mankind: and on the other hand, there is nothing at all

vicious, or worthy of dispraise, in the most sordid, beastly, malignant, devilish dispositions; in being ungrateful, profane, habitually hating God, and things sacred and holy; or in being most treacherous, envious, and cruel towards men. For all these things are *dispositions* and *inclinations* of the heart. And in short, there is no such thing as any virtuous or vicious *quality of mind;* no such thing as inherent virtue and holiness, or vice and sin: and the stronger those habits or dispositions are, which used to be called virtuous and vicious, the further they are from being so indeed; the more violent men's lusts are, the more fixed their pride, envy, ingratitude and maliciousness, still the further are they from being blameworthy. If there be a man that by his own repeated acts, or by any other means, is come to be of the most hellish disposition, desperately inclined to treat his neighbors with injuriousness, contempt and malignity: the further they should be from any disposition to be angry with him, or in the least to blame him. So, on the other hand, if there be a person, who is of a most excellent spirit, strongly inclining him to the most amiable actions, admirably meek, benevolent, &c., so much is he further from any thing rewardable or commendable. On which principles, the man Jesus Christ was very far from being praiseworthy for those acts of holiness and kindness, which he performed, these propensities being strong in his heart. And above all, the infinitely holy and gracious God is infinitely remote from any thing commendable, his good inclinations being infinitely strong, and He, therefore, at the utmost possible distance from being at liberty. And in all cases, the stronger the inclinations of any are to virtue, and the more they love it, the less virtuous they are; and the more they love wickedness, the less vicious.—Whether these things are agreeable to Scripture, let every Christian, and every man who has read the Bible, judge: and whether they are agreeable to common sense, let every one judge, that has human understanding in exercise.

And, if we pursue these principles, we shall find that virtue and vice are wholly excluded out of the world; and that there never was, nor ever can be any such thing as one or the other; either in God, angels, or men. No propensity, disposition or habit can be virtuous or vicious, as has been shown; because they, so far as they take place, destroy the freedom of the Will, the foundation of all moral agency, and exclude all capacity of either virtue or vice. —And if habits and dispositions themselves be not virtuous nor vicious, neither can the exercise of these dispositions be so; for the exercise of *bias* is not the exercise of *free self-determining Will*, and so there is no exercise of liberty in it. Consequently, no man is virtuous or vicious, either in being well or ill disposed, nor in acting from a good or bad disposition. And whether this bias or disposition, be habitual or not, if it exists but a moment before the act of Will, which is the effect of it, it alters not the case, as to the necessity of the effect. Or if there be no previous disposition at all, either habitual or occasional, that determines the act, then it is not choice that determines it: it is therefore a contingence, that happens to the man, arising from nothing in him; and is necessary, as to any inclination or choice of his; and, therefore, cannot make him either the better or worse, any more than a tree is better than other trees, because it oftener happens to be lit upon by a swan or nightingale; or a rock more vicious than other rocks, because rattlesnakes have happened oftener to crawl over it. So that there is no virtue nor vice in good or bad dispositions, either fixed or transient; nor any virtue or vice in acting from any good or bad previous inclination; nor yet any virtue or vice, in acting wholly without any previous inclination. Where then shall we find room for virtue or vice?

SECTION VII.

Arminian Notions of moral Agency inconsistent with all influence of Motive and Inducement, in either virtuous or vicious Actions.

As *Arminian* notions of that liberty, which is essential to virtue or vice, are inconsistent with common sense, in their being inconsistent with all virtuous and vicious habits and dispositions; so they are no less so in their inconsistency with all influence of motives in moral actions.

It is equally against those notions of liberty of Will, whether there be, previous to the act of choice, a preponderancy of the inclination, or a preponderancy of those circumstances, which have a tendency to move the inclination. And, indeed, it comes to just the same thing; to say, the circumstances of the mind are such as tend to sway and turn its inclination one way, is the same thing as to say, the inclination of the mind, as under such circumstances, tends that way.

Or if any think it most proper to say, that motives do alter the inclination, and give a new bias to the mind, it will not alter the case, as to the present argument. For if motives operate by giving the mind an inclination, then they operate by destroying the mind's indifference, and laying it under a bias. But to do this, is to destroy the *Arminian* freedom: it is not to leave the Will to its own self-determination, but to bring it into subjection to the power of something extrinsic, which operates upon it, sways and determines it, previous to its own determination. So that what is done from motive, cannot be either virtuous or vicious. And besides, if the acts of the Will are excited by motives, those motives are the causes of those acts of the Will; which makes the acts of the Will necessary; as effects necessarily follow the efficiency of the cause. And if the influence and power of the motive causes the volition, then the influence of the motive determines volition, and volition does not determine itself; and so is not free, in the sense of *Arminians* (as has been largely shown already), and consequently can be neither virtuous nor vicious.

The supposition, which has already been taken notice of as an insufficient evasion in other cases, would be, in like manner, impertinently alleged in this case; namely, the supposition that liberty consists in a power of suspending action for the present, in order to deliberation. If it should be said, though it be true, that the Will is under a necessity of finally following the strongest motive; yet it may, for the present, forbear to act upon the motive presented, till there has been opportunity thoroughly to consider it, and compare its real weight with the merit of other motives. I answer as follows:

Here again, it must be remembered, that if determining thus to suspend and consider, be that act of the Will, wherein alone liberty is exercised, then in this all virtue and vice must consist; and the acts that follow this consideration, and are the effects of it, being necessary, are no more virtuous or vicious than some good or bad events, which happen when men are fast asleep, and are the consequences of what they did when they were awake. Therefore, I would here observe two things:

1. To suppose, that all virtue and vice, in every case, consists in determining, whether to take time for consideration or not, is not agreeable to common sense. For, according to such a supposition, the most horrid crimes, adultery, murder

sodomy, blasphemy, &c, do not at all consist in the horrid nature of the things themselves, but only in the neglect of thorough consideration before they were perpetrated, which brings their viciousness to a small matter, and makes all crimes equal. If it be said, that neglect of consideration, when such heinous evils are proposed to choice, is worse than in other cases: I answer, this is inconsistent, as it supposes the very thing to be, which, at the same time, is supposed not to be; it supposes all moral evil, all viciousness and heinousness. does not consist merely in the want of consideration. It supposes some crimes *in themselves*, in their *own nature*, to be more heinous than others, antecedent to consideration or inconsideration, which lays the person under a previous obligation to consider in some cases more than others.

2. If it were so, that all virtue and vice, in every case, consisted only in the act of the Will, whereby it determines whether to consider or no, it would not alter the case in the least, as to the present argument. For still in this act of the Will on this determination, it is induced by some motive, and necessarily follows the strongest motive; and so is necessary, even in that act wherein alone it is either virtuous or vicious.

One thing more I would observe, concerning the inconsistence of *Arminian* notions of moral agency with the influence of motives.—I suppose none will deny, that it is possible for motives to be set before the mind so powerful, and exhibited in so strong a light, and under so advantageous circumstances, as to be invincible; and such as the mind cannot but yield to. In this case, *Arminians* will doubtless say, liberty is destroyed. And if so, then if motives are exhibited with half so much power, they hinder liberty in proportion to their strength, and go half-way towards destroying it. If a thousand degrees of motive abolish all liberty, then five hundred take it half away. If one degree of the influence of motive does not at all infringe or diminish liberty, then no more do two degrees; for nothing doubled, is still nothing. And if two degrees do not diminish the Will's liberty, no more do four, eight, sixteen, or six thousand. For nothing multiplied ever so much, comes to but nothing. If there be nothing in the nature of motive or moral suasion, that is at all opposite to liberty, then the greatest degree of it cannot hurt liberty. But if there be any thing in the nature of the thing, that is against liberty, then the least degree of it hurts it in some degree; and consequently hurts and diminishes virtue. If invincible motives, to that action which is good, take away all the freedom of the act, and so all the virtue of it; then the more forcible the motives are, so much the worse, so much the less virtue; and the weaker the motives are, the better for the cause of virtue, and none is best of all.

Now let it be considered, whether these things are agreeable to common sense. If it should be allowed, that there are some instances wherein the soul chooses without any motive, what virtue can there be in such a choice? I am sure, there is no prudence or wisdom in it. Such a choice is made for no good end; for it is for no end at all. If it were for any end, the view of the end would be the motive exciting to the act; and if the act be for no good end, and so from no good aim, then there is no good intention in it; and, therefore, according to all our natural notions of virtue, no more virtue in it than in the motion of the smoke, which is driven to and fro by the wind without any aim or end in the thing moved, and which knows not whither, nor why and wherefore, it is moved.

Corol. 1. By these things it appears, that the argument against the *Calvinists*, taken from the use of counsels, exhortations, invitations, expostulations, &c., so much insisted on by *Arminians*, is truly against themselves. For these

things can operate no other way to any good effect, than as in them is exhibited motive and inducement, tending to excite and determine the acts of the Will. But it follows, on their principles, that the acts of Will excited by such causes, cannot be virtuous; because so far as they are from these, they are not from the Will's self-determining power. Hence it will follow, that it is not worth the while to offer any arguments to persuade men to any virtuous volition or voluntary action; it is in vain to set before them the wisdom and amiableness of ways of virtue, or the odiousness and folly of ways of vice. This notion of liberty and moral agency frustrates all endeavors to draw men to virtue by instruction or persuasion, precept or example: for though these things may induce men to what is *materially* virtuous, yet at the same time they take away the *form* of virtue, because they destroy liberty; as they, by their own power, put the Will out of its equilibrium, determine and turn the scale, and take the work of self-determining power out of its hands. And the clearer the instructions are that are given, the more powerful the arguments that are used, and the more moving the persuasions or examples, the more likely they are to frustrate their own design; because they have so much the greater tendency to put the Will out of its balance, to hinder its freedom of self-determination; and so to exclude the very form of virtue, and the essence of whatsoever is praiseworthy.

So it clearly follows, from these principles, that God has no hand in any man's virtue, nor does at all promote it, either by a physical or moral influence; that none of the moral methods He uses with men to promote virtue in the world, have tendency to the attainment of that end; that all the instructions, which he has given to men, from the beginning of the world to this day, by prophets, apostles, or by his Son Jesus Christ; that all his counsels, invitations, promises, threatenings, warnings and expostulations; that all means he has used with men, in ordinances, or providences; yea, all influences of his Spirit, ordinary and extraordinary, have had no tendency to excite any one virtuous act of the mind, or to promote any thing morally good or commendable, in any respect. For there is no way that these or any other means can promote virtue, but one of these three. Either (1,) by a physical operation on the heart. But all effects that are wrought in men this way, have no virtue in them, by the concurring voice of all *Arminians*. Or, (2,) morally, by exhibiting motives to the understanding, to excite good acts in the Will. But it has been demonstrated, that volitions, which are excited by motives, are necessary, and not excited by a self-moving power; and therefore, by their principles, there is no virtue in them. Or, (3,) by merely giving the Will an opportunity to determine itself concerning the objects proposed, either to choose or reject, by its own uncaused, unmoved, uninfluenced self-determination. And if this be all, then all those means do no more to promote virtue than vice: for they do nothing but give the Will opportunity to determine itself *either way*, either to good or bad, without laying it under any bias to either: and so there is really as much of an opportunity given to determine in favor of evil, as of good.

Thus that horrid blasphemous consequence will certainly follow from the *Arminian* doctrine, which they charge on others; namely, that God acts an inconsistent part in using so many counsels, warnings, invitations, entreaties, &c. with sinners, to induce them to forsake sin and turn to the ways of virtue: and that all are insincere and fallacious. It will follow, from their doctrine, that God does these things when he knows, at the same time that they have no manner of tendency to promote the effect he seems to aim at; yea, knows that

if they have any influence, this very influence will be inconsistent with such an effect, and will prevent it. But what an imputation of insincerity would this fix on Him, who is infinitely holy and true!—So that theirs is the doctrine, which, if pursued in its consequences, does horribly reflect on the Most High, and fix on Him the charge of hypocrisy; and not the doctrine of the *Calvinists;* according to their frequent, and vehement exclamations and invectives.

Corol. 2. From what has been observed in this section, it again appears, that *Arminian* principles and notions, when fairly examined and pursued in their demonstrable consequences, do evidently shut all virtue out of the world, and make it impossible that there should ever be any such thing, in any case; or that any such thing should ever be conceived of. For, by these principles, the very notion of virtue or vice implies absurdity and contradiction.—For it is absurd in itself, and contrary to common sense, to suppose a virtuous act of mind without any good intention or aim; and, by their principles, it is absurd to suppose a virtuous act with a good intention or aim; for to act for an end, is to act from a motive. So that if we rely on these principles, there can be no virtuous act with a good design and end; and it is self-evident, there can be none without: consequently there can be no virtuous act at all.

Corol. 3. It is manifest, that *Arminian* notions of moral agency, and *the being* of a faculty of Will, cannot consist together; and that if there be any such thing as either a virtuous or vicious act it cannot be an act of the Will; no Will can be at all concerned in it. For that act which is performed without inclination, without motive, without end, must be performed without any concern of the Will. To suppose an act of the Will without these, implies a contradiction. If the soul in its act has no motive or end; then, in that act (as was observed before) it seeks nothing, goes after nothing, exerts no inclination to any thing; and this implies, that in that act it desires nothing, and chooses nothing; so that there is no act of choice in the case: and that is as much as to say, there is no act of Will in the case. Which very effectually shuts all vicious and virtuous acts out of the universe; inasmuch as, according to this, there can be no vicious or virtuous act wherein the Will is concerned; and according to the plainest dictates of reason, and the light of nature, and also the principles of *Arminians* themselves, there can be no virtuous or vicious act wherein the Will is not concerned. And therefore there is no room for any virtuous or vicious acts at all.

Corol. 4. If none of the moral actions of intelligent beings are influenced by either previous inclination or motive, another strange thing will follow; and this is, that God not only cannot foreknow any of the future moral actions of his creatures, but he can make no conjecture, can give no probable guess concerning them. For all conjecture, in things of this nature, must depend on some discerning or apprehension of these two things, *previous disposition* and *motive*, which, as has been observed, *Arminian* notions of moral agency, in their real consequence, altogether exclude.

PART IV.

WHEREIN THE CHIEF GROUNDS OF THE REASONINGS OF ARMINIANS, AS SUPPOSED, AND DEFENCE OF THE FOREMENTIONED NOTIONS OF LIBERTY, MORAL AGENCY, &c., AND AGAINST THE OPPOSITE DOCTRINE, ARE CONSIDERED.

SECTION I.

The Essence of the Virtue and Vice of Dispositions of the Heart, and Acts of the Will, lies not in their Cause, but their Nature.

One main foundation of the reasons which are brought to establish the forementioned notions of liberty, virtue, vice, &c., is a supposition, that the virtuousness of the dispositions, or acts of the Will, consists, not in the nature of these dispositions or acts, but wholly in the origin or cause of them: so that if the disposition of the mind, or act of the Will, be ever so good, yet if the cause of the disposition or act be not our virtue, there is nothing virtuous or praiseworthy in it; and, on the contrary, if the Will, in its inclination or acts, be ever so bad, yet, unless it arises from something that is our vice or fault, there is nothing vicious or blameworthy in it. Hence their grand objection and pretended demonstration, or self-evidence, against any virtue and commendableness, or vice and blameworthiness, of those habits or acts of the Will, which are not from some virtuous or vicious determination of the Will itself.

Now if this matter be well considered, it will appear to be altogether a mistake, yea, a gross absurdity; and that it is most certain, that if there be any such things as a virtuous or vicious disposition, or volition of mind, the virtuousness or viciousness of them consists, not in the origin or cause of these things, but in the nature of them.

If the essence of virtuousness or commendableness, and of viciousness or fault, does not lie in the nature of the dispositions or acts of mind, which are said to be our virtue or our fault, but in their cause, then it is certain it lies nowhere at all. Thus for instance, if the vice of a vicious act of Will lies not in the nature of the act, but the cause; so that its being of a bad nature will not make it at all our fault, unless it arises from some faulty determination of ours, as its cause, or something in us that is our fault: then, for the same reason neither can the viciousness of that cause lie in the nature of the thing itself, but in its cause: that evil determination of ours is not our fault, merely because it is of a bad nature, unless it arises from some cause in us that is our fault. And when we are come to this higher cause, still the reason of the thing holds good; though this cause be of a bad nature, yet we are not at all to blame on that account, unless it arises from something faulty in us. Nor yet can blameworthiness lie in the nature of *this cause*, but in the cause of *that*. And thus we must drive faultiness back from step to step, from a lower cause to a higher, *in infinitum*: and that is thoroughly to banish it from the world, and to allow it no possibility of existence anywhere in the universality of things. On these principles, vice, or moral evil, cannot consist in any thing that is an *effect*; because *fault* does not consist in the nature of things, but in their cause; as well as because effects are necessary, being unavoidably connected with their cause: therefore the cause only is to blame. And so it follows, that faultiness can lie

only in that cause, which is a *cause only*, and no effect of any thing. Nor yet can it lie in this; for then it must lie in the nature of the thing itself; not in its being from any determination of ours, nor any thing faulty in us which is the cause, nor indeed from any cause at all; for, by the supposition, it is no effect, and *has no cause*. And thus, he that will maintain, it is not the nature of habits or acts of Will that makes them virtuous or faulty, but the cause, must immediately run himself out of his own assertion; and in maintaining it, will insensibly contradict and deny it.

This is certain, that if effects are vicious and faulty, not from their nature, or from any thing inherent in them, but because they are from a bad cause, it must be on account of the badness of the cause and so on account of the nature of the cause: a bad effect in the Will must be bad, because the cause is *bad*, or *of an evil nature*, or *has badness* as a quality inherent in it: and a *good* effect in the Will must be *good*, by reason of the *goodness* of the cause, or its being *of a good kind and nature*. And if this be what is meant, the very supposition of fault and praise lying not in the nature of the thing, but the cause, contradicts itself, and does at least resolve the essence of virtue and vice into the nature of things, and supposes it originally to consist in that.—And if a caviller has a mind to run from the absurdity, by saying, "No, the fault of the thing, which is the cause, lies not in this, that the cause itself is *of an evil nature*, but that the cause is evil in that sense, that it is from another bad cause." Still the absurdity will follow him; for, if so, then the cause before charged is at once acquitted, and all the blame must be laid to the higher cause, and must consist in that's being *evil* or *of an evil nature*. So now, we are come again to lay the blame of the thing blameworthy, to the nature of the thing, and not to the cause. And if any is so foolish as to go higher still, and ascend from step to step, till he is come to that, which is the first cause concerned in the whole affair, and will say, all the blame lies in that; then, at last, he must be forced to own, that the faultiness of the thing, which he supposes alone blameworthy, lies wholly in the nature of the thing, and not in the original or cause of it; for the supposition is that it has no original, it is determined by no act of ours, is caused by nothing faulty in us, being absolutely *without any cause*. And so the race is at an end, but the evader is taken in his flight.

It is agreeable to the natural notions of mankind, that moral evil, with its desert of dislike and abhorrence, and all its other ill deservings, consists in a certain *deformity* in the *nature* of certain dispositions of the heart, and acts of the Will; and not in the deformity of *something else*, diverse from the very thing itself, which deserves abhorrence, supposed to be the cause of it. Which would be absurd, because that would be to suppose a thing, that is innocent and not evil, is truly evil and faulty, because another thing is evil. It implies a contradiction; for it would be to suppose the very thing, which is morally evil and blameworthy, is innocent and not blameworthy; but that something else, which is its cause, is only to blame. To say, that vice does not consist in the thing which is vicious, but in its cause, is the same as to say, that vice does not consist in vice, but in that which produces it.

It is true, a cause may be to blame, for being the cause of vice: it may be wickedness in the cause, that it produces wickedness. But it would imply a contradiction, to suppose that these two are the same individual wickedness. The wicked act of the cause in producing wickedness, is one wickedness; and the wickedness produced, if there be any produced, is another. And therefore, the wickedness of the latter does not lie in the former, but is distinct from it; and the wickedness of both lies in the *evil nature* of the things, which are wicked

The thing, which makes sin hateful, is that by which it deserves punishment; which is but the expression of hatred. And that, which renders virtue lovely, is the same with that, on the account of which, it is fit to receive praise and reward; which are but the expressions of esteem and love. But that which makes vice hateful, is its hateful nature; and that which renders virtue lovely, is its amiable nature. It is a certain beauty or deformity that is *inherent* in that good or evil Will, which is the *soul* of virtue and vice (and not in the occasion of it) which is their worthiness of esteem or disesteem, praise or dispraise, according to the common sense of mankind. If the cause or occasion of the rise of a hateful disposition or act of Will, be also hateful; suppose another antecedent evil Will; that is entirely another sin, and deserves punishment by itself, under a distinct consideration. There is worthiness of dispraise in the nature of an evil volition, and not wholly in some foregoing act, which is its cause; otherwise the evil volition, which is the effect, is no moral evil, any more than sickness, or some other natural calamity, which arises from a cause morally evil.

Thus, for instance, ingratitude is hateful and worthy of dispraise, according to common sense; not because something as bad, or worse than ingratitude, was the cause that produced it; but because it is hateful in itself, by its own inherent deformity. So the love of virtue is amiable, and worthy of praise, not merely because something else went before this love of virtue in our minds, which caused it to take place there; for instance, our own choice; we choose to love virtue, and, by some method or other, wrought ourselves into the love of it; but because of the amiableness and condecency of such a disposition and inclination of heart. If that was the case, that we did choose to love virtue, and so produced that love in ourselves, this choice itself could be no otherwise amiable or praiseworthy, than as love to virtue, or some other amiable inclination, was exercised and implied in it. If that choice was amiable at all, it must be so on account of some amiable quality in the nature of the choice. If we chose to love virtue, not in love to virtue, or any thing that was good, and exercised no sort of good disposition in the choice, the choice itself was not virtuous, nor worthy of any praise, according to common sense, because the choice was not of a *good nature*.

It may not be improper here to take notice of something said by an author, that has lately made a mighty noise in America. "A necessary holiness (says he*) is no holiness. Adam could not be originally created in righteousness and true holiness, because he must *choose* to be righteous, *before* he could be righteous. And therefore he must exist, he must be created, yea, must exercise thought and reflection, before he was righteous." There is much more to the same effect in that place, and also in p. 437, 438, 439, 440. If these things are so, it will certainly follow, that the first choosing to be righteous is no righteous choice; there is no righteousness or holiness in it; because no choosing to be righteous goes before it. For he plainly speaks of *choosing to be righteous*, as what *must go before righteousness*: and that which follows the choice, being the effect of the choice, cannot be righteousness or holiness: for an effect is a thing necessary, and cannot prevent the influence or efficacy of its cause; and therefore is unavoidably dependent upon the cause: and he says, *a necessary holiness is no holiness*. So that neither can a choice of righteousness be righteousness or holiness, nor can any thing that is consequent on that choice, and the effect of it, be righteousness or holiness; nor can any thing that is without choice, be righteousness or holiness. So that by his scheme, all righteousness and holiness is at once shut out of the world, and no door left open, by which it can ever possibly enter into the world.

* Scrip. Doc. of *Original Sin* 180, 3d Edit.

I suppose, the way that men came to entertain this absurd, inconsistent notion, with respect to *internal inclinations and volitions* themselves (or notions that imply it), viz., that the essence of their moral good or evil lies not in their nature, but their cause; was, that it is indeed a very plain dictate of common sense, that it is so with respect to all outward actions, and sensible motions of the body; that the moral good or evil of them does not lie at all in the motions themselves; which, taken by themselves, are nothing of a moral nature; and the essence of all the moral good or evil that concerns them, lies in those internal dispositions and volitions, which are the cause of them. Now, being always used to determine this, without hesitation or dispute, concerning external actions; which are the things, that in the common use of language are signified by such phrases as men's *actions*, or their *doings*; hence, when they came to speak of volitions, and *internal exercises* of their inclinations, under the same denomination of their *actions*, or *what they do*, they unwarily determined the case must also be the same with these, as with external actions; not considering the vast difference in the nature of the case.

If any shall still object and say, why is it not necessary that the cause should be considered, in order to determine whether any thing be worthy of blame or praise? Is it agreeable to reason and common sense, that a man is to be praised or blamed for that, which he is not the cause or author of, and has no hand in?

I answer, such phrases as *being the cause, being the author, having a hand*, and the like, are ambiguous: They are most vulgarly understood for being the designing, voluntary cause, or cause by antecedent choice; and it is most certain that men are not, in this sense, the causes or authors of the first act of their Wills, in any case; as certain as any thing is, or ever can be; for nothing can be more certain, than that a thing is not before it is, nor a thing of the same kind before the first thing of that kind; and so no choice before the first choice. As the phrase, *being the author*, may be understood, not of being the producer by an antecedent act of Will; but as a person may be said to be the author of the act of Will itself, by his being the immediate agent, or the being that is acting, or in exercise in that act; if the phrase of *being the author*, is used to signify this, then doubtless common sense requires men's being the authors of their own acts of Will, in order to their being esteemed worthy of praise or dispraise, on account of them. And common sense teaches, that they must be the authors of external actions, in the former sense, namely, their being the causes of them by an act of Will or choice, in order to their being justly blamed or praised; but it teaches no such thing with respect to the acts of the Will themselves. But this may appear more manifest by the things which will be observed in the following section.

SECTION II.

The Falseness and Inconsistence of that metaphysical Notion of Action and Agency, which seems to be generally entertained by the Defenders of the Arminian Doctrine concerning Liberty, moral Agency, &c.

One thing that is made very much a ground of argument and supposed demonstration by *Arminians*, in defence of the forementioned principles, concerning moral agency, virtue, vice, &c., is their metaphysical notion of agency and

action. They say, unless the soul has a self-determining power, it has no power of action; if its volitions be not caused by itself, but are excited and determined by some extrinsic cause, they cannot be the soul's own acts; and that the soul cannot be active, but must be wholly passive, in those effects which it is the subject of necessarily, and not from its own free determination.

Mr Chubb lays the foundation of his scheme of liberty, and of his arguments to support it, very much in this position, that man is an agent, and capable of action. Which doubtless is true; but self-determination belongs to his notion of action, and is the very essence of it. Whence he infers, that it is impossible for a man to act and be acted upon, in the same thing, at the same time; and that nothing, that is an action, can be the effect of the action of another; and he insists, that a necessary agent, or an agent that is necessarily determined to act, is a plain contradiction.

But those are a precarious sort of demonstrations, which men build on the meaning that they arbitrarily affix to a word; especially when that meaning is abstruse, inconsistent, and entirely diverse from the original sense of the word in common speech.

That the meaning of the word *action*, as Mr. Chubb and many others use it, is utterly unintelligible and inconsistent, is manifest, because it belongs to their notion of an action, that it is something wherein is no passion or passiveness; that is (according to their sense of passiveness), it is under the power, influence or action of no cause. And this implies, that action has no cause, and is no effect; for to be an effect implies passiveness, or the being subject to the power and action of its cause. And yet they hold, that the mind's action is the effect of its own determination, yea, the mind's free and voluntary determination; which is the same with free choice. So that action is the effect of something preceding, even a preceding act of choice; and consequently, in this effect the mind is passive, subject to the power and action of the preceding cause, which is the foregoing choice, and therefore cannot be active. So that here we have this contradiction, that action is always the effect of foregoing choice; and therefore cannot be action; because it is passive to the power of that preceding causal choice; and the mind cannot be active and passive in the same thing, at the same time. Again, they say, necessity is utterly inconsistent with action, and a necessary action is a contradiction; and so their notion of action implies contingence, and excludes all necessity. And therefore, their notion of action implies, that it has no necessary dependence or connection with any thing foregoing; for such a dependence or connection excludes contingence, and implies necessity. And yet their notion of action implies necessity, and supposes that it is necessary, and cannot be contingent. For they suppose, that whatever is properly called action, must be determined by the Will and free choice; and this is as much as to say, that it must be necessary, being dependent upon, and determined by something foregoing; namely, a foregoing act of choice. Again, it belongs to their notion of action, of that which is a proper and mere act, that it is the beginning of motion, or of exertion of power; but yet it is implied in their notion of action, that it is not the beginning of motion or exertion of power, but is consequent and dependent on a preceding exertion of power, viz., the power of Will and choice; for they say there is no proper action but what is freely chosen; or, which is the same thing, determined by a foregoing act of free choice. But if any of them shall see cause to deny this, and say they hold no such thing as that every action is chosen or determined by a foregoing choice; but that the very first exertion of Will only, undetermined by any preceding act, is properly called action; then

I say, such a man's notion of action implies necessity; for what the mind is the subject of, without the determination of its own previous choice, it is the subject of necessarily, as to any hand that free choice has in the affair, and without any ability the mind has to prevent it, by any Will or election of its own; because by the supposition it precludes all previous acts of the Will or choice in the case, which might prevent it. So that it is again, in this other way, implied in their notion of act, that it is both necessary and not necessary. Again, it belongs to their notion of an act, that it is no effect of a predetermining bias or preponderation, but springs immediately out of indifference; and this implies, that it cannot be from foregoing choice, which is foregoing preponderation: if it be not habitual, but occasional, yet if it causes the act, it is truly previous, efficacious and determining. And yet, at the same time, it is essential to their notion of an act, that it is what the agent is the author of freely and voluntarily, and that is, by previous choice and design.

So that, according to their notion of an act, considered with regard to its consequences, these following things are all essential to it, viz., that it should be necessary, and not necessary; that it should be from a cause, and no cause; that it should be the fruit of choice and design, and not the fruit of choice and design; that it should be the beginning of motion or exertion, and yet consequent on previous exertion; that it should be before it is; that it should spring immediately out of indifference and equilibrium, and yet be the effect of preponderation; that it should be self-originated, and also have its original from something else; that it is what the mind causes itself, of its own Will, and can produce or prevent, according to its choice or pleasure, and yet what the mind has no power to prevent, it precluding all previous choice in the affair.

So that an act, according to their metaphysical notion of it, is something of which there is no idea: it is nothing but a confusion of the mind, excited by words without any distinct meaning, and is an absolute nonentity; and that in two respects: (1,) there is nothing in the world that ever was, is, or can be, to answer the things which must belong to its description, according to what they suppose to be essential to it; and (2,) there neither is, nor ever was, nor can be, any notion or idea to answer the word, as they use and explain it. For if we should suppose any such notion, it would many ways destroy itself. But it is impossible any idea or notion should subsist in the mind, whose very nature and essence, which constitutes it, destroys it. If some learned philosopher, who had been abroad, in giving an account of the curious observations he had made in his travels, should say, "He had been in *Terra del Fuego*, and there had seen an animal, which he calls by a certain name, that begat and brought forth itself, and yet had a sire and dam distinct from itself; that it had an appetite, and was hungry before it had a being; that his master, who led him, and governed him at his pleasure, was always governed by him, and driven by him where he pleased; that when he moved, he always took a step before the first step; that he went with his head first, and yet always went tail foremost; and this, though he had neither head nor tail:" it would be no imprudence at all, to tell such a traveller, though a learned man, that he himself had no notion or idea of such an animal, as he gave an account of, and never had, nor ever would have.

As the forementioned notion of action is very inconsistent, so it is wholly diverse from the original meaning of the word. The more usual signification of it, in vulgar speech, seems to be some motion, or exertion of power, that is voluntary, or that is the effect of the Will; and is used in the same sense as doing; and most commonly it is used to signify outward actions. So thinking is often distinguished from acting; and desiring and willing, from doing.

Besides this more usual and proper signification of the word *action*, there are other ways in which the word is used, that are less proper, which yet have place in common speech. Oftentimes it is used to signify some motion or alteration in inanimate things, with relation to some object and effect. So the spring of a watch is said to act upon the chain and wheels; the sun-beams, to act upon plants and trees; and the fire, to act upon wood. Sometimes the word is used to signify motions, alterations, and exertions of power, which are seen in corporeal things, considered absolutely; especially when these motions seem to arise from some internal cause which is hidden; so that they have a greater resemblance of those motions of our bodies, which are the effects of internal volition, or invisible exertions of Will. So the fermentation of liquor, the operations of the loadstone, and of electrical bodies, are called the *action* of these things. And sometimes the word *action* is used to signify the exercise of thought, or of Will and inclination: so meditating, loving, hating, inclining, disinclining, choosing and refusing, may be sometimes called acting; though more rarely (unless it be by philosophers and metaphysicians) than in any of the other senses.

But the word is never used in vulgar speech in that sense which Arminian divines use it in, namely, for the self-determinate exercise of the Will, or an exertion of the soul that arises without any necessary connection, with any thing foregoing. If a man does something voluntarily, or as the effect of his choice, then in the most proper sense, and as the word is most originally and commonly used, he is said to act: but whether that choice or volition be self-determined, or no, whether it be connected with foregoing habitual bias, whether it be the certain effect of the strongest motive, or some extrinsic cause, never comes into consideration in the meaning of the word.

And if the word *action* is arbitrarily used by some men otherwise, to suit some scheme of metaphysics or morality, no argument can reasonably be founded on such a use of this term, to prove any thing but their own pleasure. For divines and philosophers strenuously to urge such arguments, as though they were sufficient to support and demonstrate a whole scheme of moral philosophy and divinity, is certainly to erect a mighty edifice on the sand, or rather on a shadow. And though it may now perhaps, through custom, have become natural for them to use the word in this sense (if that may be called a sense or meaning, which is inconsistent with itself), yet this does not prove, that it is agreeable to the natural notions men have of things, or that there can be any thing in the creation that should answer such a meaning. And though they appeal to experience, yet the truth is, that men are so far from experiencing any such thing, that it is impossible for them to have any conception of it.

If it should be objected, that *action* and *passion* are doubtless words of a contrary signification; but to suppose that the agent, in its action, is under the power and influence of something extrinsic, is to confound action and passion, and make them the same thing:

I answer, that action and passion are doubtless, as they are sometimes used, words of opposite signification; but not as signifying opposite *existences*, but only opposite *relations*. The words *cause* and *effect*, are terms of opposite signification; but, nevertheless, if I assert, that the same thing may, at the same time, in different respects and relations, be both *cause* and *effect*, this will not prove that I confound the terms. The soul may be both *active* and *passive* in the same thing in different respects; *active* with relation to one thing, and *passive* with relation to another. The word *passion*, when set in opposition to *action*, or rather *activeness*, is merely a relative term; it signifies no effect or cause, nor any proper existence; but is the same with *passiveness*, or a being

passive, or a being acted upon by some thing. Which is a mere relation of a thing to some power or force exerted by some cause, producing some effect in it, or upon it. And *action*, when set properly in opposition to *passion* or *passiveness*, is no real existence; it is not the same with AN *action*, but is a mere relation: it is the *activeness* of something on another thing, being the opposite relation to the other, viz., a relation of power, or force, exerted by some cause towards another thing, which is the subject of the effect of that power. Indeed, the word *action*, is frequently used to signify something not merely *relative*, but more *absolute*, and a real existence; as when we say *an action;* when the word is not used transitively, but absolutely, for some motion or exercise of body or mind, without any relation to any object or effect: and as used thus, it is not properly the opposite of *passion;* which ordinarily signifies nothing absolute, but merely the *relation of being acted upon.* And therefore, if the word *action* be used in the like relative sense, then action and passion are only two contrary relations. And it is no absurdity to suppose, that contrary relations may belong to the same thing, at the same time, with respect to different things. So to suppose, that there are acts of the soul by which a man voluntarily moves, and acts upon objects, and produces effects, which yet themselves are effects of something else, and wherein the soul itself is the object of something acting upon, and influencing that, does not confound action and passion. The words may nevertheless be properly of opposite signification: there may be as true and real a difference between *acting* and being *caused to act*, though we should suppose the soul to be both in the same volition, as there is between *living* and *being quickened* or *made to live.* It is no more a contradiction to suppose that action may be the effect of some other cause, besides the agent, or being that acts, than to suppose, that life may be the effect of some other cause, besides the being that lives, in whom life is caused to be.

The thing which has led men into this inconsistent notion of action, when applied to volition, as though it were essential to this internal action, that the agent should be self-determined in it, and that the Will should be the cause of it, was probably this; that according to the sense of mankind, and the common use of language, it is so with respect to men's external actions; which are originally, and according to the vulgar use and most proper sense of the word, called *actions.* Men in these are self-directed, self-determined, and their Wills are the cause of the motions of their bodies, and the external things that are done; so that unless men do them voluntarily, and of choice, and the action be determined by their antecedent volition, it is no action or doing of theirs. Hence some metaphysicians have been led unwarily, but absurdly, to suppose the same concerning volition itself, that *that* also must be determined by the Will; which is to be determined by antecedent volition, as the motion of the body is; not considering the contradiction it implies.

But it is very evident, that in the metaphysical distinction between action and passion (though long since become common and the general vogue), due care has not been taken to conform language to the nature of things, or to any distinct, clear ideas. As it is in innumerable other philosophical, metaphysical terms, used in these disputes; which has occasioned inexpressible difficulty, contention, error and confusion.

And thus probably it came to be thought, that necessity was inconsistent with action, as these terms are applied to volition. First, these terms *action* and *necessity*, are changed from their original meaning, as signifying external, voluntary action and constraint (in which meaning they are evidently inconsistent), to signify quite other things, viz., volition itself, and certainty of exist-

ence. And when the change of signification is made, care is not taken to make proper allowances and abatements for the difference of sense; but still the same things are unwarily attributed to *action* and *necessity*, in the new meaning of the words, which plainly belonged to them in their first sense; and on this ground, maxims are established without any real foundation, as though they were the most certain truths, and the most evident dictates of reason.

But however strenuously it is maintained, that what is necessary cannot be properly called action, and that a necessary action is a contradiction, yet it is probable there are few *Arminian* divines, who, if thoroughly tried, would stand to these principles. They will allow that God is, in the highest sense, an active being, and the highest fountain of life and action; and they would not probably deny, that those, that are called God's acts of righteousness, holiness and faithfulness, are truly and properly God's *acts*, and God is really a holy *agent* in them; and yet, I trust, they will not deny, that God necessarily acts justly and faithfully, and that it is impossible for Him to act unrighteously and unholily.

SECTION III.

The Reasons why some think it contrary to Common Sense, to suppose those Things which are necessary, to be worthy of either Praise or Blame.

It is abundantly affirmed and urged by Arminian writers, that it is contrary to *common sense*, and the natural notions and apprehensions of mankind, to suppose otherwise than that necessity (making no distinction between natural and moral necessity) is inconsistent with virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment. And their arguments from hence have been greatly triumphed in; and have been not a little perplexing to many, who have been friendly to the truth, as clearly revealed in the holy Scriptures; it has seemed to them indeed difficult, to reconcile Calvinistic doctrines with the notions men commonly have of justice and equity. And the true reasons of it seem to be these that follow.

I. It is indeed a very plain dictate of common sense, that natural necessity is wholly inconsistent with just praise or blame. If men do things which in themselves are very good, fit to be brought to pass, and very happy effects, properly against their Wills, and cannot help it; or do them from a necessity that is without their Wills, or with which their Wills have no concern or connection; then it is a plain dictate of common sense, that it is none of their virtue, nor any moral good in them; and that they are not worthy to be rewarded or praised, esteemed or loved on that account. And, on the other hand, that if, from like necessity, they do those things which in themselves are very unhappy and pernicious, and do them because they cannot help it; the necessity is such, that it is all one whether they will them or no; and the reason why they are done, is from necessity only, and not from their Wills; it is a very plain dictate of common sense, that they are not at all to blame; there is no vice, fault, or moral evil at all in the effect done; nor are they, who are thus necessitated, in any wise worthy to be punished, hated, or in the least disrespected, on that account.

In like manner, if things, in themselves good and desirable, are absolutely impossible, with a natural impossibility, the universal reason of mankind teaches, that this wholly and perfectly excuses persons in their not doing them.

And it is also a plain dictate of common sense, that if the doing things, in themselves good, or avoiding things, in themselves evil, is not absolutely impossible with such a natural impossibility, but very difficult, with a natural difficulty; that is, a difficulty prior to, and not at all consisting in Will and inclination itself, and which would remain the same, let the inclination be what it will; then a person's neglect or omission is excused in some measure, though not wholly; his sin is less aggravated, than if the thing to be done were easy. And if, instead of difficulty and hinderance, there be a contrary natural propensity in the state of things, to the thing to be done, or the effect to be brought to pass, abstracted from any consideration of the inclination of the heart; though the propensity be not so great as to amount to a natural necessity; yet being some approach to it, so that the doing the good thing be very much from this natural tendency in the state of things, and but little from a good inclination; then it is a dictate of common sense, that there is so much the less virtue in what is done; and so it is less praiseworthy and rewardable. The reason is easy, viz., because such a natural propensity or tendency is an approach to natural necessity; and the greater the propensity, still so much the nearer is the approach to necessity. And, therefore, as natural necessity takes away or shuts out all virtue, so this propensity approaches to an abolition of virtue; that is, it diminishes it. And, on the other hand, natural difficulty, in the state of things, is an approach to natural impossibility. And as the latter, when it is complete and absolute, wholly takes away blame; so such difficulty takes away some blame, or diminishes blame; and makes the thing done to be less worthy of punishment.

II. Men, in their first use of such phrases as these, *must*, *can't*, *can't help it*, *can't avoid it*, *necessary*, *unable*, *impossible*, *unavoidable*, *irresistible*, &c., use them to signify a necessity of constraint or restraint, a natural necessity or impossibility; or some necessity that the Will has nothing to do in; which may be whether men will or no; and which may be supposed to be just the same, let men's inclinations and desires be what they will. Such terms in their original use, I suppose, among all nations, are relative; carrying in their signification (as was before observed) a reference or respect to some contrary Will, desire or endeavor, which, it is supposed, is, or may be, in the case. All men find, and begin to find in early childhood, that there are innumerable things that cannot be done, which they desire to do; and innumerable things which they are averse to, that must be, they cannot avoid them, they will be, whether they choose them or no. It is to express this necessity, which men so soon and so often find, and which so greatly and so early affects them in innumerable cases, that such terms and phrases are first formed; and it is to signify such a necessity, that they are first used, and that they are most constantly used, in the common affairs of life; and not to signify any such metaphysical, speculative and abstract notion, as that connection in the nature or course of things, which is between the subject and predicate of a proposition, and which is the foundation of the certain truth of that proposition, to signify which, they, who employ themselves in philosophical inquiries into the first origin and metaphysical relations and dependencies of things, have borrowed these terms, for want of others. But we grow up from our cradles in a use of such terms and phrases entirely different from this, and carrying a sense exceeding diverse from that, in which they are commonly used in the controversy between Arminians and Calvinists. And it being, as was said before, a dictate of the universal sense of mankind, evident to us as soon as we begin to think, that the necessity signified by these terms, in the sense in which we first learn them, does excuse

persons and free them from all fault or blame; hence our idea of excusableness or faultiness is tied to these terms and phrases by a strong habit, which is begun in childhood, as soon as we begin to speak, and grows up with us, and is strengthened by constant use and custom, the connection growing stronger and stronger.

The habitual connection, which is in men's minds between blamelessness and those forementioned terms, *must*, *cannot*, *unable*, *necessary*, *impossible*, *unavoidable*, *&c.*, becomes very strong; because, as soon as ever men begin to use reason and speech, they have occasion to excuse themselves, from the natural necessity signified by these terms, in numerous instances—*I can't do it*,—*I could not help it.*—And all mankind have constant and daily occasion to use such phrases in this sense, to excuse themselves and others, in almost all the concerns of life, with respect to disappointments, and things that happen, which concern and affect ourselves and others, that are hurtful, or disagreeable to us or them, or things desirable, that we or others fail of.

That a being accustomed to a union of different ideas, from early childhood, makes the habitual connection exceeding strong, as though such connection were owing to nature, is manifest in innumerable instances. It is altogether by such an habitual connection of ideas, that men judge of the bigness or distance of the objects of sight, from their appearance. Thus it is owing to such a connection early established, and growing up with a person, that he judges a mountain, which he sees at ten miles distance, to be bigger than his nose, or further off than the end of it. Having been used so long to join a considerable distance and magnitude with such an appearance, men imagine it is by a dictate of natural sense whereas, it would be quite otherwise with one that had his eyes newly opened who had been born blind; he would have the same visible appearance, but natural sense would dictate no such thing, concerning the magnitude or distance of what appeared.

III. When men, after they have been so habituated to connect ideas of innocency or blamelessness with such terms, that the union seems to be the effect of mere nature, come to hear the same terms used, and learn to use them themselves in the forementioned new and metaphysical sense, to signify quite another sort of necessity, which has no such kind of relation to a contrary supposable Will and endeavor; the notion of plain and manifest blamelessness, by this means, is, by a strong prejudice, insensibly and unwarily transferred to a case to which it by no means belongs; the change of the use of the terms, to a signification which is very diverse, not being taken notice of, or adverted to. And there are several reasons, why it is not.

1. The terms, as used by philosophers, are not very distinct and clear in their meaning; few use them in a fixed, determined sense. On the contrary, their meaning is very vague and confused. Which is what commonly happens to the words used to signify things intellectual and moral, and to express what Mr. Locke calls *mixed modes*. If men had a clear and distinct understanding of what is intended by these metaphysical terms, they would be able more easily to compare them with their original and common sense; and so would not be so easily led into delusion by words of this sort.

2. The change of the signification of the terms is the more insensible, because the things signified, though indeed very different, yet do in some generals agree. In necessity, that which is *vulgarly* so called, there is a strong connection between the thing said to be necessary, and something antecedent to it, in the order of nature; so there is also in philosophical necessity. And though in both kinds of necessity, the connection cannot be called by that name, with re-

lation to an opposite Will or endeavor, to which it is *superior;* which is the case in vulgar necessity; yet in both, the connection is *prior* to Will and endeavor, and so, in some respect, *superior*. In both kinds of necessity, there is a foundation for some certainty of the proposition, that affirms the event. The terms used being the same, and the things signified agreeing in these and some other general circumstances, and the expressions, as used by philosophers being not well defined, and so of obscure and loose signification; hence persons are not aware of the great difference; and the notions of innocence or faultiness, which were so strongly associated with them, and were strictly united in their minds, ever since they can remember, remain united with them still, as if the union were altogether natural and necessary; and they that go about to make a separation, seem to them to do great violence even to nature itself.

IV. Another reason why it appears difficult to reconcile it with reason, that men should be blamed for that which is necessary with a moral necessity (which, as was observed before, is a species of philosophical necessity), is, that for want of due consideration, men inwardly entertain that apprehension, that this necessity may be against men's Wills and sincere endeavors. They go away with that notion, that men may truly will, and wish, and strive, that it may be otherwise, but that invincible necessity stands in the way. And many think thus concerning themselves: some, that are wicked men, think they wish that they were good, that they loved God and holiness; but yet do not find that their wishes produce the effect.—The reasons why men think thus, are as follows. (1.) They find what may be called an indirect willingness to have a better Will, in the manner before observed. For it is impossible, and a contradiction to suppose the Will to be directly and properly against itself. And they do not consider, that this indirect willingness is entirely a different thing from properly willing the thing that is the duty and virtue required; and that there is no virtue in that sort of willingness which they have. They do not consider, that the volitions, which a wicked man may have that he loved God, are no acts of the Will at all against the moral evil of not loving God; but only some disagreeable consequences. But the making the requisite distinction requires more care of reflection and thought, than most men are used to. And men, through a prejudice in their own favor, are disposed to think well of their own desires and dispositions, and to account them good and virtuous, though their respect to virtue be only indirect and remote, and it is nothing at all that is virtuous that truly excites or terminates their inclinations. (2.) Another thing, that insensibly leads and beguiles men into a supposition that this moral necessity or impossibility is, or may be against men's Wills and true endeavors, is the derivation and formation of the terms themselves, that are often used to express it, which is such as seems directly to point to, and holds this forth. Such words, for instance, as *unable*, *unavoidable*, *impossible*, *irresistible;* which carry a plain reference to a supposable power exerted, endeavors used, resistance made, in opposition to the necessity; and the persons that hear them, not considering nor suspecting but that they are used in their proper sense; that sense being therefore understood, there does naturally, and as it were necessarily, arise in their minds a supposition, that it may be so indeed, that true desires and endeavors may take place, but that invincible necessity stands in the way, and renders them vain and to no effect.

V. Another thing, which makes persons more ready to suppose it to be contrary to reason, that men should be exposed to the punishments threatened to sin, for doing those things which are morally necessary, or not doing those things morally impossible, is, that imagination strengthens the argument, and adds

greatly to the power and influence of the seeming reasons against it, from the greatness of that punishment. To allow that they may be justly exposed to a small punishment, would not be so difficult. Whereas, if there were any good reason in the case, if it were truly a dictate of reason, that such necessity was inconsistent with faultiness, or just punishment, the demonstration would be equally certain with respect to a small punishment, or any punishment at all, as a very great one; but it is not equally easy to the imagination. They that argue against the justice of *damning* men for those things that are thus necessary, seem to make their argument the stronger, by setting forth the greatness of the punishment in strong expressions;—*that a man should be cast into eternal burnings, that he should be made to fry in hell to all eternity for those things which he had no power to avoid, and was under a fatal, unfrustrable, invincible necessity of doing.*

SECTION IV.

It is agreeable to Common Sense, and the Natural Notions of Mankind, to suppose moral Necessity to be consistent with Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment.

Whether the reasons that have been given, why it appears difficult to some persons, to reconcile with common sense the praising or blaming, rewarding or punishing, those things which are morally necessary, are thought satisfactory or not; yet it most evidently appears, by the following things, that if this matter be rightly understood, setting aside all delusion arising from the impropriety and ambiguity of terms, this is not at all inconsistent with the natural apprehensions of mankind, and that sense of things which is found everywhere in the common people; who are furthest from having their thoughts perverted from their natural channel, by metaphysical and philosophical subtilties; but, on the contrary, altogether agreeable to, and the very voice and dictate of, this natural and vulgar sense.

I This will appear, if we consider what the vulgar notion of blameworthiness is. The idea which the common people, through all ages and nations, have of faultiness, I suppose to be plainly this; a person's being or doing wrong, with his own will and pleasure; containing these two things: 1. His doing wrong when he does as he pleases 2. His pleasure being wrong. Or, in other words, perhaps more intelligibly expressing their notion; a person's having his heart wrong, and doing wrong from his heart. And this is the sum total of the matter.

The common people do not ascend up in their reflections and abstractions to the metaphysical sources, relations and dependencies of things, in order to form their notion of faultiness or blameworthiness. They do not wait till they have decided by their refinings, what first determines the Will; whether it be determined by something extrinsic, or intrinsic; whether volition determines volition, or whether the understanding determines the Will; whether there be any such thing as metaphysicians mean by contingence (if they have any meaning); whether there be a sort of a strange, unaccountable sovereignty in the Will, in the exercise of which, by its own sovereign acts, it brings to pass all its own sovereign acts. They do not take any part of their notion of fault or blame from the resolution of any such questions. If this were the case, there are mul-

titudes, yea, the far greater part of mankind, nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand, would live and die, without having any such notion, as that of fault, ever entering into their heads, or without so much as once having any conception that any body was to be either blamed or commended for any thing. To be sure, it would be a long time before men came to have such notions. Whereas it is manifest, they are some of the first notions that appear in children; who discover, as soon as they can think, or speak, or act at all as rational creatures, a sense of desert. And, certainly, in forming their notion of it, they make no use of metaphysics. All the ground they go upon, consists in these two things; experience, and a natural sensation of a certain fitness or agreeableness, which there is in uniting such moral evil as is above described, viz., a being or doing wrong with the Will, and resentment in others, and pain inflicted on the person in whom this moral evil is. Which natural sense is what we call by the name of conscience.

It is true, the common people and children, in their notion of a faulty act or deed, of any person, do suppose that it is the person's own act and deed. But this is all that belongs to what they understand by a thing's being a person's own deed or action; even that it is something done by him of choice. That some exercise or motion should begin of itself, does not belong to their notion of an action, or doing. If so, it would belong to their notion of it, that it is something, which is the cause of its own beginning; and that is as much as to say, that it is before it begins to be. Nor is their notion of an action some motion or exercise, that begins accidentally, without any cause or reason; for that is contrary to one of the prime dictates of common sense, namely, that every thing that begins to be, has some cause or reason why it is.

The common people, in their notion of a faulty or praiseworthy deed or work done by any one, do suppose, that the man does it in the exercise of liberty. But then their notion of liberty is only a person's having opportunity of doing as he pleases. They have no notion of liberty consisting in the Will's first acting, and so causing its own acts; and determining, and so causing its own determinations; or choosing, and so causing its own choice. Such a notion of liberty is what none have, but those that have darkened their own minds with confused, metaphysical speculation, and abstruse and ambiguous terms. If a man is not restrained from acting as his Will determines, or constrained to act otherwise; then he has liberty, according to common notions of liberty, without taking into the idea that grand contradiction of all, the determinations of a man's free Will being the effects of the determinations of his free Will. Nor have men commonly any notion of freedom consisting in indifference. For if so, then it would be agreeable to their notion, that the greater indifference men act with, the more freedom they act with; whereas, the reverse is true. He that in acting, proceeds with the fullest inclination, does what he does with the greatest freedom, according to common sense. And so far is it from being agreeable to common sense, that such liberty as consists in indifference is requisite to praise or blame, that on the contrary, the dictate of every man's natural sense through the world is, that the further he is from being indifferent in his acting good or evil, and the more he does either with or without full and strong inclination, the more is he to be esteemed or abhorred, commended or condemned.

H. If it were inconsistent with the common sense of mankind, that men should be either to be blamed or commended in any volitions, they have, or fail of, in case of moral necessity or impossibility; then it would surely also be agreeable to the same sense and reason of mankind, that the nearer the case

approaches to such a moral necessity or impossibility, either through a strong antecedent moral propensity, on the one hand,* or a great antecedent opposition and difficulty on the other, the nearer does it approach to a being neither blamable nor commendable; so that acts exerted with such preceding propensity, would be worthy of proportionably less praise; and when omitted, the act being attended with such difficulty, the omission would be worthy of the less blame. It is so, as was observed before, with natural necessity and impossibility, propensity and difficulty; as it is a plain dictate of the sense of all mankind, that natural necessity and impossibility take away all blame and praise; and therefore, that the nearer the approach is to these, through previous propensity or difficulty, so praise and blame are proportionably diminished. And if it were as much a dictate of common sense, that moral necessity of doing, or impossibility of avoiding, takes away all praise and blame, as that natural necessity or impossibility does this; then, by a perfect parity of reason, it would be as much the dictate of common sense, that an approach to moral necessity of doing, or impossibility of avoiding, diminishes praise and blame, as that an approach to natural necessity and impossibility does so. It is equally the voice of common sense, that persons are excusable in part, in neglecting things difficult against their Wills, as that they are excusable wholly in neglecting things impossible against their Wills. And if it made no difference whether the impossibility were natural and against the Will, or moral, lying in the Will, with regard to excusableness; so neither would it make any difference, whether the difficulty, or approach to necessity be natural against the Will, or moral, lying in the propensity of the Will.

But it is apparent, that the reverse of these things is true. If there be an approach to a moral necessity in a man's exertion of good acts of Will, they being the exercise of a strong propensity to good, and a very powerful love to virtue; it is so far from being the dictate of common sense, that he is less virtuous, and the less to be esteemed, loved and praised; that it is agreeable to the natural notions of all mankind, that he is so much the better man, worthy of greater respect, and higher commendation. And the stronger the inclination is, and the nearer it approaches to necessity in that respect; or to impossibility of neglecting the virtuous act, or of doing a vicious one, still the more virtuous, and worthy of higher commendation. And, on the other hand, if a man exerts evil acts of mind; as, for instance, acts of pride or malice from a rooted and strong habit, or principle of haughtiness and maliciousness, and a violent propensity of heart to such acts; according to the natural sense of all men, he is so far from being the less hateful and blamable on that account, that he is so much the more worthy to be detested and condemned, by all that observe him.

Moreover, it is manifest that it is no part of the notion, which mankind commonly have of a blamable or praiseworthy act of the Will, that it is an act which is not determined by an antecedent bias or motive, but by the sovereign power of the Will itself; because, if so, the greater hand such causes have in determining any acts of the Will, so much the less virtuous or vicious would they be accounted; and the less hand, the more virtuous or vicious. Whereas, the reverse is true: men do not think a good act to be the less praiseworthy, for the agent's being much determined in it by a good inclination or a good motive, but the more. And if good inclination or motive, has but little influence in determining the agent, they do not think his act so much the more virtuous.

* It is here argued, on supposition that not all propensity implies moral necessity, but only some very high degree; which none will deny.

but the less. And so concerning evil acts, which are determined by evil motives or inclinations.

Yea, if it be supposed that good or evil dispositions are implanted in the hearts of men, by nature itself (which, it is certain, is vulgarly supposed in innumerable cases), yet it is not commonly supposed, that men are worthy of no praise or dispraise for such dispositions; although what is natural, is undoubtedly necessary, nature being prior to all acts of the Will whatsoever. Thus, for instance, if a man appears to be of a very haughty or malicious disposition, and is supposed to be so by his natural temper, it is no vulgar notion, no dictate of the common sense and apprehension of men, that such dispositions are no vices or moral evils, or that such persons are not worthy of disesteem, odium and dishonor; or that the proud or malicious acts which flow from such natural dispositions, are worthy of no resentment. Yea, such vile natural dispositions, and the strength of them, will commonly be mentioned rather as an aggravation of the wicked acts, that come from such a fountain, than an extenuation of them. Its being natural for men to act thus, is often observed by men in the height of their indignation: they will say, "It is his very nature: he is of a vile natural temper: it is as natural to him to act so as it is to breathe; he cannot help serving the devil," &c. But it is not thus with regard to hurtful, mischievous things, that any are the subjects or occasions of, by a natural necessity, against their inclinations. In such a case, the necessity, by the common voice of mankind, will be spoken of as a full excuse. Thus it is very plain, that common sense makes a vast difference between these two kinds of necessity, as to the judgment it makes of their influence on the moral quality and desert of men's actions.

And these dictates of men's minds are so natural and necessary, that it may be very much doubted whether the *Arminians* themselves have ever got rid of them; yea, their greatest doctors, that have gone furthest in defence of their metaphysical notions of liberty, and have brought their arguments to their greatest strength, and, as they suppose, to a demonstration, against the consistence of virtue and vice with any necessity; it is to be questioned, whether there is so much as one of them, but that, if he suffered very much from the injurious acts of a man, under the power of an invincible haughtiness and malignancy of temper, would not, from the forementioned natural sense of mind, resent it far otherwise, than if as great sufferings came upon him from the wind that blows, and fire that burns by natural necessity; and otherwise than he would, if he suffered as much from the conduct of a man perfectly delirious; yea, though he first brought his distraction upon him some way by his own fault.

Some seem to disdain the distinction that we make between natural and moral necessity, as though it were altogether impertinent in this controversy: "That which is necessary, say they, is necessary; it is that which must be, and cannot be prevented. And that which is impossible, is impossible, and cannot be done; and therefore, none can be to blame for not doing it." And such comparisons are made use of, as the commanding of a man to walk, who has lost his legs, and condemning and punishing him for not obeying; inviting and calling upon a man, who is shut up in a strong prison, to come forth, &c. But, in these things, Arminians are very unreasonable. Let common sense determine whether there be not a great difference between those two cases; the one, that of a man who has offended his prince, and is cast into prison; and after he has lain there a while, the king comes to him, calls him to come forth to him, and tells him, that if he will do so, and will fall down before him, and humbly beg his pardon, he shall be forgiven, and set at liberty, and also be greatly en

riched and advanced to honor; the prisoner heartily repents of the folly and wickedness of his offence against his prince, is thoroughly disposed to abase himself, and accept of the king's offer; but is confined by strong walls, with gates of brass, and bars of iron. The other case is, that of a man who is of a very unreasonable spirit, of a haughty, ungrateful, wilful disposition, and, moreover, has been brought up in traitorous principles, and has his heart possessed with an extreme and inveterate enmity to his lawful sovereign; and for his rebellion is cast into prison, and lies long there, loaden with heavy chains, and in miserable circumstances. At length the compassionate prince comes to the prison, orders his chains to be knocked off, and his prison doors to be set wide open; calls to him, and tells him, if he will come forth to him, and fall down before him, acknowledge that he has treated him unworthily, and ask his forgiveness, he shall be forgiven, set at liberty, and set in a place of great dignity and profit in his court. But he is so stout and stomachful, and full of haughty malignity that he cannot be willing to accept the offer: his rooted, strong pride and malice have perfect power over him, and as it were bind him, by binding his heart; the opposition of his heart has the mastery over him, having an influence on his mind far superior to the king's grace and condescension, and to all his kind offers and promises. Now, is it agreeable to common sense to assert and stand to it, that there is no difference between these two cases, as to any worthiness of blame in the prisoners; because, forsooth, there is a necessity in both, and the required act in each case is impossible? It is true, a man's evil dispositions may be as strong and immovable as the bars of a castle. But who cannot see that when a man, in the latter case, is said to be unable to obey the command, the expression is used improperly, and not in the sense it has originally and in common speech? And that it may properly be said to be in the rebel's power to come out of prison, seeing he can easily do it if he pleases; though by reason of his vile temper of heart, which is fixed and rooted, it is impossible that it should please him?

Upon the whole, I presume there is no person of good understanding, who impartially considers the things which have been observed, but will allow, that it is not evident, from the dictates of the common sense, or natural notions of mankind, that moral necessity is inconsistent with praise and blame. And therefore, if the Arminians would prove any such inconsistency, it must be by some philosophical and metaphysical arguments, and not common sense.

There is a grand illusion in the pretended demonstration of Arminians from common sense. The main strength of all these demonstrations lies in that prejudice, that arises through the insensible change of the use and meaning of such terms as *liberty*, *able*, *unable*, *necessary*, *impossible*, *unavoidable*, *invincible*, *action*, &c., from their original and vulgar sense, to a metaphysical sense, entirely diverse, and the strong connection of the ideas of blamelessness, &c., with some of these terms, by a habit contracted and established, while these terms were used in their first meaning. This prejudice and delusion is the foundation of all those positions, they lay down as maxims, by which most of the scriptures, which they allege in this controversy, are interpreted, and on which all their pompous demonstrations from Scripture and reason depend. From this secret delusion and prejudice they have almost all their advantages; it is the strength of their bulwarks, and the edge of their weapons. And this is the main ground of all the right they have to treat their neighbors in so assuming a manner, and to insult others, perhaps as wise and good as themselves, as *weak bigots, men that dwell in the dark caves of superstition, perversely set, obstinately shutting their eyes against the noonday light, enemies to common sense, maintaining the first*

born of absurdities, &c. &c. But perhaps an impartial consideration of the things, which have been observed in the preceding parts of this inquiry, may enable the lovers of truth better to judge, whose doctrine is indeed *absurd*, *abstruse*, *self contradictory*, and inconsistent with common sense, and many ways repugnant to the universal dictates of the reason of mankind.

COROL. From things which have been observed, it will follow, that it is agreeable to common sense to suppose, that the glorified saints have not their freedom at all diminished, in any respect; and that God himself has the highest possible freedom, according to the true and proper meaning of the term; and that he is, in the highest possible respect, an agent, and active in the exercise of his infinite holiness; though he acts therein, in the highest degree, necessarily; and his actions of this kind are in the highest, most absolutely perfect manner, virtuous and praiseworthy; and are so, for that very reason, because they are most perfectly necessary.

SECTION V.

Concerning those Objections, that this Scheme of Necessity renders all Means and Endeavors for the avoiding of Sin, or the obtaining Virtue and Holiness, vain and to no purpose; and that it makes Men no more than mere Machines in Affairs of Morality and Religion.

ARMINIANS say, if it be so, that sin and virtue come to pass by a necessity consisting in a sure connection of causes and effects, antecedents and consequents, it can never be worth the while to use any means or endeavors to obtain the one, and avoid the other; seeing no endeavors can alter the futurity of the event, which is become necessary by a connection already established.

But I desire, that this matter may be fully considered; and that it may be examined with a thorough strictness, whether it will follow that endeavors and means, in order to avoid or obtain any future thing, must be more in vain, on the supposition of such a connection of antecedents and consequents, than if the contrary be supposed.

For endeavors to be in vain, is for them not to be successful; that is to say, for them not eventually to be the means of the thing aimed at, which cannot be, but in one of these two ways; either, first: that although the means are used, yet the event aimed at does not follow; or, secondly, if the event does follow, it is not because of the means, or from any connection or dependence of the event on the means: the event would have come to pass, as well without the means as with them. If either of these two things are the case, then the means are not properly successful, and are truly in vain. The successfulness or unsuccessfulness of means, in order to an effect, or their being in vain or not in vain, consists in those means being connected, or not connected with the effect, in such a manner as this, viz., that the effect is with the means, and not without them; or that the being of the effect is, on the one hand, connected with the means, and the want of the effect, on the other hand, is connected with the want of the means. If there be such a connection as this between means and end, the means are not in vain. The more there is of such a connection, the further they are from being in vain; and the less of such a connection, the more they are in vain

Now, therefore, the question to be answered (in order to determine, whether

it follows from this doctrine of the necessary connection between foregoing things, and consequent ones, that means used in order to any effect, are more in vain than they would be otherwise) is, whether it follows from it, that there is less of the forementioned connection between means and effect; that is, whether, on the supposition of there being a real and true connection between antecedent things and consequent ones, there must be less of a connection between means and effect, than on the supposition of there being no fixed connection between antecedent things and consequent ones; and the very stating of this question is sufficient to answer it. It must appear to every one that will open his eyes, that this question cannot be affirmed, without the grossest absurdity and inconsistence. Means are foregoing things, and effects are following things; and if there were no connection between foregoing things and following ones, there could be no connection between means and end; and so all means would be wholly vain and fruitless. For it is by virtue of some connection only, that they become successful: it is some connection observed, or revealed, or otherwise known, between antecedent things and following ones, that is, what directs in the choice of means. And if there were no such thing as an established connection, there could be no choice as to means; one thing would have no more tendency to an effect, than another; there would be no such thing as tendency in the case. All those things which are successful means of other things, do therein prove connected antecedents of them; and therefore to assert, that a fixed connection between antecedents and consequents makes means vain and useless, or stands in the way to hinder the connection between means and end, is just as ridiculous as to say, that a connection between antecedents and consequents stands in the way to hinder a connection between antecedents and consequents.

Nor can any supposed connection of the succession or train of antecedents and consequents, from the very beginning of all things, the connection being made already sure and necessary, either by established laws of nature, or by these together with a decree of sovereign immediate interpositions of divine power, on such and such occasions, or any other way (if any other there be); I say, no such necessary connection of a series of antecedents and consequents can in the least tend to hinder, but that the means we use may belong to the series; and so may be some of those antecedents which are connected with the consequents we aim at, in the established course of things. Endeavors which we use, are things that exist; and, therefore, they belong to the general chain of events; all the parts of which chain are supposed to be connected; and so endeavors are supposed to be connected with some effects, or some consequent things or other. And certainly this does not hinder but that the events they are connected with, may be those which we aim at, and which we choose, because we judge them most likely to have a connection with those events, from the established order and course of things which we observe, or from something in divine revelation.

Let us suppose a real and sure connection between a man's having his eyes open in the clear day-light, with good organs of sight, and seeing; so that seeing is connected with his opening his eyes, and not seeing with his not opening his eyes; and also the like connection between such a man's attempting to open his eyes, and his actually doing it. The supposed established connection between these antecedents and consequents, let the connection be ever so sure and necessary, certainly does not prove that it is in vain, for a man in such circumstances to attempt to open his eyes, in order to seeing; his aiming at that event, and the use of the means, being the effect of his Will, does not break the connection, or hinder the success.

So that the objection we are upon does not lie against the doctrine of the necessity of events by a certainty of connection and consequence: on the contrary, it is truly forcible against the *Arminian* doctrine of contingence and self-determination; which is inconsistent with such a connection. If there be no connection between those events, wherein virtue and vice consist, and any thing antecedent; then there is no connection between these events and any means or endeavors used in order to them; and if so, then those means must be vain. The less there is of connection between foregoing things and following ones, so much the less there is between means and end, endeavors and success; and in the same proportion are means and endeavors ineffectual and vain.

It will follow from *Arminian* principles, that there is no connection between virtue or vice, and any foregoing event or thing; or, in other words, that the determination of the existence of virtue or vice does not in the least depend on the influence of any thing that comes to pass antecedently, from which the determination of its existence is, as its cause, means, or ground; because, so far as it is so, it is not from self-determination; and, therefore, so far there is nothing of the nature of virtue or vice. And so it follows, that virtue and vice are not in any degree, dependent upon, or connected with, any foregoing event or existence, as its cause, ground, or means. And if so, then all foregoing means must be totally vain.

Hence it follows, that there cannot, in any consistence with the *Arminian* scheme, be any reasonable ground of so much as a conjecture concerning the consequence of any means and endeavors, in order to escaping vice or obtaining virtue, or any choice or preference of means, as having a greater probability of success by some than others; either from any natural connection or dependence of the end on the means, or through any divine constitution, or revealed way of God's bestowing or bringing to pass these things, in consequence of any means, endeavors, prayers or deeds. Conjecture, in this latter case, depends on a supposition, that God himself is the giver, or determining cause of the events sought; but if they depend on self-determination, then God is not the determining or disposing author of them; and if these things are not of his disposal, then no conjecture can be made, from any revelation he has given, concerning any way or method of his disposal of them.

Yea, on these principles, it will not only follow, that men cannot have any reasonable ground of judgment or conjecture, that their means and endeavors to obtain virtue or avoid vice, will be successful, but they may be sure, they will not; they may be certain, that they will be vain; and that if ever the thing, which they seek, comes to pass, it will not be at all owing to the means they use. For means and endeavors can have no effect, in order to obtain the end, but in one of these two ways: either, (1,) through a natural tendency and influence, to prepare and dispose the mind more to virtuous acts, either by causing the disposition of the heart to be more in favor of such acts, or by bringing the mind more into the view of powerful motives and inducements; or, (2,) by putting persons more in the way of God's bestowment of the benefit. But neither of these can be the case. Not the latter; for, as has been just now observed, it does not consist with the *Arminian* notion of self-determination, which they suppose essential to virtue, that God should be the bestower, or (which is the same thing) the determining, disposing author of virtue. Not the former, for natural influence and tendency supposes causality and connection; and that supposes necessity of event, which is inconsistent with *Arminian* liberty. A tendency of means, by biasing the heart in favor of virtue, or by bringing the Will under the influence and power of motives in its determina-

tions, are both inconsistent with *Arminian* liberty of Will, consisting in indifference, and sovereign self-determination, as has been largely demonstrated.

But for the more full removal of this prejudice against the doctrine of necessity, which has been maintained, as though it tended to encourage a total neglect of all endeavors as vain; the following things may be considered.

The question is not, whether men may not thus improve this doctrine: we know that many true and wholesome doctrines are abused; but, whether the doctrine gives any just occasion for such an improvement; or whether, on the supposition of the truth of the doctrine, such a use of it would not be unreasonable? If any shall affirm, that it would not, but that the very nature of the doctrine is such as gives just occasion for it, it must be on this supposition, namely, that such an invariable necessity of all things already settled, must render the interposition of all means, endeavors, conclusions or actions of ours, in order to the obtaining any future end whatsoever, perfectly insignificant; because they cannot in the least alter or vary the course and series of things, in any event or circumstance; all being already fixed unalterably by necessity; and that therefore it is folly, for men to use any means for any end; but their wisdom, to save themselves the trouble of endeavors, and take their ease. No person can draw such an inference from this doctrine, and come to such a conclusion, without contradicting himself, and going counter to the very principles he pretends to act upon; for he comes to a conclusion, and takes a course, in order to an end, even his ease, or the saving himself from trouble; he seeks something future, and uses means in order to a future thing, even in his drawing up that conclusion, that he will seek nothing, and use no means in order to any thing in future; he seeks his future ease, and the benefit and comfort of indolence. If prior necessity, that determines all things, makes vain all actions or conclusions of ours, in order to any thing future; then it makes vain all conclusions and conduct of ours, in order to our future ease. The measure of our ease, with the time, manner, and every circumstance of it, is already fixed, by all-determining necessity, as much as any thing else. If he says within himself, "What future happiness or misery I shall have, is already, in effect, determined by the necessary course and connection of things; therefore, I will save myself the trouble of labor and diligence, which cannot add to my determined degree of happiness, or diminish my misery; but will take my ease, and will enjoy the comfort of sloth and negligence." Such a man contradicts himself; he says, the measure of his future happiness and misery is already fixed, and he will not try to diminish the one, nor add to the other; but yet, in his very conclusion, he contradicts this; for, he takes up this conclusion, to add to his future happiness, by the ease and comfort of his negligence; and to diminish his future trouble and misery, by saving himself the trouble of using means and taking pains.

Therefore persons cannot reasonably make this improvement of the doctrine of necessity, that they will go into a voluntary negligence of means for their own happiness. For the principles they must go upon in order to this, are inconsistent with their making any improvement at all of the doctrine; for to make some improvement of it, is to be influenced by it, to come to some voluntary conclusion in regard to their own conduct, with some view or aim; but this, as has been shown, is inconsistent with the principles they pretend to act upon. In short, the principles are such as cannot be acted upon, in any respect, consistently. And, therefore, in every pretence of acting upon them, or making any improvement of them, there is a self-contradiction.

As to that objection against the doctrine, which I have endeavored to prove, that it makes men no more than mere machines; I would say, that notwith-

standing this doctrine, man is entirely, perfectly and unspeakably different from a mere machine, in that he has reason and understanding, and has a faculty of Will, and so is capable of volition or choice; and in that, his Will is guided by the dictates or views of his understanding; and in that his external actions and behavior, and, in many respects, also his thoughts, and the exercises of his mind, are subject to his Will; so that he has liberty to act according to his choice, and do what he pleases; and by means of these things, is capable of moral habits and moral acts, such inclinations and actions as, according to the common sense of mankind, are worthy of praise, esteem, love and reward; or, on the contrary, of disesteem, detestation, indignation and punishment.

In these things is all the difference from mere machines, as to liberty and agency, that would be any perfection, dignity or privilege, in any respect; all the difference that can be desired, and all that can be conceived of; and indeed all that the pretensions of the *Arminians* themselves come to, as they are forced often to explain themselves (though their explications overthrow and abolish the things asserted, and pretended to be explained); for they are forced to explain a self-determining power of Will, by a power in the soul, to determine as it chooses or Wills; which comes to no more than this, that a man has a power of choosing, and in many instances, can do as he chooses. Which is quite a different thing from that contradiction, his having power of choosing his first act of choice in the case.

Or, if their scheme makes any other difference than this, between men and machines, it is for the worse; it is so far from supposing men to have a dignity and privilege above machines, that it makes the manner of their being determined still more unhappy. Whereas, machines are guided by an understanding cause, by the skilful hand of the workman or owner; the Will of man is left to the guidance of nothing, but absolute blind contingence.

SECTION VI.

Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been maintained, that it agrees with the Stoical Doctrine of Fate, and the Opinions of Mr. Hobbes.

When *Calvinists* oppose the *Arminian* notion of the freedom of Will, and contingence of volition, and insist that there are no acts of the Will, nor any other events whatsoever, but what are attended with some kind of necessity; their opposers cry out of them, as agreeing with the ancient *Stoics* in their doctrine of *fate*, and with Mr Hobbes in his opinion of necessity.

It would not be worth while to take notice of so impertinent an objection, had it not been urged by some of the chief *Arminian* writers. There were many important truths maintained by the ancient *Greek* and *Roman* philosophers, and especially the *Stoics*, that are never the worse for being held by them. The *Stoic* philosophers, by the general agreement of Christians, and even by *Arminian* divines, were the greatest, wisest, and most virtuous of all the heathen philosophers; and, in their doctrine and practice, came the nearest to Christianity of any of their sects. How frequently are the sayings of these philosophers, in many of the writings and sermons, even of *Arminian* divines, produced, not as arguments of the falseness of the doctrines which they delivered, but as a confirmation of some of the greatest truths of the Christian religion, relating to the unity and perfections of the Godhead, a future state, the duty and

happiness of mankind, &c., as observing how the light of nature and reason, in the wisest and best of the heathens, harmonized with, and confirms the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

And it is very remarkable, concerning Dr. Whitby, that although he alleges the agreement of the *Stoics* with us, wherein he supposes they maintained the like doctrine with us, as an argument against the truth of our doctrine; yet, this very Dr. Whitby alleges the agreement of the *Stoics* with the *Arminians*, wherein he supposes they taught the same doctrine with them, as an argument for the truth of their doctrine.* So that, when the *Stoics* agree with them, this (it seems) is a confirmation of their doctrine, and a confutation of ours, as showing that our opinions are contrary to the natural sense and common reason of mankind: nevertheless, when the *Stoics* agree with us, it argues no such thing in our favor; but, on the contrary, is a great argument against us, and shows our doctrine to be heathenish.

It is observed by some *Calvinistic* writers, that the *Arminians* symbolize with the *Stoics*, in some of those doctrines wherein they are opposed by the *Calvinists;* particularly in their denying an original, innate, total corruption and depravity of heart; and in what they held of man's ability to make himself truly virtuous and conformed to God; and in some other doctrines.

It may be further observed, it is certainly no better objection against our doctrine, that it agrees, in some respects, with the doctrine of the ancient *Stoic* philosophers, than it is against theirs, wherein they differ from us, that it agrees, in some respects, with the opinion of the very worst of the heathen philosophers, the followers of Epicurus, that father of atheism and licentiousness, and with the doctrine of the Sadducees and Jesuits.

I am not much concerned to know precisely, what the ancient *Stoic* philosophers held concerning fate, in order to determine what is truth; as though it were a sure way to be in the right, to take good heed to differ from them. It seems, that they differed among themselves; and probably the doctrine of fate as maintained by most of them, was, in some respects, erroneous. But whatever their doctrine was, if any of them held such a fate, as is repugnant to any liberty, consisting in our doing as we please, I utterly deny such a fate. If they held any such fate, as is not consistent with the common and universal notions that mankind have of liberty, activity, moral agency, virtue and vice, I disclaim any such thing, and think I have demonstrated that the scheme I maintain is no such scheme. If the *Stoics*, by *fate*, meant any thing of such a nature, as can be supposed to stand in the way of the advantage and benefit of the use of means and endeavors, or makes it less worth the while for men to desire, and seek after any thing wherein their virtue and happiness consists; I hold no doctrine that is clogged with any such inconvenience, any more than any other scheme whatsoever; and by no means so much as the *Arminian* scheme of contingence; as has been shown. If they held any such doctrine of universal fatality, as is inconsistent with any kind of liberty, that is or can be any perfection, dignity, privilege or benefit, or any thing desirable, in any respect, for any intelligent creature, or indeed with any liberty that is possible or conceivable; I embrace no such doctrine. If they held any such doctrine of fate, as is inconsistent with the world's being in all things subject to the disposal of an intelligent, wise agent, that presides, not as the soul of the world but as the Sovereign Lord of the Universe, governing all things by proper will, choice and design, in the exercise of the most perfect liberty conceivable, with

* Whitby on the Five Points. Edit. III. p. 325, 326, 327

out subjection to any constraint, or being properly under the power or influence of any thing before, above or without himself, I wholly renounce any such doctrine.

As to Mr. Hobbes' maintaining the same doctrine concerning necessity, I confess, it happens I never read Mr. Hobbes. Let his opinion be what it will, we need not reject all truth which is demonstrated by clear evidence, merely because it was once held by some bad man. This great truth, *that Jesus is the Son of God*, was not spoiled because it was once and again proclaimed with a loud voice by the devil. If truth is so defiled, because it is spoken by the mouth, or written by the pen of some ill-minded mischievous man, that it must never be received, we shall never know, when we hold any of the most precious and evident truths by a sure tenure. And if Mr. Hobbes has made a bad use of this truth, that is to be lamented; but the truth is not to be thought worthy of rejection on that account. It is common for the corruptions of the hearts of evil men to abuse the best things to vile purposes.

I might also take notice of its having been observed, that the Arminians agree with Mr. Hobbes in many more things than the Calvinists.* As, in what he is said to hold concerning original sin, in denying the necessity of supernatural illumination, in denying infused grace, in denying the doctrine of justification by faith alone, and other things.

SECTION VII.

Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.

Some may possibly object against what has been supposed of the absurdity and inconsistence of a self-determining power in the Will, and the impossibility of its being otherwise, than that the Will should be determined in every case by some motive, and by a motive which (as it stands in the view of the understanding) is of superior strength to any appearing on the other side; that if these things are true, it will follow, that not only the Will of created minds, but the Will of God himself is necessary in all its determinations. Concerning which, says the author of the *Essay on the Freedom of the Will in God and in the Creature*, pages 85, 86, "What strange doctrine is this, contrary to all our ideas of the dominion of God? Does it not destroy the glory of his liberty of choice, and take away from the Creator and Governor and Benefactor of the world, that most free, and sovereign Agent, all the glory of this sort of freedom? Does it not seem to make him a kind of mechanical medium of fate, and introduce Mr. Hobbes' doctrine of fatality and necessity, into all things that God hath to do with? Does it not seem to represent the blessed God, as a Being of vast understanding, as well as power and efficiency, but still to leave him without a Will to choose among all the objects within his view? In short, it seems to make the blessed God a sort of Almighty Minister of Fate, under its universal and supreme influence; as it was the professed sentiment of some of the ancients, that fate was above the gods."

This is declaiming, rather than arguing; and an application to men's imaginations and prejudices, rather than to mere reason. But I would calmly endeavor to consider, whether there be any reason in this frightful representa-

* Dr. Gill, in his answer to Dr. Whitby, Vol. III. p. 183, &c.

tion. But before I enter upon a particular consideration of the matter, I would observe this; that it is reasonable to suppose, it should be much more difficult to express or conceive things according to exact metaphysical truth, relating to the nature and manner of the existence of things in the Divine Understanding and Will, and the operation of these faculties (if I may so call them) of the Divine Mind, than in the human mind; which is infinitely more within our view, and nearer to a proportion to the measure of our comprehension, and more commensurate to the use and import of human speech. Language is indeed very deficient, in regard of terms, to express precise truth concerning our own minds, and their faculties and operations. Words were first formed to express external things; and those that are applied to express things internal and spiritual, are almost all borrowed, and used in a sort of figurative sense. Whence they are, most of them, attended with a great deal of ambiguity and unfixedness in their signification, occasioning innumerable doubts, difficulties and confusions, in inquiries and controversies, about things of this nature. But language is much less adapted to express things in the mind of the incomprehensible Deity, precisely as they are.

We find a great deal of difficulty in conceiving exactly of the nature of our own souls. And notwithstanding all the progress which has been made, in past and present ages, in this kind of knowledge, whereby our metaphysics, as it relates to these things, is brought to greater perfection than once it was; yet, here is still work enough left for future inquiries and researches, and room for progress still to be made, for many ages and generations. But we had need to be infinitely able metaphysicians, to conceive with clearness, according to strict, proper and perfect truth, concerning the nature of the Divine Essence, and the modes of the action and operation of the powers of the Divine Mind.

And it may be noted particularly, that though we are obliged to conceive of some things in God as consequent and dependent on others, and of some things pertaining to the Divine Nature and Will as the foundation of others, and so before others in the order of nature; as, we must conceive of the knowledge and holiness of God as prior, in the order of nature, to his happiness; the perfection of his understanding, as the foundation of his wise purposes and decrees; the holiness of his nature, as the cause and reason of his holy determinations. And yet, when we speak of cause and effect, antecedent and consequent, fundamental and dependent, determining and determined, in the first Being, who is self-existent, independent, of perfect and absolute simplicity and immutability, and the first cause of all things; doubtless there must be less propriety in such representations, than when we speak of derived dependent beings, who are compounded, and liable to perpetual mutation and succession.

Having premised this, I proceed to observe concerning the forementioned author's exclamation, about the necessary determination of God's Will, in all things, by what he sees to be fittest and best.

That all the seeming force of such objections and exclamations must arise from an imagination, that there is some sort of privilege or dignity in being without such a moral necessity, as will make it impossible to do any other, than always choose what is wisest and best; as though there were some disadvantage, meanness and subjection, in such a necessity; a thing by which the Will was confined, kept under, and held in servitude by something, which, as it were, maintained a strong and invincible power and dominion over it, by bonds that held God fast, and that he could, by no means, deliver himself from. Whereas, this must be all mere imagination and delusion. It is no disadvantage or dishonor to a being, necessarily to act in the most excellent and happy manner,

from the necessary perfection of his own nature. This argues no imperfection, inferiority or dependence, nor any want of dignity, privilege or ascendency.* It is not inconsistent with the absolute and most perfect sovereignty of God. The sovereignty of God is his ability and authority to do whatever pleases him whereby *He doth according to his Will in the armies of Heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What dost thou?*—The following things belong to the *sovereignty* of God, viz.: 1. Supreme, universal, and infinite *Power*, whereby he is able to do what he pleases, without control, without any confinement of that power, without any subjection, in the least measure, to any other power; and so without any hinderance or restraint, that it should be either impossible, or at all difficult, for him to accomplish his Will; and without any dependence of his power on any other power, from whence it should be derived, or which it should stand in any need of: so far from this, that all other power is derived from him, and is absolutely dependent on him. 2. That He has supreme *authority*, absolute and most perfect right to do what he wills, without subjection to any superior authority, or any derivation of an authority from any other, or limitation by any distinct independent authority, either superior, equal, or inferior; he being the head of all dominion, and fountain of all authority; and also without restraint by any obligation, implying either subjection, derivation, or dependence, or proper limitation. 3. That his *Will* is supreme, underived, and independent on any thing without Himself; being in every thing determined by his own counsel, having no other rule but his own wisdom; his Will not being subject to, or restrained by the Will of any other, and other Wills being perfectly subject to his. 4. That his *Wisdom*, which determines his Will, is supreme, perfect, underived, self-sufficient and independent; so that it may be said, as in Isa. xl. 14, *With whom took He*

* "It might have been objected, with more plausibleness, that the Supreme Cause cannot be free, because he must needs do always what is best in the whole. But this would not at all serve Spinoza's purpose; for this is a necessity, not of nature and of fate, but of fitness and wisdom; a necessity consistent with the greatest freedom, and most perfect choice. For the only foundation of this necessity is such an unalterable rectitude of Will, and perfection of wisdom, as makes it impossible for a wise Being to act foolishly." *Clark's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God.* Edit. 6, p. 64.

"Though God is a most perfect free agent, yet he cannot but do what is best and wisest on the whole. The reason is evident; because perfect wisdom and goodness are as steady and certain principles of action, as necessity itself; and an infinitely wise and good Being, indued with the most perfect liberty, can no more choose to act in contradiction to wisdom and goodness, than a necessary agent can act contrary to the necessity by which it is acted; it being as great an absurdity and impossibility in choice, for Infinite Wisdom to choose to act unwisely, or Infinite Goodness to choose what is not good, as it would be in nature, for absolute necessity to fail of producing its necessary effect. There was, indeed, no necessity in nature, that God should at first create such beings as he has created, or indeed any being at all, because he is, in Himself, infinitely happy and all-sufficient. There was also, no necessity in nature, that he should preserve and continue things in being, after they were created; because he would be self sufficient without their continuance, as he was before their creation. But it was fit, and wise, and good, that Infinite Wisdom should manifest, and Infinite Goodness communicate itself; and therefore it was necessary, in the sense of necessity I am now speaking of, that things should be made at such a time, and continued so long, and indeed with various perfections in such degrees, as Infinite Wisdom and Goodness saw it best and wisest that they should." *Ibid.* p. 112, 113.

"'Tis not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act, according to the last result of a fair examination. This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it. 'Tis not an abridgment, 'tis the end and use of our liberty; and the further we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifference in the mind, not determinable by its last judgment, of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the Will, would be an imperfection on the other side. 'Tis as much a perfection, that desire, or the power of preferring should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the Will: and the more certain such determination is, the greater the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free. The very end of our freedom being that we might attain the good we choose; and, therefore, every man is brought under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment, what is best for him to do; else he would be under the determination of some other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man's W—, in every determi-

counsel? And who instructed Him and taught Him in the path of judgment, and taught Him knowledge, and showed Him the way of understanding?—There is no other Divine Sovereignty but this, and this is properly *absolute sovereignty;* no other is desirable, nor would any other be honorable, or happy, and indeed, there is no other conceivable or possible. It is the glory and greatness of the Divine Sovereignty, that God's Will is determined by his own infinite all-sufficient wisdom in every thing; and in nothing is either directed by any inferior wisdom, or by no wisdom; whereby it would become senseless arbitrariness, determining and acting without reason, design or end.

If God's Will is steadily and surely determined in every thing by supreme wisdom, then it is in every thing necessarily determined to that which is most wise. And, certainly, it would be a disadvantage and indignity to be otherwise. For if the Divine Will was not necessarily determined to that, which in every case is wisest and best, it must be subject to some degree of undesigning contingence; and so in the same degree liable to evil. To suppose the Divine Will liable to be carried hither and thither at random, by the uncertain wind of blind contingence, which is guided by no wisdom, no motive, no intelligent dictate whatsoever (if any such thing were possible), would certainly argue a great degree of imperfection and meanness, infinitely unworthy of the Deity. If it be a disadvantage for the Divine Will to be attended with this moral necessity, then the more free from it, and the more left at random, the greater dignity and advantage. And, consequently, to be perfectly free from the direction of understanding, and universally and entirely left to senseless, unmeaning contingence, to act absolutely at random, would be the supreme glory.

It no more argues any dependence of God's Will, that his supremely wise volition is necessary, than it argues a dependence of his being, that his existence is necessary. If it be something too low, for the Supreme Being to have his Will

nation, follows his own judgment, is to say, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have, at the same time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present thoughts, before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other, unless he can have, and not have it, will, and not will it, at the same time; a contradiction too manifest to be admitted. If we look upon those superior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happiness, we shall have reason to judge, that they are more steadily determined in their choice of good than we; and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are, to pronounce what Infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot choose what is not good. The freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best. But to give a right view of this mistaken part of liberty, let me ask, would any one be a chancelling, because he is less determined by wise determination, than a wise man? Is it worth the name of freedom, to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon a man's self? If to break loose from the conduct of reason, and to want that restraint of examination and judgment, that keeps us from doing or choosing the worse, be liberty, true liberty, madmen and fools are the only free men. Yet I think, nobody would choose to be mad, for the sake of such liberty, but he that is mad already." *Locke, Hum. Und.* Vol. I. Edit. 7, p. 215, 216.

"This Being, having all things always necessarily in view, must always, and eternally will, according to his infinite comprehension of things; that is, must will all things that are wisest and best to be done. There is no getting free of this consequence. If it can will at all, it must will this way. To be capable of knowing, and not capable of willing, is not to be understood. And to be capable of willing otherwise than what is wisest and best, contradicts that knowledge which is infinite. Infinite knowledge must direct the Will without error. Here then, is the origin of moral necessity; and that is really of freedom. Perhaps it may be said, when the Divine Will is determined, from the consideration of the eternal aptitude of things, it is as necessarily determined, as if it were physically impelled, if that were possible. But it is unskilfulness, to suppose this an objection. The great principle is once established, viz., that the Divine Will is determined by the eternal reason and aptitudes of things, instead of being physically impelled; and after that, the more strong and necessary this determination is, the more perfect the Deity must be allowed to be. It is this that makes him an amiable and adorable Being, whose Will and power are constantly, immutably, determined by the consideration of what is wisest and best, instead of a surd Being, with power, but without discerning and reason. It is the beauty of this necessity, that it is strong as fate itself, with all the advantage of reason and goodness. It is strange, to see men contend, that the Deity is not free, because he is necessarily rational, immutably good and wise; when a man is allowed still the perfecter being, the more fixedly and constantly his Will is determined by reason and truth." *Inquiry into the Nature of the Hum. Soul.* Edit. 3, Vol. II. p. 403, 404.

determined by moral Necessity, so as necessarily, in every case, to will in the highest degree holily and happily; then why is it not also something too low, for him to have his existence, and the infinite perfection of his nature, and his infinite happiness determined by necessity? It is no more to God's dishonor, to be necessarily wise, than to be necessarily holy. And if neither of them be to his dishonor, then it is not to his dishonor necessarily to act holily and wisely And if it be not dishonorable to be necessarily holy and wise, in the highest possible degree, no more is it mean and dishonorable, necessarily to act holily and wisely in the highest possible degree; or, which is the same thing, to do that, in every case, which, above all other things, is wisest and best.

The reason, why it is not dishonorable to be necessarily most holy, is, because holiness in itself is an excellent and honorable thing. For the same reason, it is no dishonor to be necessarily most wise, and, in every case, to act most wisely, or do the thing which is the wisest of all; for wisdom is also in itself excellent and honorable.

The forementioned author of the *Essay on the Freedom of the Will*, &c., as has been observed, represents that doctrine of the Divine Will's being in every thing necessarily determined by superior fitness, as making the blessed God a kind of Almighty Minister and mechanical medium of fate; and he insists, pages 93, 94, that this moral necessity and impossibility is, in effect, the same thing with physical and natural necessity and impossibility: and in p. 54, 55, he says, "The scheme which determines the Will always and certainly by the understanding, and the understanding by the appearance of things, seems to take away the true nature of vice and virtue. For the sublimest of virtues, and the vilest of vices, seem rather to be matters of fate and necessity, flowing naturally and necessarily from the existence, the circumstances, and present situation of persons and things; for this existence and situation necessarily makes such an appearance to the mind; from this appearance flows a necessary perception and judgment, concerning these things; this judgment, necessarily determines the Will; and thus, by this chain of necessary causes, virtue and vice would lose their nature, and become natural ideas, and necessary things, instead of moral and free actions."

And yet this same author allows, p. 30, 31, that a perfectly wise being will constantly and certainly choose what is most fit; and says, p. 102, 103, "I grant, and always have granted, that wheresoever there is such antecedent superior fitness of things, God acts according to it, so as never to contradict it; and, particularly, in all his judicial proceedings as a Governor, and distributer of rewards and punishments." Yea, he says expressly, p. 42, "That it is not possible for God to act otherwise, than according to this fitness and goodness in things."

So that according to this author, putting these several passages of his Essay together, there is no virtue, nor any thing of a moral nature, in the most sublime and glorious acts and exercises of God's holiness, justice, and faithfulness; and he never does any thing which is in itself supremely worthy, and, above all other things, fit and excellent, but only as a kind of mechanical medium of fate; and in what he does as the Judge and moral Governor of the world, he exercises no moral excellency; exercising no freedom in these things, because he acts by moral necessity, which is, in effect, the same with physical or natural necessity; and, therefore, he only acts by an *Hobistical* fatality; *as a Being indeed of vast understanding, as well as power and efficiency* (as he said before), *but without a Will to choose, being a kind of Almighty Minister of fate, acting under its supreme influence.* For he allows, that in all these things, God's Will is determined

constantly and certainly by a superior fitness, and that it is not possible for him to act otherwise. And if these things are so, what glory or praise belongs to God for doing holily and justly, or taking the most fit, holy, wise and excellent course, in any one instance? Whereas, according to the Scriptures, and also the common sense of mankind, it does not, in the least, derogate from the honor of any being, that through the moral perfection of his nature, he necessarily acts with supreme wisdom and holiness; but on the contrary, his praise is the greater; herein consists the height of his glory.

The same author, p. 56, supposes, that herein appears the excellent *character of a wise and good man, that though he can choose contrary to the fitness of things, yet he does not; but suffers himself to be directed by fitness;* and that, in this conduct, *he imitates the blessed God.* And yet, he supposes it is contrariwise with the blessed God; not that he suffers himself to be directed by fitness, when *he can choose contrary to the fitness of things*, but that *he cannot choose contrary to the fitness of things;* as he says, p. 42, *that it is not possible for God to act otherwise than according to this fitness, where there is any fitness or goodness in things.* Yea, he supposes, p. 31, that if a man *were perfectly wise and good, he could not do otherwise than be constantly and certainly determined by the fitness of things.*

One thing more I would observe, before I conclude this section; and that is, that if it derogates nothing from the glory of God, to be necessarily determined by superior fitness in some things, then neither does it to be thus determined in all things: from any thing in the nature of such necessity, as at all detracting from God's freedom, independence, absolute supremacy, or any dignity or glory of his nature, state or manner of acting; or as implying any infirmity, restraint, or subjection. And if the thing be such as well consists with God's glory, and has nothing tending to detract from it; then we need not be afraid of ascribing it to God in too many things, lest thereby we should detract from God's glory too much.

SECTION VIII.

Some further Objections against the moral Necessity of God's Volitions considered.

The author last cited, as has been observed, owns that God, being perfectly wise, will constantly and certainly choose what appears most fit, where there is a superior fitness and goodness in things; and that it is not possible for him to do otherwise. So that it is in effect confessed, that in those things where there is any real preferableness, it is no dishonor, nothing in any respect unworthy of God, for him to act from necessity; notwithstanding all that can be objected from the agreement of such a necessity, with the fate of the *Stoics*, and the necessity, maintained by Mr. Hobbes. From which it will follow, that if it were so, that in all the different things, among which God chooses, there were evermore a superior fitness, or preferableness on one side, then it would be no dishonor, or any thing, in any respect, unworthy, or unbecoming of God, for his Will to be necessarily determined in every thing. And if this be allowed, it is a giving up entirely the argument, from the unsuitableness of such a necessity to the liberty, supremacy, independence and glory of the Divine Being; and a resting the whole weight of the affair on the decision of another point wholly diverse; viz., whether it be so indeed, that in all the various possible things, which are in God's view, and may be considered as capable objects of

his choice, there is not evermore a preferableness in one thing above another This is denied by this author; who supposes, that in many instances, between two or more possible things, which come within the view of the divine mind, there is a perfect indifference and equality, as to fitness or tendency to attain any good end which God can have in view, or to answer any of his designs Now, therefore, I would consider whether this be evident.

The arguments brought to prove this, are of two kinds. (1.) It is urged, that in many instances, we must suppose there is absolutely no difference between various possible objects of choice, which God has in view: and (2,) that the difference between many things is so inconsiderable, or of such a nature, that it would be unreasonable to suppose it to be of any consequence; or to suppose that any of God's wise designs would not be answered in one way as well as the other. Therefore,

I. The first thing to be considered is, whether there are any instances wherein there is a perfect likeness, and absolutely no difference, between different objects of choice, that are proposed to the Divine Understanding?

And here, in the first place, it may be worthy to be considered, whether the contradiction there is in the terms of the question proposed, does not give reason to suspect, that there is an inconsistence in the thing supposed. It is inquired, whether different objects of choice may not be absolutely without difference? If they are absolutely without difference, then how are they different objects of choice? If there be absolutely no difference, in any respect, then there is no variety or distinction; for distinction is only by some difference. And if there be no variety among proposed objects of choice, then there is no opportunity for variety of choice, or difference of determination. For that determination of a thing, which is not different in any respect, is not a different determination, but the same. That this is no quibble, may appear more fully anon.

The arguments, to prove that the Most High, in some instances, chooses to do one thing rather than another, where the things themselves are perfectly without difference, are two.

1. That the various parts of infinite time and space, absolutely considered, are perfectly alike, and do not differ at all one from another; and that therefore, when God determined to create the world in such a part of infinite duration and space, rather than others, he determined and preferred, among various objects, between which there was no preferableness, and absolutely no difference.

Answ. This objection supposes an infinite length of time before the world was created, distinguished by successive parts, properly and truly so; or a succession of limited and unmeasurable periods of time, following one another, in an infinitely long series; which must needs be a groundless imagination. The eternal duration which was before the world, being only the eternity of God's existence; which is nothing else but his immediate, perfect and invariable possession of the whole of his unlimited life, together and at once: *Vitæ interminabilis, tota, simul et perfecta possessio.* Which is so generally allowed, that I need not stand to demonstrate it.*

* "If all created beings were taken away, all possibility of any mutation or succession, of one thing to another, would appear to be also removed. Abstract succession in eternity is scarce to be understood. What is it that succeeds? One minute to another, perhaps, *velut unda supervenit undam.* But when we imagine this, we fancy that the minutes are things separately existing. This is the common notion; and yet it is a manifest prejudice. Time is nothing but the existence of created successive beings, and eternity the necessary existence of the Deity. Therefore, if this necessary being hath no change or succession in his nature, his existence must of course be unsuccessive. We seem to commit a double oversight in this case; first, we find succession in the necessary nature and existence of the Deity himself; which is wrong, if the reasoning above be conclusive. And then we ascribe this succession to eternity, considered abstractedly from the Eternal Being; and suppose it, one knows not what, a thing subsisting by itself, and flowing one minute after another. This is the work of pure imagination, and contrary to the reality of things. Hence the

So this objection supposes an extent of space beyond the limits of the creation of an infinite length, breadth and depth, truly and properly distinguished into different measurable parts, limited at certain stages, one beyond another, in an infinite series. Which notion of absolute and infinite space is doubtless as unreasonable, as that now mentioned, of absolute and infinite duration. It is as improper to imagine that the immensity and omnipresence of God is distinguished by a series of miles and leagues, one beyond another; as that the infinite duration of God is distinguished by months and years, one after another. A diversity and order of distinct parts, limited by certain periods, is as conceivable, and does as naturally obtrude itself on our imagination, in one case as the other; and there is equal reason in each case, to suppose that our imagination deceives us. It is equally improper to talk of months and years of the Divine Existence, and miles squares of Deity; and we equally deceive ourselves, when we talk of the world's being differently fixed with respect to either of these sorts of measures. I think, we know not what we mean, if we say, the world might have been differently placed from what it is, in the broad expanse of infinity; or, that it might have been differently fixed in the long line of eternity; and all arguments and objections, which are built on the imaginations we are apt to have of infinite extension or duration, are buildings founded on shadows, or castles in the air.

2. The second argument, to prove that the Most High wills one thing rather than another, without any superior fitness or preferableness in the thing preferred, is God's actually placing in different parts of the world, particles, or atoms of matter, that are perfectly equal and alike. The forementioned author says, p. 78, &c., "If one would descend to the minute specific particles, of which different bodies are composed, we should see abundant reason to believe, that there are thousands of such little particles, or atoms of matter, which are perfectly equal and alike, and could give no distinct determination to the Will of God, where to place them." He there instances in particles of water, of which there are such immense numbers, which compose the rivers and oceans of this world; and the infinite myriads of the luminous and fiery particles, which compose the body of the sun; so many, that it would be very unreasonable to suppose no two of them should be exactly equal and alike.

Answ. (1.) To this I answer: that as we must suppose matter to be infinitely divisible, it is very unlikely, that any two, of all these particles, are exactly equal and alike; so unlikely, that it is a thousand to one, yea, an infinite number to one, but it is otherwise; and that although we should allow a great similarity between the different particles of water and fire, as to their general nature and figure; and however small we suppose those particles to be, it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of them should be exactly equal in dimensions and quantity of matter. If we should suppose a great many globes of the same nature with the globe of the earth, it would be very strange, if there were any two of them that had exactly the same number of particles of dust and water in them.

common metaphorical expressions: *time runs apace, let us lay hold on the present minute*, and the like. The philosophers themselves mislead us by their illustrations. They compare eternity to the motion of a point running on forever, and making a traceless infinite line. Here the point is supposed a thing actually subsisting, representing the present minute; and then they ascribe motion or succession to it; that is they ascribe motion to a mere nonentity, to illustrate to us a successive eternity, made up of finite successive parts. If once we allow an all perfect mind, which hath an eternal, immutable and infinite comprehension of all things, always (and allow it we must) the distinction of past and future vanishes with respect to such a mind.—In a word, if we proceed step by step, as above, the eternity or existence of the Deity will appear to be *Vita interminabilis, tota, simul et perfecta possessio*; how much soever this may have been a paradox hitherto." *Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul* Vol. II. p. 409 410 411. Edit. III.

But infinitely less strange, than that two particles of light should have just the same quantity of matter. For a particle of light, according to the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter, is composed of infinitely more assignable parts, than there are particles of dust and water in the globe of the earth. And as it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of these particles should be equal; so it is, that they should be alike in other respects; to instance in the configuration of their surfaces. If there were very many globes, of the nature of the earth, it would be very unlikely that any two should have exactly the same number of particles of dust, water and stone, in their surfaces, and all posited exactly alike, one with respect to another, without any difference, in any part discernible either by the naked eye or microscope; but infinitely less strange, than that two particles of light should be perfectly of the same figure. For there are infinitely more assignable real parts on the surface of a particle of light than there are particles of dust, water and stone, on the surface of the terrestrial globe.

Answ. (2.) But then, supposing that there are two particles, or atoms of matter, perfectly equal and alike, which God has placed in different parts of the creation; as I will not deny it to be possible for God to make two bodies perfectly alike, and put them in different places; yet it will not follow, that two different or distinct acts or effects of the Divine Power have exactly the same fitness for the same ends. For these two different bodies are not different or distinct in any other respects than those wherein they differ: they are two in no other respects than those wherein there is a difference. If they are perfectly equal and alike in themselves, then they can be distinguished, or be distinct, only in those things which are called circumstances; as place, time, rest, motion, or some other present or past circumstances or relations. For it is difference only that constitutes distinction. If God makes two bodies, in themselves every way equal and alike, and agreeing perfectly in all other circumstances and relations, but only their place; then in this only is there any distinction or duplicity. The figure is the same, the measure is the same, the solidity and resistance are the same, and every thing the same only the place. Therefore what the Will of God determines, is this, namely, that there should be the same figure, the same extension, the same resistance, &c., in two different places. And for this determination he has some reason. There is some end, for which such a determination and act has a peculiar fitness, above all other acts. Here is no one thing determined without an end, and no one thing without a fitness for that end, superior to any thing else. If it be the pleasure of God to cause the same resistance, and the same figure, to be in two different places and situations, we can no more justly argue from it, that here must be some determination or act of God's Will that is wholly without motive or end, than we can argue, that whenever, in any case it is a man's Will to speak the same words, or make the same sounds at two different times; there must be some determination or act of his Will, without any motive or end. The difference of place, in the former case, proves no more than the difference of time does in the other. If any one should say, with regard to the former case, that there must be something determined without an end, viz., that of those two similar bodies, this in particular should be made in this place, and the other in the other, and should inquire, why the Creator did not make them in a transposition, when both are alike, and each would equally have suited either place? The inquiry supposes something that is not true, namely, that the two bodies differ and are distinct in other respects besides their place. So that with this distinction inherent in them, they might, in their first creation, have been transposed, and each might have begun its existence in the place of the other.

Let us, for clearness sake, suppose, that God had, at the beginning, made two globes, each of an inch diameter, both perfect spheres, and perfectly solid, without pores, and perfectly alike in every respect, and placed them near one to another, one towards the right hand, and the other towards the left, without any difference as to time, motion or rest, past or present, or any circumstance, but only their place; and the question should be asked, why God in their creation placed them so: why that which is made on the right hand, was not made on the left, and *vice versa?* Let it be well considered, whether there be any sense in such a question; and whether the inquiry does not suppose something false and absurd. Let it be considered, what the Creator must have done otherwise than he did, what different act of Will or power he must have exerted, in order to the thing proposed. All that could have been done, would have been to have made two spheres perfectly alike, in the same places where he has made them, without any difference of the things made, either in themselves or in any circumstance; so that the whole effect would have been without any difference, and therefore, just the same. By the supposition, the two spheres are different in no other respect but their place; and therefore in other respects they are the same. Each has the same roundness; it is not a distinct rotundity, in any other respect but its situation. There are also the same dimensions, differing in nothing but their place. And so of their resistance, and every thing else that belongs to them.

Here, if any chooses to say, "that there is a difference in another respect, viz., that they are not NUMERICALLY the same: that it is thus with all the qualities that belong to them; that it is confessed they are, in some respects, the same; that is, they are both exactly alike; but yet numerically they differ. Thus the roundness of one is not the same numerical individual roundness with that of the other." Let this be supposed; then the question about the determination of the Divine Will in the affair, is, Why did God will, that this individual roundness should be at the right hand, and the other individual roundness at the left? Why did he not make them in a contrary position? Let any rational person consider, whether such questions be not words without a meaning, as much as if God should see fit for some ends, to cause the same sounds to be repeated, or made at two different times; the sounds being perfectly the same in every respect, but only one was a minute after the other; and it should be asked upon it, why did God cause these sounds, numerically different, to succeed one the other in such a manner? Why did he not make that individual sound, which was in the first minute, to be in the second? And the individual sound of the last minute to be in the first? These inquiries would be even ridiculous; as, I think, every person must see, at once, in the case proposed of two sounds, being only the same repeated, absolutely without any difference, but that one circumstance of time. If the Most High sees it will answer some good end, that the same sound should be made by lightning at two distinct times, and therefore wills that it should be so, must it needs therefore be, that herein there is some act of God's Will without any motive or end? God saw fit often, at distinct times, and on different occasions, to say the very same words to Moses, namely, those, *I am Jehovah.* And would it not be unreasonable to infer, as a certain consequence, from this, that here must be some act or acts of the Divine Will, in determining and disposing these words exactly alike, at different times, wholly without aim or inducement? But it would be no more unreasonable than to say, that there must be an act of God's without any inducement, if he sees it best, and, for some reasons, determines that there shall be the same resistance, the same dimensions, and the same figure, in several distinct places.

If, in the instance of the two spheres, perfectly alike, it be supposed possible that God might have made them in a contrary position; that which is made at the right hand being made at the left; then I ask, whether it is not evidently equally possible, if God had made but one of them, and that in the place of the right hand globe, that he might have made that numerically different from what it is, and numerically different from what he did make it, though perfectly alike, and in the same place; and at the same time, and in every respect, in the same circumstances and relations? Namely, whether he might not have made it numerically the same with that which he has now made at the left hand, and so have left that which is now created at the right hand, in a state of nonexistence? And, if so, whether it would not have been possible to have made one in that place, perfectly like these, and yet numerically differing from both? And let it be considered, whether, from this notion of a numerical difference in bodies, perfectly equal and alike, which numerical difference is something inherent in the bodies themselves, and diverse from the difference of place or time, or any circumstance whatsoever; it will not follow, that there is an infinite number of numerically different possible bodies, perfectly alike, among which God chooses, by a self-determining power, when he goes about to create bodies.

Therefore let us put the case thus: supposing that God, in the beginning, had created but one perfectly solid sphere, in a certain place; and it should be inquired, Why God created that individual sphere, in that place, at that time? And why he did not create another sphere, perfectly like it, but numerically different, in the same place, at the same time? Or why he chose to bring into being there, that very body, rather than any of the infinite number of other bodies, perfectly like it; either of which he could have made there as well, and would have answered his end as well? Why he caused to exist, at that place and time, that individual roundness, rather than any other of the infinite number of individual rotundities just like it? Why that individual resistance, rather than any other of the infinite number of possible resistances just like it? And it might as reasonably be asked, Why, when God first caused it to thunder, he caused that individual sound then to be made, and not another just like it? Why did he make choice of this very sound, and reject all the infinite number of other possible sounds just like it, but numerically differing from it, and all differing one from another? I think, every body must be sensible of the absurdity and nonsense of what is supposed in such inquiries. And, if we calmly attend to the matter, we shall be convinced, that all such kind of objections as I am answering, are founded on nothing but the imperfection of our manner of conceiving things, and the obscureness of language, and great want of clearness and precision in the signification of terms.

If any shall find fault with this reasoning, that it is going a great length in metaphysical niceties and subtilties, I answer, the objection which they are in reply to, is a metaphysical subtilty, and must be treated according to the nature of it.*

II. Another thing alleged is, that innumerable things which are determined by the Divine Will, and chosen and done by God rather than others, differ from those that are not chosen in so inconsiderable a manner, that it would be unreasonable to suppose the difference to be of any consequence, or that there is any superior fitness or goodness, that God can have respect to in the determination.

* "For men to have recourse to subtilties, in raising difficulties, and then complain, that they should be taken off by minutely examining these subtilties, is a strange kind of procedure." *Nature of the Human Soul*, Vol. II. page 331.

To which I answer; it is impossible for us to determine, with any certainty or evidence, that because the difference is very small, and appears to us of no consideration, therefore there is absolutely no superior goodness, and no valuable end, which can be proposed by the Creator and Governor of the world, in ordering such a difference. The forementioned author mentions many instances. One is, there being one atom in the whole universe more or less. But I think, it would be unreasonable to suppose, that God made one atom in vain, or without any end or motive. He made not one atom, but what was a work of his Almighty power, as much as the whole globe of the earth, and requires as much of a constant exertion of Almighty power to uphold it; and was made and is upheld understandingly, and on design, as much as if no other had been made but that. And it would be as unreasonable to suppose, that he made it without any thing really aimed at in so doing, as much as to suppose, that he made the planet Jupiter without aim or design.

It is possible, that the most minute effects of the Creator's power, the smallest assignable difference between the things which God has made, may be attended, in the whole series of events, and the whole compass and extent of their influence, with very great and important consequences. If the laws of motion and gravitation, laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, hold universally, there is not one atom, nor the least assignable part of an atom, but what has influence, every moment, throughout the whole material universe, to cause every part to be otherwise than it would be, if it were not for that particular corporeal existence. And however the effect is insensible for the present, yet it may, in length of time, become great and important.

To illustrate this, let us suppose two bodies moving the same way, in straight lines, perfectly parallel one to another; but to be diverted from this parallel course, and drawn one from another, as much as might be by the attraction of an atom, at the distance of one of the furthest of the fixed stars from the earth; these bodies being turned out of the lines of their parallel motion, will, by degrees, get further and further distant, one from the other; and though the distance may be imperceptible for a long time, yet at length it may become very great. So the revolution of a planet round the sun being retarded or accelerated, and the orbit of its revolution made greater or less, and more or less elliptical, and so its periodical time longer or shorter, no more than may be by the influence of the least atom, might, in length of time, perform a whole revolution sooner or later than otherwise it would have done; which might make a vast alteration with regard to millions of important events. So the influence of the least particle may, for aught we know, have such effect on something in the constitution of some human body, as to cause another thought to arise in the mind at a certain time, than otherwise would have been; which, in length of time (yea, and that not very great), might occasion a vast alteration through the whole world of mankind. And so innumerable other ways might be mentioned, wherein the least assignable alteration may possibly be attended with great consequences.

Another argument, which the forementioned author brings against a necessary determination of the Divine Will, by a superior fitness, is, that such doctrine derogates from the freeness of God's grace and goodness, in choosing the objects of his favor and bounty, and from the obligation upon men to thankfulness for special benefits. Page 89, &c.

In answer to this objection, I would observe,

1 That it derogates no more from the goodness of God, to suppose the exercise of the benevolence of his nature to be determined by wisdom, than to

suppose it determined by chance, and that his favors are bestowed altogether at random, his Will being determined by nothing but perfect accident, without any end or design whatsoever; which must be the case, as has been demonstrated, if volition be not determined by a prevailing motive. That which is owing to perfect contingence, wherein neither previous inducement, nor antecedent choice has any hand, is not owing more to goodness or benevolence, than that which is owing to the influence of a wise end.

2. It is acknowledged, that if the motive that determines the Will of God, in the choice of the objects of his favors, be any moral quality in the object, recommending that object to his benevolence above others, his choosing that object is not so great a manifestation of the freeness and sovereignty of his grace, as if it were otherwise. But there is no necessity of supposing this, in order to our supposing that he has some wise end in view, in determining to bestow his favors on one person rather than another. We are to distinguish between the merit of the object of God's favor, or a moral qualification of the object attracting that favor and recommending to it, and the natural fitness of such a determination of the act of God's goodness, to answer some wise designs of his own, some end in the view of God's omniscience. It is God's own act, that is the proper and immediate object of his volition.

3. I suppose that none will deny, but that, in some instances, God acts from wise designs in determining the particular subjects of his favors. None will say, I presume, that when God distinguishes, by his bounty, particular societies or persons, He never, in any instance, exercises any wisdom in so doing, aiming at some happy consequence. And, if it be not denied to be so in some instances, then I would inquire, whether, in these instances, God's goodness is less manifested, than in those wherein God has no aim or end at all? And whether the subjects have less cause of thankfulness? And if so, who shall be thankful for the bestowment of distinguishing mercy, with that enhancing circumstance of the distinction's being made without an end? How shall it be known when God is influenced by some wise aim, and when not? It is very manifest, with respect to the Apostle Paul, that God had wise ends in choosing him to be a Christian and an Apostle, who had been a persecutor, &c. The Apostle himself mentions one end. 1 Tim. i. 15, 16, *Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, of whom I am chief. Howbeit, for this cause I obtained mercy, that in me first, Jesus Christ might show forth all long-suffering, for a pattern to them who should hereafter believe on Him to life everlasting.* But yet the Apostle never looked on it as a diminution of the freedom and riches of Divine Grace in his election, which he so often and so greatly magnifies. This brings me to observe,

4. Our supposing such a moral necessity in the acts of God's Will, as has been spoken of, is so far from necessarily derogating from the riches of God's grace to such as are the chosen objects of his favor, that, in many instances, this moral necessity may arise from goodness, and from the great degree of it. God may choose this object rather than another, as having a superior fitness to answer the ends, designs and inclinations of his goodness; being more sinful, and so more miserable and necessitous than others; the inclinations of Infinite Mercy and Benevolence may be more gratified, and the gracious design of God's sending his Son into the world, may be more abundantly answered, in the exercises of mercy towards such an object, rather than another.

One thing more I would observe, before I finish what I have to say on the head of the necessity of the acts of God's Will; and that is, that something much more like a servile subjection of the Divine Being to fatal necessity, will follow from Arminian principles, than from the doctrines which they oppose

For they (at least most of them) suppose, with respect to all events that happen in the moral world, depending on the volitions of moral agents, which are the most important events of the universe, to which all others are subordinate; I say, they suppose, with respect to these, that God has a certain foreknowledge of them, antecedent to any purposes or decrees of his, about them. And if so, they have a fixed certain futurity, prior to any designs or volitions of his, and independent on them, and to which his volitions must be subject, as he would wisely accommodate his affairs to this fixed futurity of the state of things in the moral world. So that here, instead of a moral necessity of God's Will, arising from, or consisting in, the infinite perfection and blessedness of the Divine Being, we have a fixed unalterable state of things, properly distinct from the perfect nature of the Divine Mind, and the state of the Divine Will and Design, and entirely independent on these things, and which they have no hand in, because they are prior to them; and which God's Will is truly subject to, he being obliged to conform or accommodate himself to it, in all his purposes and decrees, and in every thing he does in his disposals and government of the world; the moral world being the end of the natural; so that all is in vain, that is not accommodated to that state of the moral world which consists in, or depends upon, the acts and state of the wills of moral agents, which had a fixed futurition from eternity. Such a subjection to necessity as this, would truly argue an inferiority and servitude, that would be unworthy the Supreme Being; and is much more agreeable to the notion which many of the heathen had of fate, as above the gods, than that moral necessity of fitness and wisdom which has been spoken of; and is truly repugnant to the absolute sovereignty of God, and inconsistent with the supremacy of his Will; and really subjects the Will of the Most High, to the Will of his creatures, and brings him into dependence upon them.

SECTION IX.

Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine which has been maintained, that it makes God the Author of Sin.

It is urged by *Arminians*, that the doctrine of the necessity of men's volitions, or their necessary connection with antecedent events and circumstances, makes the first cause, and supreme orderer of all things, the author of sin; in that he has so constituted the state and course of things, that sinful volitions become necessary, in consequence of his disposal. Dr. Whitby, in his Discourse on the Freedom of the Will,* cites one of the ancients, as on his side, declaring that this opinion of the necessity of the Will "absolves sinners, as doing nothing of their own accord which was evil, and would cast all the blame of all the wickedness committed in the world, upon God, and upon his Providence, if that were admitted by the assertors of this fate; whether he himself did necessitate them to do these things, or ordered matters so, that they should be constrained to do them by some other cause." And the doctor says, in another place,† "In the nature of the thing, and in the opinion of philosophers, *causa deficiens, in rebus necessariis, ad causam per se efficientem reducenda est.* In things necessary, the deficient cause must be reduced to the efficient. And in this case the reason is evident; because the not doing what is required, or not avoiding what is forbidden, being a defect, must follow from the position of the necessary cause of that deficiency."

* On the Five Points, p. 361 † Ibid, p. 486.

Concerning this, I would observe the following things.

I. If there be any difficulty in this matter, it is nothing peculiar to this scheme; it is no difficulty or disadvantage, wherein it is distinguished from the scheme of *Arminians;* and, therefore, not reasonably objected by them.

Dr. Whitby supposes, that if sin necessarily follows from God's withholding assistance, or if that assistance be not given, which is absolutely necessary to the avoiding of evil; then, in the nature of the thing, God must be as properly the author of that evil, as if he were the efficient cause of it. From whence, according to what he himself says of the devils and damned spirits, God must be the proper author of their perfect unrestrained wickedness: he must be the efficient cause of the great pride of the devils, and of their perfect malignity against God, Christ, his saints, and all that is good, and of the insatiable cruelty of their disposition. For he allows, that God has so forsaken them, and does so withhold his assistance from them, that they are incapacitated for doing good, and determined only to evil.* Our doctrine, in its consequence, makes God the author of men's sin in this world, no more, and in no other sense, than his doctrine, in its consequence, makes God the author of the hellish pride and malice of the devils. And doubtless the latter is as odious an effect as the former.

Again, if it will follow at all, that God is the author of sin, from what has been supposed of a sure and infallible connection between antecedents and consequents, it will follow because of this, viz., that for God to be the author or orderer of those things which, he knows beforehand, will infallibly be attended with such a consequence, is the same thing, in effect, as for him to be the author of that consequence. But, if this be so, this is a difficulty which equally attends the doctrine of *Arminians* themselves; at least, of those of them who allow God's certain foreknowledge of all events. For on the supposition of such a foreknowledge, this is the case with respect to every sin that is committed: God knew, that if he ordered and brought to pass such and such events, such sins would infallibly follow. As for instance, God certainly foreknew, long before Judas was born, that if he ordered things so, that there should be such a man born, at such a time, and at such a place, and that his life should be preserved, and that he should, in Divine Providence, be led into acquaintance with Jesus; and that his heart should be so influenced by God's Spirit or Providence, as to be inclined to be a follower of Christ; and that he should be one of those twelve, which should be chosen constantly to attend him as his family; and that his health should be preserved, so that he should go up to Jerusalem, at the last passover in Christ's life; and if it should be so ordered, that Judas should see Christ's kind treatment of the woman which anointed him at Bethany, and have that reproof from Christ, which he had at that time, and see and hear other things, which excited his enmity against his Master, and that if other circumstances should be ordered, as they were ordered; it would be what would most certainly and infallibly follow, that Judas would betray his Lord, and would soon after hang himself, and die impenitent, and be sent to hell, for his horrid wickedness.

Therefore, this supposed difficulty ought not to be brought as an objection against the scheme which has been maintained, as disagreeing with the Arminian scheme, seeing it is no difficulty owing to such disagreement; but a difficulty wherein the Arminians share with us. That must be unreasonably made an objection against our differing from them, which we should not escape or avoid at all by agreeing with them.

And therefore I would observe,

* On the Five Points, p. 202, 203.

II. They who object, that this doctrine makes God the author of sin, ought distinctly to explain what they mean by that phrase, *The author of sin.* I know the phrase, as it is commonly used, signifies something very ill. If by *the author of sin*, be meant *the sinner, the agent*, or *actor of sin*, or *the doer of a wicked thing;* so it would be a reproach and blasphemy, to suppose God to be the author of sin. In this sense, I utterly deny God to be the author of sin; rejecting such an imputation on the Most High, as what is infinitely to be abhorred; and deny any such thing to be the consequence of what I have laid down. But if, by *the author of sin*, is meant the permitter, or not a hinderer of sin; and, at the same time, a disposer of the state of events, in such a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow: I say, if this be all that is meant, by being the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of sin (though I dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and custom is apt to carry another sense) it is no reproach for the Most High to be thus the author of sin. This is not to be the *actor of sin*, but, on the contrary, *of holiness.* What God doth herein, is holy; and a glorious exercise of the infinite excellency of his nature. And, I do not deny, that God's being thus the author of sin, follows from what I have laid down; and, I assert, that it equally follows from the doctrine which is maintained by most of the *Arminian* divines.

That it is most certainly so, that God is in such a manner the disposer and orderer of sin, is evident, if any credit is to be given to the Scripture; as well as because it is impossible, in the nature of things, to be otherwise. In such a manner God ordered the obstinacy of Pharaoh, in his refusing to obey God's commands, to let the people go. Exod. iv. 21, "I will harden his heart, that he shall not let the people go." Chap. vii. 2—5, "Aaron thy brother shall speak unto Pharaoh, that he send the children of Israel out of his land. And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my signs and my wonders in the land of Egypt. But Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you; that I may lay mine hand upon Egypt, by great judgments," &c. Chap. ix. 12, "And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh, and he hearkened not unto them, as the Lord had spoken unto Moses." Chap. x. 1, 2, "And the Lord said unto Moses, Go in unto Pharaoh; for I have hardened his heart and the heart of his servants, that I might show these signs before him, and that thou mayest tell it in the ears of thy son, and thy son's son, what things I have wrought in Egypt, and my signs which I have done amongst them, that ye may know that I am the Lord." Chap. xiv. 4, "And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, that he shall follow after them: and I will be honored upon Pharaoh, and upon all his Host." Verse 8, "And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh King of Egypt, and he pursued after the Children of Israel." And it is certain, that in such a manner, God, for wise and good ends, ordered that event, Joseph's being sold into Egypt, by his brethren. Gen. xlv. 5, "Now, therefore, be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither; for God did send me before you to preserve life." Verse 7, 8, "God sent me before you to preserve you a posterity in the earth, and to save your lives by a great deliverance: so now it was not you, that sent me hither, but God." Psal. cv. 17, "He sent a man before them, even Joseph, who was sold for a servant." It is certain, that thus God ordered the sin and folly of Sihon King of the Amorites, in refusing to let the people of Israel pass by him peaceably. Deut. ii. 30, "But Sihon King of Heshbon would not let us pass by him; for the Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver him into thine hand." It is certain, that God thus ordered the sin and folly of the Kings of Canaan, that they attempted not to

make peace with Israel, but with a stupid boldness and obstinacy, set themselves violently to oppose them and their God. Josh. xi. 20, "For it was of the Lord, to harden their hearts, that they should come against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utterly, and that they might have no favor; but that he might destroy them, as the Lord commanded Moses." It is evident, that thus God ordered the treacherous rebellion of Zedekiah against the King of Babylon. Jer. lii. 3, "For through the anger of the Lord it came to pass in Jerusalem, and Judah, until he had cast them out from his presence, that Zedekiah rebelled against the King of Babylon." So 2 Kings xxiv. 20. And it is exceeding manifest, that God thus ordered the rapine and unrighteous ravages of Nebuchadnezzar, in spoiling and ruining the nations round about. Jer. xxv. 9, "Behold, I will send and take all the families of the north, saith the Lord, and Nebuchadnezzar, my servant, and will bring them against this land, and against all the nations round about; and will utterly destroy them, and make them an astonishment, and a hissing, and perpetual desolations." Chap. xliii. 10, 11, "I will send and take Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon, my servant; and I will set his throne upon these stones that I have hid, and he shall spread his royal pavilion over them. And when he cometh, he shall smite the land of Egypt, and deliver such as are for death to death, and such as are for captivity to captivity, and such as are for the sword to the sword." Thus God represents himself as sending for Nebuchadnezzar, and taking of him and his armies, and bringing him against the nations, which were to be destroyed by him, to that very end, that he might utterly destroy them, and make them desolate; and as appointing the work that he should do, so particularly, that the very persons were designated that he should kill with the sword, and those that should be killed with famine and pestilence, and those that should be carried into captivity; and that in doing all these things, he should act as his servant; by which, less cannot be intended, than that he should serve his purposes and designs. And in Jer. xxvii. 4, 5, 6, God declares, how he would cause him thus to serve his designs, viz., by bringing this to pass in his sovereign disposal, as the great Possessor and Governor of the universe, that disposes all things just as pleases him. "Thus saith the Lord of Hosts, the God of Israel; I have made the earth, the man and the beast, that are upon the ground, by my great power, and my stretched out arm, and have given it unto whom it seemed meet unto me; and now I have given all these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar, MY SERVANT, and the beasts of the field have I given also to serve him." And Nebuchadnezzar is spoken of as doing these things, by having his arms strengthened by God, and having *God's sword put into his hands, for this end.* Ezek. xxx. 24, 25, 26. Yea, God speaks of his terribly ravaging and wasting the nations, and cruelly destroying all sorts, without distinction of sex or age, as the weapon in God's hand, and the instrument of his indignation, which God makes use of to fulfil his own purposes, and execute his own vengeance. Jer. li. 20, &c., "Thou art my battle-axe, and weapons of war: for with thee will I break in pieces the nations, and with thee will I destroy kingdoms, and with thee will I break in pieces the horse and his rider, and with thee will I break in pieces the chariot and his rider; with thee also will I break in pieces man and woman, and with thee will I break in pieces old and young, and with thee will I break in pieces the young man and the maid," &c. It is represented, that the designs of Nebuchadnezzar and those that destroyed Jerusalem, never could have been accomplished, had not God determined them, as well as they. Lam. iii. 37, "Who is he that saith, and it cometh to pass, and the Lord commandeth it not?" And yet the king of Babylon's thus destroying the nations, and especially the *Jews*, is spo-

ken of as his great wickedness, for which God finally destroyed him. Isa. xiv. 4, 5, 6, 12, Hab. ii. 5--12, and Jer. chap. l. and li. It is most manifest, that God, to serve his own designs, providentially ordered Shimei's cursing David. 2 Sam. xvi. 10, 11, "The Lord hath said unto him, Curse David.—Let him curse, for the Lord hath bidden him."

It is certain, that God thus, for excellent, holy, gracious and glorious ends, ordered the fact which they committed, who were concerned in Christ's death; and that therein they did but fulfil God's designs. As, I trust, no Christian will deny it was the design of God that Christ should *be crucified*, and that for this end, he came into the world. It is very manifest by many Scriptures, that the whole affair of Christ's crucifixion, with its circumstances, and the treachery of Judas, that made way for it, was ordered in God's Providence, in pursuance of his purpose; notwithstanding the violence that is used with those plain Scriptures, to obscure and pervert the sense of them. Acts ii. 23, "Him being delivered, by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God,* ye have taken, and with wicked hands, have crucified and slain." Luke xxii.21-2,† "But behold the hand of him that betrayeth me, is with me on the table; and truly the Son of man goeth, as it was determined." Acts iv. 27, 28, "For of a truth, against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done. Acts iii. 17, 18, "And now, brethren, I wot that through ignorance ye did it, as did also your rulers; but these things, which God before had showed by the mouth of all his prophets, that Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled." So that what these murderers of Christ did, is spoken of as what God brought to pass or ordered, and that by which he fulfilled his own word.

In Rev. xvii. 17, the agreeing of the kings of the earth to give their kingdom to the beast, though it was a very wicked thing in them, is spoken of as a fulfilling of God's Will, and what God had put into their hearts to do. It is manifest that God sometimes permits sin to be committed, and at the same time orders things so, that if he permits the fact, it will come to pass, because, on some accounts, he sees it needful and of importance, that it should come to pass Matth. xviii. 7, "It must needs be, that offences come; but wo to that man by whom the offence cometh." With 1 Cor. xi. 19, "For there must also be heresies among you, that they which are approved may be made manifest among you."

Thus it is certain and demonstrable from the Holy Scriptures, as well as the nature of things, and the principles of Arminians, that God permits sin, and at the same time, so orders things, in his Providence, that it certainly and infallibly will come to pass, in consequence of his permission.

I proceed to observe in the next place,

III. That there is a great difference between God's being concerned thus, by his permission, in an event and act, which, in the inherent subject and agent of it, is sin (though the event will certainly follow on his permission), and his being concerned in it by producing it and exerting the act of sin; or between

* "Grotius, as well as Beza, observes, *prognosis* must here signify decree; and Elsner has shown that it has that signification, in approved Greek writers. And it is certain *ekdotos* signifies one given up into the hands of an enemy." *Dodd. in Loc.*

† "As this passage is not liable to the ambiguities, which some have apprehended in Acts ii. 23, and iv. 28, (which yet seem on the whole to be parallel to it, in their most natural construction), I look upon it as an evident proof, that these things are, in the language of Scripture, said to be determined or decreed (or exactly bounded and marked out by God as the word *orizo* most naturally signifies), which he sees in fact will happen, in consequence of his volitions, without any necessitating agency; as well as those events, of which he is properly the Author." *Dodd. in Loc.*

his being the Orderer of its certain existence, by not hindering it, under certain circumstances, and his being the proper Actor or Author of it, by a positive agency or efficiency. And this, notwithstanding what Dr. Whitby offers about a saying of philosophers, that *causa deficiens, in rebus necessariis, ad causam per se efficientem reducenda est.* As there is a vast difference between the sun's being the cause of the lightsomeness and warmth of the atmosphere, and brightness of gold and diamonds, by its presence and positive influence; and its being the occasion of darkness and frost, in the night, by its motion, whereby it descends below the horizon The motion of the sun is the occasion of the latter kind of events; but it is not the proper cause, efficient or producer of them; though they are necessarily consequent on that motion under such circumstances; no more is any action of the Divine Being the cause of the evil of men's Wills. If the sun were the proper cause of cold and darkness, it would be the fountain of these things, as it is the fountain of light and heat; and then something might be argued from the nature of cold and darkness, to a likeness of nature in the sun; and it might be justly inferred, that the sun itself is dark and cold, and that its beams are black and frosty. But from its being the cause no otherwise than by its departure, no such thing can be inferred, but the contrary; it may justly be argued, that the sun is a bright and hot body, if cold and darkness are found to be the consequences of its withdrawment; and the more constantly and necessarily these effects are connected with, and confined to its absence, the more strongly does it argue the sun to be the fountain of light and heat. So, inasmuch as sin is not the fruit of any positive agency or influence of the Most High, but, on the contrary, arises from the withholding of his action and energy, and, under certain circumstances, necessarily follows on the want of his influence; this is no argument that he is sinful, or his operation evil, or has any thing of the nature of evil, but, on the contrary, that He and his agency are altogether good and holy, and that He is the fountain of all holiness. It would be strange arguing, indeed, because men never commit sin, but only when God leaves them to themselves, and necessarily sin, when he does so, that therefore their sin is not from themselves but from God; and so, that God must be a sinful Being; as strange as it would be to argue, because it is always dark when the sun is gone, and never dark when the sun is present, that therefore all darkness is from the sun, and that his disk and beams must needs be black.

IV. It properly belongs to the Supreme and Absolute Governor of the universe, to order all important events within his dominion, by his wisdom; but the events in the moral world are of the most important kind, such as the moral actions of intelligent creatures, and their consequences.

These events will be ordered by something. They will either be disposed by wisdom, or they will be disposed by chance; that is, they will be disposed by blind and undesigning causes, if that were possible, and could be called a disposal. Is it not better, that the good and evil which happens in God's world, should be ordered, regulated, bounded and determined by the good pleasure of an infinitely wise Being, who perfectly comprehends within his understanding and constant view, the universality of things, in all their extent and duration, and sees all the influence of every event, with respect to every individual thing and circumstance, throughout the grand system, and the whole of the eternal series of consequences; than to leave these things to fall out by chance, and to be determined by those causes which have no understanding or aim? Doubtless, in these important events, there is a better and a worse, as to the time, subject, place, manner and circumstances of their coming to pass, with regard to their influence or the state and course of things. And if there be

it is certainly best that they should be determined to that time, place, &c., which is best. And therefore it is in its own nature fit, that wisdom, and not chance, should order these things. So that it belongs to the Being who is the possessor of Infinite Wisdom, and is the Creator and Owner of the whole system of created existences, and has the care of all; I say, it belongs to him to take care of this matter; and he would not do what is proper for him, if he should neglect it. And it is so far from being unholy in him to undertake this affair, that it would rather have been unholy to neglect it, as it would have been a neglecting what fitly appertains to him; and so it would have been a very unfit and unsuitable neglect.

Therefore the sovereignty of God doubtless extends to this matter; especially considering, that if it should be supposed to be otherwise, and God should leave men's volitions, and all moral events, to the determination and disposition of blind and unmeaning causes, or they should be left to happen perfectly without a cause; this would be no more consistent with liberty, in any notion of it, and particularly not in the Arminian notion of it, than if these events were subject to the disposal of Divine Providence, and the Will of man were determined by circumstances which are ordered and disposed by Divine Wisdom; as appears by what has been already observed. But it is evident, that such a providential disposing and determining men's moral actions, though it infers a moral necessity of those actions, yet it does not in the least infringe the real liberty of mankind; the only liberty that common sense teaches to be necessary to moral agency, which, as has been demonstrated, is not inconsistent with such necessity.

On the whole, it is manifest, that God may be, in the manner which has been described, the Orderer and Disposer of that event, which, in the inherent subject and agent, is moral evil; and yet His so doing may be no moral evil. He may will the disposal of such an event, and its coming to pass for good ends, and his Will not be an immoral or sinful Will, but a perfectly holy Will. And he may actually, in his Providence, so dispose and permit things, that the event may be certainly and infallibly connected with such disposal and permission, and his act therein not be an immoral or unholy, but a perfectly holy act. Sin may be an evil thing, and yet that there should be such a disposal and permission, as that it should come to pass, may be a good thing. This is no contradiction or inconsistence. Joseph's brethren selling him into Egypt, consider it only as it was acted by them, and with respect to their views and aims, which were evil, was a very bad thing; but it was a good thing, as it was an event of God's ordering, and considered with respect to his views and aims, which were good. Gen. l. 20, "As for you, ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto good." So the crucifixion of Christ, if we consider only those things which belong to the event as it proceeded from his murderers, and are comprehended within the compass of the affair considered as their act, their principles, dispositions, views and aims; so it was one of the most heinous things that ever was done, in many respects the most horrid of all acts: but consider it, as it was willed and ordered of God, in the extent of his designs and views, it was the most admirable and glorious of all events, and God's willing the event, was the most holy volition of God that ever was made known to men, and God's act in ordering it was a divine act, which, above all others, manifests the moral excellency of the Divine Being.

The consideration of these things may help us to a sufficient answer to the cavils of Arminians, concerning what has been supposed by many Calvinists, of a distinction between a secret and revealed will of God, and their diversity one

from the other, supposing that the Calvinists herein ascribe inconsistent Wills to the Most High; which is without any foundation. God's secret and revealed Will, or in other words, his disposing and preceptive Will may be diverse, and exercised in dissimilar acts, the one in disapproving and opposing, the other in willing and determining, without any inconsistence. Because, although these dissimilar exercises of the Divine Will may, in some respects, relate to the same things, yet, in strictness, they have different and contrary objects, the one evil, and the other good. Thus, for instance, the crucifixion of Christ was a thing contrary to the revealed or preceptive Will of God, because, as it was viewed and done by his malignant murderers, it was a thing infinitely contrary to the holy nature of God, and so necessarily contrary to the holy inclination of his heart revealed in his law. Yet this does not at all hinder but that the crucifixion of Christ, considered with all those glorious consequences, which were within the view of the Divine Omniscience, might be indeed, and therefore might appear to God to be, a glorious event, and consequently be agreeable to his Will, though this Will may be secret, i. e., not revealed in God's law. And thus considered, the crucifixion of Christ was not evil, but good. If the secret exercises of God's Will were of a kind that is dissimilar, and contrary to his revealed Will, respecting the same, or like objects; if the objects of both were good, or both evil; then, indeed, to ascribe contrary kinds of volition or inclination to God, respecting these objects, would be to ascribe an inconsistent Will to God; but to ascribe to him different and opposite exercises of heart, respecting different objects, and objects contrary one to another, is so far from supposing God's Will to be inconsistent with itself, that it cannot be supposed consistent with itself any other way. For any being to have a Will of choice respecting good, and at the same time a Will of rejection and refusal respecting evil, is to be very consistent; but the contrary, viz., to have the same Will towards these contrary objects, and to choose and love both good and evil, at the same time, is to be very inconsistent.

There is no inconsistence in supposing, that God may hate a thing as it is in itself, and considered simply as evil, and yet that it may be his Will it should come to pass, considering all consequences. I believe, there is no person of good understanding, who will venture to say, he is certain that it is impossible it should be best, taking in the whole compass and extent of existence, and all consequences in the endless series of events, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world.* And if so, it will certainly follow, that an infinitely

* Here are worthy to be observed some passages of a late noted writer, of our nation, that nobody who is acquainted with him, will suspect to be very favorable to Calvinism. "It is difficult," says he, "to handle the necessity of evil in such a manner, as not to stumble such as are not above being alarmed at propositions which have an uncommon sound. But if philosophers will but reflect calmly on the matter, they will find, that consistently with the unlimited power of the Supreme Cause, it may be said, that in the best ordered system, evils must have place." *Turnbull's Principles of Moral Philosophy*, p. 327, 328. He is there speaking of moral evils, as may be seen.

Again the same author, in his second vol., entitled *Christian Philosophy*, p. 35, has these words: "If the Author and Governor of all things be infinitely perfect, then whatever is, is right; of all possible systems he hath chosen the best; and consequently, there is no absolute evil in the universe. This being the case, all the seeming imperfections or evils in it are such only in a partial view; and with respect to the whole system, they are *goods*."

Ibid. p. 37. "Whence then comes evil? is the question that hath, in all ages, been reckoned the *Gordian knot* in philosophy. And indeed, if we own the existence of evil in the world in an absolute sense, we diametrically contradict what hath been just now proved of God. For if there be any evil in the system that is not good in respect to the whole, then is the whole not good, but evil, or at best, very imperfect; and an author must be as his workmanship is: as is the effect, such is the cause. But the solution of this difficulty is at hand: that there is no evil in the universe. What! Are there no pains, no imperfections? Is there no misery, no vice in the world? Or are not these evils? Evils indeed they are; that is, those of one sort are hurtful, and those of the other sort are equally hurtful and abominable; but they are not evil or mischievous with respect to the whole."

Ibid. p. 42. "But He is, at the same time, said to create evil, darkness, confusion, and yet to do no

wise Being, who always chooses what is best, must choose that there should be such a thing. And, if so, then such a choice is not an evil, but a wise and holy choice. And if so, then that Providence which is agreeable to such a choice, is a wise and holy Providence. Men do will sin as sin, and so are the authors and actors of it. They love it as sin, and for evil ends and purposes. God does not will sin as sin, or for the sake of any thing evil; though it be his pleasure so to order things, that, He permitting, sin will come to pass, for the sake of the great good that by his disposal shall be the consequence. His willing to order things so that evil should come to pass, for the sake of the contrary good, is no argument that He does not hate evil, as evil; and if so, then it is no reason why he may not reasonably forbid evil, as evil, and punish it as such.

The Arminians themselves must be obliged, whether they will or no, to allow a distinction of God's Will, amounting to just the same thing that Calvinists intend by their distinction of a secret and revealed Will. They must allow a distinction of those things which God thinks best should be, considering all circumstances and consequences, and so are agreeable to his disposing Will, and those things which he loves, and are agreeable to his nature, in themselves considered. Who is there that will dare to say, that the hellish pride, malice and cruelty of devils are agreeable to God, and what He likes and approves? And yet, I trust, there is no Christian divine but what will allow, that it is agreeable to God's Will so to order and dispose things concerning them, so to leave them to themselves, and give them up to their own wickedness, that this perfect wickedness should be a necessary consequence. Besure Dr. Whitby's words do plainly suppose and allow it.*

The following things may be laid down as maxims of plain truth, and indisputable evidence.

1. That God is a perfectly happy Being, in the most absolute and highest sense possible.

2. That it will follow from hence, that God is free from every thing that is contrary to happiness, and so, that in strict propriety of speech, there is no such thing as any pain, grief, or trouble in God.

3. When any intelligent being is really crossed and disappointed, and things are contrary to what he truly desires, he is the less pleased or has less pleasure, his pleasure and happiness is diminished, and he suffers what is disagreeable to him, or is the subject of something that is of a nature contrary to joy and happiness, even pain and grief.†

From this last axiom, it follows, that if no distinction is to be admitted between God's hatred of sin, and his Will with respect to the event and existence of sin, as the all-wise Determiner of all events, under the view of all consequences through the whole compass and series of things; I say, then it certainly follows, that the coming to pass of every individual act of sin is truly, all things considered, contrary to his Will, and that his Will is really crossed in it; and

evil, but to be the Author of good only. He is called "the Father of lights, the Author of every perfect and good gift, with whom there is no variableness nor shadow of turning," who "tempteth no man, but giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not." And yet by the prophet Isaias, He is introduced saying of Himself, "I form light, and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil: I, the Lord, do all these things." What is the meaning, the plain language of all this, but that the Lord delighteth in goodness, and, as the Scripture speaks, *evil is his strange work?* He intends and pursues the universal *good* of his creation; and the *evil* which happens, is not permitted for its own sake, or through any pleasure in evil, but because it is requisite to the *greater good* pursued."

* *Whitby on the Five Points, Edit.* 2, p. 300, 305, 309.

† Certainly it is not less absurd and unreasonable, to talk of God's Will and desires being truly and properly crossed, without his suffering any uneasiness, or any thing grievous or disagreeable, than it is to talk of something that may be called a revealed Will, which may, in some respect, be different from a secret purpose; which purpose may be fulfilled, when no other is opposed.

this in proportion as He hates it. And as God's hatred of sin is infinite, by reason of the infinite contrariety of his holy nature to sin; so his Will is infinitely crossed, in every act of sin that happens. Which is as much as to say, He endures that which is infinitely disagreeable to him, by means of every act of sin that He sees committed. And therefore, as appears by the preceding positions, He endures truly and really, infinite grief or pain from every sin. And so He must be infinitely crossed, and suffer infinite pain, every day, in millions of millions of instances: He must continually be the subject of an immense number of real, and truly infinitely great crosses and vexations. Which would be to make him infinitely the most miserable of all beings.

If any objector should say; all that these things amount to, is, that God *may do evil that good may come;* which is justly esteemed immoral and sinful in men; and therefore may be justly esteemed inconsistent with the moral perfections of God; I answer, that for God to dispose and permit evil, in the manner that has been spoken of, is not to do evil that good may come; for it is not to do evil at all.—In order to a thing's being morally evil, there must be one of these things belonging to it: either it must be a thing unfit and unsuitable in its own nature; or it must have a bad tendency; or it must proceed from an evil disposition, and be done for an evil end. But neither of these things can be attributed to God's ordering and permitting such events, as the immoral acts of creatures, for good ends. (1.) It is not unfit in its own nature, that He should do so. For it is in its own nature fit, that infinite wisdom, and not blind chance, should dispose moral good and evil in the world. And it is fit, that the Being who has infinite wisdom, and is the Maker, Owner and Supreme Governor of the world, should take care of that matter. And, therefore, there is no unfitness, or unsuitableness in his doing it. It may be unfit, and so immoral, for any other beings to go about to order this affair; because they are not possessed of a wisdom, that in any manner fits them for it; and, in other respects, they are not fit to be trusted with this affair; nor does it belong to them, they not being the owners and lords of the universe.

We need not be afraid to affirm, that if a wise and good man knew with absolute certainty, it would be best, all things considered, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the world, it would not be contrary to his wisdom and goodness, for him to choose that it should be so. It is no evil desire, to desire good, and to desire that which, all things considered, is best. And it is no unwise choice, to choose that that should be, which it is best should be; and to choose the existence of that thing concerning which this is known, viz., that it is best it should be, and so is known in the whole to be most worthy to be chosen. On the contrary, it would be a plain defect in wisdom and goodness, for him not to choose it. And the reason why he might not order it, if he were able, would not be because he might not desire it, but only the ordering of that matter does not belong to him. But it is no harm for Him who is, by right and in the greatest propriety, the Supreme Orderer of all things, to order every thing in such a manner, as it would be a point of wisdom in Him to choose that they should be ordered. If it would be a plain defect of wisdom and goodness in a Being, not to choose that that should be, which He certainly knows it would, all things considered, be best should be (as was but now observed), then it must be impossible for a Being who has no defect of wisdom and goodness, to do otherwise than choose it should be; and that, for this very reason, because He is perfectly wise and good. And if it be agreeable to perfect wisdom and goodness for him to choose that it should be, and the ordering of all things supremely and perfectly belongs to him, it must be agreeable to infinite wisdom

and goodness, to order that it should be. If the choice is good, the ordering and disposing things according to that choice must also be good. It can be no harm in one to whom it belongs *to do his Will in the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth*, to execute a good volition. If his Will be good, and the object of his Will be, all things considered, good and best, then the choosing or willing it, is not willing evil that good may come. And if so, then his ordering, according to that Will, is not doing evil, that good may come.

2. It is not of a bad tendency, for the Supreme Being thus to order and permit that moral evil to be, which it is best should come to pass. For that it is of good tendency, is the very thing supposed in the point now in question. Christ's crucifixion, though a most horrid fact in them that perpetrated it, was of most glorious tendency as permitted and ordered of God.

3. Nor is there any need of supposing it proceeds from any evil disposition or aim; for by the supposition, what is aimed at is good, and good is the actual issue, in the final result of things.

SECTION X.

Concerning Sin's first Entrance into the World.

THE things, which have already been offered, may serve to obviate or clear many of the objections which might be raised concerning sin's first coming into the world; as though it would follow from the doctrine maintained, that God must be the author of the first sin, through his so disposing things, that it should necessarily follow from his permission, that the sinful act should be committed, &c. I need not therefore, stand to repeat what has been said already, about such a necessity's not proving God to be the author of sin, in any ill sense, or in any such sense as to infringe any liberty of man, concerned in his moral agency, or capacity of blame, guilt and punishment.

But, if it should nevertheless be said, supposing the case so, that God, when he had made man, might so order his circumstances, that from these circumstances, together with his withholding further assistance and divine influence, his sin would infallibly follow, why might not God as well have first made man with a fixed prevailing principle of sin in his heart? I answer,

I. It was meet, if sin did come into existence, and appear in the world, it should arise from the imperfection which properly belongs to a creature, as such, and should appear so to do, that it might appear not to be from God as the efficient or fountain. But this could not have been, if man had been made at first with sin in his heart; nor unless the abiding principle and habit of sin were first introduced by an evil act of the creature. If sin had not arisen from the imperfection of the creature, it would not have been so visible, that it did not arise from God, as the positive cause, and real source of it.—But it would require room that cannot here be allowed, fully to consider all the difficulties which have been started, concerning the first entrance of sin into the world. And therefore,

II. I would observe, that objections against the doctrine that has been laid down, in opposition to the *Arminian* notion of liberty, from these difficulties, are altogether impertinent; because no additional difficulty is incurred, by adhering to a scheme in this manner differing from theirs, and none would be removed or avoided, by agreeing with, and maintaining theirs. Nothing that

the *Arminians* say, about the contingence, or self-determining power of man's will, can serve to explain, with less difficulty, how the first sinful volition of mankind could take place, and man be justly charged with the blame of it. To say, the Will was self-determined, or determined by free choice, in that sinful volition; which is to say, that the first sinful volition was determined by a foregoing sinful volition; is no solution of the difficulty. It is an odd way of solving difficulties, to advance greater, in order to it. To say, two and two make nine; or, that a child begat his father, solves no difficulty: no more does it, to say, the first sinful act of choice was before the first sinful act of choice, and chose and determined it, and brought it to pass. Nor is it any better solution, to say, the first sinful volition chose, determined and produced itself; which is to say, it was before it was. Nor will it go any further towards helping us over the difficulty to say, the first sinful volition arose accidentally, without any cause at all; any more than it will solve that difficult question, *How the world could be made out of nothing?* to say, it came into being out of nothing, without any cause; as has been already observed. And if we should allow that that could be, that the first evil volition should arise by perfect accident, without any cause; it would relieve no difficulty, about God's laying the blame of it to man. For how was man to blame for perfect accident, which had no cause, and which therefore, he (to be sure) was not the cause of, any more than if it came by some external cause?—Such solutions are no better, than if some person, going about to solve some of the strange mathematical paradoxes, about infinitely great and small quantities; as, that some infinitely great quantities are infinitely greater than some other infinitely great quantities; and also that some infinitely small quantities, are infinitely less than others, which yet are infinitely little; in order to a solution, should say, that mankind have been under a mistake, in supposing a greater quantity to exceed a smaller; and that a hundred, multiplied by ten, makes but a single unit.

SECTION XI.

Of a supposed Inconsistence of these Principles with God's moral Character.

The things which have been already observed, may be sufficient to answer most of the objections, and silence the great exclamations of *Arminians* against the *Calvinists*, from the supposed inconsistence of *Calvinistic* principles with the moral perfections of God, as exercised in his government of mankind. The consistence of such a doctrine of necessity as has been maintained, with the fitness and reasonableness of God's commands, promises and threatenings, rewards and punishments, has been particularly considered; the cavils of our opponents, as though our doctrine of necessity made God the author of sin, have been answered; and also their objection against these principles, as inconsistent with God's sincerity, in his counsels, invitations and persuasions, has been already obviated, in what has been observed respecting the consistence of what *Calvinists* suppose, concerning the secret and revealed Will of God: by that it appears, there is no repugnance in supposing it may be the secret Will of God, that his ordination and permission of events should be such, that it shall be a certain consequence, that a thing never will come to pass; which yet it is man's duty to do, and so God's preceptive Will that he should do: and this is the same thing as to say, God may sincerely command and require

him to do it. And if he may be sincere in commanding him, he may, for the same reason, be sincere in counselling, inviting and using persuasions with him to do it. Counsels and invitations are manifestations of God's preceptive Will, or of what God loves, and what is in itself, and as man's act, agreeable to his heart; and not of his disposing Will, and what he chooses as a part of his own infinite scheme of things. It has been particularly shown, Part III. Sect. IV. that such a necessity as has been maintained, is not inconsistent with the propriety and fitness of divine commands; and for the same reason, not inconsistent with the sincerity of invitations and counsels, in the Corollary at the end of the Section. Yea, it hath been shown, Part III. Sect. VII. Corol. 1, that this objection of *Arminians*; concerning the sincerity and use of divine exhortations, invitations and counsels, is demonstrably against themselves.

Notwithstanding, I would further observe, that the difficulty of reconciling the sincerity of counsels, invitations and persuasions with such an antecedent known fixedness of all events, as has been supposed, is not peculiar to this scheme, as distinguished from that of the generality of *Arminians*, which acknowledges the absolute foreknowledge of God; and therefore, it would be unreasonably brought as an objection against my differing from them. The main seeming difficulty in the case is this; that God, in counselling, inviting and persuading, makes a show of aiming at, seeking and using endeavors for the thing exhorted and persuaded to; whereas, it is impossible for any intelligent being truly to seek, or use endeavors for a thing, which he at the same time knows, most perfectly, will not come to pass; and that it is absurd to suppose, he makes the obtaining of a thing his end, in his calls and counsels, which he, at the same time, infallibly knows will not be obtained by these means. Now, if God knows this, in the utmost certainty and perfection, the way by which he comes by this knowledge makes no difference. If he knows it is by the necessity which he sees in things, or by some other means; it alters not the case. But it is in effect allowed by *Arminians* themselves, that God's inviting and persuading men to do things, which he at the same time, certainly knows will not be done, is no evidence of insincerity; because they allow, that God has a certain foreknowledge of all men's sinful actions and omissions. And as this is thus implicitly allowed by most *Arminians*, so all that pretend to own the Scriptures to be the word of God, must be constrained to allow it.—God commanded and counselled Pharaoh to let his people go, and used arguments and persuasions to induce him to it; he laid before him arguments taken from his infinite greatness and almighty power, (Exod. vii. 16,) and forewarned him of the fatal consequences of his refusal, from time to time. (Chap. viii. 1, 2, 20, 21, Chap. ix. 1—5, 13—17, and x. 3, 6.) He commanded Moses, and the elders of Israel, to go and beseech Pharaoh to let the people go; and at the same time told them, he knew surely that he would not comply with it. Exod. iii. 18, 19, "And thou shalt come, thou and the elders of Israel, unto the king of Egypt, and you shall say unto him; the Lord God of the Hebrews hath met with us; and now let us go, we beseech thee, three days' journey into the wilderness, that we may sacrifice unto the Lord our God; and, I am sure, that the king of Egypt will not let you go." So our blessed Saviour, the evening wherein he was betrayed, knew that Peter would shamefully deny him, before the morning; for he declares it to him with asseverations, to show the certainty of it; and tells the disciples, that all of them should be offended because of him that night; Matth. xxvi. 31—35, Luke xxii. 31—34, John xiii. 38, John xvi. 32. And yet it was their duty to avoid these things; they were very sinful things, which God had forbidden, and which it was their duty

to watch and pray against; and they were obliged to do so from the counsels and persuasions Christ used with them, at that very time, so to do; Matt. xxvi. 41, "Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation." So that whatever difficulty there can be in this matter, it can be no objection against any principles which have been maintained in opposition to the principles of *Arminians;* nor does it any more concern me to remove the difficulty, than it does them, or indeed all, that call themselves Christians, and acknowledge the divine authority of the Scriptures.—Nevertheless, this matter may possibly (God allowing) be more particularly and largely considered, in some future discourse, on the doctrine of predestination.

But I would here observe, that however the defenders of that notion of liberty of Will, which I have opposed, exclaim against the doctrine of Calvinists, as tending to bring men into doubts concerning the moral perfections of God; it is their scheme, and not the scheme of Calvinists, that indeed is justly chargeable with this. For it is one of the most fundamental points of their scheme of things, that a freedom of Will, consisting in self-determination, without all necessity, is essential to moral agency. This is the same thing as to say, that such a determination of the will, without all necessity, must be in all intelligent beings, in those things, wherein they are moral agents, or in their moral acts; and from this it will follow, that God's Will is not necessarily determined, in any thing he does, as a moral agent, or in any of his acts that are of a moral nature. So that in all things, wherein he acts holily, justly and truly, he does not act necessarily; or his Will is not necessarily determined, to act holily and justly; because, if it were necessarily determined, he would not be a moral agent in thus acting. His Will would be attended with necessity, which, they say, is inconsistent with moral agency. "He can act no otherwise: he is at no liberty in the affair; he is determined by unavoidable, invincible necessity; therefore such agency is no moral agency, yea, no agency at all, properly speaking. A necessary agent is no agent; he being passive, and subject to necessity, what he does is no act of his, but an effect of a necessity prior to any act of his."

This is agreeable to their manner of arguing. Now then what is become of all our proof of the moral perfections of God? How can we prove, that God certainly will, in any one instance, do that which is just and holy; seeing his Will is determined in the matter by no necessity? We have no other way of proving that any thing certainly will be, but only by the necessity of the event. Where we can see no necessity but that the thing may be, or may not be, there we are unavoidably left at a loss. We have no other way properly and truly to demonstrate the moral perfections of God, but the way that Mr. Chubb proves them in p. 252, 261, 262, 263, of his Tracts, viz., that God must necessarily perfectly know, what is most worthy and valuable in itself, which, in the nature of things, is best and fittest to be done. And as this is most eligible in itself, He, being omniscient, must see it to be so: and being both omniscient and self-sufficient, cannot have any temptation to reject it, and so must necessarily will that which is best. And thus, by this necessity of the determination of God's Will to what is good and best, we demonstrably establish God's moral character.

COROL. From things which have been observed, it appears that most of the arguments from Scripture which Arminians make use of to support their scheme, are no other than begging the question. For in these arguments, they determine, in the first place, that without such a freedom of Will as they hold, men cannot be proper moral agents, nor the subjects of command, counsel, persuasion, invitation, promises, threatenings, expostulations, rewards and punish

ments: and that without such freedom it is to no purpose for men to take any care, or use any diligence, endeavors or means, in order to their avoiding sin, or becoming holy, escaping punishment or obtaining happiness; and having supposed these things, which are grand things in question in the debate, then they heap up Scriptures, containing commands, counsels, calls, warnings, persuasions, expostulations, promises and threatenings; (as doubtless they may find enough such; the Bible is confessedly full of them, from the beginning to the end;) and then they glory, how full the Scripture is on their side, how many more texts there are that evidently favor their scheme, than such as seem to favor the contrary. But let them first make manifest the things in question, which they suppose and take for granted, and show them to be consistent with themselves, and produce clear evidence of their truth, and they have gained their point, as all will confess, without bringing one Scripture. For none denies, that there are commands, counsels, promises, threatenings, &c., in the Bible. But unless they do these things, their multiplying such texts of Scripture is insignificant and vain.

It may further be observed, that such Scriptures as they bring are really against them, and not for them. As it has been demonstrated, that it is their scheme, and not ours, that is inconsistent with the use of motives and persuasives, or any moral means whatsoever, to induce men to the practice of virtue, or abstaining from wickedness: their principles, and not ours, are repugnant to moral agency, and inconsistent with moral government, with law or precept, with the nature of virtue or vice, reward or punishment, and with every thing whatsoever of a moral nature, either on the part of the moral governor, or in the state, actions or conduct of the subject.

SECTION XII.

Of a supposed Tendency of these principles to Atheism and Licentiousness.

If any object against what has been maintained, that it tends to *Atheism*, I know not on what grounds such an objection can be raised, unless it be that some Atheists have held a doctrine of necessity which they suppose to be like this. But if it be so, I am persuaded the Arminians would not look upon it just, that their notion of freedom and contingence should be charged with a tendency to all the errors that ever any embraced, who have held such opinions. The Stoic philosophers, whom the Calvinists are charged with agreeing with, were no Atheists, but the greatest Theists and nearest akin to Christians in their opinions concerning the unity and the perfections of the Godhead, of all the heathen philosophers. And Epicurus, that chief Father of Atheism, maintained no such doctrine of necessity, but was the greatest maintainer of contingence.

The doctrine of necessity, which supposes a necessary connection of all events, on some antecedent ground and reason of their existence, is the only medium we have to prove the being of God. And the contrary doctrine of contingence, even as maintained by Arminians, (which certainly implies or infers, that events may come into existence, or begin to be, without dependence on any thing foregoing, as their cause, ground or reason,) takes away all proof of the being of God; which proof is summarily expressed by the apostle, in Rom. i. 20. And this is a tendency to Atheism with a witness. So that, indeed, it is the doctrine of Arminians, and not of the Calvinists, that is justly charged

with a tendency to Atheism; it being built on a foundation that is the utter subversion of every demonstrative argument for the proof of a Deity, as has been shown, Part II. Sec. 3.

And whereas it has often been said, that the Calvinistic doctrine of necessity saps the foundations of all religion and virtue, and tends to the greatest licentiousness of practice: this objection is built on the pretence, that our doctrine renders vain all means and endeavors, in order to be virtuous and religious. Which pretence has been already particularly considered in the 5th Section of this Part; where it has been demonstrated, that this doctrine has no such tendency; but that such a tendency is truly to be charged on the contrary doctrine; inasmuch as the notion of contingence, which their doctrine implies, in its certain consequences, overthrows all connection, in every degree, between endeavor and event, means and end.

And besides, if many other things which have been observed to belong to the Arminian doctrine, or to be plain consequences of it, be considered, there will appear just reason to suppose that it is that which must rather tend to licentiousness. Their doctrine excuses all evil inclinations, which men find to be natural; because in such inclinations, they are not self-determined, as such inclinations are not owing to any choice or determination of their own Wills. Which leads men wholly to justify themselves in all their wicked actions, so far as natural inclination has a hand in determining their Wills to the commission of them. Yea, these notions, which suppose moral necessity and inability to be inconsistent with blame or moral obligation, will directly lead men to justify the vilest acts and practices, from the strength of their wicked inclinations of all sorts; strong inclinations inducing a moral necessity; yea to excuse every degree of evil inclination, so far as this has evidently prevailed, and been the thing which has determined their Wills; because, so far as antecedent inclination determined the Will, so far the Will was without liberty of indifference and self-determination. Which, at last, will come to this, that men will justify themselves in all the wickedness they commit. It has been observed already, that this scheme of things does exceedingly diminish the guilt of sin, and the difference between the greatest and smallest offences;* and if it be pursued in its consequences, it leaves room for no such thing, as either virtue or vice, blame or praise in the world.† And then again how naturally does this notion of the sovereign, self-determining power of the Will, in all things, virtuous or vicious, and whatsoever deserves either reward or punishment, tend to encourage men to put off the work of religion and virtue, and turning from sin to God; it being that which they have a sovereign power to determine themselves to, just when they please; or if not, they are wholly excusable in going on in sin, because of their inability to do any other.

If it should be said, that the tendency of this doctrine of necessity to licentiousness, appears by the improvement many at this day actually make of it, to justify themselves in their dissolute courses; I will not deny that some men do unreasonably abuse this doctrine, as they do many other things which are true and excellent in their own nature; but I deny that this proves the doctrine itself has any tendency to licentiousness. I think the tendency of doctrines, by what now apppears in the world, and in our nation in particular, may much more justly be argued from the general effect which has been seen to attend the prevailing of the principles of Arminians and the contrary principles; as

* Part III. Sect. 6. † Part III. Sect. 6. Ibid. Sect. 7. Part IV. Sect. 1. Part III. Sect. 3. Corol. after the first Head.

both have had their turn of general prevalence in our nation. If it be indeed, as is pretended, that Calvinistic doctrines undermine the very foundation of all religion and morality, and enervate and disannul all rational motives to holy and virtuous practice; and that the contrary doctrines give the inducements to virtue and goodness their proper force, and exhibit religion in a rational light, tending to recommend it to the reason of mankind, and enforce it in a manner that is agreeable to their natural notions of things: I say, if it be thus, it is remarkable that virtue and religious practice should prevail most, when the former doctrines, so inconsistent with it, prevailed almost universally; and that ever since the latter doctrines, so happily agreeing with it, and of so proper and excellent a tendency to promote it, have been gradually prevailing, vice, profaneness, luxury and wickedness of all sorts, and contempt of all religion, and of every kind of seriousness and strictness of conversation, should proportionably prevail; and that these things should thus accompany one another, and rise and prevail one with another, now for a whole age together. It is remarkable that this happy remedy (discovered by the free inquiries and superior sense and wisdom of this age) against the pernicious effects of Calvinism, so inconsistent with religion, and tending so much to banish all virtue from the earth, should, on so long a trial, be attended with no good effect, but that the consequence should be the reverse of amendment; that in proportion as the remedy takes place, and is thoroughly applied, so the disease should prevail, and the very same dismal effect take place, to the highest degree, which Calvinistic doctrines are supposed to have so great a tendency to, even the banishing of religion and virtue, and the prevailing of unbounded licentiousness of manners. If these things are truly so, they are very remarkable, and matter of very curious speculation.

SECTION XIII.

Concerning that Objection against the reasoning, by which the Calvinistic doctrine is supported, that it is metaphysical and abstruse.

It has often been objected against the defenders of Calvinistic principles, that in their reasonings they run into nice, scholastic distinctions, and abstruse, metaphysical subtilties, and set these in opposition to common sense. And it is possible, that after the former manner it may be alleged against the reasoning by which I have endeavored to confute the Arminian scheme of liberty and moral agency, that it is very abstracted and metaphysical. Concerning this I would observe the following things.

I. If that be made an objection against the foregoing reasoning, that it is metaphysical, or may properly be reduced to the science of metaphysics, it is a very impertinent objection; whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any dispute or controversy. If the reasoning be good, it is as frivolous to inquire what science it is properly reduced to, as what language it is delivered in; and for a man to go about to confute the arguments of his opponent, by telling him his arguments are metaphysical, would be as weak as to tell him his arguments could not be substantial, because they were written in French or Latin. The question is not, whether what is said be metaphysics, logic, or mathematics, Latin, French, English or *Mohawk?* But whether the reasoning be good, and the arguments truly conclusive? The foregoing arguments are no more met

aphysical, than those which we use against the Papists, to disprove their doctrine of transubstantiation; alleging it is inconsistent with the notion of corporeal identity that it should be in ten thousand places at the same time. It is by metaphysical arguments only we are able to prove that the rational soul is not corporeal; that lead or sand cannot think; that thoughts are not square or round, or do not weigh a pound. The arguments by which we prove the being of God, if handled closely and distinctly, so as to show their clear and demonstrative evidence, must be metaphysically treated. It is by metaphysics only that we can demonstrate, that God is not limited to a place, or is not mutable; that he is not ignorant or forgetful; that it is impossible for him to lie, or be unjust, and that there is one God only, and not hundreds or thousands. And, indeed, we have no strict demonstration of any thing, excepting mathematical truths, but by metaphysics. We can have no proof that is properly demonstrative, of any one proposition, relating to the being and nature of God, his creation of the world, the dependence of all things on him, the nature of bodies or spirits, the nature of our own souls, or any of the great truths of morality and natural religion, but what is metaphysical. I am willing my arguments should be brought to the test of the strictest and justest reason, and that a clear, distinct and determinate meaning of the terms I use, should be insisted on; but let not the whole be rejected, as if all were confuted, by fixing on it the epithet, *metaphysical*.

II. If the reasoning which has been made use of, be in some sense metaphysical, it will not follow that therefore it must needs be abstruse, unintelligible, and akin to the jargon of the schools. I humbly conceive the foregoing reasoning, at least as to those things which are most material belonging to it, depends on no abstruse definitions or distinctions, or terms without a meaning, or of very ambiguous and undetermined signification, or any points of such abstraction and subtilty, as tends to involve the attentive understanding in clouds and darkness. There is no high degree of refinement and abstruse speculation, in determining that a thing is not before it is, and so cannot be the cause of itself; or that the first act of free choice, has not another act of free choice going before that, to excite or direct it, or in determining, that no choice is made, while the mind remains in a state of absolute indifference; that preference and equilibrium never coexist; and that therefore no choice is made in a state of liberty, consisting in indifference; and that so far as the Will is determined by motives, exhibited and operating previous to the act of the Will, so far it is not determined by the act of the Will itself; that nothing can begin to be, which before was not, without a cause, or some antecedent ground or reason, why it then begins to be; that effects depend on their causes, and are connected with them; that virtue is not the worse, nor sin the better for the strength of inclination with which it is practised, and the difficulty which thence arises of doing otherwise; that when it is already infallibly known, that the thing will be, it is not a thing contingent whether it will ever be or no; or that it can be truly said, notwithstanding, that it is not necessary it should be, but it either may be, or may not be. And the like might be observed of many other things which belong to the foregoing reasoning.

If any shall still stand to it, that the foregoing reasoning is nothing but metaphysical sophistry; and that it must be so, that the seeming force of the arguments all depends on some fallacy and wile that is hid in the obscurity which always attends a great degree of metaphysical abstraction and refinement; and shall be ready to say, "Here is indeed something that tends to confound the mind, but not to satisfy it; for, who can ever be truly satisfied in it, that men

are fitly blamed or commended, punished or rewarded for those volitions which are not from themselves, and of whose existence they are not the causes? Men may refine as much as they please, and advance their abstract notions, and make out a thousand seeming contradictions, to puzzle our understandings; yet there can be no satisfaction in such doctrine as this; the natural sense of the mind of man will always resist it."* I humbly conceive, that such an objector, if he has capacity and humility and calmness of spirit, and sufficient impartiality, thoroughly to examine himself, will find that he knows not really what he would be at; and that indeed, his difficulty is nothing but a mere prejudice, from an inadvertent customary use of words, in a meaning that is not clearly understood, nor carefully reflected upon. Let the objector reflect again, if he has candor and patience enough, and does not scorn to be at the trouble of close attention in the affair. He would have a man's volition be from himself. Let it be from himself, most primarily and originally of any way conceivable; that is, from his own choice: how will that help the matter, as to his being justly blamed or praised, unless that choice itself be blame or praiseworthy? And how is the choice itself (an ill choice, for instance) blameworthy, according to these principles, unless that be from himself too, in the same manner; that is, from his own choice? But the original and first determining choice in the affair is not from his choice; his choice is not the cause of it. And if it be from himself some other way, and not from his choice, surely that will not help the matter: if it be not from himself of choice, then it is not from himself voluntarily; and if so, he is surely no more to blame, than if it were not from himself at all. It is a vanity, to pretend it is a sufficient answer to this, to say, that it is nothing but metaphysical refinement and subtilty, and so attended with obscurity and uncertainty.

If it be the natural sense of our minds, that what is blameworthy in a man must be from himself, then it doubtless is also, that it must be from something

* A certain noted author of the present age says, the arguments for necessity are nothing but *quibbling, or logomachy, using words without a meaning, or begging the question.* I do not know what kind of necessity any authors, he may have reference to, are advocates for; or whether they have managed their arguments well, or ill. As to the arguments I have made use of, if they are *quibbles* they may be shown to be so: such knots are capable of being untied, and the trick and cheat may be detected and plainly laid open. If this be fairly done, with respect to the grounds and reasons I have relied upon, I shall have just occasion, for the future, to be silent, if not to be ashamed of my argumentations. I am willing my proofs should be thoroughly examined; and if there be nothing but *begging the question*, or mere *logomachy*, or dispute of words, let it be made manifest, and shown how the seeming strength of the argument depends on my using words without a meaning, or arises from the ambiguity of terms, or my making use of words in an indeterminate and unsteady manner; and that the weight of my reasons rests mainly on such a foundation: and then, I shall either be ready to retract what I have urged, and thank the man that has done the kind part, or shall be justly exposed for my obstinacy.

The same author is abundant in appealing, in this affair, from what he calls *logomachy and sophistry*, to *experience*. A person can experience only what passes in his own mind. But yet, as we may well suppose, that all men have the same human faculties; so a man may well argue, from his own experience to that of others, in things that show the nature of those faculties, and the manner of their operation. But then one has as good right to allege his experience, as another. As to my own experience, I find, that in innumerable things I can do as I will; that the motions of my body, in many respects, instantaneously follow the acts of my Will concerning those motions; and that my Will has some command of my thoughts; and that the acts of my Will are my own, i. e., that they are acts of my Will, the volitions of my own mind; or, in other words, that what I will, I will. Which, I presume, is the sum of what others experience in this affair. But as to finding by experience, that my Will is originally determined by itself; or that, my Will first choosing what volition there shall be, the chosen volition accordingly follows; and that this is the first rise of the determination of my Will in any affair; or that any volition rises in my mind contingently; I declare, I know nothing in myself, by experience, of this nature; and nothing that ever I experienced, carries the least appearance or shadow of any such thing, or gives me any more reason to suppose or suspect any such thing, than to suppose that my volitions existed twenty years before they existed. It is true, I find myself possessed of my volitions, before I can see the effectual power of any cause to produce them (for the power and efficacy of the cause is not seen but by the effect), and this, for aught I know, may make some imagine, that volition has no cause, or that it produces itself. But I have no more reason from hence to determine any such thing, than I have to determine that I gave myself my own being, or that I came into being accidentally without a cause, because I first found myself possessed of being, before I had knowledge of a cause of my being.

bad in himself, a bad choice, or bad disposition. But then our natural sense is, that this bad choice or disposition is evil in itself, and the man blameworthy for it, on its own account, without taking into our notion of its blameworthiness, another bad choice, or disposition going before this, from whence this arises; for that is a ridiculous absurdity, running us into an immediate contradiction, which our natural sense of blameworthiness has nothing to do with, and never comes into the mind, nor is supposed in the judgment we naturally make of the affair. As was demonstrated before, natural sense does not place the moral evil of volitions and dispositions in the cause of them, but the nature of them. An evil thing's being FROM a man, or from something antecedent in him, is not essential to the original notion we have of blameworthiness; but it is its being the choice of the heart; as appears by this, that if a thing be from us, and not from our choice, it has not the nature of blameworthiness or ill desert, according to our natural sense. When a thing is FROM a man, in that sense, that it is from his Will or choice, he is to blame for it, because his Will is IN IT: so far as the Will is IN IT, blame is IN IT, and no further. Neither do we go any further in our notion of blame, to inquire whether the bad Will be from a bad Will: there is no consideration of the original of that bad Will; because, according to our natural apprehension, blame *originally consists in it.* Therefore a thing's being from a man, is a secondary consideration, in the notion of blame or ill desert. Because those things, in our *external* actions, are most properly said to be from us, which are from our choice; and no other *external* actions, but those that are *from us*, as because we are in them, i. e., our Wills are in them; not so much because they are from some *property* of ours, as because they are our *properties.*

However, all these external actions being truly *from us*, as their cause, and we being so used, in ordinary speech, and in the common affairs of life, to speak of men's actions and conduct that we see, and that affect human society, as deserving ill or well, as worthy of blame or praise; hence it is come to pass, that philosophers have incautiously taken all their measures of good and evil, praise and blame, from the dictates of common sense, about these *overt acts* of men: to the running of every thing into the most lamentable and dreadful confusion.

And, therefore, I observe,

III. It is so far from being true (whatever may be pretended) that the proof of the doctrine which has been maintained, depends on certain abstruse, unintelligible, metaphysical terms and notions; and that the *Arminian* scheme, without needing such clouds and darkness for its defence, is supported by the plain dictates of common sense; that the very reverse is most certainly true, and that to a great degree. It is fact, that they, and not we, have confounded things with metaphysical, unintelligible notions and phrases; and have drawn them from the light of plain truth, into the gross darkness of abstruse, metaphysical propositions, and words without a meaning. Their pretended demonstrations depend very much on such unintelligible, metaphysical phrases, as *self-determination*, and *sovereignty of the Will;* and the metaphysical sense they put on such terms, as *necessity, contingency, action, agency*, &c., quite diverse from their meaning as used in common speech; and which, as they use them, are without any consistent meaning or any manner of distinct, consistent ideas; as far from it as any of the abstruse terms and perplexed phrases of the peripatetic philosophers or the most unintelligible jargon of the schools, or the cant of the wildest fanatics. Yea, we may be bold to say, these metaphysical terms, on which they build so much, are what they use without knowing what they

mean themselves; they are pure metaphysical sounds, without any ideas whatsoever in their minds to answer them; inasmuch as it has been demonstrated, that there cannot be any notion in the mind consistent with these expressions, as they pretend to explain them; because their explanations destroy themselves. No such notions as imply self-contradiction, and self-abolition, and this a great many ways, can subsist in the mind; as there can be no idea of a whole which is less than any of its parts, or of solid extension without dimensions, or of an effect which is before its cause.—*Arminians* improve these terms, as terms of art, and in their metaphysical meaning, to advance and establish those things which are contrary to common sense, in a high degree. Thus, instead of the plain, vulgar notion of liberty, which all mankind, in every part of the face of the earth, and in all ages, have; consisting in opportunity to do as one pleases; they have introduced a new, strange liberty, consisting in indifference, contingence, and self-determination; by which they involve themselves and others in great obscurity, and manifold gross inconsistence. So, instead of placing virtue and vice, as common sense places them very much, in fixed bias and inclination, and greater virtue and vice in stronger and more established inclination; these, through their refinings and abstruse notions, suppose a liberty consisting in indifference, to be essential to all virtue and vice. So they have reasoned themselves, not by metaphysical distinctions, but metaphysical confusion, into many principles about moral agency, blame, praise, reward and punishment, which are, as has been shown, exceeding contrary to the common sense of mankind; and perhaps to their own sense, which governs them in common life.

CONCLUSION.

WHETHER the things which have been alleged, are liable to any tolerable answer in the way of calm, intelligible and strict reasoning, I must leave others to judge; but I am sensible they are liable to one sort of answer. It is not unlikely that some, who value themselves on the supposed rational and generous principles of the modern, fashionable divinity, will have their indignation and disdain raised at the sight of this discourse, and on perceiving what things are pretended to be proved in it. And if they think it worthy of being read, or of so much notice as to say much about it, they may probably renew the usual exclamations, with additional vehemence and contempt, about the *fate of the heathen*, Hobbes' *necessity*, and *making men mere machines;* accumulating the terrible epithets of *fatal*, *unfrustrable*, *inevitable*, *irresistible*, &c., and it may be, with the addition of *horrid* and *blasphemous;* and perhaps much skill may be used to set forth things, which have been said, in colors which shall be shocking to the imaginations, and moving to the passions of those, who have either too little capacity, or too much confidence of the opinions they have imbibed, and contempt of the contrary, to try the matter by any serious and circumspect examination.* Or difficulties may be started and insisted on, which do not belong to the controversy; because, let them be more or less real, and hard to be resolved, they are not what are owing to any thing distinguishing of this scheme from that of the Arminians, and would not be removed nor diminished by renouncing the former, and adhering to the latter. Or some particular things may be picked out, which they may think will sound harshest in the ears of the generality; and these may be glossed and descanted on, with tart and contemptuous words; and from thence, the whole treated with triumph and insult.

It is easy to see, how the decision of most of the points in controversy, between *Calvinists* and *Arminians*, depends on the determination of this grand article concerning *the freedom of the Will, requisite to moral agency;* and that by clearing and establishing the *Calvinistic* doctrine in this point, the chief arguments are obviated, by which *Arminian* doctrines in general are supported, and the contrary doctrines demonstratively confirmed. Hereby it becomes manifest, that God's moral government over mankind, his treating them as moral agents, making them the objects of his commands, counsels, calls, warnings, expostulations, promises, threatenings, rewards and punishments, is not inconsistent with a *determining disposal* of all events, of every kind, throughout the

* A writer of the present age, whom I have several times had occasion to mention, speaks once and again of those who hold the doctrine of *necessity*, as scarcely worthy of the name of *philosophers*.—I do not know, whether he has respect to any particular notion of necessity, that some may have maintained; and, if so what doctrine of necessity it is that he means.—Whether I am worthy of the name of a philosopher, or not, would be a question little to the present purpose. If any, and ever so many, should deny it, I should not think it worth the while to enter into a dispute on that question. Though at the same time I might expect some better answer should be given to the arguments brought for the truth of the doctrine I maintain; and I might further reasonably desire, that it might be considered, whether it does not become those, who are truly worthy of the name of philosophers, to be sensible, that there is a difference between *argument* and *contempt*; yea, and a difference between the contemptibleness of the *person* that argues, and the inconclusiveness of the *arguments* he offers.

universe, in his *providence;* either by positive efficiency, or permission. Indeed, such an *universal, determining Providence* infers some kind of necessity of all events, such a necessity as implies an infallible, previous fixedness of the futurity of the event; but no other necessity of moral events, or volitions of intelligent agents, is needful in order to this, than *moral necessity;* which does as much ascertain the futurity of the event, as any other necessity. But, as has been demonstrated, such a necessity is not at all repugnant to moral agency, and a reasonable use of commands, calls, rewards, punishments, &c. Yea, not only are objections of this kind against the doctrine of an universal *determining Providence*, removed by what has been said, but the truth of such a doctrine is demonstrated.

As it has been demonstrated, that the futurity of all future events is established by previous necessity, either natural or moral; so it is manifest that the Sovereign Creator and Disposer of the world has ordered this necessity, by ordering his own conduct, either in designedly acting or forbearing to act. For, as the being of the world is from God, so the circumstances in which it had its being at first, both negative and positive, must be ordered by him, in one of these ways; and all the necessary consequences of these circumstances, must be ordered by him. And God's active and positive interpositions, after the world was created, and the consequence of these interpositions; also every instance of his forbearing to interpose, and the sure consequences of this forbearance, must all be determined according to his pleasure. And therefore every event, which is the consequence of any thing whatsoever, or that is connected with any foregoing thing or circumstance, either positive or negative, as the ground or reason of its existence, must be ordered of God; either by a designed efficiency and interposition, or a designed forbearing to operate or interpose. But, as has been proved, all events whatsoever are necessarily connected with something foregoing, either positive or negative, which is the ground of their existence: it follows, therefore, that the whole series of events is thus connected with something in the state of things, either positive or negative, which is original in the series; i. e. something which is connected with nothing preceding that, but God's own immediate conduct, either his acting or forbearing to act. From whence it follows, that as God designedly orders his own conduct, and its connected consequences, it must necessarily be, that he designedly orders all things.

The things which have been said, obviate some of the chief objections of Arminians against the Calvinistic doctrine of the *total depravity and corruption of man's nature*, whereby his heart is wholly under the power of sin, and he is utterly unable, without the interposition of sovereign grace, savingly to love God, believe in Christ, or do any thing that is truly good and acceptable in God's sight. For the main objection against this doctrine is, that it is inconsistent with the freedom of man's Will, consisting in indifference and self-determining power; because it supposes man to be under a necessity of sinning, and that God requires things of him in order to his avoiding eternal damnation, which he is unable to do; and that this doctrine is wholly inconsistent with the sincerity of counsels, invitations, &c. Now, this doctrine supposes *no other necessity* of sinning, than a moral necessity; which, as has been shown, does not at all excuse sin; and supposes *no other inability* to obey any command, or perform any duty, even the most spiritual and exalted, but a moral inability, which, as has been proved, does not excuse persons in the nonperformance of any good thing, or make them not to be the proper objects of commands, counsels and invitations. And moreover, it has been shown that there is not, and never can be, either in existence, or so much as in idea, any such freedom of will, consisting in indifference and

self-determination, for the sake of which, this doctrine of original sin is cast out and that no such freedom is necessary, in order to the nature of sin, and a just desert of punishment.

The things which have been observed, do also take off the main objections of Arminians against the doctrine of *efficacious grace;* and at the same time prove the grace of God in a sinner's conversion (if there be any grace or divine influence in the affair) to be *efficacious*, yea, and *irresistible* too, if by irresistible is meant that which is attended with a moral necessity, which it is impossible should ever be violated by any resistance. The main objection of Arminians against this doctrine is, that it is inconsistent with their self-determining freedom of Will; and that it is repugnant to the nature of virtue, that it should be wrought in the heart by the determining efficacy and power of another, instead of its being owing to a self-moving power; that in that case, the good which is wrought, would not be *our* virtue, but rather God's virtue; because it is not the person in whom it is wrought, that is the determining author of it, but God that wrought it in him. But the things, which are the foundation of these objections, have been considered; and it has been demonstrated that the liberty of moral agents does not consist in self-determining power, and that there is no need of any such liberty in order to the nature of virtue, nor does it at all hinder but that the state or act of the Will may be the virtue of the subject, though it be not from self-determination, but the determination of an extrinsic cause; even so as to cause the event to be morally necessary to the subject of it. And as it has been proved, that nothing in the state or acts of the Will of man is contingent; but that, on the contrary, every event of this kind is necessary, by a moral necessity; and as it has also been now demonstrated, that the doctrine of an universal determining Providence, follows from that doctrine of necessity which was proved before; and so that God does decisively, in his Providence, order all the volitions of moral agents, either by positive influence or permission; and it being allowed, on all hands, that what God does in the affair of man's virtuous volitions, whether it be more or less, is by some positive influence, and not by mere permission, as in the affair of a sinful volition; if we put these things together, it will follow, that God's assistance or influence, must be determining and decisive, or must be attended with a moral necessity of the event; and so, that God gives virtue, holiness and conversion to sinners, by an influence which determines the effect, in such a manner, that the effect will infallibly follow by a moral necessity; which is what Calvinists mean by efficacious and irresistible grace.

The things which have been said, do likewise answer the chief objections against the doctrine of God's *universal* and *absolute decree*, and afford infallible proof of this doctrine; and of the doctrine of *absolute, eternal, personal election* in particular. The main objections against these doctrines are, that they infer a necessity of the volitions of moral agents, and of the future, moral state and acts of men, and so are not consistent with those eternal rewards and punishments, which are connected with conversion and impenitence; nor can be made to agree with the reasonableness and sincerity of the precepts, calls, counsels, warnings and expostulations of the word of God; or with the various methods and means of grace, which God uses with sinners, to bring them to repentance; and the whole of that moral government, which God exercises towards mankind; and that they infer an inconsistence between the *secret* and *revealed* Will of God, and make God the author of sin. But all these things have been obviated in the preceding discourse. And the certain truth of these doctrines, concerning God's eternal purposes, will follow from what was just

now observed concerning God's universal Providence; how it infallibly follows from what has been proved, that God orders all events; and the volitions of moral agents amongst others by such a decisive disposal, that the events are infallibly connected with his disposal. For if God disposes all events, so that the infallible existence of the events is decided by his Providence, then he, doubtless, thus orders and decides things *knowingly* and on *design*. God does not do what he does, nor order what he orders, accidentally or unawares; either *without* or *beside* his intention. And if there be a foregoing *design*, of doing and ordering as he does, this is the same with a *purpose* or *decree*. And as it has been shown that nothing is new to God in any respect, but all things are perfectly and equally in his view from eternity; hence it will follow, that his designs or purposes are not things formed anew, founded on any new views or appearances, but are all eternal purposes. And as it has been now shown, how the doctrine of determining, efficacious grace certainly follows from things proved in the foregoing discourse; hence will necessarily follow the doctrine of *particular, eternal, absolute election*. For if men are made true saints, no otherwise than as God makes them so, and distinguishes them from others, by an efficacious power and influence of his, that decides and fixes the event; and God thus makes some saints, and not others, on design or purpose, and (as has been now observed) no designs of God are new; it follows, that God thus distinguished from others, all that ever become true saints, by his eternal design or decree. I might also show how God's certain foreknowledge must suppose an absolute decree, and how such a decree can be proved to a demonstration from it; but, that this discourse may not be lengthened out too much, that must be omitted for the present.

From these things it will inevitably follow, that however Christ in some sense may be said to *die for all*, and to redeem all visible Christians, yea, the whole world by his death; yet there must be something *particular* in the design of his death, with respect to such as he intended should actually be saved thereby. As appears by what has been now shown, God has the actual salvation or redemption of a certain number in his proper, absolute design, and of a certain number only; and therefore such a design only can be prosecuted in any thing God does, in order to the salvation of men. God pursues a proper design of the salvation of the elect in giving Christ to die, and prosecutes such a design with respect to no other, most strictly speaking: for it is impossible that God should prosecute any other design than only such as he has; he certainly does not, in the highest propriety and strictness of speech, pursue a design that he has not. And, indeed, such a particularity and limitation of redemption will as infallibly follow, from the doctrine of God's foreknowledge, as from that of the decree. For it is as impossible, in strictness of speech, that God should prosecute a design, or aim at a thing, which He at the same time most perfectly knows will not be accomplished, as that he should use endeavors for that which is beside his decree.

By the things which have been proved, are obviated some of the main objections against the doctrine of the infallible and necessary *perseverance* of saints, and some of the main foundations of this doctrine are established. The main prejudices of Arminians against this doctrine seem to be these. They suppose such a necessary, infallible perseverance to be repugnant to the freedom of the Will; that it must be owing to man's own self-determining power, that he *first becomes* virtuous and holy; and so, in like manner, it must be left a thing contingent, to be determined by the same freedom of Will, whether he will *persevere* in virtue and holiness; and that otherwise his continuing steadfast in faith

and obedience would not be his virtue, or at all praiseworthy and rewardable, nor could his perseverance be properly the matter of divine commands, counsels and promises, nor his apostasy be properly threatened, and men warned against it. Whereas we find all these things in Scripture: there we find steadfastness and perseverance in true Christianity, represented as the virtue of the saints, spoken of as praiseworthy in them, and glorious rewards promised to it; and also find that God makes it the subject of his commands, counsels and promises; and the contrary, of threatenings and warnings. But the foundation of these objections has been removed, in its being shown that moral necessity and infallible certainty of events is not inconsistent with these things; and that as to freedom of Will, lying in the power of the Will to determine itself, there neither is any such thing, nor any need of it, in order to virtue, reward, commands, counsels, &c.

And as the doctrines of efficacious grace and absolute election do certainly follow from things which have been proved in the preceding discourse; so some of the main foundations of the doctrine of perseverance, are thereby established. If the beginning of true faith and holiness, and a man's becoming a true saint at first, does not depend on the self-determining power of the Will, but on the determining, efficacious grace of God; it may well be argued, that it is so also with respect to men's being continued saints, or persevering in faith and holiness. The conversion of a sinner being not owing to a man's self-determination, but to God's determination and eternal election, which is absolute and depending on the sovereign Will of God, and not on the free Will of man; as is evident from what has been said; and it being very evident from the Scriptures, that the eternal election which there is of saints to faith and holiness, is also an election of them to eternal salvation. Hence their appointment to salvation must also be absolute, and not depending on their contingent, self-determining Will. From all which it follows, that it is absolutely fixed in God's decree, that all true saints shall persevere to actual eternal salvation.

But I must leave all these things to the consideration of the fair and impartial reader; and when he has maturely weighed them, I would propose it to his consideration, whether many of the first reformers, and others that succeeded them, whom God in their day made the chief pillars of his church, and greatest instruments of their deliverance from error and darkness, and of the support of the cause of piety among them, have not been injured in the contempt with which they have been treated by many late writers, for their teaching and maintaining such doctrines as are commonly called *Calvinistic*. Indeed, some of these new writers, at the same time that they have represented the doctrines of these ancient and eminent divines as in the highest degree ridiculous, and contrary to common sense, in an ostentation of a very generous charity, have allowed that they were honest, well-meaning men; yea, it may be, some of them, as though it were in great condescension and compassion to them, have allowed that they did pretty well for the day in which they lived, and considering the great disadvantages they labored under; when at the same time, their manner of speaking has naturally and plainly suggested to the minds of their readers, that they were persons, who, through the lowness of their genius, and greatness of the bigotry with which their minds were shackled and thoughts confined, living in the gloomy caves of superstition, fondly embraced, and demurely and zealously taught the most absurd, silly, and monstrous opinions, worthy of the greatest contempt of gentlemen possessed of that noble and generous freedom of thought, which happily prevails in this age of light and inquiry. When, indeed, such is the case, that we might, if so disposed,

speak as big words as they, and on far better grounds. And really all the *Arminians* on earth might be challenged, without arrogance or vanity, to make these principles of theirs, wherein they mainly differ from their fathers, whom they so much despise, consistent with common sense; yea, and perhaps to produce any doctrine ever embraced by the blindest bigot of the church of Rome, or the most ignorant Mussulman or extravagant enthusiast, that might be reduced to more demonstrable inconsistencies, and repugnancies to common sense, and to themselves; though their inconsistencies indeed may not lie so deep, or be so artfully veiled by a deceitful ambiguity of words, and an indeterminate signification of phrases. I will not deny, that these gentlemen, many of them, are men of great abilities, and have been helped to higher attainments in philosophy, than those ancient divines, and have done great service to the church of God in some respects; but I humbly conceive that their differing from their fathers with such magisterial assurance, in these points in divinity, must be owing to some other cause than superior wisdom.

It may also be worthy of consideration, whether the great alteration, which has been made in the state of things in our nation, and some other parts of the Protestant world, in this and the past age, by the exploding so generally Calvinistic doctrines, that is so often spoken of as worthy to be greatly rejoiced in by the friends of truth, learning and virtue, as an instance of the great increase of light in the Christian church; I say, it may be worthy to be considered, whether this be indeed a happy change, owing to any such cause as an increase of true knowledge and understanding in things of religion; or whether there is not reason to fear, that it may be owing to some worse cause.

And I desire it may be considered, whether the boldness of some writers may not be worthy to be reflected on, who have not scrupled to say, that if these and those things are true (which yet appear to be the demonstrable dictates of reason, as well as the certain dictates of the mouth of the Most High) then God is unjust and cruel, and guilty of manifest deceit and double dealing, and the like. Yea, some have gone so far, as confidently to assert, that if any book which pretends to be Scripture, teaches such doctrines, that alone is sufficient warrant for mankind to reject it, as what cannot be the word of God.—Some, who have not gone so far, have said, that if the Scripture seems to teach any such doctrines, so contrary to reason, we are obliged to find out some other interpretation of those texts, where such doctrines seem to be exhibited. Others express themselves yet more modestly: they express a tenderness and religious fear, lest they should receive and teach any thing that should seem to reflect on God's moral character, or be a disparagement to his methods of administration, in his moral government; and therefore express themselves as not daring to embrace some doctrines, though they seem to be delivered in Scripture, according to the more obvious and natural construction of the words. But indeed it would show a truer modesty and humility, if they would more entirely rely on God's wisdom and discerning, who knows infinitely better than we, what is agreeable to his own perfections, and never intended to leave these matters to the decision of the wisdom and discerning of men; but by his own unerring instruction, to determine for us what the truth is; knowing how little our judgment is to be depended on, and how extremely prone vain and blind men are to err in such matters.

The truth of the case is, that if the Scripture plainly taught the opposite doctrines, to those that are so much stumbled at, viz., the *Arminian* doctrine of free Will, and others depending thereon, it would be the greatest of all difficulties that attend the Scriptures, incomparably greater than its containing any,

even the most mysterious of those doctrines of the first reformers, which our late free-thinkers have so superciliously exploded.—Indeed, it is a glorious argument of the divinity of the holy Scriptures, that they teach such doctrines, which in one age and another, through the blindness of men's minds, and strong prejudices of their hearts, are rejected, as most absurd and unreasonable, by the wise and great men of the world; which yet, when they are most carefully and strictly examined, appear to be exactly agreeable to the most demonstrable, certain and natural dictates of reason. By such things it appears, that the *foolishness of God is wiser than men*, and God does as is said in 1 Cor. i. 19, 20: "For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise; I will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?" And as it used to be in time past, so it is probable it will be in time to come, as it is there written, in verses 27, 28, 29: "But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world, to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world, to confound the things that are mighty; and base things of the world, the things which are despised, hath God chosen: yea, and things which are not, to bring to nought things that are; that no flesh should glory in his presence." AMEN.

REMARKS

ON THE ESSAYS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY AND NATURAL RELIGION, IN A LETTER TO A MINISTER OF THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.

REVEREND SIR:

THE intimations you have given me of the use which has, by some, been made of what I have written on the *Freedom of the Will*, &c., to vindicate what is said on the subject of liberty and necessity, by the author of the *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, has occasioned my reading this author's essay on that subject, with particular care and attention. And I think it must be evident to every one, that has read both his *Essay* and my *Inquiry*, that our schemes are exceeding reverse from each other. The wide difference appears particularly in the following things.

This author supposes, that such a necessity takes place with respect to all men's actions, as is inconsistent with liberty,* and plainly denies that men have any liberty in acting. Thus in p. 168, after he had been speaking of the necessity of our determinations, as connected with motives, he concludes with saying, "In short, if motives are not under our power or direction, which is confessedly the fact, we can at bottom have——NO LIBERTY." Whereas, I have abundantly expressed it as my mind, that man, in his moral actions, has true liberty; and that the moral necessity, which universally takes place, is not in the least inconsistent with any thing that is properly called liberty, and with the utmost liberty that can be desired, or that can possibly exist or be conceived of.†

I find that some are apt to think, that in that kind of moral necessity of men's volitions, which I suppose to be universal, at least some degree of liberty is denied; that though it be true I allow a sort of liberty, yet those who maintain a self-determining power in the Will, and a liberty of contingence and indifference, hold a higher sort of freedom than I do; but I think this is certainly a great mistake.

Liberty, as I have explained it, in p. 17, and other places, is *the power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do as he pleases, or conducting* in any respect, *according to his pleasure;* without considering how his pleasure comes to be as it is. It is demonstrable, and, I think, has been demonstrated, that no necessity of men's volitions that I maintain, is inconsistent with this liberty; and I think it is impossible for any one to rise higher in his conceptions of liberty than this: if any imagine they desire higher, and that they conceive of a higher and greater liberty than this, they are deceived, and delude themselves with confused ambiguous words, instead of ideas. If any one should here say, "Yes, I conceive of a freedom above and beyond the liberty a man has of conducting in any respect as he pleases, viz., a liberty of *choosing* as he pleases." Such a one, if he reflected, would either blush or laugh at his own instance. For, is not choosing as he pleases, conducting, *in some respect*, according to his pleasure, and still without determining how he came by that pleasure? If he

* P. 160, 161, 164, 165, and many other places.
† *Inquiry*, p. 17—20. 100, 101. 151—156, 163, 167, 177, 178—182.

says, "Yes, I came by that pleasure by my own choice." If he be a man of common sense, by this time he will see his own absurdity; for he must needs see that his notion or conception, even of this liberty, does not contain any judgment or conception, how he comes by that choice, which first determines his pleasure, or which originally fixed his own will respecting the affair. Or if any shall say, "That a man exercises liberty in this, even in determining his own choice, but not as he pleases, or not in consequence of any choice, preference, or inclination of his own, but by a determination arising contingently out of a state of absolute indifference;" this is not rising higher in his conception of liberty; as such a determination of the Will would not be a voluntary determination of it. Surely he that places liberty in a power of doing something not according to his own choice, or from his choice, has not a higher notion of it, than he that places it in doing as he pleases, or acting from his own election. If there were a power in the mind to determine itself, but not by its choice or according to its pleasure, what advantage would it give? And what liberty, worth contending for, would be exercised in it? Therefore no *Arminian*, *Pelagian*, or *Epicurean*, can rise higher in his conceptions of liberty, than the notion of it which I have explained: which notion is apparently, perfectly consistent with the whole of that necessity of men's actions, which I suppose takes place. And I scruple not to say, it is beyond all their wits to invent a higher notion, or form a higher imagination of liberty; let them talk of *sovereignty of the Will*, *self-determining power*, *self-motion*, *self-direction*, *arbitrary decision*, *liberty* ad utrumvis, *power of choosing differently in given cases*, &c. &c., as long as they will. It is apparent that these men, in their strenuous affirmation and dispute about these things, aim at they know not what, fighting for something they have no conception of, substituting a number of confused, unmeaning words, instead of things, and instead of thoughts. They may be challenged clearly to explain what they would have: they never can answer the challenge.

The author of the *Essays*, through his whole *Essay on Liberty* and *Necessity*, goes on the supposition, that, in order to the being of real liberty, a man must have a freedom that is opposed to moral necessity; and yet he supposes, p. 175, that "such a liberty must signify a power in the mind of acting without and against motives, a power of acting without any view, purpose or design, and even of acting in contradiction to our own desires and aversions, and to all our principles of action; and is an absurdity altogether inconsistent with a rational nature. Now, who ever imagined such a liberty as this, a higher sort or degree of freedom, than a liberty of following one's own views and purposes, and acting agreeable to his own inclinations and passions? Who will ever reasonably suppose that liberty, which is an absurdity altogether inconsistent with a rational nature, to be a kind of liberty above that which is consistent with the nature of a rational, intelligent, designing agent?

The author of the *Essays* seems to suppose such a necessity to take place, as is inconsistent with some supposable *power of arbitrary choice*;* or that there is some liberty conceivable, whereby men's own actions might be more *properly in their power*,† and by which events might be more *dependent on ourselves*;‡ contrary to what I suppose to be evident in my *Inquiry*.§ What way can be imagined, of our actions being more *in our power*, *from ourselves*, or *dependent on ourselves*, than their being from our power to fulfil our own choice, to act from our own inclination, pursue our own views, and execute our own designs? Certainly, to be able to act thus, is as properly having our actions in our power,

* P. 169. † P. 191, 195, 197, 206. ‡ P. 163. § P. 181, 182.

and dependent on ourselves, as a being liable to be the subjects of acts and events, contingently and fortuitously, *without desire, view, purpose or design, or any principle of action* within ourselves; as we must be according to this author's own declared sense, if our actions are performed with that liberty that is opposed to moral necessity.

This author seems everywhere to suppose, that necessity, most properly so called, attends all men's actions; and that the terms *necessary, unavoidable, impossible*, &c., are equally applicable to the case of moral and natural necessity. In p. 173, he says, "The idea of necessary and unavoidable, equally agrees, both to moral and physical necessity." And in p. 184, "All things that fall out in the natural and moral world are alike necessary." P. 174, "This inclination and choice is unavoidably caused or occasioned by the prevailing motive. In this lies the necessity of our actions, that, in such circumstances, it was impossible we could act otherwise." He often expresses himself in like manner elsewhere, speaking in strong terms of men's actions as *unavoidable*, what they *cannot* forbear, having *no power* over their own actions, the order of them being *unalterably* fixed and *inseparably* linked together, &c.*

On the contrary, I have largely declared, that the connection between antecedent things and consequent ones, which takes place with regard to the acts of men's Wills, which is called moral necessity, is called by the name of *necessity* improperly; and that all such terms as *must, cannot, impossible, unable, irresistible, unavoidable, invincible*, &c., when applied here, are not applied in their proper signification, and are either used nonsensically, and with perfect insignificance, or in a sense quite diverse from their original and proper meaning, and their use in common speech; and, that such a necessity as attends the acts of men's Wills, is more properly called *certainty*, than *necessity*; it being no other than the certain connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms their existence.

Agreeably to what is observed in my *Inquiry*, I think it is evidently owing to a strong prejudice in persons' minds, arising from an insensible, habitual perversion and misapplication of such like terms as *necessary, impossible unable, unavoidable, invincible*, &c., that they are ready to think, that to suppose a certain connection of men's volitions, without any foregoing motives or inclinations, or any preceding moral influence whatsoever, is truly and properly to suppose such a strong, irrefragable chain of causes and effects, as stands in the way of, and makes utterly vain, opposite desires and endeavors, like immovable and impenetrable mountains of brass; and impedes our liberty like walls of adamant, gates of brass, and bars of iron: whereas, all such representations suggest ideas as far from the truth, as the east is from the west. Nothing that I maintain, supposes that men are at all hindered by any fatal necessity, from doing, and even willing and choosing as they please, with full freedom; yea, with the highest degree of liberty that ever was thought of, or that ever could possibly enter into the heart of any man to conceive. I know it is in vain to endeavor to make some persons believe this, or at least fully and steadily to believe it; for if it be demonstrated to them, still the old prejudice remains, which has been long fixed by the use of the terms *necessary, must, cannot, impossible*, &c.; the association with these terms of certain ideas, inconsistent with liberty, is not broken; and the judgment is powerfully warped by it, as a thing that has been long bent and grown stiff, if it be straightened, will return to its former curvity again and again.

* P. 180, 188, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 205, 206.

The author of the *Essays* most manifestly supposes that if men had the truth concerning the real necessity of all their actions clearly in view, they would not appear to themselves, or one another, as at all praiseworthy or culpable, or under any moral obligation, or accountable for their actions;* which supposes, that men are not to be blamed or praised for any of their actions, and are not under any obligations, nor are truly accountable for any thing they do, by reason of this necessity; which is very contrary to what I have endeavored to prove, throughout the *third part* of my *Inquiry*. I humbly conceive it is there shown, that this is so far from the truth, that the moral necessity of men's actions, which truly take place, is requisite to the being of virtue and vice, or any thing praiseworthy or culpable: that the liberty of indifference and contingence, which is advanced in opposition to that necessity, is inconsistent with the being of these; as it would suppose that men are not determined in what they do, by any virtuous or vicious principles, nor act from any motives, intentions or aims whatsoever; or have any end, either good or bad, in acting. And is it not remarkable, that this author should suppose, that, in order to men's actions truly having any desert, they must be performed *without any view, purpose, design, or desire, or any principle of action*, or any thing *agreeable to a rational nature?* As it will appear that he does, if we compare p. 206, 207, with p. 175.

The author of the *Essays* supposes, that God has deeply implanted in man's nature, a strong and invincible apprehension or feeling, as he calls it, of a liberty and contingence, of his own actions, opposite to that necessity which truly attends them; and which in truth does not agree with real fact,† is not agreeable to strict, philosophic truth,‡ is contradictory to the truth of things,§ and which truth contradicts,‖ not tallying with the real plan;¶ and that therefore such feelings are deceitful,** are in reality of the delusive kind.†† He speaks of them as a wise delusion,‡‡ as nice, artificial feelings, merely that conscience may have a commanding power;§§ meaning plainly, that these feelings are a cunning artifice of the Author of Nature, to make men believe they are free, when they are not.‖‖ He supposes that, by these feelings, the moral world has a disguised appearance.¶¶ And other things of this kind he says. He supposes that all self-approbation, and all remorse of conscience, all commendation or condemnation of ourselves or others, all sense of desert, and all that is connected with this way of thinking, all the ideas which at present are suggested by the words *ought, should*, arise from this delusion, and would entirely vanish without it.*†

All which is very contrary to what I have abundantly insisted on and endeavored to demonstrate in my *Inquiry*, where I have largely shown that it is agreeable to the natural sense of mankind, that the moral necessity or certainty that attends men's actions, is consistent with praise and blame, reward and punishment;*‡ and that it is agreeable to our natural notions, that moral evil, with its desert of dislike and abhorrence, and all its other ill-deservings, consists in a certain deformity in the nature of the dispositions and acts of the heart, and not in the evil of something else, diverse from these, supposed to be their cause or occasion.*§

I might well ask here, whether any one is to be found in the world of mankind, who is conscious to a sense or feeling, naturally and deeply rooted in his mind, that in order to a man's performing any action that is praise or blame

* P. 207, 209, and other places. † P. 200. ‡ P. 152. § P. 183. ‖ P. 186. ¶ P. 20[illegible] ** P. 203, 204, 211. †† P. 183. ‡‡ P. 209. §§ P. 211. ‖‖ P. 153. ¶¶ 214. *† P. 160, 1[illegible] 198, 205, 206, 209. *‡ Inquiry, Part IV. Sect. 4, throughout. *§ Idem, Part IV. Sect. 1 throughout, and p. 174, 175.

worthy, he must exercise a liberty that implies and signifies a power of acting without any motive, view, design, desire or principle of action? For such a liberty, this author supposes that must be which is opposed to moral necessity, as I have already observed once and again. Supposing a man should actually do good, independent of desire, aim, inducement, principle or end, is it a dictate of invincible, natural sense, that his act is more meritorious or praiseworthy, than if he had performed it for some *good end*, and had been governed in it by *good principles* and *motives?* And so I might ask on the contrary, with respect to evil actions.*

The author of the *Essays* supposes that the liberty without necessity, which we have a natural feeling of, implies *contingence;* and speaking of this contingence, he sometimes calls it by the name of *chance.* And it is evident that his notion of it, or rather what he says about it, implies things happening *loosely, fortuitously, by accident,* and *without a cause.** Now I conceive the slightest reflection may be sufficient to satisfy any one that such a contingence of men's actions, according to our natural sense, is so far from being essential to the morality or merit of those actions, that it would destroy it; and that, on the contrary, the dependence of our actions on such causes as inward inclinations, incitements and ends, is essential to the being of it. Natural sense teaches men, when they see any thing done by others of a good or evil tendency, to inquire what their intention was; what principles and views they were moved by, in order to judge how far they are to be justified or condemned; and not to determine, that in order to their being approved or blamed at all, the action must be performed altogether fortuitously, proceeding from nothing, arising from no cause. Concerning this matter I have fully expressed my mind in the *Inquiry.*

If the liberty which we have a natural sense of as necessary to desert, consists in the mind's self-determination, without being determined by previous inclination or motive, then indifference is essential to it, yea, absolute indifference, as is observed in my *Inquiry.* But men naturally have no notion of any such liberty as this, as essential to the morality, or demerit of their actions; but, on the contrary, such a liberty, if it were possible, would be inconsistent with our natural notions of desert, as is largely shown in the *Inquiry.* If it be agreeable to natural sense, that men must be indifferent in determining their own actions, then, according to the same, the more they are determined by inclination, either good or bad, the less they have of desert. The more good actions are performed from good dispositions, the less praiseworthy; and the more evil deeds are from evil dispositions, the less culpable; and in general, the more men's actions are from their hearts, the less they are to be commended or condemned; which all must know is very contrary to natural sense.

Moral necessity is owing to the power and government of the inclination of the heart, either habitual or occasional, excited by motive; but according to natural and common sense, the more a man does any thing with full inclination of heart, the more is it to be charged to his account for his condemnation if it be an ill action, and the more to be ascribed to him for his praise, if it be good.

If the mind were determined to evil actions by contingence, from a state of indifference, then either there would be no fault in them, or else the fault would be in being so perfectly indifferent, that the mind was equally liable to a bad or good determination. And if this influence be liberty, then the very essence of the blame or fault would lie in the liberty itself, or the wickedness would, primarily and summarily, lie in being a free agent. If there were no fault in

* See this matter illustrated in my *Inquiry*, Part IV. Sect. 4. † P. 156—159, 177, 178, 181, 183—185.

being indifferent, then there would be no fault in he determination's being agreeable to such a state of indifference; that is, there could no fault be reasonably found with this, viz., that opposite determinations actually happen to take place *indifferently* sometimes good and sometimes bad, as contingence governs and decides. And if it be a fault to be indifferent to good and evil, then such indifference is no indifference to good and evil, but is a determination to evil, or to a fault; and such an indifferent disposition would be an evil, faulty disposition, tendency or determination of mind. So inconsistent are these notions of liberty, as essential to praise or blame.

The author of the *Essays* supposes men's natural, delusive sense of a liberty of contingence, to be in truth, the foundation of all the labor, care and industry of mankind;* and that if men's *practical ideas had been formed on the plan of universal necessity, the* ignava ratio, *the inactive doctrine of the Stoics, would have followed; and that there would have been no* ROOM *for forethought about futurity, or any sort of industry and care;*† plainly implying, that in this case men would see and know that all their industry and care signified nothing, was in vain and to no purpose, or of no benefit; events being fixed in an irrefragable chain, and not at all depending on their care and endeavor; as he explains himself, particularly in the instance of men's use of means to prolong life;‡ not only very contrary to what I largely maintain in my *Inquiry*, but also very inconsistently with his own scheme, in what he supposes of the ends for which God has so deeply implanted this deceitful feeling in man's nature; in which he manifestly supposes men's care and industry not to be in vain and of no benefit, but of great use, yea, of absolute necessity, in order to the obtaining the most important ends and necessary purposes of human life, and to fulfil the ends of action to the best advantage, as he largely declares.§ Now, how shall these things be reconciled? That if men had *a clear view of real truth*, they would see that there was *no room* for their care and industry, because they would see it to be in vain, and of no benefit; and yet that God, by having a clear view of real truth, sees that their being excited to care and industry, will be of excellent use to mankind, and greatly for the benefit of the world, yea, absolutely necessary in order to it; and that therefore the great wisdom and goodness of God to men appears, in artfully contriving to put them on care and industry for their good, which good could not be obtained without them; and yet both these things are maintained at once, and in the same sentences and words by this author. The very reason he gives, why God has put this deceitful feeling into men, contradicts and destroys itself. That God in his great goodness to men gave them such a deceitful feeling, because it was very useful and necessary for them, and greatly for their benefit, or excites them to care and industry for their own good, which care and industry is useful and necessary to that end; and yet the very thing that this great benefit of care and industry is given as a reason for, is God's deceiving men in this very point, in making them think their care and industry to be of great benefit to them, when indeed it is of none at all; and if they saw the real truth, they would see all their endeavors to be wholly useless, that there was *no room* for them, and that the event does not at all *depend* upon them.¶

And besides, what this author says plainly implies (as appears by what has been already observed), that it is necessary men should be deceived, by being made to believe that future events are contingent, and their own future actions free, with such a freedom, as signifies that their actions are not the fruit of their

* P. 184. † P. 189. ‡ P. 184. 185. § P. 188—192, and in many other places. ¶ P. 188. 189. &c.

own desires or designs, but altogether contingent, fortuitous, and without a cause. But how should a notion of liberty, consisting in accident or loose chance, encourage care and industry? I should think it would rather entirely discourage every thing of this nature. For surely, if our actions do not depend on our desires and designs, then they do not depend on our endeavors, flowing from our desires and designs. This author himself seems to suppose, that if men had, indeed, such a liberty of contingence, it would render all endeavors to determine or move men's future volitions vain; he says, that in this case *to exhort, to instruct, to promise, or to threaten, would be to no purpose.* Why? Because (as he himself gives the reason), *then our Will would be capricious and arbitrary, and we should be thrown loose altogether, and our arbitrary power could do us good or ill only by accident.* But if such a loose, fortuitous state would render vain other endeavors upon us, for the same reason would it make useless our endeavors on ourselves; for events that are truly contingent and accidental, and altogether loose from, and independent of, all foregoing causes, are independent on every foregoing cause within ourselves, as well as in others.

I suppose that it is so far from being true, that our minds are naturally possessed with a notion of such liberty as this, so strongly that it is impossible to root it out; that indeed men have no such notion of liberty at all, and that it is utterly impossible, by any means whatsoever, to implant or introduce such a notion into the mind. As no such notions as imply self-contradiction and self-abolition can subsist in the mind, as I have shown in my *Inquiry*, I think a mature, sensible consideration of the matter, sufficient to satisfy any one, that even the greatest and most learned advocates themselves for liberty of indifference and self-determination, have no such notion; and that indeed they mean something wholly inconsistent with, and directly subversive of, what they strenuously affirm, and earnestly contend for. By man's having a power of determining his own Will, they plainly mean a power of determining his Will, as he pleases, or as he chooses; which supposes that the mind has a choice, prior to its going about to confirm any action or determination to it. And if they mean that they determine even the original or prime choice, by their own pleasure or choice, as the thing that causes and directs it; I scruple not most boldly to affirm, that they speak they know not what, and that of which they have no manner of idea, because no such contradictory notion can come into, or have a moment's subsistence in the mind of any man living, as an original or first choice being caused, or brought into being, by choice. After all, they say they have no higher or other conception of liberty, than that vulgar notion of it, which I contend for, viz., a man's having power or opportunity to do as he chooses; or if they had a notion that every act of choice was determined by choice, yet it would destroy their notion of the contingence of choice; for then no one act of choice would arise contingently, or from a state of indifference, but every individual act, in all the series, would arise from foregoing bias or preference, and from a cause predetermining and fixing its existence, which introduces at once such a chain of causes and effects, each preceding link decisively fixing the following, as they would by all means avoid.

And such kind of delusion and self-contradiction as this, does not arise in men's minds by nature; it is not owing to any natural feeling which God has strongly fixed in the mind and nature of man; but to false philosophy, and strong prejudice, from a deceitful abuse of words. It is *artificial*, not in the sense of the author of the *Essays*, supposing it to be a deceitful artifice of God; but artificial as opposed to natural, and as owing to an artificial, deceitful management of terms, to darken and confound the mind. Men have no such

thing when they first begin to exercise reason; but must have a great deal of time to blind themselves, with metaphysical confusion, before they can embrace, and rest in such definitions of liberty as are given, and imagine they understand them.

On the whole, I humbly conceive, that whosoever will give himself the trouble of weighing what I have offered to consideration in my *Inquiry*, must be sensible, that such a moral necessity of men's actions as I maintain, is not at all inconsistent with any liberty that any creature has, or can have, as a free, accountable, moral agent, and subject of moral government; and that this moral necessity is so far from being inconsistent with praise and blame, and the benefit and use of men's own care and labor, that, on the contrary, it implies the very ground and reason, why men's actions are to be ascribed to them as their own, in that manner as to infer desert, praise and blame, approbation and remorse of conscience, reward and punishment; and that it establishes the moral system of the universe, and God's moral government, in every respect, with the proper use of motives, exhortations, commands, counsels, promises, and threatenings; and the use and benefit of endeavors, care and industry; and that therefore there is no need that the strict philosophic truth should be at all concealed from men; no danger in *contemplation* and *profound discovery* in these things. So far from this, that the truth in this matter is of vast importance, and extremely needful to be known; and that the more clearly and perfectly the real fact is known, and the more constantly it is in view, the better; and particularly, that the clear and full knowledge of that, which is the true system of the universe, in these respects, would greatly establish the doctrines which teach the true Christian scheme of Divine Administration in the city of God, and the gospel of Jesus Christ, in its most important articles; and that these things never can be well established, and the opposite errors, so subversive of the whole gospel, which at this day so greatly and generally prevail, be well confuted, or the arguments by which they are maintained, answered, till these points are settled. While this is not done, it is, to me, beyond doubt, that the friends of those great gospel truths will but poorly maintain their controversy with the adversaries of those truths. They will be obliged often to dodge, shuffle, hide, and turn their backs: and the latter will have a strong fort, from whence they never can be driven, and weapons to use, which those whom they oppose will find no shield to screen themselves from; and they will always puzzle, confound, and keep under the friends of sound doctrine, and glory and vaunt themselves in their advantage over them; and carry their affairs with a high hand, as they have done already for a long time past.

I conclude, sir, with asking your pardon for troubling you with so much said in vindication of myself from the imputation of advancing a scheme of necessity, of a like nature with that of the author of the *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*. Considering that what I have said is not only in vindication of myself, but, as I think, of the most important articles of moral philosophy and religion; I trust in what I know of your candor, that you will excuse,

Your obliged friend and brother,
JONATHAN EDWARDS.

STOCKBRIDGE, *July* 25, 1757

DISSERTATION

CONCERNING

THE END FOR WHICH GOD CREATED THE WORLD

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CONCERNING THE END FOR WHICH GOD CREATED THE WORLD.

INTRODUCTION.

CONTAINING EXPLANATIONS OF TERMS, AND GENERAL POSITIONS.

To avoid all confusion in our inquiries and reasonings, concerning the end for which God created the world, a distinction should be observed between the chief end for which an agent or efficient exerts any act and performs any work, and the ultimate end. These two phrases are not always precisely of the same signification: and though the *chief* end be always an *ultimate* end, yet every *ultimate* end is not always a chief end.

A chief end is opposite to an inferior end: an ultimate end is opposite to a subordinate end. A subordinate end is something that an agent seeks and aims at in what he does; but yet does not seek it, or regard it at all upon its own account, but wholly on the account of a further end, or in order to some other thing, which it is considered as a means of. Thus, when a man that goes a journey to obtain a medicine to cure him of some disease, and restore his health, the obtaining that medicine is his subordinate end; because it is not an end that he seeks for itself, or values at all upon its own account, but wholly as a means of a further end, viz., his health. Separate the medicine from that further end, and it is esteemed good for nothiug; nor is it at all desired.

An ultimate end is that which the agent seeks in what he does, for its own sake: that he has respect to, as what he loves, values and takes pleasure in on its own account, and not merely as a means of a further end. As when a man loves the taste of some particular sort of fruit, and is at pains and cost to obtain it, for the sake of the pleasure of that taste, which he values upon its own account, as he loves his own pleasure; and not merely for the sake of any other good, which he supposes his enjoying that pleasure will be the means of.

Some ends are subordinate ends, not only as they are subordinated to an ultimate end, but also to another end that is itself but a subordinate end: yea, there may be a succession or chain of many subordinate ends, one dependent on another—one sought for another: the first for the next, and that for the sake of the next to that, and so on in a long series before you come to any thing, that the agent aims at and seeks for its own sake: as when a man sells a garment to get money—to buy tools—to till his land—to obtain a crop—to supply him with food—to gratify the appetite. And he seeks to gratify his appetite, on its own account, as what is grateful in itself. Here the end of his selling his garment, is to get money; but getting money is only a subordinate end: it is not only subordinate to the last end, his gratifying his appetite; but to a nearer end, viz., his buying husbandry tools; and his obtaining these, is

only a subordinate end, being only for the sake of tilling land; and the tillage of land is an end not sought on its own account, but for the sake of the crop to be produced; and the crop produced is not an ultimate end, or an end sought for itself, but only for the sake of making bread; and the having bread, is not sought on its own account, but for the sake of gratifying the appetite.

Here the gratifying the appetite, is called the ultimate end; because it is the last in the chain, where a man's aim and pursuit stops and rests, obtaining in that, the thing finally aimed at. So whenever a man comes to that in which his desire terminates and rests, it being something valued on its own account, then he comes to an ultimate end, let the chain be longer or shorter; yea, if there be but one link or one step that he takes before he comes to this end. As when a man that loves honey puts it into his mouth, for the sake of the pleasure of the taste, without aiming at any thing further. So that an end which an agent has in view, may be both his immediate and his ultimate end; his next and his last end. That end which is sought for the sake of itself, and not for the sake of a further end, is an ultimate end; it is ultimate or last, as it has no other beyond it, for whose sake it is, it being for the sake of itself: so that here the aim of the agent stops and rests (without going further), being come to the good which he esteems a recompense of its pursuit for its own value.

Here it is to be noted that a thing sought, may have the nature of an ultimate, and also of a subordinate end; as it may be sought partly on its own account, and partly for the sake of a further end. Thus a man in what he does, may seek the love and respect of a particular person, partly on its own account, because it is in itself agreeable to men to be the objects of others' esteem and love: and partly, because he hopes, through the friendship of that person to have his assistance in other affairs; and so to be put under advantage for the obtaining further ends.

A chief end or highest end, which is opposite not properly to a subordinate end, but to an inferior end, is something diverse from an ultimate end. The chief end is an end that is most valued; and therefore most sought after by the agent in what he does. It is evident, that to be an end more valued than another end, is not exactly the same thing as to be an end valued ultimately, or for its own sake. This will appear, if it be considered,

1. That two different ends may be both ultimate ends, and yet not be chief ends. They may be both valued for their own sake, and both sought in the same work or acts, and yet one valued more highly and sought more than another: thus a man may go a journey to obtain two different benefits or enjoyments, both which may be agreeable to him in themselves considered, and so both may be what he values on their own account and seeks for their own sake; and yet one may be much more agreeable than the other; and so be what he sets his heart chiefly upon, and seeks most after in his going a journey. Thus a man may go a journey partly to obtain the possession and enjoyment of a bride that is very dear to him, and partly to gratify his curiosity in looking in a telescope, or some new invented and extraordinary optic glass: both may be ends he seeks in his journey, and the one not properly subordinate or in order to another. One may not depend on another, and therefore both may be ultimate ends; but yet the obtaining his beloved bride may be his chief end, and the benefit of the optic glass, his inferior end. The former may be what he sets his heart vastly most upon, and so be properly the chief end of his journey.

2. An ultimate end is not always the chief end, because some subordinate ends may be more valued and sought after than some ultimate ends. Thus for

instance, a man may aim at these two things in his going a journey ; one may be to visit his friends, and another to receive a great estate, or a large sum of money that lies ready for him at the place to which he is going. The latter, viz., his receiving the sum of money, may be but a subordinate end : he may not value the silver and gold on their own account, but only for the pleasure, gratification, and honor; that is the ultimate end, and not the money, which is valued only as a means of the other. But yet the obtaining the money, may be what is more valued, and so a higher end of his journey, than the pleasure of seeing his friends ; though the latter is what is valued on its own account, and so is an ultimate end.

But here several things may be noted :

First. That when it is said, that some subordinate ends may be more valued than some ultimate ends, it is not supposed that ever a subordinate end is more valued than that ultimate end or ends to which it is subordinate ; because a subordinate end has no value, but what it derives from its ultimate end : for that reason it is called a subordinate end, because it is valued and sought, not for its own sake, or its own value, but only in subordination to a further end, or for the sake of the ultimate end, that it is in order to. But yet a subordinate end may be valued more than some other ultimate end that it is not subordinate to, but is independent of it, and does not belong to that series, or chain of ends. Thus for instance : if a man goes a journey to receive a sum of money, not at all as an ultimate end, or because he has any value for the silver and gold for their own sake, but only for the value of the pleasure and honor that the money may be a means of. In this case it is impossible that the subordinate end, viz., his having the money, should be more valued by him than the pleasure and honor for which he values it. It would be absurd to suppose that he values the means more than the end, when he has no value for the means but for the sake of the end, of which it is the means : but yet he may value the money, though but a subordinate end, more than some other ultimate end, to which it is not subordinate, and with which it has no connection. For instance, more than the comfort of a friendly visit ; which was one end of his journey.

Secondly. Not only is a subordinate end never superior to that ultimate end, to which it is subordinate; but the ultimate end is always (not only equal but) superior to its subordinate end, and more valued by the agent; unless it be when the ultimate end entirely depends on the subordinate: so that he has no other means by which to obtain his last end, and also is looked upon as certainly connected with it—then the subordinate end may be as much valued as the last end; because the last end, in such a case, does altogether depend upon, and is wholly and certainly conveyed by it. As for instance, if a pregnant woman has a peculiar appetite to a certain rare fruit that is to be found only in the garden of a particular friend of hers, at a distance; and she goes a journey to go to her friend's house or garden, to obtain that fruit—the ultimate end of her journey, is to gratify that strong appetite: the obtaining that fruit, is the subordinate end of it. If she looks upon it, that the appetite can be gratified by no other means than the obtaining that fruit; and that it will certainly be gratified if she obtains it, then she will value the fruit as much as she values the gratification of her appetite. But otherwise, it will not be so: if she be doubtful whether that fruit will satisfy her craving, then she will not value it equally with the gratification of her appetite itself; or if there be some other fruit that she knows of, that will gratify her desire, at least in part; which she can obtain without such inconvenience or trouble as shall countervail the gratification; which is in effect frustrating her of her last end, because her last end is the

pleasure of gratifying her appetite, without any trouble that shall countervail, and in effect destroy it. Or if it be so, that her appetite cannot be gratified without this fruit, nor yet with it alone, without something else to be compounded with it—then her value for her last end will be divided between these several ingredients as so many subordinate, and no one alone will be equally valued with the last end

Hence it rarely happens among mankind, that a subordinate end is equally valued with its last end; because the obtaining of a last end rarely depends on one single uncompounded means, and is infallibly connected with that means: therefore, men's last ends are commonly their highest ends.

Thirdly. If any being has but one ultimate end, in all that he does, and there be a great variety of operations, his last end may justly be looked upon as his *supreme* end: for in such a case, every other end but that one, is an end to that end; and therefore no other end can be superior to it. Because, as was observed before, a subordinate end is never more valued, than the end to which it is subordinate.

Moreover, the subordinate effects, events, or things brought to pass, which all are means of this end, all uniting to contribute their share towards the obtaining the one last end, are very various; and therefore, by what has been now observed, the ultimate end of all must be valued, more than any one of the particular means. This seems to be the case with the works of God, as may more fully appear in the sequel.

From what has been said, to explain what is intended by an ultimate end, the following things may be observed concerning ultimate ends in the sense explained.

Fourthly Whatsoever any agent has in view in any thing he does, which he loves, or which is an immediate gratification of any appetite or inclination of nature; and is agreeable to him in itself, and not merely for the sake of something else, is regarded by that agent as his last end. The same may be said, of avoiding of that which is in itself painful or disagreeable: for the avoiding of what is disagreeable is agreeable. This will be evident to any bearing in mind the meaning of the terms. By last end being meant, that which is regarded and sought by an agent, as agreeable or desirable for its own sake; a subordinate that which is sought only for the sake of something else.

Fifthly. From hence it will follow, that if an agent in his works has in view more things than one that will be brought to pass by what he does, that are agreeable to him, considered in themselves, or what he loves and delights in on their own account—then he must have more things than one that he regards as his last ends in what he does. But if there be but one thing that an agent seeks, as the consequence of what he does that is agreeable to him, on its own account, then there can be but one last end which he has in all his actions and operations.

But only here a distinction must be observed of things which may be said to be agreeable to an agent, in themselves considered, in two senses. (1.) What is in itself grateful to an agent, and valued and loved on its own account, *simply* and *absolutely* considered, and is so universally and originally, antecedent to, and *independent* of all conditions, or any supposition of particular cases and circumstances. And (2.) What may be said to be in itself agreeable to an agent, *hypothetically* and consequentially: or, on supposition or condition of such and such circumstances, or on the happening of such a particular case. Thus, for instance: a man may originally love society. An inclination to society may be implanted in his very nature: and society may be agreeable to him antecedent to all presupposed cases and circumstances: and this may cause him to seek a family. And the comfort of society may be originally his last end, in seeking a family. But after he has a family, peace, good order and

mutual justice and friendship in his family, may be agreeable to him, and what he delights in for their sake; and therefore these things may be his last end in many things he does in the government and regulation of his family. But they were not his original end with respect to his family. The justice and peace of a family, was not properly his last end before he had a family, that induced him to seek a family, but consequentially. And the case being put of his having a family, then these things wherein the good order and beauty of a family consist, become his last end in many things he does in such circumstances. In like manner we must suppose that God, before he created the world, had some good in view, as a consequence of the world's existence, that was originally agreeable to him in itself considered, that inclined him to create the world, or bring the universe, with various intelligent creatures, into existence in such a manner as he created it. But after the world was created, and such and such intelligent creatures actually had existence, in such and such circumstances, then a wise, just regulation of them was agreeable to God, in itself considered. And God's love of justice, and hatred of injustice, would be sufficient in such a case to induce God to deal justly with his creatures, and to prevent all injustice in him towards them. But yet there is no necessity of supposing, that God's love of doing justly to intelligent beings, and hatred of the contrary, was what originally induced God to create the world, and make intelligent beings; and so to order the occasion of doing either justly or unjustly. The justice of God's nature makes a just regulation agreeable, and the contrary disagreeable, as there is occasion, the subject being supposed, and the occasion given: but we must suppose something else that should incline him to create the subjects or order the occasion.

So that perfection of God which we call his faithfulness, or his inclination to fulfil his promises to his creatures, could not properly be what moved him to create the world; nor could such a fulfilment of his promises to his creatures, be his last end, in giving the creatures being. But yet after the world is created, after intelligent creatures are made, and God has bound himself by promise to them, then that disposition which is called his faithfulness may move him in his providential disposals towards them: and this may be the end of many of God's works of providence, even the exercise of his faithfulness in fulfilling his promises; and may be in the lower sense his last end. Because faithfulness and truth must be supposed to be what is in itself amiable to God, and what he delights in for its own sake. Thus God may have ends of particular works of providence, which are ultimate ends in a lower sense, which were not ultimate ends of the creation.

So that here we have two sorts of ultimate ends; one of which may be called an original, and independent ultimate end; the other consequential and dependent. For it is evident, the latter sort are truly of the nature of ultimate ends: because, though their being agreeable to the agent, or the agent's desire of them, be consequential on the existence, or supposition of proper subjects and occasion; yet the subject and occasion being supposed, they are agreeable and amiable in themselves. We may suppose, that to a righteous being, the doing justice between two parties, with whom he is concerned, is agreeable in itself, and is loved for its own sake, and not merely for the sake of some other end: and yet we may suppose, that a desire of doing justice between two parties, may be consequential on the being of those parties, and the occasion given.

Therefore, I make a distinction between an end that in this manner is *consequential*, and a *subordinate* end.

It may be observed, that when I speak of God's ultimate end in the creation

of the world, in the following discourse, I commonly mean in that highest sense, viz., the original ultimate end.

Sixthly. It may be further observed, that the original ultimate end or ends of the creation of the world is *alone* that which induces God to give the occasion for consequential ends, by the first creation of the world, and the original disposal of it. And the more original the end is, the more extensive and universal it is. That which God had primarily in view in creating, and the original ordination of the world, must be constantly kept in view, and have a governing influence in all God's works, or with respect to every thing that he does towards his creatures. And therefore,

Seventhly. If we use the phrase ultimate end in this highest sense, then the same that is God's ultimate end in creating the world, if we suppose but one such end, must be what he makes his ultimate aim in all his works, in every thing he does either in creation or providence. But we must suppose that in the use, which God puts the creatures to that he hath made, he must evermore have a regard to the end, for which he has made them. But if we take *ultimate end* in the other lower sense, God may sometimes have regard to those things as ultimate ends, in particular works of providence, which could not in any proper sense be his last end in creating the world.

Eighthly. On the other hand, whatever appears to be God's ultimate end in any sense, of his works of providence in general, that must be the ultimate end of the work of creation itself. For though it be so that God may act for an end, that is an ultimate end in a lower sense, in some of his works of providence, which is not the ultimate end of the creation of the world; yet this doth not take place with regard to the works of providence in general. But we may justly look upon whatsoever has the nature of an ultimate end of God's works of providence in general, that the same is also an ultimate end of the creation of the world; for God's works of providence in general, are the same with the general use that he puts the world to that he has made. And we may well argue from what we see of the general use which God makes of the world, to the general end for which he designed the world. Though there may be some things that are ends of particular works of providence, that were not the last end of the creation, which are in themselves grateful to God in such particular emergent cirumstances; and so are last ends in an inferior sense; yet this is only in certain cases, or particular occasions. But if they are last ends of God's proceedings in the use of the world in general, this shows that his making them last ends does not depend on particular cases and circumstances, but the nature of things in general, and his general design in the being and constitution of the universe.

Ninthly. If there be but one thing that is originally, and independent on any future supposed cases, agreeable to God, to be obtained by the creation of the world, then there can be but one last end of God's work, in this highest sense: but if there are various things, properly diverse one from another, that are, absolutely and independently on the supposition of any future given cases, agreeable to the divine Being, which are actually obtained by the creation of the world, then there were several ultimate ends of the creation, in that highest sense

CHAPTER I.

WHEREIN IS CONSIDERED, WHAT REASON TEACHES CONCERNING THIS AFFAIR.

SECTION I.

SOME THINGS OBSERVED IN GENERAL, WHICH REASON DICTATES.

Having observed these things, which are proper to be taken notice of, to prevent confusion in discourses on this subject, I now proceed to consider what may, and what may not be supposed to be God's ultimate end in the creation of the world.

And in the first place, I would observe some things which reason seems to dictate in this matter. Indeed, this affair seems properly to be an affair of divine revelation. In order to be determined what was aimed at, or designed in the creating of the astonishing fabric of the universe which we behold, it becomes us to attend to and rely on what he has told us, who was the architect that built it. He best knows his own heart, and what his own ends and designs were in the wonderful works which he has wrought. Nor is it to be supposed that mankind, who, while destitute of revelation, by the utmost improvements of their own reason, and advances in science and philosophy, could come to no clear and established determination who the author of the world was, would ever have obtained any tolerable settled judgment of the end which the author of it proposed to himself in so vast, complicated and wonderful a work of his hands. And though it be true, that the revelation which God has given to men, which has been in the world as a light shining in a dark place, has been the occasion of great improvement of their faculties, has taught men how to use their reason: (in which regard, notwithstanding the nobleness and excellency of the faculties which God had given them, they seemed to be in themselves almost helpless:) and though mankind now, through the long, continual assistance they have had by this divine light, have come to attainments in the habitual exercise of reason, which are far beyond what otherwise they would have arrived to; yet I confess it would be relying too much on reason, to determine the affair of God's last end in the creation of the world, only by our own reason, or without being herein principally guided by divine revelation, since God has given a revelation containing instructions concerning this matter. Nevertheless, as in the disputes and wranglings which have been about this matter, those objections, which have chiefly been made use of against what I think the Scriptures have truly revealed, have been from the pretended dictates of reason—I would in the first place soberly consider in a few things, what seems rational to be supposed concerning this affair; and then proceed to consider what light divine revelation gives us in it.

As to the first of these, viz., what seems in itself rational to be supposed concerning this matter, I think the following things appear to be the dictates of reason:

1. That no notion of God's last end in the creation of the world is agreeable to reason, which would truly imply or infer any indigence, insufficiency and mutability in God; or any dependence of the Creator on the creature, for any part of his perfection or happiness. Because it is evident, by both Scripture and reason, that God is infinitely, eternally, unchangeably, and independently glorious and happy; that he stands in no need of, cannot be profited by, or receive any thing from the creature; or be truly hurt, or be the subject of any sufferings, or *impair* of his glory and felicity from any other being. I need not stand to produce the proofs of God's being such a one, it being so universally allowed and maintained by such as call themselves Christians. The notion of God's creating the world in order to receive any thing properly from the creature, is not only contrary to the nature of God, but inconsistent with the notion of creation; which implies a being's receiving its existence, and all that belongs to its being, out of nothing. And this implies the most perfect, absolute, and universal derivation and dependence. Now, if the creature receives its all from God entirely and perfectly, how is it possible that it should have any thing to add to God, to make him in any respect more than he was before, and so the Creator become dependent on the creature?

2. Whatsoever is good and valuable in itself, is worthy that God should value for itself, and on its own account; or which is the same thing, value it with an ultimate value or respect. It is therefore worthy to be ultimately sought by God, or made the last end of his action and operation, if it be a thing of such a nature as to be properly capable of being attained in any divine operation. For it may be supposed that some things, which are valuable and excellent in themselves, are not properly capable of being attained in any divine operation; because they do not remain to be attained; but their existence in all possible respects, must be conceived of prior to any divine operation. Thus God's existence and infinite perfection, though infinitely valuable in themselves, and infinitely valued by God, yet cannot be supposed to be the end of any divine operation. For we cannot conceive of them as in any respect consequent on any works of God: but whatever is in itself valuable, absolutely so, and that is capable of being sought and attained, is worthy to be made a last end of the divine operation. Therefore.

3. Whatever that be which is in itself most valuable, and was so originally, prior to the creation of the world, and which is attainable by the creation, if there be any thing which was superior in value to all others, *that* must be worthy to be God's last end in the creation; and also worthy to be his highest end. In consequence of this, it will follow,

4. That if God himself be in any respect properly capable of being his own end in the creation of the world, then it is reasonable to suppose that he had respect to *himself* as his last and highest end in this work; because he is worthy in himself to be so, being infinitely the greatest and best of beings. All things else, with regard to worthiness, importance and excellence, are perfectly as nothing in comparison of him. And, therefore, if God esteems, values, and has respect to things according to their nature and proportions, he must necessarily have the greatest respect to himself. It would be against the perfection of his nature, his wisdom, holiness, and perfect rectitude, whereby he is disposed to do every thing that is fit to be done, to suppose otherwise. At least a great part of the moral rectitude of the heart of God, whereby he is disposed to every thing

that is fit, suitable and amiable in itself, consists in his having infinitely the highest regard to that which is in itself infinitely highest and best: yea, it is in this that it seems chiefly to consist. The moral rectitude of God's heart must consist in a proper and due respect of his heart to things that are objects of moral respect; that is, to intelligent beings capable of moral actions and relations. And therefore it must chiefly consist in giving due respect to that Being to whom most is due; yea, infinitely most, and in effect all. For God is infinitely the most worthy of regard. The worthiness of others is as nothing to his: so that to him belongs all possible respect. To him belongs the whole of the respect that any moral agent, either God, or any intelligent being is capable of. To him belongs all the heart. Therefore, if moral rectitude of heart consists in paying the respect or regard of the heart which is due, or which fitness and suitableness requires, fitness requires infinitely the greatest regard to be paid to God; and the denying supreme regard here, would be a conduct infinitely the most unfit. Therefore a proper regard to this Being, is what the fitness of regard does infinitely most consist in. Hence it will follow—That the moral rectitude and fitness of the disposition, inclination or affection of God's heart, does chiefly consist in a respect or regard to himself infinitely above his regard to all other beings: or, in other words, his holiness consists in this.

And if it be thus fit that God should have a supreme regard to himself, then it is fit that this supreme regard should appear, in those things by which he makes himself known, or by his *word* and *works;* i. e., in what he says, and in what he does. If it be an infinitely amiable thing in God, that he should have a supreme regard to himself, then it is an amiable thing that he should act as having a chief regard to himself; or act in such a manner, as to show that he has such a regard; that what is highest in God's heart, may be highest in his actions and conduct. And if it was God's intention, as there is great reason to think it was, that his works should exhibit an image of himself their author, that it might brightly appear by his works what manner of being he is, and afford a proper representation of his divine excellencies, and especially his *moral* excellence, consisting in the *disposition of his heart;* then it is reasonable to suppose that his works are so wrought as to show this supreme respect to himself, wherein his moral excellency does primarily consist.

When we are considering with ourselves, what would be most fit and proper for God to have a chief respect to, in his proceedings in general, with regard to the universality of things, it may help us to judge of the matter with the greater ease and satisfaction to consider, what we can suppose would be judged and determined by some third being of perfect wisdom and rectitude, neither the Creator nor one of the creatures, that should be perfectly indifferent and disinterested. Or if we make the supposition, that wisdom itself, or infinitely wise justice and rectitude were a distinct, disinterested person, whose office it was to determine how things shall be most fitly and properly ordered in the whole system, or kingdom of existence, including king and subjects, God and his creatures; and upon a view of the whole, to decide what regard should prevail and govern in all proceedings. Now such a judge, in adjusting the proper measures and kinds of regard that every part of existence is to have, would weigh things in an even balance; taking care, that greater, or more existence should have a greater share than less, that a greater part of the whole should be more looked at and respected than the lesser, in proportion (other things being equal) to the measure of existence, that the more excellent should be more regarded than the less excellent: so that the degree of regard should always be in a proportion, compounded of the proportion of existence, and pro-

portion of excellence, or according to the degree of greatness and goodness, considered conjunctly. Such an arbiter, in considering the system of created intelligent beings by itself, would determine that the system in general, consisting of many millions, was of greater importance, and worthy of a greater share of regard, than only one individual. For however considerable some of the individuals might be, so that they might be much greater and better and have a greater share of the sum total of existence and excellence than another individual, yet no one exceeds others so much as to countervail all the rest of the system. And if this judge consider not only the system of created beings, but the system of being in general, comprehending the sum total of universal existence, both Creator and creature; still every part must be considered according to its weight and importance, or the measure it has of existence and excellence. To determine then, what proportion of regard is to be allotted to the Creator, and all his creatures taken together, both must be as it were put in the balance; the Supreme Being, with all in him that is great, considerable and excellent, is to be estimated and compared with all that is to be found in the whole creation; and according as the former is found to outweigh, in such proportion is he to have a greater share of regard. And in this case, as the whole system of created beings in comparison of the Creator, would be found as the light dust of the balance (which is taken no notice of by him that weighs), and as nothing and vanity; so the arbiter must determine accordingly with respect to the degree in which God should be regarded by all intelligent existence, and the degree in which he should be regarded in all that is done through the whole universal system; in all actions and proceedings, determinations and effects whatever, whether creating, preserving, using, disposing, changing, or destroying. And as the Creator is infinite, and has all possible existence, perfection and excellence, so he must have all possible regard. As he is every way the first and supreme, and as his excellency is in all respects the supreme beauty and glory, the original good, and fountain of all good; so he must have in all respects the supreme regard. And as he is God over all, to whom all are properly subordinate, and on whom all depend, worthy to reign as supreme head with absolute and universal dominion; so it is fit that he should be so regarded by all and in all proceedings and effects through the whole system: that this universality of things in their whole compass and series should look to him, and respect him in such a manner as that respect to him should reign over all respect to other things, and that regard to creatures should universally be subordinate and subject.

When I speak of regard to be thus adjusted in the universal system, or sum total of existence, I mean the regard of the sum total; not only the regard of individual creatures, or all creatures, but of all intelligent existence, created, and uncreated. For it is fit that the regard of the Creator should be proportioned to the worthiness of objects, as well as the regard of creatures. Thus we must conclude such an arbiter, as I have supposed, would determine in this business, being about to decide how matters should proceed most fitly, properly, and according to the nature of things. He would therefore determine that the whole universe, including all creatures, animate and inanimate, in all its actings, proceedings, revolutions, and entire series of events, should proceed from a regard and with a view, to God, as the supreme and last end of all: that every wheel, both great and small, in all its rotations, should move with a constant, invariable regard to him as the ultimate end of all; as perfectly and uniformly, as if the whole system were animated and directed by one common soul; or, as if such an ar er as I have before supposed, one possessed of perfect wisdom and

rectitude, became the common soul of the universe, and actuated and governed it in all its motions.

Thus I have gone upon the supposition of a third person, neither creator nor creature, but a disinterested person stepping in to judge of the concerns of both, and state what is most fit and proper between them. The thing supposed is impossible; but the case is nevertheless just the same as to what is most fit and suitable in itself. For it is most certainly proper for God to act, according to the greatest *fitness*, in his proceedings, and he knows what the greatest *fitness* is, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct person to direct him. As therefore there is no third being, beside God and the created system, nor can be, so there is no need of any, seeing God himself is possessed of that perfect discernment and rectitude which have been supposed. It belongs to him as supreme arbiter, and to his infinite wisdom and rectitude, to state all rules and measures of proceedings. And seeing these attributes of God are infinite, and most absolutely perfect, they are not the less fit to order and dispose because they are in him, who is a being concerned, and not a third person that is disinterested. For being interested unfits a person to be arbiter or judge, no otherwise than as interested tends to blind and mislead his judgment, or incline him to act contrary to it. But that God should be in danger of either, is contrary to the supposition of his being possessed of discerning and justice absolutely perfect. And as there must be some supreme judge of fitness and propriety in the universality of things, as otherwise there could be no order nor regularity, it therefore belongs to God whose are all things, who is perfectly fit for this office, and who alone is so to state all things, according to the most perfect fitness and rectitude, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct person. We may therefore be sure it is and will be done.

I should think that these things might incline us to suppose that God has not forgot himself, in the ends which he proposed in the creation of the world; but that he has so stated these ends (however he is self-sufficient, immutable, and independent) as therein plainly to show a supreme regard to himself. Whether this can be, or whether God has done thus, must be considered afterwards, as also what may be objected against this view of things.

5. Whatsoever is good, amiable and valuable in itself, absolutely and originally, which facts and events show that God aimed at in the creation of the world, must be supposed to be regarded, or aimed at by God *ultimately*, or as an ultimate end of creation. For we must suppose from the perfection of God's nature, that whatsoever is valuable and amiable in itself, simply and absolutely considered, God values simply for itself; it is agreeable to him absolutely on its own account, because God's judgment and esteem are according to truth. He values and loves things, accordingly, as they are worthy to be valued and loved. But if God values a thing simply, and absolutely, for itself, and on its own account, then it is the ultimate object of his value; he does not value it merely for the sake of a farther end to be attained by it. For to suppose that he values it only for some farther end, is in direct contradiction to the present supposition, which is, that he values it absolutely, and for itself. Hence it most clearly follows, that if that which God values ultimately and for itself, appears in fact and experience, to be what he seeks by any thing he does, he must regard it as an ultimate end. And therefore if he seeks it in creating the world, or any part of the world, it is an ultimate end of the work of creation. Having got thus far, we may now proceed a step further, and assert,

6. Whatsoever thing is actually the effect or consequence of the creation of the world, which is simply and absolutely good and valuable in itself, that

thing is an ultimate end of God's creating the world. We see that it is a good that God aimed at by the creation of the world; because he has actually attained it by that means. This is an evidence that he intended to attain, or aimed at it. For we may justly infer what God intends, by what he actually does; because he does nothing inadvertently, or without design. But whatever God intends to attain from a value for it; or in other words, whatever he aims at in his actions and works, that he values; he seeks that thing in those acts and works. Because, for an agent to intend to attain something he values by means he uses, is the same thing as to seek it by those means. And this is the same as to make that thing his end in those means. Now it being by the supposition what God values ultimately, it must, therefore, by the preceding position, be aimed at by God as an ultimate end of creating the world.

SECTION II.

Some farther observations concerning those things which reason leads us to suppose God aimed at in the creation of the world, showing particularly what things that are absolutely good, are actually the consequence of the creation of the world.

From what was last observed it seems to be the most proper and just way of proceeding, as we would see what light reason will give us respecting the particular end or ends God had ultimately in view in the creation of the world; to consider what thing or things, are actually the effect or consequence of the creation of the world, that are simply and originally valuable in themselves. And this is what I would directly proceed to, without entering on any tedious metaphysical inquiries wherein fitness, amiableness, or valuableness consists; or what that is in the nature of some things, which is properly the foundation of a worthiness of being loved and esteemed on their own account. In this I must at present refer what I say to the sense and dictates of the reader's mind, on sedate and calm reflection. I proceed to observe,

1. It seems a thing in itself fit, proper and desirable, that the glorious attributes of God, which consist in a sufficiency to certain acts and effects, should be exerted in the production of such effects, as might manifest the infinite power, wisdom, righteousness, goodness, &c., which are in God. If the world had not been created, these attributes never would have had any exercise. The power of God, which is a sufficiency in him to produce great effects, must for ever have been dormant and useless as to any effect. The divine wisdom and prudence would have had no exercise in any wise contrivance, any prudent proceeding or disposal of things; for there would have been no objects of contrivance or disposal. The same might be observed of God's justice, goodness and truth. Indeed God might have known as perfectly that he possessed these attributes, if they had never been exerted or expressed in any effect. But then if the attributes which consist in a sufficiency for correspondent effects, are in themselves excellent, the exercise of them must likewise be excellent. If it be an excellent thing that there should be a sufficiency for a certain kind of action or operation, the excellency of such a sufficiency must consist in its relation to this kind of operation or effect; but that could not be, unless the operation itself were excellent. A sufficiency for any act or work is no farther valuable, than the work or effect is valuable.* As God therefore esteems these attributes

* As we must conceive of things, the end and perfection of these attributes does as it were consist in their exercise: "The end of wisdom (says Mr. G. Tennent, in his Sermon at the opening of the Pres

themselves valuable, nd delights in them; so it is natural to suppose that he delights in their proper exercise and expression. For the same reason that he esteems his own sufficiency wisely to contrive and dispose effects, he also will esteem the wise contrivance and disposition itself. And for the same reason, as he delights in his own disposition to do justly, and to dispose of things according to truth and just proportion; so he must delight in such a righteous disposal itself.

2. It seems to be a thing in itself fit and desirable, that the glorious perfections of God should be known, and the operations and expressions of them seen by other beings besides himself. If it be fit, that God's power and wisdom, &c., should be exercised and expressed in some effects, and not lie eternally dormant, then it seems proper that these exercises should appear, and not be totally hidden and unknown. For if they are, it will be just the same as to the above purpose, as if they were not. God as perfectly knew himself and his perfections, had as perfect an idea of the exercises and effects they were sufficient for, antecedently to any such actual operations of them, as since. If therefore it be nevertheless a thing in itself valuable, and worthy to be desired, that these glorious perfections be actually expressed and exhibited in their correspondent effects; then it seems also, that the knowledge of these perfections, and the expressions and discoveries that are made of them, is a thing valuable in itself absolutely considered; and that it is desirable that this knowledge should exist. As God's perfections are things in themselves excellent, so the expression of them in their proper acts and fruits is excellent; and the knowledge of these excellent perfections, and of these glorious expressions of them, is an excellent thing, the existence of which is in itself valuable and desirable. It is a thing infinitely good in itself that God's glory should be known by a glorious society of created beings. And that there should be in them an increasing knowledge of God to all eternity, is an existence, a reality infinitely worthy to be, and worthy to be valued and regarded by him, to whom it belongs to order that to be, which, of all things possible, is fittest and best. If existence is more worthy than defect and nonentity, and if any created existence is in itself worthy to be, then knowledge or understanding is a thing worthy to be; and if any knowledge, then the most excellent sort of knowledge, viz., that of God and his glory. The existence of the created universe consists as much in it as in any thing. yea, this knowledge is one of the highest, most real and substantial parts of all created existence, most remote from nonentity and defect.

3. As it is a thing valuable and desirable in itself that God's glory should be seen and known, so when known, it seems equally reasonable and fit, it should be valued and esteemed, loved and delighted in, answerably to its dignity. There is no more reason to esteem it a fit and suitable thing that God's glory should be known, or that there should be an idea in the understanding corresponding unto the glorious object, than that there should be a corresponding disposition or affection in the will. If the perfection itself be excellent, the knowledge of it is excellent, and so is the esteem and love of it excellent. And as it is fit that God should love and esteem his own excellence, it is also fit that he should value and esteem the love of his excellency. For if it becomes any being greatly to value another, then it becomes him to love to have him valued and esteemed: and if it becomes a being highly to value himself, it is fit that he should love to have himself valued and esteemed. If the idea of God's per-

byte[illegible] arch of Philadelphia) is design; the end of power is action; the end of goodness is doing good. To suppose these perfections not to be exerted, would be to represent them as insignificant. Of what use would God's wisdom be, if it had nothing to design or direct? To what purpose his almightiness if it never brought any thing to pass? And of what avail his goodness, if it never did any good?"

fection in the understanding be valuable, then the love of the heart seems to be more especially valuable, as moral beauty especially consists in the disposition and affection of the heart.

4. As there is an infinite fulness of all possible good in God, a fulness of every perfection, of all excellency and beauty, and of infinite happiness; and as this fulness is capable of communication or emanation *ad extra;* so it seems a thing amiable and valuable in itself that it should be communicated or flow forth, that this infinite fountain of good should send forth abundant streams, that this infinite fountain of light should, diffusing its excellent fulness, pour forth light all around—and as this is in itself excellent, so a disposition to this, in the Divine Being, must be looked upon as a perfection or an excellent disposition, such an emanation of good is, in some sense, a multiplication of it; so far as the communication or external stream may be looked upon as any thing besides the fountain, so far it may be looked on as an increase of good. And if the fulness of good that is in the fountain, is in itself excellent and worthy to exist, then the emanation, or that which is as it were an increase, repetition or multiplication of it, is excellent and worthy to exist. Thus it is fit, since there is an infinite fountain of light and knowledge, that this light should shine forth in beams of communicated knowledge and understanding; and as there is an infinite fountain of holiness, moral excellence and beauty, so it should flow out in communicated holiness. And that as there is an infinite fulness of joy and happiness, so these should have an emanation, and become a fountain flowing out in abundant streams, as beams from the sun.

From this view it appears another way to be a thing in itself valuable, that there should be such things as the knowledge of God's glory in other beings, and a high esteem of it, love to it, and delight and complacence in it;—this appears, I say, in another way, viz., as these things are but the emanations of God's own knowledge, holiness and joy.

Thus it appears reasonable to suppose, that it was what God had respect to as an ultimate end of his creating the world, to communicate of his own infinite fulness of good; or rather it was his last end, that there might be a glorious and abundant emanation of his infinite fulness of good *ad extra*, or without himself; and the disposition to communicate himself, or diffuse his own FULNESS,* which we must conceive of as being originally in God as a perfection of his nature, was what moved him to create the world. But here, as much as possible to avoid confusion, I observe, that there is some impropriety in saying that a disposition in God to communicate himself *to the creature*, moved him to create the world. For though the diffusive disposition in the nature of God, that moved him to create the world, doubtless inclines him to communicate himself to the creature, when the creature exists; yet this cannot be all: because an inclination in God to communicate himself to an object, seems to presuppose the existence of the object, at least in idea. But the diffusive disposition that excited God to give creatures existence, was rather a communicative disposition in general, or a disposition in the fulness of the divinity to flow out and diffuse itself. Thus the disposition there is in the root and stock of a tree to diffuse and send forth its sap and life, is doubtless the reason of the communication of its sap and life to its buds, leaves and fruits, after these exist. But a disposition to communicate of its life and sap to its fruits, is not so

* I shall often use the phrase *God's fulness*, as signifying and comprehending all the good which is in God natural and moral, either excellence or happiness; partly because I know of no better phrase to be used in this general meaning; and partly because I am led here to by some of the inspired writers, particularly the apostle Paul, who often uses the phrase in this sense.

properly the cause of its producing those fruits, as its disposition to communicate itself, or diffuse its sap and life in general. Therefore, to speak more strictly according to truth, we may suppose, *that a disposition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fulness, was what excited him to create the world; and so that the emanation itself was aimed at by him as a last end of the creation.*

SECTION III.

Wherein it is considered how, on the supposition of God's making the forementioned things his last end, he manifests a supreme and ultimate regard to himself in all his works.

In the last section I observed some things, which are actually the consequence of the creation of the world, which seem absolutely valuable in themselves, and so worthy to be made God's last end in this work. I now proceed to inquire, how God's making such things as these his last end is consistent with his making himself his last end, or his manifesting an ultimate respect to himself in his acts and works. Because this is a thing I have observed as agreeable to the dictates of reason, that in all his proceedings he should set himself highest—therefore I would endeavor to show with respect to each of the forementioned things, that God, in making them his end, makes himself his end, so as in all to show a supreme and ultimate respect to himself; and how his infinite love to himself and delight in himself, will naturally cause him to value and delight in these things: or rather, how a value to these things is implied in his love to himself, or value of that infinite fulness of good that is in himself.

Now with regard to the first of the particulars mentioned above, viz., God's regard to the exercise and expression of those attributes of his nature, in their proper operations and effects, which consist in a sufficiency for these operations, it is not hard to conceive that God's regard to himself, and value for his own perfections, should cause him to value these exercises and expressions of his perfections; and that a love to them will dispose him to love their exhibition and exertment: inasmuch as their excellency consists in their relation to use, exercise and operation; as the excellency of wisdom consists in its relation to, and sufficiency for, wise designs and effects. God's love to himself, and his own attributes, will therefore make him delight in that, which is the use, end and operation of these attributes. If one highly esteem and delight in the virtues of a friend, as wisdom, justice, &c., that have relation to action, this will make him delight in the exercise and genuine effects of these virtues: so if God both esteem, and delight in his own perfections and virtues, he cannot but value and delight in the expressions and genuine effects of them. So that in delighting in the expressions of his perfections, he manifests a delight in his own perfections themselves: or in other words, he manifests a delight in himself; and in making these expressions of his own perfections his end, *he makes himself his end.*

And with respect to the second and third particulars, the matter is no less plain. For he that loves any being, and has a disposition highly to prize, and greatly to delight in his virtues and perfections, must, from the same disposition, be well pleased to have his excellencies known, acknowledged, esteemed and prized by others. He that loves and approves any being or thing, he naturally

loves and approves the love and approbation of that thing, and is opposite to the disapprobation and contempt of it. Thus it is when one loves another, and highly prizes the virtues of a friend. And thus it is fit it should be, if it be fit that the other should be beloved, and his qualification prized. And therefore thus it will necessarily be, if a being loves himself and highly prizes his own excellencies: and thus it is fit it should be, if it be fit he should thus love himself, and prize his own valuable qualities. That is, it is fit that he should take delight in his own excellencies being seen, acknowledged, esteemed, and delighted in. This is implied in a love to himself and his own perfections. And in seeking this, and making this his end, he seeks himself, and makes himself his end.

And with respect to the fourth and last particular, viz., God's being disposed to an abundant communication, and glorious emanation of that infinite fulness of good which he possesses in himself; as of his own knowledge, excellency, and happiness, in the manner which he does; if we thoroughly and properly consider the matter, it will appear, that herein also God makes himself his end, in such a sense, as plainly to manifest and testify a supreme and ultimate regard to himself.

Merely in this disposition to diffuse himself, or to cause an emanation of his glory and fulness, which is prior to the existence of any other being, and is to be considered as the inciting cause of creation, or giving existence to other beings, God cannot so properly be said to make the creature his end, as himself —for the creature is not as yet considered as existing. This disposition or desire in God, must be prior to the existence of the creature, even in intention and foresight. For it is a disposition that is the original ground of the existence of the creature; and even of the future intended and foreseen existence of the creature.—God's love, or benevolence, as it respects the creature, may be taken either in a larger, or stricter sense. In a larger sense it may signify nothing diverse from that good disposition in his nature to communicate of his own fulness in general; as his knowledge, his holiness, and happiness; and to give creatures existence in order to it. This may be called benevolence or love, because it is the same good disposition that is exercised in love; it is the very fountain from whence love originally proceeds, when taken in the most proper sense; and it has the same general tendency and effect in the creature's well-being.—But yet this cannot have any particular present or future created existence for its object; because it is prior to any such object, and the very source of the futurition of the existence of it. Nor is it really diverse from God's love to himself; as will more clearly appear afterwards.

But God's love may be taken more strictly, for this general disposition to communicate good, as directed to particular objects. Love, in the most strict and proper sense, presupposes the existence of the object beloved, at least in idea and expectation, and represented to the mind as future. God did not love angels in the strictest sense, but in consequence of his intending to create them, and so having an idea of future existing angels. Therefore his love to them was not properly what excited him to intend to create them. Love or benevolence strictly taken, presupposes an existing object, as much as pity, a miserable, suffering object.

This propensity in God to diffuse himself, may be considered as a propensity to himself diffused; or to his own glory existing in its emanation. A respect to himself, or an infinite propensity to, and delight in his own glory, is that which causes him to incline to its being abundantly diffused, and to delight in the emanation of it. Thus that nature in a tree, by which it puts forth buds, shoots

out branches, and brings forth leaves and fruit, is a disposition that terminates in its own complete self. And so the disposition in the sun to shine, or abundantly to diffuse its fulness, warmth and brightness, is only a tendency to its most glorious and complete state. So God looks on the communication of himself, and the emanation of the infinite glory and good that are in himself to belong to the fulness and completeness of himself; as though he were not in his most complete and glorious state without it. Thus the church of Christ (toward whom, and in whom are the emanations of his glory and communications of his fulness) is called the fulness of Christ: as though he were not in his complete state without her, as Adam was in a defective state without Eve And the church is called the glory of Christ, as the woman is the glory of the man, 1 Cor. xi. 7. Isaiah xlvi. 13, "I will place salvation in Zion, for Israel *my glory*." Very remarkable is that place, John xii. 23, 24, "And Jesus answered them, saying, The hour is come that the Son of Man should be glorified. Verily, I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit." He had respect herein, to the blessed fruits of Christ's death, in the conversion, salvation, and eternal happiness and holiness of those that should be redeemed by him. This consequence of his death he calls his glory; and his obtaining this fruit he calls his being glorified; as the flourishing beautiful produce of a corn of wheat sown in the ground is its glory. Without this he is alone as Adam was before Eve was created; but from him by his death proceeds a glorious offspring, in which he is communicated, that is, his fulness and glory: as from Adam in his deep sleep proceeds the woman, a beautiful companion to fill his emptiness, and relieve his solitariness By Christ's death, his fulness is abundantly diffused in many streams; and expressed in the beauty and glory of a great multitude of his spiritual offspring.—Indeed, after the creatures are intended to be created, God may be conceived of as being moved by benevolence to these creatures, in the strictest sense, in his dealings with, and works about them. His exercising his goodness, and gratifying his benevolence to them in particular, may be the spring of all God's proceedings through the universe, as being now the determined way of gratifying his general inclination to diffuse himself. Here God's acting for himself, or making himself his last end, and his acting for their sake, are not to be set in opposition, or to be considered as the opposite parts of a disjunction. They are rather to be considered as coinciding one with the other, and implied one in the other. But yet God is to be considered as first and original in his regard; and the creature is the object of God's regard consequentially, and by implication as it were comprehended in God; as shall be more particularly observed presently.

But how God's value for and delight in the emanations of his fulness in the work of creation, argues his delight in the infinite fulness of good there is in himself, and the supreme respect and regard he has for himself; and that in making these emanations of himself his end, he does ultimately make himself his end in creation, will more clearly appear by considering more particularly the nature and circumstances of these communications of God's fulness which are made, and which we have reason, either from the nature of things or the word of God, to suppose shall be made.

One part of that divine fulness which is communicated is the divine knowledge. That communicated knowledge which must be supposed to pertain to God's last end in creating the world, is the creature's knowledge of him. For this is the end of all other knowledge; and even the faculty of understanding would be vain without this. And this knowledge is most properly a communi-

cation of God's infinite knowledge, which primarily consists in the knowledge of himself. God, in making this his end, makes himself his end. This knowledge in the creature, is but a conformity to God. It is the image of God's own knowledge of himself. It is a participation of the same. It is as much the same as it is possible for that to be, which is infinitely less in degree: as particular beams of the sun communicated, are the light and glory of the sun in part.

Besides, God's perfections, or his glory, is the object of this knowledge, or the thing known; so that God is glorified in it, as hereby his excellency is seen. As therefore God values himself, as he delights in his own knowledge; he must delight in every thing of that nature: as he delights in his own light, he must delight in every beam of that light: and as he highly values his own excellency, he must be well pleased in having it manifested, and so glorified.

Another thing wherein the emanation of divine fulness that is, and will be made in consequence of the creation of the world, is the communication of virtue and holiness to the creature. This is a communication of God's holiness; so that hereby the creature partakes of God's own moral excellency; which is properly the beauty of the divine nature. And as God delights in his own beauty, he must necessarily delight in the creature's holiness; which is a conformity to, and participation of it, as truly as the brightness of a jewel, held in the sun's beams, is a participation or derivation of the sun's brightness, though immensely less in degree.—And then it must be considered wherein this holiness in the creature consists; viz., in love, which is the comprehension of all true virtue; and primarily in love to God, which is exercised in a high esteem of God, admiration of his perfections, complacency in them, and praise of them. All which things are nothing else but the heart's exalting, magnifying, or glorifying God; which, as I showed before, God necessarily approves of, and is pleased with, as he loves himself, and values the glory of his own nature.

Another part of God's fulness which he communicates, is his happiness. This happiness consists in enjoying and rejoicing in himself; and so does also the creature's happiness. It is, as has been observed of the other, a participation of what is in God; and God and his glory are the objective ground of it. The happiness of the creature consists in rejoicing in God; by which also God is magnified and exalted: joy, or the exulting of the heart in God's glory, is one thing that belongs to praise—so that God is all in all, with respect to each part of that communication of the divine fulness which is made to the creature. What is communicated is divine, or something of God; and each communication is of that nature, that the creature to whom it is made, is thereby conformed to God, and united to him, and that in proportion as the communication is greater or less. And the communication itself, is no other, in the very nature of it, than that wherein the very honor, exaltation and praise of God consists.

And it is farther to be considered, that the thing which God aimed at in the creation of the world, as the end which he had ultimately in view, was that communication of himself, which he intended throughout all eternity. And if we attend to the nature and circumstances of this eternal emanation of divine good, it will more clearly show how in making this his end, God testifies a supreme respect to himself, and makes himself his end. There are many reasons to think that what God has in view, in an increasing communication of himself throughout eternity, is an increasing knowledge of God, love to him, and joy in him. And it is to be considered that the more those divine communications increase in the creature, the more it becomes one with God; for so much the more is it

united to God in love, the heart is drawn nearer and nearer to God, and the union with him becomes more firm and close, and at the same time the creature becomes more and more conformed to God. The image is more and more perfect, and so the good that is in the creature comes forever nearer and nearer to an identity with that which is in God. In the view therefore of God, who has a comprehensive prospect of the increasing union and conformity through eternity, it must be an infinitely strict and perfect nearness, conformity and oneness. For it will forever come nearer and nearer to that strictness and perfection of union which there is between the Father and the Son; so that in the eyes of God, who perfectly sees the whole of it, in its infinite progress and increase, it must come to an eminent fulfilment of Christ's request, in John xvii. 23, "That they all may be *one*, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us, I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in *one*." In this view, those elect creatures which must be looked upon as the end of all the rest of the creation, considered with respect to the whole of their eternal duration, and as such made God's end, must be viewed as being, as it were, one with God. They were respected as brought home to him, united with him, centering most perfectly in him, and as it were swallowed up in him; so that his respect to them finally coincides and becomes one and the same with respect to himself. The interest of the creature, is, as it were, God's own interest, in proportion to the degree of their relation and union to God. Thus the interest of a man's family is looked upon as the same with his own interest; because of the relation they stand in to him; his propriety in them, and their strict union with him. But consider God's elect creatures with respect to their eternal duration, so they are infinitely dearer to God, than a man's family is to him. What has been said, shows that as all things are from God as their first cause and fountain; so all things tend to him, and in their progress come nearer and nearer to him through all eternity: which argues that he who is their first cause is their last end.

SECTION IV.

Some objections considered which may be made against the reasonableness of what has been said of God's making himself his last end.

Objection 1. Some may object against what has been said, as inconsistent with God's absolute independence and immutability, particularly the representation that has been made, as though God were inclined to a communication of his fulness and emanations of his own glory, as being his own most glorious and complete state. It may be thought that this does not well consist with God's being self-existent from all eternity, absolutely perfect in himself, in the possession of infinite and independent good. And that in general, to suppose that God makes himself his end, in the creation of the world, seems to suppose that he aims at some interest or happiness of his own, not easily reconcilable with his being happy, perfectly and infinitely happy in himself. If it could be supposed that God needed any thing; or that the goodness of his creatures could extend to him; or that they could be profitable to him; it might be fit, that God should make himself, and his own interest, his highest and last end in creating the world; and there would be some reason and ground for the preceding discourse. But seeing that God is above all need and all capacity of being added to and ad-

vanced, made better and happier in any respect; to what purpose should God make himself his end; or seek to advance himself in any respect by any of his works? How absurd is it to suppose that God should do such great things with a view to obtain what he is already most perfectly possessed of, and was so from all eternity; and therefore cannot now possibly need, nor with any color of reason be supposed to seek?

Answer 1. Many have wrong notions of God's happiness, as resulting from his absolute self-sufficience, independence, and immutability. Though it be true, that God's glory and happiness are in and of himself, are infinite and cannot be added to, unchangeable, for the whole and every part of which he is perfectly independent of the creature; yet it does not hence follow, nor is it true, that God has no real and proper delight, pleasure or happiness, in any of his acts or communications relative to the creature; or effects he produces in them; or in any thing he sees in the creature's qualifications, dispositions, actions and state. God may have a real and proper pleasure or happiness in seeing the happy state of the creature; yet this may not be different from his delight in himself; being a delight in his own infinite goodness; or the exercise of that glorious propensity of his nature to diffuse and communicate himself, and so gratifying this inclination of his own heart. This delight which God has in his creature's happiness, cannot properly be said to be what God receives from the creature. For it is only the effect of his own work in, and communications to the creature, in making it, and admitting it to a participation of his fulness. As the sun receives nothing from the jewel that receives its light, and shines only by a participation of its brightness.

With respect also to the creature's holiness: God may have a proper delight and joy in imparting this to the creature, as gratifying hereby his inclination, to communicate of his own excellent fulness. God may delight with true and great pleasure in beholding that beauty which is an image and communication of his own beauty, an expression and manifestation of his own loveliness. And this is so far from being an instance of his happiness not being in and from himself, that it is an evidence that he is happy in himself, or delights and has pleasure in his own beauty. If he did not take pleasure in the expression of his own beauty, it would rather be an evidence that he does not delight in his own beauty; that he hath not his happiness and enjoyment in his own beauty and perfection. So that if we suppose God has real pleasure and happiness in the holy love and praise of his saints, as the image and communication of his own holiness, it is not properly any pleasure distinct from the pleasure he has in himself; but is truly an instance of it.

And with respect to God's being glorified in this respect, that those perfections wherein his glory consists, are exercised and expressed in their proper and corresponding effects; as his wisdom in wise designs and well contrived works —his power in great effects—his justice in acts of righteousness—his goodness in communicating happiness; and so his showing forth the glory of his own nature, in its being exercised, exhibited, communicated, known, and esteemed; his having delight herein does not argue that his pleasure or happiness is not in himself, and his own glory; but the contrary. This is the necessary consequence of his delighting in the glory of his nature, that he delights in the emanation and effulgence of it.

Nor do any of these things argue any dependence in God on the creature for happiness. Though he has real pleasure in the creature's holiness and happiness; yet this is not properly any pleasure which he receives from the creature. For these things are what he gives the creature. They are wholly and entirely

from him. Therefore they are nothing that they give to God by which they add to him. His rejoicing therein, is rather a rejoicing in his own acts, and his own glory expressed in those acts, than a joy derived from the creature. God's joy is dependent on nothing besides his own act, which he exerts with an absolute and independent power. And yet, in some sense it can be truly said that God has the more delight and pleasure for the holiness and happiness of his creatures. Because God would be less happy, if he was less good: or if he had not that perfection of nature which consists in a propensity of nature to diffuse of his own fulness. And he would be less happy, if it were possible for him to be hindered in the exercise of his goodness, and his other perfections in their proper effects. But he has complete happiness, because he has these perfections, and cannot be hindered in exercising and displaying them in their proper effects. And this surely is not thus, because he is dependent; but because he is independent on any other that should hinder him.

From this view it appears, that nothing that has been said is in the least inconsistent with those expressions in the Scripture that signify that man cannot be profitable to God; that he receives nothing of us by any of our wisdom and righteousness. For these expressions plainly mean no more than that God is absolutely independent of us; that we have nothing of our own, no stock from whence we can give to God; and that no part of his happiness originates from man.

From what has been said it appears, that the pleasure that God hath in those things which have been mentioned, is rather a pleasure in diffusing and communicating to the creature, than in receiving from the creature. Surely, it is no argument of indigence in God, that he is inclined to communicate of his infinite fulness. It is no argument of the emptiness or deficiency of a fountain, that it is inclined to overflow.—Another thing signified by these expressions of Scripture is, that nothing that is from the creature, adds to or alters God's happiness, as though it were changeable either by increase or diminution. Nor does any thing that has been advanced in the least suppose or infer that it does, or is it in the least inconsistent with the eternity, and most absolute immutability of God's pleasure and happiness.—For though these communications of God, these exercises, operations, effects and expressions of his glorious perfections, which God rejoices in, are in time; yet his joy in them is without beginning or change. They were always equally present in the divine mind. He beheld them with equal clearness, certainty and fulness in every respect, as he doth now. They were always equally present; as with him there is no variableness or succession. He ever beheld and enjoyed them perfectly in his own independent and immutable power and will. And his view of, and joy in them is eternally, absolutely perfect, unchangeable and independent. It cannot be added to or diminished by the power or will of any creature; nor is in the least dependent on any thing mutable or contingent.

2. If any are not satisfied with the preceding answer, but still insist on the objection; let them consider whether they can devise any other scheme of God's last end in creating the world, but what will be equally obnoxious to this objection in its full force, if there be any force in it. For if God had any last end in creating the world, then there was something, in some respect future, that he aimed at, and designed to bring to pass by creating the world: something that was agreeable to his inclination or will; let that be his own glory, or the happiness of his creatures, or what it will. Now if there be something that God seeks as agreeable, or grateful to him, then in the accomplishment of it he is gratified. If the last end which he seeks in the creation of the world, be truly a thing grate-

rul to him (as certainly it is if it be truly his end and truly the object of his will), then it is what he takes a real delight and pleasure in. But then according to the argument of the objection, how can he have any thing future to desire or seek, who is already perfectly, eternally and immutably satisfied in himself? What can remain for him to take any delight in or to be further gratified by, whose eternal and unchangeable delight is in himself as his own complete object of enjoyment? Thus the objector will be pressed with his own objection; let him embrace what notion he will of God's end in the creation. And I think he has no way left to answer but that which has been taken above.

It may therefore be proper here to observe, that let what will be God's last end, that, he must have a real and proper pleasure in: whatever be the proper object of his will, he is gratified in. And the thing is either grateful to him in itself; or for something else for which he wills it: and so is his further end. But whatever is God's last end, that he wills *for its own sake;* as grateful to him in itself; or, which is the same thing, it is that which he truly delights in; or in which he has some degree of true and proper pleasure. Otherwise we must deny any such thing as will in God with respect to any thing brought to pass in time; and so must deny his work of creation, or any work of his providence to be truly voluntary. But we have as much reason to suppose that God's works in creating and governing the world, are properly the fruits of his will, as of his understanding. And if there be any such thing at all, as what we mean by *acts of will* in God; then he is not indifferent whether his will be fulfilled or not. And if he is not indifferent, then he is truly gratified and pleased in the fulfilment of his will: or, which is the same thing, he has a pleasure in it. And if he has a real pleasure in attaining his end, then the attainment of it belongs to his happiness. That in which God's delight or pleasure in any measure consists, his happiness in some measure consists. To suppose that God has pleasure in things, that are brought to pass in time, only figuratively and metaphorically; is to suppose that he exercises will about these things, and makes them his end only metaphorically.

3. The doctrine that makes God's creatures and not himself, to be his last end, is a doctrine the farthest from having a favorable aspect on God's absolute self-sufficience and independence. It far less agrees therewith than the doctrine against which this is objected. For we must conceive of the efficient as depending on his ultimate end. He depends on this end, in his desires, aims, actions and pursuits; so that he fails in all his desires, actions and pursuits, if he fails of his end.—Now if God himself be his last end, then in his dependence on his end, he depends on nothing but himself. If all things be of him, and to him, and he the first and the last, this shows him to be all in all: he is all to himself. He goes not out of himself in what he seeks; but his desires and pursuits as they originate from, so they terminate in himself; and he is dependent on none but himself in the beginning or end of any of his exercises or operations. But if not himself, but the creature, be his last end, then as he depends on his last end, he is in some sort dependent on the creature.

Objection 2. Some may object, that to suppose that God makes himself his highest and last end, is dishonorable to him; as it in effect supposes, that God does every thing from a selfish spirit. Selfishness is looked upon as mean and sordid in the creature; unbecoming and even hateful in such a worm of the dust as man. We should look upon a man as of a base and contemptible character, that should in every thing he did, be governed by selfish principles; should make his private interest his governing aim in all his conduct in life. How far then should we be from attributing any such thing to the Supreme Being, the

blessed and only potentate. Does it not become us to ascribe to him, the most noble and generous dispositions; and those qualities that are the most remote from every thing that is private, narrow and sordid?

Answer 1. Such an objection must arise from a very ignorant or inconsiderate notion of the vice of selfishness, and the virtue of generosity. If by selfishness be meant, a disposition in any being to regard himself; this is no otherwise vicious or unbecoming, than as one is less than a multitude; and so the public weal is of greater value than his particular interest. Among created beings one single person must be looked upon as inconsiderable in comparison of the generality; and so his interest as of little importance compared with the interest of the whole system: therefore in them, a disposition to prefer self, as if it were more than all, is exceeding vicious. But it is vicious on no other account than as it is a disposition that does not agree with the nature of things; and that which is indeed the greatest good. And a disposition in any one to forego his own interest for the sake of others, is no further excellent, no further worthy the name of generosity than it is a treating things according to their true value; a prosecuting something most worthy to be prosecuted; an expression of a disposition to prefer something to self-interest, that is indeed preferable in itself. But if God be indeed so great, and so excellent that all other beings are as nothing to him, and all other excellency be as nothing and less than nothing, and vanity in comparison of his; and God be omniscient, and infallible, and perfectly knows that he is infinitely the most valuable being; then it is fit that his heart should be agreeable to this, which is indeed the true nature and proportion of things, and agreeable to this infallible and all comprehending understanding which he has of them, and that perfectly clear light in which he views them; and so it is fit and suitable that he should value himself infinitely more than his creatures.

2. In created beings, a regard to self-interest may properly be set in opposition to the public welfare; because the private interest of one person may be inconsistent with the public good; at least it may be so in the apprehension of that person. That, which this person looks upon as his interest may interfere with, or oppose the general good. Hence his private interest may be regarded and pursued in opposition to the public. But this cannot be with respect to the Supreme Being, the author and head of the whole system, on whom all absolutely depend; who is the fountain of being and good to the whole. It is more absurd to suppose that his interest should be opposite to the interest of the universal system, than that the welfare of the head, heart, and vitals of the natural body, should be opposite to the welfare of the body. And it is impossible that God, who is omniscient, should apprehend the matter thus, viz., his interest, as being inconsistent with the good and interest of the whole.

3. God's seeking himself in the creation of the world, in the manner which has been supposed, is so far from being inconsistent with the good of his creatures, or any possibility of being so; that it is a kind of regard to himself that inclines him to seek the good of his creatures. It is a regard to himself that disposes him to diffuse and communicate himself. It is such a delight in his own internal fulness and glory, that disposes him to an abundant effusion and emanation of that glory. The same disposition, that inclines him to delight in his glory, causes him to delight in the exhibitions, expressions and communications of it. This is a natural conclusion. If there were any person of such a taste and disposition of mind, that the brightness and light of the sun seemed unlovely to him, he would be willing that the sun's brightness and light should be retained within itself: but they, that delight in it, to whom it appears lovely

and glorious, will esteem it an amiable and glorious thing to have it diffused and communicated through the world.

Here by the way it may be properly considered, whether some writers are not chargeable with inconsistence in this respect, viz., that whereas they speak against the doctrine of God's making himself his own highest and last end, as though this were an ignoble selfishness in God; when indeed he only is fit to be made the highest end, by himself and all other beings; inasmuch as he is the highest Being, and infinitely greater and more worthy than all others.—Yet with regard to creatures who are infinitely less worthy of supreme and ultimate regard, they (in effect at least) suppose that they necessarily at all times seek their own happiness, and make it their ultimate end in all, even their most virtuous actions: and that this principle, regulated by wisdom and prudence, as leading to that which is their true and highest happiness, is the foundation of all virtue and every thing that is morally good and excellent in them.

Objection 3. To what has been supposed, that God makes himself his end in this way, viz., in seeking that his glory and excellent perfection should be known, esteemed, loved and delighted in by his creatures, it may be objected, that this seems unworthy of God. It is considered as below a truly great man, to be much influenced in his conduct, by a desire of popular applause. The notice and admiration of a gazing multitude, would be esteemed but a low end, to be aimed at by a prince or philosopher, in any great and noble enterprise. How much more is it unworthy the great God, to perform his magnificent works, e. g., the creation of the vast universe, out of regard to the notice and admiration of worms of the dust: that the displays of his magnificence may be gazed at, and applauded by those who are infinitely more beneath him, than the meanest rabble are beneath the greatest prince or philosopher.

This objection is spacious. It hath a show of argument: but it will appear to be nothing but a show—if we consider,

1. Whether or no it be not worthy of God, to regard and value what is excellent and valuable in itself, and so to take pleasure in its existence.

It seems not liable to any doubt, that there could be nothing future, or no future existence worthy to be desired or sought by God, and so worthy to be made his end, if no future existence was valuable and worthy to be brought to effect. If when the world was not, there was any possible future thing fit and valuable in itself, I think the knowledge of God's glory, and the esteem and love of it must be so. Understanding and will are the highest kind of created existence. And if they be valuable, it must be in their exercise. But the highest and most excellent kind of their exercise, is in some actual knowledge and exercise of will. And certainly the most excellent actual knowledge and will, that can be in the creature, is the knowledge and the love of God. And the most true, excellent knowledge of God is the knowledge of his glory or moral excellence, and the most excellent exercise of the will consists in esteem and love, and a delight in his glory. If any created existence is in itself worthy to be, or any thing that ever was future is worthy of existence, such a communication of divine fulness, such an emanation and expression of the divine glory is worthy of existence. But if nothing that ever was future was worthy to exist, then no future thing was worthy to be aimed at by God in creating the world. And if nothing was worthy to be aimed at in creation, then nothing was worthy to be God's end in creation.

If God's own excellency and glory is worthy to be highly valued and delighted in by him, then the value and esteem hereof by others, is worthy to be regarded by him; for this is a necessary consequence. To make this plain, let it be con-

sidered how it is with regard to the excellent qualities of another. If we highly value the virtues and excellencies of a friend, in proportion as we do so, we shall approve of and like others' esteem of them; and shall disapprove and dislike the contempt of them. If these virtues are truly valuable, they are worthy that we should thus approve others' esteem, and disapprove their contempt of them. And the case is the same with respect to any being's own qualities or attributes. If he highly esteems them, and greatly delights in them, he will naturally and necessarily love to see esteem of them in others, and dislike their disesteem. And if the attributes are worthy to be highly esteemed by the being who hath them, so is the esteem of them in others worthy to be proportionably approved and regarded. I desire it may be considered, whether it be unfit that God should be displeased with contempt of himself. If not, but on the contrary, it be fit and suitable that he should be displeased with this, there is the same reason that he should be pleased with the proper love, esteem and honor of himself.

The matter may be also cleared, by considering what it would become us to approve and value with respect to any public society we belong to, e. g., our nation or country. It becomes us to love our country, and therefore it becomes us to value the just honor of our country. But the same that it becomes us to value and desire for a friend, and the same that it becomes us to desire and seek for the community, the same does it become God to value and seek for himself; i. e., on supposition it becomes God to love himself as well as it does men to love a friend or the public; which I think has been before proved.

Here are two things that ought particularly to be adverted to. 1. That in God, the love of himself, and the love of the public are not to be distinguished, as in man, because God's being, as it were, comprehends all. His existence, being infinite, must be equivalent to universal existence. And for the same reason that public affection in the creature is fit and beautiful, God's regard to himself must be so likewise. 2. In God, the love of what is fit and decent, or the love of virtue, cannot be a distinct thing from the love of himself. Because the love of God is that wherein all virtue and holiness does primarily and chiefly consist, and God's own holiness must primarily consist in the love of himself, as was before observed. And if God's holiness consists in love to himself, then it will imply an approbation of, and pleasedness with the esteem and love of him in others; for a being that loves himself, necessarily loves love to himself. If holiness in God consist chiefly in love to himself, holiness in the creature must chiefly consist in love to him. And if God loves holiness in himself, he must love it in the creature.

Virtue, by such of the late philosophers as seem to be in chief repute, is placed in public affection or general benevolence. And if the essence of virtue lies primarily in this, then the love of virtue itself is virtuous no otherwise than as it is implied in, or arises from this public affection, or extensive benevolence of mind. Because if a man truly loves the public, he necessarily loves love to the public.

Now, therefore, for the same reason, if universal benevolence in the highest sense, be the same thing with benevolence to the Divine Being, who is in effect universal being, it will follow, that love to virtue itself is no otherwise virtuous, than as it is implied in or arises from love to the Divine Being. Consequently God's own love to virtue is implied in love to himself; and is virtuous no otherwise than as it arises from love to himself. So that God's virtuous disposition, appearing in love to holiness in the creature, is to be resolved into the same thing with love to himself. And consequently whereinsoever he

makes virtue his end, he makes himself his end.—In fine, God, being as it were, an all comprehending Being, all his moral perfections, as his holiness, justice, grace and benevolence are some way or other to be resolved into a supreme and infinite regard to himself; and if so it will be easy to suppose that it becomes him to make himself his supreme and last end in his works.

I would here observe by the way, that if any insist that it becomes God to love and take delight in the virtue of his creatures for its own sake, in such a manner as not to love it from regard to himself, and that it supposeth too much selfishness to suppose that all God's delight in virtue is to be resolved into delight in himself: this will contradict a former objection against God's taking pleasure in communications of himself, viz., that inasmuch as God is perfectly independent and self-sufficient, therefore all his happiness and pleasure consists in the enjoyment of himself. For in the present objection it is insisted that it becomes God to have some pleasure, love or delight in virtue distinct from his delight in himself. So that if the same persons make both objections, they must be inconsistent with themselves.

2. In answer to the objection we are upon, as to God's creatures whose esteem and love he seeks, being infinitely inferior to God as nothing and vanity; I would observe that it is not unworthy of God to take pleasure in that which in itself is fit and amiable, even in those that are infinitely below him. If there be infinite grace and condescension in it, yet these are not unworthy of God, but infinitely to his honor and glory.

They who insist that God's own glory was not an ultimate end of his creation of the world; but that all that he had any ultimate regard to was the happiness of his creatures; and suppose that he made his creatures, and not himself, his last end, do it under a color of exalting and magnifying God's benevolence and love to his creatures.—But if his love to them be so great, and he so highly values them as to look upon them worthy to be his end in all his great works as they suppose; they are not consistent with themselves in supposing that God has so little value for their love and esteem. For as the nature of love, especially great love, causes him that loves to value the esteem of the person beloved; so that God should take pleasure in the creature's just love and esteem will follow both from God's love to himself and his love to his creatures. If he esteem and love himself, he must approve of esteem and love to himself, and disapprove the contrary. And if he loves and values the creature, he must value and take delight in their mutual love and esteem, because he loves not because he needs them.

3. As to what is alleged of its being unworthy of great men to be governed in their conduct and achievements by a regard to the applause of the populace; I would observe, what makes their applause to be worthy of so little regard, is their ignorance, giddiness and injustice. The applause of the multitude very frequently is not founded on any just view and understanding of things, but on humor, mistake, folly and unreasonable affections. Such applause is truly worthy to be disregarded. But it is not beneath a man of the greatest dignity and wisdom, to value the wise and just esteem of others, however inferior to him. The contrary, instead of being an expression of greatness of mind, would show a haughty and mean spirit. It is such an esteem in his creatures only, that God hath any regard to: for it is such an esteem only that is fit and amiable in itself.

Objection 4. To suppose that God makes himself his ultimate end in the creation of the world derogates from the freeness of his goodness, in his beneficence to his creatures; and from their obligations to gratitude for the good

communicated. For if God, in communicating his fulness, makes himself and not the creatures, his end; then what good he does, he does for himself, and not for them; for his own sake, and not theirs.

ANSWER. God and the creature, in this affair of the emanation of the divine fulness, are not properly set in opposition, or made the opposite parts of a disjunction. Nor ought God's glory and the creature's good to be spoken of as if they were properly and entirely distinct, as they are in the objection. This supposeth, that God's having respect to his glory, and the communication of good to his creatures, are things altogether different: That God's communicating his fulness for himself, and his doing it for them, are things standing in a proper disjunction and opposition. Whereas if we were capable of having more full and perfect views of God and divine things, which are so much above us, it is probable it would appear very clear to us, that the matter is quite otherwise; and that these things. instead of appearing entirely distinct, are implied one in the other. That God, in seeking his glory, therein seeks the good of his creatures. Because the emanation of his glory (which he seeks and delights in, as he delights in himself and his own eternal glory) implies the communicated excellency and happiness of his creatures. And that in communicating his fulness for them, he does it for himself. Because their good, which he seeks, is so much in union and communion with himself. God is their good. Their excellency and happiness is nothing but the emanation and expression of God's glory. God, in seeking their glory and happiness, seeks himself, and in seeking himself, i. e. himself diffused and expressed (which he delights in, as he delights in his own beauty and fulness), he seeks their glory and happiness.

This will the better appear, if we consider the degree and manner in which he aimed at the creature's excellency and happiness in his creating the world; viz., the degree and manner of the creature's glory and happiness during the whole of the designed eternal duration of the world he was about to create; which is in greater and greater nearness and strictness of union with himself, and greater and greater communion and participation with him in his own glory and happiness, in constant progression, throughout all eternity. As the creature's good was viewed in this manner when God made the world for it, viz., with respect to the whole of the eternal duration of it, and the eternally progressive union and communion with him; so the creature must be viewed as in infinite strict union with himself. In this view it appears that God's respect to the creature in the whole, unites with his respect to himself. Both regards are like two lines which seem at the beginning to be separate, but aim finally to meet in one, both being directed to the same centre. And as to the good of the creature itself, if viewed in its whole duration, and infinite progression, it must be viewed as infinite; and so not only being some communication of God's glory, but as coming nearer and nearer to the same thing in its infinite fulness. The nearer any thing comes to infinite, the nearer it comes to an identity with God. And if any good, as viewed by God, is beheld as infinite, it cannot be viewed as a distinct thing from God's own infinite glory.

The apostle's discourse of the great love of Christ to men, Eph. v. 25, to the end, leads us thus to think of the love of Christ to his church, as coinciding with his love to himself, by virtue of the strict union of the church with him. Thus, "Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it, that he might present it to himself a glorious church. So ought men to love their wives, as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself, even as the Lord the church; for we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones."

Now I apprehend that there is nothing in this manner of God's seeking the good of the creatures, or in his disposition to communicate of his own fulness to them, that at all derogates from the excellence of it, or the creature's obligation.

God's disposition to communicate good, or to cause his own infinite fulness to flow forth, is not the less properly called God's goodness, because the good that he communicates, is something of himself; a communication of his own glory, and what he delights in as he delights in his own glory. The creature has no less benefit by it; neither has such a disposition less of a direct tendency to the creature's benefit; or the less of a tendency to love to the creature, when the creature comes to exist. Nor is this disposition in God to communicate of and diffuse his own good, the less excellent, because it is implied in his love and regard to himself. For his love to himself does not imply it any otherwise, than as it implies a love to whatever is worthy and excellent. The emanation of God's glory, is in itself worthy and excellent, and so God delights in it; and his delight in this excellent thing, is implied in his love to himself, or his own fulness; because that is the fountain, and so the sum and comprehension of every thing that is excellent. And the matter standing thus, it is evident that these things cannot derogate from the excellency of this disposition in God, to an emanation of his own fulness, or communication of good to the creature.

Nor does God's inclination to communicate good in this manner, i. e. from regard to himself, or delight in his own glory, at all diminish the freeness of his beneficence in this communication. This will appear, if we consider particularly in what ways doing good to others from self-love, may be inconsistent with the freeness of beneficence. And I conceive there are only these two ways:

1. When any does good to another from confined self-love, that is opposite to a general benevolence. This kind of self-love is properly called *selfishness*. In some sense, the most benevolent, generous person in the world, seeks his own happiness in doing good to others, because he places his happiness in their good. His mind is so enlarged as to take them, as it were, into himself. Thus, when they are happy, he feels it, he partakes with them, and is happy in their happiness. This is so far from being inconsistent with the freeness of beneficence, that on the contrary, free benevolence and kindness consists in it. The most free beneficence that can be in men, is doing good, not from a confined selfishness, but from a disposition to general benevolence, or love to beings in general.

But now, with respect to the Divine Being, there is no such thing as such confined selfishness in him, or a love to himself, opposite to general benevolence. It is impossible, because he comprehends all entity, and all excellence in his own essence. The first Being, the eternal and infinite Being, is in effect, BEING IN GENERAL; and comprehends universal existence, as was observed before. God, in his benevolence to his creatures, cannot have his heart enlarged in such a manner as to take in beings that he finds, who are originally out of himself, distinct and independent. This cannot be in an infinite being, who exists alone from eternity. But he, from his goodness, as it were enlarges himself in a more excellent and divine manner. This is by communicating and diffusing himself; and so instead of finding, making objects of his benevolence; not by taking into himself what he finds distinct from himself, and so partaking of their good, and being happy in them, but by flowing forth, and expressing himself in them, and making them to partake of him, and rejoicing in himself expressed in them, and communicated to them.

2. Another thing, in doing good to others from self-love, that derogates from the freeness of the goodness, is doing good to others from dependence on them for the good we need or desire; which dependence obliges. So that in our beneficence we are not self-moved, but as it were constrained by something without ourselves. But it has been particularly shown already, that God's making himself his end, in the manner that has been spoken of, argues no dependence, but is consistent with absolute independence and self-sufficience.

And I would here observe, that there is something in that disposition in God to communicate goodness, which shows him to be independent and self-moved in it, in a manner that is peculiar, and above what is in the beneficence of creatures. Creatures, even the most gracious of them, are not so independent and self-moved in their goodness, but that in all the exercises of it, they are excited by some object that they find; something appearing good, or in some respect worthy of regard, presents itself, and moves their kindness. But God, being all and alone, is absolutely self-moved. The exercises of his communicative disposition are absolutely from within himself, not finding any thing, or any object to excite them or draw them forth; but all that is good and worthy in the object, and the very *being* of the object, proceeding from the overflowing of his fulness.

These things show that the supposition of God's making himself his last end, in the manner spoken of, does not at all diminish the creature's obligation to gratitude, for communications of good it receives. For if it lessen its obligation, it must be on one of the following accounts. Either, that the creature has not so much benefit by it, or that the disposition it flows from is not proper goodness, not having so direct a tendency to the creature's benefit, or that the disposition is not so virtuous and excellent in its kind, or that the beneficence is not so free. But it has been observed that none of these things take place, with regard to that disposition, which has been supposed to have excited God to create the world.

I confess there is a degree of indistinctness and obscurity in the close consideration of such subjects, and a great imperfection in the expressions we use concerning them, arising unavoidably from the infinite sublimity of the subject, and the incomprehensibleness of those things that are divine. Hence revelation is the surest guide in these matters, and what that teaches shall in the next place be considered. Nevertheless, the endeavors used to discover what the voice of reason is, so far as it can go, may serve to prepare the way, by obviating cavils insisted on by many; and to satisfy us that what the Word of God says of the matter, is not unreasonable, and thus prepare our minds for a more full acquiescence in the instructions it gives, according to the more natural and genuine sense of words and expressions, we find often used there concerning this subject.

CHAPTER II.

WHEREIN IT IS INQUIRED, WHAT IS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE HOLY SCRIPTURES CONCERNING GOD'S LAST END IN THE CREATION OF THE WORLD

SECTION I.

The Scriptures represent God as making himself his own last end in the creation of the world.

It is manifest, that the Scriptures speak, on all occasions, as though God made himself his end in all his works; and as though the same Being, who is the first cause of all things, were the supreme and last end of all things. Thus in Isa. xliv. 6, "Thus saith the Lord, the King of Israel, and his Redeemer the Lord of Hosts, I am the first, I also am the last, and besides me there is no God." Chap. xlviii. 12, "I am the first, and I am the last." Rev. i. 8, "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is, and was, and which is to come, the Almighty." Verse 11, "I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last." Verse 17, "I am the first and the last." Chap. xxi. 6, "And he said unto me, It is done. I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end." Chap. xxii. 13, "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last."

And when God is so often spoken of as the last as well as the first, and the end as well as the beginning, what is meant (or at least implied) is, that as he is the first efficient cause and fountain from whence all things originate; so he is the last final cause for which they are made; the final term to which they all tend in their ultimate issue. This seems to be the most natural import of these expressions; and is confirmed by other parallel passages; as Rom. xi. 36, "For of him, and through him, and to him are all things." Col. i. 16, "For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things were created by him, and for him." Heb. ii. 10, "For it became him, by whom are all things, and for whom are all things." In Prov. xvi. 4, it is said expressly, "The Lord hath made all things for himself."

And the manner is observable, in which God is said to be the last, to whom, and for whom are all things. It is evidently spoken of as a meet and suitable thing, a branch of his glory; a meet prerogative of the great, infinite and eternal Being; a thing becoming the dignity of him who is infinitely above all other beings; from whom all things are, and by whom they consist, and in comparison with whom, all other things are as nothing.

SECTION II.

Wherein some positions are advanced concerning a just method of arguing in this affair, from what we find in holy Scriptures.

We have seen that the Scriptures speak of the creation of the world as being for God, as its end. What remains therefore to be inquired into, is, *Which way do the Scriptures represent God as making himself his end?*

It is evident that God does not make his existence or being the end of the creation; nor can he be supposed to do so without great absurdity. His being and existence cannot be conceived of but as prior to any of God's acts or designs; they must be presupposed as the ground of them. Therefore it cannot be in this way that God makes himself the end of his creating the world. He cannot create the world to the end that he may have existence; or may have such attributes and perfections, and such an essence. Nor do the Scriptures give the least intimation of any such thing. Therefore, what divine effect, or what it is in relation to God, that is the thing which the Scripture teacheth us to be the end he aimed at in his works of creation, in designing of which, he makes *himself* his end.

In order to a right understanding of the Scripture doctrine, and drawing just inferences from what we find said in the word of God relative to this matter; so to open the way to a true and definitive answer to the above inquiry, I would lay down the following positions.

Position 1. That which appears to be spoken of as God's ultimate end in his works of providence in general, we may justly suppose to be his last end in the work of creation.—This appears from what was observed before (under the fifth particular of the introduction) which I need not now repeat.

Position 2. When any thing appears by the Scripture to be the last end of some of the works of God, which thing appears, in fact, to be the result, not only of this work, but of God's works in general; and although it be not mentioned as the end of those works, but only of some of them, yet being actually the result of other works as well as that, and nothing appears peculiar, in the nature of the case, that renders it a fit, and beautiful and valuable result of those particular works, more than of the rest; but it appears with equal reason desirable and valuable in the case of all works, of which it is spoken in the word of God as (and seen in fact to be) the effect; we may justly infer, that thing to be the last end of those other works also. For we must suppose it to be on account of the valuableness of the effect, that it is made the end of those works which it is expressly spoken of as the end; and this effect, by the supposition, being equally, and in like manner the result of the work, and of the same value, it is but reasonable to suppose, that it is the end of the work, of which it is naturally the consequence, in one case as well as in another.

Position 3. The ultimate end of God's creating the world, being also (as was before observed) the last end of all God's works of providence, and that in the highest sense, and being above all other things important, we may well presume that this end will be chiefly insisted on in the word of God, in the account it gives of God's designs and ends in his works of providence—and therefore, if there be any particular thing, that we find more frequently mentioned in Scripture as God's ultimate aim in his works of providence, than any thing else, this is a presumption that this is the supreme and ultimate end of God's works in general, and so the end of the work of creation.

Position 4. That which appears from the word of God to be his last end with respect to the moral world, or God's last end in the creation and disposal of the intelligent part of the system, and in the moral government of the world, that is God's last end in the work of creation in general. Because it is evident, from the constitution of the world itself, as well as from the word of God, that the moral part is the end of all the rest of the creation. The inanimate unintelligent part is made for the rational as much as a house is prepared for the inhabitant. And it is evident also from reason and the word of God, that it is with regard to what is moral in them, or for the sake of some moral

good in them, that moral agents are made and the world made for them. But it is further evident that whatsoever is the last end of that part of creation that is the end of all the rest, and for which all the rest of the world was made, must be the last end of the whole. If all the other parts of a watch are made for the hand of the watch, to move that aright, and for a due and proper regulation of that, then it will follow, that the last end of the hand, is the last end of the whole machine.

Position 5. That, which appears from the Scripture to be God's last end in the chief work or works of his providence, we may well determine is God's last end in creating the world. For as was observed, we may justly infer the end of a thing from the use of it. We may justly infer the end of a clock, a chariot, a ship, or water engine from the main use to which it is applied. But God's providence is his use of the world he has made. And if there be any work or works of providence that are evidently God's main work or works, herein appears and consists the main use that God makes of the creation.—From these two last positions we may infer the next, viz.

Position 6. Whatever appears by the Scriptures to be God's last end in his main work or works of providence towards the moral world, that we justly infer to be the last end of the creation of the world. Because, as was just now observed, the moral world is the chief part of the creation and the end of the rest; and God's last end in creating that part of the world, must be his last end in the creation of the whole. And it appears by the last position, that the end of God's main work or works of providence towards them, or the main use he puts them to, shows the last end for which he has made them; and consequently the main end for which he has made the whole world.

Position 7. That which divine revelation shows to be God's last end with respect to that part of the moral world which are good, or which are according to his mind, or such as he would have them be; I say that which is God's last end with respect to these (i. e. his last end in their being, and in their being good), this we must suppose to be the last end of God's creating the world. For it has been already shown that God's last end in the moral part of creation must be the end of the whole. But his end in that part of the moral world that are good, must be the last end for which he has made the moral world in general. For therein consists the goodness of a thing, viz., in its fitness to answer its end: or, at least this must be goodness in the eyes of the author of that thing. For goodness in his eyes is its agreeableness to his mind. But an agreeableness to his mind in what he makes for some end or use, must be an agreeableness or fitness to that end. For his end in this case is his mind. That which he chiefly aims at in that thing, is chiefly his mind with respect to that thing. And therefore they are good moral agents, who are fitted for the end for which God has made moral agents: as they are good machines, instruments and utensils that are fitted to the end they are designed for. And consequently that which is the chief end to which in being good they are fitted, that is the chief end of utensils. So that which is the chief end to which good created moral agents in being good are fitted, this is the chief end of moral agents, or the moral part of the creation; and consequently of the creation in general.

Position 8. That, which the word of God requires the intelligent and moral part of the world to seek as their main end, or to have respect to in that they do, and regulate all their conduct by, as their ultimate and highest end, that we have reason to suppose is the last end for which God has made them; and consequently, by position fourth, the last end for which he has made the whole world. A main difference between the intelligent and moral parts, and the rest

of the world, lies in this, that the former are capable of knowing their Creator, and the end for which he made them, and capable of actively complying with his design in their creation and promoting it; while other creatures cannot promote the design of their creation, only passively and eventually. And seeing they are capable of knowing the end for which their author has made them, it is doubtless their duty to fall in with it. Their wills ought to comply with the will of the Creator in this respect, in mainly seeking the same as their last end which God mainly seeks as their last end. This must be the law of nature and reason with respect to them. And we must suppose that God's revealed law, and the law of nature agree; and that his will, as a lawgiver, must agree with his will as a Creator. Therefore we justly infer, that the same thing which God's revealed law requires intelligent creatures to seek as their last and greatest end, that God their Creator has made their last end, and so the end of the creation of the world.

Position 9. We may well suppose that what seems in holy Scripture from time to time to be spoken of as the main end of the goodness of the good part of the moral world, so that the respect and relation their virtue or goodness has to that end, is what chiefly makes it valuable and desirable; I say, we may well suppose that to be the thing which is God's last end in the creation of the moral world; and so by position fourth, of the whole world. For the end of the goodness of a thing, is the end of the thing. Herein, it was observed before, must consist the goodness or valuableness of any thing in the eyes of him that made it for his use, viz., its being good for that use, or good with respect to the end for which he made it.

Position 10. That which persons who are described in Scripture as approved saints, and set forth as examples of piety, sought as their last and highest end in the things which they did, and which are mentioned as parts of their holy conversation, or instances of their good and approved behavior; that we must suppose, was what they ought to seek as their last end; and consequently by the preceding position was the same with God's last end in the creation of the world.

Position 11. That which appears by the word of God to be that end or event, in the desire of which, the souls of the good parts of the moral world, especially of the best, and in their best frames, do most naturally and directly exercise their goodness in, and in expressing of their desire of this event or end. they do most properly and directly express their respect to God; we may, I say, well suppose, that event or end to be the chief and ultimate end of a spirit of piety and goodness, and God's chief end in making the moral world, and so the whole world. For doubtless the most direct and natural desire and tendency of a spirit of true goodness in the good and best part of the moral world is to the chief end of goodness, and so the chief end of the creation of the moral world. And in what else can the spirit of true respect and friendship to God be expressed by way of desire, than desires of the same end, which God himself chiefly and ultimately desires and seeks in making them and all other things?

Position 12. Since the holy Scriptures teach us that Jesus Christ is the head of the moral world, and especially of all the good part of it; the chief of God's servants, appointed to be the head of his saints and angels, and set forth as the chief and most perfect pattern and example of goodness; we may well suppose by the foregoing positions, that what he sought as his last end, was God's last end in the creation of the world.

SECTION III.

Particular texts of Scripture, that show that God's glory is an ultimate End of the Creation.

WHAT God says in Isa. xlviii. 11, naturally leads us to suppose, that the way in which God makes himself his end in his work or works which he does for his own sake, is in making his glory his end. "For my own sake, even for my own sake will I do it. For how should my name be polluted? and I will not give my glory to another." Which is as much as to say, I will obtain my end, I will not forego my glory: another shall not take this prize from me. It is pretty evident here, that God's name and his glory, which seems to intend the same thing (as shall be observed more particularly afterwards), are spoken of as his last end in the great work mentioned, not as an inferior, subordinate end, subservient to the interest of others. The words are emphatical. The emphasis and repetition constrain us to understand that what God does, is ultimately for his own sake: "For *my own sake*, even for *my own sake* will I do it."

So the words of the apostle, in Rom. xi. 36, naturally lead us to suppose that the way in which all things are to God, is in being for his glory. "For of him, and through him, and to him are all things; to whom be glory forever and ever. Amen." In the preceding context, the apostle observes the marvellous disposals of divine wisdom, for causing all things to be to him in their final issue and result, as they are from him at first, and governed by him. His discourse shows how God contrived and brought this to pass in his disposition of things, viz., by setting up the kingdom of Christ in the world; leaving the Jews, and calling the Gentiles; and in what he would hereafter do in bringing in the Jews with the fulness of the Gentiles; with the circumstances of these wonderful works, so as greatly to show his justice and his goodness, magnify his grace, and manifest the sovereignty and freeness of it, and the absolute dependence of all on him—and then in the four last verses, breaks out into a most pathetic, rapturous exclamation, expressing his great admiration of the depth of divine wisdom in the steps he takes for the attaining his end, and causing all things to be to him; and finally, he expresses a joyful consent to God's excellent design in all to glorify himself, in saying, "to him be glory forever;" as much as to say, as all things are so wonderfully ordered for his glory, so let him have the glory of all, forevermore.

2. The glory of God is spoken of in holy Scripture as the last end for which that part of the moral world that are good were made. Thus in Isaiah xliii. 6, 7, "I will say to the North, give up, and to the South, keep not back.—Bring my sons from far, and my daughters from the ends of the earth, even every one that is called by my name; for I have created him for my glory, I have formed him, yea, I have made him." Isaiah lx. 21, "Thy people also shall be all righteous. They shall inherit the land forever; the branch of my planting, the work of my hand, *that I may be glorified*." Chap. lxi. 3, "That they may be called trees of righteousness, the planting of the Lord, *that he might be glorified*."

In these places we see that the glory of God is spoken of as the end of God's saints, the end for which he makes them, i. e. either gives them being, or gives them a being as saints, or both. It is said that God has made and formed them to be his sons and daughters, *for his own glory*; that they are trees of his planting, the work of his hands, as trees of righteousness, *that he might be*

glorified. And if we consider the words, especially as taken with the context in each of the places, it will appear quite unnatural to suppose that God's glory is here spoken of only as an end inferior and subordinate to the happiness of God's people; or as a prediction that God would create, form and plant them that he might be glorified, that so God's people might be happy. On the contrary, if we take the places with the context, they will appear rather as promises of making God's people happy, that God therein might he glorified. So is that in chapter xliii., as we shall see plainly if we take the whole that is said from the beginning of the chapter. It is wholly a promise of a future, great, and wonderful work of God's power and grace, delivering his people from all misery, and making them exceeding happy; and then the end of all, or the sum of God's design in all, is declared to be God's own glory. "I have redeemed thee, I have called thee by thy name, thou art mine. I will be with thee. When thou walkest through the fire thou shalt not be burnt, nor the flame kindle upon thee—thou art precious and honorable in my sight. I will give men for thee, and people for thy life. Fear not, I am with thee. I will bring my sons from far, and my daughters from the ends of the earth; every one that is called by my name, *for I have created him for my glory.*"

So it plainly is, chapter lx. 21. The whole chapter is made up of nothing but promises of future, exceeding happiness to God's church. But for brevity's sake, let us take only the two preceding verses. "The sun shall be no more thy light by day, neither for brightness shall the moon give light unto thee; but the Lord shall be unto thee an everlasting light, and thy God thy glory. Thy sun shall no more go down, neither shall thy moon withdraw itself; for the Lord shall be thine everlasting light; and the days of thy mourning shall be ended. Thy people also shall be all righteous; they shall inherit the land forever, the branch of my planting, the work of my hands," and then the end of all is added, "*that I might be glorified.*" All the preceding promises are plainly mentioned as so many parts or constituents of the great and exceeding happiness of God's people; and God's glory is mentioned rather as God's end, or the sum of his design in this happiness, than this happiness as the end of this glory. Just in like manner is the promise in the third verse of the next chapter. "To appoint to them that mourn in Zion, to give to them beauty for ashes, the oil of joy for mourning, the garment of praise for the spirit of heaviness, that they might be called trees of righteousness, the planting of the Lord, *that he might be glorified.*" The work of God promised to be effected, is plainly an accomplishment of the joy, gladness and happiness of God's people, instead of their mourning and sorrow; and the end in which the work issues, or that in which God's design in this work is obtained and summed up, is his glory. This proves by the seventh position, that God's glory is the end of the creation.

The same thing may be argued from Jer. xiii. 11: "For as a girdle cleaveth to the loins of a man, so have I caused to cleave unto me the whole house of Israel, and the whole house of Judah, saith the Lord; that they might be unto me for a people, and for a name, and for a praise, and for a *glory*, but they would not hear." That is, God sought to make them to be his own holy people; or, as the apostle expresses it, his peculiar people, zealous of good works; that so they might be a glory to him, as girdles were used in those days for ornament and beauty, and as badges of dignity and honor.* Which is agreeable to the places observed before, that speak of the church as the glory of Christ.

Now when God speaks of himself, as seeking a peculiar and holy people for himself, to be for his glory and honor, as a man that seeks an ornament and

* See verse 9, and also Isaiah iii. 24, xxii. 21, and xxiii. 19. 2 Sam. xviii. 11. Exod. xxviii. 9.

badge of honor for his glory, it is not natural to understand it merely of a subordinate end, as though God had no respect to himself in it, but only the good of others. If so, the comparison would not be natural; for men are commonly wont to seek their own glory and honor in adorning themselves, and dignifying themselves with badges of honor, out of respect to themselves.

The same doctrine seems to be taught, Eph. i. 5, 6. "Having predestinated us to the adoption of children, by Jesus Christ, unto himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace."

The same may be argued from Isaiah xliv. 23, "For the Lord hath redeemed Jacob, he hath glorified himself in Israel." And chapter xlix. 3, "Thou art my servant Jacob, in whom I will be glorified." John xvii. 10, "And all mine are thine, and thine are mine, and I am glorified in them." 2 Thess. i. 10, "When he shall come to be glorified in his saints." Verses 11, 12, "Wherefore also we pray always for you, that our God would count you worthy of his calling, and fulfil all the good pleasure of his goodness, and the work of faith with power; that the name of our Lord Jesus may be glorified in you, and ye in him, according to the grace of God and our Lord Jesus Christ."

3. The Scripture speaks from time to time of God's glory, as though it were his ultimate end of the goodness of the moral part of the creation; and that end, in a respect and relation to which chiefly it is, that the value or worth of their virtue consists. As in Phil. i. 10, 11, "That ye may approve things that are excellent, that ye may be sincere, and without offence till the day of Christ: being filled with the fruits of righteousness, which are by Jesus Christ, unto the glory and praise of God." Here the apostle shows how the fruits of righteousness in them are valuable and how they answer their end, viz., in being "by Jesus Christ to the praise and glory of God." John xv. 8, "Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit." Signifying that by this means it is, that the great end of religion is to be answered. And in 1 Peter iv. 11, the apostle directs the Christians to regulate all their religious performances, with reference to that one end. "If any man speak, let him speak as the oracles of God. If any man minister, let him do it as of the ability which God giveth, that God in all things may be glorified; to whom be praise and dominion forever and ever. Amen." And from time to time, embracing and practising true religion, and repenting of sin, and turning to holiness, is expressed by glorifying God, as though that were the sum and end of the whole matter. Rev. xi. 13, "And in the earthquake were slain of men seven thousand; and the remnant were affrighted, and gave glory to the God of heaven." So, Rev. xiv. 6, 7, "And I saw another angel fly in the midst of heaven, having the everlasting gospel to preach to them that dwell on the earth;—saying, with a loud voice, fear God, and give glory to him." As though this were the sum and end of that virtue and religion, which was the grand design of preaching the gospel everywhere through the world. Rev. xvi. 9, "And repented not, to give him glory." Which is as much as to say, they did not forsake their sins and turn to true religion, that God might receive that which is the great end he seeks, in the religion he requires of men. See to the same purpose, Psalm xxii. 21—23, Isa. lxvi. 19, xxiv. 15, xxv. 3, Jer. xiii. 15, 16, Dan. v. 23, Rom. xv. 5, 6.

And as the exercise of true religion and virtue in Christians is summarily expressed by their glorifying God; so when the good influence of this on others, as bringing them by the example to turn to the ways and practice of true goodness, is spoken of, it is expressed in the same manner. Matth. v. 16, "Let your light so shine before men, that others seeing your good works, may glorify your Father which is in heaven." 1. Pet. ii. 12, "Having your conver-

sation honest among the Gentiles, that whereas they speak evil against you as evil doers, they may by your good works which they behold, glorify God in the day of visitation."

That the ultimate end of moral goodness, or righteousness, is answered in God's glory being attained, is supposed in the objection which the apostle makes, or supposes some will make, in Rom. iii. 7: "For if the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie unto his glory, why am I judged as a sinner?" i. e., seeing the great end of righteousness is answered by my sin, in God's being glorified, why is my sin condemned and punished; and why is not my vice equivalent to virtue?

And the glory of God is spoken of as that wherein consists the value and end of particular graces; as of faith, Rom. iv. 20; "He staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief, but was strong in faith, giving glory to God." Phil. ii. 11, "That every tongue should confess that Jesus is the Lord, to the glory of God the Father." Of repentance, Josh. vi. 19, "Give, I pray thee, glory to the Lord God of Israel, and make confession unto him." Of Charity; 2 Cor. viii. 19, "With this grace, which is administered by us, to the glory of the same Lord, and declaration of your ready mind." Thanksgiving and praise; Luke vii. 18, "There are not found that returned to give glory to God, save this stranger." Psalm l. 23, "Whoso offereth praise glorifieth me, and to him that ordereth his conversation aright, will I show the salvation of God." Concerning which last place it may be observed, God here seems to say this to such as abounded in their sacrifices and outward ceremonies of religion, as taking it for granted, and as what they knew already, and supposed in their religious performances, that the end of all religion was to glorify God. They supposed they did this in the best manner, in offering a multitude of sacrifices (see the preceding part of the Psalm). But here God corrects this mistake, and informs that this grand end of religion is not attained this way, but in offering the more spiritual sacrifices of praise and a holy conversation.

In fine, the words of the apostle in 1 Cor. vi. 20, are worthy of particular notice: "Ye are not your own, for ye are bought with a price; therefore glorify God in your body, and in your spirit, which are his." Here not only is glorifying God spoken of, as what summarily comprehends the end of that religion and service of God, which is the end of Christ's redeeming us; but here I would further remark this, that the apostle in this place urges, that inasmuch as we are not our own, but bought for God, that we might be his; therefore we ought not to act as if we were our own, but as God's; and should not use the members of our bodies, or faculties of our souls for ourselves, as making ourselves our end, but for God, as making him our end. And he expresses the way in which we are to make God our end, viz., in making his glory our end: "Therefore glorify God in your body and in your spirit, which are his." Here it cannot be pretended, that though Christians are indeed required to make God's glory their end; yet it is but as a subordinate end, as subservient to their own happiness, as a higher end; for then in acting chiefly and ultimately for their own selves, they would use themselves more as their own, than as God's; which is directly contrary to the design of the apostle's exhortation, and the argument he is upon; which is, that we should give ourselves, as it were, away from ourselves to God, and use ourselves as his, and not our own, acting for his sake, and not our own sakes. Thus it is evident by *Position* 9, that the glory of God is the last end for which he created the world.

4. There are some things in the word of God, that lead us to suppose that it requires of men, that they should desire and seek God's glory, as their high

est and last end in what they do. As particularly the passage last mentioned. This appears from what has been just now observed upon it. The same may be argued from 1 Cor. x. 30: "Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." And 1 Pet iv. 11, "That God in all things may be glorified;" which was mentioned before. And it may be argued that Christ requires his followers should desire and seek God's glory in the first place, and above all things else, from that prayer which he gave his disciples, as the pattern and rule for the direction of his followers in their prayers. The first petition of which is, "Hallowed be thy name." Which in Scripture language is the same with "glorified be thy name;" as is manifest from Lev. x. 3, Ezek. xxviii. 22, and many other places. Now our last and highest end is doubtless what should be first in our desires, and consequently first in our prayers; and therefore we may argue, that since Christ directs that God's glory should be first in our prayers, therefore this is our last end. This is further confirmed by the conclusion of the Lord's prayer, "For thine is the kingdom, the power and glory." Which, as it stands in connection with the rest of the prayer, implies that we desire and ask all these things, which are mentioned in each petition, with a subordination, and in subservience to the dominion and glory of God; in which all our desires ultimately terminate, as their last end. God's glory and dominion are the two first things mentioned in the prayer, and are the subject of the first half of the prayer; and they are the two last things mentioned in the same prayer, in its conclusion: and God's glory is the Alpha and Omega in the prayer. From these things we may argue, according to *Position* 8, that God's glory is the last end of the creation.

5. The glory of God appears, by the account given in the word of God, to be that end or event, in the earnest desires of which, and in their delight in which, the best part of the moral world, and when in their best frames, do most naturally express the direct tendency of the spirit of true goodness, and give vent to the virtuous and pious affections of their heart, and do most properly and directly testify their supreme respect to their Creator. This is the way in which the holy apostles, from time to time, gave vent to the ardent exercises of their piety, and expressed and breathed forth their regard to the Supreme Being. Rom. xi. 36, "To whom be glory forever and ever. Amen." Chap. xvi. 27, "To God only wise, be glory, through Jesus Christ, forever. Amen." Gal. i. 4, 5, "Who gave himself for our sins, that he might deliver us from this present evil world, acording to the will of God and our Father, to whom be glory forever and ever. Amen." 2 Tim. iv. 18, "And the Lord shall deliver me from every evil work, and will preserve me to his heavenly kingdom; to whom be glory forever and ever. Amen." Eph. iii. 21, "Unto him be glory in the church by Christ Jesus throughout all ages, world without end." Heb. xiii. 21, "Through Jesus Christ, to whom be glory forever and ever. Amen." Phil. iv. 20, "Now unto God and our Father, be glory forever and ever. Amen." 2 Pet. iii. 18, "To him be glory both now and forever. Amen." Jude 25, "To the only wise God our Saviour, be glory and majesty, dominion and power both now and ever. Amen." Rev. i. 5, 6, "Unto him that loved us &c.—to him be glory and dominion forever and ever. Amen." It was in this way that holy David, the sweet Psalmist of Israel, vented the ardent tendencies and desires of his pious heart. 1 Chron. xvi. 28, 29, "Give unto the LORD, ye kindreds of the people, give unto the LORD glory and strength; give unto the LORD the glory due unto his name." We have much the same expressions again, Psal. xxix. 1, 2, and lxix. 7, 8. See also, Psal. lvii. 5, lxxii. 18, 19, cxv. 1. So the whole church of God, through all parts of the earth. Isa. xlii. 10—12. In

like manner the saints and angels in heaven express the piety of their hearts. Rev. iv. 9, 11, and v. 11—14, and vii. 12. This is the event that the hearts of the seraphim especially exult in, as appears by Isa. vi. 2, 3, "Above it stood the seraphim. And one cried unto another and said, Holy, holy, holy is the LORD of Hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory." So at the birth of Christ, Luke ii. 14, "Glory to God in the highest," &c.

It is manifest that these holy persons in earth and heaven, in thus expressing their desires of the glory of God, have respect to it, not merely as a subordinate end, or merely for the sake of something else; but as that which they look upon in itself valuable, and in the highest degree so. It would be absurd to say, that in these ardent exclamations, they are only giving vent to their vehement benevolence to their fellow creatures, and expressing their earnest desires that God might be glorified, that so his subjects may be made happy by the means. It is evident it is not so much love, either to themselves, or fellow creatures, which they express, as their exalted and supreme regard to the most high and infinitely glorious Being. When the church says, "Not unto us, not unto us, O Jehovah, but to thy name give glory," it would be absurd to say, that she only desires that God may have glory, as a necessary or convenient means of their own advancement and felicity. From these things it appears, by the eleventh position, that God's glory is the end of the creation.

6. The Scripture leads us to suppose, that Christ sought God's glory, as his highest and last end. John vii. 18, "He that speaketh of himself, seeketh his own glory; but he that seeketh his glory that sent him, the same is true, and no unrighteousness is in him." When Christ says, he did not seek his own glory, we cannot reasonably understand him, that he had no regard to his own glory, even the glory of the human nature: for the glory of that nature was part of the reward promised him, and of the joy set before him. But we must understand him, that this was not his ultimate aim; it was not the end that chiefly governed his conduct; and therefore when, in opposition to this, in the latter part of the sentence, he says, "But he that seeketh his glory that sent him, the same is true," &c., it is natural from the antithesis to understand him, that this was his ultimate aim, his supreme governing end. John xii. 27, 28, "Now is my soul troubled, and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour: but for this cause came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name." Christ was now going to Jerusalem, and expected in a few days there to be crucified, and the prospect of his last sufferings, in this near approach, was very terrible to him. Under this distress of mind, in so terrible a view, he supports himself with a prospect of what would be the consequence of his sufferings, viz., God's glory. Now, it is the end that supports the agent in any difficult work that he undertakes, and above all others, his ultimate and supreme end. For this is above all others valuable in his eyes; and so, sufficient to countervail the difficulty of the means. That is, the end, which is in itself agreeable and sweet to him, which ultimately terminates his desires, is the centre of rest and support; and so must be the fountain and sum of all the delight and comfort he has in his prospects, with respect to his work. Now Christ has his soul straitened and distressed with a view of that which was infinitely the most difficult part of his work, which was just at hand. Now certainly if his mind seeks support in the conflict from a view of his end, it must most naturally repair to the highest end, which is the proper fountain of all support in this case. We may well suppose, that when his soul conflicts with the appearance of the most extreme difficulties, it would resort for support to the idea of his supreme and ultimate end, the fountain of all the support and comfort he has in the means, or the work. The same

thing, viz., Christ's seeking the glory of God as his ultimate end, is manifest by what Christ says, when he comes yet nearer to the hour of his last sufferings, in that remarkable prayer, the last he ever made with his disciples, on the evening before his crucifixion; wherein he expresses the sum of his aims and desires. His first words are, "Father, the hour is come, glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee." As this is his first request, we may suppose it to be his supreme request and desire, and what he ultimately aimed at in all. If we consider what follows to the end, all the rest that is said in the prayer, seems to be but an amplification of this great request.

On the whole, I think it is pretty manifest, that Jesus Christ sought the glory of God as his highest and last end; and that therefore, by position twelfth, this was God's last end in the creation of the world.

7. It is manifest from Scripture, that God's glory is the last end of that great work of providence, the work of redemption by Jesus Christ. This is manifest from what is just now observed, of its being the end ultimately sought by Jesus Christ the Redeemer. And if we further consider the texts mentioned in the proof of that, and take notice of the context, it will be very evident, that it was what Christ sought as his last end, in that great work which he came into the world upon, viz., to procure redemption for his people. It is manifest that Christ professes in John vii. 18, that he did not seek his own glory in what he did, but the glory of him that sent him. He means that he did not seek his own glory, but the glory of him that sent him, in the work of his ministry; the work he performed, and which he came into the world to perform, and which his Father sent him to work out, which is the work of redemption. And with respect to that text, John xii. 27, 28, it has been already observed, that Christ comforted himself in the view of the extreme difficulty of his work, which was the work of redemption, in the prospect of that which he had respect to, and rejoiced in, as the highest, ultimate and most valuable excellent end of that work, which he set his heart upon, and delighted most in. And in the answer that the Father made him from heaven at that time, in the latter part of the same verse, "I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again," the meaning plainly is, that God had glorified his name in what Christ had done, in the work he sent him upon, and would glorify it again, and to a greater degree, in what he should further do, and in the success thereof. Christ shows that he understood it thus, in what he says upon it, when the people took notice of it, wondering at the voice; some saying, that it thundered, others, that an angel spake to him. Christ says, "This voice came not because of me, but for your sakes." And then he says (exulting in the prospect of this glorious end and success), "Now is the judgment of this world; now is the prince of this world cast out, and I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." In the success of the same work of redemption, he places his own glory, as was observed before, in these words, in the 23d and 24th verses of the same chapter: "The hour is come, that the Son of Man should be glorified. Verily, verily I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit."

So it is manifest that when he seeks his own and his Father's glory, in that prayer, John xvii. (which, it has been observed, he then seeks as his last end), he seeks it as the end of that great work he came into the world upon, which he is now about to finish in his death. What follows through the whole prayer, plainly shows this; and particularly the 4th and 5th verses. "I have glorified thee on the earth: I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do. And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self." Here it is

pretty plain that declaring to his Father, that he had glorified him on earth, and finished the work God gave him to do, meant that he had finished the work which God gave him to do for this end, viz., that he might be glorified He had now finished that foundation that he came into the world to lay for his glory. He had laid a foundation for his Father's obtaining his will, and the utmost that he designed. By which it is manifest, that God's glory was the utmost of his design, or his ultimate end in this great work.

And it is manifest by John xiii. 31, 32, that the glory of the Father, and his own glory, are what Christ exulted in, in the prospect of his approaching sufferings, when Judas was gone out to betray him, as the end his heart was mainly set upon, and supremely delighted in. "Therefore when he was gone out, Jesus said, Now is the Son of Man glorified, and God is glorified in him. If God be glorified in him, God shall also glorify him in himself, and shall straightway glorify him."

That the glory of God is the highest and last end of the work of redemption, is confirmed by the song of the angels at Christ's birth. Luke ii. 14, "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth, peace and good will towards men." It must be supposed that they knew what was God's last end in sending Christ into the world: and that in their rejoicing on the occasion of his incarnation, their minds would be most taken up with, and would most rejoice in that which was most valuable and glorious in it; which must consist in its relation to that which was its chief and ultimate end. And we may further suppose, that the thing which chiefly engaged their minds, as what was most glorious and joyful in the affair, is what would be first expressed in that song which was to express the sentiments of their minds, and exultation of their hearts.

The glory of the Father and the Son is spoken of as the end of the work of redemption, in Phil. ii. 6—11, very much in the same manner as in John xii. 23, 28, and xiii. 31, 32, and xvii. 1, 4, 5, "Who being in the form of God, made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross: wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name, &c., that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, and every tongue confess, that Jesus is the Lord, *to the glory of God the Father.*" So God's glory, or the praise of his glory, is spoken of as the end of the work of redemption, in Eph. i. 3, &c., "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ: according as he hath chosen us in him.—Having predestinated us to the adoption of children—*to the praise of the glory of his grace.*" And in the continuance of the same discourse concerning the redemption of Christ, in what follows in the same chapter, God's glory is once and again mentioned as the great end of all. Several things belonging to that great redemption are mentioned in the following verses; such as God's great wisdom in it, verse 8. The clearness of light granted through Christ, verse 9. God's gathering together in one, all things in heaven and earth in Christ, verse 10. God's giving the Christians that were first converted to the Christian faith from among the Jews, an interest in this great redemption, verse 11. Then the great end is added, verse 12. "That we should be *to the praise of his glory*, who first trusted in Christ." And then is mentioned the bestowing of the same great salvation on the Gentiles, in its beginning or first fruits in the world, and in the completing it in another world, in the two next verses. And then the same great end is added again: "In whom ye also trusted, after that ye heard the word of truth, the gospel of

your salvation; in whom also, after that ye believed, ye were sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise, which is the earnest of our inheritance, until the redemption of the purchased possession, *unto the praise of his glory.*" The same thing is expressed much in the same manner, in 2 Cor. iv. 14, 15, "He which raised up the Lord Jesus, shall raise up us also by Jesus, and shall present us with you. For all things are for your sake, that the abundance of grace might through the thanksgiving of many, redound *to the glory of God.*"

The same is spoken of as the end of the work of redemption in the Old Testament. Psal. lxxix. 9, "Help us, O God of our salvation, for the glory of thy name; deliver us and purge away our sins, for thy name's sake." So in the prophecies of the redemption of Jesus Christ. Isa. xliv. 23, "Sing, O ye heavens; for the Lord hath done it; shout, ye lower parts of the earth: break forth into singing, ye mountains, O forest, and every tree therein; for the Lord hath redeemed Jacob, and GLORIFIED HIMSELF in Israel." Thus the works of creation are called upon to rejoice at the attaining of the same end, by the redemption of God's people, that the angels rejoiced at, when Christ was born. See also chap. xlviii. 10, 11, and xliv. 3.

Thus it is evident that the glory of God is the ultimate end of the work of redemption,—which is the chief work of providence towards the moral world, as is abundantly manifest from Scripture: the whole universe being put in subjection to Jesus Christ; all heaven and earth, angels and men being subject to him, as executing this office; and put under him to that end, that all things may be ordered by him, in subservience to the great designs of his redemption; all power, as he says, being given to him, in heaven and in earth, that he may give eternal life to as many as the Father has given him; and he, being exalted far above all principality, and power, and might and dominion, and made head over all things to the church. The angels being put in subjection to him, that he may employ them all as ministering spirits, for the good of them that shall be the heirs of his salvation; and all things being so governed by their Redeemer for them that all things are theirs, whether things present or things to come; and all God's works of providence in the moral government of the world, which we have an account of in Scripture history, or that are foretold in Scripture prophecy, being evidently subordinate to the great purposes and ends of this great work. And besides, the work of redemption is that work, by which good men are, as it were, created, or brought into being, as good men, or as restored to holiness and happiness. The work of redemption is a new creation, according to Scripture representation, whereby men are brought into a new existence, or are made new creatures.

From these things it follows, according to the 5th, 6th and 7th positions, that the glory of God is the last end of the creation of the world.

8. The Scripture leads us to suppose, that God's glory is his last end in his moral government of the world in general. This has been already shown concerning several things that belong to God's moral government of the world. As particularly, in the work of redemption, the chief of all his dispensations, in his moral government of the world. And I have also observed it, with respect to the duty which God requires of the subjects of his moral government, in requiring them to seek his glory as their last end. And this is actually the last end of the moral goodness required of them; the end which gives their moral goodness its chief value. And also, that it is what that person which God has set at the head of the moral world, as its chief governor, even Jesus Christ, seeks as his chief end. And it has been shown, that it is the chief end for which that part of the moral world which are good, are made, or have their

existence as good. . now further observe, that this is the end of the establishment of the public worship and ordinances of God among mankind. Hag i. 8, "Go up to the mountain, and bring wood, and build the house; and I will take pleasure in it, and I will BE GLORIFIDE, saith the LORD." This is spoken of as the end of God's promises of rewards, and of their fulfilment. 2 Cor. i. 20, "For all the promises of God in him are yea, and in him amen, *to the glory of God* by us." And this is spoken of as the end of the execution of God's threatenings, in the punishment of sin. Num. xiv. 20—23, "And the LORD said, I have pardoned according to thy word. But as truly as I live, all the earth shall be filled with *the glory of Jehovah*. Because all these men, &c.—Surely they shall not see the land." The glory of Jehovah is evidently here spoken of, as that which he had regard to, as his highest and ultimate end; which, therefore, he could not fail of; but must take place everywhere, and in every case, through all parts of his dominion, whatever became of men. And whatever abatements might be made, as to judgments deserved; and whatever changes might be made in the course of God's proceedings, from compassion to sinners; yet the attaining of God's glory was an end, which being ultimate and supreme, must in no case whatsoever give place. This is spoken of as the end of God's executing judgments on his enemies in this world. Exod. xiv. 17, 18, "And I will get me honor (*Ikhabhedha*, I will be glorified) upon Pharaoh, and upon all his host," &c. Ezek. xxviii. 22, "Thus saith the Lord God, Behold I am against thee, O Zion, and I *will be glorified* in the midst of thee: and they shall know that I am the Lord, when I shall have executed judgments in her, and shall be *sanctified* in her." So Ezek. xxxix. 13, "Yea, all the people of the land shall bury them: and it shall be to them a renown, the day *that I shall be glorified*, saith the Lord God."

And this is spoken of as the end, both of the executions of wrath, and in the glorious exercises of mercy, in the misery and happiness of another world. Rom. ix. 22, 23, "What if God, willing to show his wrath, and make his power known, endured with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory." And this is spoken of as the end of the day of judgment, which is the time appointed for the highest exercises of God's authority as moral governor of the world; and is, as it were, the day of the consummation of God's moral government, with respect to all his subjects in heaven, earth and hell. 2 Thess. i. 9, 10, "Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from *the glory of his power*; when he shall come *to be glorified* in his saints, and *to be admired* in all them that believe." Then his glory shall be obtained, with respect both to saints and sinners.

From these things it is manifest by the fourth position, that God's glory is the ultimate end of the creation of the world.

9. It appears from what has been already observed, that the glory of God is spoken of in Scripture as the last end of many of God's works; and it is plain that this thing is in fact the issue and result of the works of God's common providence, and of the creation of the world. Let us take God's glory in what sense soever, consistent with its being something brought to pass, or a good attained by any work of God, certainly it is the consequence of these works; and besides it is expressly so spoken of in Scripture. This is implied in Psalm viii. 1, wherein are celebrated the works of creation; the heavens being the works of God's fingers; the moon and the stars being ordained by God, and God's making man a little lower than the angels, &c. The first verse is, "O Lord, our Lord,

how excellent is thy name in all the earth! Who hast set thy glory above the heavens," or upon the heavens. By *name* and *glory*, very much the same thing is intended here as in many other places, as shall be particularly shown afterwards. So the Psalm concludes as it began: "O Lord, our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth!" So in Psalm cxlviii., after a particular mention of the works of creation, enumerating them in order, the Psalmist says, verse 13, "Let them praise the name of the Lord, for his name alone is excellent, his glory is above the earth and the heaven." And in Psalm civ. 31, after a very particular, orderly, and magnificent representation of God's works of creation and common providence, it is said, "The glory of the Lord shall endure forever; the Lord shall rejoice in his works." Here God's glory is spoken of as the grand result and blessed consequence of all these works, which God values, and on account of which he rejoices in these works. And this is one thing doubtless implied in the song of the seraphim, Isaiah vi. 3: "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts! The whole earth is full of his glory."

The glory of God, in being the result and consequence of those works of providence that have been mentioned, is in fact the consequence of the creation. The good attained in the use of a thing made for use, is the result of the making of that thing, as the signifying the time of day, when actually attained by the use of a watch, is the consequence of the making of the watch. So that it is apparent that the glory of God is a thing that is actually the result and consequence of the creation of the world. And from what has been already observed, it appears, that it is what God seeks as good, valuable and excellent in itself. And I presume, none will pretend that there is any thing peculiar in the nature of the case, rendering it a thing valuable in some of the instances wherein it takes place, and not in others; or that the glory of God, though indeed an effect of all God's works, is an exceeding desirable effect of some of them; but of others a worthless and insignificant effect. God's glory therefore, must be a desirable, valuable consequence of the work of creation. Yea, it is expressly spoken of in Psalm civ. 3,(as was observed), as an effect, on account of which, God rejoices and takes pleasure in the works of creation.

Therefore it is manifest by *Position* 3d, that the glory of God is an ultimate end in the creation of the world.

SECTION IV.

Places of Scripture that lead us to suppose, that God created the World for his Name, to make his perfections known, and that he made it for his Praise.

Here I shall first take notice of some passages of Scripture, that speak of God's *name* as being made God's end, or the object of his regard, and the regard of his virtuous and holy, intelligent creatures, much in the same manner as has been observed of *God's glory*.

As particularly, God's name is in like manner spoken of, as the end of his acts of goodness towards the good part of the moral world, and of his works of mercy and salvation towards his people. As 1 Sam. xii. 22, "The Lord will not forsake his people, *for his great name's sake*." Psalm xxiii. 3, "He restoreth my soul, he leadeth me in the paths of righteousness, *for his name's sake*." Psalm xxxi. 3, "*For thy name's sake*, lead me and guide me." Psalm

cix. 21, "But do thou for me——*for thy name's sake.*" The forgiveness of sin in particular, is often spoken of as being for God's *name's sake.* 1 John ii. 12, "I write unto you, little children, because your sins are forgiven you *for his name's sake.*" Psalm xxv. 11, "*For thy name's sake,* O Lord, pardon mine iniquity, for it is great." Psalm lxxix. 9, "Help us, O God of our salvation, *for the glory of thy name,* and deliver us, and purge away our sins, *for thy name's sake.*" Jer. xiv. 7, "O Lord, though our iniquities testify against us, do thou it *for thy name's sake.*"

These things seem to show, that the salvation of Christ is for God's name's sake. Leading and guiding in the way of safety and happiness, restoring the soul, the forgiveness of sin, and that help, deliverance and salvation, that is consequent thereon, is *for God's name.* And here it is observable, that those two great temporal salvations of God's people, the redemption from Egypt, and that from Babylon, that are often represented as figures and similitudes of the redemption of Christ, are frequently spoken of as being wrought *for God's name's sake.* So is that great work of God, in delivering his people from Egypt, carrying them through the wilderness to their rest in Canaan. 2 Sam. vii. 23, "And what one nation in the earth is like thy people, even like Israel, whom God went to redeem for a people to himself, and to make him a *name.*" Psalm cvi. 8, "Nevertheless he saved them *for his name's sake.*" Isaiah lxiii. 12, "That led them by the right hand of Moses, with his glorious arm, dividing the waters before them, *to make himself an everlasting name.*" In Ezek. xx. God, rehearsing the various parts of this wonderful work, adds from time to time. "*I wrought for my name's sake,* that it should not be polluted before the heathen," as in ver. 9, 14, 22. See also Josh. vii. 8, 9, Dan. ix. 15. So is the redemption from the Babylonish captivity. Isaiah xlviii. 9, 10, "*For my name's sake,* will I defer mine anger. For mine own sake, even for mine own sake will I do it, for how should *my name* be polluted?" In Ezek. xxxvi. 21, 22, 23, the reason is given for God's mercy in restoring Israel: "But I had pity for my holy name.——Thus saith the Lord, I do not this for your sakes, O house of Israel, but *for my holy name's sake;* and I will *sanctify my great name,* which was profaned among the heathen." And chap. xxxix. 25, "Therefore thus saith the Lord God, Now will I bring again the captivity of Jacob, and have mercy upon the whole house of Israel, *and will be jealous for my holy name.*" Daniel prays that God would forgive his people, and show them mercy *for his own sake,* Dan. ix. 19.

When God from time to time speaks of showing mercy, and exercising goodness, and promoting his people's happiness for his *name's sake,* we cannot understand it as of a merely subordinate end. How absurd would it be to say, that he promotes their happiness for his name's sake, in subordination to their good; and that his name may be exalted only for their sakes, as a means of promoting their happiness; especially when such expressions as these are used: "For mine own sake, even for mine own sake will I do it, for how should my name be polluted?" and "Not for your sakes do I this, but for my holy name's sake."

Again, it is represented as though God's people had their existence, at least as God's people, for God's name's sake. God's redeeming or purchasing them, that they might be his people, *for his name,* implies this. As in that passage mentioned before, 2 Sam. vii. 23, "Thy people Israel, whom God went to redeem for a people to himself, and *to make him a name.*" So God's making them a people for his name, is implied in Jer. xiii. 11, "For as the girdle cleaveth to the loins of a man, so have I caused to cleave unto me the whole house of

Israel, &c.,— that they may be unto me for a people, *and for a name.*" Acts xv. 14, "Simeon hath declared how God at the first did visit the Gentiles, to take out of them a people *for his name.*"

This also is spoken of as the end of the virtue and religion, and holy behavior of the saints. Rom. i. 5, "By whom we have received grace and apostleship, for obedience to the faith among all nations *for his name.*" Matth. xix. 29, "Every one that forsaketh houses or brethren, &c.,——*for my name's sake*, shall receive an hundred fold, and shall inherit everlasting life." 3 John 7, "Because that *for his name's sake* they went forth, taking nothing of the Gentiles." Rev. ii. 3, "And hast borne, and hast patience, and *for my name's sake* hast labored, and hast not fainted."

And we find that holy persons express their desire of this, and their joy in it, in the same manner as in the glory of God. 2 Sam. vii. 26, "Let thy name be magnified forever." Psalm lxxvi. 1, "In Judah is God known: his name is great in Israel." Psalm cxlviii. 13, "Let them praise the name of the Lord; for his name alone is excellent! His glory is above the earth and heaven." Psalm cxxxv. 13, "Thy name, O Lord, endureth forever, and thy memorial throughout all generations." Isaiah xii. 4, "Declare his doings among the people, make mention that his name is exalted."

The judgments God executes on the wicked, are spoken of as being *for the sake of his name*, in like manner as for his glory. Exod. ix. 16, "And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for to show in thee my power, and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth." Neh. ix. 10, "And showedst signs and wonders upon Pharaoh, and all his servants, and on all the people of his land; for thou knewest that they dealt proudly against them; so didst thou *get thee a name* as at this day."

And this is spoken of as a consequence of the works of creation, in like manner as God's glory. Psalm viii. 1, "O Lord, *how excellent is thy name* in all the earth! Who hast set thy glory above the heavens." And then at the conclusion of the observations on the works of creation, the Psalm ends thus, verse 9, "O Lord, our Lord, *how excellent is thy name* in all the earth!" So Psalm cxlviii. 13, after a particular mention of the various works of creation, "Let them praise the name of the Lord, for his name alone is excellent in all the earth, his glory is above the earth and the heaven."

So we find manifestation, or making known God's *perfections*, his *greatness* and *excellency*, is spoken of very much in the same manner as God's glory.

There are several Scriptures which would lead us to suppose this to be the great thing that God sought of the moral world, and the end aimed at in the moral agents, which he had created, wherein they are to be active in answering their end. This seems implied in that argument God's people sometimes made use of, in deprecating a state of death and destruction; that in such a state, they cannot know or make known the glorious excellency of God. Psalm lxxxviii. 18, 19, "Shall thy loving-kindness be declared in the grave, or thy faithfulness in destruction? Shall thy wonders be known in the dark, and thy righteousness in the land of forgetfulness?" So Psalm xxx. 9, Isaiah xxxviii. 18, 19 The argument seems to be this: Why should we perish? And how shall thine end, for which thou hast made us, be obtained in a state of destruction, in which thy glory cannot be known or declared?

This is spoken of as the end of the good part of the moral world, or the end of God's people, in the same manner as the glory of God. Isaiah xliii. 21, "This people have I formed for myself, they shall show forth my *praise.*" 1 Peter ii. 9, "But ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, a holy

nation, a peculiar people, *that ye should show forth the praises of him*, who hath called you out of darkness into marvellous light."

And this seems to be represented as the thing wherein the value and proper fruit and end of their virtue appear. Isaiah lx 6—speaking of the conversion of the Gentile nations to true religion—" They shall come——and *show forth the praises* of the Lord." Isaiah lxvi. 19, "I will send——unto the nations——and to the isles afar off, that have not *heard my fame*, neither have seen my glory; and they shall *declare my glory* among the Gentiles."

And this seems by Scripture representations to be the end, in the desires of which, and delight in which appear the proper tendency and rest of true virtue, and holy dispositions, much in the same manner as the glory of God. 1 Chron. xvi. 8, " Make known his deeds among the people." Ver. 23, 24, " Show forth from day to day thy salvation. Declare his glory among the heathen." See also, Psalm ix. 1, 11, 14, and xix. 1, and xxvi. 7, and lxxi. 18. and lxxv. 9, and lxxvi. 1, and lxxix. 13, and xcvi. 2, 3, and ci. 1, and cvii. 22, and cxviii 17, and cxlv. 6, 11, 12, Isaiah xlii. 12, and lxiv. 1, 2, Jer. l. 10.

This seems to be spoken of as a great end of the acts of God's moral government; particularly the great judgments he executes for sin. Exod. ix. 16, " And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, to show in thee my power, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth." Dan. iv. 17, " This matter is by the decree of the watchers, &c.,——to the intent that the living may know that the Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will; and setteth up over it the basest of men." But places to this purpose are too numerous to be particularly recited.

This is also spoken of as a great end of God's works of favor and mercy to his people. 2 Kings xix. 19, " Now, therefore, O Lord our God, I beseech thee, save thou us out of his hand, that all the kingdoms of the earth *may know that thou art the Lord God*, even thou only." 1 Kings viii 59, 60, "——that he maintain the cause of his servant, and the cause of his people Israel at all times, as the matter shall require, that all the people of the earth may know that the Lord is God, and that there is none else."

This is spoken of as the end of the eternal damnation of the wicked, and also the eternal happiness of the righteous. Rom. ix. 22, 23, " What if God, willing to show his wrath, and make his power known, endured with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy which he hath afore prepared unto glory?"

This is spoken of from time to time, as a great end of the miracles which God wrought. See Exod. vii. 17, and viii. 10, and x. 2. Deut. xxix. 5, 6. Ezek. xxiv. 27.

This is spoken of as a great end of ordinances. Exod. xxix. 44, 45, 46, " And I will sanctify the tabernacle of the congregation; I will sanctify also both Aaron and his sons, to minister to me in the priest's office. And I will dwell among the children of Israel, and will be their God. And they shall know that I am the Lord their God," &c. Chap. xxxi. 13, " Verily my Sabbaths shall ye keep; for it is a sign between me and you, throughout your generations; that ye may know that I am the Lord that doth sanctify you." We have again almost the same words, Ezek. xx. 12, 20.

This is spoken of as a great end of the redemption out of Egypt. Psalm cvi. 8, " Nevertheless he saved them for his name's sake, that *he might make his mighty power to be known*." See also Exod. vii. 5, and Deut. iv. 34, 35. And also of the redemption from the Babylonish captivity. Ezek. xx. 34—38,

"And I will bring you out from the people, and will gather you out of the countries whither ye are scattered.——And I will bring you into the wilderness of the people; and there I will plead with you as I pleaded with your fathers in the wilderness of the land of Egypt.——And I will bring you into the bond of the covenant. And I will purge out the rebels——*and ye shall know that I am the Lord.*" Verse 42, "*And ye shall know that I am the Lord*, when I shall bring you into the land of Israel." Verse 44, "*And ye shall know that I am the Lord*, when I have wrought with you *for my name's sake.*" See also chap. xxviii. 25, 26, and xxxvi. 11, and xxxvii. 6—13.

This is also spoken of as a great end of the work of redemption of Jesus Christ: both of the purchase of redemption by Christ, and the application of redemption. Rom. iii. 25, 26, "Whom God had set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, *to declare his righteousness.——To declare, I say, at this time his righteousness;* that he might be just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus." Eph. ii. 4—7, "But God who is rich in mercy, &c. *That he might show the exceeding riches of his grace*, in his kindness towards us through Jesus Christ." Chap. iii. 8—10, "To preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ, and to make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery, which from the beginning of the world hath been hid in God, who created all things by Jesus Christ: *to the intent that now unto the principalities and powers* in heavenly places, might *be known by the church the manifold wisdom of God.*" Psal. xxii. 21, 22, "Save me from the lion's mouth. *I will declare thy name unto my brethren:* in the midst of the congregation will I praise thee," compared with Heb. ii. 12, and John xvii. 26. Isa. lxiv. 1, 2, "O that thou wouldest rend the heavens——*to make thy name known to thine adversaries.*"

And it is spoken of as the end of that great actual salvation, which should follow Christ's purchase of salvation, both among Jews and Gentiles. Isa. xlix. 22, 23, "I will lift up my hand to the Gentiles——and they shall bring thy sons in their arms——and kings shall be thy nursing fathers——*and thou shalt know that I am the Lord.*" See also, Ezek. xvi. 62, and xxix. 21, and xxxiv. 27, and xxxvi. 38, and xxxix. 28, 29. Joel iii. 17.

This is spoken of as the end of God's common providence. Job xxxvii. 6, 7, "For he saith to the snow, Be thou on the earth. Likewise to the small rain, and to the great rain of his strength. He sealeth up the hand of every man, that all men may know his work."

It is spoken of as the end of the day of judgment, that grand consummation of God's moral government of the world, and the day for the bringing all things to their designed ultimate issue. It is called "The day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God," Rom. ii. 5.

And the declaration, or openly manifesting God's excellency is spoken of as the actual, happy consequence and effect of the work of creation. Psal. xix. at the beginning, "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handy work. Day unto day uttereth speech, night unto night showeth knowledge.——In them hath he placed a tabernacle for the sun, which is as a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a strong man to run his race," &c.

In like manner, there are many Scriptures that speak of God's praise, in many of the forementioned respects, just in the same manner as of his name and glory.

This is spoken of as the end of the being of God's people, in the same manner. Jer. xiii. 11, "For as the girdle cleaveth to the loins of a man, so have I caused

to cleave unto me the whole house of Israel, and the whole house of Judah, saith the Lord; that they might be unto me for a name, *and for a praise*, and for a glory."

It is spoken of as the end of the moral world. Matth. xxi. 16, "Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings *hast thou perfected praise*." That is, so hast thou in thy sovereignty and wisdom ordered it, that thou shouldest obtain the great end for which intelligent creatures are made, more especially from some of them that are in themselves weak, or inferior and more insufficient. Compare Psal. viii. 1. 2.

And the same thing that was observed before concerning the making known God's excellency, may also be observed concerning *God's praise*. That it is made use of as an argument in deprecating a state of destruction, that in such a state this end cannot be answered; in such a manner as seems to imply its being an ultimate end, that God had made man for. Psal. lxxxviii. 10, "Shall the dead arise and *praise thee?* Shall thy loving-kindness be declared in the grave? Shall thy wonders be known in the dark?" Psal. xxx. 9, "What profit is there in my blood? When I go down to the pit, *shall the dust praise thee?* Shall it declare thy truth?" Psal. cxv. 17, 18, "The dead *praise not the Lord*, neither any that go down into silence; but we will *bless the Lord*, from this time forth and forevermore. *Praise ye the Lord*." Isa. xxxviii. 18, 19, "For the grave *cannot praise thee*, death cannot celebrate thee; they that go down into the pit cannot hope for thy truth. The living, the living, *he shall praise thee*."

It is spoken of as the end of the virtue of God's people, in like manner as is God's glory. Phil. i. 11, "Being filled with the fruits of righteousness, which are by Jesus Christ *to the praise and glory of God*."

It is spoken of as the end of the work of redemption. In the first chapter of Eph., where that work in the various parts of it is particularly insisted on and set forth in its exceeding glory, this is mentioned from time to time as the great end of all, that it should be "*to the praise of his glory*. (As in verses 6, 12, 14.) By which we may doubtless understand much the same thing, with that which in Phil. i. 11, is expressed, "*his praise and glory*." Agreeable to this, Jacob's fourth son, from whom the Messiah the great Redeemer was to proceed, by the spirit of prophecy, or the special direction of God's providence, was called *praise*, with reference to this happy consequence, and glorious end of that great redemption, this Messiah, one of his posterity, was to work out.

This in the Old Testament is spoken of as the end of the forgiveness of the sin of God's people, and their salvation, in the same manner as is God's name and glory. Isa. xlviii. 9, 10, 11, "For my name's sake will I defer mine anger, and for my *praise* will I refrain for thee, that I cut thee not off. Behold I have refined thee, for mine own sake, even for mine own sake will I do it; for how should my name be polluted? And my glory will I not give to another." Jer. xxxiii. 8, 9, "And I will cleanse them from all their iniquity——and I will pardon all their iniquities.——And it shall be to me a name of joy, a *praise*, and an honor."

And that the holy part of the moral world, do express desires of this, and delight in it, as the end which holy principles in them tend to, reach after, and rest in, in their highest exercises, just in the same manner as the glory of God, is abundantly manifest. It would be endless to enumerate particular places wherein this appears; wherein the saints declare this, by expressing their earnest desires of God's praise; calling on all nations, and all beings in heaven and earth to praise him; in a rapturous manner calling on one another, crying, "Hallelujah, praise ye the Lord, praise him forever." Expressing their resolutions

to praise him as long as they live, through all generations, and forever; declaring how good, how pleasant and comely the *praise* of God is, &c.

And it is manifest that God's *praise* is the desirable and glorious consequence and effect of all the works of creation, by such places as these: Psalm cxlv. 5—10, and cxlviii. throughout, and ciii. 19—22.

SECTION V.

Places of Scripture from whence it may be argued, that communications of good to the Creature, was one thing which God had in view, as an Ultimate End of the Creation of the World.

1. According to the Scripture, communicating good to the creatures, is what is in itself pleasing to God; and that this is not merely subordinately agreeable, and esteemed valuable on account of its relation to a further end, as it is in executing justice in punishing the sins of men; which God is inclined to as fit and necessary in certain cases, and on the account of good ends attained by it; but what God is inclined to on its own account, and what he delights in simply and ultimately. For though God is sometimes in Scripture spoken of as taking pleasure in punishing men's sins, Deut. xxviii. 63, "The Lord will rejoice over you, to destroy you;" Ezek. v. 13, "Then shall mine anger be accomplished, and I will cause my fury to rest upon them, and I will be comforted;" yet God is often spoken of as exercising goodness and showing mercy, with delight, in a manner quite different, and opposite to that of his executing wrath. For the latter is spoken of as what God proceeds to do with backwardness and reluctance; the misery of the creature being not agreeable to him on its own account. Neh. ix. 17, "That thou art a God ready to pardon, gracious and merciful, slow to anger, and of great loving-kindness." Psal. ciii. 8, "The Lord is merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy." Psal. cxlv. 8, "The Lord is gracious and full of compassion, slow to anger, and of great mercy." We have again almost the same words, Jonah iv. 2, Mic. vii. 10, "Who is a God like thee, that pardoneth iniquity, &c. He retaineth not his anger forever, because he delighteth in mercy." Ezek. xviii. 32, "I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God; wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye." Lam. iii. 33, "He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men." Ezek. xxxiii. 11, "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live: Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways, for why will ye die, O house of Israel?" 2 Pet. iii. 9, "Not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance."

2. The work of redemption wrought out by Jesus Christ, is spoken of in such a manner as being from the grace and love of God to men, that does not well consist with his seeking a communication of good to them, only subordinately, i. e., not at all from any inclination to their good directly, or delight in giving happiness to them, simply and ultimately considered; but only indirectly, and wholly from a regard to something entirely diverse, which it is a means of. Such expressions as that in John iii. 16, carry another idea: "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, should not perish, but have everlasting life." And 1 John iv. 9. 10, "In this was manifested the love of God towards us, because that God sent his only be-

gotten Son into the world, that we might live through him. Herein is love; not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be a propitiation for our sins." So Eph. ii. 4, "But God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us," &c. But if indeed this was only from love to something else, and a regard to a further end, entirely diverse from our good; then all the love is truly terminated in that, its ultimate object! And God's love consists in regard towards that; and therein is God's love, and therein is his love manifested, strictly and properly speaking, and not in that he loved us, or exercised such high regard towards us. For if our good be not at all regarded ultimately, but only subordinately, then our good or interest is, in itself considered, nothing in God's regard or love: God's respect is all terminated upon, and swallowed up in something diverse, which is the end, and not in the means

So the Scripture everywhere represents concerning Christ, as though the great things that he did and suffered, were in the most direct and proper sense, from exceeding love to us; and not as one may show kindness to a person, to whose interest, simply and in itself considered, he is entirely indifferent, only as it may be a means of promoting the interest of another (that is indeed directly regarded) which is connected with it. Thus the Apostle Paul represents the matter, Gal. ii. 20, "Who loved me, and gave himself for me." Eph. v. 25, "Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ loved the church, and gave himself for it." And Christ himself, John xvii. 19, "For their sakes I sanctify myself." And the Scripture represents Christ as resting in the salvation and glory of his people, when obtained, as in what he ultimately sought, as having therein reached the goal at the end of his race; obtained the prize he aimed at; enjoying the travail of his soul, in which he is satisfied, as the recompense of his labors and extreme agonies. Isa. liii. 10, 11, "When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand. He shall see of the travail of his soul, and shall be satisfied; by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many, for he shall bear their iniquities." He sees the travail of his soul, in seeing his seed, the children brought forth in the issue of his travail. This implies that Christ has his delight, most truly and properly, in obtaining the salvation of his church, not merely as a means conducing to the thing which terminates his delight and joy; but as what he rejoices and is satisfied in, most directly and properly; as do those Scriptures, which represent him as rejoicing in his obtaining this fruit of his labor and purchase, as the bridegroom, when he obtains his bride. Isa. lxii. 5, "As the bridegroom rejoices over the bride, so shall thy God rejoice over thee." And how emphatical and strong to the purpose, are the expressions in Zeph. iii. 17, "The Lord thy God in the midst of thee is mighty; he will save, he will rejoice over thee with joy; he will rest in his love, he will rejoice over thee with singing." The same thing may be argued from Prov. viii. 30, 31, "Then was I by him, as one brought up with him; and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him; rejoicing in the habitable part of his earth, and my delights were with the sons of men." And from those places that speak of the saints as God's portion, his jewels and peculiar treasure. These things are abundantly confirmed by what is related, John xii. 23—32. But the particular consideration of what may be observed to the present purpose, in that passage of Scripture, may be referred to the next section.

3. The communications of divine goodness, particularly forgiveness of sin, and salvation, are here spoken of from time to time, as being for God's goodness' sake, and for his mercy's sake, just in the same manner as they are spoken of, as being for God's name's sake, in places observed before. Psal. xxv, 7. "Re-

member not the sins of my youth, nor my transgressions: according to thy mercy remember thou me, *for thy goodness' sake*, O Lord." In the 11th verse the Psalmist says, "For thy name's sake, O Lord, pardon mine iniquity." Neh. ix. 31, "Nevertheless, *for thy great mercy's sake*, thou hast not utterly consumed them, nor forsaken them; for thou art a gracious and a merciful God." Psal. vi. 4, "Return, O Lord, deliver my soul: O save me for thy mercy's sake." Psal. xxxi. 16, "Make thy face to shine upon thy servant: save me *for thy mercy's sake*." Psal. xliv. 26, "Arise for our help; redeem us *for thy mercy's sake*." And here it may be observed, after what a remarkable manner God speaks of his love to the children of Israel in the wilderness, as though his love were for love's sake, and his goodness were its own end and motive. Deut. vii. 7, 8, "The Lord did not set his love upon you, nor choose you because ye were more in number than any people, for ye were the fewest of all people; *but because the Lord loved you*."

4. That the government of the world in all parts of it, is for the good of such as are to be the eternal subjects of God's goodness, is implied in what the Scripture teaches us of Christ's being set at God's right hand, made king of angels and men; set at the head of the universe, having all power given him in heaven and earth to that end, that he may promote their happiness; being made head over all things to the church, and having the government of the whole creation for their good.* Christ mentions it (Mark ii. 28) as the reason why the Son of Man is made Lord of the Sabbath, that "the Sabbath was made for man." And if so, we may in like manner argue, that *all things* were made for man, that the Son of Man is made Lord of all things.

5. That God uses the whole creation, in his whole government of it, for the good of his people, is most elegantly represented in Deut. xxxiii. 26: "There is none like the God of Jeshurun, who rideth on the heavens in thine help, and in his excellency on the sky." The whole universe is a machine, which God hath made for his own use, to be his chariot for him to ride in; as is represented in Ezekiel's vision. In this chariot, God's seat or throne is heaven, where he sits, who uses, and governs, and rides in this chariot, Ezek. i. 22, 26, 27, 28. The inferior part of the creation, this visible universe, subject to such continual changes and revolutions, are the wheels of the chariot, under the place of the seat of him who rides in this chariot. God's providence in the constant revolutions, and alterations, and successive events, is represented by the motion of the wheels of the chariot, by the spirit of him who sits in his throne on the heavens, or above the firmament. Moses tells us for whose sake it is that God moves the wheels of this chariot, or rides in it sitting in his heavenly seat; and to what end he is making his progress, or goes his appointed journey in it, viz., the salvation of his people.

6. God's judgments on the wicked in this world, and also their eternal damnation in the world to come, are spoken of as being for the happiness of God's people. So are his judgments on them in this world. Isaiah xliii. 3, 4, "For I am the Lord thy God, the Holy One of Israel, thy Saviour. I gave Egypt for thy ransom, Ethiopia and Seba for thee. Since thou hast been precious in my sight, thou hast been honorable, and I have loved thee; therefore will I give men for thee, and people for thy life." So the works of God's vindictive justice and wrath, are spoken of as works of mercy to his people, Psalm cxxxvi. 10, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20. And so is their eternal damnation in another world. Rom ix. 22, 23, "What if God, willing to show his wrath and make his power

* Eph. i. 20—23. John xvii. 2. Matth. xi. 27, and xxviii. 18, 19. John iii. 35.

known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory?" Here it is evident the last verse comes in, in connection with the foregoing, as giving another reason of the destruction of the wicked, viz., the showing the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy; in higher degrees of their glory and happiness, in an advancement of their relish of their own enjoyments and greater sense of their value, and of God's free grace in the bestowment.

7. It seems to argue that God's goodness to them who are to be the eternal subjects of his goodness, is the end of the creation, that the whole creation, in all parts of it, and all God's disposals of it, is spoken of as THEIRS. 1 Cor. iii. 22, 23, "All things are yours; whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come, all are yours." The terms are very universal; and both works of creation and providence are mentioned; and it is manifestly the design of the apostle to be understood of every work of God whatsoever. Now, how can we understand this any otherwise, than that all things are for their benefit; and that God made and uses all for their good?

8. All God's works, both his works of creation and providence, are represented as works of goodness or mercy to his people in Psal. cxxxvi. His wonderful works in general: verse 4, "To him who alone doth great wonders; for his mercy endureth forever." The works of creation in all parts of it: verses 5—9, "To him that by wisdom made the heavens, for his mercy endureth forever. To him that stretched out the earth above the waters, for his mercy endureth forever. To him that made great lights, for his mercy endureth forever. The sun to rule by day, for his mercy endureth forever. The moon and stars to rule by night, for his mercy endureth forever." And God's works of providence, in the following part of the Psalm.

9. That expression in the blessed sentence pronounced on the righteous at the day of judgment, "Inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world," seems to hold forth as much, as that the eternal expressions and fruits of God's goodness to them, was God's end in creating the world, and in his providential disposals ever since the creation: that God, in all his works, in laying the foundation of the world, and ever since the foundation of it, had been preparing this kingdom and glory for them.

10. Agreeable to this, the good of men is spoken of as an ultimate end of the virtue of the moral world. Rom. xiii. 8, 9, 10, "He that loveth another hath fulfilled the law. For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, &c.—And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. *Love worketh no ill to his neighbor; therefore, love is the fulfilling of the law.*" Gal. v. 14, "All the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." James ii. 8, "If ye fulfil the royal law according to the Scripture, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, thou shalt do well."

If the good of the creature be one end of God in all things he does; and so be one end of all things that he requires moral agents to do; and an end they should have respect to in all that they do, and which they should regulate all parts of their conduct by; these things may be easily explained; but otherwise it seems difficult to be accounted for, that the Holy Ghost should thus express himself from time to time. The Scripture represents it to be the spirit of all true saints, to prefer the welfare of God's people to their chief joy. And this was the spirit of Moses and the prophets of old; and the good of God's church

was an end they regulated all their conduct by. And so it was with the apostles. 2 Cor. iv. 15, "For all things are for your sakes." 2 Tim. ii. 10, "I endure all things for the elect's sake, that they may also obtain the salvation which is in Christ Jesus, with eternal glory." And the Scriptures represent as though every Christian should in all things he does be employed for the good of God's church, as each particular member of the body is, in all things, employed for the good of the body. Rom. xii. 4, 5, &c. Eph. iv. 15, 16. 1 Cor. xii. 12, 25, to the end; together with the whole of the next chapter. To this end the Scripture teaches us the angels are continually employed, Heb. i. 14.

SECTION VI.

Wherein it is considered what is meant by the Glory of God, and the name of God in Scripture, when spoken of as God's end in his works.

Having thus considered what things are spoken of in the holy Scriptures, as the ends of God's works; and in such a manner as justly to lead us to suppose, they were the ends which God had ultimately in view, in the creation of the world: I now proceed particularly to inquire concerning some of these things, what they are, and how the terms are to be understood.

I begin first, with the glory of God.

And here I might observe, that the phrase, *the glory of God*, is sometimes manifestly used to signify the second person in the Trinity. But it is not necessary at this time to consider that matter, or stand to prove it from particular passages of Scripture. Omitting this, therefore, I proceed to observe concerning the Hebrew word *Cabhodh*, which is the word most commonly used in the Old Testament where we have the word *glory* in the English Bible. The root which it comes from is either the verb *Cabhadh*, which signifies to be heavy, or make heavy, or from the adjective *Cabhedh*, which signifies heavy or weighty. These, as seems pretty manifest, are the primary significations of these words, though they have also other meanings, which seem to be derivative. The noun *Cobhedh* signifies gravity, heaviness, greatness, and abundance. Of very many places it will be sufficient to name a few. Prov. xxvii. 3. 2 Sam. xiv. 26. 1 Kings xii. 11. Psalm xxxviii. 4. Isaiah xxx. 27. And as the weight of bodies arises from two things, viz., solidity or density, or specific gravity, as it is called, and their magnitude; so we find the word *Cabhedh* used to signify dense, as in Exod. xix. 16. *Gnanatz Cobhedh*, a dense cloud. And it is very often used for *great*. Isaiah xxxii. 2. Gen. v. 9. 1 Kings x. 2. 2 Kings vi. 14, and xviii. 17. Isaiah xxxvi. 2, and other places.

The word *Cabhodh*, which is commonly translated *glory*, is used in such a manner as might be expected from this signification of the words from whence it comes. Sometimes it is used to signify what is internal, what is within the being or person, inherent in the subject, or what is in the possession of the person; and sometimes for emanation, exhibition or communication of this internal glory; and sometimes for the knowledge or sense, or effect of these, in those who behold it, to whom the exhibition or communication is made; or an expression of this knowledge, or sense, or effect. And here I would note, that agreeable to the use of the word *Cabhodh*, in the Old Testament, is that of the word *Doxa* in the new. For, as the word *Cabhodh* is generally translated by *Doxa* in the Septuagint; so it is apparent, that this word is designed to be used to signify the same thing in the New Testament, with *Cabhodh* in the Old.

This might be abundantly proved by comparing particular places of the Old Testament; but probably it will not be denied.

I therefore proceed particularly to consider these words, with regard to their use in Scripture, in each of the forementioned ways.

1. As to internal glory. When the word is used to signify what is within, inherent, or in the possession of the subject, it very commonly signifies excellency, or great valuableness, dignity, or worthiness, or regard. This, according to the Hebrew idiom, is, as it were, the *weight* of a thing, as that by which it is heavy; as to be *light*, is to be worthless, without value, contemptible. Numb. xxi. 5, "This *light* bread." 1 Sam. xviii. 23, "Seemeth it a *light* thing." Judges ix. 4, "*Light* persons," i. e. worthless, vain, vile persons. So Zeph. iii. 4. To set *light* is to despise, 2 Sam. xix. 43. Belshazzar's vileness in the sight of God, is represented by his being *Tekel*, weighed in the balances and found light, Dan. v. 27. And as the weight of a thing arises from these two things, its magnitude, and its specific gravity conjunctly, so the word *glory* is very commonly used to signify the excellency of a person or thing, as consisting either in greatness, or in beauty, or as it were, preciousness, or in both conjunctly; as will abundantly appear by Exod. xvi. 7, and xxviii. 2, 40, and iii. 8, and many other places.

Sometimes that internal, great, and excellent good, which is called glory, is rather in possession than inherent. Any one may be called *heavy*, that possesses an abundance; and he that is empty and destitute, may be called *light*. Thus we find riches is sometimes called *glory*. Gen. xxxi. 1, "And of that which was our fathers, hath he gotten all this glory." Esth. v. 11, "Haman told them of the glory of his riches." Psal. xlix. 16, 17, "Be not afraid, when one is made rich, when the glory of his house is increased. For when he dieth, he shall carry nothing away, his glory shall not descend after him." Nah. ii. 9, "Take ye the spoil of silver, take the spoil of gold; for there is none end of the store and glory out of the pleasant furniture."

And it is often put for a great height of happiness and prosperity, and fulness of good in general. Gen. xlv. 13, "You shall tell my father of all my glory in Egypt." Job xix. 9, "He hath stript me of my glory." Isaiah x. 3, "Where will you leave your glory?" Verse 10, "Therefore shall the Lord of Hosts send among his fat ones leanness, and under his glory shall he kindle a burning, like the burning of a fire." Isaiah xvii. 3, 4, "The kingdom shall cease from Damascus, and the remnant of Syria; they shall be as the glory of the children of Israel. And in that day it shall come to pass, that the glory of Jacob shall be made thin, and the fatness of his flesh shall be made lean." Isaiah xxi. 16, "And all the glory of Kedar shall fail." Isaiah lxi. 6, "Ye shall eat the riches of the Gentiles, and in their glory shall ye boast yourselves." Chap. lxvi. 11, 12, "That ye may milk out and be delighted with the abundance of her glory.——I will extend peace to her like a river, and the glory of the Gentiles like a flowing stream." Hos. ix. 11, "As for Ephraim, their glory shall fly away as a bird." Matth. iv. 8, "Showeth him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them." Luke xxiv. 26, "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory?" John xvii. 27, "And the glory which thou gavest me, have I given them." Rom. v. 2, "And rejoice in hope of the glory of God." Chap. viii. 18, "The sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us." See also chap. ii. 7, 10, and iii. 23, and ix. 23. 1 Cor. ii. 7, "The hidden wisdom which God ordained before the world, unto our glory." 2 Cor. iv. 17, "——Worketh out for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of

glory." Eph. i. 18, "And what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints." 1 Pet. iv. 13, "But rejoice, inasmuch as ye are made partakers of Christ's sufferings; that when his glory shall be revealed, ye may be glad also with exceeding joy." Chap. i. 8, "Ye rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory." See also Colos. i. 27, and iii. 4, and many other places.

2. The word *glory* is used in Scripture often to express the exhibition, emanation, or communication of the internal glory. Hence it often signifies a visible exhibition of glory; as in an effulgence or shining brightness, by an emanation of beams of light. Thus the brightness of the sun, and moon, and stars is called their glory in 1 Cor. xv. 41. But in particular, the word is very often thus used, when applied to God and Christ. As in Ezek. i. 28, "As the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain, so was the appearance of the brightness round about. This was the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the Lord." And chap. x. 4, "Then the glory of the Lord went up from the cherub, and stood over the threshold of the house, and the house was filled with the cloud, and the court was full of the brightness of the Lord's glory." Isaiah vi. 1, 2, 3, "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it stood the seraphim. And one cried to another and said, Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory;" compared with John xii. 4, "These things said Esaias, when he saw his glory and spake of him." Ezek. xliii. 2, "And behold, the glory of the God of Israel came from the way of the east—and the earth *shined* with his glory." Isaiah xxiv. 23, "Then the moon shall be confounded, and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of Hosts shall reign in Mount Zion, and in Jerusalem, and before his ancients *gloriously*." Isaiah lx. 1, 2, "Arise, shine, for thy light is come, and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee. For behold, the darkness shall cover the earth, and gross darkness the people; but the Lord shall arise upon thee, and his glory shall be seen upon thee." Together with verse 19: "The sun shall be no more thy light by day, neither for brightness shall the moon give light unto thee; but the Lord shall be unto thee an everlasting light, and thy God thy glory." Luke ii. 9, "The glory of the Lord shone round about them." Acts xxii. 11, "And when I could not see, for the glory of that light." In 2 Cor. iii. 7, the shining of Moses's face is called *the glory of his countenance*. And to this Christ's glory is compared, verse 18, "But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory." And so chap. iv. 4: "Lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them." Verse 6, "For God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." Heb. i. 3, "Who is the *brightness* of his glory." The Apostle Peter, speaking of that emanation of exceeding brightness, from the bright cloud that overshadowed the disciples, in the mount of transfiguration, and of the shining of Christ's face at that time, says, 2 Pet. i. 17, "For he received from God the Father, honor and glory, when there came such a voice to him from the excellent glory, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." Rev. xviii. 1, "Another angel came down from heaven, having great power, *and the earth was lightened with his glory*." Rev. xxi. 11, "Having the glory of God, and her light was like unto a stone most precious, like a jasper stone, clear as crystal." Verse 23, "And the city had no need of the sun, nor of the moon to shine in it; for the glory of God did lighten it." So the word for a visible effulgence or emanation of

light in the places to be seen in Exod. xvi. 12, and xxiv. 16, 17, 23, and xl. 34, 35, and many other places.

The word *glory*, as applied to God or Christ, sometimes evidently signifies the communications of God's fulness, and means much the same thing with God's abundant and exceeding goodness and grace. So Eph. iii. 16, "That he would grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be strengthened with might by his Spirit in the inner man." The expression, "According to the riches of his glory," is apparently equivalent to that in the same epistle, chap. i. 7, "According to the riches of his grace." And chap. ii. 7, "The exceeding riches of his grace in his kindness towards us, through Christ Jesus." In like manner is the word *glory* used in Phil. iv. 19, "But my God shall supply all your need, according to his riches in glory, by Christ Jesus." And Rom. ix. 23, "And that he might make known the riches of his glory, on the vessels of mercy." In this, and the foregoing verse, the apostle speaks of God's making known two things, his great wrath, and his rich grace. The former, on the vessels of wrath, verse 22. The latter, which he calls *the riches of his glory*, on the vessels of mercy, verse 23. So when Moses says, "I beseech thee show me thy *glory*;" God, granting his request, makes answer, "I will make all my *goodness* to pass before thee." Exod. xxxiii. 18, 19.*

What we find in John xii. 23—32, is worthy of particular notice in this place. The words and behavior of Christ, which we have an account of here, argue two things.

1. That the happiness and salvation of men, was an end that Christ ultimately aimed at in the labors and sufferings he went through for our redemption, (and consequently, by what has been before observed, an ultimate end of the work of creation.) The very same things which were observed before in this passage (*Chapter 2d, Section 3d*) concerning God's glory, are equally, and in the same manner observable, concerning the salvation of men. As it was there observed, that Christ in the great conflict of his soul, in the view of the near approach of the most extreme difficulties which attended his undertaking, comforts himself in a certain prospect of obtaining the end he had chiefly in view. It was observed that the glory of God is therefore mentioned and dwelt upon by him, as what his soul supported itself and rested in, as this great end. And at the same time, and exactly in the same manner, is the salvation of men mentioned and insisted on, as the end of these great labors and sufferings, which satisfied his soul, in the prospect of undergoing them. Compare the 23d and 24th verses; and also the 28th and 29th verses; verse 31, and 32. And,

2. The glory of God, and the emanations and fruits of his grace in man's salvation, are so spoken of by Christ on this occasion in just the same manner, that it would be quite unnatural, to understand him as speaking of two distinct things. Such is the connection, that what he says of the latter must most naturally be understood as exegetical of the former. He first speaks of his own glory and the glory of his Father, as the great end that should be obtained by what he is about to suffer; and then explains and amplifies what he says on this in what he expresses of the salvation of men that shall be obtained by it. Thus

* Dr. Goodwin observes (Vol. I. of his works, Part 2d page 166), that riches of grace are called riches of glory in Scripture. "The Scripture," says he, "speaks of riches of glory in Eph. iii. 16, 'That he would grant you according to the riches of his glory;' yet eminently mercy is there intended: for it is that which God bestows, and which the apostle there prayeth for. And he calls his mercy there his glory, as elsewhere he doth, as being the most eminent excellency in God. That in Rom. ix. 22, 23, compared, is observable. In the 22d verse, where the apostle speaks of God's making known the power of his wrath, saith he, 'God willing to show his wrath, and make his power known.' But in verse 23d, when he comes to speak of mercy, he saith, 'That he might make known the riches of his glory, on the vessels of mercy.'"

in the 23d verse he says, "The hour is come that the Son of Man should be glorified." And in what next follows, he evidently shows how he was to be glorified, or wherein his glory consisted: "Verily, verily I say unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground, and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." As much fruit is the glory of the seed, so is the multitude of redeemed ones, which should spring from his death, his glory.* So concerning the glory of his Father, in the 27th, and following verses: "Now is my soul troubled, and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour. But for this cause came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name. Then came there a voice from heaven, saying, I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again." In an assurance of this, which this voice declared, Christ was greatly comforted, and his soul even exulted under the view of his approaching sufferings. And what this glory was, in which Christ's soul was so comforted on this occasion, his own words which he then spake, plainly show. When the people said it thundered, and others said an angel spake to him, then Christ explains the matter to them, and tells them what this voice meant. Verses 30—32, "Jesus answered and said, This voice came not because of me, but for your sakes. Now is the judgment of this world; now shall the prince of this world be cast out. And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." By this behavior, and these speeches of our Redeemer, it appears that the expressions of divine grace, in the sanctification and happiness of the redeemed, are especially that glory of his, and his Father, which was the joy that was set before him, for which he endured the cross, and despised the shame; and that this glory, especially, was the end of the travail of his soul, in obtaining which end he was satisfied, agreeable to Isa. liii. 10, 11.

This is agreeable to what has been just observed, of God's glory being so often represented by an effulgence, or emanation, or communication of light, from a luminary or fountain of light. What can be thought of, that so naturally and aptly represents the emanation of the internal glory of God; or the flowing forth, and abundant communication of that infinite fulness of good that is in God? Light is very often in Scripture put for comfort, joy, happiness, and for good in general.†

Again the word *glory*, as applied to God in Scripture, implies the view or knowledge of God's excellency. The exhibition of glory, is to the view of beholders. The manifestation of glory, the emanation or effulgence of brightness, has relation to the eye. Light or brightness is a quality that has relation to the sense of seeing: we see the luminary by its light. And knowledge is often expressed in Scripture by light. The word *glory* very often in Scripture signifies or implies *honor*, as any one may soon see by casting his eye on a concordance.‡ But honor implies the knowledge of the dignity and excellency of him who hath the honor. And this is often more especially signified by the word *glory*, when applied to God. Num. xiv. 21, "But as truly as I live, all the earth shall be filled with the glory of the Lord," i. e., all the earth shall see the manifestations I will make of my perfect holiness and hatred of sin, and so of

* Here may be remembered what was before observed of the church's being so often spoken of as the glory and fulness of Christ.

† Isa. vi. 3, "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory." In the original, "His glory is the fulness of the whole earth;" which signifies much more than the words of the translation. God's glory, consisting especially in his holiness, is that, in the sight or communications of which, man's fulness, i. e., his holiness and happiness, consists. By God's glory here, there seems to be respect to that train, or those effulgent beams that filled the temple: these beams signifying God's glory shining forth, and communicated. This effulgence or communication is the fulness of all intelligent creatures, who have no fulness of their own.

‡ See particularly Heb. iii. 3.

my infinite excellence. This appears by the context. So Ezek. xxxix. 21—23, "And I will set my glory among the heathen, and all the heathen *shall see* my judgment that I have executed, and my hand that I have laid upon them. So the house of Israel *shall know* that I am the Lord their God. And the heathen *shall know*, that the house of Israel went into captivity for their iniquity." And it is manifest in many places, where we read of God's glorifying himself, or of his being glorified, that one thing directly intended is, a manifesting or making known his divine greatness and excellency.

Again, *glory*, as the word is used in Scripture, often signifies or implies *praise*. This appears from what was observed before, that glory very often signifies honor, which is much the same thing with praise, viz., high esteem and respect of heart, and the expression and testimony of it in words and actions. And it is manifest that the words *glory* and *praise*, are often used as equivalent expressions in Scripture. Psal. l. 23, "Whoso offereth praise, glorifieth me." Psal. xxii. 23, "Ye that fear the Lord, praise him; all ye seed of Israel, glorify him." Isa. xlii. 8, "My glory I will not give unto another, nor my praise to graven images." Verse 12, "Let them give glory unto the Lord, and declare his praise in the islands." Isa. xlviii. 9—11, "For my name's sake will I defer mine anger; for my praise will I refrain for thee.—For mine own sake will I do it; for, I will not give my glory unto another." Jer. xiii. 11, "That they might be unto me for a people, and for a name, and for a praise, and for a glory." Eph. i. 6, "To the praise of the glory of his grace." Verse 12, "To the praise of his glory." So verse 14. The phrase is apparently equivalent to that, Phil. i. 11, "Which are by Jesus Christ unto the praise and glory of God." 2 Cor. iv. 15, "That the abundant grace might, through the thanksgiving of many, redound to the glory of God."

It is manifest the *praise of God*, as the phrase is used in Scripture, implies the high esteem and love of the heart, exalting thoughts of God, and complacence in his excellence and perfection. This must be so manifest to every one acquainted with the Scripture, that there seems to be no need to refer to particular places.

It also implies joy in God, or rejoicing in his perfections, as is manifest by Psal. xxxiii. 2, "*Rejoice* in the Lord, O ye righteous, for *praise* is comely for the upright." How often do we read of *singing praise?* But singing is commonly an expression of joy. It is called making a joyful noise, Psal. lxvi. 1, 2, and xcvi. 4, 5. And as it is often used, it implies gratitude or love to God for his benefits to us. Psal. xxx. 12, and many other places.

Having thus considered what is implied in the phrase, the glory of God, as we find it used in Scripture; I proceed to inquire what is meant by the name of God.

And I observe that it is manifest that God's name and his glory, at least very often, signify the same thing in Scripture. As it has been observed concerning the glory of God, that it sometimes signifies the second person in the Trinity; the same might be shown of the name of God, if it were needful in this place. But that the name and glory of God are often equipollent expressions is manifest by Exod. xxxiii. 18, 19. When Moses says, "I beseech thee, show me thy glory," and God grants his request, he says, "I will proclaim the *name* of the Lord before thee." Psal. viii. 1, "O Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth! Who hast set thy glory above the heavens." Psal. lxxix. 9, "Help us, O God of our salvation, for the glory of thy name; and deliver us, and purge away our sins, for thy name's sake." Psal. cii. 15, "So the heathen shall fear the *name* of the Lord; and all the kings of the earth, thy *glory*."

Psal. cxlviii. 13, "His *name* alone is excellent, and his *glory* is above the earth and heaven." Isa. xlviii. 9, "For my *name's* sake will I defer mine anger, and for my *praise* will I refrain for thee." Verse 11, "For mine own sake, even for mine own sake will I do it; for how should my *name* be polluted? And I will not give my glory unto another." Isa. xlix. 19, "They shall fear the *name* of the Lord from the west, and his *glory* from the rising of the sun." Jer. xiii. 11, "That they might be unto me for a *name*, and for a *praise*, and for a *glory*." As glory often implies the manifestation, publication and knowledge of excellency, and the honor that any one has in the world; so it is evident does *name*. Gen. xi. 4, "Let us make us a *name*." Deut. xxvi. 19, "And to make thee high above all nations, in praise, in name, and in honor." See 2 Sam. vii. 9, and many other places.

So it is evident that by *name* is sometimes meant much the same thing as praise, by several places which have been just mentioned, as Isa. xlviii. 9, Jer. xiii. 11, Deut. xxvi. 19; and also by Jer. xxxiii. 9, "And it shall be unto me for a *name*, a *praise* and an *honor*, before all the nations of the earth, which shall hear of all the good I do unto them." Zeph. iii 20, "I will make you a *name* and a *praise* among all people of the earth."

And it seems that the expression or exhibition of God's goodness is especially called his *name*, in Exod. xxxiii. 19: "I will make all my goodness pass before thee, and I will proclaim the *name* of the Lord before thee." And chap. xxxiv. 5—7, "And the Lord descended in the cloud, and stood with him there, and proclaimed the *name* of the Lord. And the Lord passed by before him, and proclaimed the Lord, the Lord God, gracious and merciful, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth; keeping mercy for thousands," &c.

And the same illustrious brightness and effulgence in the pillar of cloud, that appeared in the wilderness, and dwelt above the mercy-seat in the tabernacle and temple (or rather the spiritual divine brightness and effulgence represented by it), which is so often called *the glory of the Lord*, is also often called *the name of the Lord*. Because God's glory was to dwell in the tabernacle, therefore he promises, Exod. xxix. 43, "There will I meet with the children of Israel, and the tabernacle shall be sanctified by my glory." And the temple was called *the house of God's glory*, Isa. lx. 7. In like manner, the *name* of God is said to dwell in the sanctuary. Thus we often read of the place, that God chose *to put his name there*; or (as it is in the Hebrew) to cause his name to inhabit there. So it is sometimes rendered by our translators. As Deut. xii. 11, "Then there shall be a place which the Lord your God shall choose *to cause his name to dwell there*." And the temple is often spoken of as built *for God's name*. And in Psal. lxxiv. 7, the temple is called *the dwelling-place of God's name*. The mercy seat in the temple was called the throne of God's name or glory: Jer. xiv. 21, "Do not abhor us; for thy name's sake, do not disgrace the throne of thy glory." Here God's *name* and his *glory*, seem to be spoken of as the same.

SECTION VI.

Showing that the Ultimate End of the Creation of the World, is but one, and what that one End is.

From what has been observed in the last section, it appears, that however the last end of the creation is spoken of in Scripture under various denomina-

tions; yet if the whole of what is said relating to this affair, be duly weighed, and one part compared with another, we shall have reason to think, that the design of the Spirit of God does not seem to be to represent God's ultimate end as manifold, but as one. For though it be signified by various names, yet they appear not to be names of different things, but various names involving each other in their meaning; either different names of the same thing, or names of several parts of one whole, or of the same whole viewed in various lights, or in its different respects and relations. For it appears that all that is ever spoken of in the Scripture as an ultimate end of God's works, is included in that one phrase, *the glory of God;* which is the name by which the last end of God's works is most commonly called in Scripture; and seems to be the name which most aptly signifies the thing.

The thing signified by that name, *the glory of God*, when spoken of as the supreme and ultimate end of the work of creation, and of all God's works, is the emanation and true external expression of God's internal glory and fulness; meaning by his fulness, what has already been explained. Or, in other words, God's internal glory extant, in a true and just exhibition, or external existence of it. It is confessed that there is a degree of obscurity in these definitions; but perhaps an obscurity which is unavoidable, through the imperfection of language, and words being less fitted to express things of so sublime a nature. And therefore the thing may possibly be better understood, by using many words and a variety of expressions, by a particular consideration of it, as it were by parts, than by any short definition.

There is included in this, the exercise of God's perfections to produce a proper effect, in opposition to their lying eternally dormant and ineffectual; as his power being eternally without any act or fruit of that power; his wisdom eternally ineffectual in any wise production, or prudent disposal of any thing, &c. The manifestation of his internal glory to created understandings. The communication of the infinite fulness of God to the creature. The creature's high esteem of God, love to God, and complacence and joy in God, and the proper exercises and expressions of these.

These at first view may appear to be entirely distinct things: but if we more closely consider the matter, they will all appear to be one thing, in a variety of views and relations. They are all but the emanation of God's glory; or the excellent brightness and fulness of the Divinity diffused, overflowing, and as it were, enlarged; or, in one word, existing *ad extra*. God's exercising his perfection to produce a proper effect, is not distinct from the emanation or communication of his fulness; for this is the effect, viz., his fulness communicated, and the producing this effect is the communication of his fulness; and there is nothing in this effectual exerting of God's perfection, but the emanation of God's internal glory. The emanation or communication is of the internal glory or fulness of God as it is. Now God's internal glory, as it is in God, is either in his understanding or will. The glory or fulness of his understanding, is his knowledge. The internal glory and fulness of God, which we must conceive of as having its special seat in his will, is his holiness and happiness. The whole of God's internal good or glory, is in these three things, viz., his infinite knowledge; his infinite virtue or holiness, and his infinite joy and happiness. Indeed there are a great many attributes in God, according to our way of conceiving or talking of them, but all may be reduced to these, or to the degree, circumstances and relations of these. We have no conception of God's power, different from the degree of these things, with a certain relation of them to effects. God's infinity is not so properly a distinct kind of good in God, but only ex-

presses the *degree* of the good there is in him. So God's eternity is not a distinct good; but is the duration of good. His immutability is still the same good, with a negation of change. So that, as I said, the fulness of the Godhead is the fulness of his understanding, consisting in his knowledge, and the fulness of his will, consisting in his virtue and happiness. And therefore the eternal glory of God consists in the communication of these. The communication of his knowledge is chiefly in giving the knowledge of himself; for this is the knowledge in which the fulness of God's understanding chiefly consists. And thus we see how the manifestation of God's glory to created understandings, and their seeing and knowing it, is not distinct from an emanation or communication of God's fulness, but clearly implied in it. Again, the communication of God's virtue or holiness is principally in communicating the love of himself, (which appears by what has before been observed.) And thus we see how, not only the creature's seeing and knowing God's excellence, but also supremely esteeming and loving him, belongs to the communication of God's fulness. And the communication of God's joy and happiness, consists chiefly in communicating to the creature, that happiness and joy, which consists in rejoicing in God, and in his glorious excellency; for in such joy God's own happiness does principally consist. And in these things, viz., in knowing God's excellency, loving God for it, and rejoicing in it; and in the exercise and expression of these, consists God's honor and praise; so that these are clearly implied in that glory of God, which consists in the emanation of his internal glory. And though we suppose all these things, which seem to be so various, are signified by that *glory*, which the Scripture speaks of as the last end of all God's works; yet it is manifest there is no greater, and no other variety in it, than in the internal and essential glory of God itself. God's internal glory is partly in his understanding, and partly in his will. And this internal glory, as seated in the will of God, implies both his holiness and his happiness; both are evidently God's glory, according to the use of the phrase. So that as God's external glory is only the emanation of his internal glory, this variety necessarily follows. And again, it hence appears that here there is no other variety or distinction, but what necessarily arises from the distinct faculties of the creature, to which the communication is made, as created in the image of God; even as having these two faculties of understanding and will. God communicates himself to the understanding of the creature, in giving him the knowledge of his glory; and to the will of the creature, in giving him holiness, consisting primarily in the love of God; and in giving the creature happiness, chiefly consisting in joy in God. These are the sum of that emanation of divine fulness, called in Scripture *the glory of God*. The first part of this glory is called *truth*, the latter, *grace*. John i. 14, "We beheld his *glory*, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of *grace* and *truth*."

Thus we see that the great and last end of God's works which is so variously expressed in Scripture, is indeed but *one;* and this *one* end is most properly and comprehensively called, THE GLORY OF GOD; by which name it is most commonly called in Scripture: and is fitly compared to an effulgence or emanation of light from a luminary, by which this glory of God is abundantly represented in Scripture. Light is the external expression, exhibition and manifestation of the excellency of the luminary, of the sun for instance: it is the abundant, extensive emanation and communication of the fulness of the sun to innumerable beings that partake of it. It is by this that the sun itself is seen, and his glory beheld, and all other things are discovered; it is by a participation of this communication from the sun, that surrounding objects receive all their lustre, beauty and brightness. It is by this that all nature is quickened and receives life, comfort

and joy. Light is abundantly used in Scripture to represent and signify these three things, knowledge, holiness and happiness. It is used to signify knowledge, or that manifestation and evidence by which knowledge is received, Psalm xix. 8, and cxix. 105, 130. Prov. vi. 23. Isaiah viii. 20, and ix. 2, and xxix. 18. Dan. v. 11. Eph. v. 13, "But all things that are reproved are made manifest by the light; for whatsoever doth make manifest, is light." And in other places of the New Testament innumerable.

It is used to signify virtue or moral good, Job xxv. 5, and other places. And it is abundantly used to signify comfort, joy and happiness, Esth. viii. 16, Job xviii. 18, and many other places.

What has been said may be sufficient to show how those things which are spoken of in Scripture as ultimate ends of God's works, though they may seem at first view to be distinct, are all plainly to be reduced to this one thing, viz., God's internal glory or fulness extant externally, or existing in its emanation. And though God in seeking this end, seeks the creature's good; yet therein appears his supreme regard to himself.

The emanation or communication of the divine fulness, consisting in the knowledge of God, love to God, and joy in God, has relation indeed both to God, and the creature; but it has relation to God as its fountain, as it is an emanation from God; and as the communication itself, or thing communicated, is something divine, something of God, something of his internal fulness, as the water in the stream is something of the fountain, and as the beams of the sun, are something of the sun. And again, they have relation to God, as they have respect to him as their object; for the knowledge communicated is the knowledge of God; and so God is the object of the knowledge, and the love communicated is the love of God; so God is the object of that love, and the happiness communicated is joy in God; and so he is the object of the joy communicated. In the creature's knowing, esteeming, loving, rejoicing in, and praising God, the glory of God is both exhibited and acknowledged; his fulness is received and returned. Here is both an *emanation* and *remanation*. The refulgence shines upon and into the creature, and is reflected back to the luminary. The beams of glory come from God, and are something of God, and are refunded back again to their original. So that the whole is *of* God, and *in* God, and *to* God, and God is the beginning, middle and end in this affair.

And though it be true that God has respect to the creature in these things; yet his respect to himself and to the creature in this matter, are not properly to be looked upon, as a double and divided respect of God's heart. What has been said in Chap. I. Sect. 3, 4, may be sufficient to show this. Nevertheless, it may not be amiss here briefly to say a few things; though they are mostly implied in what has been said already.

When God was about to create the world, he had respect to that emanation of his glory, which is actually the consequence of the creation, just as it is with regard to all that belongs to it, both with regard to its relation to himself, and the creature. He had regard to it, as an emanation from himself, and a communication of himself, and as the thing communicated, in its nature returned to himself, as its final term. And he had regard to it also, as the emanation was to the creature, and as the thing communicated was in the creature, as its subject. And God had regard to it in this manner, as he had a supreme regard to himself, and value for his own infinite, internal glory. It was this value for himself that caused him to value and seek that his internal glory should flow forth from himself. It was from his value for his glorious perfections of wisdom and righteousness, &c., that he valued the proper exercise and effect of

these perfections, in wise and righteous acts and effects. It was from his infinite value for his internal glory and fulness, that he valued the thing itself, which is communicated, which is something of the same, extant in the creature. Thus, because he infinitely values his own glory, consisting in the knowledge of himself, love to himself, and complacence and joy in himself; he therefore valued the image, communication or participation of these, in the creature. And it is because he values himself, that he delights in the knowledge, and love, and joy of the creature; as being himself the object of this knowledge, love and complacence. For it is the necessary consequence of the true esteem and love of any person or being (suppose a son or friend) that we should approve and value others' esteem of the same object, and disapprove and dislike the contrary. For the same reason is it the consequence of a being's esteem and love of himself, that he should approve of others' esteem and love of himself.

Thus it is easy to conceive, how God should seek the good of the creature, consisting in the creature's knowledge and holiness, and even his happiness, from a supreme regard to himself; as his happiness arises from that which is an image and participation of God's own beauty; and consists in the creature's exercising a supreme regard to God, and complacence in him; in beholding God's glory, in esteeming and loving it, and rejoicing in it, and in his exercising and testifying love and supreme respect to God; which is the same thing with the creature's exalting God as his chief good, and making him his supreme end.

And though the emanation of God's fulness which God intended in the creation, and which actually is the consequence of it, is to the creature as its object, and the creature is the subject of the fulness communicated, and is the creature's good; and was also regarded as such, when God sought it as the end of his works; yet it does not necessarily follow, that even in so doing, he did not make himself his end. It comes to the same thing. God's respect to the creature's good, and his respect to himself, is not a divided respect; but both are united in one, as the happiness of the creature aimed at, is happiness in union with himself. The creature is no further happy with this happiness which God makes his ultimate end, than he becomes one with God. The more happiness the greater the union: when the happiness is perfect, the union is perfect. And as the happiness will be increasing to eternity, the union will become more and more strict and perfect; nearer and more like to that between God the Father, and the Son; who are so united, that their interest is perfectly one. If the happiness of the creature be considered as it will be, in the whole of the creature's eternal duration, with all the infinity of its progress, and infinite increase of nearness and union to God; in this view the creature must be looked upon as united to God in an infinite strictness.

If God has respect to something in the creature, which he views as of everlasting duration, and as rising higher and higher through that infinite duration, and that not with constantly diminishing (but perhaps an increasing) celerity; then he has respect to it, as in the whole, of infinite height, though there never will be any particular time, when it can be said already to have come to such a height.

Let the most perfect union with God be represented by something at an infinite height above us; and the eternally increasing union of the saints with God, by something that is ascending constantly towards that infinite height, moving upwards with a given velocity, and that is to continue thus to move to all eternity. God, who views the whole of this eternally increasing height, views it as an infinite height. And if he has respect to it, and makes it his end, as it

the whole of it, he has respect to it as an infinite height, though the time will never come when it can be said it has already arrived at this infinite height.

God aims at that which the motion or progression which he causes, aims at, or tends to. If there be many things supposed to be so made and appointed, that by a constant and eternal motion, they all tend to a certain centre; then it appears that he who made them, and is the cause of their motion, aimed at that centre, that term of their motion, to which they eternally tend, and are eternally, as it were, striving after. And if God be this centre, then God aimed at himself. And herein it appears, that as he is the first author of their being and motion, so he is the last end, the final term, to which is their ultimate tendency and aim.

We may judge of the end that the Creator aimed at, in the being, nature and tendency he gives the creature, by the mark or term which they constantly aim at in their tendency and eternal progress; though the time will never come, when it can be said it is attained to, in the most absolutely perfect manner.

But if strictness of union to God be viewed as thus infinitely exalted, then the creature must be regarded as infinitely, nearly, and closely united to God. And viewed thus, their interest must be viewed as one with God's interest, and so is not regarded properly with a disjunct and separate, but an undivided respect. And as to any difficulty of reconciling God's not making the creature his ultimate end, with a respect properly distinct from a respect to himself, with his benevolence and free grace, and the creature's obligation to gratitude, the reader must be referred to Chap. I. Sec. 4, Object. 4, where this objection has been considered and answered at large.

If by reason of the strictness of the union of a man and his family, their interest may be looked upon as one, how much more one is the interest of Christ and his church (whose first union in heaven is unspeakably more perfect and exalted than that of an earthly father and his family), if they be considered with regard to their eternal and increasing union! Doubtless it may justly be esteemed as so much one, that it may be supposed to be aimed at and sought, not with a distinct and separate, but an undivided respect.

It is certain that what God aimed at in the creation of the world, was the good that would be the consequence of the creation, in the whole continuance of the thing created.

It is no solid objection against God's aiming at an infinitely perfect union of the creature with himself, that the particular time will never come when it can be said, the union is now infinitely perfect. God aims at satisfying justice in the eternal damnation of sinners; which will be satisfied by their damnation, considered no otherwise than with regard to its eternal duration. But yet there never will come that particular moment, when it can be said, that now justice is satisfied. But if this does not satisfy our modern freethinkers, who do not like the talk about satisfying justice with an infinite punishment; I suppose it will not be denied by any, that God, in glorifying the saints in heaven with eternal felicity, aims to satisfy his infinite grace or benevolence, by the bestowment of a good infinitely valuable because eternal; and yet there never will come the moment, when it can be said, that now this infinitely valuable good has been actually bestowed.

DISSERTATION

ON THE

NATURE OF VIRTUE.

THE

NATURE OF TRUE VIRTUE.

CHAPTER I.

Showing wherein the Essence of true Virtue consists.

WHATEVER controversies and variety of opinions there are about the nature of virtue, yet all (excepting some skeptics, who deny any real difference between virtue and vice) mean by it, something *beautiful*, or rather some kind of *beauty*, or excellency.—It is not *all* beauty, that is called virtue; for instance, not the beauty of a building, of a flower, or of the rainbow: but some beauty belonging to Beings that have *perception* and *will*.—It is not all beauty of *mankind*, that is called virtue; for instance, not the external beauty of the countenance, or shape, gracefulness of motion, or harmony of voice: but it is a beauty that has its original seat in the mind.—But yet perhaps not *every* thing that may be called a beauty of mind, is properly called virtue. There is a beauty of understanding and speculation. There is something in the ideas and conceptions of great philosophers and statesmen, that may be called beautiful; which is a different thing from what is most commonly meant by virtue. But virtue is the beauty* of those qualities and acts of the mind, that are of a *moral* nature, i. e., such as are attended with desert or worthiness of *praise*, or *blame*. Things of this sort, it is generally agreed, so far as I know, are not any thing belonging merely to speculation; but to the *disposition* and *will*, or (to use a general word, I suppose commonly well understood) the *heart*. Therefore I suppose, I shall not depart from the common opinion, when I say, that virtue is the beauty of the qualities and exercises of the heart, or those actions which proceed from them. So that when it is inquired, What is the nature of true *virtue?*—this is the same as to inquire, what that is which renders any habit, disposition, or exercise of the heart truly *beautiful*. I use the phrase *true* virtue, and speak of things *truly* beautiful, because I suppose it will generally be allowed, that there is a distinction to be made between some things which are truly virtuous, and others which only seem to be virtuous, through a partial and imperfect view of things: that some actions and dispositions appear beautiful, if considered partially and superficially, or with regard to some things belonging to them, and in some of their circumstances and tendencies, which would appear otherwise in a more extensive and comprehensive view, wherein they are seen clearly in their whole nature and the extent of their connections in the universality of things.—There is a general and a particular beauty. By a *particular* beauty, I mean that by which a thing appears beautiful when considered only with regard to its connection with, and tendency to some particular things within a limited, and, as it were, a private sphere. And a *general* beauty

* It is to be questioned whether it would not be more correct to say that virtue consists in those acts of the mind in themselves; beauty properly denoting their quality.—EDITOR.

is that by which a thing appears beautiful when viewed most perfectly, comprehensively and universally, with regard to all its tendencies, and its connections with every thing it stands related to. The former may be without and against the latter. As, a few notes in a tune, taken only by themselves, and in their relation to one another, may be harmonious; which when considered with respect to all the notes in the tune, or the entire series of sounds they are connected with, may be very discordant and disagreeable.—(Of which more afterwards.)—*That only*, therefore, is what I mean by true virtue, which is *that*, belonging to the *heart* of an intelligent Being, that is beautiful by a *general* beauty, or beautiful in a comprehensive view as it is in itself, and as related to every thing that it stands in connection with. And therefore when we are inquiring concerning the nature of true virtue, viz., wherein this true and general beauty of the heart does most essentially consist—this is my answer to the inquiry:

True virtue most essentially consists in benevolence to Being in general. Or perhaps to speak more accurately, it is that consent, propensity and union of heart to Being in general, that is immediately exercised in a general good will.

The things which were before observed of the nature of true virtue, naturally lead us to such a notion of it. If it has its seat in the heart, and is the general goodness and beauty of the disposition and exercise of that, in the most comprehensive view, considered with regard to its universal tendency, and as related to every thing that it stands in connection with; what can it consist in, but a consent and good will to Being in general?—Beauty does not consist in discord and dissent, but in consent and agreement. And if every intelligent Being is some way related to Being in general, and is a part of the universal system of existence; and so stands in connection with the whole; what can its general and true beauty be, but its union and consent with the great whole?

If any such thing can be supposed as a union of heart to some particular Being, or number of Beings, disposing it to benevolence to a private circle or system of Beings, which are but a small part of the whole; not implying a tendency to a union with the great system, and not at all inconsistent with enmity towards Being in general; this I suppose not to be of the nature of true virtue: although it may in some respects be good, and may appear beautiful in a confined and contracted view of things.—But of this more afterwards.

It is abundantly plain by the holy Scriptures, and generally allowed, not only by Christian divines, but by the more considerable deists, that virtue most essentially consists in love. And I suppose, it is owned by the most considerable writers, to consist in general love of benevolence, or kind affection: though it seems to me, the meaning of some in this affair is not sufficiently explained, which perhaps occasions some error or confusion in discourses on this subject.

When I say, true virtue consists in love to Being in general, I shall not be likely to be understood, that no one act of the mind or exercise of love is of the nature of true virtue, but what has Being in general, or the great system of universal existence, for its direct and immediate object: so that no exercise of love or kind affection to any one particular Being, that is but a small part of this whole, has any thing of the nature of true virtue. But, that the nature of true virtue consists in a disposition to benevolence towards Being in general. Though, from such a disposition may arise exercises of love to particular Beings, as objects are presented and occasions arise. No wonder, that he who is of a generally benevolent disposition, should be more disposed than another to have his heart moved with benevolent affection to particular persons, whom he is

acquainted and conversant with, and from whom arise the greatest and most frequent occasions for exciting his benevolent temper. But my meaning is, that no affections towards particular persons or Beings are of the nature of true virtue, but such as arise from a generally benevolent temper, or from that habit or frame of mind, wherein consists a disposition to love Being in general.

And perhaps it is needless for me to give notice to my readers, that when I speak of an intelligent Being's having a heart united and benevolently disposed to Being in general, I thereby mean *intelligent* Being in general. Not inanimate things, or Beings that have no perception or will, which are not properly capable objects of benevolence.

Love is commonly distinguished into love of benevolence and love of complacence. Love of *benevolence* is that affection or propensity of the heart to any Being, which causes it to incline to its well being, or disposes it to desire and take pleasure in its happiness. And if I mistake not, it is agreeable to the common opinion, that beauty in the object is not always the ground of this propensity: but that there may be such a thing as benevolence, or a disposition to the welfare of those that are not considered as beautiful; unless mere existence be accounted a beauty. And benevolence or goodness in the Divine Being is generally supposed, not only to be prior to the beauty of many of its objects, but to their existence: so as to be the ground both of their existence and their beauty, rather than they the foundation of God's benevolence; as it is supposed that it is God's goodness which moved him to give them both Being and beauty. So that if all virtue primarily consists in that affection of heart to Being, which is exercised in benevolence, or an inclination to its good, then God's virtue is so extended as to include a propensity, not only to Being actually existing, and actually beautiful, but to possible Being, so as to incline him to give Being, beauty and happiness. But not now to insist particularly on this. What I would have observed at present, is, that it must be allowed, benevolence doth not necessarily presuppose beauty in its object.

What is commonly called love of *complacence*, presupposes beauty. For it is no other than delight in beauty; or complacence in the person or Being beloved for his beauty.

If virtue be the beauty of an intelligent Being, and virtue consists in love, then it is a plain inconsistence, to suppose that virtue primarily consists in any love to its object *for its beauty;* either in a love of complacence, which is delight in a Being for his beauty, or in a love of benevolence, that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. For that would be to suppose, that the beauty of intelligent beings primarily consists in love to beauty; or, that their virtue first of all consists in their love to virtue. Which is an inconsistence, and going in a circle. Because it makes virtue, or beauty of mind, the foundation or first motive of that love wherein virtue originally consists, or wherein the very first virtue consists; or, it supposes the first virtue to be the consequence and effect of virtue. So that virtue is originally the foundation and exciting cause of the very beginning or first Being of virtue. Which makes the first virtue, both the ground, and the consequence, both cause and effect of itself.* Doubtless virtue primarily consists in something else besides any effect or consequence of virtue. If virtue consists primarily in love to virtue, then virtue, the thing loved, is the love of virtue: so that virtue must consist in the love of the love of virtue.

* Mr. E.'s idea here appears to be that virtue must exist prior to the existence of any virtuous object on which it can complaisantly terminate. This is undoubtedly true with respect to the duty. But this does not appear inconsistent with the supposition that the first act of virtue in a creature may be delight in virtue as it is in God.—Ed.

And if it be inquired, what that virtue is, which virtue consists in the love of the love of, it must be answered, it is the love of virtue. So that there must be the love of the love of the love of virtue, and so on *in infinitum*. For there is no end of going back in a circle. We never come to any beginning, or foundation. For it is without beginning and hangs on nothing.

Therefore if the essence of virtue or beauty of mind lies in love, or a disposition to love, it must primarily consist in something *different* both from complacence, which is a delight in beauty, and also from any benevolence that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. Because it is absurd, to say that virtue is primarily and first of all the consequence of itself. For this makes virtue primarily prior to itself.

Nor can virtue primarily consist in *gratitude;* or one Being's benevolence, to another for his benevolence to him. Because this implies the same inconsistence. For it supposes a benevolence prior to gratitude, that is the cause of gratitude. Therefore the first benevolence, or that benevolence which has none prior to it, cannot be gratitude.

Therefore there is room left for no other conclusion than that the primary object of virtuous love is Being, simply considered; or, that true virtue primarily consists, not in love to any particular Beings, because of their virtue or beauty, nor in gratitude, because they love us; but in a propensity and union of heart to Being simply considered; exciting absolute benevolence (if I may so call it) to Being in general.--I say, true virtue *primarily* consists in this. For I am far from asserting that there is no true virtue in any other love than this absolute benevolence. But I would express what appears to me to be the truth on this subject, in the following particulars.

The *first* object of a virtuous benevolence is *Being*, simply considered: and if Being, *simply* considered, be its object, then Being *in general* is its object; and the thing it has an ultimate propensity to, is the *highest good* of Being in general. And it will seek the good of every *individual* Being unless it be conceived as not consistent with the highest good of Being in general. In which case the good of a particular Being, or some Beings, may be given up for the sake of the highest good of Being in general. And particularly if there be any Being that is looked upon as statedly and irreclaimably opposite and an enemy to Being in general, then consent and adherence to Being in general will induce the truly virtuous heart to forsake that Being, and to oppose it.

And further, if Being, simply considered, be the first object of a truly virtuous benevolence, then that Being who has *most* of Being, or has the greatest share of existence, other things being equal, so far as such a Being is exhibited to our faculties or set in our view, will have the *greatest* share of the propensity and benevolent affection of the heart. I say, *other things being equal*, especially because there is a *secondary* object of virtuous benevolence, that I shall take notice of presently. Which is one thing that must be considered as the ground or motive to a purely virtuous benevolence. Pure benevolence in its first exercise is nothing else but Being's uniting consent, or propensity to Being; appearing true and pure by its extending to Being in general, and inclining to the general highest good, and to each Being, whose welfare is consistent with the highest general good, in proportion to the degree of *existence** understood, other things being equal.

* I say, in proportion to the degree of *existence*, because one Being may have more *existence* than an other, as he may be *greater* than another. That which is *great*, has more existence, and is further from nothing, than that which is *little*. One Being may have every thing positive belonging to it, or every thing which goes to its positive existence (in opposition to defect) in a higher degree than another; or a greater capacity and power, greater understanding, every faculty and every positive quality in a higher

The *second* object of a virtuous propensity of heart is *benevolent* Being. A secondary ground of pure benevolence is virtuous benevolence itself in its object When any one under the influence of general benevolence, sees another Being possessed of the like general benevolence, this attaches his heart to him, and draws forth greater love to him, than merely his having existence: because so far as the Being beloved has love to Being in general, so far his own Being is, as it were, enlarged, extends to, and in some sort comprehends, Being in general: and therefore he that is governed by love to Being in general must of necessity have complacence in him, and the greater degree of benevolence to him, as it were out of gratitude to him for his love to general existence, that his own heart is extended and united to, and so looks on its interest as its own. It is because his heart is thus united to Being in general, that he looks on a benevolent propensity to Being in general, wherever he sees it, as the beauty of the Being in whom it is; an excellency, that renders him worthy of esteem, complacence, and the greater good will.

But several things may be noted more particularly concerning this secondary ground of a truly virtuous love.

1. That loving a Being on *this ground* necessarily arises from pure benevolence to Being *in general*, and comes to the same thing. For he that has a simple and pure good will to general entity or existence, must love that temper in others, that agrees and conspires with itself. A spirit of consent to Being must agree with consent to Being. That which truly and sincerely seeks the good of others, must approve of, and love, that which joins with him in seeking the good of others.

2. This which has been now mentioned as a secondary ground of virtuous love, is the thing wherein true moral or spiritual *beauty* primarily consists. Yea spiritual beauty consists wholly in this, and the various qualities and exercises of mind which proceed from it, and the external actions which proceed from these internal qualities and exercises. And in these things consists all true *virtue*, viz., in this love of Being, and the qualities and acts which arise from it.

3. As all spiritual beauty lies in these virtuous principles and acts, so it is primarily *on this account* they are beautiful, *viz.*, that they imply *consent* and *union* with Being *in general*. This is the primary and most essential Beauty of every thing that can justly be called by the name of virtue, or is any moral excellency in the eye of one that has a perfect view of things. I say, the *primary* and *most essential* beauty—because there is a secondary and inferior sort of beauty; which I shall take notice of afterwards.

4. This spiritual beauty, that is but a *secondary* ground of a virtuous benevolence, is the ground, not only of benevolence, but *complacence*, and is the *primary* ground of the latter; that is, when the complacence is truly virtuous. Love to us in particular, and kindness received, may be a secondary ground. But this is the primary objective foundation of it.

5. It must be noted, that the *degree* of the *amiableness* or *valuableness* of true virtue, primarily consisting in consent and a benevolent propensity of heart to Being in general, in the eyes of one that is influenced by such a spirit, is not in the *simple* proportion of the degree of benevolent affection seen, but in a proportion *compounded* of the greatness of the benevolent Being or the degree of *Being* and the degree of *benevolence*. One that loves Being in general, will necessarily value good will to Being in general, wherever he sees it. But if he

degree. An archangel must be supposed to have more existence, and to be every way further removed from nonentity, than a worm, or a flea.

sees the same benevolence in *two* Beings, he will value it *more* in two, than in one only. Because it is a greater thing, more favorable to Being in general, to have two Beings to favor it, than only one of them. For there is more Being that favors Being: both together having more Being than one alone. So, if one Being be as great as two, has as much existence as both together, and has the same degree of general benevolence, it is more favorable to Being in general than if there were general benevolence in a Being that had but half that share of existence. As a large quantity of gold, with the same degree of preciousness, i. e. with the same excellent quality of matter, is more valuable than a small quantity of the same metal.

6. It is impossible that any one should truly *relish* this beauty, consisting in general benevolence, who has *not* that temper himself. I have observed, that if any Being is possessed of such a temper, he will unavoidably be pleased with the same temper in another. And it may in like manner be demonstrated, that it is such a spirit, and nothing else, which will relish such a spirit. For if a Being, destitute of benevolence, should love benevolence to Being in general, it would prize and seek that which it had no value for. Because to love an inclination to the good of Being in general, would imply a loving and prizing the good of Being in general. For how should one love and value a *disposition* to a thing, or a *tendency to promote* a thing, and for that very reason, because it tends to promote it—when the *thing* itself is what he is regardless of, and has no value for, no desires to have promoted.

CHAPTER II.

Showing how that Love, wherein true Virtue consists, respects the Divine Being and created Beings.

From what has been said, it is evident, that true virtue must chiefly consist in love to God; the Being of Beings, infinitely the greatest and best of Beings. This appears, whether we consider the primary or secondary ground of virtuous love. It was observed, that the *first* objective ground of that love wherein true virtue consists, is Being, simply considered: and as a necessary consequence of this, that Being who has the most of Being, or the greatest share of universal existence, has proportionably the greatest share of virtuous benevolence, so far as such a Being is exhibited to the faculties of our minds, other things being equal. But God has infinitely the greatest share of existence, or is infinitely the greatest Being. So that all other Being, even that of all created things whatsoever, throughout the whole universe, is as nothing in comparison of the Divine Being.

And if we consider the *secondary* ground of love, viz., beauty, or moral excellency, the same thing will appear. For as God is infinitely the greatest Being, so he is allowed to be infinitely the most beautiful and excellent: and all the beauty to be found diffused throughout the whole creation, is but the reflection of the diffused beams of that Being who hath an infinite fulness of brightness and glory. God's beauty is infinitely more valuable than that of all other Beings, upon both those accounts mentioned, viz., the *degree* of his virtue, and the greatness of the Being possessed of this virtue. And God has sufficiently exhibited himself, in his Being, his infinite greatness and excellency: and has given us

faculties, whereby we are capable of plainly discovering immense superiority to all other Beings, in these respects. Therefore he that has true virtue, consisting in benevolence to Being in general, and in that complacence in virtue, or moral beauty, and benevolence to virtuous Being, must necessarily have a supreme love to God, both of benevolence and complacence. And all true virtue must radically and essentially, and as it were summarily, consist in this. Because God is not only infinitely greater and more excellent than all other Being, but he is the head of the universal system of existence; the foundation and fountain of all Being and all Beauty; from whom all is perfectly derived, and on whom all is most absolutely and perfectly dependent; *of whom* and *through whom*, and *to whom* is all Being and all perfection; and whose Being and beauty is as it were the sum and comprehension of all existence and excellence: much more than the sun is the fountain and summary comprehension of all the light and brightness of the day.

If it should be objected, that virtue consists primarily in benevolence, but that our fellow creatures, and not God, seem to be the most proper object of our benevolence; inasmuch as our goodness extendeth not to God, and we cannot be profitable to him.—To this I answer:

1. A benevolent propensity of heart is exercised not only in seeking to promote the happiness of the Being, towards whom it is exercised, but also in *rejoicing in* his happiness. Even as gratitude for benefits received will not only excite endeavors to requite the kindness we receive, by equally benefiting our benefactor, but also if he be above any need of us, or we have nothing to bestow, and are unable to repay his kindness, it will dispose us to rejoice in his prosperity.

2. Though we are not able to give any thing to God, which we have of our own, independently; yet we may be instruments of promoting his *glory*, in which he takes a true and proper *delight*. [As was shown at large in the treatise, on God's end in creating the world, Chapter I. Sect. 4; whither I must refer the reader for a more full answer to this objection.]

Whatever influence such an objection may seem to have on the minds of some, yet is there any that owns the Being of a God, who will deny that any love or benevolent affection, is due to God, and proper to be exercised towards him? If no *benevolence* is to be exercised towards God, because we cannot profit him, then for the same reason, neither is *gratitude* to be exercised towards him for his benefits to us; because we cannot requite him. But where is the man, who believes a God and a providence, that will say this?

There seems to be an inconsistence in some writers on morality, in this respect, that they do not wholly exclude a regard to the *Deity* out of their schemes of morality, but yet mention it so slightly, that they leave me room and reason to suspect they esteem it a less important and a subordinate part of true morality; and insist on benevolence to the *created system* in such a manner as would naturally lead one to suppose, they look upon that as by far the most important and essential thing. But why should this be? If true virtue consists partly in a respect to God, then doubtless it consists chiefly in it. If true morality requires that we should have some regard, some benevolent affection to our Creator, as well as to his creatures, then doubtless it requires the first regard to be paid to him; and that he be every way the supreme object of our benevolence. If his being above our reach, and beyond all capacity of being profited by us, does not hinder but that nevertheless he is the proper object of our love, then it does not hinder that he should be loved according to his dignity, or according to the degree in which he has those things wherein worthiness of regard consists so far

as we are capable of it. But this worthiness none will deny consists in these two things, *greatness* and moral *goodness*. And those that own a God, do not deny that he infinitely exceeds all other Beings in these. If the Deity is to be looked upon as within that system of Beings which properly terminates our benevolence, or belonging to that whole, certainly he is to be regarded as the *head* of the system, and the *chief* part of it; if it be proper to call him a *part*, who is infinitely more than all the rest, and in comparison of whom and without whom all the rest are nothing, either as to beauty or existence. And therefore certainly, unless we will be atheists, we must allow that true virtue does primarily and most essentially consist in a supreme love to God; and that where this is wanting there can be no true virtue.

But this being a matter of the highest importance, I shall say something further to make it plain, that love to God is most essential to true virtue; and that no benevolence whatsoever to other Beings can be of the nature of true virtue, without it.

And therefore let it be supposed, that some Beings, by natural instinct, or by some other means, have a determination of mind to union and benevolence to a *particular person*, or *private system*,* which is but a small part of the universal system of Being: and that this disposition or determination of mind is independent on, or not subordinate to benevolence, to *Being in general*. Such a determination, disposition, or affection of mind is not of the nature of true virtue.

This is allowed by all with regard to *self-love*; in which, good will is confined to one single person only. And there are the same reasons, why any other private affection or good will, though extending to a society of persons, independent of, and unsubordinate to, benevolence to the universality, should not be esteemed truly virtuous. For, notwithstanding it extends to a number of persons, which taken together are more than a single person, yet the whole falls infinitely short of the universality of existence; and if put in the scales with it, has no greater proportion to it than a single person.

However, it may not be amiss more particularly to consider the reasons why *private affections*, or good will limited to a particular circle of Beings, falling infinitely short of the whole existence, and not dependent upon it, nor subordinate to general benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

1. Such a private affection, detached from general benevolence and independent on it, as the case may be, will be *against* general benevolence, or of a contrary tendency; and will set a person *against* general existence, and make him an enemy to it.—As it is with *selfishness*, or when a man is governed by a regard to his own private interest, independent of regard to the public good, such a temper exposes a man to act the part of an enemy to the public. As, in every case wherein his private interest seems to clash with the public; or in all those cases wherein such things are presented to his view, that suit his personal appetites or private inclinations, but are inconsistent with the good of the public. On which account a selfish, contracted, narrow spirit is generally abhorred, and is esteemed base and sordid.—But if a man's affection takes in half a dozen more, and his regards extend so far beyond his own single person as to take in his children and family; or if it reaches further still, to a longer circle, but falls infinitely short of the universal system, and is exclusive of Being in general; his

* It may be here noted, that when hereafter I use such a phrase as *private system* of Beings, or others similar, I thereby intend any system or society of Beings that contains but a small part of the great system comprehending the universality of existence. I think, that may well be called a *private system*, which is but an infinitely small part of this great whole we stand related to. I therefore also call that affection, *private affection*, which is limited to so narrow a circle; and that *general* affection or benevolence which has *Being in general* for its object.

private affection exposes him to the same thing, viz., to pursue the interest of its particular object in *opposition* to general existence; which is certainly contrary to the tendency of true virtue; yea, directly contrary to the main and most essential thing in its nature, the thing on account of which chiefly its nature and tendency is good. For the chief and most essential good that is in virtue, is its favoring Being in general. Now certainly, if private affection to a limited system had in itself the essential nature of virtue, it would be impossible, that it should in any circumstance whatsoever have a tendency and inclination directly *contrary* to that wherein the essence of virtue chiefly consists.

2. Private affection, if not subordinate to general affection, is not only liable, as the case *may* be, to issue in enmity to Being in general, but has a *tendency* to it as the case certainly *is*, and must necessarily be. For he that is influenced by private affection, not subordinate to regard to Being in general, sets up its particular or limited object above Being in general; and this most naturally tends to enmity against the latter, which is by right the great supreme, ruling, and absolutely sovereign object of our regard. Even as the setting up another prince as supreme in any kingdom, distinct from the lawful sovereign, naturally tends to enmity against the lawful sovereign. Wherever it is sufficiently published, that the supreme, infinite, and all comprehending Being requires a supreme regard to himself; and insists upon it, that our respect to him should universally rule in our hearts, and every other affection be subordinate to it, and this under the pain of his displeasure (as we must suppose it is in the world of intelligent creatures, if God maintains a moral kingdom in the world); then a consciousness of our having chosen and set up another prince to rule over us, and subjected our hearts to him, and continuing in such an act, must unavoidably excite enmity, and fix us in a stated opposition to the Supreme Being. This demonstrates, that affection to a private society or system, independent on general benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For this would be absurd, that it has the nature and essence of true virtue, and yet at the same time has a *tendency opposite* to true virtue.

3. Not only would affection to a private system, unsubordinate to regard to Being in general, have a tendency to opposition to the supreme object of virtuous affection, as its effect and consequence, but would become *itself* an opposition to that object. Considered by itself in its nature, detached from its effects, it is an instance of great opposition to the rightful supreme object of our respect. For it exalts its private object above the other great and infinite object; and sets that up as supreme, in opposition to this. It puts down Being in general, which is infinitely superior in itself and infinitely more important, in an inferior place; yea, subjects the supreme general object to this private infinitely inferior object; which is to treat it with great contempt, and truly to act in oppositon to it, and to act in opposition to the true order of things, and in opposition to that which is infinitely the supreme interest; making this supreme and infinitely important interest, as far as in us lies, to be subject to, and dependent on, an interest infinitely inferior. This is to act against it, and to act the part of an enemy to it. He that takes a subject, and exalts him above his prince, sets him as supreme instead of the prince, and treats his prince wholly as a subject, therein acts the part of an enemy to his prince.

From these things, I think, it is manifest, that no affection limited to any private system, not dependent on, nor subordinate to Being in general, can be of the nature of true virtue; and this, whatever the private system be, let it be more or less extensive, consisting of a greater or smaller number of individuals, so long as it contains an infinitely little part of universal existence, and so bears

no proportion to the great all comprehending system.—And consequently, that no affection whatsoever to any creature, or any system of created Beings, which is not dependent on, nor subordinate to a propensity or union of the heart to God, the supreme and infinite Being, can be of the nature of true virtue.

From hence also it is evident, that the *divine virtue*, or the virtue of the divine mind, must consist primarily in *love to himself*, or in the mutual love and friendship which subsists eternally and necessarily between the several persons in the Godhead, or that infinitely strong propensity there is in these divine persons one to another. There is no need of multiplying words, to prove that it must be thus, on a supposition that virtue, in its most essential nature, consists in benevolent affection or propensity of heart towards Being in general; and so flowing out to particular Beings, in a greater or less degree, according to the measure of existence and beauty which they are possessed of.—It will also follow from the foregoing things, that God's goodness and love to created Beings, is derived from, and subordinate to his love to himself. [In what manner it is so, I have endeavoured in some measure to explain in the preceding discourse of *God's end in creating the World.*]

With respect to the manner in which a virtuous love in *created* Beings, *one to another*, is dependent on, and derived from love to *God*, this will appear by a proper consideration of what has been said; that it is sufficient to render love to any created Being virtuous, if it arise from the temper of mind wherein consists a disposition to love God supremely. Because it appears from what has been already observed, all that love to *particular Beings*, which is the fruit of a benevolent propensity of heart to *Being in general*, is virtuous love. But, as has been remarked, a benevolent propensity of heart to Being in general, and a temper or disposition to love God supremely, are in effect the same thing. Therefore, if love to a created Being comes from that temper or propensity of the heart, it is virtuous.—However, every particular exercise of love to a creature may not *sensibly* arise from any exercise of love to God, or an explicit consideration of any similitude, conformity, union or relation to God, in the creature beloved.

The most proper *evidence* of love to a created Being, its arising from that temper of mind wherein consists a supreme propensity of heart to God, seems to be the agreeableness of the kind and degree of our love to *God's end* in our creation and in the creation of all things, and the coincidence of the exercises of our love, in their manner, order, and measure, with the *manner*, in which *God* himself exercises love to the creature, in the creation and government of the world, and the way in which God, as the first cause and supreme disposer of all things, has respect to the creature's happiness, in subordination to himself as his own supreme end. For the true virtue of created Beings is doubtless their highest excellency, and their true goodness, and that by which they are especially agreeable to the mind of their Creator.—But the true goodness of a thing (as was observed before) must be its agreeableness to its *end*, or its fitness to answer the design for which it was made. Or, at least, this must be its goodness in the eyes of the workmen.—Therefore they are good moral agents whose temper of mind or propensity of heart is agreeable to the *end* for which God made moral agents. But, as has been shown, the last end for which God has made moral agents, must be the last end for which God has made all things; it being evident, that the moral world is the end of the rest of the world; the inanimate and unintelligent world being made for the rational and moral world, as much as a house is prepared for the inhabitants.

By these things it appears, that a truly virtuous mind, being, as it were,

under the sovereign dominion of *love to God*, does above all things seek the *glory of God*, and makes *this* his supreme, governing, and ultimate end; consisting in the expression of God's perfections in their proper effects, and in the manifestation of God's glory to created understandings, and the communications of the infinite fulness of God to the creature; in the creature's highest esteem of God, love to God, and joy in God, and in the proper exercises and expressions of these.—And so far as a virtuous mind exercises true virtue in benevolence to created Beings, it chiefly seeks the good of the creature, consisting in its knowledge or view of God's glory and beauty, its union with God, and conformity to him, love to him, and joy in him.—And that temper or disposition of heart, that consent, union, or propensity of mind to Being in general, which appears chiefly in such exercises, is virtue, truly so called; or in other words, true grace and real holiness. And no other disposition or affection but this is of the nature of true virtue.

Corollary. Hence it appears, that those *schemes* of religion or moral philosophy, which, however well in some respects they may treat of benevolence to *mankind*, and other virtues depending on it, yet have not a supreme regard to God, and love to him, laid in the *foundation*, and all other virtues handled in a *connection* with this, and in a *subordination* to this, are not true schemes of philosophy, but are fundamentally and essentially defective. And whatever other benevolence or generosity towards mankind, and other virtues, or moral qualifications which go by that name, any are possessed of, that are not attended with a *love to God* which is altogether above them, and to which they are subordinate, and on which they are dependent, there is nothing of the nature of true virtue or religion in them.—And it may be asserted in general that nothing is of the nature of true virtue in which God is not the *first* and the *last*; or which, with regard to their exercises in general, have not their first foundation and source in apprehensions of God's supreme dignity and glory, and in answerable esteem and love of him, and have not respect to God as the supreme end.

CHAPTER III.

Concerning the Secondary and Inferior kind of Beauty.

Though this which has been spoken of, alone, is justly esteemed the true beauty of moral agents, or spiritual Beings; this alone being what would appear beautiful in them, upon a clear and comprehensive view of things; and therefore alone is the moral amiableness of Beings that have understanding and will in the eyes of him that perfectly sees all things as they are; yet there are other qualities, other sensations, propensities and affections of mind, and principles of action, that often obtain the epithet of *virtuous*, and by many are supposed to have the nature of true virtue; which are entirely of a distinct nature from this, and have nothing of that kind; and therefore are erroneously confounded with real virtue—as may particularly and fully appear from things which will be observed in this and the following chapters.

That consent, agreement, or union of Being to Being, which has been spoken of, viz., the union or propensity of *minds* to mental or spiritual existence, may be called the highest, and first, or primary beauty that is to be found among things that exist: being the proper and peculiar beauty of spiritual

and moral Beings, which are the highest and first part of the universal system, for whose sake all the rest has existence. Yet there is another inferior, secondary beauty, which is some image of this, and which is not peculiar to spiritual Beings, but is found even in inanimate things; which consists in a mutual consent and agreement of different things in form, manner, quantity, and visible end or design; called by the various names of regularity, order, uniformity, symmetry, proportion, harmony, &c. Such is the mutual agreement of the various sides of a square, or equilateral triangle, or of a regular polygon. Such is, as it were, the mutual consent of the different parts of the periphery of a circle, or surface of a sphere, and of the corresponding parts of an ellipsis. Such is the agreement of the colors, figures, dimensions and distances of the different spots on the chess board. Such is the beauty of the figures on a piece of chints, or brocade.—Such is the beautiful proportion of the various parts of a human body, or countenance. And such is the sweet mutual consent and agreement of the various notes of a melodious tune. This is the same that Mr. Hutcheson, in his treatise on beauty, expresses by uniformity in the midst of variety. Which is no other than the consent or agreement of different things, in form, quantity, &c. He observes, that the greater the variety is, in equal uniformity, the greater the beauty. Which is no more than to say, the more there are of different mutually agreeing things, the greater is the beauty. And the reason of that is, because it is more considerable to have many things consent one with another, than a few only.

The beauty which consists in the visible fitness of a thing to its use and unity of design, is not a distinct sort of beauty from this. For it is to be observed, that one thing which contributes to the beauty of the agreement and proportion of various things, is their relation one to another; which connects them, and introduces them together into view and consideration, and whereby one suggests the other to the mind, and the mind is led to compare them, and so to expect and desire agreement. Thus the uniformity of two or more pillars, as they may happen to be found in different places, is not an equal degree of beauty, as that uniformity in so many pillars in the corresponding parts of the same building. So means and an intended effect are related one to another. The answerableness of a thing to its use is only the proportion, fitness, and agreeing of a cause or means to a visibly designed effect, and so an effect suggested to the mind by the idea of the means. This kind of beauty is not entirely different from that beauty which there is in fitting a mortise to its tenon. Only when the beauty consists in unity of design, or the adaptedness of a variety of things to promote one intended effect, in which all conspire, as the various parts of an ingenious complicated machine, there is a double beauty, as there is a twofold agreement and conformity. First, there is the agreement of the various parts to the designed end. Secondly, through this, viz. the designed end or effect, all the various particulars agree one with another, as the general medium of their union, whereby they being united in this third, they thereby are all united one to another.

The reason, or at least one reason why God has made this kind of mutual consent and agreement of things beautiful and grateful to those intelligent Beings that perceive it, probably is, that there is in it some image of the true, spiritual, original beauty which has been spoken of; consisting in Being's consent to Being, or the union of minds or spiritual Beings in a mutual propensity and affection of heart. The other is an image of this, because by that uniformity, diverse things become as it were one, as it is in this cordial union. And it pleases God to observe analogy in his works, as is manifest in fact in innumer-

able instances; and especially to establish inferior things in an analogy to superior. Thus, in how many instances has he formed brutes in analogy to the nature of mankind? And plants in analogy to animals with respect to the manner of their generation, nutrition, &c. And so he has constituted the external world in an analogy to things in the spiritual world, in numberless instances; as might be shown, if it were necessary, and here were proper place and room for it.—Why such analogy in God's works pleases him, it is not needful now to inquire. It is sufficient that he makes an agreement or consent of different things, in their form, manner, measure, &c., to appear beautiful, because here is some image of a higher kind of agreement and consent of spiritual Beings. It has pleased him to establish a law of nature, by virtue of which the uniformity and mutual correspondence of a beautiful plant, and the respect which the various parts of a regular building seem to have one to another, and their agreement and union, and the consent or concord of the various notes of a melodious tune, should appear beautiful; because therein is some image of the consent of mind, of the different members of a society or system of intelligent Beings, sweetly united in a benevolent agreement of heart—And here, by the way, I would further observe, probably it is with regard to this image or resemblance, which secondary beauty has of true spiritual beauty, that God has so constituted nature, that the presenting of this inferior beauty, especially in those kinds of it which have the greatest resemblance of the primary beauty, as the harmony of sounds, and the beauties of nature, have a tendency to assist those whose hearts are under the influence of a truly virtuous temper, to dispose them to the exercises of divine love, and enliven in them a sense of spiritual beauty

From what has been said we may see, that there are two sorts of agreement or consent of one thing to another. (1.) There is a *cordial* agreement; that consists in concord and union of mind and heart; which, if not attended (viewing things in general) with more discord than concord, is true virtue, and the original or primary beauty, which is the only true *moral* beauty. (2.) There is a *natural* union or agreement; which, though some image of the other, is entirely a distinct thing; the will, disposition, or affection of the heart having no concern in it, but consisting only in uniformity and consent of nature, form, quantity, &c. (as before described), wherein lies an inferior secondary sort of beauty, which may, in distinction from the other, be called *natural* beauty.—This may be sufficient to let the reader know how I shall hereafter use the phrases of cordial, and natural agreement; and moral, spiritual, divine, and primary original beauty, and secondary, or natural beauty.

Concerning this latter, inferior kind of beauty, the following things may be observed:

1. The *cause* why secondary beauty is grateful to men, is only a *law of nature*, which God has fixed, or an *instinct* he has given to mankind; and not their perception of the same thing which *God* is pleased to have regard to, as the ground or rule by which he has established such a law of nature.—This appears in two things.

(1.) That which God has respect to, as the rule or ground of this law of nature he has given us, whereby things having a secondary beauty are made grateful to men, is their mutual agreement and proportion, in measure, form, &c. But in many instances persons that are gratified, and have their minds affected, in presenting this beauty, do not reflect on that particular agreement and proportion which, according to the law of nature, is the ground and rule of beauty in the case, yea, are ignorant of it. Thus, a man may be pleased with the harmony of the notes in a tune, and yet know nothing of that proportion or

adjustment of the notes which by the law of nature is the ground of the melody. He knows not, that the vibrations in one note regularly coincide with the vibrations in another; that the vibrations of a note coincide in time with two vibrations of its octave; and that two vibrations of a note coincide with three of its fifth, &c. Yea, he may not know, that there are vibrations of the air in the case, or any corresponding motions in the organs of hearing, in the auditory nerve, or animal spirits.—So, a man may be affected and pleased with a beautiful proportion of the features in a face, and yet not know what that proportion is, or what measures, quantities, and distances it consists in.

In this a sensation of secondary beauty differs from a sensation of primary and spiritual beauty, consisting in a spiritual union and agreement. What makes the latter grateful, is perceiving the union itself. It is the immediate view of that wherein the beauty fundamentally lies, that is pleasing to the virtuous mind.

(2.) As was observed before, God, in establishing such a law that mutual natural agreement of different things, in form, quantity, &c., should appear beautiful or grateful to men, seems to have had regard to the image and resemblance there is in such a natural agreement, of that spiritual cordial agreement, wherein original beauty consists, as one reason why he established such a law. But it is not any reflection upon, or perception of, such a resemblance of this to spiritual beauty, that is the reason why such a form or state of objects appears beautiful to men: but their sensation of pleasure, on a view of this secondary beauty, is immediately owing to the law God has established, or the instinct he has given.

2. Another thing observable concerning this kind of beauty, is, that it affects the mind more (other things being equal) when taken notice of in objects which are of considerable importance, than in little trivial matters. Thus the symmetry of the parts of a human body, or countenance, affects the mind more than the beauty of a flower. So, the beauty of the solar system, more than as great and as manifold an order and uniformity in a tree. And the proportions of the parts of a church, or a palace, more than the same proportions in some little slight compositions, made to please children.

3. It may be observed (which was hinted before) that not only uniformity and proportion, &c., of different things is requisite in order to this inferior beauty, but some relation or connection of the things thus agreeing one with another. As, the uniformity or likeness of a number of pillars, scattered hither and thither, does not constitute beauty, or at least by no means in an equal degree as uniformity in pillars connected in the same building, in parts that have relation one to another. So, if we see things unlike, and very disproportioned, in distant places, which have no relation to each other, this excites no such idea of deformity, as disagreement and inequality or disproportion in things related and connected: and the nearer the relation, and the stricter the connection, so much the greater and more disgustful is the deformity, consisting in their disagreement.

4. This secondary kind of beauty, consisting in uniformity and proportion, not only takes place in material and external things, but also in things immaterial; and is, in very many things, plain and sensible in the latter, as well as the former: and when it is so, there is no reason why it should not be grateful to them that behold it, in these as well as the other, by virtue of the same sense, or the same determination of mind to be gratified with uniformity and proportion. If uniformity and proportion be the things that affect, and appear agreeable to, this sense of beauty, then why should not uniformity and proportion affect the same

sense in immaterial things as well as material, if there be equal capacity of discerning it in both? And indeed *more* in spiritual things (*cæteris paribus*), as these are more important than things merely external and material.

This is not only reasonable to be supposed, but it is evident in fact, in numberless instances. There is a beauty of order in society, besides what consists in benevolence, or can be referred to it, which is of the secondary kind. As, when the different members of society have all their appointed office, place and station, according to their several capacities and talents, and every one keeps his place, and continues in his proper business. In this there is a beauty, not of a different kind from the regularity of a beautiful building, or piece of skilful architecture, where the strong pillars are set in their proper place, the pilasters in a place fit for them, the square pieces of marble in the pavement, in a place suitable for them, the panels in the walls and partitions in their proper places, the cornices in places proper for them, &c. As the agreement of a variety in one common design, of the parts of a building, or complicated machine, is one instance of that regularity, which belongs to the secondary kind of beauty, so there is the same kind of beauty in immaterial things, in what is called *wisdom*, consisting in the united tendency of thoughts, ideas, and particular volitions, to one general purpose: which is a distinct thing from the goodness of that general purpose, as being useful and benevolent.

So there is a beauty in the virtue called *justice*, which consists in the agreement of different things, that have relation to one another, in nature, manner and measure: and therefore is the very same sort of beauty with that uniformity and proportion, which is observable in those external and material things that are esteemed beautiful. There is a natural agreement and adaptedness of things that have relation one to another, and a harmonious corresponding of one thing to another: that he who from his will *does* evil to others, should *receive* evil from the will of others, or from the will of him or them whose business it is to take care of the injured, and to act in their behalf: and that he should suffer evil in *proportion* to the evil of his doings. Things are in natural regularity and mutual agreement, not in a metaphorical but literal sense, when he whose heart opposes the general system, should have the hearts of that system, or the heart of the head and ruler of the system, against him: and that in consequence, he should receive evil in proportion to the evil tendency of the opposition of his heart.—So, there is a like agreement in nature and measure, when he that loves, has the proper returns of love; when he that from his heart promotes the good of another, has his good promoted by the other; as there is a kind of justice in a becoming gratitude.

Indeed most of the duties incumbent on us, if well considered, will be found to partake of the nature of justice. There is some natural agreement of one thing to another; some adaptedness of the agent to the object; some answerableness of the act to the occasion; some equality and proportion in things of a similar nature, and of a direct relation one to another. So it is in relative duties; duties of children to parents, and of parents to children; duties of husbands and wives; duties of rulers and subjects; duties of friendship and good neighborhood: and all duties that we owe to God, our Creator, preserver, and benefactor; and all duties whatsoever, considered as required by God, and as branches of our duty to him, and also considered as what are to be performed with a regard to Christ, as acts of obedience to his precepts, and as testimonies of respect to him, and of our regard to what he has done for us, the virtues and temper of mind he has exercised towards us, and the benefits we have or hope for therefrom.

It is this secondary kind of beauty, which belongs to the virtues and duties required of us, that Mr. *Wollaston* seems to have had in his eye, when he resolved all virtue into an agreement of inclinations, volitions and actions with *truth*. He evidently has respect to the justice there is in the virtues and duties that are proper to be in one Being towards another; which consists in one Being's expressing such affections and using such a conduct towards another, as hath a natural agreement and proportion to what is in them, and what we receive from them; which is as much a natural conformity of affection and action with its ground, object and occasion, as that which is between a true proposition and the thing spoken of in it.

But there is another and higher beauty in true virtue, and in all truly virtuous dispositions and exercises, than what consists in any uniformity or similarity of various things, viz., the *union of heart* to *Being in general*, or to God the Being of Beings, which appears in those virtues; and which those virtues, when true, are the various expressions or effects of.—Benevolence to Being in general, or to Being simply considered, is entirely a distinct thing from uniformity in the midst of variety, and is a superior kind of beauty.

It is true, that benevolence to Being in general, when a person hath it, will naturally incline him to justice, or proportion in the exercises of it. He that loves Being, simply considered, will naturally (as was observed before), other things being equal, love particular Beings, in a proportion compounded of the degree of Being, and the degree of virtue or benevolence to Being, which they have. And that is to love Beings in proportion to their dignity. For the dignity of any Being consists in those two things Respect to Being, in this proportion, is the first and most general kind of justice; which will produce all the subordinate kinds. So that, after benevolence to Being in general exists, the proportion which is observed in objects, may be the cause of the proportion of benevolence to those objects: but no proportion is the cause or ground of the existence of such a thing as benevolence to Being. The tendency of objects to excite that degree of benevolence, which is proportionable to the degree of Being, &c., is the *consequence* of the existence of benevolence; and not the ground of it. Even as a tendency of bodies, one to another, by mutual attraction, in proportion to the quantity of matter, is the consequence of the Being of such a thing as mutual attraction; and not attraction the effect of proportion.

By this it appears, that *just* affections and acts have a beauty in them, distinct from, and superior to, the uniformity and equality there is in them; for which, he that has a truly virtuous temper, relishes and delights in them. And that is the expression and manifestation there is in them of benevolence to Being in general.—And besides this, there is the agreement of *justice* to the will and command of God; and also something in the tendency and consequences of justice, that is agreeable to general benevolence, viz., as in many respects it tends to the glory of God, and the general good. Which tendency also makes it beautiful to a truly virtuous mind. So that the tendency of general benevolence to produce justice, also the tendency of justice to produce effects agreeable to general benevolence, both render justice pleasing to a virtuous mind. And it is on these accounts *chiefly*, that justice is grateful to a virtuous taste, or a truly benevolent heart. But, though it be true, there is that in the uniformity and proportion there is in justice, which is grateful to a benevolent heart, as this uniformity and proportion tends to the general good; yet that is no argument, that there is no other beauty in it but its agreeing with benevolence. For so the external regularity and order of the natural world gratifies benevolence, as it is profitable, and tends to the general good; but that is no argument, that

there is no other sort of beauty in external uniformity and proportion, but only its suiting benevolence by tending to the general good.

5. From all that has been observed concerning this secondary kind of beauty, it appears that that disposition or sense of the mind, which consists in determination of mind to approve and be pleased with this beauty, considered simply and by itself, has nothing of the nature of true virtue, and is entirely a different thing from a truly virtuous taste. For it has been shown, that this kind of beauty is entirely diverse from the beauty of true virtue, whether it takes place in material or immaterial things. And therefore it will follow, that a taste of this kind of beauty is entirely a different thing from a taste of true virtue. Who will affirm, that a disposition to approve of the harmony of good music, or the beauty of a square, or equilateral triangle, is the same with true holiness, or a truly virtuous disposition of mind! It is a relish of uniformity and proportion, that determines the mind to approve these things. And if this be all, there is no need of any thing higher, or of any thing in any respect diverse, to determine the mind to approve and be pleased with equal uniformity and proportion among spiritual things which are equally discerned. It is virtuous to love true virtue, as that denotes an agreement of the heart with virtue. But it argues no virtue, for the heart to be pleased with that which is entirely distinct from it.

Though it be true, there is some analogy in it to spiritual and virtuous beauty, as much as material things can have analogy to things spiritual (on which they can have no more than a shadow), yet, as has been observed, men do not approve it because of any such analogy perceived.

And not only reason, but experience plainly shows, that men's approbation of this sort of beauty, does not spring from any virtuous temper, and has no connection with virtue. For, otherwise, men's delight in the beauty of squares, and cubes, and regular polygons, in the regularity of buildings, and the beautiful figures in a piece of embroidery, would increase in proportion to men's virtue; and would be raised to a great height in some eminently virtuous or holy men; but would be almost wholly lost in some others that are very vicious and lewd. It is evident in fact, that a relish of these things does not depend on general benevolence, or any benevolence at all to any Being whatsoever, any more than a man's loving the taste of honey, or his being pleased with the smell of a rose. A taste of this inferior beauty in things immaterial, is one thing which has been mistaken by some moralists, for a true virtuous principle, implanted naturally in the hearts of all mankind.

CHAPTER IV.

Of Self-Love, and its various Influence, to cause Love to others, or the contrary.

Many assert, that all love arises from self-love. In order to determine this point, it should be clearly ascertained what is meant by self-love.

Self-love, I think, is generally defined—a man's love of his own happiness. Which is short, and may be thought very plain: but indeed is an ambiguous definition, as the pronoun *his own*, is equivocal, and liable to be taken in two very different senses. For a man's *own happiness* may either be taken universally, for all the happiness and pleasure which the mind is in any regard the subject of, or whatever is grateful and pleasing to men; or it may be taken for

the pleasure a man takes in his own proper, private, and separate good.—And so, *self-love* may be taken two ways.

1. Self-love may be taken for the same as his loving whatsoever is grateful or pleasing to him. Which comes only to this, that self-love is a man's liking, and being suited and pleased in that which he likes, and which pleases him; or, that it is a man's loving what he loves. For whatever a man loves, that thing is grateful and pleasing to him, whether that be his own peculiar happiness, or the happiness of others. And if this be all that they mean by self-love, no wonder they suppose that all love may be resolved into self-love. For it is undoubtedly true, that whatever a man loves, his love may be resolved into his loving what he loves—if that be proper speaking. If by self-love is meant nothing else but a man's loving what is grateful or pleasing to him, and being averse to what is disagreeable, this is calling *that* self-love, which is only a general capacity of loving, or hating; or a capacity of being either pleased or displeased; which is the same thing as a man's having a faculty of will. For if nothing could be either pleasing or displeasing, agreeable or disagreeable to a man, then he could incline to nothing, and will nothing. But if he is capable of having inclination, will and choice, then what he inclines to, and chooses, is grateful to him; whatever that be, whether it be his own private good, the good of his neighbors, or the glory of God. And so far as it is grateful or pleasing to him, so far it is a part of his pleasure, good, or happiness.

But if this be what is meant by self-love, there is an impropriety and absurdity even in the putting of the question, Whether all our love, or our love to each particular object of our love, does not arise from self-love? For that would be the same as to inquire, Whether the reason why our love is fixed on such and such particular objects, is not, that we have a capacity of loving some things? This may be a general reason why men love or hate any thing at all; and therein differ from stones and trees, which love nothing, and hate nothing. But it can never be a reason why men's love is placed on such and such objects. That a man, in general, loves and is pleased with happiness, or (which is the same thing) has a capacity of enjoying happiness, cannot be the reason why such and such things become his happiness: as for instance, why the good of his neighbor, or the happiness and glory of God, is grateful and pleasing to him, and so becomes a part of his happiness.

Or if what they mean, who say that all love comes from self-love, be not, that our loving such and such particular persons and things, arises from our love to happiness in general, but from a love to love our own happiness, which consists in these objects; so the reason why we love benevolence to our friends, or neighbors, is, because we love our happiness, consisting in their happiness, which we take pleasure in;—still the notion is absurd. For here the effect is made the cause of that, of which it is the effect: our happiness, consisting in the happiness of the person beloved, is made the cause of our love to that person. Whereas, the truth plainly is, that our love to the person is the cause of our delighting, or being happy in his happiness. How comes our happiness to consist in the happiness of such as we love, but by our hearts being first united to them in affection, so that we, as it were, look on them as ourselves, and so on their happiness as our own?

Men who have benevolence to others, have pleasure when they see others' happiness, because seeing their happiness gratifies some inclination that was in their hearts before.—They before inclined to their happiness; which was by benevolence or good will; and therefore when they see their happiness, their

inclination is suited, and they are pleased. But the Being of inclinations and appetites is prior to any pleasure in gratifying these appetites.

2. Self-love, as the phrase is used in common speech, most commonly signifies a man's regard to his confined *private self*, or love to himself with respect to his *private interest*.

By *private* interest I mean that which most immediately consists in those pleasures, or pains, that are *personal*. For there is a comfort, and a grief, that some have in others' pleasures or pains; which are in others originally, but are derived to them, or in some measure become theirs, by virtue of a benevolent union of heart with others. And there are other pleasures and pains that are originally our own, and not what we have by such a participation with others. Which consist in preceptions agreeable, or contrary, to certain personal inclinations implanted in our nature; such as the sensitive appetites and aversions. Such also is the disposition or the determination of the mind to be pleased with external beauty, and with all inferior secondary beauty, consisting in uniformity, proportion, &c., whether in things external or internal, and to dislike the contrary deformity. Such also is the natural disposition in men to be pleased in a perception of their being the objects of the honor and love of others, and displeased with others' hatred and contempt. For pleasures and uneasinesses of this kind are doubtless as much owing to an immediate determination of the mind by a fixed law of our nature, as any of the pleasures or pains of external sense. And these pleasures are properly of the private and personal kind; being not by any participation of the happiness or sorrow of others, through benevolence. It is evidently mere self-love, that appears in this disposition. It is easy to see, that a man's love to himself will make him love love to himself, and hate hatred to himself. And as God has constituted our nature, self-love is exercised in no one disposition more than in this. Men, probably, are capable of much more pleasure and pain through this determination of the mind, than by any other personal inclination, or aversion, whatsoever. Though perhaps we do not so very often see instances of extreme suffering by this means, as by some others, yet we often see evidences of men's dreading the contempt of others more than death; and by such instances many conceive something what men would suffer, if universally hated and despised; and many reasonably infer something of the greatness of the misery, that would arise under a sense of universal abhorrence, in a great view of intelligent Being in general, or in a clear view of the Deity, as incomprehensibly and immensely great, so that all other Beings are as nothing and vanity—together with a sense of his immediate continual presence, and an infinite concern with him and dependence upon him—and living constantly in the midst of most clear and strong evidences and manifestations of his hatred and contempt and wrath.

But to return.—These things may be sufficient to explain what I mean by private interest; in regard to which, self-love, most properly so called, is immediately exercised.

And here I would observe, that if we take self-love in this sense, so love to some others may truly be the effect of self-love; i. e., according to the common method and order, which is maintained in the laws of nature. For no created thing has power to produce an effect any otherwise than by virtue of the laws of nature. Thus that a man should love those that are of his party, when there are different parties contending one with another; and that are warmly engaged on his side, and promote his interest—this is the natural consequence of a private self-love. Indeed there is no metaphysical necessity, in the nature of things, but because a man loves himself, and regards his own interest, he therefore

should love those that love him, and promote his interest; i. e., to suppose it to be otherwise, implies no contradiction. It will not follow from any absolute metaphysical necessity, that because bodies have solidity, cohesion, and gravitation towards the centre of the earth, therefore a weight suspended on the beam of a balance should have greater power to counterbalance a weight on the other side, when at a distance from the fulcrum, than when it is near. It implies no contradiction, that it should be otherwise: but only as it contradicts that beautiful proportion and harmony, which the author of nature observes in the laws of nature he has established. Neither is there any absolute necessity, the contrary implying a contradiction, that because there is an internal mutual attraction of the parts of the earth, or any other sphere, whereby the whole becomes one solid coherent body, therefore other bodies that are around it, should also be attracted by it, and those that are nearest, be attracted most. But according to the order and proportion generally observed in the laws of nature, one of these effects is connected with the other, so that it is justly looked upon as the same power of attraction in the globe of the earth, which draws bodies about the earth towards its centre, with that which attracts the parts of the earth themselves one to another; only exerted under different circumstances. By a like order of nature, a man's love to those that love him, is no more than a certain expression or effect of self-love. No other principle is needful in order to the effect, if nothing intervenes to countervail the natural tendency of self-love. Therefore there is no more true virtue in a man's thus loving his friends merely from self-love, than there is in self-love itself, the principle from whence it proceeds. So, a man's being disposed to hate those that hate him, or to resent injuries done him, arises from self-love in like manner as the loving those that love us, and being thankful for kindness shown us.

But it is said by some, that it is apparent, there is some other principle concerned in exciting the passions of gratitude and anger, besides self-love, viz., a moral sense, or sense of moral beauty and deformity, determining the minds of all mankind to approve of, and be pleased with virtue, and to disapprove of vice, and behold it with displicence; and that their seeing or supposing this moral beauty or deformity, in the kindness of a benefactor, or opposition of an adversary, is the occasion of these affections of gratitude or anger. Otherwise, why are not these affections excited in us towards inanimate things, that do us good, or hurt? Why do we not experience gratitude to a garden, or fruitful field? And why are we not angry with a tempest, or blasting mildew, or an overflowing stream? We are very differently affected towards those that do us good from the virtue of generosity, or hurt us from the vice of envy and malice, than towards things that hurt or help us, which are destitute of reason and will. Now concerning this, I would make several remarks.

1. Those who thus argue, that gratitude and anger cannot proceed from self-love, might argue in the same way, and with equal reason, that neither can these affections arise from love to others; which is contrary to their own scheme

They say that the reason why we are affected with gratitude and anger towards men, rather than things without life, is moral sense; which they say, is the effect of that principle of benevolence or love to others, or love to the public, which is naturally in the hearts of all mankind. But now I might say, according to their own way of arguing, gratitude and anger cannot arise from love to others, or love to the public, or any sense of mind that is the fruit of public affection. For how differently are we affected towards those that do good or hurt to the public from understanding and will, and from a general public spirit, or public motive.—I say, how differently affected are we towards these, from what

we are towards such inanimate things as the sun and the clouds, that do good to the public by enlightening and enlivening beams and refreshing showers; or mildew, and an overflowing stream, that does hurt to the public, by destroying the fruits of the earth? Yea, if such a kind of argument be good, it will prove that gratitude and anger cannot arise from the united influence of self-love, and public love, or moral sense arising from the public affection. For, if so, why are we not affected towards inanimate things, that are beneficial or injurious both to us and the public, in the same manner as to them that are profitable or hurtful to both on choice and design, and from benevolence, or malice?

2. On the supposition of its being indeed so, that men love those who love them, and are angry with those who hate them, from the natural influence of self-love; it is not at all strange that the author of nature, who observes order, uniformity and harmony in establishing its laws, should so order that it should be natural for self-love to cause the mind to be affected differently towards exceedingly different objects; and that it should cause our heart to extend itself in one manner towards inanimate things, which gratify self-love, without sense or will, and in another manner towards Beings which we look upon as having understanding and will, like ourselves, and exerting these faculties in our favor, and promoting our interest from love to us. No wonder, seeing we love ourselves, that it should be natural to us to extend something of that same kind of love which we have for ourselves, to them who are the same kind of Beings as ourselves, and comply with the inclinations of our self-love, by expressing the same sort of love towards us.

3. If we should allow that to be universal, that in gratitude and anger there is the exercise of some kind of moral sense (as it is granted, there is something that may be so called). All the moral sense, that is essential to those affections, is a sense of DESERT; which is to be referred to that sense of *justice*, before spoken of, consisting in an apprehension of that secondary kind of beauty, that lies in uniformity and proportion: which solves all the difficulty in the objection. —This, or some appearance of it to a narrow private view, indeed attends all anger and gratitude. Others' love and kindness to us, or their ill will and injuriousness, appears to us to *deserve* our love, or our resentment. Or, in other words, it seems to us no other than *just*, that as they love us, and do us good, we also should love them, and do them good. And so it seems *just*, that when others' hearts oppose us, and they from their hearts do us hurt, our hearts should oppose them, and that we should desire they themselves may suffer in like manner as we have suffered; i. e., there appears to us to be a natural agreement, proportion, and adjustment between these things. Which is indeed a kind of moral sense or sense of a beauty in moral things. But as was before shown, it is a moral sense of a *secondary* kind, and is entirely different from a sense or relish of the original essential beauty of true virtue; and may be without any principle of true virtue in the heart. Therefore doubtless it is a great *mistake* in any to suppose, all that moral sense which appears and is exercised in a sense of *desert*, is the same thing as a love of virtue, or a disposition and determination of mind to be pleased with true virtuous beauty, consisting in public benevolence. Which may be further confirmed, if it be considered that even with respect to a sense of *justice* or *desert*, consisting in uniformity [and agreement between others' actions towards us, and our actions towards them, in a way of well doing, or of ill doing] it is not absolutely necessary to the being of these passions of gratitude and anger, that there should be any notion of justice in them, in any public or general view of things;—as will appear by what shall be next observed.

4. Those authors who hold that that moral sense which is natural to all mankind, consists in a natural relish of the beauty of virtue, and so arises from a principle of true virtue implanted by nature in the hearts of all—they hold that true virtue consists in *public benevolence.* Therefore, if the affections of gratitude and anger necessarily imply such a moral sense as they suppose, then these affections imply some delight in the public good, and an aversion of the mind to public evil. And if this were so, then every time any man feels anger for opposition he meets with, or gratitude for any favor, there must be at least a supposition of a tendency to public injury in that opposition, and a tendency to public benefit in the favor that excites his gratitude. But how far is this from being true? As, in such instances as these, which, I presume, none will deny to be possible, or unlike to any thing that happens among mankind. A ship's crew enter into a conspiracy against the master, to murder him, and run away with the ship and turn pirates; but before they bring their matters to a ripeness for execution, one of them repents and opens the whole design; whereupon the rest are apprehended and brought to justice. The crew are enraged with him that has betrayed them, and earnestly seek opportunity to revenge themselves upon him.—And for an instance of gratitude, a gang of robbers that have long infested the neighboring country, have a particular house whither they resort, and where they meet from time to time, to divide their booty or prey, and hold their consultations for carrying on their pernicious designs. The magistrates and officers of the country, after many fruitless endeavors to discover their secret haunt and place of resort, at length by some means are well informed where it is, and are prepared with sufficient force to surprise them, and seize them all, at the place of rendezvous, at an hour appointed when they understand they will all be there. A little before the arrival of the appointed hour, while the officers with their bands are approaching, some person is so kind to these robbers as to give them notice of their danger, so as just to give them opportunity to escape. They are thankful to him, and give him a handful of money for his kindness.—Now in such instances, I think it is plain, that there is no supposition of a public injury in that which is the occasion of their *anger;* yea, they know the contrary. Nor is there any supposition of public good in that which excites their gratitude; neither has public benevolence, or moral sense, consisting in a determination to approve of what is for the public good, any influence at all in the affair. And though there be some affection, besides a sense of uniformity and proportion, that has influence in such anger and gratitude, it is not public affection or benevolence, but private affection; yea, that affection which is to the highest degree private, consisting in a man's love of his own person.

5. The passion of *anger*, in particular, seems to have been unluckily chosen as a medium to prove a sense and determination to delight in virtue, consisting in benevolence, natural to all mankind.

For, if that moral sense which is exercised in anger, were that which arose from a benevolent temper of heart, being no other than a sense or relish of the beauty of benevolence, one would think a disposition to anger should increase, at least in some proportion, as a man had more of a sweet, benign, and benevolent temper; which seems something disagreeable to reason, as well as contrary to experience, which shows that the less men have of benevolence, and the more they have of a contrary temper, the more are they disposed to anger and deep resentment of injuries.

And though *gratitude* be that which many speak of as a certain noble principle of virtue, which God has implanted in the hearts of all mankind; and though it be true, there is a gratitude, that is truly virtuous, and the want of

gratitude or an ungrateful temper, is truly vicious, and argues an abominable depravity of heart (as I may have particular occasion to show afterwards) yet, I think what has been observed, may serve to convince such as impartially consider it, not only that not all anger, or hating those who hate us, but also that not all gratitude, or loving those who love us, arises from a truly virtuous benevolence of heart.

Another sort of affections, which may be properly referred to self-love, as their source, and which might be expected to be the fruit of it, according to the general analogy of nature's laws, are affections to such as are near to us by the ties of nature; that we look upon as those whose Beings we have been the occasions of, and that we have a very peculiar propriety in, and whose circumstances, even from the first beginning of their existence, do many ways lead them, as it were, necessarily, to a high esteem of us, and to treat us with great dependence, submission and compliance; and whom the constitution of the world makes to be united in interest, and accordingly to act as one in innumerable affairs, with a communion in each other's affections, desires, cares, friendships, enmities, and pursuits. Which is the cause of men's affection to their children. And in like manner self-love will also beget in a man some degree of affections, towards others, with whom he has connection in any degree parallel. As to the opinion of those that ascribe the natural affection there is between parents and children, to a particular *instinct* of nature, I shall take notice of it afterwards.

And as men may love persons and things from self-love, so may love to qualities and characters arise from the same source. Some represent as though there were need of a great degree of metaphysical refining to make it out, that men approve of others from self-love, whom they hear of at a distance, or read of in history, or see represented on the stage, from whom they expect no profit or advantage. But perhaps it is not considered, that what we approve of in the first place is the character, and from the character we approve the person; and is it a strange thing, that men should, from self-love, like a temper or character which in its nature and tendency falls in with the nature and tendency of self-love; and which, we know by experience and self-evidence, without metaphysical refining, in the general, tends to men's pleasure and benefit? And on the contrary, should dislike what they see tends to men's pain and misery? Is there need of a great degree of subtilty and abstraction, to make it out, that a child, which has heard and seen much, strongly to fix an idea of the pernicious deadly nature of the rattlesnake, should have aversion to that species or form, from self-love; so as to have a degree of this aversion and disgust excited by seeing even the picture of that animal? And that from the same self-love it should be pleased and entertained with a lively figure and representation of some pleasant fruit which it has often tasted the sweetness of? Or, with the image of some bird, which it has always been told, is innocent, and whose pleasant singing it has often been entertained with? Though the child neither fears being bitten by the picture of the snake, nor expects to eat of the painted fruit, or to hea- the figure of the bird sing. I suppose none will think it difficult to allow, that such an approbation or disgust of a child may be accounted for from its natural delight in the pleasures of taste and hearing, and its aversion to pain and death, through self-love, together with the habitual connection of these agreeable or terrible ideas with the form and qualities of these objects, the ideas of which are impressed on the mind of the child by their images.

And where is the difficulty of allowing, that a child or man may hate the general character of a spiteful and malicious man, for the like reason, as he hates the general nature of a serpent; knowing, from reason instruction and

experience, that malice in men is pernicious to mankind, as well as spite or poison in a serpent? And if a man may, from self-love, disapprove the vices of malice, envy, and others of that sort, which naturally tend to the hurt of mankind, why may he not from the same principle approve the contrary virtues of meekness, peaceableness, benevolence, charity, generosity, justice, and the social virtues in general; which he as easily and clearly knows, naturally tend to the good of mankind?

It is undoubtedly true that some have a love to these virtues from a higher principle. But yet I think it as certainly true that there is generally in mankind a sort of approbation of them, which arises from self love.

Besides what has been already said, the same thing further appears from this; that men commonly are most affected towards, and do most highly approve, those virtues which agree with their interest most, according to their various conditions in life. We see that persons of low condition are especially enamored with a condescending, accessible, affable temper in the great; not only in those whose condescension has been exercised towards themselves; but they will be peculiarly taken with such a character when they have accounts of it from others, or when they meet with it in history or even in romance. The poor will most highly approve and commend liberality. The weaker sex, who especially need assistance and protection, will peculiarly esteem and applaud fortitude and generosity in those of the other sex, they read or hear of, or have represented to them on a stage.

As I think it plain from what has been observed, that men may approve and be disposed to commend a benevolent temper, from self-love, so the higher the degree of benevolence is, the more may they approve of it. Which will account for some kind of approbation, from this principle, even of love to enemies, viz., as a man's loving his enemies is an evidence of a high degree of benevolence of temper;--the degree of it appearing from the obstacles it overcomes.

And it may be here observed, that the consideration of the tendency and influence of self-love may show, how men in general may approve of *justice* from another ground, besides that approbation of the secondary beauty there is in uniformity and proportion, which is natural to all. Men from their infancy see the necessity of it, not only that it is necessary for others, or for human society; but they find the necessity of it for themselves, in instances that continually occur; which tends to prejudice them in its favor, and to fix an habitual approbation of it from self-love.

And again, that forementioned approbation of justice and desert arising from a sense of the beauty of natural agreement and proportion, will have a kind of reflex, and indirect influence to cause men to approve benevolence, and disapprove malice; as men see that he who hates and injures others, deserves to be hated and punished, and that he who is benevolent, and loves others, and does them good, deserves himself also to be loved and rewarded by others, as they see the natural congruity or agreement and mutual adaptedness of these things. And having always seen this, malevolence becomes habitually connected in the mind with the idea of being hated and punished, which is disagreeable to self-love; and the idea of benevolence is habitually connected and associated with the idea of being loved and rewarded by others, which is grateful to self-love. And by virtue of this association of ideas, benevolence itself becomes grateful, and the contrary displeasing.

Some vices may become in a degree odious by the influence of self-love, through an habitual connection of ideas of contempt with it; contempt being

what self-love abhors. So it may often be with drunkenness, gluttony, sottishness, cowardice, sloth, niggardliness. The idea of contempt becomes associated with the idea of such vices, both because we are used to observe that those things are commonly objects of contempt, and also find that they excite contempt, in ourselves.—Some of them appear marks of littleness, i. e., of small abilities, and weakness of mind, and insufficiency for any considerable effects among mankind.—By others, men's influence is contracted into a narrow sphere, and by such means persons become of less importance, and more insignificant among mankind. And things of little importance are naturally little accounted of. And some of these ill qualities are such as mankind find it their interest to treat with contempt, as they are very hurtful to human society.

There are no particular moral virtues whatsoever, but what in some or other of these ways, and most of them in several of these ways, come to have some kind of approbation from self-love, without the influence of a truly virtuous principle; nor any particular vices, but what by the same means meet with some disapprobation.

This kind of approbation and dislike, through the joint influence of self-love and association of ideas, is in very many vastly heightened by education; as this is the means of a strong, close, and almost irrefragable association, in innumerable instances, of ideas which have no connection any other way than by education; and of greatly strengthening that association, or connection, which persons are led into by other means; as any one would be convinced, perhaps more effectually than in most other ways, if they had opportunity of any considerable acquaintance with *American* savages and their children.

CHAPTER V.

Of Natural Conscience, and the Moral Sense.

There is yet another disposition or principle, of great importance, natural to mankind; which, if we consider the consistence and harmony of nature's laws, may also be looked upon as in some sort arising from self-love, or self-union: and that is a disposition in man to be uneasy in a consciousness of being inconsistent with himself, and as it were, against himself, in his own actions. This appears particularly in the inclination of the mind to be uneasy in the consciousness of doing that to others, which he should be angry with them for doing to him, if they were in his case, and he in theirs; or, of forbearing to do that to them, which he would be displeased with them for neglecting to do to him.

I have observed from time to time, that in pure love to others (i. e. love not arising from self-love) there is a union of the heart with others; a kind of enlargement of the mind, whereby it so extends itself as to take others into a man's self: and therefore it implies a disposition to feel, to desire, and to act as though others were one with ourselves. So, self-love implies an inclination to feel and act as one with ourselves; which naturally renders a sensible inconsistence with ourselves, and self-opposition, in what we ourselves choose and do, to be uneasy to the mind; which will cause uneasiness of mind to be the consequence of a malevolent and unjust behavior towards others, and a kind of disapprobation of acts of this nature, and an approbation of the contrary. To do that to another, which we should be angry with him for doing to us, and to hate a per

son for doing that to us, which we should incline to, and insist on doing to him, if we were exactly in the same case, is to disagree with ourselves, and contradict ourselves. It would be, for ourselves both to choose and adhere to, and yet to refuse and utterly reject, as it were the very same thing. No wonder, this is contrary to nature. No wonder, that such a self-opposition, and inward war with a man's self, naturally begets unquietness, and raises disturbance in his mind.

A thus approving of actions, because we therein act as in agreement with ourselves, or as one with ourselves—and a thus disapproving and being uneasy in the consciousness of disagreeing and being inconsistent with ourselves in what we do—is quite a different thing from approving or disapproving actions because in them we agree and are united with Being in general; which is loving or hating actions from a sense of the primary beauty of true virtue, and odiousness of sin.—The former of these principles is private: the latter is public and truly benevolent in the highest sense. The former (i. e. an inclination to agree with ourselves) is a natural principle: but the latter (i. e. an agreement or union of heart to the great system, and to God, the head of it, who is all in all in it) is a divine principle.

In that uneasiness now mentioned, consists very much of that inward trouble men have from reflections of conscience: and when they are free from this uneasiness, and are conscious to themselves, that in what they have acted towards others, they have done the same which they should have expected from them in the same case, then they have what is called peace of conscience, with respect to these actions.—And there is also an approbation of conscience, of the conduct of others towards ourselves. As when we are blamed, condemned, or punished by them, and are conscious to ourselves that if we were in their case, and they in ours, we should in like manner blame, condemn, and punish them. And thus men's consciences may justify God's anger and condemnation. When they have the ideas of God's greatness, their relation to him, the benefits they have received from him, the manifestations he has made of his will to them, &c., strongly impressed on their minds, a consciousness is excited within them of those resentments, which would be occasioned in themselves by an injurious treatment in any wise parallel.

There is such a consciousness as this oftentimes within men, implied in the thoughts and views of the mind, which perhaps on reflection they could hardly give an account of. Unless men's consciences are greatly stupified, it is naturally and necessarily suggested; and does habitually, spontaneously, instantaneously, and as it were insensibly arise in the mind. And the more so for this reason, viz., that we have not, nor never had from our infancy, any other way to conceive of any thing which other persons act or suffer, or of any thing about intelligent, moral agents, but by recalling and exciting the ideas of what we ourselves are conscious of in the acts, passions, sensations, volitions, &c., which we have found in our own minds; and by putting the ideas which we obtain by this means, in the place of another; or as it were substituting ourselves in their place. Thus, we have no conception in any degree, what understanding, perception, love, pleasure, pain, or desire are in others, but by putting ourselves as it were in their stead, or transferring the ideas we obtain of such things in our own minds by consciousness, into their place; making such an alteration, as to degree and circumstances, as what we observe of them requires. It is thus in all moral things that we conceive of in others, which are all mental, and not corporeal things; and every thing that we conceive of belonging to others, more than shape, size, complexion, situation, and motion of their

bodies And this is the only way that we come to be capable of having ideas of any perception or act even of the Godhead. We never could have any notion what understanding or volition, love or hatred are, either in created spirits or in God, if we had never experienced what understanding and volition, love and hatred, are in our own minds. Knowing what they are by consciousness, we can add degrees, and deny limits, and remove changeableness and other imperfections, and ascribe them to God. Which is the only way we come to be capable of conceiving of any thing in the Deity.

But though it be so, that men in thinking of others do, as it were, put themselves in their place, they do it so naturally, or rather habitually, instantaneously and without set purpose, that they do it insensibly, and can scarce give any account of it, and many would think strange if they were told of it. So it may be in men's substituting themselves in others' place in such exercises of conscience as have been spoken of; and the former substitution leads to the latter, in one whose conscience is not greatly stupified. For in all his thoughts of the other person, in whatever he apprehends or conceives of his moral conduct to others or to himself, if it be in loving or hating him, approving or condemning him, rewarding or punishing him, he necessarily as it were puts himself in his stead, for the forementioned reason; and therefore the more naturally, easily and quietly sees whether he, being in his place, should approve or condemn, be angry or pleased as he is.

Natural conscience consists in these two things:

1. In that which has now been spoken of: that disposition to approve or disapprove the moral treatment which passes between us and others, from a determination of the mind to be easy, or uneasy, in a consciousness of our being consistent, or inconsistent with ourselves. Hereby we have a disposition to approve our own treatment of another, when we are conscious to ourselves that we treat him so as we should expect to be treated by him, were he in our case and we in his; and to disapprove of our own treatment of another, when we are conscious that we should be displeased, with the like treatment from him, if we were in his case. So we in our consciences approve of another's treatment of us, if we are conscious to ourselves, that if we were in his case, and he in ours, we should think it just to treat him as he treats us; and disapprove his treatment of us, when we are conscious that we should think it unjust, if we were in his case. Thus men's consciences approve or disapprove the sentence of their judge, by which they are acquitted or condemned.—But this is not all that is in natural conscience. Besides this approving or disapproving from uneasiness as being inconsistent with ourselves, there is another thing that must precede it, and be the foundation of it. As for instance, when my conscience disapproves my own treatment of another, being conscious to myself that were I in his case, I should be displeased and angry with him for so treating me, the question might be asked, But what would be the ground of that supposed disapprobation, displeasure and anger, which I am conscious would be in me in that case?—That disapprobation must be on some other grounds. Therefore,

2. The other thing which belongs to the approbation or disapprobation of natural conscience, is the sense of desert, which was spoken of before; consisting, as was observed, in a natural agreement, proportion and harmony between malevolence or injury, and resentment and punishment; or between loving and being loved, between showing kindness and being rewarded, &c. Both these kinds of approving or disapproving concur in the approbation or disapprobation of conscience; the one founded on the other. Thus, when a man's conscience disapproves of his treatment of his neighbor, in the first place he is conscious

that if he were in his neighbor's stead, he should resent such treatment, from a sense of justice, or from a sense of uniformity and equality between such treatment and resentment and punishment, as before explained. And then in the next place he perceives, that therefore he is not consistent with himself, in doing what he himself should resent in that case; and hence disapproves it, as being naturally averse to opposition to himself.

Approbation and disapprobation of conscience, in the sense now explained, will extend to all virtue and vice; to every thing whatsoever that is morally good or evil, in a mind which does not confine its view to a private sphere, but will take things in general into its consideration, and is free from speculative error. For, as all virtue or moral good may be resolved into love to others, either God or creatures, so men easily see the uniformity and natural agreement there is between loving others, and being accepted and favored by others. And all vice, sin, or moral evil, summarily consisting in the want of this love to others, or in the contrary, viz., hatred or malevolence, so men easily see the natural agreement there is between hating and doing ill to others, and being hated by them and suffering ill by them, or from him that acts for all and has the care of the whole system. And as this sense of equality and natural agreement extends to all moral good and evil, so this lays a foundation of an equal extent with the other kind of approbation and disapprobation, which is grounded upon it, arising from an aversion to self-inconsistence and opposition. For in all cases of benevolence or the contrary towards others, we are capable of putting ourselves in the place of others, and are naturally led to do it, and so of reflecting, or being conscious to ourselves, how we should like or dislike such treatment from others. Thus natural conscience, if the understanding be properly enlightened, and errors and blinding stupifying prejudices are removed, concurs with the law of God, and is of equal extent with it, and joins its voice with it in every article.

And thus, in particular, we may see in what respect this natural conscience that has been described, extends to true virtue, consisting in union of heart to Being in general, and supreme love to God. For, although it sees not, or rather does not taste its primary and essential beauty, i. e., it tastes no sweetness in benevolence to Being in general, simply considered, or loves it not for Being in general's sake (for nothing but general benevolence itself can do that), yet this natural conscience, common to mankind, may approve of it from that uniformity, equality and justice, which there is in it, and the demerit which is seen in the contrary, consisting in the natural agreement between the contrary and being hated of Being in general. Men by natural conscience may see the justice (or natural agreement) there is in yielding all to God, as we receive all from God; and the justice there is in being his that has made us, and being willingly so, which is the same as being dependent on his will, and conformed to his will in the manner of our Being, as we are for our Being itself, and in the conformity of our will to his will, on whose will we are universally and most perfectly dependent; and also the justice there is in our supreme love to God, from his goodness—the natural agreement there is between our having supreme respect to him who exercises infinite goodness to us, and from whom we receive all well being.—Besides that disagreement and discord appears worse to natural sense (as was observed before) in things nearly related and of great importance; and therefore it must appear very ill, as it respects the infinite Being, and in that infinitely great relation which there is between the Creator and his creatures. And it is easy to conceive how that sense which is in natural conscience, should see the desert of punishment which there is in the contrary of true virtue, viz., opposition and enmity to Being in general. For, this is only to see the natural

agreement there is between opposing Being in general, and being opposed by Being in general; with a consciousness how that if we were infinitely great, we should expect to be regarded according to our greatness, and should proportionably resent contempt. Thus natural conscience, if well informed, will approve of true virtue, and will disapprove and condemn the want of it, and opposition to it; and yet without seeing the true beauty of it. Yea, if men's consciences were fully enlightened, if they were delivered from being confined to a private sphere, and brought to view and consider things in general, and delivered from being stupified by sensual objects and appetites, as they will be at the day of judgment, they would approve nothing but true virtue, nothing but general benevolence, and those affections and actions that are consistent with it, and subordinate to it. For they must see that consent to Being in general, and supreme respect to the Being of Beings, is most just; and that every thing which is inconsistent with it, and interferes with it, or flows from the want of it, is unjust, and deserves the opposition of universal existence.

Thus has God established and ordered, that this principle of natural conscience, which, though it implies no such thing as actual benevolence to Being in general, nor any delight in such a principle, simply considered, and so implies no truly spiritual sense or virtuous taste, yet should approve and condemn the same things that are approved and condemned by a spiritual sense or virtuous taste.

That moral sense which is natural to mankind, so far as it is disinterested and not founded in association of ideas, is the same with this natural conscience that has been described. The sense of moral good and evil, and that disposition to approve virtue and disapprove vice, which men have by natural conscience, is that moral sense, so much insisted on in the writings of many of late a misunderstanding of which seems to have been the thing that has misled those moralists who have insisted on a disinterested moral sense, universal in the world of mankind, as an evidence of a disposition to true virtue, consisting in a benevolent temper, naturally implanted in the minds of all men. Some of the arguments made use of by these writers, do indeed prove that there is a moral sense or taste, universal among men, distinct from what arises from self-love. Though I humbly conceive, there is some confusion in their discourses on the subject, and not a proper distinction observed in the instances of men's approbation of virtue, which they produce. Some of which are not to their purpose, being instances of that approbation of virtue, that was described, which arises from self-love. But other instances prove that there is a moral taste, or sense of moral good and evil, natural to all, which does not properly arise from self-love. Yet I conceive there are no instances of this kind which may not be referred to natural conscience, and particularly to that which I have observed to be primary in the approbation of natural conscience, viz., a sense of desert and approbation of that natural agreement there is, in manner and measure, in justice. But I think it is plain from what been said, that neither this or any thing else wherein consists the sense of moral good and evil which there is in natural conscience, is of the nature of a truly virtuous taste, or determination of mind to relish and delight in the essential beauty of true virtue, arising from a virtuous benevolence of heart.

But it further appears from this. If the approbation of conscience were the same with the approbation of the inclination, of the heart, or the natural disposition and determination of the mind, to love and be pleased with virtue, then approbation and condemnation of conscience would always be in proportion to the virtuous temper of the mind; or rather the degree would be just the same. In that person who had a high degree of a virtuous temper, therefore, the testimony

of conscience in favor of virtue would be equally full: but he that had but little, would have as little a degree of the testimony of conscience for virtue, and against vice. But I think the case is evidently otherwise. Some men, through the strength of vice in their hearts, will go on in sin against clearer light and stronger convictions of conscience, than others. If conscience's approving duty and disapproving sin, were the same thing as the exercise of a virtuous principle of the heart, in loving duty and hating sin, then remorse of conscience will be the same thing as repentance; and just in the same degree as the sinner feels remorse of conscience for sin, in the same degree is his heart turned from the love of sin to the hatred of it, inasmuch as they are the very same thing.

Christians have the greatest reason to believe, from the Scriptures, that in the future day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God, when sinners shall be called to answer before their judge, and all their wickedness in all its aggravations, brought forth and clearly manifested in the perfect light of that day, and God will reprove them and set their sins in order before them, their consciences will be greatly awakened and convinced, their mouths will be stopped, all stupidity of conscience will be at an end, and conscience will have its full exercise: and therefore their consciences will approve the dreadful sentence of the judge against them, and seeing that they have deserved so great a punishment, will join with the judge in condemning them. And this, according to the notion I am opposing, would be the same thing as their being brought to the fullest repentance; their hearts being perfectly changed to hate sin and love holiness; and virtue or holiness of heart in them will be brought to the most full and perfect exercise. But how much otherwise, have we reason to suppose, it will then be? viz., that the sin and wickedness of their heart will come to its highest dominion and completest exercise; that they shall be wholly left of God, and given up to their wickedness, even as the devils are! When God has done waiting on sinners, and his Spirit done striving with them, he will not restrain their wickedness, as he does now. But sin shall then rage in their hearts as a fire no longer restrained or kept under. It is proper for a judge when he condemns a criminal, to endeavor so to set his guilt before him as to convince his conscience of the justice of the sentence. This the Almighty will do effectually, and do to perfection, so as most thoroughly to awaken and convince the conscience. But if natural conscience, and the disposition of the heart to be pleased with virtue, were the same, then at the same time that the conscience was brought to its perfect exercise, the heart would be made perfectly holy; or, would have the exercise of true virtue and holiness in perfect benevolence of temper. But instead of this, their wickedness will then be brought to perfection, and wicked men will become very devils, and accordingly will be sent away as cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels.

But supposing natural conscience to be what has been described, all these difficulties and absurdities are wholly avoided. Sinners, when they see the greatness of the Being, whom they have lived in contempt of, and in rebellion and opposition to, and have clearly set before them their obligations to him, as their Creator, preserver, benefactor, &c., together with the degree in which they have acted as enemies to him, may have a clear sense of the *desert* of their sin, consisting in the natural agreement there is between such contempt and opposition of such a Being, and his despising and opposing them; between their being and acting as so great enemies to such a God, and their suffering the dreadful consequences of his being and acting as their great enemy: and their being conscious within themselves of the degree of anger, which would naturally arise in their own hearts in such a case if they were in the place and

state of their judge. In order to these things there is no need of a virtuous benevolent temper, relishing and delighting in benevolence, and loathing the contrary. The conscience may see the natural agreement between opposing and being opposed, between hating and being hated, without abhorring malevolence from a benevolent temper of mind, or without loving God from a view of the beauty of his holiness. These things have no necessary dependence one on the other.

CHAPTER VI.

Of particular Instincts of Nature, which in some respects resemble Virtue.

THERE are various dispositions and inclinations natural to men, which depend on particular laws of nature, determining their minds to certain affections and actions towards particular objects; which laws seem to be established chiefly for the preservation of mankind, though not only for this, but also for their comfortably subsisting in the world. Which dispositions may be called *instincts*.

Some of these instincts respect only ourselves personally; such are many of our natural appetites and aversions. Some of them are not wholly personal, but more social, and extend to others; such are the mutual inclinations between the sexes, &c.—Some of these dispositions are more external and sensitive, such are some of our natural inclinations that are personal—as those that relate to meat and drink. And of this sort also are some dispositions that are more social, and in some respects extend to others; as, the more sensitive inclinations of the sexes towards each other. Besides these instincts of the sensitive kind, there are others that are more internal and mental; consisting in affections of the mind, which mankind naturally exercise towards some of their fellow creatures, or in some cases towards men in general. Some of these instincts that are mental and social, are what may be called kind affections; as having something in them of benevolence, or a resemblance of it. And others are of a different sort, having something in them that carries an angry appearance; such as the passion of jealousy between the sexes, especially in the male towards the female.

It is only the former of these two last mentioned sorts, that it is to my purpose to consider in this place, viz., those natural instincts which appear in benevolent affections, or which have the appearance of benevolence, and so in some respects resemble virtue. These I shall therefore consider; and shall endeavor to show that none of them can be of the nature of true virtue.

That kind of affection which is exercised towards those who are near one to another in natural relation, particularly the love of parents to their children, called natural affection, is by many referred to instinct. I have already considered this sort of love as an affection that arises from self-love; and in that view, and in that supposition have shown, it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. But if any think, that natural affection is more properly to be referred to a particular instinct of nature, than to self-love, as its cause, I shall not think it a point worthy of any controversy or dispute. In my opinion, both are true, viz., that natural affection is owing to natural instinct, and also that it arises from self-love. It may be said to arise from instinct, as it depends on a law of nature. But yet it may be truly reckoned as an affection arising from self-love; because, though it arises from a law of nature, yet that is such a law as

according to the order and harmony everywhere observed among the laws of nature, is connected with, and follows from self-love, as was shown before. However, it is not necessary to my present purpose, to insist on this. For if it be so, that natural affection to a man's children or family, or near relations, is not properly to be ascribed to self-love, as its cause, in any respect, but is to be esteemed an affection arising from a particular independent instinct of nature, which the Creator in his wisdom has implanted in men for the preservation and well-being of the world of mankind, yet it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For it has been observed, and I humbly conceive, proved before (Chap. II.), that if any Being or Beings have by natural instinct, or any other means, a determination of mind to benevolence, extending only to some particular persons, or private system, however large that system may be, or however great a number of individuals it may contain, so long as it contains but an infinitely small part of universal existence, and so bears no proportion to this great and universal system—such limited private benevolence, not arising from, nor being subordinate to benevolence to Being in general, cannot have the nature of true virtue.

However, it may not be amiss briefly to observe now, that it is evident to a demonstration, those affections cannot be of the nature of true virtue, from these two things.

First, That they do not arise from a principle of virtue.—A principle of virtue, I think, is owned by the most considerable of late writers on morality to c general benevolence or public affection: and I think it has been proved to be union of heart to Being simply considered; which implies a disposition to benevolence to Being in general. Now by the supposition, the affections we are speaking of do not arise from this principle; and that, whether we suppose they arise from self-love, or from particular instincts; because either of those sources is diverse from a principle of general benevolence. And,

Secondly, These private affections, if they do not arise from general benevolence, and they are not connected with it in their first existence, have no tendency to produce it. This appears from what has been observed: for being not dependent on it, their detached and unsubordinate operation rather tends to, and implies opposition to Being in general, than general benevolence; as every one sees and owns with respect to self-love. And there are the very same reasons why any other private affection, confined to limits infinitely short of universal existence, should have that influence, as well as love that is confined to a single person. Now upon the whole, nothing can be plainer than that affections which do not arise from a virtuous principle, and have no tendency to true virtue, as their effect, cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

For the reasons which have been given, it is undeniably true, that if persons by any means come to have a benevolent affection limited to a party that is very large, or to the country or nation in general, of which they are a part, or the public community they belong to, though it be as large as the Roman empire was of old, yea, if there could be an instinct or other cause determining a person to benevolence towards he whole world of mankind, or even all created sensible natures throughout the universe, exclusive of union of heart to general existence and of love to God, nor derived from that temper of mind which disposes to a supreme regard to him, nor subordinate to such divine love, it cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

If what is called natural affection, arises from a particular natural instinct, so, much more indisputably does that mutual affection which naturally arises between the sexes. I agree with *Hutcheson* and *Hume* in this, that there is a

foundation laid in nature for kind affections between the sexes, that are truly diverse from all inclinations to sensitive pleasure, and do not properly arise from any such inclination. There is doubtless a disposition both to a mutual benevolence and mutual complacence, that are not naturally and necessarily connected with any sensitive desires. But yet it is manifest such affections as are limited to opposite sexes, are from a particular instinct, thus directing and limiting them; and not arising from a principle of general benevolence; for this has no tendency to any such limitation. And though these affections do not properly arise from the sensitive desires which are between the sexes, yet they are implanted by the Author of nature chiefly for the same purpose, viz., the preservation or continuation of the world of mankind, to make persons willing to forsake father and mother, and all their natural relations in the families where they were born and brought up, for the sake of a stated union with a companion of the other sex, and to dispose to that union in bearing and going through with that series of labors, anxieties, and pains requisite to the Being, support and education of a family of children. Though not only for these ends, but partly also for the comfort of mankind as united in a marriage relation. But I suppose, few (if any) will deny, that the peculiar natural dispositions there are to mutual affection between the sexes, arise from an instinct or particular law of nature. And therefore it is manifest from what has been said already, that those natural dispositions cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

Another affection which is owing to a particular instinct, implanted in men for like purposes with other instincts, is that pity which is natural to mankind, when they see others in great distress. It is acknowledged, that such an affection is natural to mankind. But I think it evident, that the pity which is general and natural, is owing to a particular instinct, and is not of the nature of true virtue. I am far from saying, that there is no such thing as a truly virtuous pity among mankind. For I am far from thinking, that all the pity or mercy which is anywhere to be found among them, arises merely from natural instinct, or, that none is to be found, which arises from that truly virtuous divine principle of general benevolence to sensitive Beings. Yet at the same time I think, this is not the case with all pity, or with that disposition to pity which is natural to mankind in common. I think I may be bold to say, this does not arise from general benevolence, nor is it truly of the nature of benevolence, or properly called by that name.

If all that uneasiness on the sight of others' extreme distress, which we call pity, were properly of the nature of benevolence, then they who are the subjects of this passion, must needs be in a degree of uneasiness in being sensible of the total want of happiness, of all such as they would be disposed to pity in extreme distress. For that certainly is the most direct tendency and operation of benevolence or good will, to desire the happiness of its object. But now this is not the case universally, where men are disposed to exercise pity. There are many men, with whom that is the case in respect to some others in the world, that it would not be the occasion of their being sensibly affected with any uneasiness, to know they were dead (yea men who are not inflenced by the consideration of a future state, but view death as only a cessation of all sensibility, and consequently an end of all happiness), who yet would have been moved with pity towards the same persons, if they had seen them under some very extreme anguish. Some men would be moved with pity by seeing a brute creature under extreme and long torments, who yet suffer no uneasiness in knowing that many thousands of them every day cease to live, and so have an end put to all their pleasure, at butchers' shambles in great cities. It is the

nature of true benevolence to desire and rejoice in the prosperity and pleasure of the object of it; and that, in some proportion to its degree of prevalence. But persons may greatly pity those that are in extreme pain, whose positive pleasure they may still be very indifferent about. In this case a man may be much moved and affected with uneasiness, who yet would be affected with no sensible joy in seeing signs of the same person's or Being's enjoyment of very high degrees of pleasure.

Yea, pity may not only be without benevolence, but may consist with true malevolence, or with such ill will as shall cause men not only not to desire the positive happiness of another, but even to desire his calamity. They may pity such a one when his calamity goes beyond their hatred. A man may have true malevolence towards another, desiring no positive good for him, but evil; and yet his hatred not be infinite, but only to a certain degree. And when he sees the person whom he thus hates, in misery far beyond his ill will, he may then pity him; because then the natural instinct begins to operate. For malevolence will not overcome the natural instinct, inclining to pity others in extreme calamity, any further than it goes, or to the limits of the degree of misery it wishes to its object. Men may pity others under exquisite torment, when yet they would have been grieved if they had seen their prosperity. And some men have such a grudge against one or another, that they would be far from being uneasy at their very death, nay, would even be glad of it. And when this is the case with them, it is manifest that their heart is void of benevolence towards such persons, and under the power of malevolence. Yet at the same time they are capable of pitying even these very persons, if they should see them under a degree of misery very much disproportioned to their ill will.

These things may convince us that natural pity is of a nature very different from true virtue, and not arising from a disposition of heart to general benevolence; but is owing to a particular instinct, which the Creator has implanted in mankind, for the same purposes as most other instincts, viz., chiefly for the preservation of mankind, though not exclusive of their well being. The giving of this instinct is the fruit of God's mercy, and an instance of his love of the world of mankind, and an evidence that though the world be so sinful, it is not God's design to make it a world of punishment; and therefore has many ways made a merciful provision for men's relief in extreme calamities: and among others has given mankind in general a disposition to pity; the natural exercises whereof extend beyond those whom we are in a near connection with, especially in case of great calamity; because commonly in such cases men stand in need of the help of others besides their near friends, and because commonly those calamities which are extreme, without relief, tend to men's destruction. This may be given as the reason why men are so made by the Author of nature, that they have no instinct inclining as much to rejoice at the sight of others' great prosperity and pleasure, as to be grieved at their extreme calamity, viz., because they do not stand in equal necessity of such an instinct as that in order to their preservation. But if pure benevolence were the source of natural pity, doubtless it would operate to as great a degree in congratulation, in cases of others' great prosperity, as in compassion towards them in great misery.

The instincts God has given to mankind in this world, which in some respects resemble a virtuous benevolence, are agreeable to the state that God designed mankind for here, where he intends their preservation, and comfortable subsistence. But in the world of punishment, where the state of the wicked inhabitants will be exceeding different, and God will have none of these

merciful designs to answer, there, we have great reason to think, will be no such thing as a disposition to pity, in any case; as also there will be no natural affection toward near relations, and no mutual affection between opposite sexes.

To conclude what I have to say on the natural instinct disposing men to pity others in misery, I would observe, that this is a source of a kind of abhorrence in men of some vices, as cruelty and oppression; and so, of a sort of approbation of the contrary virtues, humanity, mercy, &c. Which aversion and approbation, however, so far as they arise from this cause only, are not from a principle of true virtue.

CHAPTER VII.

The Reasons why those things that have been mentioned, which have not the Essence of Virtue, have yet by many been mistaken for True Virtue.

The first reason that may be given of this, is, that although they have not the specific and distinguishing nature and essence of virtue, yet they have something that *belongs to the general nature* of virtue.—The general nature of true virtue is love. It is expressed both in love of benevolence and complacence; but primarily in benevolence to persons and Beings, and consequently and secondarily in complacence in virtue—as has been shown. There is something of the general nature of virtue in those natural affections and principles that have been mentioned, in both those respects

In many of these natural affections there is something of the appearance of love to persons. In some of them there appears the tendency and effect of benevolence, in part. Others have truly a sort of benevolence in them, though it be a private benevolence, and in several respects falls short of the extent of true virtuous benevolence, both in its nature and object.

The last mentioned passion, natural to mankind in their present state, viz., that of pity to others in distress, though not properly of the nature of love, as has been demonstrated, yet has partly the same influence and effect with benevolence. One effect of true benevolence is to cause persons to be uneasy, when the objects of it are in distress, and to desire their relief. And natural pity has the same effect.

Natural gratitude, though in every instance wherein it appears it is not properly called love, because persons may be moved with a degree of gratitude towards persons on certain occasions, whom they have no real and proper friendship for, as in the instance of *Saul* towards *David*, once and again, after *David's* sparing his life, when he had so fair an opportunity to kill him: yet it has the same or like operation and effect with friendship, in part, for a season, and with regard to so much of the welfare of its object, as appears a deserved requital of kindness received. And in other instances it may have a more general and abiding influence, so as more properly to be called by the name of love. So that many times men from natural gratitude do really with a sort of benevolence love those who love them. From this, together with some other natural principles, men may love their near friends, love their own party, love their country, &c.

The natural disposition there is to mutual affection between the sexes, often operates by what may properly be called love. There is oftentimes truly a kind both of benevolence and complacence. As there also is between parents and children.

Thus these things have something of the general nature of virtue, which is love;* and especially the thing last mentioned has something of a love of benevolence. What they are essentially defective in, is, that they are private in their nature, they do not arise from any temper of benevolence to Being in general, nor have they a tendency to any such effect in their operation. But yet agreeing with virtue in its general nature, they are beautiful within their own private sphere, i. e., they appear beautiful if we confine our views to that private system, and while we shut all other things they stand in any relation to out of our consideration. If that private system contained the sum of universal existence, then their benevolence would have true beauty; or, in other words, would be beautiful, all things considered; but now it is not so. These private systems are so far from containing the sum of universal Being, or comprehending all existence which we stand related to, that it contains but an infinitely small part of it. The reason why men are so ready to take these private affections for true virtue, is the narrowness of their views; and above all, that they are so ready to leave the Divine Being out of their view, and to neglect him in their consideration, or to regard him in their thoughts, as though he were not properly belonging to the system of real existence, but as a kind of shadowy, imaginary Being. And though most men allow that there is a God, yet in their ordinary view of things, his Being is not apt to come into the account, and to have the influence and effect of a real existence, as it is with other Beings which they see, and are conversant with by their external senses. In their views of beauty and deformity, and in the inward sensations of displicence and approbation which rise in their minds, it is not a thing natural to them to be under the influence of a view of the Deity, as part of the system, and as the head of the system, and he who is all in all, in comparison of whom all the rest is nothing, and with regard to whom all other things are to be viewed, and their minds to be accordingly impressed and affected.

Yea, we are apt, through the narrowness of our views, in judging of the beauty of affections and actions to limit our consideration to only a small part of the created system.—When private affections extend themselves to a considerable number, we are very ready to look upon them as truly virtuous, and accordingly to applaud them highly. Thus it is with respect to love to a large party, or a man's love to his country. For though his private system contains but a small part even of the world of mankind, yet being a considerable number, through the contracted limits of the mind and the narrowness of his views, they are ready to fill his mind and engross his sight, and to seem as if they were all. Hence among the *Romans* love to their country was the highest virtue; though this affection of theirs, so much extolled among them, was employed as it were for the destruction of the rest of the world of mankind. The larger the number is, that private affection extends to, the more apt men are, through the narrowness of their sight, to mistake it for true virtue; because then the private system appears to have more of the image of the universal system. Whereas, when the circle it extends to, is very small, it is not so apt to be looked upon as virtuous, or not so virtuous. As, a man's love to his own children——

And this is the reason why self-love is by nobody mistaken for true virtue. For though there be something of the general nature of virtue in this, as here is love and good will, yet the object is so private, the limits so narrow, that it by no means engrosses the view; unless it be of the person himself, who, through

* It claims to be considered, whether these things can be of the nature of virtue, even according to the distinctions the author has made.—Ed.

the greatness of his pride, may imagine himself as it were *all*. The minds of men are large enough to take in a vastly greater extent; and though self-love is far from being useless in the world, yea, it is exceeding necessary to society, besides its directly and greatly seeking the good of one, yet every body sees that if it be not subordinate to, and regulated by, another more extensive principle, it may make a man a common enemy to the system he is related to. And though this is as true of any other private affection, notwithstanding its extent may be to a system that contains thousands of individuals, and those private systems bear no greater proportion to the whole of universal existence, than one alone, yet they bear a greater proportion to the extent, to the view and comprehension of men's minds, and are more apt to be regarded as if they were *all*, or at least as some resemblance of the universal system.

Thus I have observed how many of these natural principles, which have been spoken of, resemble virtue in its primary operation, which is benevolence. Many of them also have a resemblance of it in its secondary operation, which is its approbation of and complacence in virtue itself. Several kinds of approbation of virtue have been taken notice of, as common to mankind, which are not of the nature of a truly virtuous approbation, consisting in a sense and relish of the essential beauty of virtue, consisting in a Being's cordial union to Being in general, from a spirit of love to Being in general. As particularly, the approbation of conscience, from a sense of the inferior and secondary beauty which there is in virtue, consisting in uniformity, and from a sense of desert, consisting in a sense of the natural agreement of loving and being beloved, showing kindness and receving kindness. So from the same principle, there is a disapprobation of vice, from a natural opposition to deformity and disproportion, and a sense of evil desert, or the natural agreement there is between hating and being hated, opposing and being opposed, &c., together with a painful sensation naturally arising in a sense of self-opposition and inconsistence. Approbation of conscience is the more readily mistaken for a truly virtuous approbation, because by the wise constitution of the great Governor of the world (as was observed), when conscience is well informed, and thoroughly awakened, it agrees with the latter fully and exactly, as to the object approved, though not as to the ground and reason of approving. It approves all virtue, and condemns all vice. It approves true virtue, and indeed approves nothing that is against it, or that falls short of it; as was shown before. And indeed natural conscience is implanted in all mankind, there to be as it were in God's stead, and to be an internal judge or rule to all, whereby to distinguish right and wrong.

It has also been observed, how that virtue, consisting in benevolence, is approved, and vice, consisting in ill-will, is disliked, from the influence of self-love, together with association of ideas, in the same manner as men dislike those qualities in things without life or reason, with which they have always connected the ideas of hurtfulness, malignancy, perniciousness; but like those things with which they habitually connect the ideas of profit, pleasantness, comfortableness, &c. This sort of approbation or liking of virtue, and dislike of vice, is easily mistaken for true virtue, not only because those things are approved by it that have the nature of virtue, and the things disliked have the nature of vice, but because here is much resemblance of virtuous approbation, it being complacence from love; the difference only lying in this, that it is not from love to Being in general, but from self-love.

There is also, as has been shown, a liking of some virtues, and dislike of some vices, from the influence of the natural instinct of pity. This, men are apt to mistake for the exercise of true virtue on many accounts. Here is not

only a kind of complacence, and the objects of complacence are what have the nature of virtue, and the virtues indeed very amiable, such as humanity, mercy, tenderness of heart, &c., and the contrary very odious; but besides, the approbation is not merely from self-love, but from compassion, an affection that respects others, and resembles benevolence, as has been shown.

Another reason why the things which have been mentioned are mistaken for true virtue, is, that there is indeed a true *negative* moral goodness in them. By a negative moral goodness, I mean the negation or absence of true moral evil.—They have this negative moral goodness, because a being without them would be an evidence of a much greater moral evil. Thus, the exercise of natural conscience in such and such degrees, wherein appears such a measure of an awakening or sensibility of conscience, though it be not of the nature of real positive virtue or true moral goodness, yet has a negative moral goodness; because in the present state of things, it is an evidence of the absence of that higher degree of wickedness, which causes great insensibility or stupidity of conscience. For sin, as was observed, is not only against a spiritual and divine sense of virtue, but is also against the dictates of that moral sense which is in natural conscience. No wonder, that this sense being long opposed and often conquered, grows weaker. All sin has its source from selfishness, or from self-love, not subordinate to regard to Being in general. And natural conscience chiefly consists in a sense of desert, or the natural agreement between sin and misery. But if self were indeed *all*, and so more considerable than all the world besides, there would be no ill desert in his regarding himself above all, and making all other interests give place to private interest. And no wonder that men by long acting from the selfish principle, and by being habituated to treat themselves as if they were *all*, increase in pride, and come as it were naturally to look on themselves as *all*, and so to lose entirely the sense of ill desert in their making all other interests give place to their own.—And no wonder that men by often repeating acts of sin, without punishment, or any visible appearance of approaching punishment, have less and less sense of the connection of sin with punishment. That sense which an awakened conscience has of the desert of sin, consists chiefly in a sense of its desert of resentment of the Deity, the fountain and head of universal existence. But no wonder that by a long continued worldly and sensual life, men more and more lose all sense of the Deity, who is a spiritual and invisible Being. The mind being long involved in, and engrossed by sensitive objects, becomes sensual in all its operations, and excludes all views and impressions of spiritual objects, and is unfit for their contemplation. Thus the conscience and general benevolence are entirely different principles, and sense of conscience differs from the holy complacence of a benevolent and truly virtuous heart. Yet wickedness may, by long habitual exercise, greatly diminish a sense of conscience. So that there may be negative moral goodness, in sensibility of conscience, as it may be an argument of the absence of that higher degree of wickedness, which causeth stupidity of conscience.

So with respect to natural *gratitude*, though there may be no virtue merely in loving them that love us, yet the contrary may be an evidence of a great degree of depravity, as it may argue a higher degree of selfishness, so that a man is come to look upon himself as all, and others as nothing, and so their respect and kindness as nothing. Thus an increase of pride diminishes gratitude.—So does sensuality, or the increase of sensual appetites, and coming more and more under the power and impression of sensible objects, tends by degrees to make the mind insensible to any thing else; and those appetites take up the whole

soul; and through habit and custom the water is all drawn out of other channels, in which it naturally flows, and is all carried as it were into one channel.

In like manner natural affection and natural pity, though not of the nature of virtue, yet may be diminished greatly by the increase of those two principles of pride and sensuality, and as the consequence of this, being habitually disposed to envy, malice, &c. These lusts when they prevail to a high degree may overcome and diminish the exercise of those natural principles: even as they often overcome and diminish common prudence in a man, as to seeking his own private interest, in point of health, wealth or honor, and yet no one will think it proves that a man's being cunning, in seeking his own personal and temporal interest, has any thing of the nature and essence of true virtue.

Another reason why these natural principles and affections are mistaken for true virtue, is, that in several respects they have the same effect which true virtue tends to; especially in these two ways:

1. The present state of the world is so ordered and constituted by the wisdom and goodness of its supreme Ruler, that these natural principles for the most part tend to the good of the world of mankind. So do natural pity, gratitude, parental affection, &c. Herein they agree with the tendency of general benevolence, which seeks and tends to the general good. But this is no proof that these natural principles have the nature of true virtue. For self-love is a principle that is exceeding useful and necessary in the world of mankind. So are the natural appetites of hunger and thirst, &c. But yet nobody will assert, that these have the nature of true virtue.

2. These principles have a like effect with true virtue in this respect, that they tend several ways to restrain vice, and prevent many acts of wickedness. So, natural affection, love to our party, or to particular friends, tends to keep us from acts of injustice towards these persons: which would be real wickedness. Pity preserves from cruelty, which would be real and great moral evil. Natural conscience tends to restrain sin in general, in the present state of the world. But neither can this prove these principles themselves to be of the nature of true virtue. For so is this present state of mankind ordered by a merciful God, that men's self-love does in innumerable respects restrain from acts of true wickedness; and not only so, but puts men upon seeking true virtue; yet is not itself true virtue, but is the source of all the wickedness that is in the world.

Another reason why these inferior affections, especially some of them, are accounted virtuous, is, that there are affections of the same denomination, which are truly virtuous.—Thus, for instance, there is a truly virtuous *pity*, or a compassion to others under affliction or misery from general benevolence. Pure benevolence would be sufficient to excite pity to another in calamity, if there were no particular instinct, or any other principle determining the mind thereto. It is easy to see how benevolence, which seeks another's good, should cause us to desire his deliverance from evil. And this is a source of pity far more extensive than the other. It excites compassion in cases that are overlooked by natural instinct. And even in those cases to which instinct extends, it mixes its influence with the natural principle, and guides and regulates its operations. And when this is the case, the pity which is exercised may be called a virtuous compassion. So there is a virtuous *gratitude*, or a gratitude that arises not only from self-love, but from a superior principle of disinterested general benevolence. As it is manifest, that when we receive kindness from such as we love already, we are more disposed to gratitude, and disposed to greater degrees of it than when the mind is destitute of any such friendly pre-

possession. Therefore, when the superior principle of virtuous love has a governing hand, and regulates the affair, it may be called a virtuous gratitude So there is a virtuous love of *justice*, arising from pure benevolence to Being in general, as that naturally and necessarily inclines the heart, that every particular Being should have such a share of benevolence as is proportioned to its dignity, consisting in the degree of its Being, and the degree of its virtue. Which is entirely diverse from an apprehension of justice, from a sense of the beauty of uniformity in variety: as has been particularly shown already. And so it is easy to see how there may be a virtuous sense of desert different from what is natural and common. And so a virtuous *conscientiousness* or a sanctified conscience. And as when *natural affections* have their operations mixed with the influence of virtuous benevolence, and are directed and determined hereby, they may be called virtuous, so there may be a virtuous love of parents to children, and between other near relatives, a virtuous love of our town, or country, or nation. Yea, and a virtuous love between the sexes, as there may be the influence of virtue mingled with instinct, and virtue may govern with regard to the particular manner of its operation, and may guide it to such ends as are agreeable to the great ends and purposes of true virtue.

Genuine virtue prevents that increase of the habits of pride and sensuality, which tend to overbear and greatly diminish the exercises of the forementioned useful and necessary principles of nature. And a principle of general benevolence softens and sweetens the mind, and makes it more susceptible of the proper influence and exercise of the gentler natural instincts, and directs every one into its proper channel, and determines the exercise to the proper manner and measure, and guides all to the best purposes.

CHAPTER VIII.

In what respects Virtue or moral good is founded in Sentiment; and how far it is founded in the Reason and Nature of things.

THAT which is called *virtue*, is a certain kind of beautiful nature, form or quality that is observed in things. That form or quality is called beautiful to any one beholding it to whom it is beautiful, which appears in itself agreeable or comely to him, or the view or idea of which is immediately pleasant to the mind. I say agreeable *in itself*, and *immediately* pleasant, to distinguish it from things which in themselves are not agreeable nor pleasant, but either indifferent or disagreeable, which yet appear eligible and agreeable indirectly for something else that is the consequence of them, or with which they are connected. Such a kind of indirect agreeableness or eligibleness in things, not for themselves, but for something else, is not what is called beauty. But when a form or quality appears lovely, pleasing and delightful in itself, then it is called beautiful; and this agreeableness or gratefulness of the idea is what is called beauty. It is evident therefore by this, that the way we come by the idea or sensation of beauty, is by immediate sensation of the gratefulness of the idea called *beautiful*; and not by finding out by argumentation any consequences, or other things that it stands connected with; any more than tasting the sweetness of honey, or perceiving the harmony of a tune, is by argumentation on connections and consequences. And this manner of being affected with the immediate presence of the beautiful idea depends not, therefore, on any reasonin

about the idea, after we have it, before we can find out whether it be beautiful or not; but on the frame of our minds, whereby they are so made that such an idea, as soon as we have it, is grateful, or appears beautiful.

Therefore, if this be all that is meant by them who affirm virtue is founded in sentiment, and not in reason, that they who see the beauty there is in true virtue, do not perceive it by argumentation on its connections and consequences, but by the frame of their own minds, or a certain spiritual sense given them of God, whereby they immediately perceive pleasure in the presence of the idea of true virtue in their minds, or are directly gratified in the view or contemplation of this object, this is certainly true.

But if thereby is meant, that the frame of mind, or inward sense given them by God, whereby the mind is disposed to delight in the idea or view of true virtue, is given arbitrarily, so that if he had pleased he might have given a contrary sense and determination of mind, which would have agreed as well with the necessary nature of things, this I think is not true.

Virtue, as I have observed, consists in the cordial consent or union of Being to Being in general. And as has also been observed, that frame of mind, whereby it is disposed to relish and be pleased with the view of this, is benevolence or union of heart itself to Being in general, or a universally benevolent frame of mind: because he whose temper is to love Being in general, therein must have a disposition to approve and be pleased with the love to Being in general.—Therefore now the question is, whether God, in giving this temper to a created mind, whereby it unites to or loves Being in general, acts so arbitrarily, that there is nothing in the necessary nature of things to hinder but that a contrary temper might have agreed or consisted as well with that nature of things as this?

And in the *first* place I observe, that to assert this, would be a plain absurdity, and contrary to the very supposition.—For here it is supposed, that virtue in its very essence consists in agreement or consent of Being to Being. Now certainly agreement itself to Being in general must necessarily agree better with general existence, than opposition and contrariety to it.

I observe, *secondly*, that God in giving to the creature such a temper of mind, gives that which is agreeable to what is by absolute necessity his own temper and nature. For, as has been often observed, God himself is in effect Being in general; and without all doubt it is in itself full necessary, and impossible it should be otherwise, that God should agree with himself, be united with himself or love himself: and therefore, when he gives the same temper to his creatures, this is more agreeable to his necessary nature, than the opposite temper: yea, the latter would be infinitely contrary to his nature.

Let it be noted, *thirdly*, by this temper only can created Beings be united to, and agree with one another. This appears, because it consists in consent and union to Being in general; which implies agreement and union with every particular Being, except such as are opposite to Being in general, or excepting such cases wherein union with them is by some means inconsistent with union with general existence. But certainly if any particular created Being were of a temper to oppose Being in general, that would infer the most universal and greatest possible discord, not only of creatures with their Creator, but of created Beings one with another.

Fourthly, I observe, there is no other temper but this, that a man can have, and agree with himself or be without self-inconsistence, i. e., without having some inclinations and relishes repugnant to others. And that for these reasons. Every Being that has understanding and will, necessarily loves happiness. For,

to suppose any Being not to love happiness, would be to suppose he did not love what was agreeable to him; which is a contradiction: or at least would imply, that nothing was agreeable or eligible to him, which is the same as to say, that he has no such thing as choice, or any faculty of will. So that every Being who has a faculty of will must of necessity have an inclination to happiness. And therefore, if he be consistent with himself, and has not some inclinations repugnant to others, he must approve of those inclinations whereby Beings desire the happiness of Being in general, and must be against a disposition to the misery of Being in general: because otherwise he would approve of opposition to his own happiness. For, if a temper inclined to the misery of Being in general prevailed universally, it is apparent, it would tend to universal misery. But he that loves a tendency to universal misery, in effect loves a tendency to his own misery, and as he necessarily hates his own misery, he has then one inclination repugnant to another. And besides it necessarily follows from self-love, that men love to be loved by others; because in this others' love agrees with their own love. But if men loved hatred to Being in general, they would in effect love the hatred of themselves; and so would be inconsistent with themselves, having one natural inclination contrary to another.

These things may help us to understand why that spiritual and divine sense, by which those that are truly virtuous and holy, perceive the excellency of true virtue, is in the sacred Scriptures called by the name of light, knowledge, understanding, &c. If this divine sense were a thing arbitrarily given without any foundation in the nature of things, it would not properly be called by such names. For, if there were no correspondence or agreement in such a sense with the nature of things any more than there would have been in a diverse or contrary sense, the idea we obtain by this spiritual sense could in no respect be said to be a knowledge or perception of any thing besides what was in our own minds. For this idea would be no representation of any thing without. But since it is otherwise, since it is agreeable in the respects abovementioned, to the nature of things, and especially since it is the representation and image of the moral perfection and excellency of the Divine Being, hereby we have a perception of that moral excellency, of which we could have no true idea without it. And it being so, hereby persons have that true knowledge of God, which greatly enlightens the mind in the knowledge of divine things in general, and does (as might be shown, if it were necessary to the main purpose of this discourse) in many respects assist persons to a right understanding of things in general, to understand which our faculties were chiefly given us, and which do chiefly concern our interest; and assists us to see the nature of them, and the truth of them, in their proper evidence. Whereas, the want of this spiritual sense, and the prevalence of those dispositions that are contrary to it, tend to darken and distract the mind, and dreadfully to delude and confound men's understandings.

And as to that moral sense, common to mankind, which there is in *natural conscience*, neither can this be truly said to be no more than a sentiment arbitrarily given by the Creator, without any relation to the necessary nature of things: but is established in an agreement with the nature of things; so as no sense of mind that can be supposed, of a contrary nature and tendency could be. This will appear by these two things:

1. This moral sense, if the understanding be well informed, and be exercised at liberty, and in an extensive manner, without being restrained to a private sphere, approves the very same things which a spiritual and divine sense approves; and those things only: though not on the same grounds, nor with the same kind of approbation. Therefore, as that divine sense has been already

shown to be agreeable to the necessary nature of things, so this inferior moral sense, being so far correspondent to that, must also so far agree with the nature of things

2. It has been shown, that this moral sense consists in approving the uniformity and natural agreement there is between one thing and another. So that by the supposition it is agreeable to the nature of things. For therein it consists, viz., a disposition of mind to consent to, or like, the agreement of the nature of things, or the agreement of the nature and form of one thing with another. And certainly such a temper of mind as likes the agreement of things to the nature of things, is more agreeable to the nature of things than an opposite temper of mind.

Here it may be observed:—As the use of *language* is for mankind to express their sentiments or ideas to each other, so that those terms in language, by which things of a moral nature are signified, are to express those moral sentiments or ideas that are common to mankind; therefore it is, that moral sense which is in natural conscience, that chiefly governs the use of language among mankind, and is the mind's rule of language in these matters among mankind; it is indeed the general natural rule which God has given to all men, whereby to judge of moral good and evil. By such words, right and wrong, good and evil, when used in a moral sense, is meant in common speech that which deserves praise or blame, respect or resentment. But as has been often observed, mankind in general have a sense of desert, by this natural moral sense.

Therefore here may arise a question, which may deserve to be considered viz., seeing it is thus, that sentiment among mankind is the rule of language, as to what is called by the name of good and evil, worthy and unworthy; and it is apparent, that sentiment, at least as to many particulars, by some means or other is different in different persons, in different nations; that being thought to deserve praise by one, which by others is thought to be worthy of blame; how therefore can virtue and vice be any other than arbitrary, not at all determined by the nature of things, but by the sentiments of men with relation to the nature of things?

In order to the answering this question with clearness, it may be divided into two, viz., Whether men's sentiments of moral good and evil are not arbitrary, or rather casual and accidental? And, whether the way of their using words in what they call good and evil, is not arbitrary, without respect to any common sentiment in all, conformed to the nature of things?

As to the first, I would observe, that the general disposition or sense of mind exercised in a sense of desert of esteem or resentment, may be the same in all; though as to particular objects and occasions with regard to which it is exercised, it may be very various in different men or bodies of men, through the partiality or error that may attend the view or attention of the mind. In all, a notion of desert of love, or resentment, may consist in the same thing, in general, viz., a suitableness, or natural uniformity and agreement between the affections and acts of the agent, and the affections and treatment of others some way concerned; or the natural agreement between love (or something that some way implies love, or proceeds from it, or tends to it) and love; a natural agreement between treating well, and being well treated; the natural agreement between hating (or something that some way partakes of the nature of hatred) and being hated, &c. I say, this general notion of desert may be the same; and yet occasions and objects through variety of apprehensions about these occasions and objects, and the various manner in which they are viewed, by reason of the partial attention of the mind, may be extremely various; and example, custom, education, and association may have a hand in this, in ways innumerable. But it is needless to dwell long on this, since things which have

been said by others (Mr. *Hutcheson* in particular) may abundantly show, that the differences which are to be found among different persons and nations, concerning moral good and evil, are not inconsistent with a general moral sense, common to all mankind.

Nor, secondly, is the use of the words, good and evil, right and wrong, when used in a moral sense, altogether unfixed and arbitrary, according to the variety of notions, opinions, and views, that occasion the forementioned variety of sentiment. For though the signification of words is determined by use, yet that which governs in the use of terms is general or common use. And mankind, in what they would signify by terms, are obliged to aim at a consistent use; because it is easily found that the end of language, which is to be a common medium of manifesting ideas and sentiments, cannot be obtained any other way than by a consistent use of words; both that men should be consistent with themselves, and one with another, in the use of them. But men cannot call any thing right or wrong, worthy or ill deserving, consistently, any other way than by calling things so, which truly deserve praise or blame, i. e., things, wherein (all things considered) there is most uniformity in connecting with them praise or blame. There is no other way that they can use these terms consistently with themselves. Thus, if thieves or traitors may be angry with informers, that bring them to justice, and call their behavior by odious names, yet herein they are inconsistent with themselves; because, when they put themselves in the place of those that have injured them, they approve the same things they condemn. And therefore such are capable of being convinced, that they apply these odious terms in an abusive manner. So, a nation that prosecutes an ambitious design of universal empire, by subduing other nations with fire and sword, may affix terms that signify the highest degrees of virtue, to the conduct of such as show the most engaged, stable, resolute spirit in this affair, and do most of this bloody work. But yet they are capable of being convinced, that they use these terms inconsistently, and abuse language in it, and so having their mouths stopped. And not only will men use such words inconsistently with themselves but also with one another, by using them any otherwise than to signify true merit or ill deserving, as before explained. For there is no way else, wherein men have any notion of good or ill desert, that mankind in general can agree in. Mankind in general seem to suppose some general standard or foundation in nature for a universal consistence in the use of the terms whereby they express moral good and evil; which none can depart from but through error and mistake. This is evidently supposed in all disputes they may have one with another, about right and wrong; and in all endeavors used to evince or prove that any thing is either good or evil, in a moral sense.

THE GREAT CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

OF

ORIGINAL SIN

DEFENDED;

EVIDENCES OF ITS TRUTH PRODUCED

AND

ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY ANSWERED

CONTAINING IN PARTICULAR,

A REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS AND ARGUINGS OF DR. JOHN TAYLOR, IN HIS BOOK, ENTITLED, "THE SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN PROPOSED TO FREE AND CANDID EXAMINATION, ETC."

Matth. ix. 12. "They that be whole, need not a Physician; but they that are sick."

Et hæc non tantum ad Peccatores referenda est; quia in omnibus Maledictionibus primi Hominis, omnes ejus Generationes conveniunt.... R. Sal. Jarchi.

Propter Concupiscentiam, innatam Cordi humano, dicitur, In Iniquitate genitus sum; atque Sensus est, quod a Nativitate implantatum sit Cordi humano *Jetser hareng* Figmentum malum.... Aben Ezra.

....Ad Mores Natura recurrit
Damnatos, fixa et mutari nescia....
....Dociles, imitandis
Turpibus et pravis omnes sumus.... Juv.

ADVERTISEMENT,

FOR THE TREATISE ON ORIGINAL SIN.

When the page is referred to in this manner, p. 40, p. 50, without mentioning the book, thereby is to be understood such a book in Dr. Taylor's *Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin*. *S* intends the Supplement. When the word *Key* is used to signify the book referred to, thereby is to be understood Dr. Taylor's KEY *to the Apostolic Writings*. This mark [§] with figures or a number annexed, signifies such a section or paragraph in his *Key*. When after mentioning *Preface to Par. on Epist. to Romans*, there is subjoined p. 145, 47, or the like, thereby is intended Page and Paragraph, page 145, Paragraph 47. The references suit the London Editions of Dr. Taylor's books, printed about the year 1760.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THE following Discourse is intended, not merely as an answer to any *particular Book* written against the Doctrine of *Original Sin*, but as a *general Defence* of that great important Doctrine. Nevertheless, I have in this Defence taken notice of the main things said against this Doctrine, by such of the more noted opposers of it, as I have had opportunity to read; particularly those two late Writers, Dr. TURNBULL and Dr. TAYLOR of *Norwich*; but especially the latter, in what he has published in those two Books of his, the first entitled "*The Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin proposed to free and candid Examination*;" the other, his "*Key to the Apostolic Writings, with a Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistle to the Romans.*" I have closely attended to Dr. TAYLOR's "*Piece on Original Sin*," in all its Parts, and have endeavored that no one thing there said, of any consequence in this Controversy, should pass unnoticed, or that any thing which has the appearamce of an Argument, in opposition to this Doctrine, should be left unanswered. I look on the Doctrine as of *great Importance*; which every body will doubtless own it is, if it be *true*. For, if the case be such indeed, that all Mankind are by *Nature* in a state of *total Ruin*, both with respect to the *moral Evil* they are the subjects of, and the *afflictive Evil* they are exposed to, the one as the consequence and punishment of the other, then doubtless the great *Salvation* by CHRIST stands in direct Relation to this *Ruin*, as the remedy to the disease; and the whole *Gospel*, or Doctrine of Salvation, must suppose it; and all real belief, or true notion of that Gospel, must be built upon it. Therefore, as I think the Doctrine is most certainly both true and important, I hope, my attempting a *Vindication* of it, will be *candidly* interpreted; and that what I have done towards its defence, will be *impartially* considered, by all that will give themselves the trouble to read the ensuing Discourse; in which it is designed to examine every thing material throughout the Doctor's *whole* Book, and many things in that other Book of *Dr. Taylor's* containing his *Key* and exposition on *Romans*; as also many things written in opposition to this Doctrine by some *other* modern Authors. And moreover, my discourse being not only intended for an *Answer* to Dr. TAYLOR, and other opposers of the Doctrine of Original Sin, but (as was observed above) for a *general defence* of that Doctrine; producing the *evidence* of the truth of the Doctrine, as well as answering *objections* made against it—considering these things, I say, I hope this attempt of mine will not be thought needless, nor be altogether useless, notwithstanding other publications on this subject.

I would also hope, that the *extensiveness* of the plan of the following treatise will excuse the *length* of it. And that when it is considered, how *much* was absolutely requisite to the full executing of a design formed on such a plan; how much has been written *against* the Doctrine of Original Sin, and with what plausibility; and how strong the *prejudices* of many are in favor of what is said in *opposition* to this Doctrine; and that it cannot be expected, any thing short of a full consideration of almost *every* argument advanced by

the main opposers, especially by this late and specious Writer, Dr TAYLOR, will satisfy many readers; and also, how much must unavoidably be said in order to a full handling of the arguments in defence of the Doctrine; and how *important* the Doctrine must be, if true; I say, when such circumstances as these are considered, I trust, the length of the following discourse will not be thought to exceed what the case really required. However, this must be left to the Judgment of the intelligent and candid Reader.

STOCKBRIDGE, MAY 26, 1757

DOCTRINE

OF

ORIGINAL SIN

DEFENDED.

PART I.

WHEREIN ARE CONSIDERED SOME EVIDENCES OF ORIGINAL SIN FROM FACTS AND EVENTS, AS FOUND BY OBSERVATION AND EXPERIENCE, TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIONS AND TESTIMONIES OF HOLY SCRIPTURE, AND THE CONFESSION AND ASSERTIONS OF OPPOSERS.

CHAPTER I.

THE EVIDENCE OF ORIGINAL SIN FROM WHAT APPEARS IN FACT OF THE SINFULNESS OF MANKIND.

SECTION I.

All Mankind do constantly, in all Ages, without Fail in any one Instance, run into that moral Evil, which is, in Effect, their own utter and eternal Perdition, in a total Privation of God's Favor, and Suffering of his Vengeance and Wrath.

By *Original Sin*, as the phrase has been most commonly used by divines, is meant *the innate, sinful depravity of the heart*. But yet, when the doctrine of Original Sin is spoken of, it is vulgarly understood in that latitude, as to include not only the *depravity of nature*, but the *imputation of Adam's* first Sin; or in other words, the liableness or exposedness of *Adam's* posterity, in the divine judgment, to partake of the punishment of that Sin. So far as I know, most of those who have held one of these, have maintained the other; and most of those who have opposed one have opposed the other; both are opposed by the author chiefly attended to in the following discourse, in his book against Original Sin: and it may perhaps appear in our future consideration of the subject, that they are closely connected, and that the arguments which prove the one, establish the other, and that there are no more difficulties attending the allowing of one than the other.

I shall, in the first place, consider this doctrine more especially with regard to the corruption of nature; and as we treat of this, the other will naturally come into consideration, in the prosecution of the discourse, as connected with it.

As all moral qualities, all principles either of virtue or vice, lie in the disposition of the heart, I shall consider whether we have any evidence, that the heart of man is naturally of a corrupt and evil disposition. This is strenuously denied by many late writers, who are enemies to the doctrine of Original Sin; and particularly by Dr. *Taylor*.

The way we come by the idea of any such thing as disposition or tendency is by observing what is constant or general in event; especially under a great variety of circumstances; and above all, when the effect or event continues the same through great and various opposition, much and manifold force and means used to the contrary not prevailing to hinder the effect. I do not know, that such a prevalence of effects is denied to be an evidence of prevailing tendency in causes and agents; or that it is expressly denied by the opposers of the doctrine of Original Sin, that if, in the course of events, it universally or generally proves that mankind are actually corrupt, this would be an evidence of a prior, corrupt propensity in the world of mankind; whatever may be said by some which, if taken with its plain consequences, may seem to imply a denial of this; which may be considered afterwards.—But by many the fact is denied; that is, it is denied, that corruption and moral evil are commonly prevalent in the world: on the contrary, it is insisted on, that good preponderates, and that virtue has the ascendant.

To this purpose Dr. *Turnbull* says,* "With regard to the prevalence of vice in the world, men are apt to let their imagination run out upon all the robberies, piracies, murders, perjuries, frauds, massacres, assassinations they have either heard of, or read in history; thence concluding all mankind to be very wicked. As if a court of justice was a proper place to make an estimate of the morals of mankind, or a hospital of the healthfulness of a climate. But ought they not to consider, that the number of honest citizens and farmers far surpasses that of all sorts of criminals in any state, and that the innocent and kind actions of even criminals themselves surpass their crimes in numbers; that it is the rarity of crimes, in comparison of innocent or good actions, which engages our attention to them, and makes them to be recorded in history; while honest, generous, domestic actions are overlooked, only because they are so common? As one great danger, or one month's sickness shall become a frequently repeated story during a long life of health and safety.—Let not the vices of mankind be multiplied or magnified. Let us make a fair estimate of human life, and set over against the shocking, the astonishing instances of barbarity and wickedness that have been perpetrated in any age, not only the exceeding generous and brave actions with which history shines, but the prevailing innocency, good nature, industry, felicity, and cheerfulness of the greater part of mankind at all times; and we shall not find reason to cry out, as objectors against Providence do on this occasion, that all men are vastly corrupt, and that there is hardly any such thing as virtue in the world. Upon a fair computation, the fact does indeed come out, that very great villanies have been very uncommon in all ages, and looked upon as monstrous; so general is the sense and esteem of virtue." It seems to be with a like view that Dr. *Taylor* says, "We must not take the measure of our health and enjoyments from a lazar house, nor of our understanding from bedlam, nor of our morals from a gaol."

With respect to the propriety and pertinence of such a representation of things, and its force as to the consequence designed, I hope we shall be better able to judge, and in some measure to determine, whether the natural disposition of the hearts of mankind be corrupt or not, when the things which follow have been considered.

But for the greater clearness, it may be proper here to premise one consideration, that is of great importance in this controversy, and is very much overlooked by the opposers of the doctrine of Original Sin in their disputing against it; which is this:

* Moral Philosophy, p. 289, 290.

That is to be looked upon as the true tendency of the natural or innate disposition of man's heart, which appears to be its tendency, when we consider things as they are in themselves, or in their own nature, without the *interposition of divine grace*. Thus, that state of man's nature, that disposition of the mind, is to be looked upon as evil and pernicious, which, as it is in itself, tends to extremely pernicious consequences, and would certainly end therein, were it not that the free mercy and kindness of God interposes to prevent that issue. It would be very strange if any should argue, that there is no evil tendency in the case, because the mere favor and compassion of the Most High may step in and oppose the tendency, and prevent the sad effect tended to. Particularly, if there be any thing in the nature of man, whereby he has a universal, unfailing tendency to that moral evil, which, according to the real nature and true demerit of things, as they are in themselves, implies his utter ruin, that must be looked upon as an evil tendency or propensity; however divine grace may interpose, to save him from deserved ruin, and to overrule things to an issue contrary to that which they tend to of themselves. Grace is a sovereign thing, exercised according to the good pleasure of God, bringing good out of evil. The effect of it belongs not to the nature of things themselves, that otherwise have an ill tendency, any more than the remedy belongs to the disease; but is something altogether independent on it, introduced to oppose the natural tendency, and reverse the course of things. But the event that things tend to, according to their own demerit, and according to divine justice, that is the event which they tend to in their own nature, as Dr. Taylor's own words fully imply. "God alone (says he) can declare whether he will pardon or punish the ungodliness and unrighteousness of mankind, which is in *its own nature* punishable." Nothing is more precisely according to the truth of things, than divine justice: it weighs things in an even balance: it views and estimates things no otherwise than they are truly in their own nature. Therefore undoubtedly that which implies a tendency to ruin, according to the estimate of divine *justice*, does indeed imply such a tendency in its *own nature*.

And then it must be remembered that it is a *moral depravity* we are speaking of; and therefore when we are considering whether such depravity do not appear by a tendency to a bad effect or issue, it is a *moral tendency* to such an issue, that is the thing to be taken into the account. A moral tendency or influence is by *desert*. Then may it be said, man's nature or state is attended with a pernicious or destructive tendency, in a *moral* sense, when it tends to that which *deserves* misery and destruction. And therefore it equally shows the moral depravity of the nature of mankind in their present state, whether that nature be universally attended with an effectual tendency to destructive vengeance actually *executed*, or to their deserving misery and ruin, or their just exposedness to destruction, however that fatal consequence may be prevented by grace, or whatever the actual event be.

One thing more is to be observed here, viz., that the topic mainly insisted on by the opposers of the doctrine of Original Sin, is the justice of God; both in their objections against the imputation of Adam's sin, and also against its being so ordered, that men should come into the world with a corrupt and ruined nature, without having merited the displeasure of their Creator by any personal fault. But the latter is not repugnant to God's justice, if men can be, and actually are, born into the world with a tendency to sin, and to misery and ruin for their sin, which actually will be the consequence, unless *mere grace* steps in and prevents it. If this be allowed, the argument from *justice* is given up; for it is to suppose that their liableness to misery and ruin comes in a way of justice;

otherwise there would be no need of the interposition of divine grace to save them. Justice alone would be sufficient security, if exercised, without grace. It is all one in this dispute about what is just and righteous, whether men are born in a miserable state, by a tendency to ruin, which *actually follows*, and that *justly*; or whether they are born in such a state as tends to a desert of ruin, which *might justly* follow, and *would actually follow*, did not grace prevent. For the controversy is not, what grace will do, but what justice might do.

I have been the more particular on this head, because it enervates many of the reasonings and conclusions by which Dr. Taylor makes out his scheme; in which he argues from that state which mankind are in *by divine grace*, yea, which he himself supposes to be by divine grace, and yet not making any allowance for this, he from hence draws conclusions against what others suppose of the deplorable and ruined state mankind are in by the fall. He often speaks of death and affliction as coming on Adam's posterity in consequence of his sin; and in pages 20, 21, and many other places, he supposes that these things come in consequence of his sin, not as a punishment or a calamity, but as a benefit. But in page 23, he supposes these things would be a great calamity and misery, if it were not for the resurrection; which resurrection he there, and in the following pages, and in many other places, speaks of as being by Christ; and often speaks of it as being *by the grace* of God in Christ.

In pages 63, 64, speaking of our being subjected to sorrow, labor and death, in consequence of Adam's sin, he represents these as evils that are reversed and turned into advantages, and that we are delivered from *through grace* in Christ. And in pages 65—67, he speaks of God's thus turning death into an advantage *through grace* in Christ, as what vindicates the justice of God in bringing death by Adam.

In pages 152, 156, it is one thing which he alleges against this proposition of the assembly of divines, that we are by nature bondslaves to Satan; *that God hath been providing from the beginning of the world to this day, various means and dispensations, to preserve and rescue mankind from the devil.*

In pages 168—170, one thing alleged in answer to that objection against his doctrine, that we are in worse circumstances than Adam, is, the happy circumstances we are under by the provision and means furnished through *free grace in Christ.*

In page 228, among other things which he says, in answering that argument against his doctrine, and brought to show men have corruption by nature, viz., that there is a law in our members—bringing us into captivity to the law of sin and death, spoken of in Rom. vii., he allows that the case of those who are under a law threatening death for every sin (which law he elsewhere says, *shows us the natural and proper demerit of sin, and is perfectly consonant to everlasting truth and righteousness*), *must be quite deplorable, if they have no relief from the mercy of the lawgiver.*

In pages 90—93, *S.*, in opposition to what is supposed of the miserable state mankind are brought into by Adam's sin, one thing he alleges, is, *The noble designs of love, manifested by advancing a new and happy dispensation, founded on the obedience and righteousness of the Son of God;* and that although by Adam we are subjected to death, yet in this dispensation a resurrection is provided; and that Adam's posterity are under a mild dispensation of *grace*, &c.

In page 112, *S.*, he vindicates God's dealings with Adam, in placing him at first under the rigor of law, to transgress and die (which, as he expresses it, *was putting his happiness on a foot extremely dangerous*), by saying, *that as God had*

before determined in his own breast, so he immediately established his covenant upon a quite different bottom, namely, upon grace.

In pages 122, 123, *S.*, against what *R. R.* says, that God forsook man when he fell, and that mankind after Adam's sin were born without divine favor, &c., he alleges among other things, *Christ's coming to be the propitiation for the sins of the whole world. And the riches of God's mercy in giving the promise of a Redeemer to destroy the works of the devil. That he caught his sinning, falling creature in the arms of his grace.*

In his note on Rom. v. 20, p. 297, 298, he says as follows: "The law, I conceive, is not a dispensation suitable to the infirmity of the human nature in our present state; or it doth not seem congruous to the goodness of God, to afford us no other way of salvation but by law, which, if we once transgress, we are ruined forever. For who then from the beginning of the world could be saved? And therefore it seems to me that the law was not absolutely intended to be a rule for obtaining life, even to Adam in Paradise. Grace was the dispensation God intended mankind should be under; and therefore Christ was foreordained before the foundation of the world."

There are various other passages in this author's writings of the like kind. Some of his arguments and conclusions to this effect, in order to be made good, must depend on such a supposition as this: That God's dispensations of grace are rectifications or amendments of his foregoing constitutions and proceedings, which were merely legal; as though the dispensations of grace, which succeed those of mere law, implied an acknowledgment, that the preceding, legal constitution would be unjust, if left as it was, or at least, very hard dealing with mankind; and that the other were of the nature of a satisfaction to his creatures, for former injuries or hard treatment; so that put together, the injury with the satisfaction, the legal and injurious dispensation, taken with the following good dispensation, which our author calls grace, and the unfairness or improper severity of the former, amended by the goodness of the latter, both together made up one righteous dispensation.

The reader is desired to bear in mind that which I have said concerning the interposition of divine grace, its not altering the nature of things, as they are in themselves; and accordingly, when I speak of such and such an evil tendency of things, belonging to the present nature and state of mankind, understand me to mean their tendency *as they are in themselves*, abstracted from any consideration of that remedy the sovereign and infinite grace of God has provided.

Having premised these things, I now proceed to say,

That mankind are all naturally in such a state, as is attended, without fail, with this consequence or issue: that they universally run themselves into that which is, in effect, their own utter, eternal perdition, as being finally accursed of God, and the subjects of his remediless wrath through sin.

From which I infer that the natural state of the mind of man, is attended with a propensity of nature, which is prevalent and effectual, to such an issue; and that therefore their nature is corrupt and depraved with a moral depravity, that amounts to and implies their utter undoing.

Here I would first consider the truth of the proposition; and then would show the certainty of the consequences which I infer from it. If both can be clearly and certainly proved, then, I trust, none will deny but that the doctrine of original depravity is evident, and so the falseness of Dr. Taylor's scheme demonstrated; the greatest part of whose book, called "*The Scripture Doctrine of Original Sin*," &c., is against the doctrine of *innate depravity*. In page 107, *S.*, he speaks of the conveyance of a corrupt and sinful nature to Adam's pos-

terity as *the grand point* to be proved by the maintainers of the Doctrine of Original Sin.

In order to demonstrate what is asserted in the proposition laid down, there is need only that these two things should be made manifest: *one* is this fact, that all mankind come into the world in such a state, as without fail comes to this issue, namely, the universal commission of sin; or that every one who comes to act in the world as a moral agent, is, in a greater or less degree, guilty of sin. The *other* is, that all sin deserves and exposes to utter and eternal destruction, under God's wrath and curse; and would end in it, were it not for the interposition of divine grace to prevent the effect. Both which can be abundantly demonstrated to be agreeable to the word of God, and to Dr. Taylor's own doctrine.

That every one of mankind, at least of them that are capable of acting as moral agents, are guilty of sin (not now taking it for granted that they come guilty into the world) is a thing most clearly and abundantly evident from the holy Scriptures. 1 Kings viii. 46, "If any man sin against thee; for there is no man that sinneth not." Eccl. vii. 20, "There is not a just man upon earth that doeth good, and sinneth not." Job ix. 2, 3, "I know it is so of a truth (i. e., as Bildad had just before said, that *God would not cast away a perfect man*, &c.), but how should man be just with God? If he will contend with him, he cannot answer him one of a thousand." To the like purpose, Psalm cxliii. 2, "Enter not into judgment with thy servant; for in thy sight shall no man living be justified." So the words of the apostle (in which he has apparent reference to those of the Psalmist), Rom. iii. 19, 20, "That every mouth may be stopped, and all the world become guilty before God. Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight; for by the law is the knowledge of sin." So Gal. ii. 16, and 1 John i. 7—10, "If we walk in the light, the blood of Christ cleanseth us from all sin. If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness. If we say that we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and his word is not in us." As in this place, so in innumerable other places, confession and repentance of sin are spoken of, as duties proper for all; as also prayer to God for pardon of sin; and forgiveness of those that injure us, from that motive, that we hope to be forgiven of God. Universal guilt of sin might also be demonstrated from the appointment, and the declared use and end of the ancient sacrifices; and also from the ransom, which every one that was numbered in Israel, was directed to pay, to make atonement for his soul, Exod. xxx. 11—16. All are represented, not only as being sinful, but as having great and manifold iniquity, Job ix. 2, 3, James iii. 1, 2.

There are many scriptures which both declare the universal sinfulness of mankind, and also that all sin deserves and justly exposes to everlasting destruction, under the wrath and curse of God; and so demonstrate both parts of the proposition I have laid down. To which purpose that in Gal. iii. 10, is exceeding full: "For as many as are of the works of the law are under the curse; for it is written, Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law, to do them." How manifestly is it implied in the apostle's meaning here, that there is no man but what fails in some instances of doing all things that are written in the book of the law, and therefore as many as have their dependence on their fulfilling the law, are under that curse which is pronounced on them that do fail of it? And here the apostle infers in the next verse, *that no man is justified by the law in the sight of God*,

as he had said before in the preceding chapter, verse 16, "*By the works of the law shall no flesh be justified.*" The apostle shows us that he understands, that by this place which he cites from Deuteronomy, the Scripture hath concluded, or shut up, all under sin, as in chap. iii. 22. So that here we are plainly taught, both that every one of mankind is a sinner, and that every sinner is under the curse of God.

To the like purpose is that, Rom. iv. 14, and also 2 Cor. iii. 6, 7, 9, where the law is called *the letter that kills, the ministration of death*, and *the ministration of condemnation.* The wrath, condemnation and death, which is threatened in the law to all its transgressors, its final perdition, the second death, eternal ruin, as is very plain, and is confessed. And this punishment which the law threatens for every sin, is a just punishment, being what every sin truly deserves; God's law being a righteous law, and the sentence of it a righteous sentence.

All these things are what Dr. Taylor himself confesses and asserts. He says that the law of God requires perfect obedience. (Note on Rom. vii. 6, p, 308), "God can never require imperfect obedience, or by his holy law allow us to be guilty of any one sin, how small soever. And if the law, as a rule of duty, were in any respect abolished, then we might in some respects transgress the law, and yet not be guilty of sin. The moral law, or law of nature, is the truth, everlasting, unchangeable, and therefore, as such, can never be abrogated. On the contrary, our Lord Jesus Christ has promulgated it anew under the gospel, fuller and clearer than it was in the Mosaical constitution, or anywhere else; having added to its precepts the sanction of his own divine authority." And many things which he says, imply that all mankind do in some degree transgress the law. In page 229, speaking of what may be gathered from Rom. vii. and viii., he says, "We are apt, in a world full of temptation, to be deceived, and drawn into sin by bodily appetites, &c. And the case of those who are under a law threatening death to every sin, must be quite deplorable, if they have no relief from the mercy of the lawgiver."

But this is very fully declared in what he says in his note on Rom. v. 20, page 297. His words are as follows: "Indeed, as a rule of action prescribing our duty, it (the law) always was, and always must be a rule ordained for obtaining life; but not as a rule of justification, not as it subjects to death for every transgression. For if it *could* in its utmost rigor have given us life, then, as the apostle argues, it would have been against the promises of God. For if there had been a law, in the strict and rigorous sense of law, *which could have made us live*, verily justification should have been by the law. But he supposes, no such law was ever given; and therefore there is need and room enough for the promises of grace; or as he argues, Gal. ii. 21, it would have frustrated, or rendered useless the grace of God. For if justification came by the law, then truly Christ is dead in vain, then he died to accomplish what was, or *might have been effected* by law itself without his death. Certainly the law was not brought in among the Jews to be a rule of justification, or to recover them out of a state of death, and to procure life by their sinless obedience to it; for in this, as well as in another respect, it was *weak*, not in itself, but through the *weakness* of our flesh, Rom. viii. 3. The law, I conceive, is not a dispensation *suitable to the infirmity of human nature* in our present state; or it doth not seem congruous to the goodness of God to afford us no other way of salvation, but by *law, which, if we once transgress, we are ruined forever. For who then, from the beginning of the world, could be saved?*". How clear and express are

these things, that no one of mankind, from the beginning of the world, can ever be justified by law, because every one transgresses it ?*

And here also we see, Dr. Taylor declares, that by the law, men are sentenced to *everlasting ruin* for one transgression. To the like purpose he often expresses himself. So p. 207, "The law requireth the most extensive obedience, discovering sin in all its branches. It gives sin a deadly force, subjecting every transgression to the penalty of death; and yet supplieth neither help nor hope to the sinner, but leaveth him under the power of sin and sentence of death." In p. 213, he speaks of the law as "extending to lust and irregular desires, and to every branch and principle of sin; and even to its latent principles, and minutest branches." Again (Note on Rom. vii. 6, p. 308), "to every sin, how small soever." And when he speaks of the law subjecting every transgression to the penalty of death, he means eternal death, as he from time to time explains the matter. In p. 212, he speaks of the law "in the condemning power of it, as binding us in everlasting chains." In p. 120. *S.*, he says, "that death which is the wages of sin, is the second death;" and this p. 78, he explains of "final perdition." In his *Key*, p. 107, § 296, he says, "The curse of the law subjected men for every transgression to *eternal death*." So in *Note* on Rom. v. 20, p. 291, "The law of *Moses* subjected those who were under it to death, meaning by death eternal death." These are his words.

He also supposes, that this sentence of the law, thus subjecting men for *every*, even the *least sin*, and *every minutest branch* and *latent principle of sin*, to so dreadful a punishment, is *just and righteous, agreeable to truth* and the *nature of things*, or to the *natural demerits of sin*. This he is very full in. Thus in p. 186, *P.*, "It was sin (says he) which subjected us to death by the law, JUSTLY threatening sin with death. Which law was given us, that sin might appear; might be set forth IN ITS PROPER COLORS; when we saw it subjected us to death by a law *perfectly holy, just* and *good*; that sin by the commandment, by the law, might be represented *what it really is*, an exceeding great and deadly evil." So in note on Rom. v. 20, p. 299, "The law or ministration of death, as it subjects to death for every transgression, is still of use to show the *natural and proper demerit of sin*." *Ibid.* p. 292, "The language of the law, dying thou shalt die, is to be understood of the *demerit* of the transgression, that which it *deserves*." *Ibid.* p. 298, "The law was added," saith Mr. Locke, on the place, "because the *Israelites*, the posterity of Abraham, were transgressors as well as other men, to show them their sins, and the punishment and death, which in *strict justice* they incurred by them. And this appears to be a true comment on Rom. vii. 13.—Sin, by virtue of the law, subjected you to death for this end, that sin, working death in us, by that which is *holy, just, and good, perfectly consonant to everlasting truth and righteousness*.—Consequently every sin is *in strict justice deserving* of wrath and punishment; and the law in its rigor was given to the Jews, to set home this awful truth upon their consciences, to show them the evil and pernicious *nature* of sin; and that, being conscious they had broke the law of God, this might convince them of the great need they had of the *favor* of the lawgiver, and oblige them, by faith in his *goodness*, to fly to his *mercy*, for pardon and salvation."

If the law be holy, just, and good, a constitution perfectly agreeable to God's holiness, justice, and goodness; then he might have put it exactly in ex-

* I am sensible, these things are quite inconsistent with what he says elsewhere, of "sufficient power in all mankind constantly to do the whole duty which God requires of them," without a necessity of breaking God's law in any degree. (p. 63—68, G.) But, I hope, the reader will not think me accountable for his inconsistences.

ecution, agreeably to all these his perfections. Our author himself says, p. 133, *S.*, "How that constitution, which establishes a law, the making of which is inconsistent with the justice and goodness of God, and the executing of it inconsistent with his holiness, can be a righteous constitution, I confess, is quite beyond my comprehension."

Now the reader is left to judge, whether it be not most plainly and fully agreeable to Dr. Taylor's own doctrine, that there never was any one person from the beginning of the world, who came to act in the world as a moral agent, and that it is not to be hoped there ever will be any, but what is a sinner or transgressor of the law of God; and that therefore this proves to be the issue and event of things, with respect to all mankind in all ages, that, by the natural and proper demerit of their own sinfulness, and in the judgment of the law of God, which is perfectly consonant to truth, and exhibits things in their true colors, they are the proper subjects of the curse of God, eternal death, and everlasting ruin; which must be the actual consequence, unless the grace or favor of the lawgiver interpose, and mercy prevail for their pardon and salvation. The reader has seen also how agreeable this is to the doctrine of the holy Scripture.

And if so, and what has been observed concerning the interposition of divine grace be remembered, namely, that this alters not the nature of things as they are in themselves, and that it does not in the least affect the state of the controversy we are upon, concerning the true nature and tendency of the state that mankind come into the world in, whether grace prevents the fatal effect or no; I say, if these things are considered, I trust, none will deny, that the proposition that was laid down, is fully proved, as agreeable to the word of God, and Dr. Taylor's own words; viz., that mankind are all naturally in such a state, as is attended, without fail, with this consequence or issue, that they universally are the subjects of that guilt and sinfulness, which is, in effect, their utter and eternal ruin, being cast wholly out of the favor of God, and subjected to his everlasting wrath and curse.

SECTION II.

It follows from the Proposition proved in the foregoing Section, that all Mankind are under the influence of a prevailing effectual Tendency in their Nature, to that Sin and Wickedness, which implies their utter and eternal ruin.

THE proposition laid down being proved, the consequence of it remains to be made out, viz., that the mind of man has a natural tendency or propensity to that event, which has been shown universally and infallibly to take place (if this be not sufficiently evident of itself, without proof), and that this is a corrupt or depraved propensity.

I shall here consider the former part of this consequence, namely, whether such a universal, constant, infallible event is truly a proof of the being of any tendency or propensity to that event; leaving the evil and corrupt nature of such a propensity to be considered afterwards.

If any should say, they do not think that its being a thing universal and infallible in event, that mankind commit some sin, is a proof of a prevailing tendency to sin; because they do not only sin, but also do good, and perhaps more good than evil; let them remember, that the question at present is not, how much sin there is a tendency to; but whether there be a prevailing pro-

pensity to that issue, which it is allowed all men do actually come to, that all fail of keeping the law perfectly; whether there be not a tendency to such imperfection of obedience, as always without fail comes to pass; to that degree of sinfulness, at least, which all fall into; and so to that utter ruin, which that sinfulness implies and infers. Whether an effectual propensity to this be worth the name of depravity, because of the good that may be supposed to balance it, shall be considered by and by. If it were so, that all mankind, in all nations and ages, were at least one day in their lives deprived of the use of their reason, and run raving mad; or that all, even every individual person, once cut their own throats, or put out their own eyes; it might be an evidence of some tendency in the nature or natural state of mankind to such an event; though they might exercise reason many more days than they were distracted, and were kind to, and tender of themselves oftener than they mortally and cruelly wounded themselves.

To determine whether the unfailing constancy of the above named event be an evident of tendency, let it be considered, what can be meant by *tendency*, but a prevailing liableness or exposedness to such or such an event. Wherein consists the notion of any such thing, but some stated prevalence or preponderation in the nature or state of causes or occasions, that is followed *by*, and so proves to be effectual *to*, a stated prevalence or commonness of any particular kind of effect? Or, something in the permanent state of things, concerned in bringing a certain sort of event to pass, which is a foundation for the constancy, or strongly prevailing probability of such an event? If we mean this by tendency (as I know not what else can be meant by it, but this, or something like this), then it is manifest, that where we see a stated prevalence of any kind of effect or event, there is a tendency to that effect in the nature and state of its causes. A common and steady effect shows, that there is somewhere a preponderation, a prevailing exposedness or liableness in the state of things, to what comes so steadily to pass. The natural dictate of reason shows, that where there is an effect, there is a cause, and a cause sufficient for the effect; because, if it were not sufficient, it would not be effectual; and that therefore, where there is a stated prevalence of the effect, there is a stated prevalence in the cause: a steady effect argues a steady cause. We obtain a notion of such a thing as tendency no other way than by observation; and we can observe nothing but events; and it is the commonness or constancy of events that gives us a notion of tendency in all cases. Thus we judge of tendencies in the natural world. Thus we judge of the tendencies or propensities of nature in minerals, vegetables, animals, rational and irrational creatures. A notion of a stated tendency, or fixed propensity, is not obtained by observing only a single event. A stated preponderation in the cause or occasion, is argued only by a stated prevalence of the effect. If a die be once thrown, and it falls on a particular side, we do not argue from hence, that that side is the heaviest: but if it be thrown without skill or care, many thousands or millions of times going, and constantly falls on the same side, we have not the least doubt in our minds, but that there is something of propensity in the case, by superior weight of that side, or in some other respect. How ridiculous would he make himself, who should earnestly dispute against any tendency in the state of things to cold in the winter, or heat in the summer; or should stand to it, that although it often happened that water quenched fire, yet there was no tendency in it to such an effect.

In the case we are upon, the human nature, as existing in such an immense diversity of persons and circumstances, and never failing in any one instance, of coming to that issue, viz., that sinfulness, which implies extreme misery and

eternal ruin, is as the die often cast. For it alters not the case in the least, as to the evidence of tendency, whether the subject of the constant event be an individual, or a nature and kind. Thus, if there be a succession of trees of the same sort, proceeding one from another, from the beginning of the world, growing in all countries, soils, and climates, and otherwise in (as it were) an infinite variety of circumstances, all bearing ill fruit; it as much proves the nature and tendency of the *kind*, as if it were only one individual tree, that had remained from the beginning of the world, had often been transplanted into different soils, &c., and had continued to bear only bad fruit. So, if there were a particular family, which, from generation to generation, and through every remove to innumerable different countries, and places of abode, all died of a consumption, or all run distracted, or all murdered themselves, it would be as much an evidence of the tendency of something in the nature or constitution of that race, as it would be of the tendency of something in the nature or state of an individual, if some one person had lived all that time, and some remarkable event had often appeared in him, which he had been the agent or subject of from year to year, and from age to age, continually and without fail.

Here may be observed the weakness of that objection, made against the validity of the argument for a fixed propensity to sin, from the constancy and universality of the event, that Adam sinned in one instance, without a fixed propensity. Without doubt a single event is an evidence, that there was some cause or occasion of that event; but the thing we are speaking of, is a *fixed cause*. Propensity is a *stated*, continued thing. We justly argue, that a *stated effect* must have a *stated cause;* and truly observe, that we obtain the notion of tendency, or *stated preponderation* in causes, no other way than by observing a stated prevalence of a particular kind of effect. But who ever argues a fixed propensity from a single event? And is it not strange arguing, *that* because an event which once comes to pass, does not prove any stated tendency, therefore the unfailing constancy of an event is an evidence of no such thing? But because Dr. Taylor makes so much of this objection, from Adam's sinning without a propensity, I shall hereafter consider it more particularly, in the beginning of the 9th *Section* of this Chapter; where will also be considered what is objected from the fall of the angels.

Thus a propensity, attending the present nature or natural state of mankind, eternally to ruin themselves by sin, may certainly be inferred from apparent and acknowledged facts. And I would now observe further, that not only does this follow from facts that are acknowledged by Dr. Taylor, but the things he asserts, the expressions and words which he uses, do plainly imply that all mankind have such a propensity; yea, one of the highest kind, a propensity that is *invincible*, or a tendency which really amounts to a fixed, constant, unfailing *necessity*. There is a plain confession of a propensity or proneness to sin, p. 143: "Man, who drinketh in iniquity like water, who is attended with so many sensual appetites, and so *apt* to indulge them." And again, p. 228, "*we are very apt*, in a world full of temptation, to be deceived, and drawn into sin by bodily appetites." If we are *very apt* or prone to be drawn into sin by bodily appetites, and *sinfully to indulge them*, and very apt or prone *to yield to temptation to sin*, then we are *prone to sin;* for to yield to temptation to sin is *sinful*. In the same page he represents, that on this account, and on account of the consequences of this, *the case of those who are under a law, threatening death for every sin, must be quite deplorable, if they have no relief from the mercy of the lawgiver*. Which implies, that their case is hopeless, as to an escape from death, the punishment of sin, by any other means than God's mercy. And that

implies, that there is such an aptness to yield to temptation to sin, that it is hopeless that any of mankind should wholly avoid it. But he speaks of it elsewhere, over and over, as truly *impossible*, or what *cannot be;* as in the words which were cited in the last *Section*, from his note on Rom. v. 20, where he repeatedly speaks of the law, which subjects us to death for every transgression, as what *cannot give life;* and represents that "if God offered us no other way of salvation, no man from the beginning of the world *could* be saved." In the same place he, with approbation, cites Mr. Locke's words, in which, speaking of the Israelites, he says, "all endeavors after righteousness were *lost labor*, since any one slip forfeited life, and it was impossible for them to expect aught but death." Our author speaks of it as impossible for the law requiring sinless obedience, to give life, *not that the law was weak in itself, but through the weakness of our flesh.* Therefore he says, *he conceives the Law not to be a dispensation suitable to the infirmity of the human nature in its present state.* These things amount to a full confession, that the proneness in men to sin, and to a demerit of, and just exposedness to eternal ruin by sin, is universally invincible, or, which is the same thing, amounts to absolute, invincible necessity; which surely is the highest kind of tendency or propensity; and that not the less for his laying this propensity to our infirmity or weakness, which may seem to intimate some defect, rather than any thing positive: and it is agreeable to the sentiments of the best divines, that all sin originally comes from a defective or privative cause. But sin does not cease to be sin, or a thing not justly exposing to eternal ruin (as implied in Dr. Taylor's own words) for arising from infirmity or defect; nor does any invincible propensity to sin, cease to be a propensity to such demerit of eternal ruin, because the proneness arises from such a cause.

It is manifest, that this tendency which has been proved, does not consist in any particular external circumstances, that some or many are in, peculiarly tempting or influencing their minds; but is *inherent*, and is seated in that *nature* which is common to all mankind, which they carry with them wherever they go, and still remains the same, however circumstances may differ. For it is implied in what has been proved, and shown to be confessed, that the same event comes to pass in all circumstances, that any of mankind ever are, or can be under in the world. *In God's sight no man living can be justified;* but all are sinners, and exposed to condemnation. This is true of persons of all constitutions, capacities, conditions, manners, opinions and educations; in all countries, climates, nations and ages; and through all the mighty changes and revolutions, which have come to pass in the habitable world.

We have the same evidence, that the propensity in this case lies in the nature of the subject, and does not arise from any particular circumstances, as we have in any case whatsoever; which is only by the effects appearing to be the same in all changes of time and place, and under all varieties of circumstances. It is in this way only we judge, that any propensities, which we observe in mankind, are such as are seated in their nature, in all other cases. It is thus we judge of the mutual propensity betwixt the sexes, or of the dispositions which are exercised in any of the natural passions or appetites, that they truly belong to the nature of man; because they are observed in mankind in general, through all countries, nations, and ages, and in all conditions.

If any should say, though it be evident that there is a tendency in the state of things to this general event, that all mankind should fail of perfect obedience, and should sin, and incur a demerit of eternal ruin; and also that this tendency does not lie in any distinguishing circumstances of any particular people, person, or age; yet it may not lie in man's nature, but in the general con-

stitution and frame of this world, into which men are born; though the nature of man may be good, without any evil propensity inherent in it; yet the nature and universal state of this earthly world may be such as to be full of so many and strong temptations everywhere, and of such a powerful influence on such a creature as man, dwelling in so infirm a body, &c., that the result of the whole may be a strong and infallible tendency *in such a state of things*, to the sin and eternal ruin of every one of mankind.

To this I would reply, that such an evasion will not at all avail to the purpose of those whom I oppose in this controversy. It alters not the case as to this question, whether man is not a creature that in his present state is depraved and ruined by propensities to sin. If any creature be of such a nature that it proves evil in its proper place, or in the situation which God has assigned it in the universe, it is of an evil nature. That part of the system is not good, which is not good in its place in the system; and those inherent qualities of that part of the system, which are not good, but corrupt, in that place, are justly looked upon as evil inherent qualities. That propensity is truly esteemed to belong to the *nature* of any being, or to be inherent in it, that is the necessary consequence of its nature, considered together with its proper situation in the universal system of existence, whether that propensity be good or bad. It is the *nature* of a stone to be heavy; but yet, if it were placed, as it might be, at a distance from this world, it would have no such quality. But seeing a stone is of such a nature, that it will have this quality or tendency, in its proper place, here in this world, where God has made it, it is properly looked upon as a propensity belonging to its nature: and if it be a good propensity here in its proper place, then it is a good quality of its nature; but if it be contrariwise, it is an evil natural quality. So, if mankind are of such a nature, that they have a universal, effectual tendency to sin and ruin in this world, where God has made and placed them, this is to be looked upon as a pernicious tendency belonging to their nature. There is, perhaps, scarce any such thing in beings not independent and self-existent, as any power or tendency, but what has some dependence on other beings, which they stand in some connection with, in the universal system of existence: propensities are no propensities, any otherwise, than as taken with their objects. Thus it is with the tendencies observed in natural bodies, such as gravity, magnetism, electricity, &c. And thus it is with the propensities observed in the various kinds of animals; and thus it is with most of the propensities in created spirits.

It may further be observed, that it is exactly the same thing, as to the controversy concerning an agreeableness with God's moral perfections of such a disposal of things, that man should come into the world in a depraved, ruined state, by a propensity to sin and ruin; whether God has so ordered it, that this propensity should lie in his nature considered alone, or with relation to its situation in the universe, and its connection with other parts of the system to which the Creator has united it; which is as much of God's ordering, as man's nature itself, most simply considered.

Dr. Taylor (p. 188, 189), speaking of the attempt of some to solve the difficulty of God's being the author of our nature, and yet that our nature is polluted, by supposing that God makes the soul pure, but unites it to a polluted body (or a body so made, as tends to pollute the soul), he cries out of it as weak and insufficient, and *too gross to be admitted*. "For (says he), who infused the soul into the body? And if it is polluted by being infused into the body, who is the author and cause of its pollution? And who created the body," &c. But is not the case just the same, as to those who suppose that

God made the soul pure, and places it in a polluted world, or a world tending by its natural state in which it is made, to pollute the soul, or to have such an influence upon it, that it shall without fail be polluted with sin, and eternally ruined? Here, may not I also cry out, on as good grounds as Dr. Taylor, Who placed the soul here in this world? And if the world be polluted, or so constituted as naturally and infallibly to pollute the soul with sin, who is the cause of this pollution? And who created the world?

Though in the place now cited, Dr. Taylor so insists upon it, that God must be answerable for the pollution of the soul, if he has infused or put the soul into a body that tends to pollute it; yet this is the very thing which he himself supposes to be the fact, with respect to the soul's being created by God, in such a body as it is, and in such a world as it is; in a place which I have already had occasion to observe, where he says, "We are *apt*, in a world full of temptation, to be drawn into sin by bodily appetites." And if so, according to his way of reason, God must be the author and cause of this aptness to be drawn into sin. Again, page 143, we have these words, "Who drinketh in iniquity like water? Who is attended with so many sensual appetites, and so apt to indulge them?" In these words our author in effect says the individual thing that he cries out of as so *gross*, viz., the tendency of the body, as God has made it, to pollute the soul which he has infused into it. These sensual appetites, which incline the soul, or make it *apt* to a sinful *indulgence*, are either from the body which God hath made, or otherwise a proneness to sinful indulgence is immediately and originally seated in the soul itself, which will not mend the matter for Dr. Taylor.

I would here lastly observe, that our author insists upon it, page 42, *S.*, that this lower world where we dwell, in its present state, "is as it was, when, upon a review, God pronounced it, and all its furniture, very good. And that the present form and furniture of the earth is full of God's riches, mercy and goodness, and of the most evident tokens of his love and bounty to the inhabitants." If so, there can be no room for such an evasion of the evidences from fact, of the universal, infallible tendency of man's nature to sin and eternal perdition, as that the tendency there is to this issue, does not lie in man's nature, but in the general constitution and frame of this earthly world, which God hath made to be the habitation of mankind.

SECTION III.

That Propensity, which has been proved to be in the nature of all mankind, must be a very evil, depraved and pernicious Propensity; making it manifest, that the soul of man, as it is by nature, is in a corrupt, fallen and ruined state; which is the other part of the consequence, drawn from the proposition laid down in the first Section.

THE question to be considered, in order to determine whether man's nature is not *depraved and ruined*, is not, whether he is not inclined to perform as many *good deeds* as *bad ones;* but which of these two he preponderates to, in the frame of his heart, and state of his nature, *a state of innocence and righteousness, and favor with God;* or *a state of sin, guiltiness, and abhorrence in the sight of God.* Persevering sinless righteousness, or else the guilt of sin, is the alternative, on the decision of which depends (as is confessed), according to the nature and truth of things, as they are in themselves, and according to the rule of right, and of perfect justice, man's being approved and accepted of his Maker, and

eternally blessed as good; or his being rejected, thrown away, and cursed as bad. And therefore the determination of the tendency of man's heart and nature, with respect to these terms, is that which is to be looked at, in order to determine whether his nature is good or evil, pure or corrupt, sound or ruined. If such be man's nature, and state of his heart, that he has an infallibly effectual propensity to the latter of those terms; then it is wholly impertinent to talk of *the innocent and kind actions, even of criminals themselves, surpassing their crimes in numbers, and of the prevailing innocence, good nature, industry, felicity, and cheerfulness of the greater part of mankind.* Let never so many thousands or millions of acts of honesty, good nature, &c., be supposed; yet, by the supposition, there is an unfailing propensity to such moral evil, as in its dreadful consequences infinitely outweighs all effects or consequences of any supposed good. Surely that tendency, which, in effect, is an infallible tendency to eternal destruction, is an infinitely dreadful and pernicious tendency; and that nature and frame of mind, which implies such a tendency, must be an infinitely dreadful and pernicious frame of mind. It would be much more absurd to suppose that such a state of nature is good, or not bad, under a notion of men's doing more honest and kind things than evil ones; than to say, the state of that ship is good to cross the Atlantic Ocean in, that is such as cannot hold together through the voyage, but will infallibly founder and sink by the way; under a notion that it may probably go great part of the way before it sinks, or that it will proceed and sail above water more hours than it will be in sinking: or to pronounce that road a good road to go to such a place, the greater part of which is plain and safe, though some parts of it are dangerous, and certainly fatal to them that travel in it; or to call that a good propensity, which is an inflexible inclination to travel in such a way.

A propensity to that sin which brings God's eternal wrath and curse (which has been proved to belong to the nature of man) is evil, not only as it is *calamitous* and *sorrowful*, ending in great *natural evil*, but as it is *odious* and *detestable*: for by the supposition, it tends to that *moral evil*, by which the subject becomes odious in the sight of God, and liable, as such, to be condemned, and utterly rejected, and cursed by him. This also makes it evident, that the state which it has been proved mankind are in, is a corrupt state in a *moral sense*, that it is inconsistent with the fulfilment of the law of God, which is the rule of moral rectitude and goodness. That tendency which is opposite to that which the moral law requires and insists upon, and prone to that which the moral law utterly forbids, and eternally condemns the subject for, is doubtless a corrupt tendency, in a moral sense.

So that this depravity is both *odious*, and also *pernicious*, fatal and destructive, in the highest sense, as inevitably tending to that which implies man's eternal ruin; it shows that man, as he is by nature, is in a deplorable and undone state, in the highest sense. And this proves that men do not come into the world perfectly innocent in the sight of God, and without any just exposedness to his displeasure. For the being by nature in a lost and ruined state, in the highest sense, is not consistent with being by nature in a state of favor with God.

But if any should still insist on a notion of men's good deeds exceeding their bad ones, and that, seeing the good that is in men is more than countervails the evil, they cannot be properly denominated evil; all persons and things being most properly denominated from that which prevails, and has the ascendant in them, I would say further, that,

I presume it will be allowed, that if there is in man's nature a tendency to

guilt and ill desert, in a vast overbalance to virtue and merit; or a propensity to that sin, the evil and demerit of which is so great, that the value and merit that is in him, or in all the virtuous acts that ever he performs, are as nothing to it; then truly the nature of man may be said to be corrupt and evil.

That this is the true case, may be demonstrated by what is evident of the infinite heinousness of sin against God, from the nature of things. The heinousness of this must rise in some proportion to the obligation we are under to regard the Divine Being; and that must be in some proportion to his worthiness of regard; which doubtless is infinitely beyond the worthiness of any of our fellow creatures. But the merit of our respect or obedience to God is not infinite. The merit of respect to any being does not increase, but is rather diminished, in proportion to the obligations we are under in strict justice to pay him that respect. There is no great merit in paying a debt we owe, and by the highest possible obligations in strict justice are obliged to pay, but there is great demerit in refusing to pay it. That on such accounts as these there is an infinite demerit in all sin against God, which must therefore immensely outweigh all the merit which can be supposed to be in our virtue, I think, is capable of full demonstration; and that the futility of the objections which some have made against the argument, might most plainly be demonstrated. But I shall omit a particular consideration of the evidence of this matter from the nature of things, as I study brevity, and lest any should cry out, *Metaphysics!* as the manner of some is, when any argument is handled against any tenet they are fond of, with a close and exact consideration of the nature of things. And this is not so necessary in the present case, inasmuch as the point asserted, namely, that he who commits any one sin, has guilt and ill desert, which is so great, that the value and merit of all the good which it is possible he should do in his whole life, is as nothing to it; I say this point is not only evident by *metaphysics*, but is plainly demonstrated by what has been shown to be *fact*, with respect to God's own constitutions and dispensations towards mankind; as particularly by this, that whatever acts of virtue and obedience a man performs, yet if he trespasses in one point, is guilty of any the least sin, he, according to the law of God, and so according to the exact truth of things, and the proper demerit of sin, is exposed to be wholly cast out of favor with God, and subjected to his curse, to be utterly and eternally destroyed. This has been proved, and shown to be the doctrine which Dr. Taylor abundantly teaches. But how can it be agreeable to the nature of things, and exactly consonant to everlasting truth and righteousness, thus to deal with a creature for the least sinful act, though he should perform ever so many thousands of honest and virtuous acts, to countervail the evil of that sin? Or how can it be agreeable to the exact truth and real demerit of things, thus wholly to cast off the deficient creature, without any regard to the merit of all his good deeds, unless that be in truth the case, that the value and merit of all those good actions, bear no proportion to the heinousness of the least sin? If it were not so, one would think, that however the offending person might have some proper punishment, yet, seeing there is so much virtue to lay in the balance against the guilt, it would be agreeable to the nature of things, that he should find some favor, and not be altogether rejected, and made the subject of perfect and eternal destruction; and thus no account at all be made of all his virtue, so much as to procure him the least relief or hope. How can such a constitution *represent sin in its proper colors*, and *according to its true nature and desert* (as Dr. Taylor says it does), unless this be its true nature, that it is so bad, that even in the least instance it perfectly swallows up all the value of the sinner's supposed good deeds, let them be ever so many. So that this

matter is not left to our metaphysics or philosophy; the great Lawgiver, and infallible Judge of the universe, has clearly decided it, in the revelation he has made of what is agreeable to exact truth, justice, and the nature of things, in his revealed law, or rule of righteousness.

He that in any respect or degree is a transgressor of God's law, is a wicked man, yea, wholly wicked in the eye of the law; all his goodness being esteemed nothing, having no account made of it, when taken together with his wickedness. And therefore, without any regard to his righteousness, he is, by the sentence of the law, and so by the voice of truth and justice, to be treated as worthy to be rejected, abhorred, and cursed forever; and must be so, unless grace interposes, to cover his transgression. But men are really, in themselves, what they are in the eye of the law, and by the voice of strict equity and justice; however they may be looked upon, and treated by infinite and unmerited mercy.

So that, on the whole, it appears, all mankind have an infallibly effectual propensity to that moral evil, which infinitely outweighs the value of all the good that can be in them; and have such a disposition of heart, that the certain consequence of it is, their being in the eye of perfect truth and righteousness, wicked men. And I leave all to judge, whether such a disposition be not in the eye of truth a depraved disposition.

Agreeably to these things, the Scripture represents all mankind, not only as having guilt, but immense guilt, which they can have no merit or worthiness to countervail. Such is the representation we have in Matth. xviii. 21, to the end. There, on Peter's inquiring, *How often his brother should trespass against him, and he forgive him, whether until seven times;* Christ replies, *I say not unto thee, until seven times, but until seventy times seven;* apparently meaning, that he should esteem no number of offences too many, and no degree of injury it is possible our neighbor should be guilty of towards us, too great to be forgiven. For which this reason is given in the parable there following, that, if ever we obtain forgiveness and favor with God, he must pardon that guilt and injury towards his majesty, which is immensely greater than the greatest injuries that ever men are guilty of one towards another, yea, than the sum of all their injuries put together, let them be ever so many, and ever so great; so that the latter would be but as a hundred pence to ten thousand talents, which immense debt we owe to God, and have nothing to pay; which implies, that we have no merit to countervail any part of our guilt. And this must be, because if all that may be called virtue in us, be compared with our ill desert, it is in the sight of God as nothing to it. The parable is not to represent Peter's case in particular, but that of all who then were, or ever should be, Christ's disciples. It appears by the conclusion of the discourse, *So likewise shall my heavenly Father do, if ye, from your hearts, forgive not every one his brother their trespasses.*

Therefore how absurd must it be for Christians to object against the depravity of man's nature, a greater number of innocent and kind actions, than of crimes; and to talk of a prevailing innocency, good nature, industry and cheerfulness of the greater part of mankind? Infinitely more absurd, than it would be to insist that the domestic of a prince was not a bad servant, because though sometimes he contemned and affronted his master to a great degree, yet he did not spit in his master's face so often as he performed acts of service; or, than it would be to affirm, that his spouse was a good wife to him, because, although she committed *adultery*, and that with the *slaves* and *scoundrels* sometimes, yet she did not do this so often as she did the duties of a wife These notions would be

use the crimes are too heinous to be atoned for by many honest
servant or spouse of the prince; there being a vast disproportion
merit of the one, and the ill desert of the other; but in no measure
..., may infinitely less, than that between the demerit of our offences against
God, and the value of our acts of obedience.

Thus I have gone through with my first argument; having shown the evidence of the truth of the proposition I laid down, at first, and proved its consequence. But there are many other things, that manifest a very corrupt tendency or disposition in man's nature, in his present state, which I shall take notice of in the following *Sections*.

SECTION IV.

The depravity of Nature appears by a propensity in all to Sin immediately, as soon as they are capable of it, and to Sin continually and progressively; and also by the remains of Sin in the best of Men.

The great depravity of man's nature appears, not only in that they universally commit sin, who spend any long time in the world, but in that men are naturally so prone to sin, that none ever fail of *immediately* transgressing God's law, and so of bringing infinite guilt on themselves, and exposing themselves to eternal perdition, as soon as they are capable of it.

The Scriptures are so very express in it, that all mankind, *all flesh*, *all the world*, every man *living*, are guilty of sin; that it must at least be understood, every one that is come to be capable of being active in duty to God, or sin against him, is guilty of sin. There are multitudes in the world who have but very lately begun to exert their faculties, as moral agents; and so are but just entered on their state of trial, as acting for themselves. There are many thousands constantly in the world, who have not lived one month, or week, or day since they have arrived to any period that can be assigned from their birth to twenty years of age. And if there be not a strong propensity in man's nature to sin, that should, as it were, hurry them on to speedy transgression, and they have no guilt previous to their personal sinning, what should hinder, but that there might always be a great number of such as act for themselves on the stage of the world, and are answerable for themselves to God, who have hitherto kept themselves free from sin, and have perfectly obeyed God's law, and so are righteous in God's sight, with the righteousness of the law; and if they should be called out of the world without any longer trial (as great numbers die at all periods of life) would be justified by the deeds of the law? And how then can it be true, that *in God's sight no man living can be justified*, that *no man can be just with God*, and that *by the deeds of the law no flesh can be justified, because by the law is the knowledge of Sin?* And what should hinder but that there may always be many in the world, who are capable subjects of instruction and counsel, and of prayer to God, for whom the calls of God's word to repentance and to seek pardon through the blood of Christ, and to forgive others their injuries, because they need that God should forgive them, would not be proper; and for whom the Lord's prayer is not suitable, wherein Christ directs all his followers to pray, that God would forgive their sins, as they forgive those that trespass against them?

If there are any in the world, though but lately become capable of acting for themselves, as subjects of the law of God, who are perfectly free from sin.

such are most likely to be found among the children of Christian parents, who give them the most pious education, and set them the best examples; and therefore such would never be so likely to be found in any part or age of the world, as in the primitive Christian church, in the first age of Christianity (the age of the church's greatest purity) so long after Christianity had been established, that there had been time for great numbers of children to be born, and educated by those primitive Christians. It was in that age, and in such a part of that age, that the Apostle John wrote his first epistle to the Christians that then were. But if there was then a number of them come to understanding, who were perfectly free from sin, why does he write as he does? 1 John i. 8—10, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness. If we say that we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and the truth is not in us."

If any should object, that this is an overstraining of things; and that it supposes a greater niceness and exactness than is observed in Scripture representations and expressions, to infer from these expressions, that all men sin immediately as soon as ever they are capable of it. To this I would say, that I think the arguments used are truly solid, and do really and justly conclude, either that men are born guilty, and so are chargeable with sin before they come to act for themselves, or else commit sin immediately, without the least time intervening, after they are capable of understanding their obligation to God, and reflecting on themselves; and that the Scripture clearly determines, there is not one such person in the world, free from sin. But whether this be a straining things up to too great an exactness, or not; yet I suppose, none that do not entirely set aside the sense of such Scriptures as have been mentioned, and deny those propositions which Dr. Taylor himself allows to be contained in some of them, will deny they prove, that no *considerable time* passes after men are capable of acting for themselves, as the subjects of God's law, before they are guilty of sin; because if the time were considerable, it would be great enough to deserve to be taken notice of, as an exception to such universal propositions, as, *In thy sight shall no man living be justified*, &c. And if this be allowed, that men are so prone to sin, that in fact all mankind do sin, *as it were*, immediately, after they come to be capable of it, or fail not to sin so soon, that *no considerable time* passes before they run into transgression against God; it does not much alter the case, as to the present argument. If the time of freedom from sin be so small, as not to be worthy of notice in the forementioned universal propositions of Scripture, it is also so small, as not to be worthy of notice in the present argument.

Again, the reality and greatness of the depravity of man's nature appears in this, that he has a prevailing propensity to be continually sinning against God. What has been observed above, will clearly prove this. That same disposition of nature, which is an effectual propensity to immediate sin, amounts to a propensity to continual sin. For a being prone to continual sinning, is nothing but a proneness to immediate sin continued. Such appears to be the tendency of nature to sin, that as soon as ever man is capable, it causes him immediately to sin, without suffering any considerable time to pass without sin. And therefore, if the same propensity be continued undiminished, there will be an equal tendency to immediate sinning again, without any considerable time passing. And so the same will always be a disposition still immediately to sin, with as little time passing without sin afterwards, as at first. The only reason that can be given why sinning must be immediate at first, is that the disposition is so great, that it will not suffer any considerable time to pass without sin; and therefore, the

same disposition being continued in equal degree, without some new restraint, or contrary tendency, it will still equally tend to the same effect. And though it is true, the propensity may be diminished, or have restraints laid upon it, by gracious disposals of Providence, or merciful influences of God's spirit; yet this is not owing to nature. That strong propensity of nature, by which men are so prone to immediate sinning at first, has no tendency in itself to a diminution; but rather to an increase; as the continued exercise of an evil disposition, in repeated actual sins, tends to strengthen it more and more; agreeable to that observation of Dr. Taylor's, p. 228, "We are apt to be drawn into sin by bodily appetites, and when once we are under the government of these appetites, it is at least exceeding difficult, if not impracticable, to recover ourselves, by the mere force of reason." The increase of strength of disposition in such a case, is as in a falling body, the strength of its tendency to descend is continually increased, so long as its motion is continued. Not only a constant commission of sin, but a constant increase in the habits and practice of wickedness, is the true tendency of man's depraved nature, if unrestrained by divine grace; as the true tendency of the nature of a heavy body, if obstacles are removed, is not only to fall with a continued motion, but with a constantly increasing motion. And we see, that increasing iniquity is actually the consequence of natural depravity, in most men, notwithstanding all the restraints they have. Dispositions to evil are commonly much stronger in adult persons, than in children, when they first begin to act in the world as rational creatures.

If sin be such a thing as Dr. Taylor represents it, p. 69, "A thing of an odious and destructive nature, the corruption and ruin of our nature, and infinitely hateful to God;" then such a propensity to continual and increasing sin, must be a very evil disposition. And if we may judge of the perniciousness of an inclination of nature, by the evil of the effect it naturally tends to, the propensity of man's nature must be evil indeed; for the soul being immortal, Dr. Taylor acknowledges, p. 94, *S.*, it will follow from what has been observed above, that man has a natural disposition to one of these two things; either to an increase of wickedness without end, or till wickedness comes to be so great, that the capacity of his nature will not allow it to be greater. This being what his wickedness will come to by its natural tendency, if divine grace does not prevent, it may as truly be said to be the effect which man's natural corruption tends to, as that an acorn in a proper soil, truly tends by its nature to become a great tree.

Again, that sin which is remaining in the hearts of the best men on earth, makes it evident, that man's nature is corrupt, as he comes into the world. A remaining depravity of heart in the greatest saints, may be argued from the sins of most of those who are set forth in Scripture as the most eminent instances and examples of virtue and piety; and is also manifest from this, that the Scripture represents all God's children as standing in need of chastisement. Heb. xii. 6—8, "For whom the Lord loveth, he chasteneth; and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth. What son is he, whom the father chasteneth not? If ye are without chastisement, then are ye bastards, and not sons." But this is directly and fully asserted in some places; as in that forementioned, Eccles. vii. 20, "There is not a just man upon earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not." Which is as much as to say, there is no man on earth, that is so just, as to have attained to such a degree of righteousness, as not to commit any sin. Yea, the Apostle James speaks of all Christians as often sinning, or committing many sins; even in that primitive age of the Christian church, an age distinguished from all others by eminent attainments in holiness; James iii. 2,

'In many things we all offend." And that there is pollution in the hearts of all, as the remainder of moral filth that was there antecedent to all attempts or means for purification, is very plainly declared, in Prov. xx. 9, "Who can say, I have made my heart clean, I am pure from my sin?"

According to Dr. Taylor, men come into the world wholly free from sinful propensities. And if so, it appears from what has been already said, there would be nothing to hinder, but that many, without being better than they are by nature, might perfectly avoid the commission of sin. But much more might this be the case with men after they had, by care, diligence, and good practice, attained those positive habits of virtue, whereby they are at a much greater distance from sin, than they were naturally; which this writer supposes to be the case with many good men. But since the Scripture teaches us, that the best men in the world do often commit sin, and have remaining pollution of heart, this makes it abundantly evident, that men, when they are no otherwise than they were by nature, without any of those virtuous attainments, have a sinful depravity; yea, must have great corruption of nature.

SECTION V.

The depravity of Nature appears, in that the general Consequence of the State and Tendency of Man's Nature is a much greater Degree of Sin, than Righteousness; not only with respect to Value and Demerit, but Matter and Quantity.

I HAVE before shown, that there is a propensity in man's nature to that sin, which in heinousness and ill desert immensely outweighs all the value and merit of any supposed good, that may be in him, or that he can do. I now proceed to say further, that such is man's nature, in his present state, that it tends to this lamentable effect; that there should at all times, through the course of his life, be at least much more sin than righteousness, not only as to *weight* and *value*, but as to *matter* and *measure;* more disagreement of heart and practice from the law of God, and from the law of nature and reason, than agreement and conformity.

The law of God is the rule of right, as Dr. Taylor often calls it: it is the measure of virtue and sin: so much agreement as there is with this rule, so much is there of rectitude, righteousness, or true virtue, and no more; and so much disagreement as there is with this rule, so much sin is there.

Having premised this, the following things may be here observed.

I. The degree of disagreement from this rule of light is to be determined not only by the degree of distance from it in *excess*, but also in *defect;* or in other words, not only in positive transgression, or doing what is *forbidden*, but also in withholding what is *required*. The Divine Lawgiver does as much prohibit the one as the other, and does as much charge the latter as a sinful breach of his law, exposing to his eternal wrath and curse, as the former. Thus at the day of judgment, as described Matth. xxv., the wicked are condemned as *cursed* to *everlasting fire*, for their sin in defect and omission: *I was an hungered, and ye gave me no meat*, &c. And the case is thus, not only when the defect is in word or behavior, but in the inward temper and exercise of the mind. 1 Cor. xvi. 22, "If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be Anathema Maranatha." Dr. Taylor, speaking of the sentence and punishment of the wicked (Matth. xxv. 41, 46), says, p. 159, "It was manifestly for *want* of benevolence, love and compassion to their fellow creatures, that they were

condemned." And elsewhere, as was observed before, he says, that the law of God extends to the *latent principles* of sin to *forbid* them, and to condemn to eternal destruction for them. And if so, it doubtless also extends to the inward principles of holiness, to *require* them, and in like manner to condemn for the want of them.

II. The sum of our duty to God, required in his law, is *love to God;* taking love in a large sense, for the true regard of our hearts to God, implying esteem, honor, benevolence, gratitude, complacence, &c. This is not only very plain by the Scripture, but it is evident in itself The sum of what the law of God requires, is doubtless obedience to that law: no law can require more than that it be obeyed. But it is manifest, that obedience to God is nothing, any otherwise than as a testimony of the respect of our hearts to God: without the heart, man's external acts are no more than the motions of the limbs of a wooden image, have no more of the nature of either sin or righteousness. It must therefore needs be so, that love to God, or the respect of the heart, must be the sum of the duty required towards God in his law.

III. It therefore appears from the premises, that whosoever withholds more of that love or respect of heart from God, which his law requires, than he affords, has more sin than righteousness. Not only he that has less divine love, than passions and affections which are opposite; but also he that does not love God half so much as he ought, or has reason to do, has justly more wrong than right imputed to him; according to the law of God, and the law of reason, he has more irregularity than rectitude, with regard to the law of love. The sinful disrespect or unrespectfulness of his heart to God, is greater than his respect to him.

But what considerate person is there, even among the more virtuous part of mankind, but what would be ashamed to say, and profess before God or men, that he loves God half so much as he ought to do; or that he exercises one half of that esteem, honor and gratitude towards God, which would be altogether becoming him; considering what God is, and what great manifestations he has made of his transcendent excellency and goodness, and what benefits he receives from him? And if few or none of the best of men can with reason and truth make even such a profession, how far from it must the generality of mankind be?

The chief and most fundamental of all the commands of the moral law, requires us "*to love the Lord our God with all our hearts, and with all our souls, with all our strength, and all our mind;*" that is plainly, with all that is within us, or to the utmost capacity of our nature; all that belongs *to*, or is comprehended *within* the utmost extent or capacity of our heart and soul, and mind and strength, is required. God is in himself worthy of infinitely greater love, than any creature can exercise towards him: he is worthy of love equal to his perfections, which are infinite: God loves himself with no greater love than he is worthy of, when he loves himself infinitely; but we can give God no more than we have. Therefore, if we give him so much, if we love him to the utmost extent of the faculties of our nature, we are excused; but when what is proposed, is only that we should love him as much as our capacity will allow, this excuse of want of capacity ceases, and obligation takes hold of us; and we are doubtless obliged to love God to the utmost of what is possible for us, with such faculties, and such opportunities and advantages to know God, as we have. And it is evidently implied in this great commandment of the law, that our love to God should be so great, as to have the most absolute possession of all the soul, and the perfect government of all the principles and springs of action that are in our nature.

Though it is not easy, precisely to fix the limits of man's capacity, as to

love to God; yet in general we may determine, that his capacity of love is co-extended with his capacity of knowledge; the exercise of the understanding opens the way for the exercise of the other faculty. Now, though we cannot have any proper positive understanding of God's infinite excellency; yet the capacity of the human understanding is very great, and may be extended far. It is needless to dispute, how far man's knowledge may be said to be strictly comprehensive of things that are very great, as of the extent of the expanse of the heavens, or of the dimensions of the globe of the earth, and of such a great number, as of the many millions of its inhabitants. The word *comprehensive* seems to be ambiguous. But doubtless we are capable of some proper positive understanding of the greatness of these things, in comparison of other things that we know, as unspeakably exceeding them. We are capable of some clear understanding of the greatness or considerableness of a whole nation; or of the whole world of mankind, as vastly exceeding that of a particular person or family. We can positively understand that the whole globe of the earth is vastly greater than a particular hill or mountain. And can have some good positive apprehension of the starry heavens, as so greatly exceeding the globe of the earth, that the latter is as it were nothing to it. So the human faculties are capable of a real and clear understanding of the greatness, glory and goodness of God, and of our dependence upon him, from the manifestations which God has made of himself to mankind, as being beyond all expression above that of the most excellent human friend, or earthly object. And so we are capable of an esteem and love to God, which shall be proportionable, and as much exceeding that which we have to any creature.

These things may help us to form some judgment, how vastly the generality of mankind fall below their duty, with respect to love to God; yea, how far they are from coming half way to that height of love, which is agreeable to the rule of right. Surely if our esteem of God, desires after him, and delight in him, were such as become us, considering the things forementioned, they would exceed our regard to other things as the heavens are high above the earth, and would swallow up all other affections like a deluge. But how far, how exceeding far, are the generality of the world from any appearance of being influenced and governed by such a degree of divine love as this!

If we consider the love of God, with respect to that one kind of exercise of it, namely, *gratitude*, how far indeed do the generality of mankind come short of the rule of right and reason in this! If we consider how various, innumerable, and vast the benefits are we receive from God, and how infinitely great and wonderful that grace of his is, which is revealed and offered to them that live under the gospel, in that eternal salvation which is procured by God's giving his only begotten Son to die for sinners; and also how unworthy we are all, deserving (as Dr. Taylor confesses) eternal perdition under God's wrath and curse; how great is the gratitude that would become us, who are the subjects of so many and great benefits, and have such grace towards poor, sinful, lost mankind set before us in so affecting a manner, as in the extreme sufferings of the Son of God, being carried through those pains by a love stronger than death, a love that conquered those mighty agonies, a love whose length, and breadth, and depth, and height, passes knowledge? But oh! What poor returns! How little the gratitude! How low, how cold and inconstant the affection in the best, compared with the obligation! And what then shall be said of the gratitude of the generality? Or rather, who can express the ingratitude?

If it were so, that the greater part of them that are called Christians, were no enemies to Christ in heart and practice, were not governed by principles

opposite to him and his gospel, but had some real love and gratitude; yet if their love falls vastly short of the obligation or occasion given, they are guilty of shameful and odious ingratitude. As when a man has been the subject of some instance of transcendent generosity, whereby he has been relieved from the most extreme calamity, and brought into very opulent, honorable, and happy circumstances, by a benefactor of excellent character; and yet expresses no more gratitude on such an occasion than would be requisite for some kindness comparatively infinitely small, he may justly fall under the imputation of vile unthankfulness, and of much more ingratitude than gratitude; though he may have no ill will to his benefactor, or no positive affection of mind contrary to thankfulness and benevolence. What is odious in him is his defect, whereby he falls so vastly below his duty.

Dr. Turnbull abundantly insists, that the forces of the affections naturally in man are well proportioned; and often puts a question to this purpose: How man's nature could have been better constituted in this respect? How the affections of his heart could have been better proportioned? I will now mention one instance, out of many that might be mentioned:

Man, if his heart were not depraved, might have had a disposition to *gratitude to God for his goodness*, in proportion to his disposition to *anger towards men for their injuries*. When I say in proportion, I mean considering the greatness and number of favors and injuries, and the degree in which the one and the other are unmerited, and the benefit received by the former, and the damage sustained by the latter. Is there not an apparent and vast difference and inequality in the dispositions to these two kinds of affection, in the generality of both old and young, adult persons and little children? How ready is resentment for injuries received from men! And how easily is it raised in most, at least to an equality with the desert! And is it so with respect to gratitude for benefits received from God, in any degree of comparison? Dr. Turnbull pleads for the natural disposition to anger for injuries, as being good and useful; but surely gratitude to God, if we were inclined to it, would be at least as good and useful as the other.

How far the generality of mankind are from their duty with respect to love to God, will further appear, if we consider that we are obliged not only to love him with a love of gratitude for benefits received; but true love to God primarily consists in a supreme regard to him for what he is in himself. The tendency of true virtue is to treat every thing as it is, and according to its nature. And if we regard the Most High according to the infinite dignity and glory of his nature, we shall esteem and love him with all our heart and soul, and to the utmost of the capacity of our nature, on this account; and not primarily because he has promoted our interest. If God be infinitely excellent in himself, then he is infinitely lovely on that account, or in other words, infinitely worthy to be loved. And doubtless, if he be worthy to be loved for this, then he ought to be loved for this. And it is manifest there can be no true love to him, if he be not loved for what he is in himself. For if we love him not for his own sake, but for something else, then our love is not terminated on him, but on something else, as its ultimate object. That is no true value for infinite worth, which implies no value for that worthiness in itself considered, but only on the account of something foreign. Our esteem of God is fundamentally defective, if it be not primarily for the excellency of his nature, which is the foundation of all that is valuable in him in any respect. If we love not God because he is what he is, but only because he is profitable to us, in truth we love him not at all; if we seem to love him, our love is not to him, but to something else.

And now I must leave it to every one to judge for himself, from his own opportunities of observation and information concerning mankind, how little there is of this disinterested love to God, this pure divine affection, in the world. How very little indeed in comparison of other affections altogether diverse, which perpetually urge, actuate and govern mankind, and keep the world, through all nations and ages, in a continual agitation and commotion! This is an evidence of a horrid contempt of God, reigning in the world of mankind. It would justly be esteemed a great instance of disrespect and contempt of a prince, if one of his subjects, when he came into his house, should set him below his meanest slave. But in setting the Infinite JEHOVAH below earthly objects and enjoyments, men degrade him below those things, between which and him there is an infinitely greater distance, than between the highest earthly potentate, and the most abject of mortals. Such a conduct as the generality of men are guilty of towards God, continually and through all ages, in innumerable respects, would be accounted the most vile, contemptuous treatment of a fellow creature of distinguished dignity. Particularly men's treatment of the offers God makes of himself to them as their Friend, their Father, their God, and everlasting portion; their treatment of the exhibitions he has made of his unmeasurable love, and the boundless riches of his grace in Christ, attended with earnest repeated calls, counsels, expostulations and entreaties, as also of the most dreadful threatenings of his eternal displeasure and vengeance.

Before I finish this Section, it may be proper to say something in reply to an objection, some may be ready to make against the force of that argument, which has been used to prove that men in general have more sin than righteousness, namely, that they do not come half way to that degree of love to God, which becomes them, and is their duty.

The objection is this: that the argument seems to prove too much, in that it will prove, that even good men themselves have more sin than holiness, which also has been supposed. But if this were true, it would follow that sin is the prevalent principle even in good men, and that it is the principle which has the predominancy in the heart and practice of the truly pious, which is plainly contrary to the word of God.

I answer, if it be indeed so, that there is more sin, consisting in defect of required holiness, than there is of holiness in good men in this world; yet it will not follow that sin has the chief government of their heart and practice, for two reasons.

1. They may love God more than other things, and yet there may not be so much love, as there is want of due love; or in other words, they may love God more than the world, and therefore the love of God may be predominant, and yet may not love God near half so much as they ought to do. This need not be esteemed a paradox: a person may love a father, or some great friend and benefactor, of a very excellent character, more than some other object, a thousand times less worthy of his esteem and affection, and yet love him ten times less than he ought; and so be chargeable, all things considered, with a deficiency in respect and gratitude, that is very unbecoming and hateful. If love to God prevails above the love of other things, then virtue will prevail above evil affections, or positive principles of sin; by which principles it is, that sin has a positive power and influence. For evil affections radically consist in inordinate love to other things besides God; and therefore, virtue prevailing beyond these, will have the governing influence. The predominance of the love of God in the hearts of good men, is more from the nature of the object loved, and the nature of the principle of true love, than the degree of the principle. The ob-

ject is one of supreme loveliness; immensely above all other objects in worthiness of regard; and it is by such a transcendent excellency, that he is God, and worthy to be regarded and adored as God; and he that truly loves God, loves him as God: true love acknowledges him to be God, or to be divinely and supremely excellent; and must arise from some knowledge, sense, and conviction of his worthiness of supreme respect; and though the sense and view of it may be very imperfect, and the love that arises from it in like manner imperfect; yet if there be any realizing view of such divine excellency, it must cause the heart to respect God above all.

2. Another reason, why a principle of holiness maintains the dominion in the hearts of good men, is the nature of the covenant of grace, and the promises of that covenant, on which true Christian virtue relies, and which engage God's strength and assistance to be on its side, and to help it against the enemy, that it may not be overcome. The just live by faith. Holiness in the Christian, or his spiritual life, is maintained, as it has respect by faith to its author and finisher; and derives strength and efficacy from the divine fountain, and by this means overcomes. For, as the apostle says, *This is the victory that overcomes the world, even our faith.* It is our faith in him who has promised, never to leave nor forsake his people, and not to forsake the work of his own hands, nor suffer his people to be tempted above their ability, and that his grace shall be sufficient for them, and that his strength shall be made perfect in weakness, and that where he has begun a good work he will carry it on to the day of Christ.

SECTION VI.

The Corruption of Man's Nature appears by its Tendency, in its present State, to an extreme degree of Folly and Stupidity in Matters of Religion.

It appears, that man's nature is greatly depraved, by an apparent proneness to an exceeding *stupidity* and sottishness in those things wherein his duty and main interest are chiefly concerned.

I shall instance in two things, viz., men's proneness to idolatry; and so general and great a disregard of eternal things, as appears in them that live under the light of the gospel.

It is manifest, that man's nature in its present state is attended with a great propensity to forsake the acknowledgment and worship of the true God, and to fall into the most stupid *idolatry*. This has been sufficiently proved by known fact, on abundant trial: inasmuch as the world of mankind in general (excepting one small people, miraculously delivered and preserved) through all nations, in all parts of the world, ages after ages, continued without the knowledge and worship of the true God, and overwhelmed in gross idolatry, without the least appearance or prospect of its recovering itself from so great blindness, or returning from its brutish principles and customs, till delivered by divine grace.

In order to the most just arguing from fact, concerning the tendency of man's nature, as that is in itself, it should be inquired what the event has been, where nature has been left to itself, to operate according to its own tendency, with least opposition made to it by any thing supernatural; rather than in exempt places, where the infinite power and grace of God have interposed, and extraordinary means have been used to stem the current, and bring men to true religion and virtue. As to the means by which God's people of old, in the line of Abraham,

were delivered and preserved from idolatry, they were miraculous, and of mere grace: notwithstanding which, they were often relapsing into the notions and ways of the heathen; and when they had backslidden, never were recovered, but by divine gracious interposition. And as to the means by which many Gentile nations have been delivered since the days of the gospel, they are such as have been wholly owing to most wonderful, miraculous, and infinite grace. God was under no obligation to bestow on the heathen world greater advantages than they had in the ages of their gross darkness; as appears by the fact, that God actually did not, for so long a time, bestow greater advantages.

Dr. Taylor himself observes (*Key*, p. 1), "That in about four hundred years after the flood, the generality of mankind were fallen into idolatry." And thus it was everywhere through the world, excepting among that people that was saved and preserved by a constant series of miracles, through a variety of countries, nations, and climates, *great enough;* and through excessive changes, revolutions, and ages, *numerous enough*, to be a sufficient trial of what mankind are prone to, if there be any such thing as a sufficient trial.

That men should forsake the true God for idols, is an evidence of the most astonishing folly and stupidity, by God's own testimony, Jer. ii. 12, 13: "Be astonished, O ye heavens, at this, and be ye horribly afraid, be ye very desolate, saith the Lord: for my people have committed two evils; they have forsaken me, the fountain of living waters, and have hewed out to themselves cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water." And that mankind in general did thus, so soon after the flood, was from the evil propensity of their hearts, and *because they did not like to retain God in their knowledge;* as is evident by Rom. i. 28. And the universality of the effect shows that the cause was universal, and not any thing belonging to the particular circumstances of one, or only some nations or ages, but something belonging to that nature that is common to all nations, and that remains the same through all ages. And what other cause could this great effect possibly arise from, but a depraved disposition, natural to all mankind? It could not arise from want of a sufficient capacity or means of knowlege. This is in effect confessed on all hands. Dr. Turnbull (*Christian Philosophy*, p. 21) says as follows: "The existence of one infinitely powerful, wise, and good mind, the author, creator, upholder, and governor of all things, is a truth that lies plain and obvious to all that will but think." And (ibid. p. 245), "Moral knowledge, which is the most important of all knowledge, may easily be acquired by all men." And again (ibid. p. 292), "Every man by himself, if he would duly employ his mind in the contemplation of the works of God about him, or in the examination of his own frame, might make very great progress in the knowledge of the wisdom and goodness of God. This all men, generally speaking, might do, with very little assistance; for they have all sufficient abilities for thus employing their minds, and have all sufficient time for it." Mr. Locke says (*Human Understanding*, p. 4, Chap. iv. p. 242, Edit. 11), "Our own existence, and the sensible parts of the universe, offer proofs of a Deity so clearly and cogently to our thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considerate man to withstand them. For I judge it as certain and clear a truth, as can anywhere be delivered, that the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." And Dr Taylor himself (in p. 78) says, "The light given to all ages and nations of the world, is sufficient for the knowledge and practice of their duty." And in p. 111, 112, citing those words of the apostle, Rom. ii. 14, 15, says, "This clearly supposes that the Gentiles who were then in the world, might

have done the things contained in the law by nature, or their natural power." And in one of the next sentences, he says, "The apostle in Rom. i. 19—21, affirms that the Gentiles had light sufficient to have seen God's eternal power and Godhead, in the works of creation; and that the reason why they did not glorify him as God, was because they became vain in their imaginations, and had darkened their foolish heart; so that they were without excuse." And in his paraphrase on those verses in the 1st of Romans he speaks of the "very heathens, that were without a written revelation, as having that clear and evident discovery of God's being and perfections, that they are inexcusable in not glorifying him suitably to his excellent nature, and as the author of their being and enjoyments." And in p. 146, *S.*, he says, "God affords every man sufficient light to know his duty." If all ages and nations of the world have sufficient light for the knowledge of God, and their duty to him, then even such nations and ages, in which the most brutish ignorance and barbarity prevailed, had sufficient light, if they had had but a disposition to improve it; and then much more those of the heathen, which were more knowing and polished, and in ages wherein arts and learning had made greatest advances. But even in such nations and ages, there was no advance made towards true religion; as Dr. Winder observes (*History of Knowledge*, Vol. II. p. 336) in the following words: "The Pagan religion degenerated into greater absurdity, the further it proceeded; and it prevailed in all its height of absurdity, when the Pagan nations were polished to the height. Though they set out with the talents of reason, and had solid foundations of information to build upon, it in fact proved, that with all their strengthened faculties, and growing powers of reason, the edifice of religion rose in the most absurd deformities and dispositions, and gradually went on in the most irrational, disproportioned, incongruous systems, of which the most easy dictates of reason would have demonstrated the absurdity. They were contrary to all just calculations in moral mathematics." He observes, "That their grossest abominations first began in Egypt, where was an ostentation of the greatest progress in learning and science; and they never renounced clearly any of their abominations, or openly returned to the worship of the one true God, the Creator of all things, and to the original, genuine sentiments of the highest and most venerable antiquity. The Pagan religion continued in this deep state of corruption to the last. The Pagan philosophers, and inquisitive men, made great improvements in many sciences, and even in morality itself; yet the inveterate absurdities of Pagan idolatry remained without remedy. Every temple smoked with incense to the sun and moon, and other inanimate material luminaries, and earthly elements, to Jupiter, Juno, Mars and Venus, &c., the patrons and examples of almost every vice. Hecatombs bled on the altars of a thousand gods; as mad superstitions inspired. And this was not the disgrace of our ignorant, untaught northern countries only; but even at *Athens* itself, the infamy reigned, and circulated through all *Greece;* and finally prevailed, amidst all their learning and politeness, under the *Ptolemys* in *Egypt*, and the *Cæsars* at *Rome.* Now if the knowledge of the Pagan world, in religion, proceeded no further than this; if they retained all their deities, even the most absurd of them their deified beasts, and deified men, even to the last breath of Pagan power; we may justly ascribe the great improvements in the world, on the subject of religion, to divine revelation, either vouchsafed in the beginning when this knowledge was competently clear and copious; or at the death of Paganism, when this light shone forth in its consummate lustre at the coming of Christ."

Dr. Taylor often speaks of the idolatry of the heathen world, as *great wickedness*, in which they were wholly inexcusable; and yet often speaks of their

case as remediless, and of them as being dead in sin, and unable to recover themselves. And if so, and yet, according to his own doctrine, every age, and every nation, and every man, had sufficient light afforded, to know God, and to know and do their whole duty to him; then their inability to deliver themselves must be a moral inability, consisting in a desperate depravity, and most evil disposition of heart.

And if there had not been sufficient trial of the propensity of the hearts of mankind, through all those ages that passed from Abraham to Christ, the trial has been continued down to this day, in all those vast regions of the face of the earth, that have remained without any effects of the light of the gospel; and the dismal effect continues everywhere unvaried. How was it with that multitude of nations inhabiting *south* and *north America?* What appearance was there, when the *Europeans* first came hither, of their being recovered, or recovering in any degree, from the grossest ignorance, delusions, and most stupid Paganism? And how is it at this day, in those parts of Africa and Asia, into which the light of the gospel has not penetrated?

This strong and universally prevalent disposition of mankind to idolatry, of which there has been such great trial, and so notorious and vast proof, in fact, is a most glaring evidence of the exceeding depravity of the human nature; as it is a propensity, in the utmost degree, contrary to the highest end, the main business, and chief happiness of mankind, consisting in the knowledge service, and enjoyment of the living God, the Creator and Governor of the world; in the highest degree contrary to that for which mainly God gave mankind more understanding than the beasts of the earth, and made them wiser than the fowls of heaven; which was, that they might be capable of the knowledge of God; and in the highest degree contrary to the first and greatest commandment of the moral law, that *we should have no other gods before Jehovah*, and that we should love and adore him with all our heart, soul, mind, and strength. The Scriptures are abundant in representing the idolatry of the heathen world, as their exceeding wickedness, and their most brutish stupidity. They worship and trust in idols, are said to be like the lifeless statues they worship, like mere senseless stocks and stones, Ps. cxv. 4—8, and cxxxv. 15—18.

A second instance of the natural *stupidity* of the minds of mankind, that I shall observe, is, that great *disregard of their own eternal interests*, which appears so remarkably, so generally among them that live under the gospel.

As Mr. Locke observes (*Human Understanding*, Vol. I p. 207), "Were the will determined by the views of good, as it appears in contemplation, greater or less to the understanding, it could never get loose from the infinite, eternal joys of heaven, once proposed, and considered as possible; the external condition of a future state infinitely outweighing the expectation of riches or honor, or any other worldly pleasure, which we can propose to ourselves; though we should grant these the more probable to be obtained." Again (p. 228, 229), "He that will not be so far a rational creature, as to reflect seriously upon infinite happiness and misery, must needs condemn himself, as not making that use of his understanding he should. The rewards and punishments of another life, which the Almighty has established, as the enforcements of his laws, are of weight enough to determine the choice, against whatsoever pleasure or pain this life can show. When the eternal state is considered but in its bare possibility, which nobody can make any doubt of, he that will allow exquisite and endless happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good life here, and the contrary state the possible reward of a bad one, must own himself to judge very much amiss, if he does not conclude that a virtuous life, with the certain

expectation of everlasting bliss, which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the fear of that dreadful state of misery, which it is very possible may overtake the guilty, or at least the terrible, uncertain hope of annihilation. This is evidently so; though the virtuous life here had nothing but pain, and the vicious continual pleasure; which yet is for the most part quite otherwise, and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their present possession: nay, all things rightly considered, have I think even the worst part here. But when infinite happiness is put in one scale, against infinite misery in the other; if the worst that comes to the pious man, if he mistakes, be the best that the wicked man can attain to, if he be in the right; who can, without madness run the venture? Who in his wits would choose to come within a possibility of infinite misery? Which if he miss, there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard: whereas, on the other side, the sober man ventures nothing, against infinite happiness to be got, if his expectation comes to pass.

That disposition of mind which is a propensity to act contrary to reason is a depraved disposition. It is not because the faculty of reason, which God has given to mankind, is not sufficient fully to discover to them, that forty, sixty, or a hundred years, is as nothing in comparison of eternity, infinitely less than a second of time to a hundred years, that the greatest worldly prosperity and pleasure is not treated with most perfect disregard, in all cases where there is any degree of competition of earthly things, with salvation from exquisite, eternal misery, and the enjoyment of everlasting glory and felicity; as certainly it would be, if men acted according to reason. But is it a matter of doubt or controversy, whether men in general do not show a strong disposition to act far otherwise, from their infancy, till death is in a sensible approach? In things that concern men's temporal interest, they easily discern the difference between things of a long and short continuance. It is no hard matter to convince men of the difference between a being admitted to the accommodations and entertainments of a convenient, beautiful, well furnished habitation, and to partake of the provisions and produce of a plentiful estate for a day or a night, and having all given to them, and settled upon them as their own, to possess as long as they live, and to be theirs, and their heirs' forever. There would be no need of men's preaching sermons, and spending their strength and life, to convince men of the difference. Men know how to adjust things in their dealings and contracts one with another, according to the length of time in which any thing agreed for is to be used or enjoyed. In temporal affairs, men are sensible that it concerns them to provide for future time, as well as for the present. Thus common prudence teaches them to take care in summer to lay up for winter; yea, to provide a fund, and get a solid estate, whence they may be supplied for a long time to come. And not only so, but they are willing and forward to spend and be spent, to provide that which will stand their children in stead, after they are dead; though it be quite uncertain, who shall use and enjoy what they lay up, after they have left the world: and if their children should have the comfort of it, as they desire, they will not partake with them in that comfort, or have any more a portion in any thing under the sun. In things which relate to men's temporal interest, they seem very sensible of the uncertainty of life, especially of the lives of others; and to make answerable provision for the security of their worldly interest, that no considerable part of it may rest only on so uncertain a foundation, as the life of a neighbor or friend Common discretion leads men to take good care that their outward possessions be well secured by a good and firm title. In worldly concerns men are discerning of their opportunities, and careful to improve them before they are

past. The husbandman is careful to plough his ground and sow his seed in the proper season, otherwise he knows he cannot expect a crop; and when the harvest is come, he will not sleep away the time: for he knows, if he does so, the crop will soon be lost. How careful and eagle eyed is the merchant to observe and improve his opportunities and advantages to enrich himself! How apt are men to be alarmed at the appearance of danger to their worldly estate, or any thing that remarkably threatens great loss or danger to their outward interest! And how will they bestir themselves in such a case, if possible to avoid the threatened calamity! In things purely secular, and not of a moral or spiritual nature, men easily receive conviction by past experience, when any thing, on repeated trial, proves unprofitable or prejudicial, and are ready to take warning by what they have found themselves, and also by the experience of their neighbors and forefathers.

But if we consider how men generally conduct themselves in things on which their well being does infinitely more depend, how vast is the diversity! In these things how cold, lifeless and dilatory! With what difficulty are a few of multitudes excited to any tolerable degree of care and diligence, by the innumerable means used with men to make them wise for themselves! And when some vigilance and activity is excited, how apt is it to die away, like a mere force against a natural tendency! What need of a constant repetition of admonitions and counsels, to keep the heart from falling asleep! How many objections are made! And how are difficulties magnified! And how soon is the mind discouraged! How many arguments, and often renewed, and variously and elaborately enforced, do men stand in need of, to convince them of things that are self-evident! As that things which are eternal, are infinitely more important than things temporal, and the like. And after all, how very few are convinced effectually, or in such a manner as to induce to a practical preference of eternal things! How senseless are men to the necessity of improving their time to provide for futurity, as to their spiritual interest, and their welfare in another world! Though it be an endless futurity, and though it be their own personal, infinitely important good, after they are dead, that is to be cared for, and not the good of their children, which they shall have no share in. Though men are so sensible of the uncertainty of their neighbors' lives, when any considerable part of their estates depends on the continuance of them; how stupidly senseless do they seem to be of the uncertainty of their own lives, when their preservation from immensely great, remediless, and endless misery, is risked by a present delay, through a dependence on future opportunity! What a dreadful venture will men carelessly and boldly run, and repeat and multiply, with regard to their eternal salvation, who are very careful to have every thing in a deed or bond firm, and without a flaw! How negligent are they of their special advantages and opportunities for their soul's good! How hardly awakened by the most evident and imminent dangers, threatening eternal destruction, yea, though put in mind of them, and much pains taken to point them forth, show them plainly, and fully to represent them, if possible to engage their attention to them! How are they like the horse, that boldly rushes into the battle! How hardly are men convinced by their own frequent and abundant experience, of the unsatisfactory nature of earthly things, and the instability of their own hearts in their good frames and intentions! And how hardly convinced by their own observation, and the experience of all past generations, of the uncertainty of life, and its enjoyments! Psalm xlix. 11, &c., "Their inward thought is, that their houses shall continue forever.—Nevertheless, man being in honor, abideth not: he is like the beasts that perish This their way

is their folly, yet their posterity approve their sayings. Like sheep are they aid in the grave."

In these things, men that are prudent for their temporal interest, act as if they were bereft of reason: "They have eyes, and see not; ears, and hear not neither do they understand: they are like the horse and mule, that have no understanding." Jer. viii. 7, "The stork in the heaven knoweth her appointed times; and the turtle, and the crane, and the swallow, observe the time of their coming; but my people know not the judgment of the Lord."

These things are often mentioned in Scripture, as evidences of extreme folly and stupidity, wherein men act the part of enemies to themselves, as though they loved their own ruin, Prov. viii. 36; "Laying wait for their own blood," Prov. i. 18. And how can these things be accounted for, but by supposing a most wretched depravity of nature? Why otherwise should not men be as wise for themselves in spiritual and eternal things, as in temporal? All Christians will confess that man's faculty of reason was given him chiefly to enable him to understand the former, wherein his main interest, and true happiness consists. This faculty would therefore undoubtedly be every way as fit for the understanding of them, as the latter, if not depraved. The reason why these are understood, and not the other, is not that such things as have been mentioned, belonging to men's spiritual, eternal interest, are more obscure and abstruse in their own nature. For instance, the difference between long and short, the need of providing for futurity, the importance of improving proper opportunities, and of having good security, and a sure foundation, in affairs wherein our interest is greatly concerned, &c., these things are as plain in themselves in religious matters, as in other matters. And we have far greater means to assist us to be wise for ourselves in eternal, than in temporal things. We have the abundant instruction of perfect and infinite wisdom itself, to lead and conduct us in the paths of righteousness, so that we may not err. And the reasons of things are most clearly, variously, and abundantly set before us in the word of God; which is adapted to the faculties of mankind, tending greatly to enlighten and convince the mind: whereas we have no such excellent and perfect rules to instruct and direct us in things pertaining to our temporal interest, nor any thing to be compared to it.

If any should say, it is true, if men gave full credit to what they are told concerning eternal things, and these appeared to them as real and certain things, it would be an evidence of a sort of madness in them, that they show no greater regard to them in practice; but there is reason to think this is not the case; the things of another world being unseen things, appear to men as things of a very doubtful nature, and attended with great uncertainty. In answer, I would observe, agreeably to what has been cited from Mr. Locke, though eternal things were considered in their bare possibility, if men acted rationally, they would infinitely outweigh all temporal things in their influence on their hearts. And I would also observe, that the supposing eternal things not to be fully believed, at least by them who enjoy the light of the gospel, does not weaken, but rather strengthen the argument for the depravity of nature. For the eternal world being what God had chiefly in view in the creation of men, and the things of this world being made to be wholly subordinate to the other, man's state here being only a state of probation, preparation, and progression, with respect to the future state, and so eternal things being in effect men's all, their whole concern; to understand and know which, it chiefly was, that they had understanding given them; and it concerning them infinitely more to know the truth of eternal things than any other, as all that are not infidels will own:

therefore we may undoubtedly conclude, that if men have not respect to them as real and certain things, it cannot be for want of sufficient evidence of their truth, to induce them so to regard them; especially as to them that live under that light, which God has appointed as the most proper exhibition of the nature and evidence of these things; but it must be from a dreadful stupidity of mind, occasioning a sottish insensibility of their truth and importance, when manifested by the clearest evidence.

SECTION VII.

That man's nature is corrupt, appears in that vastly the greater part of mankind, in all ages, have been wicked Men.

THE depravity of man's nature appears, not only in its propensity to sin in *some degree*, which renders a man an evil or wicked man in the *eye of the law*, and strict justice, as was before shown; but it is so corrupt, that its depravity either shows that men *are*, or tends to make them *to be*, of such an evil character, as shall denominate them wicked men, according to the tenor of the covenant of grace.

This may be argued from several things which have been already observed; as from a tendency to continual sin, a tendency to much greater degrees of sin than righteousness, and from the general extreme stupidity of mankind. But yet the present state of man's nature, as implying or tending to a *wicked character*, may be worthy to be more particularly considered, and directly proved. And in general, this appears in that there have been so very few in the world, from age to age, ever since the world has stood, that have been of any other character.

It is abundantly evident in Scripture, and is what I suppose none that call themselves Christians will deny, that the whole world is divided into good and bad, and that all mankind at the day of judgment will either be approved as righteous, or condemned as wicked; either glorified as *children of the kingdom*, or cast into a furnace of fire, as *children of the wicked one*.

I need not stand to show what things belong to the character of such as shall hereafter be accepted as righteous, according to the word of God. It may be sufficient for my present purpose, to observe what Dr. Taylor himself speaks of, as belonging essentially to the character of such. In p. 203, he says, "This is infallibly the character of true Christians, and what is essential to such, that they have really mortified the flesh with its lusts; they are dead to sin, and live no longer therein; the old man is crucified, and the body of sin destroyed; they yield themselves to God, as those that are alive from the dead, and their members as instruments of righteousness to God, and as servants of righteousness to holiness." There is more to the like purpose in the two next pages. In p. 226, he says, "Whatsoever is evil and corrupt in us, we ought to condemn; not so, as it shall still remain in us, that we may always be condemning it, but that we may speedily reform, and be effectually delivered from it; otherwise certainly we do not come up to the character of the true disciples of Christ."

In page 248, he says, "Unless God's favor be preferred before all other enjoyments whatsoever, unless there be a delight in the worship of God, and in converse with him, unless every appetite be brought into subjection to reason and truth, and unless there be a kind and benevolent disposition towards our

fellow creatures, how can the mind be fit to dwell with God, in his house and family, to do him service in his kingdom, and to promote the happiness of any part of his creation?" And in his Key, § 286, pages 101, 102, &c, showing there, *what it is to be a true Christian*, he says among other things, "That he is one who has such a sense and persuasion of the love of God in Christ, that he devotes his life to the honor and service of God, in hope of eternal glory And that to the character of a true Christian, it is absolutely necessary that he diligently study the things that are freely given him of God, viz., his election, regeneration, &c., that he may gain a just knowledge of those inestimable privileges, may taste that the Lord is gracious, and rejoice in the gospel salvation, as his greatest happiness and joy. It is necessary that he work these blessings on his heart, till they become a vital principle, producing in him the love of God, engaging him to all cheerful obedience to his will, giving him a proper dignity and elevation of soul, raising him above the best and worst of this world, carrying his heart into heaven, and fixing his affections and regards upon his everlasting inheritance, and the crown of glory laid up for him there. Thus he is armed against all the temptations and trials resulting from any pleasure or pain, hopes or fears, gain or loss, in the present world. None of these things move him from a faithful discharge of any part of his duty, or from a firm attachment to truth and righteousness; neither counts he his very life dear to him, that he may do the will of God, and finish his course with joy. In a sense of the love of God in Christ, he maintains daily communion with God, by reading and meditating on his word. In a sense of his own infirmity, and the readiness of the divine favor to succor him, he daily addresses the throne of grace, for the renewal of spiritual strength, in assurance of obtaining it, through the one Mediator Christ Jesus. Enlightened and directed by the heavenly doctrine of the gospel," &c.*

Now I leave it to be judged by every one that has any degree of impartiality, whether there be not sufficient grounds to think, from what appears everywhere, that it is but a very small part indeed, of the many myriads and millions which overspread this globe, who are of a character that in any wise answers these descriptions. However, Dr. Taylor insists that all nations, and every man on the face of the earth, have light and means sufficient to do the whole will of God, even they that live in the grossest darkness of paganism.

Dr. Taylor in answer to arguments of this kind, very impertinently from time to time objects, that we are no judges of the viciousness of men's characters, nor are able to decide in what degree they are virtuous or vicious. As though we could have no good grounds to judge, that any thing appertaining to the qualities or properties of the mind, which is invisible, is general or prevailing among a multitude or collective body, unless we can determine how it is with each individual. I think I have sufficient reason, from what I know and have heard of the *American Indians*, to judge, that there are not many good philosophers among them; though the thoughts of their hearts, and the ideas and knowledge they have in their minds, are things invisible; and though I have never seen so much as a thousandth part of the *Indians;* and with respect to most of them, should not be able to pronounce peremptorily concerning any one, that he was not very knowing in the nature of things, if all should singly pass before me. And Dr. Taylor himself seems to be sensible of the falseness of his own conclusions, that he so often urges against others; if we may judge by his practice, and the liberties he takes, in judging of a multitude himself. He, it

* What Dr. Turnbull says of the character of a good man, is also worthy to be observed, *Christian Philosophy*, p. 86, 258, 259, 288, 375, 376, 409, 410.

seems, is sensible that a man may have good grounds to judge, that wickedness of character is general in a collective body; because he openly does it himself. (*Key*, p. 102.) After declaring the things which belong to the character of a true Christian, he judges of the generality of Christians, that they have cast off these things, that *they are a people that do err in their hearts, and have not known God's ways.* P. 259, he judges that *the generality of Christians are the most wicked of all mankind;* when he thinks it will throw some disgrace on the opinion of such as he opposes. The like we have from time to time in other places, as in p. 168, p. 258. *Key*, p. 127, 128.

But if men are not sufficient judges, whether there are few of the world of mankind but what are wicked, yet doubtless God is sufficient, and his judgment, often declared in his word, determines the matter. Matth. vii. 13, 14, "Enter ye in at the strait gate; for wide is the gate, and broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there be that go in thereat: because strait is the gate, and narrow is the way that leadeth to life, and few there be that find it." It is manifest, that here Christ is not only describing the state of things, as it was at that day, and does not mention the comparative smallness of the number of them that are saved, as a consequence of the peculiar perverseness of that people, and of that generation; but as a consequence of the general circumstances of the way to life, and the way to destruction, the broadness of the one, and the narrowness of the other. In the straitness of the gate, &c., I suppose none will deny, that Christ has respect to the strictness of those rules, which he had insisted on in the preceding sermon, and which render the way to life very difficult to mankind. But certainly these amiable rules would not be difficult, were they not contrary to the natural inclinations of men's hearts; and they would not be contrary to those inclinations, were these not depraved. Consequently the wideness of the gate, and broadness of the way, that leads to destruction, in consequence of which many go in thereat, must imply the agreeableness of this way to men's natural inclinations. The like reason is given by Christ, why few are saved. Luke xiii. 23, 24, "Then said one unto him, Lord, are there few saved? And he said unto them, Strive to enter in at the strait gate: for many, I say unto you, shall seek to enter in, and shall not be able." That there are generally but few good men in the world, even among them that have those most distinguishing and glorious advantages for it, which they are favored with, that live under the gospel, is evident by that saying of our Lord, from time to time in his mouth, *many are called, but few are chosen.* And if there are but few among these, how few, how very few indeed, must persons of this character be, compared with the whole world of mankind? The exceeding smallness of the number of true saints, compared with the whole world, appears by the representations often made of them as distinguished from the world; in which they are spoken of as called and chosen out of the world, redeemed from the earth, redeemed from among men; as being those that are of God, while the whole world lieth in wickedness, and the like. And if we look into the Old Testament, we shall find the same testimony given. Prov. xx. 6, "Most men will proclaim every one his own goodness: but a faithful man who can find?" By a faithful man, as the phrase is used in Scripture, is intended much the same as a sincere, upright, or truly good man; as in Psal. xii. 1, and xxxi. 23, and ci. 6, and other places. Again, Eccl. vii. 25—29, "I applied mine heart to know, and to search, and to find out wisdom, and the reason of things, and to know the wickedness of folly, even of foolishness and madness: and I find more bitter than death, the woman whose heart is snares, &c.—Behold, this have I found, saith the preacher, counting one by one, to find out the

account, which yet my soul seeketh, but I find not: one man among a thousand have I found; but a woman among all these have I not found. Lo, this only have I found, that God made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions." Solomon here signifies, that when he set himself diligently to find out the account or proportion of true wisdom, or thorough uprightness among men, the result was, that he found it to be but as one to a thousand, &c. Dr. Taylor on this place, p. 184, says, "The wise man in the context, is inquiring into the corruption and depravity of mankind, of the men and women, *that lived in his time.*" As though what he said represented nothing of the state of things in the world in general, but only *in his time.* But does Dr. Taylor or any body else, suppose this only to be the design of that book, to represent the vanity and evil of the world in that time, and to show that all was vanity and vexation of spirit in Solomon's day? (Which day truly we have reason to think, was a day of the greatest smiles of heaven on that nation, that ever had been on any nation from the foundation of the world) Not only does the subject and argument of the whole book show it to be otherwise; but also the declared design of the book in the first chapter; where the world is represented as very much the same, as to the vanity and evil it is full of, from age to age, making little or no progress, after all its revolutions and restless motions, labors and pursuits, like the sea, that has all the rivers constantly emptying themselves into it, from age to age, and yet is never the fuller. As to that place, Prov. xx. 6, "A faithful man, who can find?" There is no more reason to suppose that the wise man has respect only to his time, in these words, than in those immediately preceding, *Counsel in the heart of a man is like deep waters; but a man of understanding will draw it out.* Or in the words next following, *The just man walketh in his integrity: his children are blessed after him.* Or in any other Proverb in the whole book. And if it were so, that Solomon in these things meant only to describe his own times, it would not at all weaken the argument. For, if we observe the history of the Old Testament, there is reason to think there never was any time from Joshua to the captivity, wherein wickedness was more restrained, and virtue and religion more encouraged and promoted, than in David's and Solomon's times. And if there was so little true piety in that nation that was the only people of God under heaven, even in their very best times, what may we suppose concerning the world in general, take one time with another?

Notwithstanding what some authors advance concerning the prevalence of virtue, honesty, good neighborhood, cheerfulness, &c., in the world; Solomon, whom we may justly esteem as wise and just an observer of human nature, and the state of the world of mankind, as most in these days (besides, Christians ought to remember, that he wrote by divine inspiration), judged the world to be so full of wickedness, that it was better never to be born, than to be born to live only in such a world. Eccles. iv. at the beginning: "So I returned and considered all the oppressions that are done under the sun; and behold, the tears of such as were oppressed, and they had no comforter: and on the side of their oppressors there was power; but they had no comforter. Wherefore, I praised the dead, which are already dead, more than the living, which are yet alive. Yea, better is he than both they, which hath not yet been; who hath not seen the evil work that is done under the sun." Surely it will not be said that Solomon has only respect to his times here too, when he speaks of the oppressions of them that were in power; since he himself, and others appointed by him, and wholly under his control, were the men that were in power in that land, and in almost all the neighboring countries.

The same inspired writer says, Eccles. ix. 3, "The heart of the sons of men

is full of evil; and madness is in their heart while they live; and after that they go to the dead." If these general expressions are to be understood only of some, and those the less part, when in general, *truth, honesty, good nature*, &c., govern the world, why are such general expressions from time to time used? Why does not this wise and noble, and great souled Prince express himself in a more generous and benevolent strain, as well as more agreeable to truth, and say, *Wisdom is in the hearts of the sons of men while they live*, &c.—instead of leaving in his writings so many sly, ill-natured suggestions, which pour such contempt on the human nature, and tend so much to excite mutual jealousy and malevolence, to taint the minds of mankind through all generations after him?

If we consider the various successive parts and periods of the duration of the world, it will, if possible, be yet more evident, that vastly the greater part of mankind have, in all ages, been of a wicked character. The short accounts we have of Adam and his family are such as lead us to suppose, that far the greatest part of his posterity in his lifetime, yea, in the former part of his life, were wicked. It appears, that his eldest son, Cain, was a very wicked man, who slew his righteous brother Abel. And Adam lived a hundred and thirty years before Seth was born; and by that time, we may suppose, his posterity began to be considerably numerous: when he was born, his mother *called his name* Seth; *for God, said she, hath appointed me another seed instead of* Abel. Which naturally suggests this to our thoughts; that of all her seed then existing, none were of any such note for religion and virtue, as that their parents could have any great comfort in them, or expectation from them on that account. And by the brief history we have, it looks as if (however there might be some intervals of a revival of religion, yet), in the general, mankind grew more and more corrupt till the flood. It is signified, that *when men began to multiply on the face of the earth*, wickedness prevailed exceedingly, Gen. vi. at the beginning. And that before God appeared to Noah, to command him to build the Ark, one hundred and twenty years before the flood, the world had long continued obstinate in great and general wickedness, and the disease was become inveterate. The expressions we have in the 3d, 5th, and 6th verses of that chapter suggests as much: "And the Lord said, My Spirit shall not always strive with man; and God saw, that the wickedness of man was great on the earth, and that every imagination of the thought of his heart was evil, only evil continually; and it repented the Lord, that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart." And by that time, *all flesh had corrupted his way upon the earth*, v. 12. And as Dr. Taylor himself observes, p. 122, "Mankind were universally debauched into lust, sensuality, rapine, and injustice."

And with respect to the period after the flood, to the calling of Abraham; Dr. Taylor says, as has been already observed, that in about four hundred years after the flood, the generality of mankind were fallen into idolatry; which was before the passing away of one generation; or before all they were dead, that came out of the Ark. And it cannot be thought, the world sunk into that so general and extreme degree of corruption, all at once; but that they had been gradually growing more and more corrupt; though it is true, it must be by very swift degrees (however soon we may suppose they began), to get to that pass in one age.

And as to the period from the calling of Abraham to the coming of Christ, Dr. Taylor justly observes as follows (*Key*, p. 133): "If we reckon from the cal. of Abraham to the coming of Christ, the Jewish dispensation continued one thousand nine hundred and twenty-one years; during which period, the other families and nations of the earth, not only lay out of God's peculiar king-

dom, but also lived in idolatry, great ignorance, and wickedness." And with regard to that one only exempt family or nation of the Israelites, it is evident that wickedness was the generally prevailing character among them, from age to age. If we consider how it was with Jacob's family, the behavior of Reuben with his father's concubine, the behavior of Judah with Tamar, the conduct of Jacob's sons in general (though Simeon and Levi were leading) towards the Shechemites, the behavior of Joseph's ten brethren in their cruel treatment of him; we cannot think, that the character of true piety belonged to many of them, according to Dr. Taylor's own notion of such a character; though it be true, they might afterwards repent. And with respect to the time the children of Israel were in Egypt; the Scripture, speaking of them in general, or as a collective body, often represents them as complying with the abominable idolatries of the country.* And as to that generation which went out of Egypt, and wandered in the wilderness, they are abundantly represented as extremely and almost universally wicked, perverse, and children of divine wrath. And after Joshua's death, the Scripture is very express, that wickedness was the prevailing character in the nation, from age to age. So it was till Samuel's time. 1 Sam. viii. 7, 8, "They have rejected me, that I should not reign over them; according to all their works which they have done, since the day that I brought them out of Egypt, unto this day." Yea, so it was till Jeremiah and Ezekiel's time. Jer. xxxii. 30, 31, "For the children of Israel, and the children of Judah, have only done evil before me from their youth; for the children of Israel have only provoked me to anger with the work of their hands, saith the Lord: for this city hath been to me a provocation of mine anger, and of my fury, from the day they built it, even unto this day." (Compare chap. v. 21, 23, and chap. vii. 25—27.) So Ezek. ii. 3, 4, "I send thee to the children of Israel, to a rebellious nation, that hath rebelled against me, they and their fathers have transgressed against me, even unto this very day: for they are impudent children, and stiff-hearted." And it appears by the discourse of Stephen (Acts vii.) that this was generally the case with that nation, from their first rise, even to the days of the apostles. After his summary rehearsal of the instances of their perverseness from the very time of their selling Joseph into Egypt, he concludes (verses 51—53), "Ye stiff-necked, and uncircumcised in heart and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost. As your fathers did, so do ye. Which of the prophets have not your fathers persecuted? And they have slain them which showed before of the coming of that just one, of whom ye have been now the betrayers and murderers: who have received the law by the disposition of angels, and have not kept it."

Thus it appears, that wickedness was the generally prevailing character in all the nations of mankind, till Christ came. And so also it appears to have been since his coming to this day. So in the age of the apostles; though then, among those that were converted to Christianity, were great numbers of persons eminent for piety; yet this was not the case with the greater part of the world, or the greater part of any one nation in it. There was a great number of persons of a truly pious character in the latter part of the apostolic age, when multitudes of converts had been made, and Christianity was as yet in its primitive purity. But what says the Apostle John of the church of God at that time, as compared with the rest of the world? 1 John v. 19, "We know that we are of God, and the whole world lieth in wickedness." And after Christianity came to prevail, to that degree, that Christians had the upper hand in nations

* Levit. xvii. 7. Josh. v. 9, and xxiv. 14. Ezek. xx. 7, 8, and xxiii. 8

and civil communities, still the greater part of mankind remained in their old heathen state; which Dr. Taylor speaks of as a state of great ignorance and wickedness. And besides, this is noted in all ecclesiastical history, that as the Christians gained in power and secular advantages, true piety declined, and corruption and wickedness prevailed among them. And as to the state of the Christian world, since Christianity began to be established by human laws, wickedness for the most part has greatly prevailed; as is very notorious, and is implied in what Dr. Taylor himself says. He, in giving an account how the doctrine of Original Sin came to prevail among Christians, says, p. 167, *S.*, "That the Christian religion was very early and grievously corrupted, by dreaming, ignorant, superstitious monks." In p. 259, he says, "The generality of Christians have embraced this persuasion concerning Original Sin; and the consequence has been, that the generality of Christians have been the most wicked, lewd, bloody, and treacherous of all mankind."

Thus, a view of the several successive periods of the past duration of the world, from the beginning to this day, shows, that wickedness has ever been exceeding prevalent, and has had vastly the superiority in the world. And Dr. Taylor himself in effect owns that it has been so ever since Adam first turned into the way of transgression, p. 168. "It is certain (says he) the moral circumstances of mankind, since the time Adam first turned into the way of transgression, have been very different from a state of innocence. So far as we can judge from history, or what we know at present, the greatest part of mankind have been, and still are very corrupt, though not equally so in every age and place." And lower in the same page, he speaks of *Adam's posterity, as having sunk themselves into the most lamentable degrees of ignorance, superstition, idolatry, injustice, debauchery*, &c.

These things clearly determine the point, concerning the tendency of man's nature to wickedness, if we may be allowed to proceed according to such rules and methods of reasoning, as are universally made use of, and never denied, or doubted to be good and sure, in experimental philosophy;* or may reason from experience and facts, in that manner which common sense leads all mankind to in other cases. If experience and trial will evince any thing at all concerning the natural disposition of the hearts of mankind, one would think the experience of so many ages, as have elapsed since the beginning of the world, and the trial as it were made by hundreds of different nations together, for so long a time, should be sufficient to convince all, that wickedness is agreeable to the nature of mankind in its present state.

Here, to strengthen the argument, if there were any need of it, I might observe some further evidences than those which have been already mentioned, not only of the *extent* and *generality* of the prevalence of wickedness in the world, but of the *height* to which it has risen, and the *degree* in which it has reigned. Among innumerable things which show this, I shall now only observe this, viz., the degree in which mankind have from age to age been hurtful one to another. Many kinds of brute animals are esteemed very noxious and destructive, many of them very fierce, voracious, and many very poisonous, and the destroying of them has always been looked upon as a public benefit; but have not mankind been a thousand times as hurtful and destructive as any one of them, yea, as all the noxious beasts, birds, fishes, and reptiles in the

* Dr. Turnbull, though so great an enemy to the doctrine of the Depravity of Nature, yet greatly insists upon it, that the experimental method of reasoning ought to be gone into in moral matters, and things pertaining to the human nature, and should chiefly be relied upon, in moral, as well as natural philosophy. See *Introd to Mor. Phil.*

earth, air, and water, put together, at least of all kinds of animals that are visible? And no creature can be found anywhere so destructive of its own kind as mankind are. All others for the most part are harmless and peaceable, with regard to their own species. Where one wolf is destroyed by another wolf, one viper by another, probably a thousand of mankind are destroyed by those of their own species. Well, therefore, might our blessed Lord say, when sending forth his disciples into the world, Matt. x. 16, 17, *Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves;*—BUT BEWARE OF MEN. As much as to say, I send you forth as sheep among wolves. But why do I say, wolves? I send you forth into the wide world of *men*, that are far more hurtful and pernicious, and that you had much more need to beware of, than wolves.

It would be strange indeed, that this should be the state of the world of mankind, the chief of the lower creation, distinguished above all by reason, to that end that they might be capable of religion, which summarily consists in love, if men, as they come into the world, are in their nature innocent and harmless, undepraved, and perfectly free from all evil propensities.

SECTION VIII.

The native Depravity of Mankind appears, in that there has been so little good effect of so manifold and great means used to promote Virtue in the World.

THE evidence of the native corruption of mankind, appears much more glaring, when it is considered that the world has been so generally, so constantly, and so exceedingly corrupt, notwithstanding the various, *great and continual means*, that have been used to restrain men from sin, and promote virtue and true religion among them.

Dr. Taylor supposes all that sorrow and death, which came on mankind, in consequence of Adam's sin, was brought on them by God, in *great favor* to them; as a *benevolent Father*, exercising a *wholesome discipline* towards his children, to restrain them from sin, by *increasing the vanity of all earthly things, to abate their force to tempt and delude*; to induce them to be *moderate in gratifying the appetites of the body*; to *mortify pride and ambition*; and that men might *always have before their eyes a striking demonstration, that sin is infinitely hateful to God*, by a sight of that, *than which nothing is more proper to give them the utmost abhorrence of iniquity, and to fix in their minds a sense of the dreadful consequences of sin*, &c. &c. And in general, that they do not come as punishments, but purely as means to keep men from vice, and to make them better. If it be so, surely they are great means indeed. Here is a mighty alteration: mankind, once so easy and happy, healthful, vigorous and beautiful, rich in all the pleasant and abundant blessings of Paradise, now turned out, destitute, weak, and decaying, into a wide, barren world, yielding briers and thorns, instead of the delightful growth and sweet fruit of the garden of Eden, to wear out life in sorrow and toil, on the ground cursed for his sake; and at last, either through long languishment and lingering decay, or severe pain and acute disease, to expire and turn to putrefaction and dust. If these are only used as *medicines*, to prevent and to cure the diseases of the mind, they are sharp medicines indeed, especially death; which, to use Hezekiah's representation, is, as it were, *breaking all his bones:* and one would think, should be very effectual, if the subject had no depravity, no evil and contrary bias, to

resist and hinder a proper effect; especially in the old world, when the thing which was the first occasion of this terrible alteration, this severity of means, was fresh in memory, Adam continuing alive near two thirds of the time that passed before the flood; so that a very great part of those that were alive till the flood, might have opportunity of seeing and conversing with him, and hearing from his mouth, not only an account of his fall, and the introduction of the awful consequences of it, but also of his first finding himself in existence in the new created world, and of the creation of Eve, and the things which passed between him and his Creator in Paradise.

But what was the success of these great means, to restrain men from sin, and induce them to virtue? Did they prove sufficient? Instead of this, the world soon grew exceeding corrupt, till it came to that, to use our author's own words, *that mankind were universally debauched into lust, sensuality, rapine, and injustice.*

Then God used further means: he sent *Noah*, a preacher of righteousness, to warn the world of the universal destruction which would come upon them by a flood of waters, if they went on in sin. Which warning he delivered with these circumstances, tending to strike their minds, and command their attention; that he immediately went about building that vast structure of the ark, in which he must employ a great number of hands, and probably spend all he had in the world, to save himself and his family. And under these uncommon means God waited upon them one hundred and twenty years; but all to no effect. The whole world, for aught appears, continued obstinate, and absolutely incorrigible; so that nothing remained to be done with them, but utterly to destroy the inhabitants of the earth, and to begin a new world from that single family who had distinguished themselves by their virtue, that from them might be propagated a new and purer race. Accordingly this was done; and the inhabitants of this new world, of Noah's posterity, had these new and extraordinary means to restrain sin, and to excite to virtue, in addition to the toil, sorrow, and common mortality, which the world had been subjected to before, in consequence of Adam's sin, viz., that God had newly testified his dreadful displeasure for sin, in destroying the many millions of mankind, all at one blow, old and young, men, women and children, without pity on any for all the dismal shrieks and cries which the world was filled with; when they themselves, the remaining family, were so wonderfully distinguished by God's preserving goodness, that they might be a holy seed, being delivered from the corrupting examples of the old world, and being all the offspring of a living parent, whose pious instructions and counsels they had, to enforce these things upon them, to prevent sin, and engage them to their duty. And these inhabitants of the new earth, must for a long time, have before their eyes many evident, and as it were, fresh and striking effects and signs of that universal destruction, to be a continual, affecting admonition to them. And besides all this, God now shortened the life of man, to about one half of what it used to be. The shortening man's life, Dr. Taylor says, page 68, "was, that the wild range of ambition and lust might be brought into narrow bounds, and have less opportunity of doing mischief; and that death, being still nearer to our view, might be a more powerful motive to regard less the things of a transitory world, and to attend more to the rules of truth and wisdom."

And now let us observe the consequence. These new and extraordinary means in addition to the former, were so far from proving sufficient, that the new world degenerated, and became corrupt by such swift degrees, that, as Dr Taylor observes, mankind in general were sunk into idolatry in about four hun-

dred years after the flood, and so in about fifty years after Noah's death. They became so wicked and brutish, as to forsake the true God, and turn to the worship of inanimate creatures.

When things were come to this dreadful pass, God was pleased, for a remedy, to introduce a new and wonderful dispensation; separating a particular family and people from all the rest of the world, by a series of most astonishing miracles, done in the open view of the world, and fixing their dwelling, as it were in the midst of the earth, between Asia, Europe and Africa, and in the midst of those nations which were most considerable and famous for power, knowledge, and arts, that God might, in an extraordinary manner, dwell among that people, in visible tokens of his presence, manifesting himself there, and from thence to the world, by a course of great and miraculous operations and effects for many ages; that that people might be holy to God, and as a kingdom of priests, and might stand as a city on a hill, to be a light to the world; withal, gradually shortening man's life, till it was brought to be but about one twelfth part of what it used to be before the flood; and so, according to Dr. Taylor, vastly cutting off and diminishing his temptations to sin, and increasing his excitements to holiness. And now let us consider what the success of these means was, both as to the Gentile world, and the nation of Israel.

Dr. Taylor justly observes (*Key*, p. 24, § 75), "The Jewish dispensation had respect to the nations of the world, to spread the knowledge and obedience of God in the earth; and was established for the benefit of all mankind." But how unsuccessful were these means, and all other means used with the heathen nations, so long as this dispensation lasted! *Abraham* was a person noted in all the principal nations that were then in the world; as in Egypt, and the eastern monarchies: God made his name famous, by his wonderful, distinguishing dispensations towards him, particularly by so miraculously subduing before him and his trained servants, those armies of the four eastern kings. This great work of the most high God, Possessor of heaven and earth, was greatly taken notice of by Melchizedeck, and one would think, should have been sufficient to have awakened the attention and consideration of all the nations in that part of the world, and to have led them to the knowledge and worship of the only true God; especially if considered in conjunction with that miraculous and most terrible destruction of Sodom, and all the cities of the plain, for their wickedness, with Lot's miraculous deliverance, which doubtless were facts that in their day were much famed abroad in the world. But there is not the least appearance, in any accounts we have, of any considerable good effect. On the contrary, those nations which were most in the way of observing and being affected with these things, even the nations of Canaan, grew worse and worse, till their iniquity came to the full, in Joshua's time. And the posterity of Lot, that saint so wonderfully distinguished, soon became some of the most gross idolaters; as they appear to have been in Moses' time. See Numb. xxv. Yea, and the far greater part even of Abraham's posterity, the children of Ishmael, Ziman, Jokshan, Medan, Midian, Ishbak and Shuah, and Esau, soon forgot the true God, and fell off to heathenism.

Great things were done in the sight of the nations of the world, tending to awaken them, and lead them to the knowledge and obedience of the true God, in Jacob's and Joseph's time; in that God did miraculously, by the hand of Joseph, preserve from perishing by famine, as it were the whole world, as appears by Gen. xli. 56, 57. Agreeably to which, the name that Pharaoh gave to Joseph, *Zaphnath Paaneah*, as is said, in the Egyptian language signifies *Saviour of the World* But there does not appear to have been any good abiding effect of this;

no, not so much as in the nation of the Egyptians (which seems to have been the chief of all the heathen nations at that day), who had these great works of Jehovah in their most immediate view; on the contrary, they grew worse and worse, and seem to be far more gross in their idolatries and ignorance of the true God, and every way more wicked, and ripe for *ruin*, when *Moses* was sent to Pharaoh, than they were in *Joseph's* time.

After this, in Moses' and Joshua's time, the great God was pleased to manifest himself in a series of the most astonishing miracles, for about fifty years together, wrought in the most public manner, in Egypt, in the wilderness, and in Canaan, in the view, as it were, of the whole world; miracles by which the world was shaken, the whole frame of the visible creation, earth, seas and rivers, the atmosphere, the clouds, sun, moon and stars were affected; miracles, greatly tending to convince the nations of the world, of the vanity of their false gods, showing JEHOVAH to be infinitely above them, in the thing wherein they dealt most proudly, and exhibiting God's awful displeasure at the wickedness of the Heathen world. And these things are expressly spoken of as one end of these great miracles, in Exod. ix. 14, Numb. xiv. 21, Josh. iv. 23, 24, and other places. However, no reformation followed these things; but, by the Scripture account, the nations which had them most in view, were dreadfully hardened, stupidly refusing all conviction and reformation, and obstinately went on in an opposition to the living God, to their own destruction.

After this, God did from time to time very publicly manifest himself to the nations of the world, by wonderful works, wrought in the time of the *Judges*, of a like tendency with those already mentioned. Particularly in so miraculously destroying, by the hand of Gideon, almost the whole of that vast army of the Midianites, Amalekites, and *all the Children of the East*, consisting of about 135,000 men, Judges vii. 12, and viii. 10. But no reformation followed this, or the other great works of God, wrought in the times of Deborah and Barak, Jephtha and Sampson.

After these things, God used new, and in some respects much greater means with the heathen world, to bring them to the knowledge and service of the true God, in the days of David and Solomon. He raised up David, a man after his own heart, a most fervent worshipper of the true God, and zealous hater of idols, and subdued before him almost all the nations between Egypt and Euphrates; often miraculously assisting him in his battles with his enemies; and he confirmed Solomon, his son, in the full and quiet possession of that great empire, for about forty years; and made him the wisest, richest, most magnificent, and every way the greatest monarch that ever had been in the world; and by far the most famous, and of greatest name among the nations; especially for his wisdom, and things *concerning the name of his God*; particularly the temple he built, which was *exceeding magnificent, that it might be of fame and glory throughout all lands*; 1 Chron. xxii. 5. And we are told, that there came of all people to hear the wisdom of Solomon, from all the kings of the earth; 1 Kings iv. 34, and x. 24. And the Scripture informs us, that these great things were done, that the "nations in far countries might hear of God's great name, and of his outstretched arm; that all the people of the earth might fear him, as well as his people Israel: and that all the people of the earth might know, that the Lord was God, and that there was none else." 1 Kings viii. 41—43, 60. But still there is no appearance of any considerable abiding effect, with regard to any one heathen nation.

After this, before the captivity in Babylon, many great things were done in the sight of the Gentile nations, very much tending to enlighten, affect, and

persuade them: as, God's destroying the army of the *Ethiopians* of a thousand thousand, before Asa; Elijah's and Elisha's miracles; especially Elijah's miraculously confounding Baal's prophets and worshippers; Elisha's healing Naaman, the king of Syria's prime minister, and the miraculous victories obtained through Elisha's prayers, over the Syrians, Moabites and Edomites; the miraculous destruction of the vast united army of the children of Moab, Ammon and Edom, at Jehoshaphat's prayer (2 Chron. xx.); Jonah's preaching at Nineveh, together with the miracle of his deliverance from the whale's belly; which was published and well attested, as a sign to confirm his preaching; but more especially that great work of God in destroying Sennacherib's army by an angel, for his contempt of the God of Israel, as if he had been no more than the gods of the heathen.

When all these things proved ineffectual, God took a new method with the heathen world, and used, in some respects, much greater means to convince and reclaim them, than ever before. In the first place, his people the Jews were removed to Babylon, the head and heart of the heathen world (Chaldea having been very much the fountain of idolatry), to carry thither the revelations which God had made of himself, contained in the sacred writings; and there to bear their testimony against idolatry; as some of them, particularly Daniel, Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego, did, in a very open manner before the king and the greatest men of the empire, with such circumstances as made their testimony very famous in the world; God confirming it with great miracles, which were published through the empire, by order of its monarch, as the mighty works of the God of Israel, showing him to be above all gods: Daniel, that great prophet, at the same time being exalted to be governor of all the wise men of Babylon, and one of the chief officers of Nebuchadnezzar's court.

After this, God raised up Cyrus to destroy Babylon, for its obstinate contempt of the true God, and injuriousness towards his people; according to the prophecies of Isaiah, speaking of him by name, instructing him concerning the nature and dominion of the true God (Isa. xlv.); which prophecies were probably shown to him, whereby he was induced to publish his testimony concerning the God of Israel, as *the God.* (Ezra i. 2, 3.) Daniel, about the same time, being advanced to be prime minister of state in the new empire, erected under Darius, did in that place appear openly as a worshipper of the God of Israel, and him alone; God confirming his testimony for him, before the king and all the grandees of his kingdom, by preserving him in the den of lions; whereby Darius was induced to publish to all people, nations and languages, that dwelt in all the earth, his testimony, that *the God of Israel was the living God, and steadfast forever,* &c.

When, after the destruction of Babylon, some of the Jews returned to their own land, multitudes never returned, but were dispersed abroad through many parts of the vast Persian empire; as appears by the book of Esther. And many of them afterwards, as good histories inform, were removed into the more western parts of the world; and so were dispersed as it were all over the heathen world, having the Holy Scriptures with them, and Synagogues everywhere, for the worship of the true God. And so it continued to be, to the days of Christ and his apostles; as appears by the *Acts of the Apostles.* Thus that light, which God had given them, was in the providence of God carried abroad into all parts of the world: so that now they had far greater advantages, to come to the knowledge of the truth, in matters of religion, if they had been disposed to improve their advantages.

And besides all these things, from about Cyrus's time, learning and philos-

phy increased, and was carried to a great height. God raised up a number of men of prodigious genius, to instruct others, and improve their reason and understanding in the nature of things; and philosophic knowledge, having gone on to increase for several ages, seemed to be got to its height before Christ came, or about that time.

And now let it be considered what was the effect of all these things; instead of a reformation, or any appearance or prospect of it, the heathen world in general rather grew worse. As Dr. Winder observes, "The inveterate absurdities of Pagan idolatry continued without remedy, and increased, as arts and learning increased; and paganism prevailed in all its height of absurdity, when Pagan nations were polished to the height, and in the most polite cities and countries; and thus continued to the last breath of Pagan power." And so it was with respect to wickedness in general, as well as idolatry; as appears by what the Apostle Paul observes in Rom. i. Dr. Taylor, speaking of the time when the gospel scheme was introduced (*Key*, § 289), says, "The moral and religious state of the heathen was very deplorable, being generally sunk into great ignorance, gross idolatry, and abominable vice." Abominable vices prevailed, not only among the common people, but even among their philosophers themselves, yea, some of the chief of them, and of greatest genius; so Dr. Taylor himself observes, as to that detestable vice of Sodomy, which they commonly and openly allowed and practised without shame. See Dr. Taylor's note on Rom. i. 27.

Having thus considered the state of the heathen world, with regard to the effect of means used for its reformation, during the Jewish dispensation, from the first foundation of it in Abraham's time; let us now consider how it was with that people themselves, that were distinguished with the peculiar privileges of that dispensation. The means used with the heathen nations were great: but they were small, if compared with those used with the Israelites. The advantages by which that people were distinguished, are represented in Scripture as vastly above all parallel, in passages which Dr. Taylor takes notice of. (*Key*, § 54.) And he reckons these privileges among those which he calls *antecedent blessings*, consisting in motives to virtue and obedience; and says (*Key*, § 66), "That this was the very end and design of the dispensation of God's extraordinary favors to the Jews, viz., to engage them to duty and obedience, or that it was a scheme for promoting virtue, is clear beyond dispute, from every part of the Old Testament." Nevertheless, as has been already shown, the generality of that people, through all the successive periods of that dispensation, were men of a wicked character. But it will be more abundantly manifest, how strong the natural bias to iniquity appeared to be among that people, by considering more particularly how things were with them from time to time.

Notwithstanding the great things God had done in the times of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, to separate them and their posterity from the idolatrous world, that they might be a holy people to himself; yet in about two hundred years after Jacob's death, and in less than one hundred and fifty years after the death of Joseph, and while some were alive that had seen Joseph, the people had in a great measure lost the true religion, and were apace conforming to the heathen world: when, for a remedy, and the more effectually to alienate them from idols, and engage them to the God of their fathers, God appeared to bring them out from among the Egyptians, and separate them from the heathen world, and to reveal himself in his glory and majesty, in so affecting and astonishing a manner, as tended most deeply and durably to impress their minds; that they might never forsake him more. But so perverse were they, that they murmured even in the midst of the miracles that God wrought for them in Egypt, and murmured

at the Red Sea, in a few days after God had brought them out with such a mighty hand. When he had led them through the sea, *they sang his praise, but soon forgot his works.* Before they got to Mount Sinai, they openly manifested their perverseness from time to time; so that God says of them, Exod. xvi. 28, "How long refuse ye to keep my commandments, and my laws?" Afterwards they murmured again at Rephidim.

In about two months after they came out of Egypt, they came to Mount Sinai, where God entered into a most solemn covenant with the people, that they should be a holy people unto him, with such astonishing manifestations of his power, majesty and holiness, as were altogether unparalleled; as God puts the people in mind, Deut. iv. 32—34: "For ask now of the days that are past, which were before thee, since the day that God created man upon the earth; and ask from one side of heaven unto the other, whether there has been any such thing as this great thing is, or hath been heard like it. Did ever people hear the voice of God, speaking out of the midst of the fire, as thou hast heard, and live? Or hath God assayed to take him a nation from the midst of another nation," &c. And these great things were to that end, to impress their minds with such a conviction and sense of divine truth, and their obligations to their duty, that they might never forget them; as God says, Exod. xix. 9, "Lo, I come unto thee in a thick cloud, that the people may hear when I speak with thee, and believe thee forever." But what was the effect of all? Why, it was not more than two or three months, before that people, there, under that very mountain, returned to their old Egyptian idolatry, and were singing and dancing before a golden calf, which they had set up to worship. And after such awful manifestations as there were of God's displeasure for that sin, and so much done to bring them to repentance, and confirm them in obedience, it was but a few months before they came to that violence of spirit, in open rebellion against God, that with the utmost vehemence they declared their resolution to follow God no longer, but to make them a captain to return into Egypt. And thus they went on in ways of perverse opposition to the Most High, from time to time, repeating their open acts of rebellion, in the midst of continued, astonishing miracles, till that generation was destroyed. And though the following generation seems to have been the best that ever was in Israel, yet, notwithstanding their good example, and notwithstanding all the wonders of God's power and love to that people in Joshua's time, how soon did that people degenerate, and begin to forsake God, and join with the heathen in their idolatries, till God, by severe means, and by sending prophets and judges, extraordinarily influenced from above, reclaimed them! But when they were brought to some reformation by such means, they soon fell away again into the practice of idolatry; and so from time to time, from one age to another; and nothing proved effectual for any abiding reformation.

After things had gone on thus for several hundred years, God used new methods with his people, in two respects: *First*, he raised up a great prophet, under whom a number of young men were trained up in schools, that from among them there might be a constant succession of great prophets in Israel, of such as God should choose; which seems to have been continued for more than five hundred years. *Secondly*, God raised up a great king, David, one eminent for wisdom, piety, and fortitude, to subdue all their heathen neighbors, who used to be such a snare to them; and to confirm, adorn and perfect the institutions of his public worship; and by him to make a more full revelation of the great salvation, and future glorious kingdom of the Messiah. And after him, raised up his son, Solomon, the wisest and greatest prince that ever was on earth, more

fully to settle and establish those things which his father David had begun, concerning the public worship of God in Israel, and to build a glorious temple for the honor of Jehovah, and the institutions of his worship, and to instruct the neighbor nations in true wisdom and religion. But as to the success of these new and extraordinary means; if we take Dr. Taylor for our expositor of Scripture, the nation must be extremely corrupt in David's time; for he supposes, he has respect to his own times, in those words, Psal. xiv. 2, 3, "The Lord looked down from heaven, to see if there were any that did understand, and seek God; they are all gone aside; they are together become filthy; there is none that doeth good; no, not one." But whether Dr. Taylor be in the right in this, or not, yet if we consider what appeared in Israel, in Absalom's and Sheba's rebellion, we shall not see cause to think, that the greater part of the nation at that day were men of true wisdom and piety. As to Solomon's time, Dr. Taylor supposes, as has been already observed, that Solomon speaks of his own times, when he says, he had found but one in a thousand that was a thoroughly upright man. However, it appears, that all those great means used to promote and establish virtue and true religion, in Samuel's, David's and Solomon's times, were so far from having any general, abiding good effect in Israel, that Solomon himself, with all his wisdom, and notwithstanding the unparalleled favors of God to him, had his mind corrupted, so as openly to tolerate idolatry in the land, and greatly to provoke God against him. And as soon as he was dead, ten tribes of the twelve forsook the true worship of God, and instead of it, openly established the like idolatry, that the people fell into at Mount Sinai, when they made the golden calf; and continued finally obstinate in this apostasy, notwithstanding all means that could be used with them by the prophets, whom God sent, one after another, to reprove, counsel and warn them, for about two hundred and fifty years; especially those two great prophets, Elijah and Elisha. Of all the kings that reigned over them, there was not so much as one but what was of a wicked character. And at last it came to that, that their case seemed utterly desperate; so that nothing remained to be done with them, but to remove them out of God's sight. Thus the Scripture represents the matter, 2 Kings xvii.

And as to the other two tribes; though their kings were always of the family of David, and they were favored in many respects far beyond their brethren, yet they were generally very corrupt; their kings were most of them wicked men, and their other magistrates, and priests and people, were generally agreed in the corruption. Thus the matter is represented in the Scripture history, and the books of the prophets. And when they had seen how God had cast off the ten tribes, instead of taking warning, they made themselves vastly more vile than ever the others had done; as appears by 2 Kings xvii. 18, 19, Ezek. xvi. 46, 47, 51. God indeed waited longer upon them, for his servant David's sake, and for Jerusalem's sake, that he had chosen; and used more extraordinary means with them; especially by those great prophets, Isaiah and Jeremiah, but to no effect: so that at last it came to this, as the prophets represent the matter, that they were like a body universally and desperately diseased and corrupted, that would admit of no cure, the whole head sick, and the whole heart faint, &c.

Things being come to that pass, God took this method with them: he utterly destroyed their city and land, and the temple which he had among them, made thorough work in purging the land of them; as when a man *empties a dish, wipes it, and turns it upside down; or when a vessel is cast into a fierce fire, till its filthiness is thoroughly burnt out.* 2 Kings xxi. 13. Ezek. Chap. xxiv.

They were carried into captivity, and there left till that wicked generation was dead, and those old rebels were purged out; that afterwards the land might be resettled with a more pure generation.

After the return from the captivity, and God had built the Jewish church again in their own land, by a series of wonderful providences; yet they corrupted themselves again, to so great a degree, that the transgressors were come to the full again in the days of Antiochus Epiphanes; as the matter is represented in the prophecy of Daniel, Dan. viii. 23. And then God made them the subjects of a dispensation, little, if any thing, less terrible than that which had been in Nebuchadnezzar's days. And after God had again delivered them, and restored the state of religion among them, by the instrumentality of the Maccabees, they degenerated again; so that when Christ came, they were arrived to that extreme degree of corruption, which is represented in the accounts given by the evangelists.

It may be observed here in general, that the Jews, though so vastly distinguished with advantages, means and motives to holiness, yet are represented as coming, from time to time, to that degree of corruption and guilt, that they were more wicked in the sight of God, than the very worst of the Heathen. As, of old, God sware by his life, that the wickedness of Sodom was small, compared with that of the Jews. Ezek. xvi. 47, 48, &c., also chap. v. 5—10. So Christ, speaking of the Jews in his time, represents them as having much greater guilt than the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, or even Sodom and Gomorrah

But we are now come to the time when the grandest scene was displayed, that ever was opened on earth. After all other schemes had been so long and so thoroughly tried, and had so greatly failed of success, both among Jews and Gentiles; that wonderful dispensation was at length introduced, which was the greatest scheme for the suppressing and restraining iniquity among mankind, that ever infinite wisdom and mercy contrived, even the glorious gospel of Jesus Christ. "A new dispensation of grace was erected (to use Dr. Taylor's own wards, p. 239, 240) for the more certain and effectual sanctification of mankind, into the image of God; the delivering them from the sin and wickedness, into which they might fall, or were already fallen; to redeem them from all iniquity, and bring them to the knowledge and obedience of God." In whatever high and exalted terms the Scripture speaks of the means and motives which the Jews enjoyed of old; yet their privileges are represented as having no glory, in comparison of the advantages of the gospel. Dr. Taylor's words in p. 233, are worthy to be here repeated: "Even the Heathen (says he) knew God, and might have glorified him as God; but under the glorious light of the gospel, we have very clear ideas of the divine perfections, and particularly of the love of God as our Father, and as the God and Father of our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ. We see our duty in the utmost extent, and the most cogent reasons to perform it: we have eternity opened to us, even an endless state of honor and felicity, the reward of virtuous actions, and the Spirit of God promised for our direction and assistance. And all this may and ought to be applied to the purifying our minds, and the perfecting of holiness. And to those happy advantages we are born, for which we are bound for ever to praise and magnify the rich grace of God in the Redeemer." And he elsewhere says,* "The gospel constitution is a scheme the most perfect and effectual for restoring true religion, and promoting virtue and happiness, that ever the world has yet seen." And† *admirably adapted to enlighten our minds,*

* *Key*, § 167. † *Note* on Rom. i. 18.

and sanctify our hearts; and * *never were motives so divine and powerful proposed, to induce us to the practice of all virtue and goodness.*

And yet even these means have been ineffectual upon the far greater part of them with whom they have been used; of the *many that have been called, few have been chosen.*

As to the Jews, God's ancient people, with whom they were used in the first place, and used long by Christ and his apostles, the generality of them rejected Christ and his gospel, with extreme pertinaciousness of spirit. They not only went on still in that career of corruption which had been increasing from the time of the Maccabees; but Christ's coming, and his doctrine and miracles, and the preaching of his followers, and the glorious things that attended the same, were the occasion, through their perverse misimprovement, of an infinite increase of their wickedness. They crucified the Lord of Glory with the utmost malice and cruelty, and persecuted his followers; they pleased not God. and were contrary to all men; and went on to grow worse and worse, till they filled up the measure of their sin, and wrath came upon them to the uttermost; and they were destroyed, and cast out of God's sight, with unspeakably greater tokens of the divine abhorrence and indignation, than in the days of Nebuchadnezzar. The bigger part of the whole nation were slain, and the rest were scattered abroad through the earth, in the most abject and forlorn circumstances. And in the same spirit of unbelief and malice against Christ and the gospel, and in their miserable, dispersed circumstances, do they remain to this day.

And as to the Gentile nations, though there was a glorious success of the gospel amongst them in the apostles' days, yet probably not one in ten of those that had the gospel preached to them, embraced it. The powers of the world were set against it, and persecuted it with insatiable malignity. And among the professors of Christianity, there presently appeared in many a disposition to corruption, and to abuse the gospel unto the service of pride and licentiousness. And the apostles, in their days, foretold a grand apostasy of the Christian world, which should continue many ages, and observed that there appeared a disposition to such an apostasy, among professing Christians, even in that day. 2 Thess. ii. 7. And the greater part of the ages which have now elapsed, have been spent in the duration of that grand and general apostasy, under which the Christian world, as it is called, has been transformed into that which has been vastly more deformed, more dishonorable and hateful to God, and repugnant to true virtue, than the state of the Heathen world before; which is agreeable to the prophetical descriptions given of it by the Holy Spirit.

In these latter ages of the Christian church, God has raised up a great number of great and good men, to bear testimony against the corruptions of the church of Rome, and by their means introduced that light into the world, by which, in a short time, at least one third part of Europe was delivered from the more gross enormities of Antichrist; which was attended at first with a great reformation as to vital and practical religion. But how is the gold soon become dim! To what a pass are things come in Protestant countries at this day, and in our nation in particular! To what a prodigious height has a deluge of infidelity, profaneness, luxury, debauchery and wickedness of every kind, arisen! The poor savage Americans are mere babes and fools (if I may so speak), as to proficiency in wickedness, in comparison of multitudes that the Christian world throngs with. Dr. Taylor himself, as was before observed,

* *Pref. to Par.* on Rom. pages 145, 47.

represents that the *generality of Christians have been the most wicked, lewd, bloody, and treacherous of all mankind;* and says (*Key*, § 388), "The wickedness of the Christian world renders it so much like the Heathen, that the good effects of our change to Christianity are but little seen."

And with respect to the dreadful corruption of the present day, it is to be considered, besides the advantages already mentioned, that great advances in learning and philosophic knowledge have been made in the present and past century, giving great advantage for a proper and enlarged exercise of our rational powers, and for our seeing the bright manifestation of God's perfections in his works. And it is to be observed, that the means and inducements to virtue, which this age enjoys, are in addition to most of those which were mentioned before as given of old, and among other things, in addition to the shortening of man's life to seventy or eighty years, from near a thousand. And with regard to this, I would observe, that as the case now is in Christendom, take one with another of them that ever come to years of discretion, their life is not more than forty or forty-five years; which is but about the twentieth part of what it once was; and not so much in great cities, places where profaneness, sensuality and debauchery commonly prevail to the greatest degree.

Dr. Taylor (*Key*, § 1) truly observes, that God has, from the beginning, exercised wonderful and infinite wisdom, in the methods he has, from age to age, made use of to oppose vice, cure corruption, and promote virtue in the world, and introduced several schemes to that end. It is indeed remarkable, how many schemes and methods were tried of old, both before and after the flood; how many were used in the times of the Old Testament, both with Jews and Heathens, and how ineffectual all these ancient methods proved for four hundred years together, till God introduced that grand dispensation for the redeeming men from all iniquity, and purifying them to himself, a people zealous of good works, which the Scripture represents as the subject of the admiration of angels. But even this has now so long proved ineffectual with respect to the generality, that Dr. Taylor thinks *there is need of a new dispensation; the present light of the gospel being insufficient for the full reformation of the Christian world, by reason of its corruptions* (Note on Rom. i. 27); and yet all these things, according to him, without any natural bias to the contrary; no stream of natural inclination or propensity at all, to oppose inducements to goodness; no native opposition of heart, to withstand these gracious means, which God has ever used with mankind, from the beginning of the world to this day, any more than there was in the heart of Adam, the moment God created him in perfect innocence.

Surely Dr. Taylor's scheme is attended with strange paradoxes! And that his mysterious tenets may appear in a true light, it must be observed, at the same time while he supposes these means, even the very greatest and best of them, to have proved so ineffectual, that help from them, as to any general reformation, is to be despaired of; yet he maintains that all mankind, even the Heathen in all parts of the world, yea, every single person in it (which must include every Indian in America, before the Europeans came hither; and every inhabitant of the unknown parts of Africa and *Terra Australis*), has ability, light and means sufficient to do their whole duty; yea (as many passages in his writings plainly suppose), to perform perfect obedience to God's law, without the least degree of vice or iniquity.*

But I must not omit to observe:—Dr. Taylor supposes that the reason why

* See p. 259, 63, 64, 72, S.

the gospel dispensation has been so ineffectual, is, that it has been greatly misunderstood and perverted. In *Key*, § 389, he says, "Wrong representations of the scheme of the gospel have greatly obscured the glory of divine grace, and contributed much to the corruption of its professors. Such doctrines have been almost universally taught and received, as quite subvert it. Mistaken notions about nature, grace, election and reprobation, justification, regeneration, redemption, calling, adoption, &c., have quite taken away the very ground of the Christian life."

But how came the gospel to be so universally and exceedingly misunderstood? Is it because it is in itself so very dark and unintelligible, and not adapted to the apprehension of the human faculties? If so, how is the possession of such an obscure and unintelligible thing, so unspeakable and glorious an advantage? Or is it because of the native blindness, corruption and superstition of mankind? But this is giving up the thing in question, and allowing a great depravity of nature. And Dr. Taylor speaks of the gospel as far otherwise than dark and unintelligible; he represents it as exhibiting the clearest and most glorious light, to deliver the world from darkness, and bring them into marvellous light. He speaks of the light which the Jews had, under the Mosaic dispensation, as vastly exceeding the light of nature, which the Heathen enjoyed: and yet he supposes that even the latter was so clear as to be sufficient to lead men to the knowledge of God, and their whole duty to him. And he speaks of the light of the gospel as vastly exceeding the light of the Old Testament. He says of the apostle Paul in particular, "That he wrote with great perspicuity; that he takes great care to explain every part of his subject; that he has left no part of it unexplained and unguarded, and that never was an author more exact and cautious in this."* Is it not strange, therefore, that the Christian world, without any native depravity to prejudice and darken their minds, should be so blind in the midst of such glaring light, as to be all, or the generality, agreed, from age to age, so essentially to *misunderstand* that which is made so very plain?

Dr. Taylor says, p. 167, *S.*, "It is my persuasion that the Christian religion was very early and grievously corrupted, by dreaming, ignorant, superstitious *monks*, too conceited to be satisfied with plain gospel, and has long remained in that deplorable state." But how came the whole Christian world, without any blinding depravity, to hearken to these ignorant, foolish men, rather than unto wiser and better teachers? Especially, when the latter had *plain gospel* on their side, and the doctrines of the other were (as our author supposes) so very contrary, not only to the plain gospel, but to men's reason and common sense! Or were all the teachers of the Christian church nothing, but a parcel of *ignorant dreamers?* If so, this is very strange indeed, unless mankind naturally *love darkness*, rather than light, seeing in all parts of the Christian world there was so great a multitude of those in the work of the ministry, who had the gospel in their hands, and whose whole business it was to study and teach it, and therefore had infinitely greater advantages to become truly wise, than the Heathen philosophers. But if it did happen so, by some strange and inconceivable means, that notwithstanding all these glorious advantages, all the teachers of the Christian church through the world, without any native evil propensity, very early became silly *dreamers*, and also in their dreaming, generally stumbled on the *same* individual, monstrous opinions, and so the world might be blinded for a while; yet why did they not hearken to that wise and great man, Pelagius, and others like him, when he plainly held forth the truth

* *Pref. to Par.* on Rom. p. 146, 48.

to the Christian world! Especially seeing his instructions were so agreeable to the plain doctrines, and the bright and clear light of the gospel of Christ, and also so agreeable to the plainest dictates of the common sense and understanding of all mankind: but the other so repugnant to it, that (according to our author) if they were true, it would prove understanding to be *no understanding*, and *the Word of God to be no rule of truth, nor at all to be relied upon, and God to be a Being worthy of no regard!*

And besides, if the ineffectualness of the gospel to restrain sin and promote virtue, be owing to the general prevalence of these doctrines, which are supposed to be so absurd and contrary to the gospel, here is this further to be accounted for, namely, why, since there has been so great an increase of light in religious matters (as must be supposed on Dr. Taylor's scheme) in this and the last age, and these monstrous doctrines of Original Sin, Election, Reprobation, Justification, Regeneration, &c., have been so much exploded, especially in our nation, there has been no reformation attending this great advancement of light and truth; but on the contrary, vice, and every thing that is opposite to practical Christianity, has gone on to increase, with such a prodigious celerity, as to become like an overflowing deluge, threatening, unless God mercifully interpose, speedily to swallow up all that is left of what is virtuous and praiseworthy.

Many other things might have been mentioned under this head, of the *means* which mankind have had to restrain vice, and promote virtue; such as wickedness being many ways contrary to men's temporal interest and comfort in this world, and their having continually before their eyes so many instances of persons made miserable by their vices; the restraints of human laws, without which men cannot live in society; the judgments of God brought on men for their wickedness, with which history abounds, and the providential rewards of virtue, and innumerable particular means that God has used from age to age to curb the wickedness of mankind, which I have omitted. But there would be no end of a particular enumeration of such things. Enough has been said. They that will not be convinced by the instances which have been mentioned, probably would not be convinced, if the world had stood a thousand times so long, and we had the most authentic and certain accounts of means having been used from the beginning, in a thousand times greater variety, and new dispensations had been introduced, after others had been tried in vain, ever so often, and still to little effect He that will not be convinced by a thousand good witnesses, it is not likely that he would be convinced by a thousand thousand. The proofs that have been extant in the world, from trial and fact, of the depravity of man's nature, are inexpressible, and as it were infinite, beyond the representation of all comparison and similitude. If there were a piece of ground, which abounded with briers and thorns, or some poisonous plant, and all mankind had used their endeavors, for a thousand years together, to suppress that evil growth, and to bring that ground by manure and cultivation, planting and sowing, to produce better fruit, but all in vain, it would still be overrun with the same noxious growth; it would not be a proof, that such a produce was agreeable to the nature of that soil, in any wise to be compared to that which is given in divine providence that wickedness is a produce agreeable to the nature of the field of the world of mankind; which has had means used with it, that have been so various, great and wonderful, contrived by the unsearchable and boundless wisdom of God medicines procured with infinite expense, exhibited with so vast an apparatus so marvellous a succession of dispensations, introduced one after another, displaying an incomprehensible length and breadth, depth and height, of divin-

wisdom, love, and power, and every perfection of the Godhead, to the eternal admiration of the principalities and powers in heavenly places.

SECTION IX.

Several Evasions of the Arguments for the Depravity of Nature, from trial and events, considered.

EVASION 1. DR. TAYLOR says, p. 231, 232, "Adam's nature, it is allowed, was very far from being sinful; yet he sinned. And therefore, the common doctrine of Original Sin, is no more necessary to account for the sin that has been, or is in the world, than it is to account for Adam's sin." Again, p. 52—54, *S.*, &c., "If we allow mankind to be as wicked as R. R. has represented them to be; and suppose that there is not one upon earth that is truly righteous, and without sin, and that some are very enormous sinners, yet it will not thence follow, that they are naturally corrupt. For, if sinful action infers a nature originally corrupt, then, whereas Adam (according to them that hold the doctrine of Original Sin) committed the most heinous and aggravated sin, that ever was committed in the world; for, according to them, he had greater light than any other man in the world, to know his duty, and greater power than any other man to fulfil it, and was under greater obligations than any other man to obedience; he sinned, when he knew he was the representative of millions, and that the happy or miserable state of all mankind, depended on his conduct; which never was, nor can be, the case of any other man in the world: then, I say, it will follow, that his nature was originally corrupt, &c. Thus their argument from the wickedness of mankind, to prove a sinful and corrupt nature, must inevitably and irrecoverably fall to the ground; which will appear more abundantly, if we take in the case of the angels, who in numbers sinned, and kept not their first estate, though created with a nature superior to Adam's." Again, p. 145, *S.*, "When it is inquired, how it comes to pass that our appetites and passions are now so irregular and strong, as that not one person has resisted them, so as to keep himself pure and innocent? If this be the case, if such as make the inquiry will tell the world, how it came to pass that Adam's appetites and passions were so irregular and strong, that he did not resist them, so as to keep himself pure and innocent, when, upon their principles, he was far more able to have resisted them; I also will tell them how it comes to pass, that his posterity does not resist them. Sin doth not alter its nature, by its being general; and therefore how far soever it spreads, it must come upon all just as it came upon Adam."

These things are delivered with much assurance. But is there any reason in such a way of talking? One thing implied in it, and the main thing, if any thing at all to the purpose, is, that because an effect's being general, does not alter the nature of the effect, therefore nothing more can be argued concerning the cause, from its happening constantly, and in the most steady manner, than from its happening but once. But how contrary is this to reason! If such a case should happen, that a person, through the deceitful persuasions of a pretended friend, once takes an unwholesome and poisonous draught, of a liquor he had no inclination to before; but after he has once taken of it, he be observed to act as one that has an insatiable, incurable thirst after more of the same, in his constant practice, and acts often repeated, and obstinately continued in as long as he lives, against all possible arguments and endeavors used to dissuade

him from it; and we should from hence argue a fixed inclination, and begin to suspect that this is the nature and operation of the poison, to produce such an inclination, or that this strong propensity is some way the consequence of the first draught in such a case, could it be said with good reason, that a fixed propensity can no more be argued from his consequent constant practice, than from his first draught? Or, if we suppose a young man, no otherwise than soberly inclined, and enticed by wicked companions, should drink to excess, until he had got a habit of excessive drinking, and should come under the power of a greedy appetite after strong drink, so that drunkenness should become a common and constant practice with him; and some observer, arguing from this his general practice, should say, "It must needs be that this young man has a fixed inclination to that sin; otherwise, how should it come to pass that he should make such a trade of it?" And another, ridiculing the weakness of his arguing, should reply, "Do you tell me how it came to pass, that he was guilty of that sin the first time, without a fixed inclination, and I will tell you how he is guilty of it so generally without a fixed inclination. Sin does not alter its nature by being general; and therefore, how common soever it becomes, it must come at all times by the same means that it came at first." I leave it to every one to judge, who would be chargeable with weak arguing in such a case.

It is true, as was observed before, there is no effect without some cause, occasion, ground or reason of that effect, and some cause answerable to the effect. But certainly it will not follow from thence, that a transient effect requires a permanent cause, or a fixed influence or propensity. An effect's happening once, though the effect may be great, yea, though it may come to pass on the same occasion in many subjects at the same time, will not prove any fixed propensity, or permanent influence. It is true, it proves an influence great and extensive, answerable to the effect, once exerted, or once effectual; but it proves nothing in the cause fixed or constant. If a particular tree, or a great number of trees standing together, have blasted fruit on their branches at a particular season, yea, if the fruit be very much blasted, and entirely spoiled, it is evident that something was the occasion of such an effect at that time; but this alone does not prove the nature of the tree to be bad. But if it be observed, that those trees, and all other trees of the kind, wherever planted, and in all soils, countries, climates and seasons, and however cultivated and managed, still bear ill fruit, from year to year, and in all ages, it is a good evidence of the evil nature of the tree; and if the fruit, at all these times, and in all these cases, be very bad, it proves the nature of the tree to be very bad; and if we argue in like manner from what appears among men, it is easy to determine, whether the universal sinfulness of mankind, and their all sinning immediately, as soon as capable of it, and all sinning continually, and generally being of a wicked character, at all times, in all ages, and all places, and under all possible circumstances, against means and motives inexpressibly manifold and great, and in the utmost conceivable variety, be from a permanent, internal, great cause.

If the voice of common sense were attended to, and heard, there would be no occasion for labor in multiplying arguments and instances to show, that one act does not prove a fixed inclination; but that constant practice and pursuit do. We see that it is in fact agreeable to the reason of all mankind, to argue fixed principles, tempers, and prevailing inclinations, from repeated and continued actions, though the actions are voluntary, and performed of choice; and thus to judge of the tempers and inclinations of persons, ages, sexes, tribes and nations. But is it the manner of men to conclude, that whatever they see others once do, they have a fixed, abiding inclination to do? Yea, there may be sev

eral acts seen, and yet they not taken as good evidence of an established propensity; nay, though attended with that circumstance, that one act, or those several acts, are followed with such constant practice, as afterwards evidences fixed disposition. As for example, there may be several instances of a man's drinking some spirituous liquor, and they be no sign of a fixed inclination to that liquor; but these acts may be introductory to a settled habit or propensity, which may be made very manifest afterwards by constant practice.

From these things it is plain, that what is alleged concerning the first sin of Adam, and of the angels, without a previous, fixed disposition to sin, cannot in the least injure or weaken the arguments, which have been brought to prove a fixed propensity to sin in mankind in their present state. The thing which the permanence of the cause has been argued from, is the permanence of the effect. And that the permanent cause consists in an internal, fixed propensity, and not any particular, external circumstances, has been argued from the effects being the same, through a vast variety and change of circumstances. Which things do not take place with respect to the first act of sin that Adam or the angels were guilty of; which first acts, considered in themselves, were no permanent, continued effects. And though a great number of the angels sinned, and the effect on that account was the greater, and more extensive; yet this *extent* of the effect is a very different thing from that *permanence*, or settled continuance of the effect, which is supposed to show a permanent cause, or fixed influence or propensity. Neither was there any trial of a vast variety of circumstances attending a permanent effect, to show the fixed cause to be internal, consisting in a settled disposition of nature, in the instances objected. And however great the sin of Adam, or of the angels was, and however great means, motives, and obligations they sinned against; whatever may be thence argued concerning the transient cause, occasion, or temptation, as being very subtle, remarkably tending to deceive and seduce, or otherwise great; yet it argues nothing of any *settled* disposition, or *fixed* cause at all, either great or small; the effect both in the angels and our first parents, being in itself *transient*, and for aught appears, happening in each of them under one system or coincidence of influential circumstances.

The general continued wickedness of mankind, against such means and motives, proves each of these things, viz., that the cause is *fixed*, and that the fixed cause is *internal*, in man's nature, and also that it is very *powerful*. It proves the *first*, namely, that the cause is fixed, because the effect is so abiding, through so many changes. It proves the *second*, that is, that the fixed cause is internal, because the circumstances are so various: the variety of means and motives is one thing that is to be referred to the head of variety of circumstances; and they are that kind of circumstances, which above all others proves this; for they are such circumstances as cannot possibly cause the effect, being most opposite to the effect in their tendency. And it proves the *third*, viz., the greatness of the internal cause, or the powerfulness of the propensity; because the means which have opposed its influence, have been so great, and yet have been statedly overcome.

But here I may observe by the way, that with regard to the motives and obligations which our first fathers sinned against, it is not reasonably alleged, that he sinned when he knew his sin would have destructive consequences to all his posterity, *and might, in process of time, pave the whole globe with skulls*, &c. Seeing it is so evident, by the plain account the Scripture gives us of the temptation which prevailed with our first parents to commit that sin, that it was so contrived by the subtilty of the tempter, as first to blind and deceive them as

to that matter, and to make them believe that their disobedience should be followed with *no destruction or calamity at all* to themselves (and therefore not to their posterity), but on the contrary, with a great increase and advancement of dignity and happiness.

Evasion 2. Let the wickedness of the world be ever so general and great, there is no necessity of supposing any depravity of nature to be the cause; man's own *free will* is cause sufficient. Let mankind be more or less corrupt, they make themselves corrupt by their own free choice. This, Dr. Taylor abundantly insists upon, in many parts of his book.*

But I would ask, how it comes to pass that mankind so universally agree in this evil exercise of their free will? If their wills are in the first place as free to good as evil, what is it to be ascribed to, that the world of mankind, consisting of so many millions, in so many successive generations, without consultation, all agree to exercise their freedom in favor of evil? If there be no natural tendency or preponderation in the case, then there is as good a chance for the will's being determined to good as evil. If the cause is indifferent, why is not the effect in some measure indifferent? If the balance be no heavier at one end than the other, why does it perpetually, and, as it were, infinitely, preponderate one way? How comes it to pass, that the free will of mankind has been determined to evil, in like manner before the flood, and after the flood; under the law, and under the gospel; and among both Jews and Gentiles, under the Old Testament; and since that, among *Christians, Jews, Mahometans;* among Papists and Protestants; in those nations where civility, politeness, arts, and learning most prevail, and among the Negroes and Hottentots in Africa, the Tartars in Asia, and Indians in America, towards both poles, and on every side of the globe; in greatest cities and obscurest villages; in palaces and in huts, wigwams and cells under ground? Is it enough to reply, it happens so, that men everywhere, and at all times, choose thus to determine their own wills, and so to make themselves sinful, as soon as ever they are capable of it, and to sin constantly as long as they live, and universally to choose never to come up half way to their duty?

As has been often observed, a steady effect requires a steady cause; but free will, without any previous propensity to influence its determinations, is no permanent cause; nothing can be conceived of, further from it: for the very notion of freedom of will, consisting in self-determining power, implies contingence: and if the will is free in that sense, that it is perfectly free from any government of previous inclination, its freedom must imply the most *absolute* and *perfect* contingence; and surely nothing can be conceived of, more unfixed than that. The notion of liberty of will, in this sense, implies perfect freedom from every thing that should previously fix, bind or determine it; that it may be left to be fixed and determined wholly by itself: therefore its determinations must be previously altogether unfixed. And can that which is so unfixed, so contingent, be a cause sufficient to account for an effect, in such a manner, and to such a degree, permanent, fixed and constant?

When men see only one particular person, going on in a certain course with great constancy, against all manner of means to dissuade him, do they judge this to be no argument of any fixed disposition of mind, because he, being free, may determine to do so, if he will, without any such disposition? Or if they see a nation or people that differ greatly from other nations, in such and such instances of their constant conduct, as though their tempers and inclinations were

* Pages 257, 258, 52, 53, 8., and many other places.

very diverse, and any should deny it to be from any such cause, and should say, we cannot judge at all of the temper or disposition of any nation or people, by any thing observable in their constant practice or behavior, because they have all free will, and therefore may all choose to act so, if they please, without any thing in their temper or inclination to bias them; would such an account of such effects be satisfying to the reason of mankind? But infinitely further would it be from satisfying a considerate mind, to account for the constant and universal sinfulness of mankind, by saying, that the will of all mankind is free, and therefore all mankind may, if they please, make themselves wicked: they are free when they first begin to act as moral agents, and therefore all may, if they please, begin to sin as soon as they begin to act: they are free as long as they continue to act in the world, and therefore they may all commit sin continually, if they will: men of all nations are free, and therefore all nations may act alike in these respects, if they please (though some do not know how other nations do act). Men of high and low condition, learned and ignorant, are free, and therefore they may agree in acting wickedly, if they please (though they do not consult together). Men in all ages are free, and therefore men in one age may all agree with men in every other age in wickedness, if they please (though they do not know how men in other ages have acted), &c. &c. Let every one judge whether such an account of things can satisfy reason.

Evasion 3. It is said by many of the opposers of the doctrine of Original Sin, that the corruption of the world of mankind may be owing, not to a depraved nature, but to bad example. And I think we must understand Dr. Taylor as having respect to the powerful influence of bad instruction and example, when he says, p. 118, "The Gentiles, in their heathen state, when incorporated into the body of the Gentile world, were without strength, unable to help or recover themselves." And in several other places to the like purpose. If there was no depravity of nature, what else could there be but bad instruction and example, to hinder the heathen world, as a collective body (for as such Dr. Taylor speaks of them, as may be seen p. 117, 118), from emerging out of their corruption, on the rise of each new generation? As to their bad instruction, our author insists upon it, that the heathen, notwithstanding all their disadvantages, had sufficient light to know God, and do their whole duty to him, as we have observed from time to time. Therefore it must be chiefly bad example, that we must suppose, according to him, rendered their case helpless.

Now concerning this way of accounting for the corruption of the world, by the influence of bad example, I would observe the following things:

1. It is accounting for the thing by the thing itself. It is accounting for the corruption of the world by the corruption of the world. For, that bad examples are general all over the world to be followed by others, and have been so from the beginning, is only an instance, or rather a description of that corruption of the world which is to be accounted for. If mankind are naturally no more inclined to evil than good, then how comes there to be so many more bad examples than good ones, in all ages? And if there are not, how come the bad examples that are set, to be so much more followed than the good? If the propensity of man's nature be not to evil, how comes the current of general example, everywhere, and at all times, to be so much to evil? And when opposition has been made by good examples, how comes it to pass that it has had so little effect to stem the stream of general wicked practice?

I think from the brief account the Scripture gives us of the behavior of the first parents of mankind, the expressions of their faith and hope in God's mercy revealed to them, we have reason to suppose, that before ever they had any

children, they repented, and were pardoned, and became truly pious. So that God planted the world at first with a *noble vine;* and at the beginning of the generations of mankind, he set the stream of example the right way. And we see, that children are more apt to follow the example of their parents, than of any others; especially in early youth, their forming time, when those habits are contracted, which abide by them all their days. And besides, Adam's children had no other examples to follow, but those of their parents. How therefore came the stream so soon to turn, and to proceed the contrary way, with so violent a current? Then, when mankind became so universally and desperately corrupt, as not to be fit to live on earth any longer, and the world was everywhere full of bad examples, God destroyed them all at once, but only righteous Noah, and his family, to remove those bad examples, and that the world of mankind might be planted again with good example, and the stream again turned the right way: how therefore came it to pass, that Noah's posterity did not follow his good example, especially when they had such extraordinary things to enforce his example, but so generally, even in his lifetime, became so exceeding corrupt? One would think, the first generations at least, while all lived together as one family, under Noah, their venerable father, might have followed his good example; and if they had done so, then, when the earth came to be divided in Peleg's time, the heads of the several families would have set out their particular colonies with good examples, and the stream would have been turned the right way in all the various divisions, colonies, and nations of the world. But we see verily the fact was, that in about fifty years after Noah's death, the world in general was overrun with dreadful corruption; so that all virtue and goodness were like soon to perish from among mankind, unless something extraordinary should be done to prevent it.

Then, for a remedy, God separated Abraham and his family from all the rest of the world, that they might be delivered from the influence of bad example, that, in his posterity, he might have a holy seed. Thus God again planted a *noble vine;* Abraham, Isaac and Jacob being eminently pious. But how soon did their posterity degenerate, till true religion was like to be swallowed up! We see how desperately, and almost universally corrupt they were, when God brought them out of Egypt, and led them in the wilderness.

Then God was pleased, before he planted his people in Canaan, to destroy that perverse generation in the wilderness, that he might plant them there a *noble vine, wholly a right seed,* and set them out with good example, in the land where they were to have their settled abode, Jer. ii. 21. It is evident, that the generation which came with Joshua into Canaan, was an excellent generation, by innumerable things said of them.* But how soon did that people, nevertheless, become *the degenerate plant of a strange vine!*

And when the nation had a long time proved themselves desperately and incurably corrupt, God destroyed them, and sent them into captivity, till the old rebels were dead and purged out, to deliver their children from their evil example; and when the following generation were purified as in a furnace, God planted then again, in the land of Israel, a *noble vine,* and set them out with good example; which yet was not followed by their posterity.

When again the corruption was become inveterate and desperate, the Christian church was planted by a glorious outpouring of the Spirit of God, causing true virtue and piety to be exemplified in the first age of the church of Christ, far beyond whatever had been on earth before; and the Christian church

* See Jer. ii. 2, 3. Psal. lxviii. 14. Josh. xxii. 2, and xxiv. 8. Deut. iv. 3, 4. Hos. xi. 1, and ix. 10. Judges ii. 7, 17, 22, and many other places.

was planted a *noble vine.* But that primitive good example has not prevailed, to cause virtue to be generally and steadfastly maintained in the Christian world: to how great a degree it has been otherwise, has already been observed.

After many ages of general and dreadful apostasy, God was pleased to erect the Protestant church, as separated from the more corrupt part of Christendom; and true piety flourished very much in it at first; God planted it a *noble vine:* but, notwithstanding the good examples of the first reformers, what a melancholy pass is the Protestant world come to at this day!

When England grew very corrupt, God brought over a number of pious persons, and planted them in New England, and this land was planted with a *noble vine.* But how is the gold become dim! How greatly have we forsaken the pious examples of our fathers!

So prone have mankind always proved themselves to degeneracy, and bent to backsliding. Which shows plainly their natural propensity; and that when good has revived, and been promoted among men, it has been by some divine interposition, to oppose the natural current; the fruit of some extraordinary means, the efficacy of which has soon been overcome by constant, natural bias, and the effect of good example presently lost, and evil has regained and maintained the dominion: like a heavy body, which may by some great power be caused to ascend, against its nature, a little while, but soon goes back again towards the centre, to which it naturally and constantly tends.

So that evil example will in no wise account for the corruption of mankind, without supposing a natural proneness to sin. The tendency of example alone will not account for general wicked practice, as consequent on good example. And if the influence of bad example is a reason of some of the wickedness that is in the world, that alone will not account for man's becoming worse than the example set, and degenerating more and more, and growing worse and worse, which has been the manner of mankind.

2. There has been given to the world an example of virtue, which, were it not for a dreadful depravity of nature, would have influence on them that live under the gospel, far beyond all other examples; and that is, the example of Jesus Christ.

God, who knew the human nature, and how apt men are to be influenced by example, has made answerable provision. His infinite wisdom has contrived that we should have set before us the most amiable and perfect example, in such circumstances, as should have the greatest tendency to influence all the principles of man's nature, but his corruption. Men are apt to be moved by the example of others *like themselves,* or in their own nature; therefore this example was given in our nature. Men are ready to follow the example of the great and honorable; and this example, though it was of one in our nature, yet it was of one infinitely higher and more honorable than kings or angels. A people are apt to follow the example of their prince: this is the example of that glorious person, who stands in a peculiar relation to Christians, as their Lord and King, the Supreme Head of the church; and not only so, but the King of kings, Supreme Head of the Universe, and head over all things to the church. Children are apt to follow the example of their parents: this is the example of the Author of our Being, and one who is in a peculiar and extraordinary manner our Father, as he is the Author of our Holy and happy Being; besides his being the Creator of the world, and everlasting Father of the Universe. Men are very apt to follow the example of their friends: the example of Christ is of one that is infinitely our greatest friend, standing in the most endearing relations of our Brother, Redeemer, Spiritual Head and Husband; whose grace and love

expressed to us, transcends all other love and friendship, as much as heaven is higher than the earth. And then the virtues and acts of his example were exhibited to us in the most endearing and engaging circumstances that can possibly be conceived of: his obedience and submission to God, his humility, meekness, patience, charity, self-denial, &c., being exercised and expressed in a work of infinite grace, love, condescension, and beneficence to us; and had all their highest expressions in his laying down his life for us, and meekly, patiently, and cheerfully undergoing such extreme and unutterable suffering, for our eternal salvation. Men are peculiarly apt to follow the example of such as they have great benefits from: but it is utterly impossible to conceive of greater benefits, that we could have by the virtues of any person, than we have by the virtuous acts of Christ; who depend upon being thereby saved from eternal destruction, and brought to inconceivable immortal glory at God's right hand. Surely if it were not for an extreme corruption of the heart of men, such an example would have that strong influence on the heart, that would as it were swallow up the power of all the evil and hateful examples of a generation of vipers.

3. The influence of bad example, without corruption of nature, will not account for children's universally committing sin as soon as capable of it; which, I think, is a fact that has been made evident by the Scripture. It will not account for this, in the children of eminently pious parents; the first examples that are set in their view, being very good; which, as has been observed, was especially the case of many children in Christian families in the apostles' days, when the apostle John supposes that every individual person had sin to repent of, and confess to God.

4. What Dr. Taylor supposes to have been fact, with respect to a great part of mankind, cannot consistently be accounted for from the influence of bad example, viz., the state of the Heathen world, which he supposes, considered as a collective body, was helpless, dead in sin, and unable to recover itself. Not evil example alone, no, nor as united with evil instruction, can be supposed a sufficient reason why every new generation that arose among them, should not be able to emerge from the idolatry and wickedness of their ancestors, in any consistence with his scheme. The ill example of ancestors could have no power to oblige them to sin, any other way than as a strong temptation. But Dr. Taylor himself says, p. 72. *S.*, "To suppose men's temptations to be superior to their powers, will impeach the goodness and justice of God, who appoints every man's trial." And as to bad instructions, as was observed before, he supposes that they all, yea every individual person, had light sufficient to know God, and do their whole duty. And if each one could do this for himself, then surely they might all be agreed in it through the power of free will, as well as the whole world be agreed in corruption by the same power.

Evasion 4. Some modern opposers of the doctrine of Original Sin, do thus account for the general prevalence of wickedness, viz., that in a course of nature our senses grow up first, and the animal passions get the start of reason. So Dr. Turnbull says,* "Sensitive objects first affect us, and inasmuch as reason is a principle, which, in the nature of things, must be advanced to strength and vigor, by gradual cultivation, and these objects are continually assailing and soliciting us; so, unless a very happy education prevents, our sensitive appetites must have become very strong, before reason can have force enough to call them to an account, and assume authority over them." From hence Dr. Turnbull supposes it comes to pass,† "That though some few may, through the influence

* See *Moral Philosophy*, p. 279, and *Christian Philosophy*, p. 274. † *Christian Philosophy*, p. 252, 253

of virtuous example, be said to be sanctified from the womb, so liberal, so generous, so virtuous, so truly noble is their cast of mind ; yet, generally speaking, the whole world lieth in such wickedness, that, with respect to the far greater part of mankind, the study of virtue is beginning to reform, and is a severe struggle against bad habits, early contracted, and deeply rooted ; it is therefore putting off an old, inveterate, corrupt nature, and putting on a new form and temper; i is moulding ourselves anew ; it is a being born again, and becoming as children And how few are there in the world who escape its pollutions, so as not to be early in that class, or to be among the righteous that need no repentance!"

Dr. Taylor, though he is not so explicit, seems to hint at the same thing, p. 192: "It is by slow degrees (says he) that children come to the use of understanding; the animal passions being for some years the governing part of their constitution. And therefore, though they may be froward and apt to displease us, yet how far this is sin in them, we are not capable of judging. But it may suffice to say, that it is the will of God that children should have appetites and passions to regulate and restrain, that he hath given parents instructions and commands to discipline and inform their minds, that if parents first learned true wisdom for themselves, and then endeavored to bring up their children in the way of virtue, there would be less wickedness in the world."

Concerning these things I would observe, that such a scheme is attended with the very same difficulties, which they that advance it would avoid ; liable to the same objections, which they make against God's ordering it so that men should be brought into being with a prevailing propensity to sin. For this scheme supposes, the author of nature has so ordered things, that men should come into being as moral agents, that is, should first have existence in a state and capacity of moral agency, under a prevailing propensity to sin. For that strength, which sensitive appetites and animal passions come to by their habitual exercise, before persons come to the exercise of their rational powers, amounts to a strong propensity to sin, when they first come to the exercise of those rational powers, by the supposition: because this is given as a reason why the scale is turned for sin among mankind, and why, *generally speaking, the whole world lies in wickedness, and the study of virtue is a severe struggle against bad habits, early contracted, and deeply rooted.* These deeply rooted habits must imply a tendency to sin ; otherwise they could not account for that which they are brought to account for, namely, prevailing wickedness in the world ; for that cause cannot account for an effect, which is supposed to have no tendency to that effect. And this tendency which is supposed, is altogether equivalent to a natural tendency : it is as necessary to the subject. For it is supposed to be brought on the person who is the subject of it, when he has no power to withstand or oppose it : the habit, as Dr. Turnbull says, becoming very strong, before reason can have force enough to call the passions to account, or assume authority over them. And it is supposed, that this necessity, by which men become subject to this propensity to sin, is from the ordering and disposal of the author of nature ; and therefore must be as much from his hand, and as much without the hand of the person himself, as if he were first brought into being with such a propensity. Moreover, it is supposed that the effect, which the tendency is *to*, is truly wickedness. For it is alleged as a cause or reason why the whole world lies in wickedness, and why all but a very few are first in the class of the wicked, and not among the righteous, that need no repentance. If they need repentance, what they are guilty of is truly and properly wickedness, or moral evil for certainly men need no repentance for that which is no sin, or blamable evil If it be so, that, as a consequence of this propensity, the world lies in wickedness

and the far greater part are of a wicked character, without doubt, the far greater part go to eternal perdition; for death does not pick and choose for men of a righteous character only. And certainly that is an evil, corrupt state of things which naturally tends to, and issues in that consequence, that as it were the whole world lies and lives in wickedness, and dies in wickedness, and perishes eternally. And this, by the supposition, is a state of things, wholly of the ordering of the author of nature, before mankind are capable of having any hand in the affair. And is this any relief to the difficulties, which these writers object against the doctrine of natural depravity?

And I might here also observe, that this way of accounting for the wickedness of the world, amounts to just the same thing with that solution of man's depravity, which was mentioned before, that Dr. Taylor cries out of as too gross to be admitted (p. 188, 189), viz., God's creating the soul pure, and putting it into such a body, as naturally tends to pollute it. For this scheme supposes, that God creates the soul pure, and puts it into a body, and into such a state in that body, that the natural consequence is a strong propensity to sin, as soon as the soul is capable of sinning.

Dr. Turnbull seems to suppose, that the matter could not have been ordered otherwise, consistent with the nature of things, than that animal passions should be so aforehand with reason, as that the consequence should be that which has been mentioned; because reason is a faculty of such a nature, that it can have strength and vigor no otherwise than by exercise and culture.* But can there be any force in this? Is there any thing in nature, to make it impossible, but that the superior principle of man's nature should be so proportioned to the inferior, as to prevent such a dreadful consequence, as the moral and natural ruin, and eternal perdition of the far greater part of mankind? Could not those superior principles be in vastly greater strength at first, and yet be capable of endless improvement? And what should hinder its being so ordered by the Creator, that they should improve by vastly swifter degrees than they do? If we are Christians we must be forced to allow it to be possible in the nature of things, that the principles of human nature should be so balanced, that the consequence should be no propensity to sin, in the first beginning of a capacity of moral agency; because we must own, that it was so in fact in Adam, when first created, and also in the man Christ Jesus; though the faculties of the latter were such as grew by culture and improvement, so that he increased in wisdom as he grew in stature.

Evasion 5. Seeing men in this world are in a state of trial, it is fit that their virtue should meet with trials, and consequently that it should have opposition and temptation to overcome; not only from without, but from within, in the animal passions and appetites we have to struggle with; that by the conflict and victory our virtue may be refined and established. Agreeably to this, Dr. Taylor (p. 253) says, "Without a right use and application of our powers, were they naturally ever so perfect, we could not be judged fit to enter into the kingdom of God. This gives a good reason why we are now in a state of trial and temptation, viz., to prove and discipline our minds, to season our virtue, and to fit us for the kingdom of God; for which, in the judgment of infinite wisdom, we cannot be qualified, but by overcoming our present temptations." And in p. 78, *S.*, he says, "We are upon trial, and it is the will of our Father that our constitution should be attended with various passions and appetites, as well as our outward condition with various temptations." He says the like in sev-

* Mor. Phil. p. 311

eral other places. To the same purpose very often Dr. Turnbull, particularly *Christian Philosophy*, p. 310, "What merit (says he) except from combat? What virtue without the encounter of such enemies, such temptations as arise both from within and from abroad? To be virtuous, is to prefer the pleasures of virtue, to those which come into competition with it, and vice holds forth to tempt us; and to dare to adhere to truth and goodness, whatever pains and hardships it may cost. There must therefore, in order to the formation and trial, in order to the very being of virtue, be pleasures of a certain kind to make temptations to vice."

In reply to these things I would say, either the state of temptation, which is supposed to be ordered for men's trial, amounts on the whole to a prevailing tendency to that state of general wickedness and ruin, which has been proved to take place, or it does not. If it does not amount to a tendency to such an effect, then how does it account for it? When it is inquired, by what cause such an effect should come to pass, is it not absurd to allege a cause, which is owned at the same time to have no tendency to such an effect? Which is as much as to confess, that it will not account for it. I think it has been demonstrated, that this effect must be owing to some prevailing tendency. If the other part of the dilemma be taken, and it be said, that this state of things does imply a prevailing tendency to that effect, which has been proved, viz., that all mankind, without the exception of so much as one, sin against God, to their own deserved and just, eternal ruin; and not only so, but sin thus immediately, as soon as capable of it, and sin continually, and have more sin than virtue, and have guilt that infinitely outweighs the value of all the goodness any ever have, and that the generality of the world in all ages are extremely stupid and foolish, and of a wicked character, and actually perish for ever; I say, if the state of temptation implies a natural tendency to such an effect as this, it is a very evil, corrupt, and dreadful state of things, as has been already largely shown.

Besides, such a state has a tendency to defeat its own supposed end, which is to refine, ripen, and perfect virtue in mankind, and so to fit men for the greater eternal happiness and glory: whereas, the effect it tends to, is the reverse of this, viz., general, eternal infamy and ruin, in all generations. It is supposed, that men's virtue must have passions and appetites to struggle with, in order to have the glory and reward of victory; but the consequence is, a prevailing, continual and generally effectual tendency, not to men's victory over evil appetites and passions, and the glorious reward of that victory, but to the victory of evil appetites and lusts over men, and utterly and eternally destroying them. If a trial of virtue be requisite, yet the question is, whence comes so general a failing in the trial, if there be no depravity of nature? If conflict and war be necessary, yet surely there is no necessity that there should be more cowards than good soldiers; unless it be necessary that men should be overcome and destroyed: especially it is not necessary that the whole world as it were should lie in wickedness, and so lie and die in cowardice.

I might also here observe, that Dr. Turnbull is not very consistent in supposing, that combat with temptation is requisite to the *very being* of virtue. For I think it clearly follows from his own notion of virtue, that virtue must have a being prior to any virtuous or praiseworthy combat with temptation. For, by his principles, all virtue lies in good affection, and no actions can be virtuous, but what proceed from good affection.* Therefore, surely the combat itself can have

* *Christian Philosophy*, p. 113—115

no virtue in it unless it proceeds from virtuous affection; and therefore virtue must have an existence before the combat, and be the cause of it

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CHAPTER II.

Universal Mortality proves Original Sin; particularly the Death of Infants, with its various circumstances.

THE universal reign of *death*, over persons of all ages indiscriminately, with the awful circumstances and attendants of death, proves that men come sinful into the world.

It is needless here particularly to inquire, whether God has not a sovereign right to set bounds to the lives of his own creatures, be they sinful or not; and as he gives life, so to take it away when he pleases? Or how far God has a right to bring extreme suffering and calamity on an innocent moral agent? For death, with the pains and agonies with which it is usually brought on, is not merely a limiting of existence, but is a most terrible calamity; and to such a creature as man, capable of conceiving of immortality, and made with so earnest a desire after it, and capable of foresight and of reflection on approaching death, and that has such an extreme dread of it, is a calamity above all others terrible, to such as are able to reflect upon it. I say, it is needless, elaborately to consider, whether God may not, consistent with his perfections, by absolute sovereignty, bring so great a calamity on mankind when perfectly innocent It is sufficient, if we have good evidence from Scripture, that it is not agreeable to God's manner of dealing with mankind so to do.

It is manifest, that mankind were not originally subjected to this calamity: God brought it on them afterwards, on occasion of man's sin, at a time of the manifestation of God's great displeasure for sin, and by a denunciation and sentence pronounced by him, as acting the part of a judge, as Dr. Taylor often confesses. Sin entered into the world, and death by sin, as the apostle says. Which certainly leads us to suppose, that this affair was ordered of God, not merely by the sovereignty of a Creator, but by the righteousness of a judge. And the Scripture everywhere speaks of all great afflictions and calamities, which God in his providence brings on mankind, as testimonies of his displeasure for sin, in the subject of those calamities; excepting those sufferings which are to atone for the sins of others. He ever taught his people to look on such calamities as his *rod*, *the rod of his anger*, his *frowns*, the *hidings of his face* in displeasure. Hence such calamities are in Scripture so often called by the name of *judgments*, being what God brings on men as a *judge*, executing a righteous sentence for transgression: yea, they are often called by the name of *wrath*, especially calamities consisting or issuing in death.* And hence also is that which Dr. Taylor would have us take so much notice of, that sometimes, in the Scripture, calamity and suffering is called by such names as *sin*, *iniquity*, *being guilty*, &c., which is evidently by a metonymy of the cause for the effect. It is not likely, that in the language in use of old among God's people, calamity or suffering would have been called even by the names of sin and guilt, if it had been so far from having any connection with sin, that even death itself, which is always spoken of as the most terrible of calamities, is not so much as any sign

* See Levit. x. 6. Numb. i. 53. and xviii. 5, Josh. ix. 20. 2 Chron. xxiv. 18, and xix. 2, 10, and xxvii. 13, and xxxii. 25. Ezra viii. 23. Neh. xiii. 18. Zech vii. 12, and many other places.

of the sinfulness of the subject, or any testimony of God's displeasure for any guilt of his, as Dr. Taylor supposes.

Death is spoken of in Scripture as the chief of calamities, the most extreme and terrible of all those natural evils, which come on mankind in this world. *Deadly destruction* is spoken of as the most terrible destruction, 1 Sam. v. 11; *deadly sorrow*, as the most extreme sorrow, Isa. xvii. 11, Matth. xxvi. 38; and *deadly enemies*, as the most bitter and terrible enemies, Psal. xvii. 9. The extremity of Christ's sufferings is represented by his suffering *unto death*, Phil. ii. 8, and other places. Hence the greatest testimonies of God's anger for the sins of men in this world, have been by inflicting death: as on the sinners of the old world, on the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, on Onan, Pharaoh, and the Egyptians, Nabab and Abihu, Korah and his company, and the rest of the rebels in the wilderness, on the wicked inhabitants of Canaan, on Hophni and Phinehas, Ananias and Sapphira, the unbelieving Jews, upon whom wrath came to the uttermost, in the time of the last destruction of Jerusalem. This calamity is often spoken of as in a peculiar manner the fruit of the guilt of sin. Exod. xxviii. 43, "That they bear not iniquity and *die*." Levit. xxii. 9, "Lest they bear sin for it and *die*." So Numb. xviii. 22, compared with Levit. x. 1, 2. The very light of nature, or tradition from ancient revelation, led the heathen to conceive of death as in a peculiar manner an evidence of divine vengeance. Thus we have an account, Acts xxviii. 4, that *when the barbarians saw the venomous beast hang on Paul's hand, they said among themselves, No doubt this man is a murderer, whom, though he hath escaped the seas, yet* vengeance suffereth not to live.

Calamities that are very small in comparison of the universal, temporal destruction of the whole world of mankind by death, are spoken of as manifest indications of God's great displeasure for the sinfulness of the subject; such as the destruction of particular cities, countries, or numbers of men, by war or pestilence. Deut. xxix. 24, "All nations shall say, Wherefore hath the Lord done thus unto this land? What meaneth the heat of this great anger?" Here compare Deut. xxxii. 30, 1 Kings ix. 8, and Jer. xxii. 8, 9. These calamities, thus spoken of as plain testimonies of God's great anger, consisted only in hastening on that death, which otherwise, by God's disposal, would most certainly have come in a short time. Now the taking off of thirty or forty years from seventy or eighty (if we should suppose it to be so much, one with another, in the time of these extraordinary judgments), is but a small matter, in comparison of God's first making man mortal, cutting off his hoped for immortality, subjecting him to inevitable death, which his nature so exceedingly dreads; and afterwards shortening his life further, by cutting off more than eight hundred years of it; so bringing it to be less than a twelfth part of what it was in the first ages of the world. Besides that innumerable multitudes in the common course of things, without any extraordinary judgment, die in youth, in childhood, and infancy. Therefore how inconsiderable a thing is the additional or hastened destruction, that is brought on a particular city or country by war, compared with that universal havoc which death makes of the whole race of mankind, from generation to generation, without distinction of sex, age, quality, or condition, with all the infinitely various, dismal circumstances, torments, and agonies, which attend the death of old and young, adult persons and little infants? If those particular and comparatively trivial calamities, extending perhaps not to more than the thousandth part of the men of one generation, are clear evidences of God's great anger; certainly this universal, vast destruction, by which the whole world in all generations is swallowed up, as by a flood, that nothing

can resist, must be a most glaring manifestation of God's anger for the sinfulness of mankind. Yea, the Scripture is express in it, that it is so. Psal. xc. 3, &c., "Thou turnest man to destruction, and sayest, Return, ye children of men.—Thou carriest them away as with a flood: they are as a sleep: in the morning they are like grass which groweth up; in the morning it flourisheth and groweth up; in the evening it is cut down and withereth. For we are consumed by thine anger, and by thy wrath are we troubled. Thou hast set our iniquities before thee, our secret sins in the light of thy countenance. For all our days are passed away in thy wrath: we spend our years as a tale that is told. The days of our years are threescore years and ten; and if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their strength labor and sorrow; for it is soon cut off, and we fly away. Who knoweth the power of thine anger? According to thy fear, so is thy wrath. So teach us to number our days, that we may apply our hearts unto wisdom." How plain and full is this testimony, that the general mortality of mankind is an evidence of God's anger for the sin of those who are the subjects of such a dispensation!

Abimelech speaks of it as a thing which he had reason to conclude from God's nature and perfection, *that he would not slay a righteous nation.* Gen. xx. 4. By *righteous* evidently meaning *innocent.* And if so, much less *will God slay a righteous world* (consisting of so many nations—repeating the great slaughter in every generation), or subject the whole world of mankind to death, when they are considered as innocent, as Dr. Taylor supposes. We have from time to time in Scripture such phrases as *worthy of death*, and *guilty of death;* but certainly the righteous Judge of all the earth will not bring death on thousands of millions, not only that are not worthy of death, but are worthy of no punishment.

Dr. Taylor from time to time speaks of affliction and death as a great benefit, as they increase the vanity of all earthly things, and tend to excite sober reflections, and to induce us to be moderate in gratifying the appetites of the body, and to mortify pride and ambition, &c.* To this I would say,

1. It is not denied but God may see it needful for mankind in their present state, that they should be mortal, and subject to outward afflictions, to restrain their lusts, and mortify their pride and ambition, &c. But then is it not an evidence of man's depravity that it is so? Is it not an evidence of distemper of mind, yea, strong disease, when man stands in need of such sharp medicines, such severe and terrible means to restrain his lusts, keep down his pride, and make him willing to be obedient to God? It must be because of a corrupt and ungrateful heart, if the riches of God's bounty, in bestowing life and prosperity, and things comfortable and pleasant, will not engage the heart to God, and to virtue, and childlike love and obedience, but that he must always have the rod held over him, and be often chastised, and held under the apprehensions of death, to keep him from running wild in pride, contempt and rebellion, ungratefully using the blessings dealt forth from God's hand, in sinning against him, and serving his enemies. If man has no natural disingenuity of heart, it must be a mysterious thing indeed, that the sweet blessings of God's bounty have not as powerful an influence to restrain him from sinning against God, as terrible afflictions. If any thing can be a proof of a perverse and vile disposition, this must be a proof of it, that men should be most apt to forget and despise God, when his providence is most kind; and that they should need to have God chastise them with great severity, and even to kill them, to keep them in order. If we were as much disposed to gratitude to God for his benefits, as we are to anger

* Pages 21, 67, and other places.

at our fellow creatures for injuries, as we must be (so far as I can see) if we are not of a depraved heart, the sweetness of the divine bounty, if continued in life, and the height of every enjoyment that is pleasant to innocent human nature, would be as powerful incentives to a proper regard to God, tending as much to promote religion and virtue, as to have the world filled with calamity, and to have God (to use the language of Hezekiah, Isaiah xxxviii. 13, describing death and its agonies) *as a lion, breaking all our bones, and from day even to night, making an end of us.*

Dr. Taylor himself, p. 252, says, "That our first parents before the fall were placed in a condition proper to engage their gratitude, love and obedience." Which is as much as to say, proper to engage them to the exercise and practice of all religion. And if the paradisaical state was proper to engage to all religion and duty, and men still come into the world with hearts as good as the two first of the species, why is it not proper to engage them to it still? What need of so vastly changing man's state, depriving him of all those blessings, and instead of them allotting to him a world full of briers and thorns, affliction, calamity and death, to engage him to it? The taking away of life, and all those pleasant enjoyments man had at first, by a permanent constitution, would be no stated benefit to mankind, unless there was a stated disposition in them to abuse such blessings. The taking them away is supposed to be a benefit under the notion of their being things that tend to lead men to sin; but they would have no such tendency, at least in a stated manner, unless there was in men a fixed tendency to make that unreasonable misimprovement of them. Such a temper of mind as amounts to a disposition to make such a misimprovement of blessings of that kind, is often spoken of in Scripture, as most astonishingly vile and perverse. So concerning Israel's abusing the blessings of Canaan, that land flowing with milk and honey; their ingratitude in it is spoken of by the prophets, as enough to astonish all heaven and earth, and as more than brutish stupidity and vileness. Jer. ii. 7, "I brought them into a plentiful country, to eat the fruit thereof, and the goodness thereof. But when ye entered, ye defiled my land," &c. See the following verses, especially verse 12, "Be astonished, O ye heavens, at this." So Isaiah i. 2—4, "Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth; I have nourished and brought up children, and they have rebelled against me. The ox knoweth his owner, and the ass his master's crib, but my people doth not know, Israel doth not consider. Ah, sinful nation! A people laden with iniquity, a seed of evil doers, children that are corrupters." Compare Deut. xxxii. 6—19. If it showed so great depravity, to be disposed thus to abuse the blessings of so fruitful and pleasant a land as Canaan, surely it would be an evidence of a no less astonishing corruption, to be inclined to abuse the blessings of Eden, and the garden of God there.

2. If death be brought on mankind only as a benefit, and in that manner which Dr. Taylor mentions, viz., to mortify or moderate their carnal appetites and affections, wean them from the world, excite them to sober reflections, and lead them to the fear and obedience of God, &c., is it not strange that it should fall so heavy on infants, who are not capable of making any such improvement of it; so that many more of mankind suffer death in infancy, than in any other equal part of the age of man? Our author sometimes hints, that the death of infants may be for the good of parents, and those that are adult, and may be for the correction and punishment of the sins of parents: but hath God any need of such methods to add to parents' afflictions? Are there not ways enough that he might increase their trouble, without destroying the lives of such multitudes

of those that are perfectly innocent, and have in no respect any sin belonging to them; on whom death comes at an age, when not only the subjects are not capable of any reflection or making any improvement of it, either in the suffering or expectation of it; but also at an age, when parents and friends, who alone can make a good improvement, and whom Dr. Taylor supposes alone to be punished by it, suffer least by being bereaved of them; though the infants themselves sometimes suffer to great extremity?

3. To suppose, as Dr. Taylor does, that death is brought on mankind in consequence of Adam's sin, not at all as a calamity, but only as a favor and benefit, is contrary to the doctrine of the gospel, which teaches that when Christ, as the second Adam, comes to remove and destroy that death which came by the first Adam, he finds it not as a friend, but an enemy. 1 Cor. xv. 22, "For as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive;" with verses 25 and 26, "For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last *enemy* that shall be destroyed, is *death*."

Dr. Taylor urges that the afflictions which mankind are subjected to, and particularly their common mortality, are represented in Scripture as the chastisements of our heavenly Father; and therefore are designed for our spiritual good, and consequently are not of the nature of punishments. So in p. 68, 69, 38, 39, *S*.

Though I think the thing asserted far from being true, viz., that the Scripture represents the afflictions of mankind in general, and particularly their common mortality, as the chastisements of an heavenly Father, yet it is needless to stand to dispute that matter; for if it be so, it will be no argument that the afflictions and death of mankind are not evidences of their sinfulness. Those would be strange chastisements from the hand of a wise and good father, which are wholly for nothing; especially such severe chastisements as to break the child's bones, when at the same time the father does not suppose any guilt, fault or offence in any respect belonging to the child; but it is chastised in this terrible manner, only for fear that it will be faulty hereafter. I say, these would be a strange sort of chastisements; yea, though he should be able to make it up to the child afterwards. Dr. Taylor tells of representations made by the whole current of Scripture: I am certain it is not agreeable to the current of Scripture, to represent divine, fatherly chastisements after this manner. It is true, that the Scripture supposes such chastenings to be the fruit of God's goodness; yet at the same time it evermore represents them as being for the sin of the subject, and as evidences of the divine displeasure for its sinfulness. Thus the apostle in 1 Cor. xi. 30—32, speaks of God's chastening his people by mortal sickness, for their good, *that they might not be condemned with the world*, and yet signifies that it was *for their sin; for this cause many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep:* that is, for the profaneness and sinful disorder before mentioned. So Elihu, Job xxxiii. 16, &c., speaks of the same *chastening* by sickness, as for men's good, *to withdraw man from his* sinful *purpose, and to hide pride from man, and keep back his soul from the pit;* that *therefore God chastens man with pain on his bed, and the multitude of his bones with strong pain.* But these chastenings are for his sins, as appears by what follows, verse 28, where it is observed, that when God by this means has brought men to *repent*, and humbly confess *their sins*, he delivers them. Again, the same Elihu, speaking of the unfailing love of God to the righteous, even when he *chastens them*, and *they are bound in fetters, and holden in cords of affliction*, chapter xxxvi. 7, &c., yet speaks of these chastenings as being for their sins: verse 9, "Then he showeth them their work, and their transgressions, that they have

exceeded." So David, Psalm xxx., speaks of God's *chastening* by sore afflictions, as being for his good, and issuing joyfully; and yet being the fruit of God's anger for his sin: verse 5, "God's anger endureth but for a moment," &c. Compare Psalm cxix. 67, 71, 75. God's fatherly chastisements, are spoken of as being for sin. 2 Sam. vii. 14, 15, "I will be his father, and he shall be my son. If he commit iniquity, I will chasten him with the rod of men, and with the stripes of the children of men, but my mercy shall not depart away from him." So the prophet Jeremiah speaks of the great affliction that God's people of the young generation suffered in the time of the captivity, as being for their good. Lam. iii. 25, &c. But yet these chastisements are spoken of as being for their sin, see especially verses 39, 40. So Christ says, Rev. iii. 19, "As many as I love, I rebuke and chasten." But the words following show that these chastenings from love, are for sin that should be repented of: "Be zealous, therefore, and repent." And though Christ tells us, they are blessed that are persecuted for righteousness' sake, and have reason to rejoice and be exceeding glad; yet even the persecution of God's people, as ordered in divine providence, are spoken of as divine chastenings for sin, like the just corrections of a father, when the children deserve them, Heb. xii. The apostle, there speaking to the Christians concerning the persecutions which they suffered, calls their sufferings by the name of divine *rebukes*, which implies testifying *against a fault*; and that they may not be discouraged, puts them in mind, that *whom the Lord loves he chastens, and scourgeth every son that he receiveth.* It is also very plain, that the persecutions of God's people, as they are from the disposing hand of God, are chastisements for sin, from 1 Pet. iv. 17, 18, compared with Prov. xi. 31. See also Psalm lxix. 4—9.

If divine chastisements in general are certain evidences that the subjects are not wholly without sin, some way belonging to them, then in a peculiar manner is death so, for these reasons:

1. Because slaying or delivering to death, is often spoken of as in general a more awful thing than the chastisements that are endured in this life. So Psalm cxviii. 17, 18, "I shall not die, but live, and declare the works of the Lord. The Lord hath chastened me sore, but he hath not given me over unto death." So the Psalmist, in Psalm lxxxviii. 15, setting forth the extremity of his affliction, represents it by this, that it was next to death. "I am afflicted and ready to die: while I suffer thy terrors, I am distracted." So David, 1 Sam. xx. 3. So God's tenderness towards persons under chastisements, is from time to time set forth by that, that he did not proceed so far as to make an end of them by death, as in Psalm lxxviii. 38, 39, Psalm ciii. 9, with verses 14, 15, Psalm xxx. 2, 3, 9, and Job xxxiii. 22, 23, 24. So we have God's people often praying, when under great affliction, that God would not proceed to this, as being the greatest extremity. Psalm xiii. 3, "Consider, and hear me, O Lord my God: lighten mine eyes, lest I sleep the sleep of death." So Job x. 9, Psalm vi. 1—5, lxxxviii. 9, 10, 11, and cxliii. 7.

Especially may death be looked upon as the most extreme of all temporal sufferings, when attended with such dreadful circumstances, and extreme pains, as those with which Providence sometimes brings it on infants, as on the children that were offered up to Moloch, and some other idols, who were tormented to death in burning brass. Dr. Taylor says, p. 83, 128, *S.*, "The Lord of all being can never want time, and place, and power, to compensate abundantly any sufferings infants now undergo in subserviency to his good providence." But there are no bounds to such a license, in evading evidences from fact. It might as well be said, that there is not and cannot be any such thing as evidence,

from events of God's displeasure, which is most contrary to the whole current of Scripture, as may appear in part from things which have been observed. This gentleman might as well go further still, and say that God may cast guiltless persons into hellfire, to remain there in the most unutterable torments for ages of ages (which bear no greater proportion to eternity than a quarter of an hour), and if he does so, it is no evidence of God's displeasure, because he can never want time, place, and power, abundantly to compensate their sufferings afterwards. If it be so, it is not to the purpose, as long as the Scripture does so abundantly teach us to look on great calamities and sufferings which God brings on men, especially death, as marks of his displeasure for sin, and for sin belonging to them that suffer.

2. Another thing which may well lead us to suppose death, in a peculiar manner, above all other temporal sufferings, intended as a testimony of God's displeasure for sin, is, that death is a thing attended with that awful appearance, that gloomy and terrible aspect, that naturally suggests to our minds God's awful displeasure. Which is a thing that Dr. Taylor himself takes particular notice of, page 69, speaking of death : "Herein," says he, "have we before our eyes a striking demonstration that sin is infinitely hateful to God, and the corruption and ruin of our nature. Nothing is more proper than such a sight to give us the utmost abhorrence of all iniquity," &c. Now if death be no testimony of God's displeasure for sin, no evidence that the subject is looked upon, by him who inflicts it, as any other than perfectly innocent, free from all manner of imputation of guilt, and treated only as an object of favor, is it not strange, that God should annex to it such affecting appearances of his hatred and anger for sin, more than to other chastisements? Which yet the Scripture teaches us are always for sin. These gloomy and striking manifestations of God's hatred of sin attending death, are equivalent to awful frowns of God attending the stroke of his hand. If we should see a wise and just father chastising his child, mixing terrible frowns with severe strokes, we should justly argue, that the father considered his child as having something in him displeasing to him, and that he did not thus treat his child only under a notion of mortifying him, and preventing his being faulty hereafter, and making it up to him afterwards, when he had been perfectly innocent, and without fault, either of action or disposition thereto.

We may well argue from these things, that infants are not looked upon by God as sinless, but that they are by nature children of wrath, seeing this terrible evil comes so heavily on mankind in infancy. But besides these things, which are observable concerning the mortality of infants in general, there are some particular cases of the death of infants, which the Scripture sets before us, that are attended with circumstances, in a particular manner giving evidences of the sinfulness of such, and their just exposedness to divine wrath. As particularly,

The destroying of the infants in Sodom, and the neighboring cities; which cities, destroyed in so extraordinary, miraculous, and awful a manner, are set forth as a signal example, of God's dreadful vengeance for sin, to the world in all generations; agreeable to that of the apostle, Jude, verse 7. God did not reprove, but manifestly countenanced Abraham, when he said, with respect to the destruction of Sodom, (Gen. xviii. 23, 25), "Wilt thou destroy the righteous with the wicked?—That be far from thee to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked, and that the righteous should be as the wicked, that be far from thee. Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" Abraham's words imply that God would not destroy the innocent with the guilty. We may well understand *innocent* as included in the word *righteous*, according

to the language usual in Scripture, in speaking of such cases of judgment and punishment; as is plain in Gen. xx. 4. Exod. xxiii. 7. Deut. xxv. 1. 2 Sam. iv. 11. 2 Chron. vi. 33, and Prov xviii 5. Eliphaz says, Job iv. 7, "Who ever perished, being innocent? Or where were the righteous cut off?" We see what great care God took that Lot should not be involved in that destruction. He was miraculously rescued by angels, sent on purpose; who aid hold on him, and brought him, and set him without the gates of the city; and told him that they could do nothing till he was out of the way. Gen. xix. 22. And not only was he thus miraculously delivered, but his two wicked daughters for his sake. The whole affair, both the destruction, and the rescue of them that escaped, was miraculous; and God could as easily have delivered the infants which were in those cities. And if they had been without sin, their perfect innocency, one should think, would have pleaded much more strongly for them, than those lewd women's relation to Lot pleaded for them. When in such a case, we must suppose these infants much further from deserving to be involved in that destruction, than even Lot himself. To say here, that God could make it up to those infants in another world, must be an insufficient reply. For so he could as easily have made it up to Lot, or to ten or fifty righteous, if they had been destroyed in the same fire: nevertheless it is plainly signified, that this would not have been agreeable to the wise and holy proceedings of the judge of all the earth.

Since God declared, that if there had been found but ten righteous in Sodom, he would have spared the whole city for their sake, may we not well suppose, if infants are perfectly innocent, that he would have spared the *old world*, in which there were, without doubt, many hundred thousand infants, and in general one in every family, whose perfect innocence pleaded for its preservation? Especially when such vast care was taken to save Noah and his family (some of whom, one at least, seem to have been none of the best), that they might not be involved in that destruction. If the perfect sinlessness of infants had been a notion entertained among the people of God of old, in the ages next following the flood, handed down from Noah and his children, who well knew that vast multitudes of infants perished in the flood, is it likely that Eliphaz, who lived within a few generations of Shem and Noah, would have said to Job, as he does in that forementioned, Job iv. 7, "Who ever perished being innocent? And when were the righteous cut off?" Especially since in the same discourse (chap. v. 1.) he appeals to the tradition of the ancients for a confirmation of this very point; as he also does in chap. xv. 7—10, and xxii. 15, 16 In which last place he mentions that very thing, the destruction of the wicked by the flood, as an instance of that perishing of the wicked, which he supposes to be peculiar to them, for Job's conviction; in which *the wicked were cut down out of time, their foundation being overflown with a flood.* Where it is also observable, that he speaks of such an untimeliness of death as they suffered by the flood, as one evidence of guilt; as he also does, chap. xv. 32, 33, "It shall be accomplished before his time; and his branch shall not be green." But those that were destroyed by the flood in infancy, above all the rest, were *cut down out of time;* when instead of living above nine hundred years, according to the common period of man's life, many were cut down before they were one year old.

And when God executed vengeance on the ancient inhabitants of Canaan, not only did he not spare their cities and families for the sake of the infants that were therein, nor take any care that they should not be involved in the destruction; but often with particular care repeated his express commands,

that their infants should not be spared, but should be utterly destroyed, without any pity; while Rahab the *harlot* (who had been far from innocence, though she expressed her faith in entertaining, and safely dismissing the spies) was preserved, and all her friends for her sake. And when God executed his wrath on the Egyptians, by slaying their first born, though the children of Israel, who were most of them wicked men, as was before shown, were wonderfully spared by the destroying angel, yet such first born of the Egyptians as were infants, were not spared. They not only were not rescued by the angel, and no miracle wrought to save them (as was observed in the case of the infants of Sodom) but the angel destroyed them by his own immediate hand, and a miracle was wrought to kill them.

Here, not to stay to be particular concerning the command by Moses respecting the destruction of the infants of the Midianites, Num. xxxi. 17; and that given to Saul to destroy all the infants of the Amalekites, 1 Sam. xv. 3; and what is said concerning Edom, Psalm cxxxvii. 9, "Happy shall he be that taketh, and dasheth thy little ones against the stones;" I proceed to take notice of something remarkable concerning the destruction of Jerusalem, represented in Ezek. ix., when command was given to them, that had charge over the city, to destroy the inhabitants, verses 1—8. And this reason is given for it, that their iniquity required it, and it was a just recompense of their sin, verses 9, 10. And God at the same time was most particular and exact in his care that such should by no means be involved in the slaughter, as had proved by their behavior, that they were not partakers in the abominations of the city. Command was given to the angel to go through the city, and set a mark upon their foreheads, and the destroying angel had a strict charge not to come near any man, on whom was the mark; yet the infants were not marked, nor a word said of sparing them: on the contrary, infants were expressly mentioned as those that should be utterly destroyed, without pity, verse 5, 6, "Go through the city, and smite: let not your eye spare, neither have ye pity. Slay utterly old and young, both maids and little children; but come not near any man upon whom is the mark."

And if any should suspect that such instances as these were peculiar to a more severe dispensation, under the Old Testament, let us consider a remarkable instance in the days of the glorious gospel of the grace of God; even the last destruction of Jerusalem; which was far more terrible, and with greater testimonies of God's wrath and indignation, than the destruction of Sodom. or of Jerusalem in Nebuchadnezzar's time, or any thing that ever had happened to any city or people, from the beginning of the world to that time: agreeable to Matt. xxiv. 21, and Luke xxi, 22, 23. But at that time particular care was taken to distinguish and deliver God's people, as was foretold Dan. xii. 1. And we have in the New Testament a particular account of the care Christ took for the preservation of his followers: he gave them a sign, by which they might know when the desolation of the city was nigh, that they that were in Jerusalem night flee to the mountains, and escape. And as history gives account, the Christians followed the directions given, and escaped to a place in the mountains called Pella, and were preserved. Yet no care was taken to preserve the infants of the city, in general; but, according to the prediction of that event, they were involved with others in that great destruction; so heavily did the calamity fall upon them, that those words were verified, Luke xxiii. 29, "Behold the days are coming, in which they shall say, Blessed are the barren, and the womb that never bare, and the paps which never gave suck." And that prophecy in Deut. xxxii. 21—25, which has undoubtedly special respect to this very time, and is so applied by the best commentators: "I will

provoke them to jealousy, with those that are not a people; for a fire is kindled in mine anger; and it shall burn to the lowest hell. I will heap mischiefs upon them: I will spend mine arrows upon them. They shall be burnt with hunger, and devoured with burning heat, and bitter destruction. The sword without, and terror within, shall destroy both the young man, and the virgin, the suckling also, with the man of gray hairs." And it appears by the history of that destruction, that at that time was a remarkable fulfilment of that in Deut. xxviii. 53—57, concerning *parents' eating their children in the siege; and the tender and delicate woman eating her new-born child.* And here it must be remembered, that these very destructions of that city and land are spoken of in those places forementioned, as clear evidences of God's wrath, to all nations which shall behold them. And if so, they were evidences of God's wrath towards infants; who, equally with the rest, were the subjects of the destruction. If a particular kind or rank of persons, which made a very considerable part of the inhabitants, were from time to time partakers of the overthrow, without any distinction made in divine providence, and yet this was no evidence at all of God's displeasure with any of them; then a being the subject of such a calamity could not be an evidence of God's wrath against any of the inhabitants, to the reason of *all nations*, or any nation, or so much as one person.

PART II.

CONTAINING OBSERVATIONS ON PARTICULAR PARTS OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURE, WHICH PROVE THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN.

CHAPTER I.

OBSERVATIONS RELATING TO THINGS CONTAINED IN THE THREE FIRST CHAPTERS OF GENESIS, WITH REFERENCE TO THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN.

SECTION I.

Concerning Original Righteousness; and whether our first Parents were created with Righteousness, or moral rectitude of Heart?

THE doctrine of *Original Righteousness*, or the creation of our first parents with holy principles and dispositions, has a close connection, in several respects, with the doctrine of Original Sin. Dr. Taylor was sensible of this; and accordingly he strenuously opposes this doctrine, in his book against Original sin. And therefore in handling the subject, I would in the first place remove this author's main objection against this doctrine, and then show how the doctrine may be inferred from the account which Moses gives us, in the *three first chapters of Genesis.*

Dr. Taylor's grand objection against this doctrine, which he abundantly insists on, is this: that it is utterly inconsistent with the nature of virtue, that

it should be concreated with any person; because, if so, it must be by an act of God's absolute power, without our knowledge or concurrence; and that moral virtue, in its very nature implieth the choice and consent of the moral agent, without which it cannot be virtue and holiness: that a necessary holiness is no holiness. So p. 180, where he observes, "That Adam must exist, he must be created, yea he must exercise thought and reflection, before he was righteous." See also p. 250, 251. In p. 161. *S.*, he says, "To say, that God not only endowed Adam with a capacity of being righteous, but moreover that righteousness and true holiness were created with him, or wrought into his nature, at the same time he was made, is to affirm a contradiction, or what is inconsistent with the very nature of righteousness." And in like manner Dr. Turnbull in many places insists upon it, that it is necessary to the very being of virtue, that it be owing to our own choice, and diligent culture.

With respect to this, I would observe, that it consists in a notion of virtue quite inconsistent with the nature of things, and the common notions of mankind; and also inconsistent with Dr. Taylor's own notions of virtue. Therefore if it be truly so, that to affirm that to be virtue or holiness, which is not the fruit of preceding thought, reflection and choice, is to affirm a contradiction, I shall show plainly, that for him to affirm otherwise is a contradiction to himself.

In the first place, I think it a contradiction to the nature of things, as judged of by the common sense of mankind. It is agreeable to the sense of the minds of men in all nations and ages, not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but the good choice itself, from whence that effect proceeds; yea, and not only so, but also the antecedent good disposition, temper, or affection of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice, is virtuous. This is the general notion, not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed; and so that the act of choosing that which is good, is no further virtuous than it proceeds from a good principle, or virtuous disposition of mind. Which supposes, that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act of choice; and that therefore it is not necessary that there should first be thought, reflection and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before the existence of a good disposition of heart, what signifies that choice? There can, according to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which proceeds from no virtuous principle, but from mere self-love, ambition, or some animal appetite; and therefore a virtuous temper of mind may be before a good act of choice, as a tree may be before the fruit, and the fountain before the stream which proceeds from it.

The following things in Mr. Hutcheson's inquiry concerning moral good and evil, are evidently agreeable to the nature of things, and the voice of human sense and reason. *Section* II. p. 132, 133, "Every action which we apprehend as either morally good or evil, is always supposed to flow from some affections towards sensitive natures. And whatever we call virtue or vice, is either some such affection, or some action *consequent upon it*. All the actions counted religious in any country, are supposed by those who count them so, to *flow from* some affections towards the Deity; and whatever we call social virtue, we still suppose to *flow from* affections towards our fellow creatures. Prudence, if it is only employed in promoting private interest, is never imagined to be a virtue." In these things Dr. Turnbull expressly agrees with Mr. Hutcheson, who is his admired author.*

* *Moral Philosophy* p. 112—115, p. 142, *et alibi passim.*

If a virtuous disposition or affection is before acts that proceed from it then they are before those virtuous acts of choice which proceed from it. And therefore there is no necessity that all virtuous dispositions or affections should be the effect of choice: and so no such supposed necessity can be a good objection against such a disposition's being natural, or from a kind of instinct, implanted in the mind in its creation. Agreeable to what Mr. Hutcheson says (*Ibid. Section* III. p. 196, 197): "I know not," says he, "for what reason some will not allow that to be virtue, which flows from instinct or passions. But how do they help themselves? They say, virtue arises from reason. What is reason, but the sagacity we have in prosecuting any end? The ultimate end proposed by common moralists, is the happiness of the agent himself. And this certainly he is determined to pursue from instinct. Now may not another instinct towards the public, or the good of others, be as proper a principle of virtue, as the instinct towards private happiness? If it be said, that actions from instinct are not the effect of prudence and choice, this objection will hold full as strongly against the actions which flow from self-love."

And if we consider what Dr. Taylor declares as his own notion of the essence of virtue, we shall find, what he so confidently and often affirms, of its being essential to all virtue, that it should follow choice and proceed from it, is no less repugnant to that, than it is to the nature of things, and the general notions of mankind. For it is his notion, as well as Mr. Hutcheson's, that the essence of virtue lies in *good affection*, and particularly in benevolence or *love*; as he very fully declares in these words in his Key,* "That the word that signifies goodness and mercy should also signify moral rectitude in general, will not seem strange, if we consider that love is the fulfilling of the law. Goodness, according to the sense of Scripture, and the nature of things, includes all *moral rectitude*, which, I reckon, may every part of it, where it is true and genuine, be resolved into this *single principle*." If it be so indeed, then certainly no act whatsoever can have *moral rectitude*, but what proceeds from *this principle*. And consequently no act of volition or choice can have any moral rectitude, that takes place before this principle exists. And yet he most confidently affirms, that thought, reflection and choice must go before virtue, and that all virtue or righteousness must be the fruit of preceding choice. This brings his scheme to an evident contradiction. For no act of choice can be virtuous but what proceeds from a principle of benevolence or *love*; for he insists that all genuine, moral rectitude, in every part of it, is resolved into this single principle; and yet the principle of benevolence itself cannot be virtuous, unless it proceeds from choice, for he affirms, that nothing can have the nature of virtue but what comes from choice. So that virtuous love, as the principle of all virtue, must go before virtuous choice, and be the principle or spring of it; and yet virtuous choice must go before virtuous benevolence, and be the spring of that. If a virtuous act of choice goes before a principle of benevolence, and produces it, then this virtuous act is something distinct from that principle which follows it, and is its effect. So that here is at least one part of virtue, yea, the spring and source of all virtue, viz., a virtuous choice, that cannot be resolved into that single principle of *love*.

Here also it is worthy to be observed, that Dr. Taylor, p. 128, says, "The cause of every effect is alone chargeable with the effect it produceth; or which proceedeth from it:" and so he argues, that if the effect be bad, the cause alone is sinful. According to which reasoning, when the effect is good, the cause alone

* Marginal Note annexed to § 358.

is righteous or virtuous: to the cause is to be ascribed all the praise of the good effect it produceth. And by the same reasoning it will follow, that if, as Dr. Taylor says, Adam must choose to be righteous, before he was righteous, and if it be essential to the nature of righteousness or moral rectitude, that it be the effect of choice, and hence a principle of benevolence cannot have moral rectitude, unless it proceeds from choice; then not to the principle of benevolence, which is the effect, but to the foregoing choice alone is to be ascribed all the virtue or righteousness that is in the case. And so, instead of all moral rectitude in every part of it, being resolved into that single principle of benevolence, no moral rectitude, in any part of it, is to be resolved into that principle; but all is to be resolved into the foregoing choice, which is the cause.

But yet it follows from these inconsistent principles, that there is no moral rectitude or virtue in that first act of choice, that is the cause of all consequent virtue. This follows two ways: 1. Because every part of virtue lies in the benevolent principle, which is the effect, and therefore no part of it can lie in the cause. 2. The choice of virtue, as to the first act at least, can have no virtue or righteousness at all, because it does not proceed from any foregoing choice. For Dr. Taylor insists that a man must first have reflection and choice, before he can have righteousness, and that it is essential to holiness that it proceed from choice. So that the first choice of holiness, which holiness proceeds from, can have no virtue at all, because by the supposition it does not proceed from choice, being the first choice. Hence if it be essential to holiness, that it proceeds from choice, it must proceed from an unholy choice; unless the first holy choice can be before itself, or there be a virtuous act of choice before that which is first of all.

And with respect to Adam, let us consider how, upon Dr. Taylor's principles, it was not possible he ever should have any such thing as righteousness, by any means at all. In the state wherein God created him, he could have no such thing as love to God, or any love or benevolence in his heart. For if so, there would have been original righteousness; there would have been *genuine moral rectitude:* nothing would have been wanting; for our author says, *True, genuine, moral rectitude, in every part of it, is to be resolved into this single principle.* But if he were wholly without any such thing as love to God, or any virtuous love, how should he come by virtue? The answer doubtless will be, by act of choice: he must first choose to be virtuous. But what if he did choose to be virtuous? It could not be from love to God, or any virtuous principle, that he chose it; for, by the supposition, he has no such principle in his heart: and if he chooses it without such a principle, still, according to this author, there is no virtue in his choice; for all virtue, he says, is to be resolved into that single principle of love. Or will he say, there may be produced in the heart a virtuous benevolence by an act or acts of choice, that are not virtuous? But this does not consist with what he implicitly asserts, that to the cause alone is to be ascribed what is in the effect. So that there is no way that can possibly be devised, in consistence with Dr. Taylor's scheme, in which Adam ever could have any righteousness, or could ever either obtain any principle of virtue, or perform any one virtuous act.

These confused, inconsistent assertions, concerning virtue and moral rectitude, arise from the absurd notions in vogue, concerning *Freedom of Will*, as if it consisted in the will's *self-determining power*, supposed to be necessary to moral agency, virtue and vice. The absurdities of which, with the grounds of these errors, and what the truth is respecting these matters, with the evidences of it, I have, according to my ability, fully and largely considered, in my *Inquiry* on

that subject; to which I must refer the reader, who desires further satisfaction, and is willing to give himself the trouble of reading that discourse.

Having considered this great argument, and pretended demonstration of Dr. Taylor's against original righteousness; I proceed to the *proofs* of the doctrine. And in the first place, I would consider, whether there be not evidence of it in the three first chapters of Genesis: or, whether the history there delivered, does not lead us to suppose, that our *first parents* were created in a state of moral rectitude and holiness.

I. This history leads us to suppose, Adam's sin, with relations to the forbidden fruit, was the first sin he committed. Which could not have been, had he not always, till then, been perfectly righteous, righteous from the first moment of his existence, and consequently, created, or brought into existence righteous. In a moral agent, subject to moral obligations, it is the same thing to be perfectly *innocent*, as to be perfectly *righteous*. It must be the same, because there can no more be any *medium* between sin and righteousness, or between a being right and being wrong, in a moral sense, than there can be a medium between straight and crooked, in a natural sense. Adam was brought into existence capable of acting immediately, as a moral agent, and therefore he was immediately under a rule of *right* action: he was obliged as soon as he existed to *act right*. And if he was obliged to act right as soon as he existed, he was obliged even then to be *inclined* to act right. Dr. Taylor says, p. 166, *S.*, "Adam could not *sin* without a sinful *inclination*."* And just for the same reason he could not do *right*, without an *inclination* to right action. And as he was obliged to act right from the first moment of his existence, and did do so till he sinned in the affair of the forbidden fruit, he must have an inclination or disposition of heart to do right the first moment of his existence; and that is the same as to be created or brought into existence, with an inclination to right action, or which is the same thing, a virtuous and holy disposition of heart.

Here it will be in vain to say, it is true that it was Adam's duty to have a good disposition or inclination, as soon as it was possible to be obtained, in the nature of things; but as it could not be without *time* to establish such a habit, which requires antecedent thought, reflection, and repeated right action; therefore all that Adam could be obliged to in the first place, was to reflect and consider things in a right manner, and apply himself to right action, in order to obtain a right disposition. For this supposes, that even this reflection and consideration, which he was obliged to, was *right action*. Surely he was obliged to it no otherwise than as a thing that was *right*; and therefore he must have an *inclination* to this right action immediately, before he could perform those first right actions. And as the inclination to them should be right, the principle or disposition from which he performed even these actions, must be good; otherwise the actions would not be right in the sight of him who looks at the heart; nor would they answer the man's obligations, or be a doing his duty, if he had done them for some sinister end, and not from a regard to God and his duty. Therefore there must be a regard to God and his duty implanted in him at his first existence; otherwise it is certain he would have done nothing from a regard to God and his duty; no, not so much as to reflect and consider, and try to obtain such a disposition. The very supposition of a *disposition* to right action being first obtained by repeated right *action*, is grossly inconsistent with itself; for it supposes a course of right action, *before* there is a disposition to perform any right action.

* This is doubtless true; for although there was no natural, sinful inclination in Adam, yet an inclination to that sin of eating the forbidden fruit, was forgotten in him by the delusion and error he was led into, and this inclination to eat the forbidden fruit, must precede his actual eating.

These are no invented quibbles or sophisms. If God expected of Adam any obedience or duty to him at all, when he first made him, whether it was in reflecting, considering, or any way exerting the faculties he had given him, then God expected he should immediately exercise love and regard to him. For how could it be expected, that Adam should have a strict and perfect regard to God's commands and authority, and his duty to him, when he had no love nor regard to him in his heart, nor could it be expected he should have any? If Adam from the beginning did his duty to God, and had more respect to the will of his Creator than to other things, and as much respect to him as he ought to have; then from the beginning he had a supreme and perfect respect and love to God; and if so, he was created with such a principle. There is no avoiding the consequence. Not only external duties, but internal duties, such as summarily consist in love, must be immediately required of Adam, as soon as he existed, if any duty at all was required. For it is most apparently absurd, to talk of a spiritual being, with the faculties of understanding and will, being required to perform external duties, without internal. Dr. Taylor himself observes, that love is the fulfilling of the law, and that *all moral rectitude, even every part of it, must be resolved into that single principle.* Therefore, if any morally right act at all, reflection, consideration, or any thing else, was required of Adam immediately on his first existence, and was performed as required; then he must, the first moment of his existence, have his heart possessed of that principle of divine *love;* which implies the whole of moral rectitude in every part of it, according to our author's own doctrine: and so the whole of moral rectitude or righteousness must begin with his existence; which is the thing taught in the doctrine of Original Righteousness.

And let us consider how it could be otherwise, than that Adam was always, in every moment of his existence, obliged to exercise such regard or respect of heart towards every object or thing, as was agreeable to the apparent merit of that object. For instance, would it not at any time have been a becoming thing in Adam, on the exhibition to his mind of God's infinite goodness to him, for him to have exercised answerable gratitude, and the contrary have been unbecoming and odious? And if something had been presented to Adam's view, transcendently amiable in itself, as for instance, the glorious perfection of the divine nature, would it not have become him to love, relish and delight in it? Would not such an object have merited this? And if the view of an object so amiable in itself did not affect his mind with complacence, would it not, according to the plain dictates of our understanding, have shown an unbecoming temper of mind?

To say that he had not had time, by culture, to form and establish a good disposition or relish, is not what would have taken off the disagreeableness and odiousness of the temper. And if there had been never so much time, I do not see how it could be expected he should improve it aright, in order to obtain a good disposition, if he had not already some good disposition to engage him to it.

That belonging to the will and disposition of the heart, which is in itself either odious or amiable, unbecoming or decent, always would have been Adam's virtue or sin, in any moment of his existence; if there be any such thing as virtue or vice, by which nothing can be meant, but that in our moral disposition and behavior, which is becoming or unbecoming, amiable or odious.

Human nature must be created with some dispositions; a disposition to relish some things as good and amiable, and to be averse to other things as odious and disagreeable; otherwise it must be without any such thing as inclination or

will: it must be perfectly indifferent, without preference, without choice or aversion towards any thing as agreeable or disagreeable. But if it had any concreated dispositions at all, they must be either right or wrong, either agreeable or disagreeable to the nature of things. If man had at first the highest relish of those things that were most excellent and beautiful, a disposition to have the quickest and highest delight in those things that were most worthy of it, then his dispositions were morally right and amiable, and never can be decent and excellent in a higher sense. But if he had a disposition to love most those things that were inferior and less worthy, then his dispositions were vicious And it is evident there can be no medium between these.

II. This notion of Adam's being created without a principle of holiness in his heart, taken with the rest of Dr. Taylor's scheme, is inconsistent with what the history, in the beginning of Genesis, leads us to suppose of the great favors and smiles of heaven, which Adam enjoyed while he remained in innocency. The Mosaic account suggests to us that till Adam sinned he was in happy circumstances, surrounded with testimonies and fruits of God's favor. This is implicitly owned by Dr. Taylor, when he says, page 252, "That in the dispensation our first parents were under before the fall, they were placed in a condition proper to engage their gratitude, love and obedience." But it will follow on our author's principles, that Adam, while in innocency, was placed in far worse circumstances than he was in after his disobedience, and infinitely worse than his posterity are in; under unspeakably greater disadvantages for the avoiding of sin, and the performance of duty. For by his doctrine, Adam's posterity come into the world with their hearts as free from any propensity to sin as he, and he was made as destitute of any propensity to righteousness as they; and yet God, in favor to them, does great things to restrain them from sin, and excite them to virtue, which he never did for Adam in innocency, but laid him, in the highest degree, under contrary disadvantages.

God, as an instance of his great favor, and fatherly love to man, since the fall, has denied him the ease and pleasures of Paradise, which gratified and allured his senses, and bodily appetites; that he might diminish his temptations to sin. And as a still greater means to restrain from sin, and promote virtue, has subjected him to labor, toil and sorrow in the world; and not only so, but as a means to promote his spiritual and eternal good far beyond this, has doomed him to death: and when all this was found insufficient, he, in further prosecution of the designs of his love, shortened men's lives exceedingly, made them twelve or thirteen times shorter than in the first ages. And yet this, with all the innumerable calamities, which God in great favor to mankind has brought on the world, whereby their temptations are so vastly cut short, and the means and inducements to virtue heaped one upon another, to so great a degree, all have proved insufficient, now for so many thousand years together, to restrain from wickedness in any considerable degree; innocent human nature, all along, coming into the world with the same purity and harmless dispositions that our first parents had in Paradise. What vast disadvantages indeed then must Adam and Eve have been in, that had no more in their nature to keep them from sin, or incline them to virtue, than their posterity, and yet were without all those additional and extraordinary means! Not only without such exceeding great means as we now have, when our lives are made so very short, but having vastly less advantages than their antediluvian posterity, who to prevent their being wicked, and to make them good, had so much labor and toil, sweat and sorrow, briers and thorns, with a body gradually decaying and returning to the dust; when our first parents had the extreme disadvantage of being placed in the midst of

so many and exceeding great temptations, not only without toil or sorrow, pain or disease, to humble and mortify them, and a sentence of death to wean them from the world, but in the midst of the most exquisite and alluring sensitive delights, the reverse in every respect, and to the highest degree, of that most gracious state of requisite means, and great advantages, which mankind now enjoy! If mankind now under these vast restraints, and great advantages, are not restrained from general, and as it were universal wickedness, how could it be expected that Adam and Eve, created with no better hearts than men bring into the world now, and destitute of all these advantages, and in the midst of all contrary disadvantages, should escape it?

These things are not agreeable to Moses' account; which represents a happy state of peculiar favors and blessings before the fall, and the curse coming afterwards; but according to this scheme, the curse was before the fall, and the great favors and testimonies of love followed the apostasy. And the curse before the fall must be a curse with a witness, being to so high a degree the reverse of such means, means so necessary for such a creature as innocent man, and in all their multitude and fulness proving too little. Paradise therefore must be a mere delusion! There was indeed a great show of favor, in placing man in the midst of such delights. But this delightful garden it seems, with all its beauty and sweetness, was in its real tendency worse than the apples of Sodom: it was but a mere bait (God forbid the blasphemy) the more effectually enticing by its beauty and deliciousness, to Adam's eternal ruin; which might be the more expected to be fatal to him, seeing that he was the first man that ever existed, having no superiority of capacity to his posterity, and wholly without the advantage of the observations, experiences, and improvements of preceding generations, which his posterity have.

I proceed now to take notice of an additional proof of the doctrine we are upon, from another part of the holy Scripture. A very clear text for *original righteousness* is that in Eccles. vii. 29, "Lo, this only have I found, that God made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions."

It is an observation of no weight which Dr. Taylor makes on this text, that the word *man* is commonly used to signify mankind in general, or mankind collectively taken. It is true it often signifies the species of mankind; but then it is used to signify the species, with regard to its duration and succession from its beginning, as well as with regard to its extent. The English word mankind is used to signify the species: but what if it be so? Would it be an improper or unintelligible way of speaking, to say, that when God first made mankind, he placed them in a pleasant paradise (meaning in their first parents), but now they live in the midst of briers and thorns? And it is certain, that to speak of God's making mankind in such a meaning, viz., his giving the species an existence in their first parents, at the creation of the world, is agreeable to the Scripture use of such an expression. As in Deut. iv. 32, "Since the day that God created man upon the earth." Job xx. 4, "Knowest thou not this of old, since man was placed upon the earth." Isa. xlv. 12, "I have made the earth, and created man upon it: I, even my hands, have stretched out the heavens." Jer. xxvii. 5, "I have made the earth, the man and the beast that are upon the ground, by my great power." All these texts speak of God's making man, by the word *man*, signifying the species of mankind; and yet they all plainly have respect to God's making man *at first*, when God *made the earth and stretched out the heavens*, and created the first parents of mankind. In all these places the same word Adam is used, as here in Ecclesiastes; and in the last of them, used with *he emphaticum*, as it is here; though Dr. Taylor omits

it, when he tells us, he gives us a catalogue of all the places in Scripture where the word is used. And it argues nothing to the doctor's purpose, that the pronoun *they* is used. *They have sought out many inventions.* Which is properly applied to the species, which God made at first upright: God having begun the species with more than one, and it being continued in a multitude. As Christ speaks of the two sexes, in the relation of man and wife, as continued in successive generations. Matth. xix. 4, "He that made them at the beginning, made them male and female;" having reference to Adam and Eve.

No less impertinent, and also very unfair, is his criticism on the word *jashar*, translated *upright*. Because the word sometimes signifies *right*, he would from thence infer, that it does not properly signify a moral rectitude, even when used to express the character of moral agents. He might as well insist, that the English word *upright*, sometimes, and in its most original meaning, signifies *right up*, or in an erect posture, therefore it does not properly signify any moral character, when applied to moral agents; and indeed less unreasonably; for it is known, that in the Hebrew language, in a peculiar manner, most words used to signify moral and spiritual things, are taken from things external and natural. The word *jashar* is used, as applied to moral agents, or to the words and actions of such (if I have not misreckoned*), about a hundred and ten times in Scripture; and about a hundred of them, without all dispute, to signify virtue, or moral rectitude (though Dr. Taylor is pleased to say, the word does not generally signify a moral character), and for the most part it signifies *true virtue*, or virtue in such a sense, as distinguishes it from all false appearances of virtue, or what is only virtue in some respects, but not truly so in the sight of God. It is used at least eighty times in this sense: and scarce any word can be found in the Hebrew language more significant of this. It is thus used constantly in Solomon's writings (where it is often found), when used to express a character or property of moral agents. And it is beyond all controversy, that he uses it in this place, in the 7th of Ecclesiastes, to signify a moral rectitude, or character of real virtue and integrity. For the wise man, in this context, is speaking of men with respect to their moral character, inquiring into the corruption and depravity of mankind (as is confessed p. 184), and he here declares, he had not found more than one among a thousand of the right stamp, truly and thoroughly virtuous and upright; which appeared a strange thing! But in this text he clears God, and lays the blame on man: man was not made thus at first. He was made of the right stamp, altogether good in his kind (as all other things were), truly and thoroughly virtuous, as he ought to be; *but they have sought out many inventions.* Which last expression signifies things sinful, or morally evil; as is confessed, p. 185. And this expression, used to signify those moral evils he found in man, which he sets in opposition to the uprightness man was made in, shows, that by uprightness he means the most true and sincere goodness. The word rendered inventions, most naturally and aptly signifies the subtle devices, and crooked and deceitful ways of hypocrites, wherein they are of a character contrary to men of simplicity and godly sincerity; who, though wise in that which is good, are simple concerning evil. Thus the same wise man, in Prov. xii. 2, sets a truly good man in opposition to a man of *wicked devices*, whom God will condemn. Solomon had occasion to observe many who put on an artful disguise and fair show of goodness; but on searching thoroughly, he found very few truly upright. As he says, Prov. xx. 6, "Most men will proclaim every one his own goodness: but a

* Making use of Buxford's Concordance, which, according to the author's professed design, directs to all the places where the word is used.

faithful man who can find ?" So that it is exceeding plain, that by uprightness in this place in Ecclesiastes, Solomon means true moral goodness.

What our author urges concerning *many inventions* being spoken of, whereas Adam's eating the forbidden fruit was but *one invention*, is of as little weight as the rest of what he says on this text. For the many lusts and corruptions of mankind, appearing in innumerable ways of sinning, are all the consequence of that sin. The great corruption men are fallen into by the original apostasy, appears in the multitude of wicked ways they are inclined to And therefore these are properly mentioned as the fruits and evidences of the greatness of that apostasy and corruption.

SECTION II.

Concerning the kind of Death, threatened to our first Parents, if they should eat of the Forbidden Fruit.

Dr. Taylor, in his observations on the three first chapters of Genesis, says, p. 7, "The threatening to man, in case of transgression was, that he should surely die. Death is the losing of life. Death is opposed to life, and must be understood according to the nature of that life, to which it is opposed. Now the death here threatened can, with any certainty, be opposed only to the life God gave Adam, when he created him, verse 7. Any thing besides this, must be pure conjecture, without solid foundation."

To this I would say, it is true, *death is opposed to life, and must be understood according to the nature of that life, to which it is opposed:* but does it therefore follow, that nothing can be meant by it but the *loss* of life? Misery is opposed to happiness, and sorrow is in Scripture often opposed to joy; but can we conclude from thence, that nothing is meant in Scripture by sorrow, but the *loss of joy?* Or that there is no more in misery, than the *loss* or absence of happiness? And if it be so, that the death threatened to Adam can, with certainty, be opposed only to the life *given to Adam, when God created him;* I think, a state of perfect, perpetual and hopeless misery is properly opposed to that state *Adam was in, when God created him.* For I suppose it will not be denied, that the life Adam had, was truly a *happy* life; happy in perfect innocency, in the favor of his Maker, surrounded with the happy fruits and testimonies of his love: and I think it has been proved, that he also was happy in a state of perfect righteousness. And nothing is more manifest, than that it is agreeable to a very common acceptation of the word *life*, in Scripture, that it be understood as signifying a state of excellent and happy existence. Now that which is most opposite to *that life* and state *Adam was created in*, is a state of total, confirmed wickedness, and perfect hopeless misery, under the divine displeasure and curse; not excluding temporal death, or the destruction of the body, as an introduction to it.

And besides, that which is much more evident, than any thing Dr. Taylor says on this head, is this, viz., that the death, which was to come on Adam, as the *punishment* of his *disobedience*, was opposed to that *life*, which he would have had as the *reward* of his *obedience* in case he had not sinned. *Obedience* and *disobedience* are contraries: and the *threatenings* and *promises*, that are sanctions of a law, are set in direct opposition: and the *promised rewards* and *threatened punishments*, are what are most properly taken as each other's opposites But none will deny, that the life which would have been Adam's reward,

if he had persisted in obedience, was *eternal life*. And therefore we argue justly, that the death which *stands opposed to that life* (Dr. Taylor himself being judge, p. 120, *S*,) *is manifestly eternal death, a death widely different from the death we now die*—to use his own words. If Adam, for his persevering *obedience*, was to have had *everlasting life and happiness*, in *perfect holiness, union* with his Maker, and *enjoyment of his favor*, and this was the life which was to be confirmed by the tree of life; then doubtless the death threatened in case of disobedience, which stands in direct opposition to this, was a being given over *everlasting wickedness and misery*, in *separation* from God, and in *enduring his wrath*.

And it may with the greatest reason be supposed, that when God first made mankind, and made known to them the methods of his moral government towards them, in the revelation he made of himself to the natural head of the whole species; and let him know, that obedience to him was expected as his duty; and enforced this duty with the sanction of a threatened punishment, called by the name of *death*; I say, we may with the greatest reason suppose in such a case, that by *death* was meant the same death which God esteemed to be the most proper punishment of the sin of mankind, and which he speaks of under that name, throughout the Scripture, as the proper wages of the sin of man, and was always from the beginning understood to be so in the church of God. It would be strange indeed, if it should be otherwise. It would have been strange, if when the law of God was first given, and enforced by the threatening of a punishment, nothing at all had been mentioned of that great punishment, ever spoken of under the name of *death* (in the revelations which he has given to mankind from age to age), as the proper punishment of the sin of mankind. And it would be no less strange, if when the punishment which was mentioned and threatened on that occasion, was called by the same name, even death, yet we must not understand it to mean the same thing, but something infinitely diverse, and infinitely more inconsiderable.

But now let us consider what that death is, which the Scripture ever speaks of as the proper wages of the sin of mankind, and is spoken of as such by God's saints in all ages of the church, from the first beginning of a written revelation, to the conclusion of it. I will begin with the New Testament. When the Apostle Paul says, Rom. vi. 23, *the wages of sin is death*, Dr. Taylor tells us, p. 120. *S.*, that "this means eternal death, the second death, a death widely different from the death we now die." The same apostle speaks of death as the proper punishment due for sin, in Rom. vii. 5, and chap. viii. 13, 2 Cor. iii. 7, 1 Cor. xv. 56. In all which places, Dr. Taylor himself supposes the apostle to intend eternal death.* And when the Apostle James speaks of death as the proper reward, fruit, and end of sin, Jam. i. 15, "Sin when it is finished bringeth forth death," it is manifest that our author supposes eternal destruction to be meant.† And the Apostle John, agreeable to Dr. Taylor's sense, speaks of the second death as that which sin unrepented of will bring all men to at last. Rev. ii. 11, xx. 6, 14, and xxi. 8. In the same sense the Apostle John uses the word in his 1st epistle, chap. iii. 14, "We know, that we have passed from *death* to life, because we love the brethren: he that hateth his brother, abideth in *death*.

In the same manner Christ used the word from time to time when he was on earth, and spake concerning the punishment and issue of sin. John 7.

* See p. 78. Note on Rom. vii. 5, and Note on verse 6. Note on Rom. v. 20. Note on Rom. vii. 8.

† By comparing what he says, p. 126, with what he often says of that death and destruction which is the demerit and end of personal sin which he says is the *second death*, or *eternal destruction*.

24, "He that heareth my word, and believeth, &c., hath everlasting life; and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from *death* to life." Where, according to Dr. Taylor' own way of arguing, it cannot be the death which we now die, that Christ speaks of, but eternal death, because it is set in opposition to everlasting life. John vi. 50, "This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof, and not die." Chap. viii. 51, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, if a man keep my saying, he shall never see *death*." Chap. xi. 26, "And whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die." In which places it is plain Christ does not mean that believers shall never see temporal death. See also Matth. x. 28, and Luke x. 28. In like manner, the word was commonly used by the prophets of old, when they spake of death as the proper end and recompense of sin. So, abundantly by the Prophet Ezekiel. Ezek. iii. 18, "When I say unto the wicked man, thou shalt surely *die*." In the original it is, *Dying thou shalt die.* The same form of expression, which God used in the threatening to Adam. We have the same words again, chap. xxxiii. 18. In chap. xviii. 4, it is said, *The soul that sinneth, it shall die.* To the like purpose are chap. iii. 19, 20, and xviii. 4, 9, 13, 17—21, 24, 26, 28, chap. xxxiii. 8, 9, 12, 14, 19. And that temporal death is not meant in these places is plain, because it is promised most absolutely, that the righteous shall not die the death spoken of. Chap. xviii. 21, *He shall surely live, he shall not die.* So verses 9, 17, 19, and 22, and chap. iii. 21. And it is evident the Prophet Jeremiah uses the word in the same sense. Jer. xxxi. 30, *Every one shall die for his own iniquity.* And the same death is spoken of by the Prophet Isaiah. Isai. xi. 4, *With the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked.* See also chap. lxvi. 16, with verse 24. Solomon, who we must suppose was thoroughly acquainted with the sense in which the word was used by the wise, and by the ancients, continually speaks of death as the proper fruit, issue, and recompense of sin, using the word only in this sense. Prov. xi. 19, *As righteousness tendeth to* life, *so he that pursueth evil, pursueth it to his own* death. So chap. v. 5, 6, 23, vii. 27, viii. 36, ix. 18, x. 21, xi. 19, xiv. 12, xv. 10, xviii. 21, xix. 16, xxi. 16, and xxiii. 13, 14. In these places he cannot mean temporal death, for he often speaks of it as a punishment of the wicked, wherein the righteous shall certainly be distinguished from them; as in Prov. xii. 28, *In the way of righteousness is life, and in the pathway thereof is no* death. So in chap. x. 2, xi. 4, xiii. 14, xiv. 27, and many other places. But we find this same wise man observes, that as to temporal death, and temporal events in general, there is no distinction, but that they happen alike to good and bad. Eccl. ii. 14, 15, 16, viii. 14, and ix. 2, 3. His words are remarkable in Eccl. vii. 15, "There is a just man that *perisheth* in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that *prolongeth his life* in his wickedness." So we find David, in the Book of Psalms, uses the word *death* in the same sense, when he speaks of it as the proper wages and issue of sin. Psal. xxxiv. 21, "Evil shall *slay* the wicked." He speaks of it as a certain thing, Psal. cxxxix. 19, "Surely thou wilt *slay* the wicked, O God." And he speaks of it as a thing wherein the wicked are distinguished from the righteous. Psalm lxix. 28, "Let them be blotted out of the book of the *living*, and not be written with the righteous." And thus we find the word *death* used in the Pentateuch, or Books of Moses; in which part of the Scripture it is, that we have the account of the threatening of death to Adam. When death, in these books, is spoken of as the proper fruit, and appointed reward of sin, it is to be understood of eternal death. So Deut. xxx. 15, "See, I have set before thee this day *life* and good, and *death* and evil." Verse 19, "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that

I have set before you *life* and *death*, blessing and cursing." The life that is spoken of here, is doubtless the same that is spoken of in Levit. xviii. 5, "Ye shall therefore keep my statutes and my judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them." This the apostle understands of *eternal life*, as is plain by Rom. x. 5, and Gal. iii. 12. But that the death threatened for sin in the law of Moses, meant eternal death, is what Dr. Taylor abundantly declares. So in his Note on Rom. v. 20, Par. p. 291, "Such a constitution the law of Moses was, subjecting those who were under it to death for every transgression: meaning by *death eternal death*." These are his words. The like he asserts in many other places. When it is said, in the place now mentioned, *I have set before thee* life *and* death, *blessing and cursing*, without doubt, the same *blessing and cursing* is meant which God had already set before them with such solemnity, in the 27th and 28th chapters, where we have the sum of the curses in those last words of the 27th chapter, "Cursed is every one, which confirmeth not all the words of this law to do them." Which the apostle speaks of as a threatening of eternal death, and with him Dr. Taylor himself.* In this sense also Job and his friends spake of death, as the wages and end of sin, who lived before any written revelation, and had their religion and their phraseology about the things of religion from the ancients.

If any should insist upon it as an objection, against supposing that death was intended to signify eternal death in the threatening to Adam, that this use of the word is figurative; I reply, that though this should be allowed, yet it is by no means so figurative as many other phrases used in the history contained in these three chapters; as when it is said, *God said, Let there be light: God said, Let there be a firmament*, &c., as though God spake such words with a voice. So when it is said, God *called* the light, day: God *called* the firmament, heaven, &c.: God *rested* on the seventh day; as though he had been weary, and then rested. And when it is said, They heard the *voice* of God walking; as though the Deity had two feet, and took steps on the ground. Dr. Taylor supposes, that when it is said of Adam and Eve, "Their eyes were opened, and they saw that they were naked;" by the word *naked* is meant a *state of guilt*; page 12 Which sense of the word *naked*, is much further from the common use of the word, than the supposed sense of the word *death*. So this author supposes the promise concerning the seed of the woman's *bruising the serpent's head*, while the serpent should *bruise his heel*, is to be understood of "the Messiah's destroying the power and sovereignty of the Devil, and receiving some slight hurt from him;" pages 15, 16. Which makes the sentence full of figures, vastly more beside the common use of words. And why might not God deliver threatenings to our first parents in figurative expressions, as well as promises? Many other strong figures are used in these chapters.

But indeed, there is no necessity of supposing the word *death*, or the Hebrew word so translated, if used in the manner that has been supposed, to have been figurative at all. It does not appear but that this word, in its true and proper meaning, might signify perfect misery, and sensible destruction, though the word was also applied to signify something more external and visible. There are many words in our language, such as *heart*, *sense*, *discovery*, *conception*, *light*, and many others, which are applied to signify external things, as that muscular part of the body called *heart*; external feeling, called *sense*; the sight of the bodily eye, called *view*; the finding of a thing by its being uncovered, called *discovery*; the first beginning

* Note on Rom. v. 20. Par. p. 291—299.

of the fœtus in the womb, called *conception;* and the rays of the sun, called *light:* yet these words do as truly and properly signify other things of a more spiritual, internal nature, as those: such as the disposition, affection, perception, and thought of the mind, and manifestation and evidence to the soul. Common use, which governs the propriety of language, makes the latter things to be as much signified by those words, in their proper meaning, as the former. It is especially common in the Hebrew, and I suppose, other oriental languages, that the same word that signifies something external, does no less properly and usually signify something more spiritual. So the Hebrew words used for breath, have such a double signification: *Neshama* signifies both *breath* and the *soul*, and the latter as commonly as the former. *Ruach* is used for *breath* or *wind*, but yet more commonly signifies *spirit*. *Nephesh* is used for *breath*, but yet more commonly signifies *soul*. So the word *lebh*, *heart*, no less properly signifies the *soul*, especially with regard to the will and affections, than that part of the body so called. The word *shalom*, which we render *peace*, no less properly signifies prosperity and happiness, than mutual agreement. The word translated *life*, signifies the natural life of the body, and also the perfect and happy state of sensible, active being, and the latter as properly as the former. So the word *death* signifies destruction, as to outward *sensibility*, activity and enjoyment; but it has most evidently another signification, which, in the Hebrew tongue, is no less proper, viz., *perfect, sensible, hopeless ruin and misery.*

It is therefore wholly without reason urged, that death properly signifies only the loss of this present life; and that therefore nothing else was meant by that death which was threatened for eating the forbidden fruit. Nor does it at all appear but that Adam, who, from what God said concerning the seed of the woman, that was so very figurative, could understand, that relief was promised as to the death which was threatened (as Dr. Taylor himself supposes), understood the death that was threatened in the more important sense; especially seeing temporal death, as it is originally, and in itself, is evermore, excepting as changed by divine grace, an introduction or entrance into that gloomy, dismal state of misery, which is shadowed forth by the dark and awful circumstances of this death, naturally suggesting to the mind the most dreadful state of hopeless, sensible ruin.

As to that objection which some have made, that the phrase, *dying thou shalt die*, is several times used in the Books of Moses, to signify temporal death, it can be of no force: for it has been shown already, that the same phrase is sometimes used in Scripture to signify eternal death, in instances much more parallel with this. But indeed nothing can be certainly argued concerning the nature of the thing intended, from its being expressed in such a manner. For it is evident that such repetitions of a word in the Hebrew language, are no more than an emphasis upon a word in the more modern languages, to signify the great degree of a thing, the importance of it, or the certainty of it, &c. When we would signify and impress these, we commonly put an emphasis on our words: instead of this, the Hebrews, when they would express a thing strongly, repeated or doubled the word, the more to impress the mind of the hearer; as may be plain to every one in the least conversant with the Hebrew Bible. The repetition in the threatening to Adam, therefore, only implies the solemnity and importance of the threatening. But God may denounce either eternal or temporal death with peremptoriness and solemnity, and nothing can certainly be inferred concerning the nature of the thing threatened, because it is threatened with emphasis, more than this, that the threatening is much to be regarded. Though it be true, that it might in an especial manner be expected

that a threatening of eternal death would be denounced with great emphasis, such a threatening being infinitely important, and to be regarded above all others.

SECTION III.

Wherein it is inquired, whether there be any thing in the history of the three first chapters of Genesis, which should lead us to suppose that God, in his constitution with Adam, dealt with mankind in general, as included in their first father, and that the threatening of death, in case he should eat the forbidden fruit, had respect not only to him, but his posterity?

Dr. Taylor, rehearsing that threatening to Adam, *Thou shalt surely die*, and giving us his paraphrase of it, p. 7, 8, concludes thus: "Observe, here is not *one word* relating to Adam's posterity." But it may be observed in opposition to this, that there is scarcely *one word* that we have an account of, which God ever said to Adam or Eve, but what does manifestly include their posterity in the meaning and design of it. There is as much of *a word* said about Adam's posterity in that threatening, as there is in those words of God to Adam and Eve, Gen. i. 28, "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it;" and as much in events, to lead us to suppose Adam's posterity to be included. There is as much of *a word* of his posterity in that threatening, as in those words, verse 29, "Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed—and every tree in which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed," &c. Even when God was about to create Adam, what he said on that occasion, had not respect only to Adam, but to his posterity. Gen. i. 26, "Let us make man in our image, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea," &c. And, what is more remarkable, there is as much of a word said about Adam's posterity in the threatening of death, as there is in that sentence, Gen. iii. 19, "Unto dust shalt thou return." Which Dr. Taylor himself supposes to be a sentence pronounced for the execution of that very threatening, "Thou shalt surely die;" and which sentence he himself also often speaks of as including Adam's posterity; and what is much more remarkable still, is a sentence which Dr. Taylor himself often speaks of, as *including his posterity as a sentence of condemnation*, as a *judicial* sentence, and a sentence which God pronounced with regard to Adam's *posterity, acting the part of a Judge*, and as such condemning them to temporal death. Though he is therein utterly inconsistent with himself, inasmuch as he at the same time abundantly insists, that death is not brought on Adam's posterity in consequence of his sin, at all as a punishment; but merely by the gracious disposal of a Father, bestowing a *benefit of the highest nature* upon them.*

But I shall show that I do not in any of these things falsely charge, or misrepresent Dr. Taylor. He speaks of the sentence in chap. iii. 19, as pronounced in pursuance of the threatening in the former chapter, in these words, pages 17, 18, "The sentence upon man, verses 17, 18, 19, first affects the earth, upon which he was to subsist: the ground should be incumbered with many noxious weeds, and the tillage of it more toilsome; which would oblige the man to procure a sustenance by hard labor, till he should die, and drop into the ground, from whence he was taken. Thus death entered by sin into the world, and man became mortal,† *according to the threatening in the former*

* Page 27, 8.

† The subsequent part of the quotation, the reader will not meet with in the third edition of Dr. Taylor, but in the second of 1741.

chapter." Now, if mankind becomes mortal, and must die, according to the threatening in the former chapter, then doubtless the threatening in the former chapter, *Thou shalt die*, had respect not only to Adam, but to mankind, and included Adam's posterity. Yea, and Dr. Taylor is express in it, and very often so, that the sentence concerning dropping into the ground, or returning to the dust, did include Adam's posterity. So, page 20, speaking there of that sentence. "Observe (says he), that we their posterity are in fact subjected to the affliction and mortality, here by sentence inflicted upon our first parents." Page 42, Note. But yet men through that long tract, were all subject to death, therefore they must be included in the sentence." The same he affirms in innumerable other places, some of which I shall have occasion to mention presently.

The sentence which is founded on the threatening, and, as Dr. Taylor says, *according to the threatening*, extends to as many as were included in the threatening, and to no more. If the sentence be upon a collective subject, infinitely (as it were), the greatest part of which were not included in the threatening, nor were ever threatened at all by any threatening whatsoever, then certainly this sentence is not *according to the threatening*, nor built upon it. If the sentence be according to the threatening, then we may justly explain the threatening by the sentence; and if we find the sentence spoken to the same person, to whom the threatening was spoken, and spoken in the second person singular, in like manner with the threatening, and *founded on* the threatening, and *according to* the threatening: and if we find the sentence includes Adam's posterity, then we may certainly infer, that so did the threatening; and hence, that both the threatening and sentence were delivered to Adam as the public head and representative of his posterity.

And we may also further infer from it, in another respect directly contrary to Dr. Taylor's doctrine, that the sentence which included *Adam's* posterity, was to death, *as a punishment* to that posterity, as well as to *Adam* himself. For a sentence pronounced in execution of a threatening, is to a punishment. Threatenings are of punishments. Neither God nor man are wont to threaten others with favors and benefits.

But lest any of this author's admirers should stand to it, that it may very properly be said, God threatened mankind with bestowing great kindness upon them, I would observe, that Dr. Taylor often speaks of this sentence as pronounced by God on all mankind as condemning them, speaks of it as *a sentence of condemnation judicially pronounced*, or a sentence which God pronounced on all mankind *acting as their judge*, and *in a judicial proceeding*. Which he affirms in multitudes of places. In p. 20, speaking of this sentence, which he there says, subjects us, Adam's and Eve's posterity, to affliction and mortality, he calls it a judicial act of condemnation. "The *judicial act of condemnation* (says he) clearly implies, a taking him to pieces, and turning him to the ground from whence he was taken." And p. 28, 29, Note, "In all the Scripture from one end to the other, there is recorded but one *judgment to condemnation*, which came upon *all men*, and that is, Gen. iii. 17—19, *Dust thou art*," &c. P. 40, speaking of the same, he says, "*all men* are brought under condemnation." In p. 27, 28, "By judgment, *judgment to condemnation*, it appeareth evidently to me, he (Paul) means the being *adjudged* to the forementioned death; he means the sentence of death, of a general mortality, *pronounced upon mankind*, in consequence of Adam's first transgression. And the *condemnation* inflicted by the *judgment of God*, answereth to, and is in effect the same thing with being dead." P. 30, "The many, that is mankind, were subject to death by the *judicial act* of God." P. 31, "Being made sinners, may very well signify, being *adjudged*,

or *condemned* to death. For the Hebrew word, &c., signifies to make one a sinner by a *judicial sentence*, or to *condemn*." P. 178, Par. on Rom. v. 19, "Upon the account of one man's disobedience, *mankind* were *judicially constituted sinners;* that is, subjected to death, by the sentence of God the *judge*." And there are many other places where he repeats the same thing. And it is pretty remarkable, that in p. 48, 49, immediately after citing Prov. xvii. 15, "He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, are both an abomination to the Lord;" and when he is careful in citing these words to put us in mind, that it is meant of a *judicial act;* yet in the very next words he supposes that God himself does so, since he constantly supposes that Adam's posterity, whom God condemns, are innocent. His words are these, "From all this it followeth, that as the judgment, that passed upon all men to *condemnation*, is death's coming upon *all men* by the *judicial act of God*, upon occasion of Adam's transgression: so," &c. And it is very remarkable, that in p. 3, 4, 7, *S.*, he insists, "That in Scripture no action is said to be imputed, reckoned, or accounted to any person for righteousness or CONDEMNATION, but the proper act and deed of that person." And yet he thus continually affirms, that all mankind are made sinners by a *judicial act of God* the *Judge*, even to *condemnation*, and *judicially constituted sinners*, and so subjected to a *judicial sentence of condemnation*, on occasion of Adam's sin; and all according to the threatening denounced to Adam, *thou shalt surely die:* though he supposes Adam's posterity were not included in the threatening, and are looked upon as perfectly innocent, and treated wholly as such.

I am sensible Dr. Taylor does not run into all this inconsistence, only through oversight and blundering; but that he is driven to it, to make out his matters in his evasion of that noted paragraph in the 5th chapter of Romans; especially those three sentences, ver. 16, "The judgment was by one to condemnation." Ver. 18, "By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation;" and ver. 19, "By one man's disobedience many were made sinners." And I am also sensible of what he offers to salve the inconvenience, viz., "That if the threatening had immediately been executed on Adam, he would have had no posterity; and that so far the possible existence of Adam's posterity fell under the threatening of the law, and into the hands of the judge, to be disposed of as he should think fit: and that this is the ground of the judgment to condemnation, coming upon all men."* But this is trifling, to a great degree: for,

1. Suffering death, and failing of possible existence, are entirely different things. If there had never been any such thing as sin committed, there would have been infinite numbers of possible beings, which would have failed of existence, by God's appointment. God has appointed not to bring into existence numberless possible worlds, each replenished with innumerable possible inhabitants. But is this equivalent to God's appointing them all to suffer death?

2. Our author represents, that *by Adam's sin, the possible existence of his posterity fell into the hands of the judge, to be disposed of as he should think fit.* But there was no need of any sin of Adam's, or any body's else, in order to their being brought into God's hands in this respect. The future possible existence of all created beings, is in God's hands, antecedently to the existence of any sin. And therefore by God's sovereign appointment, infinite numbers of possible beings, without any relation to Adam, or any other sinning being, do fail of their possible existence. And if Adam had never sinned, yet it would be unreasonable to suppose, but that innumerable multitudes of his possible posterity, would

* Pages 90, 91, 95.

have failed of existence by God's disposal. For will any be so unreasonable as to imagine, that God would, and must have brought into existence as many of his posterity as it was possible should be, if he had not sinned? Or that in that case, it would not have been possible, that any other persons of his posterity should ever have existed, than those individual persons, who now actually fall under that sentence of suffering death, and returning to the dust?

3. We have many accounts in Scripture, which imply the actual failing of the possible existence of innumerable multitudes of Adam's posterity, yea, of many more than ever come into existence. As of the possible posterity of Abel, the possible posterity of all them that were destroyed by the flood: and the possible posterity of the innumerable multitudes which we read of in Scripture, destroyed by sword, pestilence, &c. And if the threatening to Adam reached his posterity, in no other respect than this, that they were liable to be deprived by it of their possible existence, then these instances are much more properly a fulfilment of that threatening, than the suffering of death by such as actually come into existence; and so is that which is most properly the judgment to condemnation, executed by the sentence of the judge, proceeding on the foot of that threatening. But where do we ever find this so represented in Scripture? We read of multitudes cut off for their personal sins, who thereby failed of their possible posterity. And these are mentioned as God's judgments on them, and effects of God's condemnation of them: but when are they ever spoken of as God's judicially proceeding against, and condemning their possible posterity?

4. Dr. Taylor, in what he says concerning this matter, speaks of the threatening of the law delivered to Adam, which the possible existence of his posterity fell under, *as the ground of the judgment to condemnation coming upon all men.* But herein he is exceeding inconsistent with himself; for he affirms in a place forecited, that the Scripture never speaks of any sentence of condemnation coming upon all men, but that sentence in the third of Genesis, concerning man's turning to dust. But according to him, the threatening of the law delivered to Adam, could not be the ground of that sentence; for he greatly insists upon it, that that law was entirely abrogated before that sentence was pronounced, that this law at that time was *not in being, had no existence* to have any such influence, as might procure a sentence of death; and that therefore this sentence was introduced entirely on another foot, viz., on the foot of a new dispensation of grace. The reader may see this matter strenuously urged, and particularly argued by him, p. 113—220, *S.* So that this sentence could not, according to him, have the threatening of that law for its ground, as he supposes; for it never stood upon that ground. It could not be called a judgment of condemnation *under any such view;* for it could not be viewed under circumstances under which it never existed.

5. If it be as our author supposes, that the sentence of death on all men comes under the notion of a judgment to condemnation by this means, viz., that the threatening to Adam was in some respects the ground of it; then it also comes under the notion of a punishment: for threatenings annexed to breaches of laws, are to punishments; and a judgment of condemnation to the thing threatened, must be to punishment; and the thing condemned to, must have as much the notion of a punishment, as the sentence has the notion of a judgment to condemnation. But this, Dr. Taylor wholly denies: he denies that the death sentenced to, comes as any punishment at all, but insists that it comes only as a favor and benefit, and a fruit of fatherly love to Adam's posterity, respected, not as guilty, but wholly innocent. So that his scheme will not admit of its coming under the notion of a sentence to condemnation in any respect whatso-

ever. Our author's supposition, that the possible existence of Adam s posterity comes under the threatening of the law, and into the hands of the judge, and is the ground of the condemnation of all men to death, implies, that death, by this sentence, is appointed to mankind as an evil, at least negatively so; as it is a privation of good: for he manifestly speaks of a nonexistence as a negative evil. But herein he is inconsistent with himself: for he continually insists, that mankind are subjected to death *only as a benefit*, as has been before shown. According to him, death is not appointed to mankind as a negative evil, as any cessation of existence, as any cessation or even diminution of good; but on the contrary, as a means *of a more happy existence*, and a great *increase of good*.

So that this evasion or salvo of Dr. Taylor's, is so far from helping the matter, or salving the inconsistence, that it increases it.

And that the constitution or law, with the threatening of death annexed, which was given to Adam, was to him as the head of mankind, and to his posterity as included in him, not only follows from some of our author's own assertions, and the plain and full declarations of the apostle, in the fifth of Romans (of which more afterwards), which drove Dr. Taylor into such gross inconsistencies: but the account given in the three first chapters of Genesis, directly and inevitably leads us to such a conclusion.

Though the sentence, Gen. iii. 19, *Unto dust thou shalt return*, be not of equal extent with the threatening in the foregoing chapter, or an execution of the main curse of the law therein denounced; for, that it should have been so, would have been inconsistent with the intimations of mercy just before given: yet it is plain, this sentence is in pursuance of that threatening, being to something that was included in it. The words of the sentence were delivered to the same person, with the words of the threatening, and in the same manner, in like singular terms, as much without any express mention of his posterity: and yet it manifestly appears by the consequence, as well as all circumstances, that his posterity were included in the words of the sentence; as is confessed on all hands. And as the words were apparently delivered in the form of the sentence of a judge, condemning for something that he was displeased with, and caught to be condemned, viz. sin; and as the sentence to him and his posterity was but one, dooming to the same suffering, under the same circumstances, both the one and the other sentenced in the same words, spoken but once, and immediately to but one person, we hence justly infer, that it was the same thing to both; and not as Dr. Taylor suggests, p. 67, a sentence to a proper punishment to Adam, but a mere promise of favor to his posterity.

Indeed, sometimes our author seems to suppose, that God meant the thing denounced in this sentence, as a favor both to Adam and his posterity.* But to his posterity, or mankind in general, who are the main subject, he ever insists, that it was purely intended as a favor. And therefore one would have thought the sentence should have been delivered, with manifestations and appearances of favor, and not of anger. How could Adam understand it as a promise of great favor, considering the manner and circumstances of the denunciation? How could he think, that God would go about to delude him, by clothing himself with garments of vengeance, using words of displeasure and rebuke, setting forth the heinousness of his crime, attended with cherubims and a flaming sword; when all that he meant was only higher testimonies of favor, than he had before in a state of innocence, and to manifest fatherly love and kindness, in promises of great blessings? If this was the case, God's words to Adam must be under

* Pages 25, 45, 46, 8

stood thus: "Because thou hast done so wickedly, hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree of which I commanded thee, saying, Thou shalt not eat of it; therefore I will be more kind to thee than I was in thy state of innocence, and do now appoint for thee the following great favors: *Cursed be the ground for thy sake*," &c. And thus Adam must understand what was said, unless any will say (and God forbid that any should be so blasphemous) that God clothed himself with appearances of displeasure, to deceive Adam, and make him believe the contrary of what he intended, and lead him to expect a dismal train of evil on his posterity, contrary to all reason and justice, implying the most horribly unrighteous treatment of millions of perfectly innocent creatures. It is certain there is not the least appearance in what God said, or the manner of it, as Moses gives us the account, of any other, than that God was now testifying displeasure, condemning the subject of the sentence he was pronouncing, as justly exposed to punishment for sin, and for that sin which he mentions.

When God was pronouncing this sentence, Adam doubtless understood, that God had respect to his posterity, as well as himself, though God spake wholly in the second person singular, "Because thou hast eaten—In sorrow shalt thou eat—Unto the dust shalt thou return." But he had as much reason to understand God as having respect to his posterity, when he directed his speech to him in like manner in the threatening, *Thou shalt surely die.* The sentence plainly refers to the threatening, and results from it. The threatening says, *If thou eat thou shalt die:* the sentence says, *Because thou hast eaten, thou shalt die.* And Moses, who wrote the account, had no reason to doubt but that the affair would be thus understood by his readers; for such a way of speaking was well understood in those days: the history he gives us of the origin of things, abounds with it. Such a manner of speaking to the first of the kind, or heads of the race, having respect to the progeny, is not only used in almost every thing that God said to Adam and Eve, but even in what he said to the very birds and fishes, Gen. i. 22; and also in what he said afterwards to Noah, Gen. ix., and to Shem, Ham and Japheth, and Canaan, Gen. ix. 25—27. So in promises made to Abraham, in which God directed his speech to him, and spake in the second person singular, from time to time, but meant chiefly his posterity: "To thee will I give this land. In thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed," &c. &c. And in what is said of Ishmael, as of his person, but meant chiefly of his posterity, Gen xvi. 12, and xvii. 20. And so in what Isaac said to Esau and Jacob, in his blessing; in which he spake to them in the second person singular, but meant chiefly their posterity. And so for the most part in the promises made to Isaac and Jacob, and in Jacob's blessing of Ephraim and Manasseh, and of his twelve sons.

But I shall take notice of one or two things further, showing that Adam's posterity were included in God's establishment with him, and the threatening denounced for his sin; and that the calamities which come upon them in consequence of his sin, are brought on them as punishments.

This is evident from the *curse on the ground;* which, if it be any curse at all, comes equally on Adam's posterity with himself. And if it be a curse, then against whomsoever it is designed and on whomsoever it terminates, it comes as a punishment, and not as a blessing, so far as it comes in consequence of that sentence.

Dr. Taylor, page 19, says, "A curse is pronounced upon the ground, but no curse upon the woman and the man." And in pages 45, 46, *S.*, he insists that the ground only was cursed, and not the man; just as though a curse

could terminate on lifeless, senseless earth! To understand this curse otherwise than as terminating upon man through the ground, would be as senseless as to suppose the meaning to be, *The ground shall be punished and shall be miserable for thy sake* Our author interprets the curse on the ground, of its being incumbered with noxious weeds; but would these weeds have been any curse on the ground, if there had been no inhabitants, or if the inhabitants had been of such a nature, that these weeds would not have been noxious, but useful to them? It is said, Deut. xxviii. 17, "Cursed shall be thy basket, and thy store;" and would he not be thought to talk very ridiculously, who should say, "Here is a curse upon the basket, but not a word of any curse upon the owner; and therefore we have no reason at all to look upon it as any punishment upon him, or any testimony of God's displeasure towards him." How plain is it, that when lifeless things, which are not capable of either benefit or suffering, are said to be cursed or blessed with regard to sensible beings, that use or possess these things or have connection with them, the meaning must be, that these sensible beings are cursed or blessed *in the other*, or with respect to them! In Exod. xxiii. 25, it is said, "He shall bless thy bread and thy water." And I suppose, never any body yet proceeded to such a degree of subtilty in distinguishing, as to say, "Here is a blessing on the bread and the water, which went into the possessors' mouths, but no blessing on them." To make such a distinction with regard to the curse God pronounced on the ground, would in some respects be more unreasonable, because God is express in explaining the matter, declaring that it was *for man's sake*, expressly referring this curse to *him*, as being with respect to him, and for the sake of his guilt, and as consisting in the sorrow and suffering he should have from it, "In sorrow shalt *thou* eat of it. Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth *to thee*." So that God's own words tell us where the curse terminates. The words are parallel with those in Deut. xxviii. 16, but only more plain and explicit, "Cursed shalt *thou* be in the field," or in the ground.

If this part of the sentence was pronounced under no notion of any curse or punishment at all upon mankind, but on the contrary, as making an alteration in the ground, that should be for the *better*, as to *them*; that instead of the sweet, but tempting, pernicious fruits of paradise, it might produce wholesome fruits, more for the health of the soul; that it might bring forth thorns and thistles, as excellent medicines, to prevent or cure moral distempers, diseases which would issue in eternal death; I say, if what was pronounced was under this notion, then it was a blessing on the ground, and not a curse: and it might more properly have been said, "*Blessed* shall the ground be for thy sake. I will make a happy change of it, that it may be a habitation more fit for a creature so infirm, and so apt to be overcome with temptation, as thou art."

The event makes it evident, that in pronouncing this curse, God had as much respect to Adam's posterity, as to himself: and so it was understood by his pious posterity before the flood; as appears by what Lamech, the father of Noah, says, Gen. v. 29, "And he called his name *Noah*, saying, This same shall comfort us concerning our work, and the toil of our hands, *because of the ground which the Lord hath cursed*."

Another thing which argues, that Adam's posterity were included in the threatening of death, and that our first parents understood, when fallen, that the tempter, in persuading them to eat the forbidden fruit, had aimed at the punishment and ruin of both them and their posterity, and had procured it, is Adam's immediately giving his wife that new name, Eve, or *Life*, on the promise or intimation of the disappointment and overthrow of the tempter in that

matter, by her seed, which Adam understood to be by his procuring life, not only for themselves, but for many of their posterity, and thereby delivering them from that death and ruin which the serpent had brought upon them. Those that should be thus delivered, and obtain life, Adam calls *the living*; and because he observed, by what God had said, that deliverance and life were to be by the seed of the woman, he therefore remarks that *she is the mother of all living*, and thereupon gives her a new name, calls her *Chavah*, LIFE, Gen. iii. 20.

There is a great deal of evidence, that this is the occasion of Adam's giving his wife her new name. This was her new honor, and the greatest honor, at least in her present state, that the Redeemer was to be of her seed. New names were wont to be given for something that was the person's peculiar honor. So it was with regard to the new names of Abraham, Sarah, and Israel. Dr. Taylor himself observes,* that they who are saved by Christ, are called the *livers*, οἱ ζῶντες, 2 Cor. iv. 11, *the living*, or *they that live*. So we find in the Old Testament, the righteous are called by the name of *the living*, Psalm lxix. 28, "Let them be blotted out of the book of the *living*, and not be written with the righteous." If what Adam meant by her being the *mother of all living*, was only her being the mother of mankind, and gave her the name *life* upon that account; it were much the most likely that he would have given her this name at first, when God first united them, under that blessing, "Be fruitful and multiply," and when he had a prospect of her being the mother of mankind *in a state of immortality*, living indeed, *living*, and never *dying*. But that Adam should at that time give her only the name of Isha, and then immediately on that melancholy change, by their coming under the *sentence of death*, with all their posterity, having now a new, awful prospect of her being the mother of nothing but a *dying race*, all from generation to generation turning to dust, through her folly; I say, that immediately on this, he should change her name into *life*, calling her now the mother of *all living*, is perfectly unaccountable. Besides, it is manifest that it was not her being the mother of all mankind, or *her relation* as a mother, which she stood in to her posterity, but the *quality of those* she was to be the mother of, which was the thing Adam had in view, in giving his wife this new name; as appears by the name itself, which signifies *life*. And if it had been only a natural and mortal life which he had in view, this was nothing distinguishing of her posterity from the brutes; for the very same name of *living* ones, or *living* things, is given from time to time in this Book of Genesis to them; as in chap. i. 21, 24, 28, ii. 19, vi. 19, vii. 23, viii. 1, and many other places in the Bible. And besides, if by *life* the quality of her posterity was not meant, there was nothing in it to distinguish her from Adam; for thus she was no more the mother of all living, than he was the father of all living; and she could no more properly be called by the name of *life* on any such account, than he; but names are given for distinction. Doubtless Adam took notice of something distinguishing concerning her, that occasioned his giving her this new name. And I think it is exceeding natural to suppose, that as Adam had given her her *first name* from the manner of her *creation*, so he gave her her new name from *redemption*, and as it were, *new* creation, through the Redeemer, of her seed; and that he should give her this name from that which comforted him, with respect to the curse that God had pronounced on him and the earth, as Lamech named Noah, Gen. v. 29 "Saying, This same shall comfort us concerning our work, and toil of our

* Note annexed to § 287.

nands, because of the ground which the Lord hath cursed." Accordingly he gave her this new name, not at her first creation, but immediately after the promise of a Redeemer, of her seed. See Gen. iii. 15—20.

Now as to the consequence which I infer from Adam's giving his wife this name, on the intimation which God had given, that Satan should by her seed be overthrown and disappointed, as to his malicious design, in that deed of his which God then spake of, viz., his tempting the woman. Adam infers from it, that great numbers of mankind should be saved, whom he calls *the living;* they should be saved from the effects of this malicious design of the old serpent, and from that ruin which he had brought upon them by tempting their first parents to sin; and so the serpent would be, with respect to them, disappointed and overthrown in his design. But how is any death or ruin, or indeed any calamity at all, brought upon their posterity by Satan's malice in that temptation, if instead of that, all the death and sorrow that was consequent, was the fruit of God's fatherly love, and not Satan's malice, and was an instance of God's free and sovereign favor, such favor as Satan could not possibly foresee? And if multitudes of Eve's posterity are saved, from either spiritual or temporal death, by a Redeemer, of her seed, how is that any disappointment of Satan's design in tempting our first parents? How came he to have any such thing in view, as the death of Adam's and Eve's posterity, by tempting them to sin, or any expectation that their death would be the consequence, unless he knew that they were included in the threatening?

Some have objected against Adam's posterity's being included in the threatening delivered to Adam, that the threatening itself was inconsistent with his having any posterity; it being that he should die on the day that *he sinned.*

To this I answer, that the threatening was not inconsistent with his having posterity, on two accounts.

Those words, "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," according to the use of such like expressions among the Hebrews, do not signify immediate death, or that the execution shall be within twenty-four hours from the commission of the fact; nor did God, by those words, limit himself as to the time of executing the threatened punishment, but that was still left to God's pleasure. Such a phrase, according to the idiom of the Hebrew tongue, signifies no more than these two things:

1. A *real connection* between the sin and the punishment. So Ezek. xxxiii. 12, 13, "The righteousness of the righteous shall not deliver him *in the day* of his transgression. As for the wickedness of the wicked, he shall not fall thereby *in the day* that he turneth from his wickedness; neither shall the righteous be able to live *in the day that he sinneth;* but for his iniquity that he hath committed, *he shall die* for it." Here it is said, that *in the day* he sinneth, he shall not be able to live, but he shall die; not signifying the time when death shall be executed upon him, but the connection between his sin and death; such a connection as in our present common use of language is signified by the adverb of time, *when;* as if one should say, "According to the laws of our nation, so long as a man behaves himself as a good subject, he may live; but *when* he turns rebel, he must die:" not signifying the hour, day or month in which he must be executed, but only the connection between his crime and death.

2. Another thing which seems to be signified by such an expression, is, that Adam should be exposed to *death for one transgression*, without waiting on him to try him the second time. If he eat of that tree, he should immediately fall under condemnation, though afterwards he might abstain ever so strictly. In this respect the words are much of the same force with those words of Solomon

to Shimei, 1 Kings ii. 37, "For it shall be that on the *day* that thou goest out, and passest over the brook Kidron, thou shalt know for *certain, that thou shalt surely die.*" Not meaning that he should certainly be executed on that day, but that he should be assuredly liable to death for the first offence, and that he should not have another trial to see whether he would go over the brook Kidron a second time.

And then besides:

II. If the words had implied that Adam should die that very day, within twenty-four or twelve hours, or that moment that he transgressed, yet it will by no means follow, that God obliged himself to execute the punishment in its *utmost extent* on that day. The sentence was in great part executed immediately: he then died spiritually: he lost his innocence and original righteousness, and the favor of God; a dismal alteration was made in his soul, by the loss of that holy, divine principle, which was in the highest sense the life of the soul. In this he was truly ruined and undone that very day, becoming corrupt, miserable and helpless. And I think it has been shown that such a spiritual death was one great thing implied in the threatening. And the alteration then made in his body and external state, was the beginning of temporal death. Grievous, external calamity is called by the name of *death* in Scripture; Exod. x. 17, "Entreat the Lord that he may take away this *death.*" Not only was Adam's soul ruined that day, but his body was ruined: it lost its beauty and vigor, and became a poor, dull, decaying, dying thing. And besides all this, Adam was that day undone in a more dreadful sense: he immediately fell under the curse of the law, and condemnation to eternal perdition. In the language of Scripture, he is *dead*, that is, in a state of condemnation to death; even as our author often explains this language in his exposition upon Romans. In Scripture language, he that believes in Christ, immediately receives life. He passes at that time from death to life, and thenceforward (to use the Apostle John's phrase) "has eternal life abiding in him." But yet he does not then receive eternal life in its highest completion; he has but the beginning of it, and receives it in a vastly greater degree at death; but the proper time for the complete fulness is not till the day of judgment. When the angels sinned, their punishment was immediately executed in a degree; but their full punishment is not until the end of the world. And there is nothing in God's threatening to Adam that bound him to execute his full punishment at once, nor any thing which determines that he should have no posterity. The law or constitution which God established and declared, determined that if he sinned, and had posterity, he and they should die; but there was no constitution determining concerning the actual being of his posterity in this case; what posterity he should have, how many, or whether any at all. All these things God had reserved in his own power: the law and its sanction intermeddled not with the matter.

It may be proper in this place also to take some notice of that objection of Dr. Taylor's, against Adam's being supposed to be a federal head for his posterity, that it gives him greater honor than Christ, as it supposes that all his posterity would have had eternal life by his obedience, if he had stood; and so a greater number would have had the benefit of his obedience, than are saved by Christ.* I think a very little consideration is sufficient to show that there is no weight in this objection; for the benefit of Christ's merits may nevertheless be vastly beyond that which would have been by the obedience of Adam. For those that are saved by Christ, are not merely advanced to happiness by his merits, but are

* Page 120, &c., S.

saved from the infinitely dreadful effects of Adam's sin, and many from immense guilt, pollution and misery, by personal sins; also brought to a holy and happy state, as it were through infinite obstacles, and are exalted to a far greater degree of dignity, felicity and glory, than would have been due for Adam's obedience, for aught I know, many thousand times so great. And there is enough in the gospel dispensation, clearly to manifest the sufficiency of Christ's merits for such effects in all mankind. And how great the number will be, that shall *actually* be the subjects of them, or how great a proportion of the whole race, considering the vast success of the gospel, that shall be in that future, extraordinary and glorious season, often spoken of, none can tell. And the honor of these two federal heads arises not so much from what was proposed to each for his trial, as from their success, and the good actually obtained, and also the manner of obtaining. Christ obtains the benefits men have through him by proper merit of condignity, and a true purchase by an equivalent; which would not have been the case with Adam, if he had obeyed.

I have now particularly considered the account which Moses gives us in the beginning of the Bible, of our first parents, and God's dealings with them, the constitution he established with them, their transgression, and what followed. And on the whole, if we consider the manner in which God apparently speaks to Adam from time to time; and particularly, if we consider how plainly and undeniably his posterity are included in the sentence of death pronounced on Adam after his fall, founded on the foregoing threatening; and consider the curse denounced on the ground for his sake, and for his and his posterity's sorrow: and also consider what is evidently the occasion of his giving his wife the new name of Eve, and his meaning in it, and withal consider apparent fact in constant and universal events, with relation to the state of our first parents, and their posterity from that time forward, through all ages of the world; I cannot but think, it must appear to every impartial person, that Moses' account does, with sufficient evidence, lead all mankind, to whom his account is communicated, to understand, that God, in his constitution with Adam, dealt with him as a public person, and as the head of the human species, and had respect to his posterity, as included in him: and that this history is given by divine direction, in the beginning of the first written revelation, to exhibit to our view the origin of the present, sinful, miserable state of mankind, that we might see what that was, which first gave occasion for all those consequent, wonderful dispensations of divine mercy and grace towards mankind, which are the great subject of the Scriptures, both of the Old and New Testament: and that these things are not obscurely and doubtfully pointed forth, but delivered in a plain account of things, which easily and naturally exhibits them to our understandings.

And by what follows in this discourse, we may have, in some measure, opportunity to see how other things in the Holy Scripture agree with what has been now observed from the three first chapters of Genesis.

CHAPTER II.

Observations on other parts of the Holy Scriptures, chiefly in the Old Testament, that prove the doctrine of Original Sin.

Original depravity may well be argued, from wickedness being often spoken of in Scripture, as a thing *belonging to the race of mankind, and as if it were a*

property of the species. So in Psal. xiv. 2, 3, "The Lord looked down from heaven upon the *children of men*, to see if there were any that did understand and seek God. They are all gone aside; they are together become filthy: there is none that doeth good; no, not one." The like we nave again, Psal. liii. 2, 3. Dr. Taylor says, p. 104, 105, "The Holy Spirit does not mean this of every individual; because in the very same psalm, he speaks of some that were righteous; ver. 5, *God is in the generation of the righteous.*" But how little is this observation to the purpose! For who ever supposed, that no unrighteous men were ever changed by divine grace, and afterwards made righteous? The Psalmist is speaking of what men are as they are the *children of men*, born of the corrupt race; and not as born of God, whereby they come to be the children of God, and of the generation of the righteous. The Apostle Paul cites this place in Rom. iii. 10, 11, 12, to prove the universal corruption of mankind; but yet in the same chapter he supposes these same persons here spoken of as wicked, may become righteous, through the righteousness and grace of God.

So wickedness is spoken of in other places in the Book of Psalms, as a thing that *belongs to men, as of the human race, as sons of men.* Thus in Psal. iv. 2, "O ye *sons of men*, how long will ye turn my glory into shame? How long will ye love vanity?" &c. Psal. lvii. 4, "I lie among them that are set on fire, *even the sons of men*, whose teeth are spears and arrows, and their tongue a sharp sword." Psal. lviii. 1, 2, "Do ye indeed speak righteousness, O congregation? Do ye judge uprightly, *O ye sons of men!* Yea, in heart ye work wickedness; ye weigh out the violence of your hands in the earth." Our author, mentioning these places, says, p. 105, Note, "There was a strong party in Israel disaffected to David's person and government, and sometimes he chooseth to denote them by the sons or children of men." But it would have been worth his while to have inquired, *Why* the Psalmist *should choose to denote* the wickedest and worse men in Israel by this name! Why he should choose thus to disgrace the human race, as if the compellation of sons of men most properly belonged to such as were of the vilest character, and as if all the sons of men, even every one of them, were of such a character, and none of them did good; no, not one? Is it not strange, that the righteous should not be thought worthy to be called *sons of men*, and ranked with that noble race of beings, who are born into the world wholly right and innocent! It is a good, easy, and natural reason, why he chooseth to call the wicked, *sons of men*, as a proper name for them, that by being of the sons of men, or of the corrupt, ruined race of mankind, they come by their depravity. And the Psalmist himself leads us to this very reason, Psal. lviii. at the beginning: "Do ye judge uprightly, *O ye sons of men?* Yea, in heart ye work wickedness, ye weigh out the violence of your hands. The wicked are estranged from the womb," &c., of which I shall speak more by and by.

Agreeable to these places is Prov. xxi. 8, "The way of *man* is froward and strange; but as for the pure, his work is right." He that is perverse in his walk, is here called by the name of *man*, as distinguished from the pure: which I think is absolutely unaccountable, if all mankind by nature are pure, and perfectly innocent, and all such as are froward and strange in their ways, therein depart from the native purity of all mankind. The words naturally lead us to suppose the contrary; that depravity and perverseness properly belong to mankind as they are naturally, and that a being made pure, is by an after-work, by which some are delivered from native pollution, and distinguished from mankind in general; which is perfectly agreeable to the representation in Rev. xiv.

4, where we have an account of a number that *were not defiled*, but were pure, and *followed the Lamb*; of whom it is said, *These were redeemed from among men.*

To these things agree Jer. xvii. 5, 9. In ver. 5, it is said, "Cursed is he that trusteth in *man*." And in ver. 9, this reason is given, "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked; who can know it?" What heart is this so wicked and deceitful? Why, *evidently the heart of him, whom, it was said before, we must not trust*; and that is *man*. It alters not the case, as to the present argument, whether the deceitfulness of the heart here spoken of, be its deceitfulness to the man himself, or to others. So Eccl. ix. 3, "Madness is in the heart of the *sons of men*, while they live." And those words of Christ to Peter, Matth. xvi. 23, "Get thee behind me, Satan, for thou savorest not the things that be of God, but the things that be of *men*." Signifying plainly, that to be carnal and vain, and opposite to what is spiritual and divine, is what properly belongs to *men* in their present state. The same thing is supposed in that of the apostle, 1 Cor. iii. 3, "For ye are yet carnal. For whereas there is among you envying and strife, are ye not carnal, and walk as *men?*" And that in Hos. vi. 7, "But they like *men*, have transgressed the covenant." To these places may be added Matth. vii. 11, "If ye, being evil, know how to give good gifts." Jam. iv. 5, "Do ye think that the Scripture saith in vain, The spirit that *dwelleth in us, lusteth to envy?*" 1 Pet. iv. 2, "That he no longer should live the rest of his time in the lusts of *men*, but to the will of God." Yet above all, that in Job xv. 16, "How much more abominable and filthy is *man, who drinketh iniquity like water?*" Of which more presently.

Now what account can be given of these things, on Dr. Taylor's scheme? How strange is it, that we should have such descriptions, all over the Bible, of *man*, and the *sons of men!* Why should man be so continually spoken of as evil, carnal, perverse, deceitful, and desperately wicked, if all men are by nature as perfectly innocent, and free from any propensity to evil, as Adam was the first moment of his creation, all *made right*, as our author would have us understand, Eccl. vii. 29? Why, on the contrary, is it not said, at least as often, and with equal reason, that *the heart of man is right and pure*; that *the way of man is innocent and holy*; and that *he who savors true virtue and wisdom, savors the things that be of men?* Yea, and why might it not as well have been said, *The Lord looked down from heaven on the sons of men, to see if there were any that did understand, and did seek after God; and they were all right, altogether pure, there was none inclined to do wickedness, no not one?*

Of the like import with the texts mentioned are those which represent wickedness as what properly belongs to the *world*; and that they who are otherwise, are *saved from the world*, and *called out of it*. As John vii. 7, "The *world* cannot hate you; but me it hateth; because I testify of it, that the works thereof are evil." Chap. viii. 23, "Ye are of this *world*: I am not of this *world*." Chap. xiv. 17, "The Spirit of truth, whom the *world* cannot receive; because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him: but ye know him." Chap. xv. 18, 19, "If the world hate you, ye know that it hated me before it hated you. If ye were of the *world*, the *world* would love its own: but because ye are not of the *world*, but I have chosen you out of the *world*, therefore the *world* hateth you." Rev. xiv. 3, 4, "These are they which were redeemed from the *earth*—redeemed from among men." John xvii. 9, "I pray not for the *world*, but for them which thou hast given me." Ver. 14, "I have given them thy word; and the *world* hath hated them, because they are not of the *world*, even as I am not of the *world*." 1 John iii. 13, "Marvel not, my brethren, if the *world* hate you." Chap. iv. 5, "They are of the *world*, therefore speak they of

the *world*, and the *world* heareth them." Chap. v. 19, "We are of God, and the whole *world* lieth in wickedness." It is evident, that in these places, by the world is meant the world of mankind; not the habitation, but the inhabitants: for it is the world spoken of as *loving, hating, doing evil works, speaking, hearing*, &c.

It shows the same thing, that wickedness is often spoken of as being man's *own*, in contradistinction from virtue and holiness. So men's lusts are often called their *own* heart's lusts, and their practising wickedness is called walking in their *own* ways, walking in their *own* counsels, in the imagination of their *own* heart, and in the sight of their *own* eyes, according to their *own* devices, &c. These things denote wickedness to be a quality belonging properly to the character and nature of mankind in their present state: as, when Christ would represent that lying is remarkably the character and the very nature of the devil in his present state, he expresses it thus, John viii. 44, "When he speaketh a *lie*, he speaketh of his *own*: for he is a liar, and the father of it."

And that wickedness belongs to the nature of mankind in their present state, may be argued from those places which speak of mankind as being wicked *in their childhood*, or *from their childhood*. So, that in Prov. xxii. 15, "Foolishness is bound in the heart of a child; but the rod of correction shall drive it far from him." Nothing is more manifest, than that the wise man in this book continually uses the word folly, or foolishness, for wickedness: and that this is what he means in this place, the words themselves do show: for the rod of correction is proper to drive away no other foolishness, than that which is of a moral nature. The word rendered *bound*, signifies, as is observed in *Pool's Synopsis*, a close and firm union. The same word is used in chap. vi. 21, "*Bind* them continually upon thy heart." And chap. vii. 3, "*Bind* them upon thy fingers, write them upon the table of thine heart." To the like purpose is chap. iii. 3, and Deut. xi. 18, where this word is used. The same verb is used, 1 Sam. xviii. 1, "The soul of *Jonathan* was *knit* (or *bound*) to the soul of *David*, and *Jonathan* loved him as his own soul." But how comes wickedness to be so firmly bound, and strongly fixed, in the hearts of children, if it be not there naturally? They having had no time firmly to fix habits of sin, by long custom in actual wickedness, as those that have lived many years in the world.

The same thing is signified in that noted place, Gen. viii. 21, "For the imagination of man's heart is evil *from his youth*." It alters not the case, whether it be translated *for* or *though* the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth, as Dr. Taylor would have it; still the words suppose it to be so as is said. The word translated *youth*, signifies the whole of the former part of the age of man, which commences from the beginning of life. The word, in its derivation, has reference to the birth or beginning of existence. It comes from *Nagnar*, which signifies to shake off, as a tree shakes off its ripe fruit, or a plant its seed: the birth of children being commonly represented by a tree's yielding fruit, or a plant's yielding seed. So that the word here translated *youth*, comprehends not only what we in *English* most commonly call the time of youth, but also childhood and infancy, and is very often used to signify these latter. A word of the same root is used to signify a *young child*, or a *little child*, in the following places; 1 Sam. 1. 24, 25, 27; 1 Kings iii. 7, and xi. 17; 2 Kings ii. 23; Job xxxiii. 25; Prov. xxii. 6, xxiii. 13, and xxix. 21; Isai. x. 19, xi. 6, and lxv. 20; Hos. xi. 1. The same word is used to signify an *infant*, in Exod. ii. 6, and x. 9; Judg. xiii. 5, 7, 8, 24; 1 Sam. i. 22, and iv 21; 2 Kings v. 14; Isai. vii. 16, and viii. 4.

Dr. Taylor says, p. 124, Note, that he "conceives, *from the youth*, is a

phrase signifying the greatness or long duration of a thing." But if by long duration he means any thing else than what is literally expressed, viz., from the beginning of life, he has no reason to conceive so; neither has what he offers, so much as the shadow of a reason for his conception. There is no appearance in the words of the two or three texts he mentions, of their meaning any thing else than what is most literally signified. And it is certain, that what he suggests is not the ordinary import of such a phrase among the Hebrews: but that thereby is meant from the beginning, or early time of life, or existence; as may be seen in the places following, where the same word in the Hebrew is used, as in this place in the 8th of Genesis. 1 Sam. xii. 2, "I am old, and gray headed—and I have walked before you from my *childhood* unto this day;" where the original word is the same. Psal, lxxi. 5, 6, "Thou art my trust *from my youth:* by thee have I been holden up from the womb. Thou art he that took me out of my mother's bowels." Ver. 17, 18, "O God, thou hast taught me *from my youth;* and hitherto have I declared thy wondrous works: now also, when I am old and gray headed, forsake me not." Psal. cxxix. 1, 2, "Many a time have they afflicted me *from my youth*, may Israel now say: many a time have they afflicted me *from my youth;* yet they have not prevailed against me." Isai. xlvii 12, "Stand now with the multitude of thy sorceries, wherein thou hast labored, *from thy youth.*" So ver. 15, and 2 Sam. xix. 7, "That will be worse unto thee, than all the evil that befel thee, *from thy youth* until now." Jer. iii. 24, 25, "Shame hath devoured the labor of our fathers, *from our youth.* We have sinned against the Lord our God *from our youth*, even to this day." So Gen. xlvi. 34; Job xxxi. 18; Jer. xxxii. 30, and xlviii. 11; Ezek. iv. 14; Zech. xiii. 5.

And it is to be observed, that according to the manner of the Hebrew language, when it is said, such a thing has been *from youth*, or the first part of existence, the phrase is to be understood as including that first time of existence. So, Josh. vi. 21, "They utterly destroyed all, from the young to the old" (so it is in the Hebrew), i. e. including both. So Gen. xix. 4, and Esther iii. 13.

And as mankind are represented in Scripture, as being of a wicked heart *from their youth*, so in other places they are spoken of as being thus *from the womb.* Psal. lviii. 3, "The wicked are estranged *from the womb:* they go astray as soon as they be born, speaking lies." It is observable, that the Psalmist mentions this as what belongs to the wicked, as the *sons of men*: For, these are the preceding words: "Do ye judge uprightly, *O ye sons of men?* Yea, in heart ye work wickedness." (A phrase of the like import with that in Gen. viii. 21. *The imagination*, or operation, as it might have been rendered, of his heart is evil.) Then it follows, *The wicked are estranged* from the womb, &c. The next verse is, *Their poison is like the poison of a serpent.* It is so remarkably, as the very nature of a serpent is poison: serpents are poisonous as soon as they come into the world: they derive a poisonous nature by their generation. Dr. Taylor, p. 134, 135, says, "It is evident that this is a scriptural figurative way of aggravating wickedness on the one hand, and of signifying early and settled habits of virtue on the other, to speak of it as being *from the womb.*" And as a probable instance of the latter, he cites that in Isai. xlix. 1, "The Lord hath called me *from the womb;* from the bowels of my mother he made mention of my name." But I apprehend, that in order to *seeing* this to be either *evident* or *probable*, a man must have eyes peculiarly affected. I humbly conceive that such phrases as that in the 49th of Isaiah, of God's calling the prophet *from the womb*, are *evidently* not of the import which he supposes; but mean truly from the beginning of existence, and are manifestly of like sig-

nification with that which is said of the prophet Jeremiah, Jer. i. 5, "Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee: before thou camest out of the womb, I sanctified thee, and ordained thee a prophet unto the nations." Which surely means something else besides a high degree of virtue: it plainly signifies that he was, from his first existence, set apart by God for a prophet. And it would be as unreasonable to understand it otherwise, as to suppose the angel meant any other than that Samson was set apart to be a Nazarite from the beginning of his life, when he says to his mother, "Behold, thou shalt conceive and bear a son: and now drink no wine, nor strong drink, &c. For the child shall be a Nazarite to God, *from the womb*, to the day of his death." By these instances it is plain, that the phrase, *from the womb*, as the other, *from the youth*, as used in Scripture, properly signifies from the beginning of life.

Very remarkable is that place, Job xv. 14, 15, 16, "What is man, that he should be clean? And he that is born of a *woman*, that he should be righteous? Behold, he putteth no trust in his saints: yea, the heavens are not clean in his sight! How much more abominable and filthy is man, which drinketh iniquity like water!" And no less remarkable is our author's method of managing it. The sixteenth verse expresses an exceeding degree of wickedness, in as plain and emphatical terms, almost, as can be invented; every word representing this in the strongest manner: "How much more abominable and filthy is man, that drinketh iniquity like water!" I cannot now recollect where we have a sentence equal to it in the whole Bible, for an emphatical, lively and strong representation of great wickedness of heart. Any one of the words, as such words are used in Scripture, would represent great wickedness: If it had been only said, "How much more abominable is man!" Or, "How much more filthy is man!" Or, "Man that drinketh iniquity." But all these are accumulated with the addition of—*like water*—the further to represent the boldness or greediness of men in wickedness; though iniquity be the most deadly poison, yet men drink it as boldly as they drink water, are as familiar with it as with their common drink, and drink it with like greediness, as he that is thirsty drinks water. That boldness and eagerness in persecuting the saints, by which the great degree of the depravity of man's heart often appears, is represented thus, Psal. xiv. 4, "Have the workers of iniquity no knowledge, who eat up my people *as they eat bread?*" And the greatest eagerness of thirst is represented by thirsting as an animal thirsts after water, Psalm xlii. 1.

Now let us see the soft, easy, light manner, in which Dr. Taylor treats this place, p. 143: "How much more abominable and filthy is man, *in comparison of the divine purity*, who drinketh iniquity like water! Who is attended with so many sensual appetites, and so apt to indulge them. You see the argument, man, in his present weak and fleshly state, cannot be clean before God. Why so? Because he is conceived and born in sin, by reason of Adam's sin? No such thing. But because, if the purest creatures are not pure, *in comparison of God*, much less a being subject to so many *infirmities*, as a *mortal* man. Which is a demonstration to me, not only that Job and his friends did not intend to establish the doctrine we are now examining, but that they were wholly strangers to it." Thus this author endeavors to reconcile this text with his doctrine of the perfect, native innocence of mankind; in which we have a notable specimen of his demonstrations, as well as of that great impartiality and fairness in examining and expounding the Scripture, which he makes so often a profession of.

In this place we are not only told how wicked man's heart is, but also how men come by such wickedness; even by being of the race of mankind, by ordi-

nary generation. "What is man, that he should be clean? And he that is born of a woman, that he should be righteous?" Our author, pages 141, 142, represents man's being born of a woman, as a periphrasis, to signify man; and that there is no design in the words to give a reason, why man is not clean and righteous. But the case is most evidently otherwise, if we may interpret the Book of Job by itself: it is most plain, that man's being born of a woman is given as a reason of his not being clean, chap. xiv. 14: "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?" Job is speaking there expressly of man being born of a woman, as appears in verse 1. And here how plain is it, that this is given as a reason of man's not being clean? Concerning this Dr. Taylor says, "That this has no respect to any moral uncleanness, but only common frailty," &c. But how evidently is this also otherwise? When that uncleanness, which a man has by being born of a woman, is expressly explained of unrighteousness, in the next chapter at verse 14, "What is man that he should be clean? And he that is born of a woman, that he should be righteous?" And also in chap. xxv. 4, "How then can man be justified with God? And how can he be clean that is born of a woman?" It is a moral cleanness Bildad is speaking of, which a man needs in order to being justified. His design is, to convince Job of his moral impurity, and from thence of God's righteousness in his severe judgments upon him; and not of his natural frailty.

And without doubt, David has respect to this same way of derivation of wickedness of heart, when he says, Psalm li. 5, "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." It alters not the case as to the argument we are upon, whether the word translated conceive, signifies conceive, or nurse; which latter our author takes so much pains to prove: for when he has done all, he speaks of it as a just translation of the words to render them thus: "I was *born* in iniquity, and in sin did my mother nurse me," page 135. If it is owned that man is *born* in sin, it is not worth the while to dispute whether it is expressly asserted that he is conceived in sin. But Dr. Taylor after his manner insists, that such expressions, as being *born* in sin, being transgressors from the womb, and the like, are only phrases figuratively to denote aggravation and high degree of wickedness. But the contrary has been already demonstrated, from many plain Scripture instances. Nor is one instance produced, in which there is any evidence that such a phrase is used in such a manner. A poetical sentence out of Virgil's Æneids, has here been produced, and made much of by some, as parallel with this, in what Dido says to Æneas in these lines:

> Nec tibi diva parens, generis nec Dardanus auctor,
> Perfide: Sed duris genuit te cautibus horrens
> Caucasus, hyrcanique admorunt ubera tygres.

In which she tells Æneas, that not a goddess was his mother, nor Anchises his father; but that he had been brought forth by a horrid, rocky mountain, and nursed at the dugs of tigers, to represent the greatness of his cruelty to her. But how unlike and unparallel is this! Nothing could be more natural than for a woman, overpowered with the passion of love, and distracted with raging jealousy and disappointment, thinking herself treated with brutish perfidy and cruelty, by a lover, whose highest fame had been his being the son of a goddess, to aggravate his inhumanity and hardheartedness with this, that his behavior was not worthy the son of a goddess, nor becoming one whose father was an illustrious prince; and that he acted more as if he had been brought forth by hard, unrelenting rocks, and had sucked the dugs of tigers. But what is there in the

case of David parallel, or at all in like manner leading him to speak of himself as born in sin, in any such sense? He is not speaking himself, nor any one else speaking to him, of any excellent and divine father and mother, that he was born of; nor is there any appearance of his aggravating his sin by its being unworthy of his high birth. There is nothing else visible in David's case, to lead him to take notice of his being born in sin, but only his having such experience of the continuance and power of indwelling sin, after so long a time, and so many great means to engage him to holiness; which showed that sin was inbred, and in his very nature.

Dr. Taylor often objects to these and other texts, brought by divines to prove Original Sin, that there is no mention made in them of Adam, nor of his sin. He cries out, "Here is not the least mention or intimation of Adam, or any ill effects of his sin upon us.—Here is not one word, not the least hint of Adam, or any consequences of his sin," &c. &c.* He says,† "If Job and his friends had known and believed the doctrine of a corrupt nature, derived from Adam's sin only, they ought in reason and truth to have given this as the true and only reason of the human imperfection and uncleanness they mention." But these objections and exclamations are made no less impertinently, than they are frequently. It is no more a proof, that corruption of nature did not come by Adam's sin, because many times when it is mentioned, Adam's sin is not expressly mentioned as the cause of it, than that death did not come by Adam's sin (as Dr. Taylor says it did) because though death, as incident to mankind, is mentioned so often in the Old Testament, and by our Saviour in his discourses, yet Adam's sin is not once expressly mentioned, after the three first chapters of Genesis, anywhere in all the Old Testament, or the four evangelists, as the occasion of it.

What Christian has there ever been, that believed the moral corruption of the nature of mankind, who ever doubted that it came that way, which the apostle speaks of, when he says, "*By one man* sin entered into the world, and death by sin?" Nor indeed have they any more reason to doubt of it, than to doubt of the whole history of our first parents, because Adam's name is so rarely mentioned, on any occasion in Scripture, after that first account of him and Eve's never at all; and because we have no more any express mention of the particular manner, in which mankind were first brought into being, either with respect to the creation of Adam or Eve. It is sufficient, that the abiding most visible effects of these things, remain in the view of mankind in all ages and are often spoken of in Scripture; and that the particular manner of their being introduced, is once plainly set forth in the beginning of the Bible, in that history which gives us an account of the origin of all things. And doubtless it was expected, by the great author of the Bible, that the account in the three first chapters of Genesis should be taken as a plain account of the introduction of both natural and moral evil into the world, as it has been shown to be so indeed. The history of Adam's sin, with its circumstances, God's threatening, and the sentence pronounced upon him after his transgression, and the immediate consequences, consisting in so vast an alteration in his state, and the state of the world, which abides still, with respect to all his posterity, do most directly and sufficiently lead to an understanding of the rise of calamity, sin and death, in this sinful, miserable world.

It is fit we all should know, that it does not become us to tell the Most High, how often he shall particularly explain and give the reason of any doctrine which he teaches, in order to our believing what he says. If he has at all given us

* Pages 5, 64, 96, 97, 98, 102, 108, 112. .. 120, 122, 127, 128, 136, 142, 143, 149, 152, 155, 229. † 142

evidence that it is a doctrine agreeable to his mind, it becomes us to receive it with full credit and submission; and not sullenly to reject it, because our notions and humors are not suited in the manner, and number of times, of his particularly explaining it to us. How often is pardon of sins promised in the Old Testament to repenting and returning sinners? How many hundred times is God's special favor there promised to the sincerely righteous, without any express mention of these benefits being through Christ? Would it therefore be becoming us to say, that, inasmuch as our dependence on Christ for these benefits, is a doctrine, which, if true, is of such importance, God ought expressly to have mentioned Christ's merits as the reason and ground of the benefits, if he knew they were the ground of them, and should have plainly declared it sooner, and more frequently, if ever he expected we should believe him, when he did tell us of it? How often is vengeance and misery threatened in the Old Testament to the wicked, without any clear and express signification of any such thing intended, as that everlasting fire, where there is wailing and gnashing of teeth, in another world, which Christ so often speaks of as the punishment appointed for all the wicked? Would it now become a Christian, to object and say, that if God really meant any such thing, he ought *in reason and truth* to have declared it plainly and fully; and not to have been so silent about a matter of such vast importance to all mankind, for four thousand years together?

CHAPTER III.

OBSERVATIONS ON VARIOUS OTHER PLACES OF SCRIPTURE, PRINCIPALLY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, PROVING THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN.

SECTION I.

Observations on John iii. 6, in connection with some other passages in the New Testament.

THOSE words of Christ, giving a reason to Nicodemus, why we must be born again, John iii. 6, "That which is born of the flesh, is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit, is spirit;" have not, without good reason, been produced by divines, as a proof of the doctrine of original sin; supposing, that by *flesh* here is meant *the human nature in a debased and corrupt state.* Yet Dr. Taylor, p. 144, thus explains these words, *That which is born of the flesh, is flesh:* "That which is born by natural descent and propagation, is a man, consisting of body and soul, or the mere constitution and powers of a man in their natural state." But the constant use of these terms, *flesh* and *spirit*, in other parts of the New Testament, when thus set in opposition one to another, and the latter said to be produced by the Spirit of God, as here, and when speaking of the same thing, which Christ is here speaking of to Nicodemus, viz., the requisite qualifications to salvation, will fully vindicate the sense of our divines. Thus in the 7th and 8th chapters of Romans, where these terms *flesh* and *spirit* (σαρξ and πνευμα) are abundantly repeated, and set in opposition, as here. So, chap. vii. 14: The

law is *spiritual* (πνευματικος), but I am *carnal* (σαρκικος), *sold under sin*. He cannot only mean, "I am a man, consisting of body and soul, and having the powers of a man." Ver. 18, "I know that in me, that is, in my *flesh*, dwelleth no good thing." He does not mean to condemn his frame, *as consisting of body and soul;* and to assert, that in his *human constitution, with the powers of a man*, dwells no good thing. And when he says in the last verse of the chapter, "With the mind, I myself serve the law of God, but with the *flesh*, the law of sin;" he cannot mean, "I myself serve the law of God; *but with my innocent* human constitution, as having the powers of a man, *I serve the law of sin.*" And when he says in the next words in the beginning of the 8th chapter, "There is no condemnation to them, that walk not after the *flesh*, but after the *spirit;*" and ver. 4, "The righteousness of the law is fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh;" he cannot mean, "There is no condemnation to them that walk not according to *the powers of a man*," &c. And when he says, ver. 5 and 6, "They that are after the *flesh*, do mind the things of the *flesh;* and to be *carnally* minded is death;" he does not intend, "They that are according to the *human constitution, and* the *powers of a man*, do mind the things of the *human constitution and powers;* and to mind these, is death." And when he says, ver. 7 and 8, "The carnal (or *fleshly*) mind is enmity against God, and is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be; so that they that are in the *flesh*, cannot please God;" he cannot mean, that, "to mind the things which are agreeable to the *powers and constitution of a man*" (who, as our author says, is constituted or made right), "is enmity against God; and that a mind which is agreeable to this right human constitution, as God hath made it, is not subject to the law of God, nor indeed can be; and that they who are according to such a constitution, cannot please God." And when it is said, ver. 9, "Ye are not in the *flesh*, but in the *spirit;*" the apostle cannot mean, "Ye are not in the *human nature, as constituted of body and soul, and with the powers of a man.*" It is most manifest, that by the *flesh* here, the apostle means some nature that is corrupt, and of an evil tendency, and directly opposite to the law, and holy nature of God; so that to be, and walk according to it, and to have a mind conformed to it, is to be an utter enemy to God and his law, in a perfect inconsistence with being subject to God, and pleasing God; and in a sure and infallible tendency to death, and utter destruction. And it is plain, that here by *being* and *walking after*, or according to the *flesh*, is meant the same thing as being and walking according to a corrupt and sinful nature; and to be and walk according to the *spirit*, is to be and walk according to a holy and divine nature, or principle: and to be *carnally* minded, is the same as being viciously and corruptly minded; and to be *spiritually* minded, is to be of a virtuous and holy disposition.

When Christ says, John iii. 6, "That which is born of the *flesh*, is *flesh*," he represents the *flesh* not merely as a quality; for it would be incongruous, to speak of a quality as a thing born: it is a person, or man, that is born. Therefore man, as in his whole nature corrupt, is called *flesh:* which is agreeable to other Scripture representations, where the corrupt nature is called the *old man*, the *body of sin*, and the *body of death*. Agreeable to this are those representations in the 7th and 8th chapters of Romans: there *flesh* is figuratively represented as a person, according to the apostle's manner, observed by Mr. Locke, and after him by Dr. Taylor, who takes notice, that the apostle, in the 6th and 7th of Romans, represents sin as a person; and that he figuratively distinguishes in himself two persons; speaking of flesh as his person. *For I know that in me, that is in my* flesh, *dwelleth no good thing.* And it may be observed, that in the 8th chapter he still continues this representation, speaking of the *flesh*

as a person: and accordingly in the 6th and 7th verses, speaks of *the mind* of the *flesh*, φρονημα σαρκος, and of the mind of the spirit, φρονημα πνευματος, as if the *flesh* and spirit were two opposite persons, each having a mind contrary to the mind of the other. Dr. Taylor interprets this *mind of the flesh*, and *mind of the spirit*, as though the *flesh* and the *spirit* were here spoken of as the different *objects*, about which the mind spoken of is conversant. Which is plainly beside the apostle's sense; who speaks of the flesh and spirit as the subjects and agents, in which the mind spoken of is; and not the objects about which it acts. We have the same phrase, again, ver. 27: *He that searcheth the hearts*, knoweth what is the *mind of the spirit*, φρονημα πνευματος; the mind of the spiritual nature in the saints being the same with the mind of the Spirit of God himself, who imparts and actuates that spiritual nature; here the spirit is the subject and agent, and not the object. The same apostle in like manner uses the word νους, in Col. ii. 18, *Vainly puffed up by his* fleshly mind, υπο του νοος της σαρκος αυτου, *by the mind of his flesh.* And this agent so often called *flesh*, represented by the apostle, as altogether evil, without any good thing dwelling in it, or belonging to it; yea, perfectly contrary to God and his law, and tending only to death and ruin, and directly opposite to the spirit, is what Christ speaks of to Nicodemus as born in the first birth, as giving a reason why there is a necessity of a new birth, in order to a better production.

One thing is particularly observable in that discourse of the apostle, in the 7th and 8th of Romans, in which he so often uses the term *flesh*, as opposite to *spirit*, which, as well as many other things in his discourse, makes it plain, that by *flesh* he means something in itself corrupt and sinful, and that is, that he expressly calls it *sinful flesh*, Rom. viii. 3. It is manifest, that by *sinful flesh* he means the same thing with that flesh spoken of in the immediately foregoing and following words, and in all the context: and that when it is said, Christ was made in the likeness of *sinful flesh*, the expression is equipollent with those that speak of Christ as *made sin*, and *made a curse for us.*

Flesh and *spirit* are opposed to one another in Gal. v. in the same manner as in the 8th of Romans: and there, by *flesh* cannot be meant only the *human nature of body and soul*, or *the mere constitution and powers of a man*, as in its natural state, innocent and right. In the 16th verse the apostle says, "Walk in the *spirit*, and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the *flesh*:" where the flesh is spoken of as a thing of an evil inclination, desire or lust. But this is more strongly signified in the next words: "For the *flesh* lusteth against the *spirit*, and the *spirit* against the *flesh*; and these are contrary the one to the other." What could have been said more plainly, to show that what the apostle means by *flesh*, is something very evil in its nature, and an irreconcilable enemy to all goodness? And it may be observed, that in these words, and those that follow, the apostle still figuratively represents the *flesh* as a person or agent, desiring, acting, having lusts, and performing works. And by works of the *flesh*, and fruits of the *spirit*, which are opposed to each other, from ver. 19, to the end, are plainly meant the same as works of a sinful nature, and fruits of a holy, renewed nature. Now the works of the *flesh* are manifest, which are these: adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, &c. But the fruit of the *spirit* is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, &c. The apostle, by *flesh*, does not mean any thing that is innocent and good in itself, that only needs to be restrained, and kept in proper bounds; but something altogether evil, which is to be destroyed, and not merely restrained. 1 Cor. v. 5, "To deliver such a one to Satan, for the *destruction of the flesh*." We must have *no mercy on it;*

we cannot be *too cruel to it ;* it must even *be crucified.*" Gal. v. 24, "They that are Christ's, have *crucified* the *flesh*, with the affections and lusts."

The apostle John, the same apostle that writes the account of what Christ said to Nicodemus, by the *spirit* means the same thing as a new, divine, and holy nature, exerting itself in a principle of divine love, which is the sum of all Christian holiness. 1 John iii. 23, 24, "And that we should love one another, as he gave us commandment; and he that keepeth his commandments, dwelleth in him, and he in him: and hereby we know that he abideth in us, by the *spirit* that he hath given us." With chap. iv. 12, 13, "If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and his love is perfected in us: hereby know we, that we dwell in him, because he hath given us of his *spirit.*" The spiritual principle in us being as it were communicated of the Spirit of God to us.

And as by πνευμα is meant a holy nature, so by the epithet, πνευματικος, *spiritual*, is meant the same as truly virtuous and holy. Gal. vi. 1, "Ye that are *spiritual*, restore such a one in the spirit of meekness." The apostle refers to what he had just said, in the end of the foregoing chapter, where he had mentioned *meekness*, as a fruit of the *spirit*. And so by *carnal*, or *fleshly*, σαρκικος, is meant the same as sinful. Rom. vii. 14, "The law is *spiritual* (i. e. *holy*), but I am carnal, sold under sin."

And it is evident, that by *flesh*, as the word is used in the New Testament, and opposed to *spirit*, when speaking of the qualifications for eternal salvation, is not meant only what is now vulgarly called *the sins of the flesh*, consisting in inordinate appetites of the body, and their indulgence; but the whole body of sin, implying those lusts that are most subtle, and furthest from any relation to the body; such as pride, malice, envy, &c. When the *works of the flesh* are enumerated, Gal. v. 19, 20, 21, they are vices of the latter kind chiefly that are mentioned; idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings. So, pride of heart is the effect or operation of the *flesh*. Col. ii. 1, 8, "Vainly puffed up by his *fleshly mind:*" in the Greek, *by the mind of the flesh*. So, pride, envying, strife and division, are spoken of as works of the *flesh*. 1 Cor. iii. 3, 4, "For ye are yet carnal (σαρκικο, *fleshly*). For whereas there is envying, and strife, and division, are ye not *carnal*, and walk as men? For while one saith, I am of *Paul*, and another, I am of *Apollos*, are ye not *carnal?*" Such kind of lusts do not depend on the body, or external senses; for the devil himself has them in the highest degree, who has not, nor ever had, any body or external senses to gratify.

Here, if it should be inquired, how corruption or depravity in general, or the nature of man as corrupt and sinful, came to be called *flesh ;* and not only that corruption which consists in inordinate bodily appetites, I think, what the apostle says in the last cited place, *Are ye not carnal, and walk as men?* leads us to the true reason. It is because a corrupt and sinful nature is what properly belongs to mankind, or the race of Adam, as they are in themselves, and as they are *by nature*. The word *flesh* is often used in both Old Testament and New, to signify mankind in their present state. To enumerate all the places, would be very tedious; I shall therefore only mention a few places in the New Testament. Matth. xxiv. 22, "Except those days should be shortened, no *flesh* should be saved." Luke iii. 6, "All *flesh* shall see the salvation of God." John xvii. 2, "Thou hast given him power over all *flesh.*" See also Acts ii. 17, Rom. iii. 20, 1 Cor. i. 29, Gal. ii. 16. Man's nature, being left to itself, forsaken of the Spirit of God, as it was when man fell, and consequently forsaken of divine and holy principles, of itself became exceeding corrupt, utterly depraved and ruined: and so the word *flesh*, which signifies *man*, came to be

used to signify man as he is in himself, in his natural state, debased, corrupt and ruined: and on the other hand, the word *spirit* came to be used to signify a divine and holy principle, or new nature; because that is not *of man*, but *of God*, by the indwelling and vital influence of his *Spirit*. And thus to be *corrupt*, and to be *carnal*, or *fleshly*, and to *walk as men*, are the same thing with the apostle. And so in other parts of the Scripture, to *savor the things that be of men*, and to *savor things which are corrupt*, are the same; and *sons of men*, and *wicked men*, also are the same, as was observed before. And on the other hand, to *savor the things that be of God*, and to *receive the things of the Spirit of God*, are phrases that signify as much as relishing and embracing true holiness or divine virtue.

All these things confirm what we have supposed to be Christ's meaning, in saying, "That which is born of the flesh, is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit, is spirit." His speech implies, that what is born in the first birth of man is nothing but man as he is of himself, without any thing divine in him; depraved, debased, sinful, ruined man, utterly unfit to enter into the kingdom of God, and incapable of the spiritual, divine happiness of that kingdom: but that which is born in the new birth, of the Spirit of God, is a spiritual principle, and holy and divine nature, meet for the divine and heavenly kingdom. It is a confirmation that this is the true meaning, that it is not only evidently agreeable to the constant language of the Spirit of Christ in the New Testament; but the words understood in this sense, contain the proper and true reason, why a man must be born again, in order to enter into the kingdom of God; the reason that is given everywhere in other parts of the Scripture for the necessity of a renovation, a change of mind, a new heart, &c., in order to salvation: to give a reason of which to Nicodemus, is plainly Christ's design in the words which have been insisted on.

Before I proceed, I would observe one thing as a corollary from what has been said.

Coroll. If by flesh and spirit, when spoken of in the New Testament, and opposed to each other, in discourses on the necessary qualifications for salvation, we are to understand what has been now supposed, it will not only follow, that men by nature are corrupt, but *wholly corrupt*, without any good thing. If by flesh is meant man's nature, as he receives it in his first birth, then *therein dwelleth no good thing*; as appears by Rom. vii. 18. It is wholly opposite to God, and to subjection to his law, as appears by Rom. viii. 7, 8. It is directly contrary to true holiness, and wholly opposes it, and holiness is opposite to that; as appears by Gal. v. 17. So long as men are in their natural state, they not only have no good thing, but it is impossible they should have or do any good thing; as appears by Rom. viii. 8. There is nothing in their nature, as they have it by the first birth, whence should arise any true subjection to God; as appears by Rom. viii. 7. If there were any thing truly good in the *flesh*, or in *man's nature*, or natural disposition, under a moral view, then it should only be amended; but the Scripture represents as though we were to be enemies to it, and were to seek nothing short of its entire destruction, as has been observed. And elsewhere the apostle directs not to the amending of the *old man*, but *putting it off*, and putting on the *new man*; and seeks not to have the *body of death* made better, but to be *delivered* from it, and says, "That if any man be in Christ he is a new creature (which doubtless means the same as a man *new born*) old things are (not amended) but passed away, and *all* things are become new."

But this will be further evident, if we particularly consider the apostle's discourse in the latter part of the second chapter of 1 Cor. and the beginning of the third. There the apostle speaks of the *natural man*, and the *spiritual man*,

where *natural* and *spiritual* are opposed just in the same manner, as I have observed *carnal* and *spiritual* often are." In chap. ii. 14, 15, he says, "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. But he that is spiritual, judgeth all things." And not only does the apostle here oppose *natural* and *spiritual*, just as he elsewhere does *carnal* and *spiritual*, but his following discourse evidently shows, that he means the very same distinction, the same two distinct and opposite things. For immediately on his thus speaking of the difference between the *natural* and the *spiritual* man, he turns to the Corinthians, in the first words of the next chapter, connected with this, and says, "And I, brethren, could not speak unto you as unto *spiritual*, but as unto *carnal*." Referring manifestly to what he had been saying, in the immediately preceding discourse, about *spiritual* and *natural men*, and evidently using the word *carnal*, as synonymous with *natural*. By which it is put out of all reasonable dispute, that the apostle by *natural men* means the same as men in that *carnal*, sinful state, that they are in by their first birth: notwithstanding all the glosses and criticisms, by which modern writers have endeavored to palm upon us another sense of this phrase; and so to deprive us of the clear instruction the apostle gives in that 14th verse, concerning the sinful, miserable state of man by nature. Dr. Taylor says, by ψυχικος, is meant the *animal man*, the man who maketh sense and appetite the law of his action. If he aims to limit the meaning of the word to external sense, and bodily appetite, his meaning is certainly not the apostle's. For the apostle in his sense includes the more spiritual vices of envy, strife, &c., as appears by the four first verses of the next chapter; where, as I have observed, he substitutes the word *carnal* in the place of ψυχικος. So the Apostle Jude uses the word in like manner, opposing it to *spiritual*, or *having the spirit*, ver. 19, "These are they that separate themselves, sensual (ψυχικοι), not having the spirit." The vices he had been just speaking of, were chiefly of the more spiritual kind. Ver. 16, "These are murmurers, complainers, walking after their own lusts; and their mouth speaketh great swelling words, having men's persons in admiration, because of advantage." The vices mentioned are much of the same kind with those of the Corinthians, for which he calls them *carnal*, *envying*, *strife* and *divisions*, and saying, *I am of Paul*, and *I of Apollos*; and being *puffed up for one against another*. We have the same word again, Jam. iii. 14, 15, "If ye have bitter envying and strife, glory not, and lie not against the truth: this wisdom descendeth not from above, but is earthly, *sensual* (ψυχικη) and devilish;" where also the vices the apostle speaks of are of the more spiritual kind.

So that on the whole, there is sufficient reason to understand the apostle, when he speaks of the *natural* man in that 1 Cor. ii. 14, as meaning man in his native, corrupt state. And his words represent him as totally corrupt, wholly a stranger and enemy to true virtue or holiness, and things appertaining to it, which it appears are commonly intended in the New Testament by things *spiritual*, and are doubtless here meant by *things of the Spirit of God*. These words also represent that it is impossible man should be otherwise, while in his natural state. The expressions are very strong: *the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God*, is not susceptible of things of that kind, *neither can he know them*, can have no true sense or relish of them, or notion of their real nature and true excellency, *because they are spiritually discerned*: they are not discerned by means of any principle in nature, but altogether by a principle that is divine, something introduced by the grace of God's Holy Spirit, which is above all that is natural. The words are in a considerable degree parallel with

those of our Saviour, John xiv. 16, 17, "He shall give you the Spirit of Truth whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him; but ye know him, for he dwelleth with you, and shall be in you."

SECTION II.

Observations on Romans iii. 9—24.

If the Scriptures represent all mankind as wicked in their first state, before they are made partakers of the benefits of Christ's redemption, then they are wicked by nature; for doubtless men's first state is their native state, or the state they come into the world in. But the Scriptures do thus represent all mankind.

Before I mention particular texts to this purpose, I would observe that it alters not the case as to the argument in hand, whether we suppose these texts speak directly of infants, or only of such as are capable of some understanding, so as to understand something of their own duty and state. For if it be so with all mankind, that as soon as ever they are capable of reflecting and knowing their own moral state, they find themselves wicked, this proves that they are wicked by nature; either born wicked, or born with an infallible disposition to be wicked as soon as possible, if there be any difference between these, and either of them will prove men to be born exceedingly depraved. I have before proved, that a native propensity to sin certainly follows from many things said in the Scripture of mankind; but what I intend now, is something more direct, to prove by direct Scripture testimony, that all mankind, in their first state, are really of a wicked character.

To this purpose is exceeding full, express and abundant, that passage of the apostle, in Rom. iii., beginning with the 9th verse to the end of the 24th; which I shall set down at large, distinguishing the universal terms which are here so often repeated by a distinct character. The apostle, having in the first chapter, verses 16, 17, laid down his proposition, that none can be saved in any other way than through the righteousness of God, by faith in Jesus Christ, proceeds to prove this point, by showing particularly that all are in themselves wicked, and without any righteousness of their own. First he insists on the wickedness of the Gentiles, in the first chapter, and next, on the wickedness of the Jews, in the second chapter. And then in this place, he comes to sum up the matter, and draw the conclusion in the words following: "What then, are we better than they? No, in no wise; for we have before proved both Jews and Gentiles, that they are *all* under sin; as it is written, There is *none* righteous, no, not *one;* there is *none* that understandeth; there is *none* that seeketh after God; they are *all* gone out of the way; they are *together* become unprofitable; there is *none* that doth good, no not *one*. Their throat is an open sepulchre; with their tongues they have used deceit; the poison of asps is under their lips; whose mouth is full of cursing and bitterness; their feet are swift to shed blood; destruction and misery are in their ways, and the way of peace they have not known; there is no fear of God before their eyes. Now we know that whatsoever things the law saith, it saith to them that are under the law, that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God. Therefore by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in his sight; for by the law is the knowledge of sin. But now the righteousness of God without the law, is manifest, being witnessed by the law and the prophets;

even the righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ, unto *all*, and upon *all* them that believe: for there is *no* difference. For *all* have sinned, and come short of the glory of God. Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption which is in Jesus Christ."

Here the thing which I would prove, viz., that mankind in their first state, before they are interested in the benefits of Christ's redemption, are universally wicked, is declared with the utmost possible fulness and precision. So that if here this matter be not set forth plainly, expressly, and fully, it must be because no words can do it, and it is not in the power of language, or any manner of terms and phrases, however contrived and heaped up one upon another, determinately to signify any such thing.

Dr. Taylor, to take off the force of the whole, would have us to understand, pages 104—107, that these passages, quoted from the Psalms, and other parts of the Old Testament, do not speak of *all* mankind, nor of *all* the Jews; but only of *them* of whom they were *true*. He observes, there were many that were innocent and righteous; though there were also many, a strong party, that were wicked, corrupt, &c., of whom these texts were to be understood. Concerning which I would observe the following things:

1. According to this, the universality of the terms that are found in these places, which the apostle cites from the Old Testament, to prove that all the world, both Jews and Gentiles, are under sin, is nothing to his purpose. The apostle uses universal terms in his proposition, and in his conclusion, that *all* are under sin, that *every mouth* is stopped, *all* the world guilty—that by the deeds of the law *no flesh* can be justified. And he chooses out a number of universal sayings or clauses out of the Old Testament, to confirm this universality; as, "There is none righteous, no, not one: they are all gone out of the way: there is none that understandeth," &c. But yet the universality of these expressions is nothing to this purpose, because the universal terms found in them have indeed no reference to any such universality as this the apostle speaks of, nor any thing akin to it; they mean no universality, either in the collective sense, or personal sense; no universality of the nations of the world, or of particular persons in those nations, or in any one nation in the world: "but only of those of whom they are true." That is, there are none of them righteous, of whom it is *true* that they are not *righteous*, no, not one; there are none that understand, of whom it is *true*, that they *understand not*: they are all gone out of the way, of whom it is *true*, that they *are* gone out of the way, &c. Or if these expressions are to be understood concerning that strong party in Israel, in David's and Solomon's days, and in the prophets' days, they are to be understood of them universally. And what is that to the apostle's purpose? How does such a universality of wickedness as this—that all were wicked in Israel, who were wicked; or that there was a particular evil party, all of which were wicked, confirm that universality which the apostle would prove, viz., that all Jews and Gentiles, and the whole world, were wicked, and every mouth stopped, and that no flesh could be justified by their own righteousness.

Here nothing can be said to abate the nonsense but this, that the apostle would convince the Jews that they were capable of being wicked, as well as other nations; and to prove it, he mentions some texts, which show that there was a wicked party in Israel a thousand years ago; and that as to the universal terms which happened to be in these texts, the apostle had no respect to these; but his reciting them is as it were accidental, they happened to be in some texts which speak of an evil party in Israel, and the apostle cites them as they are, not because they are any more to his purpose for the universal

terms, which happen to be in them. But let the reader look on the words of the apostle, and observe the violence of such a supposition. Particularly let the words of the 9th and 10th verses, and their connection, be observed: "All are under sin: as it is written, There is none righteous; no, not one." How plain is it, that the apostle cites that latter universal clause out of the 14th Psalm, to confirm the preceding universal words of his own proposition? And yet it will follow from the things which Dr. Taylor supposes, that the universa lity of the terms in the last words, *there is none righteous; no, not one*, hath no relation at all to that universality he speaks of in the preceding clause, to which they are joined, *all are under sin*, and is no more a confirmation of it, than if the words were thus: "There are *some*, or there are *many* in Israel, that are not righteous."

2. To suppose the apostle's design in citing these passages, was only to prove to the Jews, that of old there was a considerable number of their nation that were wicked men, is to suppose him to have gone about to prove what none of the Jews denied, or made the least doubt of. Even the Pharisees, the most self-righteous sect of them, who went furthest in glorying in the distinction of their nation from other nations, as a holy people, knew it and owned it: they openly confessed that their *forefathers killed the prophets*, Matth. xxiii. 29—31. And if the apostle's design had been only to refresh their memories, to put them in mind of the ancient wickedness of their nation, to lead to reflection on themselves as guilty of the like wickedness (as Stephen does, Acts vii.), what need had the apostle to go so far about to prove this; gathering up many sentences here and there, which prove that their Scriptures did speak of some, as wicked men, and then in the next place, to prove that the wicked men spoken of must be of the nation of the Jews, by this argument, "That what things soever the law saith, it saith to them that are under the law," or that whatsoever the books of the Old Testament said, it must be understood of that people that had the Old Testament? What need had the apostle of such an ambages or fetch as this, to prove to the Jews, that there had been many of their nation in some of the ancient ages, which were wicked men; when the Old Testament was full of passages that asserted this expressly, not only of a strong party, but of the nation in general? How much more would it have been to such a purpose, to have put them in mind of the wickedness of the people in general, in worshipping the golden calf, and the unbelief, murmuring, and perverseness of the whole congregation in the wilderness, for forty years, as Stephen does! Which things he had no need to prove to be spoken of their nation, by any such indirect argument, as that, "Whatsoever things the law saith, it saith to them that are under the law."

3. It would have been impertinent to the apostle's purpose, even as our author understands his purpose, for him to have gone about to convince the Jews that there had been a strong party of bad men in David's, Solomon's and the prophets' times. For Dr. Taylor supposes, the apostle's aim is to prove the great corruption of both Jews and Gentiles at that day, when Christ came into the world.*

In order more fully to evade the clear and abundant testimonies to the doctrine of Original Sin, contained in this part of the Holy Scripture, our author says, "The apostle is here speaking of bodies of people, of Jews and Gentiles in a collective sense, as two great bodies into which mankind are divided; speaking of them in their collective capacity, and not with respect to particular

* See Key, § 307, 310

persons; that the apostle's design is to prove, neither of these two great collective bodies, in their collective sense, can be justified by law, because both were corrupt; and so that no more is implied, than that the generality of both were wicked."*

On this I observe,

(1.) That this supposed sense disagrees extremely with the terms and language which the apostle here makes use of. For according to this, we must understand, either,

First, That the apostle means no universality at all, but only the far greater part. But if the words which the apostle uses, do not most fully and determinately signify a universality, no words ever used in the Bible are sufficient to do it. I might challenge any man to produce any one paragraph in the Scripture, from the beginning to the end, where there is such a repetition and accumulation of terms, so strongly and emphatically and carefully, to express the most perfect and absolute universality, or any place to be compared to it. What instance is there in the Scripture, or indeed any other writing, when the meaning is only the much greater part, where this meaning is signified in such a manner, by repeating such expressions, "They are all—they are all—they are all—together—every one—all the world," joined to multiplied negative terms, to show the universality to be without exception, saying, "There is no flesh—there is none—there is none—there is none—there is none, four times over; besides the addition of "No, not one—no, not one," once and again!

Or, secondly, if any universality at all be allowed, it is only of the collective bodies spoken of; and these collective bodies but two, as Dr. Taylor reckons them, viz., the Jewish nation, and the Gentile world; supposing the apostle is here representing each of these parts of mankind as being wicked. But is this the way of men's using language, when speaking of but two things, to express themselves in universal terms of such a sort, and in such a manner, and when they mean no more than that the thing affirmed is predicated of both of them? If a man, speaking of his two feet as both lame, should say, "All my feet are lame, they are all lame, all together are become weak: none of my feet are strong, none of them are sound, no, not one;" would not he be thought to be lame in his understanding, as well as his feet? When the apostle says, *that every mouth may be stopped*, must we suppose, that he speaks only of these two great collective bodies, figuratively ascribing to each of them a mouth, and means that these two mouths are stopped!

And besides, according to our author's own interpretation, the universal terms used in these texts cited from the Old Testament, have no respect to those two great collective bodies, nor indeed to either of them, but to *some* in Israel, a particular disaffected party in that one nation, which was made up of wicked men. So that his interpretation is every way absurd and inconsistent.

(2.) If the apostle is speaking only of the wickedness or guilt of great collective bodies, then it will follow, that also the justification he here treats of, is no other than the justification of such collective bodies. For they are the same he speaks of as guilty and wicked, that he argues cannot be *justified* by the works of the law, by reason of their being *wicked*. Otherwise his argument is wholly disannulled. If the guilt he speaks of be only of collective bodies, then what he argues from that guilt, must be only that collective bodies cannot be justified by the works of the law, having no respect to the justification of particular persons. And indeed, this is Dr. Taylor's declared opinion. He sup-

* Pages 102, 104, 117, 119, 120, and Note on Rom. iii. 10—19.

poses the apostle here, and in other parts of this epistle, is speaking of men's justification *considered only as in their collective capacity.** But the contrary is most manifest. The 26th and 28th verses of this third chapter cannot, without the utmost violence, be understood otherwise than of the justification of particular persons. "That he might be just, and the justifier of *him* that believeth in Jesus. Therefore we conclude that a *man* is justified by faith, without the deeds of the law." So chap. iv. 5, "But to *him* that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, *his* faith is counted for righteousness." And what the apostle cites in the 6th, 7th and 8th verses from the Book of Psalms, evidently shows that he is speaking of the justification of particular persons. "Even as David also describeth the blessedness of *the man* unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works, saying, Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered." David says these things in the 32d Psalm, with a special respect to his own particular case; there expressing the great distress he was in, while under a sense of the guilt of his personal sin, and the great joy he had when God forgave him.

And then, it is very plain in that paragraph of the 3d chapter which we have been upon, that it is the justification of particular persons that the apostle speaks of, by that place in the Old Testament which he refers to in ver. 20, "Therefore by the deeds of the law, there shall no flesh be justified in his sight." He refers to that in Psal. cxliii. 2, "Enter not into judgment with thy servant; for in thy sight shall *no man living* be justified." Here the Psalmist is not speaking of the justification of a nation, as a collective body, or of one of the two parts of the world, but of a particular man. And it is further manifest, that the apostle is here speaking of personal justification, inasmuch as this place is evidently parallel with that, Gal. iii. 10, 11, "For as many as are of the works of the law are under the curse: for it is written, Cursed is *every one* that continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to do them. But that *no man* is justified by the works of the law, is evident; for the just shall live by faith." It is plain, that this place is parallel with that in the 3d of Romans, not only as the thing asserted is the same, and the argument by which it is proved here, is the same as there, viz., that all are guilty, and exposed to be condemned by the law: but the same saying of the Old Testament is cited here in the beginning of this discourse in Galatians, chap. ii. 16. And many other things demonstrate, that the apostle is speaking of the same justification in both places, which I omit for brevity's sake.

And besides all these things, our author's interpretation makes the apostle's argument wholly void another way. The apostle is speaking of a certain subject, which cannot be justified by the works of the law; and his argument is, that that same subject is guilty, and is condemned by the law. If he means, that one subject, suppose a collective body or bodies, cannot be justified by the law, because another subject, another collective body is condemned by the law, it is plain, the argument would be quite vain and impertinent. Yet thus the argument must stand according to Dr. Taylor's interpretation. The collective bodies, which he supposes are spoken of as wicked, and condemned by the law, considered as in their collective capacity, are those two, the Jewish nation, and the Heathen world: but the collective body which he supposes the apostle speaks of as justified without the deeds of the law, is neither of these, but the Christian church, or body of believers; which is a new collective body, a new creature, and a new man (according to our author's understanding of such

* See note on Rom. iii. 10—19, chap. v, 11, and ix. 30, 31.

phrases) which never had any existence before it was justified, and therefore never was wicked or condemned, unless it was with regard to the individuals of which it was constituted; and it does not appear, according to our author's scheme, that these individuals had before been generally wicked. For according to him, there was a number both among the Jews and Gentiles, that were righteous before. And how does it appear, but that the comparatively few Jews and Gentiles, of which this new created collective body was constituted, were chiefly of the best of each?

So that in every view, this author's way of explaining this passage in the third of Romans, appears vain and absurd. And so clearly and fully has the apostle expressed himself, that it is doubtless impossible to invent any other sense to put upon his words, than that which will imply, that all mankind, even every individual of the whole race, but their Redeemer himself, are in their first original state, corrupt and wicked.

Before I leave this passage of the apostle, it may be proper to observe, that it not only is a most clear and full testimony to the native depravity of mankind, but also plainly declares that natural depravity to be total and exceeding great. It is the apostle's manifest design in these citations from the Old Testament, to show these three things. 1. That *all mankind* are by nature *corrupt*. 2. That every one is *altogether corrupt*, and, as it were, depraved in every part. 3. That they are in every part *corrupt in an exceeding degree*. With respect to the second of these, that every one is wholly, and, as it were, in every part corrupt, it is plain the apostle chooses out, and puts together those particular passages of the Old Testament, wherein most of those members of the body are mentioned, that are the soul's chief instruments or organs of external action. The hands (implicitly) in those expressions, *They are together become unprofitable, There is none that doth good.* The throat, tongue, lips and mouth, the organs of speech, in those words; "Their *throat* is an open sepulchre: with their *tongues* they have used deceit: the poison of asps is under their *lips;* whose *mouth* is full of cursing and bitterness." The feet in those words, ver. 15, "Their *feet* are swift to shed blood." These things together signify, that man is, as it were, all over corrupt in every part. And not only is the total corruption thus intimated by enumerating the several parts, but by denying of all good; any true understanding or spiritual knowledge, any virtuous action, or so much as truly virtuous desire, or seeking after God. There is none that *understandeth:* there is none that *seeketh* after God: there is none that *doth good:* the way of peace have they *not known.* And in general, by denying all true piety or religion in men in their first state, ver. 18, "There is *no fear* of God before their eyes." The expressions also are evidently chosen to denote a most extreme and desperate wickedness of heart. An exceeding depravity is ascribed to every part: to the throat, the scent of an *open sepulchre;* to the tongue and lips, *deceit*, and *the poison of asps;* to the mouth, *cursing* and *bitterness;* of their feet it is said, *they are swift to shed blood:* and with regard to the whole man, it is said, *destruction* and *misery* are in their ways. The representation is very strong of each of these things, viz., that *all* mankind are corrupt; that every one is *wholly* and altogether corrupt; and also *extremely* and desperately corrupt. And it is plain, it is not accidental, that we have here such a collection of such strong expressions, so emphatically signifying these things; but that they are chosen of the apostle on design, as being directly and fully to his purpose; which purpose appears in all his discourse in the whole of this chapter and indeed from the beginning of the epistle.

SECTION III.

Observations on Romans v. 6—10, and Ephesians ii. 3, with the Context, and Romans vii.

ANOTHER passage of this apostle in the same epistle to the Romans, which shows that all that are made partakers of the benefits of Christ's redemption, are in their first state wicked, and desperately wicked, is that, chap. v. 6—10, "For when we were yet *without strength*, in due time Christ died for the *ungodly*. For scarcely for a righteous man will one die; yet peradventure for a good man, some would even dare to die. But God commendeth his love towards us, in that while we were yet *sinners*, Christ died for us. Much more then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from *wrath* through him. For if while we were *enemies*, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son; much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life."

Here all that Christ died for, and that are saved by him, are spoken of as being in their first state *sinners*, *ungodly*, *enemies* to God, exposed to divine *wrath*, and *without strength*, without ability to help themselves, or deliver their souls from this miserable state.

Dr. Taylor says, The apostle here speaks of the *Gentiles only in their heathen state*, in contradistinction to the Jews; and that not of particular persons among the heathen Gentiles, or as to the state they were in personally; but only of the Gentiles collectively taken, or of the miserable state of that great collective body, the heathen world: and that these appellations, *sinners*, *ungodly*, *enemies*, &c., were names by which the apostles in their writings were wont to signify and distinguish the heathen world, in opposition to the Jews; and that in this sense these appellations are to be taken in their epistles, and in this place in particular.* And it is observable, that this way of interpreting these phrases in the apostolic writings, is become fashionable with many late writers; whereby they not only evade several clear testimonies to the doctrine of original sin, but make void great part of the New Testament; on which account it deserves the more particular consideration.

It is allowed to have been long common and customary among the Jews, in Christ's and the apostle's days, especially those of the sect of the Pharisees, in their pride and confidence in their privileges, as the peculiar people of God, to exalt themselves exceedingly above other nations, and greatly to despise the Gentiles, and call them by such names as *sinners*, *enemies*, *dogs*, &c., as notes of distinction from themselves, whom they accounted in general (excepting the publicans, and the notoriously profligate) as the *friends*, special *favorites*, and *children* of God; because they were the children of Abraham, were circumcised, and had the law of Moses, as their peculiar privilege, and as a wall of partition between them and the Gentiles.

But it is very remarkable, that a Christian divine, who has studied the New Testament, and the epistle to the Romans in particular, so diligently as Dr. Taylor, should be strong in an imagination, that the apostles of Jesus Christ should so far countenance, and do so much to cherish these self-exalting, uncharitable dispositions and notions of the Jews, which gave rise to such a custom, as to fall in with that custom, and adopt that language of their pride and

* Pages 114—120. See also Dr. Taylor's Paraph. and Notes on the place.

contempt, and especially that the Apostle Paul should do it. It is a most unreasonable imagination on many accounts.

1. The whole gospel dispensation is calculated entirely to overthrow and abolish every thing to which this self-distinguishing, self-exalting language of the Jews was owing. It was calculated wholly to exclude such boasting, and to destroy that pride and self-righteousness that were the causes of it; it was calculated to abolish the enmity, and break down the partition wall between Jews and Gentiles, and *of twain* to *make one new man, so making peace;* to destroy all dispositions in nations and particular persons to despise one another, or to say one to another, *Stand by thyself, come not near to me; for I am holier than thou;* and to establish the contrary principles of humility, mutual esteem, honor and love, and universal union, in the most firm and perfect manner.

2. Christ, when on earth, set himself, through the course of his ministry, to militate against this pharisaical spirit, practice, and language of the Jews; appearing in such representations, names, and epithets, so customary among them; by which they showed so much contempt of the Gentiles, publicans, and such as were openly lewd and vicious, and so exalted themselves above them; calling them *sinners* and *enemies*, and themselves *holy* and *God's children;* not allowing the Gentile to be their neighbor, &c. He condemned the Pharisees for not esteeming themselves *sinners*, as well as the publicans; trusting in themselves that they were righteous, and despising others. He militated against these things in his own treatment of some Gentiles, publicans, and others, whom they called *sinners*, and in what he said on those occasions.*

He opposed these notions and manners of the Jews in his parables,† and in his instructions to his disciples how to treat the unbelieving Jews;‡ and in what he says to Nicodemus about the necessity of a new birth, even for the Jews, as well as the unclean Gentiles, with regard to their proselytism, which some of the Jews looked upon as a *new birth:* and in opposition to their notions of their being the children of God, because the children of Abraham, but the Gentiles by nature sinners and children of wrath, he tells them that even they were *children of the devil.*||

3. Though we should suppose the apostles not to have been thoroughly brought off from such notions, manners and language of the Jews, till after Christ's ascension; yet after the pouring out of the Spirit on the day of pentecost, or at least, after the calling of the Gentiles, begun in the conversion of Cornelius, they were fully indoctrinated in this matter, and effectually taught no longer to call the Gentiles *unclean*, as a note of distinction from the Jews, Acts x. 28, which was before any of the apostolic epistles were written.

4. Of all the apostles, none were more perfectly instructed in this matter, and none so abundant in instructing others in it, as Paul, the great Apostle of the Gentiles. He had abundance to do in this matter: none of the apostles had so much occasion to exert themselves against the forementioned notions and language of the Jews, in opposition to Jewish teachers, and judaizing Christians,

* Matth. viii. 5—13. Chap. ix. 9—13. Chap. xi 19—24. Chap. xv. 21—28. Luke vii. 37, to the end. Chap. xvii. 12—19. Chap. xix. 1—10. John iv. 9, &c. ver. 39. &c. Compare Luke x. 29, &c.

† Matth. xxi. 28—32. Chap. xxii. 1—10. Luke xiv. 16—24. Compare Luke xiii. 28, 29, 30

‡ Matth. x. 14, 15. || John viii. 33—44.

It may also be observed, that John the Baptist greatly contradicted the Jews' opinion of themselves as being a holy people, and accepted of God, because they were the children of Abraham, and on that account better than the heathen, whom they called sinners, enemies, unclean, &c., in baptizing the Jews as a *polluted* people, and *sinners*, as the Jews used to baptize proselytes from among the heathen: calling them to repentance as sinners, saying, "Think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father; for I say unto you, that God is able, of these stones, to raise up children unto Abraham;" and teaching the Pharisees, that instead of their being a holy generation, and children of God, as they called themselves, they were a *generation of vipers.*

that strove to keep up the separation wall between Jews and Gentiles, and to exalt the former, and set the latter at nought.

5. This apostle does especially strive in this matter in his epistle to the Romans, above all his other writings; exerting himself in a most elaborate manner, and with his utmost skill and power, to bring the Jewish Christians off from every thing of this kind; endeavoring by all means that there might no longer be in them any remains of these old notions they had been educated in, of such a great distinction between Jews and Gentiles, as were expressed in the names they used to distinguish them by, calling the Jews holy, children of Abraham, friends and children of God; but the Gentiles sinners, unclean, enemies, and the like. He makes it almost his whole business, from the beginning of the epistle, to this passage in the 5th chapter, which we are upon, to convince them that there was no ground for any such distinction, and to prove that in common, both Jews and Gentiles, all were desperately wicked, and none righteous; no, not one. He tells them, chap. iii. 9, that the Jews were by no means better than the Gentiles; and (in what follows in that chapter) that there was no difference between Jews and Gentiles; and represents all as without strength, or any sufficiency of their own in the affair of justification and redemption: and in the continuation of the same discourse, in the 4th chapter, teaches that all that were justified by Christ, were in themselves *ungodly;* and that being the children of Abraham was not peculiar to the Jews. In this 5th chapter, still in continuation of the same discourse, on the same subject and argument of justification through Christ, and by faith in him, he speaks of Christ's dying for the *ungodly* and *sinners*, and those that were without *strength* or sufficiency for their own salvation, as he had done all long before. But now, it seems, the apostle by *sinners* and *ungodly* must not be understood according as he used these words before; but must be supposed to mean only the Gentiles as distinguished from the Jews; adopting the language of these self-righteous, self-exalting, disdainful, judaizing teachers, whom he was with all his might opposing; countenancing the very same thing in them, which he had been from the beginning of the epistle discountenancing and endeavoring to discourage, and utterly to abolish, with all his art and strength

One reason why the Jews looked on themselves better than the Gentiles, and called themselves *holy*, and the Gentiles *sinners*, was, that they had the *law of Moses*. They *made their boast of the law*. But the apostle shows them, that this was so far from making them better, that it condemned them, and was an occasion of their being *sinners*, in a higher degree, and more aggravated manner, and more effectually and dreadfully *dead* in, and by sin, chap. vii. 4—13, agreeable to those words of Christ, John v. 45.

It cannot be justly objected here, that this apostle did indeed use this language, and call the Gentiles sinners, in contradistinction to the Jews, in what he said to Peter, which he himself gives an account of in Gal. ii. 15, 16, "We who are Jews by nature, and not sinners of the Gentiles, knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by faith in Jesus Christ." It is true that the apostle here refers to this distinction, as what was usually made by the self-righteous Jews, between themselves and the Gentiles, but not in such a manner as to adopt or favor it; but on the contrary, so as plainly to show his disapprobation of it; *q. d.*, "Though we were born Jews, and by nature are of that people which are wont to make their boast of the law, expecting to be justified by it, and trust in themselves that they are righteous, despising others, calling the Gentiles *sinners*, in distinction from themselves; yet we, being now instructed in the gospel of Christ, know better. We now know that

a man is not justified by the works of the law; that we are all justified only by faith in Christ, in whom there is no difference, no distinction of Greek or Gentile and Jew, but all are one in Christ Jesus." And this is the very thing he there speaks of, which he blamed Peter for; that by his withdrawing and separating himself from the Gentiles, refusing to eat with them, &c., he had countenanced this self-exalting, self-distinguishing, separating spirit and custom of the Jews, whereby they treated the Gentiles, as in a distinguishing manner, *sinners* and *unclean*, and not fit to come near them who were a holy people.

6. The words themselves of the apostle in this place, show plainly, that he here uses the word *sinners*, not as signifying Gentiles, in opposition to Jews, but as denoting the *morally evil*, in opposition to such as are *righteous* or *good*: because this latter opposition or distinction between *sinners* and *righteous* is here expressed in plain terms: "Scarcely for a *righteous* man will one die yet peradventure for a *good* man some would even dare to die; but God commended his love towards us, in that while we were yet *sinners*, Christ died for us." By *righteous* men are doubtless meant the same that are meant by such a phrase, throughout this apostle's writings, and throughout the New Testament, and throughout the Bible. Will any one pretend, that by the righteous man, whom men would scarcely die for, and by the good man, that perhaps some might even dare to die for, is meant a Jew? Dr. Taylor himself does not explain it so, in his exposition of this epistle, and therefore is not very consistent with himself, in supposing that in the other part of the distinction the apostle means Gentiles, as distinguished from the Jews. The apostle himself had been laboring abundantly, in the preceding part of the epistle, to prove that the Jews were sinners in this sense, namely, in opposition to *righteous*; that all had *sinned*, that all were under *sin*, and therefore could not be justified, could not be accepted as righteous by their own righteousness.

7. Another thing which makes it evident that the apostle, when he speaks in this place of the sinners and enemies which Christ died for, does not mean only the Gentiles, is that he includes himself among them, saying, while *we* were sinners, and when *we* were enemies.

Our author from time to time says, "The apostle, though he speaks only of the Gentiles in their Heathen state, yet *puts himself with them, because he was the apostle of the Gentiles.*" But this is very violent and unreasonable. There is no more sense in it than there would be in a father's ranking himself among his children, when speaking to his children of the benefits they have by being begotten by himself, and saying, *We children*—or in a physician's ranking himself with his patients, when talking to them of their diseases and cure, saying, *We sick folks.*—Paul being the apostle of the Gentiles, to save them from their Heathenism, is so far from being a reason for him to reckon himself among the Heathen, that on the contrary, it is the very thing that would render it in a peculiar manner unnatural and absurd for him so to do. Because, as the apostle of the Gentiles, he appears as their healer and deliverer from Heathenism; and therefore in that capacity does in a peculiar manner appear in his distinction from the Heathen, and in opposition to the state of Heathenism. For it is by the most opposite qualities only, that he is fitted to be an apostle of the Heathen, and recoverer from Heathenism. As the clear light of the sun is the thing which makes it a proper restorative from darkness; and therefore the sun's being spoken of as such a remedy, none would suppose to be a good reason why it should be ranked with darkness, or among dark things. And besides (which makes this supposition of Dr. Taylor's appear more violent), the apostle in this epistle, does expressly rank himself with the Jews, when he speaks of them as distin-

guished from the Gentiles, as in chapter iii. 9, "What then? Are *we* better than they?" That is, are we *Jews* better than the *Gentiles?*

It cannot justly be alleged in opposition to this, that the Apostle Peter puts himself with the heathen, 1 Pet. iv. 3: "For the time past of *our* life may suffice *us* to have wrought the will of the Gentiles; when *we* walked in lasciviousness, lusts, excess of wine, revellings, banquetings, and abominable idolatries. For the Apostle Peter (who by the way was not an apostle of the Gentiles) here does not speak of himself as one of the Heathen, but as one of the church of Christ in general, made up of those that had been Jews, Proselytes, and Heathens, who were now all one body, of which body he was a member. It is this society therefore, and not the Gentiles, that he refers to in the pronoun *us*. He is speaking of the wickedness that the members of this body or society had lived in before their conversion; not that every member had lived in all those vices here mentioned, but some in one, others in another. Very parallel with that of the Apostle Paul to Titus, chapter iii. 3, "For *we* ourselves also (i. e. we of the Christian church) were sometimes foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving divers lusts and pleasures (some one lust and pleasure, others another), living in malice, envy, hateful and hating one another," &c. There is nothing in this, but what is very natural. That the apostle, speaking *to* the Christian church, and *of* that church, confessing its former sins, should speak of himself as one of that society, and yet mention some sins that he personally had not been guilty of, and among others, Heathenish idolatry, is quite a different thing from what it would have been for the apostle, expressly distinguishing those of the Christians which had been Heathen, from those which had been Jews, to have ranked himself with the former, though he was truly of the latter.

If a minister in some congregation in England, speaking in a sermon of the sins of the nation, being himself of the nation, should say, "*We* have greatly corrupted ourselves, and provoked God by our deism, blasphemy, profane swearing, lascivousness, venality," &c., speaking in the first person plural, though he himself never had been a deist, and perhaps none of his hearers, and they might also have been generally free from other sins he mentioned; yet there would be nothing unnatural in his thus expressing himself. But it would be a quite different thing, if one part of the British dominions, suppose our king's American dominions, had universally apostatized from Christianity to deism, and had long been in such a state, and if one that had been born and brought up in England among Christians, the country being universally Christian, should be sent among them to show them the folly and great evil of deism, and convert them to Christianity; and this missionary, when making a distinction between English Christians, and these deists, should rank himself with the latter, and say, "*We* American deists, *we* foolish, blind, infidels," &c., this indeed would be very unnatural and absurd.

Another passage of the apostle, to the like purpose with that which we have been considering in the 5th of Romans, is that in Eph. ii. 3, "And were by nature children of wrath, even as others." This remains a plain testimony to the doctrine of Original Sin, as held by those that used to be called orthodox Christians, after all the pains and art used to torture and pervert it. This doctrine is here not only plainly and fully taught, but abundantly so, if we take the words with the context, where Christians are once and again represented as being, in their first state, *dead in sins*, and as *quickened* and *raised up* from such a state of death, in a most marvellous display of free and *rich grace* and *love*, and *exceeding greatness of the power of God*, &c.

With respect to those words, ημεν τεκνα φυσει οργης, *We were by nature*

children of wrath, Dr. Taylor says, pages 112—114, "The apostle means no more by this, than *truly* or *really children of wrath;* using a metaphorical expression, borrowed from the word that is used to signify a true and genuine child of a family, in distinction from one that is a child only by adoption." In which it is owned, that the proper sense of the phrase is, being a child by nature, in the same sense as a child by birth or natural generation; but only he supposes that here the word is used *metaphorically*. The instance he produces as parallel, to confirm his supposed metaphorical sense of the phrase, as meaning only *truly*, *really*, or *properly* children of wrath, viz., the Apostle Paul's calling Timothy his *own son in the faith*, γνησιον τεκνον, is so far from confirming his sense, that it is rather directly against it. For doubtless the apostle uses the word γνησιον in its original signification here, meaning his *begotten son*, γνησιος being the adjective from γονη, offspring, or the verb γενναω, to beget; as much as to say, *Timothy, my begotten son in the faith;* only allowing for the two ways of being begotten, spoken of in the New Testament, one natural, and the other spiritual; one being the first generation, the other regeneration; the one a being begotten as to the human nature, the other a being begotten in the faith, begotten in Christ, or as to one's Christianity. The apostle expressly signifies which of these he means in this place, *Timothy my begotten son* in the faith, in the same manner as he says to the Corinthians, 1 Cor. iv. 15, "In Christ Jesus I have begotten you through the gospel." To say the apostle uses the word φυσει, in Eph ii. 3, only as signifying *real*, true, and proper, is a most arbitrary interpretation, having nothing to warrant it in the whole Bible. The word φυσις is nowhere used in this sense in the New Testament.*

Another thing which our author alleges to evade the force of this, is that the word rendered *nature*, sometimes signifies habit contracted by *custom*, or an acquired nature. But this is not the proper meaning of the word. And it is plain the word in its common use, in the New Testament, signifies what we properly express in English by the word *nature*. There is but one place where there can be the least pretext for supposing in can be used otherwise; and that is 1 Cor. xi. 14, "Doth not even *nature* itself teach you, that if a man have long hair, it is a shame unto him?" And even here there is, I think, no manner of reason for understanding *nature* otherwise than in the proper sense. The emphasis used, αυτη η φυσις, *nature itself*, shows that the apostle does not mean *custom*, but nature in the proper sense. It is true, it was long custom, that made having the head covered a token of subjection, and a feminine habit or appearance; as it is custom that makes any outward action or word a sign or signification of any thing: but nature *itself*, nature in its proper sense, teaches that it is a shame for a man to appear with the established signs of the female sex, and with significations of inferiority, &c. As nature itself shows it to be a shame for a father to bow down or kneel to his own child or servant, or for men to bow to an idol, because bowing down is by custom an established token or sign of subjection and submission; such a sight, therefore, would be *unnatural*, shocking to a man's *very nature*. So nature would teach that it is a shame for a woman to use such and such lascivious words or gestures, though it be custom, that establishes the unclean signification of those gestures and sounds.

It is particularly unnatural and unreasonable, to understand the phrase, τεκνα φυσει, in this place, any otherwise than in the proper sense, on the following accounts.

1. It may be observed that both the words τεκνα and φυσις, in their original

* The following are all the other places where the word is used, Rom. i. 26, ii. 14, 27, xi. 21, 24, thrice in that verse. 1 Cor. xi. 14. Gal. ii. 15, iv. 8. James iii. 7, twice in that verse, and 2 Pet. i. 4.

signification, have reference to the birth or generation. So the word φυσις, which comes from φυω, which signifies to beget, or bring forth young, or to put forth, or bud forth as a plant that brings forth young buds and branches. And so the word τεκνον, comes from τικτω, which signifies to bring forth children

2. As though the apostle took care by the word used here, to signify what we are by birth, he changes the word he used before for children. In the preceding verse he used υιοι, speaking of the children of disobedience; but here τεκνα, which is a word derived, as was now observed, from τικτω, to bring forth a child, and more properly signifies a *begotten* or *born child.*

3. It is natural to suppose that the apostle here speaks in opposition to the pride of some, especially the Jews (for the church in Ephesus was made up partly of Jews, as well as the church in Rome), who exalted themselves in the privileges they had by birth, because they were *born* the children of Abraham, and were Jews by *nature*, φυσει Ιουδαιοι, as the phrase is, Gal. ii. 15. In opposition to this proud conceit, he teaches the Jews, that notwithstanding this, they were by *nature* children of wrath, *even as others*, i. e. as well as the Gentiles, which the Jews had been taught to look upon as *sinners*, and out of favor with God by *nature*, and *born children of wrath*.

4. It is more plain, that the apostle uses the word *nature* in its proper sense here, because he sets what they were by *nature*, in opposition to what they are by *grace*. In this verse, the apostle shows what they are by *nature*, viz., children of wrath; and in the following verses he shows how very different their state is by *grace*, saying, verse 5, *By grace ye are saved*, repeating it again verse 8, *By grace ye are saved.* But if by being children of wrath by nature, were meant no more than only their being *really* and *truly* children of wrath, as Dr. Taylor supposes, there would be no opposition in the signification of these phrases; for in this sense they were by *nature* in a state of *salvation*, as much as *by nature children of wrath;* for they were *truly*, *really*, and *properly* in a state of salvation.

If we take these words with the context, the whole abundantly proves that by nature we are totally corrupt, without any good thing in us. For if we allow the plain scope of the place, without attempting to hide it, by extreme violence used with the apostle's words and expressions, the design here is strongly to establish this point; that what Christians have that is good in them, or in their state, is *in no part* of it naturally in themselves, or from themselves, but is *wholly from divine grace*, all *the gift of God*, and *his workmanship*, the effect of his power, and free and wonderful love: none of our good works are primarily from ourselves, but with respect to them all, *we are God's workmanship, created unto good works*, as it were out of nothing: not so much as *faith itself*, the first principle of good works in Christians, is of themselves, but that *is the gift of God.*

Therefore the apostle compares the work of God, in forming Christians to true virtue and holiness, not only to a *new creation*, but a *resurrection*, or raising from the dead, ver. 1, "You hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins." And again, ver. 5, "Even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ." In speaking of Christians being quickened with Christ, the apostle has reference to what he had said before, in the latter part of the foregoing chapter, of God's manifesting *the exceeding greatness of his power* towards Christian converts in their conversion, *agreeable to the operation of his mighty power, when he raised Christ from the dead.* So that it is plain by every thing in this discourse, the apostle would signify, that *by nature* we have *no goodness;* but are as destitute of it as a dead corpse is of life: and that all

goodness, all good works, and faith the principal of all, are perfectly the gift of God's grace, and the work of his great, almighty, and exceeding excellent power. I think, there can be need of nothing but reading the chapter, and minding what is read, to convince all who have common understanding, of this; whatever any of the most subtle critics have done, or ever can do, to twist, rack, perplex, and pervert the words and phrases here used.

Dr. Taylor here again insists, that the apostle speaks only of the Gentiles in their heathen state, when he speaks of those that were *dead in sin*, and *by nature children of wrath*; and that though he seems to include himself among these, saying, "*We* were by nature children of wrath, *we* were dead in sins;" yet he only puts himself among them because he was the apostle of the Gentiles. The gross absurdity of which may appear from what was said before. But besides the things which have been already observed, there are some things which make it peculiarly unreasonable to understand it so here. It is true, the greater part of the church of Ephesus had been heathens, and therefore the apostle often has reference to their heathen state, in this epistle. But the words in this chap. ii. 3, plainly show, that he means himself and other Jews in distinction from the Gentiles; for the distinction is fully expressed. After he had told the Ephesians, who had been generally heathen, that they had been dead in sin, and had walked according to the course of this world, &c., ver. 1 and 2, he makes a *distinction*, and says, "Among whom *we also* had our conversation, &c., and were by nature children of wrath, *even as others*." Here first he changes the person; whereas, before he had spoken in the second person, "*Ye* were dead—*Ye* in time past walked," &c. Now he changes style, and uses the first person, in a most manifest distinction, "Among whom *we also*," that is, *we Jews*, as well as *ye Gentiles*: not only changing the person, but adding a particle of distinction, *also*; which would be nonsense, if he meant the same without distinction. And besides all this, more fully to express the distinction, the apostle further adds a pronoun of distinction: "*We* also, even as *others*," or, we as well as others: most evidently having respect to the notions, so generally entertained by the Jews, of their being much better than the Gentiles, in being Jews *by nature*, children of Abraham, and children of God; whom they supposed the Gentiles to be utterly cast off, as *born aliens*, and *by nature children of wrath*: in opposition to this, the apostle says, "We Jews, after all our glorying in our distinction, *were by nature children of wrath as well as the rest of the world*." And a yet further evidence, that the apostle here means to include the Jews, and even himself, is the universal term he uses, "Among whom also we *all* had our conversation," &c. Though wickedness was supposed by the Jews to be the *course of this world*, as to the generality of mankind, yet they supposed themselves an exempt people, at least the Pharisees, and the devout observers of the law of Moses, and traditions of the elders; whatever might be thought of publicans and harlots. But in opposition to this, the apostle asserts, that *they all* were no better by nature than others, but were to be reckoned among the *children of disobedience*, and *children of wrath*.

And then besides, if the apostle chooses to put himself among the Gentiles because he was the apostle of the Gentiles, I would ask, why does he not do so in the 11th verse of the same chapter, where he speaks of their Gentile state expressly? *Remember that ye being in time past Gentiles in the flesh.* Why does he here make a distinction between the Gentiles and himself? Why did he not say, Let *us* remember, that *we* being in times past *Gentiles*? And why does the same apostle, even universally, make the same distinction, speaking either in the second or third person, and never in the first, where he expressly

speaks of the Gentilism of those that he wrote to; or speaks of them with reference to their distinction from the Jews? So everywhere in this same epistle; as in chap. i. 12, 13, where the distinction is made just in the same manner as here, by the change of the person, and by the distinguishing particle, *also*, "That *we* should be to the praise of his glory who first trusted in Christ (the first believers in Christ being of the Jews, before the Gentiles were called), in whom *ye also* trusted, after that ye heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation." And in all the following part of this second chapter, as ver. 11, 17, 19, and 22, in which last verse the same distinguishing particle again is used: "In whom *ye also* are builded together for a habitation of God through the Spirit." See also the following chapters: chap. iii. 6, and iv. 17. And not only in this epistle, but constantly in other epistles; as Rom. i. 12, 13; chap. xi. 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31; chap. xv. 15, 16; 1 Cor. xii. 2; Gal. iv. 8; Col. i. 27; chap ii. 13; 1 Thess. i. 5, 6, 9; chap. ii. 13, 14, 15, 16.

Though I am far from thinking our author's exposition of the 7th chapter of Romans to be in any wise agreeable to the true sense of the apostle, yet it is needless here to stand particularly to examine it: because the doctrine of Original Sin may be argued not the less strongly, though we should allow the thing wherein he mainly differs from such as he opposes in his interpretation, viz., that the apostle does not speak in his own name, or to represent the state of a true Christian, but as representing the state of the Jews under the law. For even on this supposition, the drift of the place will prove, that every one who is under the law, and with equal reason every one of mankind, *is carnal, sold under sin*, in his first state, and till delivered by Christ. For it is plain, that the apostle's design is to show the insufficiency of the law to give life to any one whatsoever. This appears by what he says when he comes to draw his conclusion, in the continuation of this discourse; chap. viii. 3,* "For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh; God sending his own Son," &c. Our author supposes this here spoken of, viz., "That the law cannot give life, because it is weak through the flesh," is true with respect to *every one of mankind*.† And when the apostle gives this reason, *In that it is weak through the flesh*, it is plain, that by the *flesh*, which here he opposes to the *Spirit*, he means the same thing which, in the preceding part of the same discourse, in the foregoing chapter, he had called by the name *flesh*, ver. 5, 14, 18; and *the law of the members*, ver. 23; and *the body of death*, ver. 24. Which is the thing that through this chapter he insists on as the grand hinderance and reason why the law could not give life, just as he does in his conclusion, chap. viii. 3. Which in this last place, is given as a reason why the law cannot give life *to any of mankind*. And it being the *same reason* of the *same thing*, spoken of in the *same discourse*, in the former part of it; as appears, because this last place is the conclusion, of which that former part is the premises: and inasmuch as the reason there given is *being in the flesh*, and a *being carnal, sold under sin*: therefore, taking the whole of the apostle's discourse, this is justly understood to be a reason, why the law cannot give life to any of mankind; and consequently, that all mankind are *in the flesh*, and are *carnal, sold under sin*, and so remain till delivered by Christ: and consequently, all mankind in their first or original state are very sinful; which was the thing to be proved.

* Dr. Taylor himself reckons this a part of the same discourse or paragraph, in the division he makes of the epistle, in his paraphrase and notes upon it. † See Note on Rom. v. 20.

CHAPTER IV.

CONTAINING OBSERVATIONS ON ROMANS V. 12, TO THE END.

SECTION I.

Remarks on Dr. Taylor's way of explaining this Text.

THE following things are worthy to be taken notice of, concerning our author's exposition of this remarkable passage of the Apostle Paul.

1. He greatly insists, that by *death* in this place no more is meant, than that death which we all die, when this present life is extinguished, and the body returns to the dust; that no more is meant in the 12th, 14th, 15th, and 17th verses. Page 27, he speaks of it as *evidently, clearly, and infallibly so*, because the apostle is still discoursing on the same subject; plainly implying, that it must most *infallibly* be so, that the apostle means no more by death, throughout this paragraph on the subject. But as infallible as this is, if we believe what Dr. Taylor elsewhere says, it must needs be otherwise. He, in p. 120, *S.*, speaking of those words in the last verse of the next chapter, "The wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is *eternal life*, through Jesus Christ our Lord," says, "Death in this place is widely different from the death we *now die;* as it stands there *opposed to eternal life*, which is the gift of God through Jesus Christ, it manifestly signifies *eternal death*, the *second death*, or that death which they shall *hereafter die*, who live after the flesh." But death (in the conclusion of the paragraph we are upon in the 5th chapter, concerning the death that comes by Adam) and the life that comes by Christ, in the last verse of the chapter, is *opposed to eternal life* just in the same manner as it is in the last verse of the next chapter: "That as sin has reigned unto *death*, even so might grace reign, through righteousness, unto *eternal life*, by Jesus Christ our Lord." So that by our author's own argument, death in this place also is *manifestly widely different from the death we now die, as it stands here opposed to eternal life, through Jesus Christ; and signifies eternal death, the second death.* And yet this is a part of the same discourse or paragraph with that begun in the 12th verse, as reckoned by Dr. Taylor himself in his division of paragraphs, in his paraphrase and notes on the epistle. So that if we will follow him, and admit his reasonings in the various parts of his book, here is *manifest* proof against *infallible* evidence! So that it is true, the apostle throughout this whole passage on the same subject, by death, *evidently, clearly*, and *infallibly means no more than that death we now die, when this life is extinguished;* and yet by death, in some part of this passage, is meant something widely different from the death we now die, and is *manifestly* intended *eternal death, the second death.*

But had our author been more consistent with himself in his laying of it down as so certain and *infallible*, that because the apostle has a special respect to temporal death, in the 14th verse, *Death reigned from Adam to Moses*, therefore he means no more in the several consequent parts of this passage, yet he is doubtless too confident and positive in this matter. This is no more *evident, clear*, and *infallible*, than that Christ meant no more by *perishing*, in Luke xiii 5, when he says, "I tell you, Nay, but except ye repent, ye shall all likewise

perish;" than such a temporal death, as came on those that died by the fall of the tower of Siloam, spoken of in the preceding words of the same speech; and no more infallible, than that by *life*, Christ means no more than this temporal life, in each part of that one sentence, Matth. x. 39, "He that findeth his *life* shall lose *it*; and he that loseth *his life* for my sake, shall find *it*;" because in the first part of each clause, he has respect especially to temporal life.*

The truth of the case, with respect to what the apostle intends by the word *death* in this place, is this, viz., that the same thing is meant, that is meant by death in the foregoing and following parts of this epistle, and other writings of this apostle, where he speaks of death as the consequence of sin, viz., the whole of that death, which he, and the Scripture everywhere, speaks of as the proper wages and punishment of sin, including death, temporal, spiritual, and eternal; though in some parts of this discourse he has a more special respect to one part of this whole, in others to another, as his argument leads him; without any more variation than is common in the same discourse. That life, which the Scripture speaks of as the reward of righteousness, is a whole, containing several parts, viz., the life of the body, union of soul and body, and the most perfect sensibility, activity, and felicity of both, which is the chief thing. In like manner the death, which the Scripture speaks of as the punishment of sin, is a whole, including the death of the body, and the death of the soul, and the eternal, sensible, perfect destruction and misery of both. It is this latter whole, that the apostle speaks of by the name of death in this discourse, in Rom. v., though in some sentences he has a more special respect to one part, in others to another: and this, without changing the signification of the word. For a having respect to several things included in the extensive signification of the word, is not the same thing as using the word in several distinct significations. As for instance, the appellative, *man*, or the proper name of any particular man, is the name of a whole, including the different parts of soul and body. And if any one in speaking of James or John, should say, he was a wise *man*, and a beautiful *man*; in the former part of the sentence, respect would be had more especially to his soul, in the latter to his body, in the word *man*: but yet without any proper change of the signification of the name to distinct senses. In John xxi. 7, it is said, *Peter was naked*, and in the following part of the same story it is said, *Peter was grieved*. In the former proposition, respect is had especially to his body, in the latter to his soul: but yet here is no proper change of the meaning of the name, *Peter*. And as to the apostle's use of the word *death*, in the passage now under consideration, on the supposition that he in general means the whole of that death, which is the wages of sin, there is nothing but what is perfectly natural in supposing that he, in order to evince, that death, the proper punishment of sin, comes on all mankind, in consequence of Adam's sin, should take notice of that part of this punishment, which is visible in this world, and which every body therefore sees, does in fact come on all mankind (as in

* There are many places parallel with these, as John xi. 25, 26, "I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet he shall live: and whosoever liveth, and believeth in me, shall never die." Here both the words, life and death, are used with this variation: "I am the resurrection and the life," meaning spiritual and eternal life: "He that believeth in me, though he were dead," having respect to temporal death, "yet shall he live," with respect to spiritual life, and the restoration of the life of the body. "And whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die," meaning a spiritual and eternal death. So in John vi. 49, 50, "Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness, and are dead," having respect chiefly to temporal death. "This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof, and not die," i. e., by the loss of spiritual life, and by eternal death. (See also ver. 58.) And in the next verse, "If any man eat of this bread, he shall live forever," have eternal life. So ver. 54. See another like instance, John v. 24-29

ver. 14), and from thence should infer, that all mankind are exposed to the whole of that death which is the proper punishment of sin, whereof that temporal death which is visible, is a part, and a visible image of the whole, and (unless changed by divine grace) an introduction to the principal, and infinitely the most dreadful part.

II. Dr. Taylor's explanation of this passage makes wholly insignificant those first words, "By one man sin entered into the world," and leaves this proposition without any sense or signification at all. The apostle had been largely and elaborately representing, how the whole world was full of sin, in all parts of it, both among the Jews and Gentiles, and all exposed to death and condemnation. It is plain, that in these words he would tell us how this came to pass, viz., that this sorrowful event came *by one man*, even the first man. That the world was full of sin, and full of death, were two great and notorious facts, deeply affecting the interests of mankind; and they seemed very wonderful facts, drawing the attention of the more thinking part of mankind everywhere, who often asked this question, *Whence comes evil*, moral and natural evil? (the latter chiefly visible in death.) It is manifest the apostle here means to tell us, how these came into the world, and came to prevail in it as they do. But all that is meant, according to Dr. Taylor's interpretation, is, "*He begun transgression.*"* As if all that the apostle meant, was, to tell us who happened to sin first; not how such a malady came upon the world, or how any one in the world, besides Adam himself, came by such a distemper. The words of the apostle, "By one man sin entered *into the world*, and death by sin," show the design to be, to tell us how these evils came, as affecting the state of *the world;* and not only as reaching one man in the world. If this were not plain enough in itself, the words immediately following demonstrate it: "And so death passed upon *all men*, for that all have sinned." By *sin's being in the world*, the apostle does not mean being in the world only in that *one instance* of Adam's first transgression, but being *abroad in the world*, among the inhabitants of the earth, in a wide extent, and continued series of wickedness; as is plain in the first words of the next verse, "For until the law, sin was *in the world.*" And therefore when he gives us an account how it came to be *in the world*, or, which is the same thing, how it *entered into the world*, he does not mean only coming in, in one instance.

If the case were as Dr. Taylor represents, that the sin of Adam, either in its pollution or punishment, reached none but himself, any more than the sin of any other man, it would be no more proper to say, that *by one man sin entered into the world*, than if it should be inquired, how mankind came into America, and there had anciently been a ship of the Phenicians wrecked at sea, and a single man of the crew was driven ashore on this continent, and here died as soon as he reached the shore, it should be said, *by that one man mankind came into America.*

And besides, it is not true, that by *one* man, or by Adam, sin entered into the world, in Dr. Taylor's sense; for it was not he, but *Eve*, that *begun transgression.* By one man Dr. Taylor understands Adam, as the figure of Christ And it is plain that it was for his transgression, and not Eve's, that the sentence of death was pronounced on mankind after the fall, Gen. iii. 19. It appears unreasonable to suppose the apostle means to include Eve, when he speaks of Adam; for he lays great stress on it, that it was *by one*, repeating it several times.

* Page 86.

III. In like manner this author brings to nothing the sense of the causal particles, in such phrases as these, so often repeated; "Death *by* sin," verse 12. "If *through* the offence of one, many be dead," verse 15. "*By* one that sinned—Judgment was *by* one to condemnation," verse 16. "*By* one man's offence, death reigned *by* one," verse 17. "*By* the offence of one, judgment came upon all," &c., verse 18. "*By* one man's disobedience," verse 19. These causal particles, so dwelt upon, and so variously repeated, unless we make mere nonsense of the discourse, signify some connection and dependence, by some sort of influence of that sin of one man, or some tendency to that effect, which is so often said to come *by* it. But according to Dr. Taylor, there can be no *real* dependence or influence in the case of any sort whatsoever. There is no connection by any *natural* influence of that one act to make all mankind mortal. Our author does not pretend to account for this effect in any such manner, but in another most diverse, viz., a gracious act of God, laying mankind under affliction, toil and death, from special favor and kindness. Nor can there be any dependence of this effect on that transgression of Adam, by any *moral* influence, as deserving such a consequence. or exposing to it on any *moral account*, for he supposes that mankind are not in this way exposed to the least degree of evil. Nor has this effect any *legal* dependence on that sin, or any connection by virtue of any antecedent constitution, which God had established with Adam; for he insists that in that threatening, *In the day thou eatest thou shalt die*, there is not a word said of his posterity, page 8. And death on mankind, according to him, cannot come by virtue of that legal constitution with Adam; because the sentence by which it came, was after the annulling and abolishing that constitution, page 113, *S*. And it is manifest that this consequence cannot be through any kind of *tendency* of that sin to such an effect, because the effect comes only as a benefit, and is the fruit of mere favor; but sin has no tendency, either *natural* or *moral*, to benefits and divine favors. And thus that sin of Adam could neither be the efficient cause nor the procuring cause, neither the *natural*, *moral*, nor *legal* cause, nor an *exciting* and *moving* cause, any more than Adam's eating of any other tree of the garden. And the only real relation that the effect can have to that sin, is a relation as to time, viz., that it is *after* it. And when the matter is closely examined, the whole amounts to no more than this, that God is pleased, of his mere good will and pleasure, to bestow a greater favor upon us, than he did upon Adam in innocency, *after that sin* of his eating the forbidden fruit; which sin we are no more concerned in, than in the sin of the king of Pegu, or emperor of China.

IV. It is altogether inconsistent with the apostle's scope, and the import of what he says, to suppose that the death which he here speaks of, as coming on mankind by Adam's sin, comes not as a punishment, but only as a favor. It quite makes void the opposition, in which the apostle sets the consequences of Adam's sin, and the consequences of the grace and righteousness of Christ. They are set in opposition to each other, as opposite effects, arising from opposite causes, throughout the paragraph: one as the *just consequence of an offence*, the other a *free gift*, verses 15—18. Whereas, according to this scheme, there is no such opposition in the case; both are benefits, and both are free gifts. A very wholesome medicine to save from perishing, ordered by a kind father, or a shield to preserve from an enemy, bestowed by a friend, is as much a free gift as pleasant food. The death that comes by Adam, is set in opposition to the life and happiness that comes by Christ, as being the fruit of *sin*, and *judgment for sin*; when the latter is the fruit of *divine grace*, verses 15,

17, 20, 21. Whereas, according to our author, both came by grace: death comes on mankind by the free kindness and love of God, much more truly and properly than by Adam's sin. Dr. Taylor speaks of it as coming by *occasion* of Adam's sin. (But as I have observed, it is an occasion without any influence.) Yet the proper *cause* is *God's grace;* so that the true cause is wholly good Which, by the way, is directly repugnant to the apostle's doctrine in Rom. vii. 13, "Was then that which is good, made death unto me? God forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin, working death in me by that which is good." Where the apostle utterly rejects any such suggestion, as though that which is good were the *proper cause of death;* and signifies that *sin* is the proper *cause*, and that which is *good*, only the *occasion*. But according to this author, the reverse is true: that which is good in the highest sense, even the love of God, and a divine, gracious constitution, is the proper *cause* of death, and sin only the *occasion*.

But to return, it is plain, that death by Adam, and life and happiness *by Christ*, are here set in opposition; the latter being spoken of as *good*, the other as *evil;* one as the effect of *righteousness*, the other of an *offence;* one the fruit of *obedience*, the other of *disobedience;* one as the fruit of God's *favor*, in consequence of what was pleasing and acceptable to him, but the other the fruit of his *displeasure*, in consequence of what was displeasing and hateful to him; the latter coming by *justification*, the former by the *condemnation* of the subject. But according to the scheme of our author, there can be no opposition in any of these respects; the death here spoken of, neither comes as an *evil*, nor from an *evil cause*, either an evil *efficient* cause, or *procuring* cause; not at all as any testimony of God's *displeasure* to the subject, but as properly the effect of God's favor, no less than that which is spoken of as coming by Christ; yea, and as much as to that appointed by an act of *justification* of the subject, as he understands and explains the word *justification;* for both are by a *grant of favor*, and are instances of mercy and goodness. And he does abundantly insist upon it, that "*any* grant of favor, *any* instance of mercy and goodness, whereby God delivers and exempts from any kind of danger, suffering or calamity, or confers *any* favor, blessing, or privilege, is called *justification*, in the Scripture sense and use of the word."*

And over and above all these things, our author makes void, and destroys the grand and fundamental opposition of all, to illustrate which is the chief scope of this whole passage, viz., that between the *first* and *second* Adam, in the *death* that comes by *one*, and the *life* and happiness by the *other*. For, according to his doctrine, *both come by Christ*, the *second* Adam; both by his grace, righteousness, and obedience: the death that God sentenced mankind to in Gen. iii. 19, being a great deal more properly and truly by Christ, than by Adam. For, according to him, that sentence was not pronounced on the foot of the covenant with Adam, because that was abrogated, and entirely set aside, as what was to have no more effect, before it was pronounced; as he largely insists for many pages together, pages 113—119, *S*. He says, page 113, *S*. "This covenant with Adam was disannulled immediately after Adam sinned Even before God passed sentence upon Adam, grace was introduced." And in p. 119, *S*., he says, "The death that mankind are the subjects of now, stands under the covenant of grace." And in p. 120, *S*., "In the counsel and appointment of God, it stood in this very light, even before the sentence of death was

* Key, § 374, where it is to be observed, that he himself puts the word ANY in capital letters. The same thing in substance is often asserted elsewhere. And this, indeed, is his main point in what he calls "the true gospel scheme."

pronounced upon Adam; and consequently, death is no proper and legal punishment of sin." And he often insists, that it comes only as a favor and benefit; and standing, as he says, under the covenant of grace, which is by Christ, therefore is truly one of the benefits of the new covenant, which comes by Christ, the second Adam. For he himself is full in it, to use his own words,* "That all the grace of the gospel is dispensed to us, *in*, *by*, or *through* the Son of God." "Nothing is clearer (says he†) from the whole current of Scripture, than that all the mercy and love of God, and all the blessings of the gospel, from first to last, are *in*, *by*, and *through* Christ, and particularly by his blood, by the redemption that is in him. This (says he) can bear no dispute among Christians." What then becomes of all this discourse of the apostle, about the great difference and opposition between Adam and Christ; as death is by one, and eternal life and happiness by the other? This grand distinction between the two Adams, and all the other instances of opposition and difference here insisted on, as between the effects of *sin* and *righteousness*, the consequences of *obedience* and *disobedience*, of the *offence* and the *free gift*, *judgment* and *grace*, *condemnation* and *justification*, they all come to nothing; and this whole discourse of the apostle, wherein he seems to labor much, as if it were to set forth some very grand and most important *distinctions* and *oppositions* in the state of things, as derived from the two great *heads* of mankind, proves nothing but a multitude of words without a meaning, or rather a heap of inconsistencies.

V. Our author's own doctrine entirely *makes void* what he supposes to be the apostle's *argument* in the 13th and 14th verses, in these words: "For until the law, sin was in the world; but sin is not imputed where there is no law. Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression."

What he supposes the apostle would prove here, is, that death, or the mortality of mankind, comes only by Adam's sin, and not by men's *personal* sins; and that it is here proved by this argument, viz., because there was *no law* threatening death to Adam's posterity for *personal sins*, before the law of Moses; but death, or the mortality of Adam's posterity, took place many ages before the law was given; therefore death could not be by any law threatening death for *personal* sins, and consequently could be by nothing but Adam's sin.‡

On this I would observe,

1. That which he supposes the apostle to take for a truth in this argument, viz., that there was *no law of God* in being, by which men were exposed to death for *personal sin*, during the time from Adam to Moses, is neither true, nor agreeable to this apostle's own doctrine.

First, It is *not true*. For the law of *nature*, written in men's hearts, was then in being, and was a law by which men were exposed to death for *personal* sin. That there was a divine establishment, fixing the death and destruction of the sinner, as the consequence of personal sin, which was well known before the giving of Moses' law, is plain by many passages in the book of Job, as fully and clearly implying a connection between such sin and such a punishment, as any passage in the law of Moses; such as that in Job xxiv. 19, "Drought and heat consume the snow waters: so doth the grave them that have sinned." (Compare verses 20 and 24.) Also chap. xxxiv. 6, "He preserveth not the life of the wicked." Chap. xxi. 29—32, "Have ye not asked them that go by the way? And do ye not know their tokens? That the wicked is reserved to the

* Key, chap. viii. Title, p. 44. † Key, § 145.
‡ Pages 40, 41, 42, 57, and often elsewhere.

day of destruction; they shall be brought forth to the day of wrath." Verse 32, "He shall be brought to the grave."*

Secondly, to suppose that there is no law in being, by which men are exposed to death for *personal* sins, where or when a revealed law of God, before in, or after Moses' time is not in being, *is contrary to this apostle's own doctrine* in this epistle. Rom. ii. 12, 14, 15, "For as many as have sinned without law, (i. e., the revealed law) shall perish without law." But how they can be exposed to die and perish, who have not the law of Moses, nor any revealed law, the apostle shows us in the 14th and 15th verses, viz., in that they have the law of nature, by which they fall under sentence to this punishment. "For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law to themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts; their conscience also bearing witness." Their conscience not only bore witness to the duty prescribed by this law, but also to the punishment before spoken of, as that which they who sinned without law, were liable to suffer, viz., that they should perish. In which the apostle is yet more express, chap. i. 32, speaking more especially of the Heathen, "Who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death." Dr. Taylor often calls the law the *rule of right;* and this rule of right sentenced those sinners to death, who were not under the law of Moses, according to this author's own paraphrase of this verse, in these words, "The Heathen were not ignorant of the *rule of right*, which God has implanted in the human nature; and which shows that they which commit such crimes, are deserving of death." And he himself supposes Abraham, who lived between Adam and Moses, to be *under law*, by which he would have been *exposed to punishment without hope*, were it not for the promise of grace—in his paraphrase on Rom. iv. 15.

So that in our author's way of explaining the passage before us, the grand argument, which the apostle insists upon here, to prove his main point, viz., that death does not come by men's *personal sins*, but by Adam's sin, because it came *before* the law was given, that threatened death for personal sin: I say, this argument which Dr. Taylor supposes so clear and strong,† is brought to nothing more than a mere shadow without substance; the very foundation of the argument having no truth. To say, there was no such law actually expressed in any standing revelation, would be mere trifling: for it no more appears, that God would not bring temporal death for personal sins, without a standing revealed law threatening it, than that he would not bring eternal death before there was a revealed law threatening that: which yet wicked men that lived in Noah's time, were exposed to, as appears by 1 Pet. iii. 19, 20, and which Dr. Taylor supposes all mankind are exposed to by their personal sins; and he himself says,‡ "Sin, in its own unalterable nature, leads to death." Yea, it might be argued with as much strength of reason, that God could bring on men no punishment at all for any sin, that was committed from Adam to Moses, because there was no standing revealed law then extant, threatening any punishment. It may here be properly observed, that our author supposes the shortening of man's days, and hastening of death, *entered into the world by the sin of the antediluvians*, in the same sense as death and mortality entered into the world by Adam's sin.§ But where was there any standing revealed law for that, though the event was so universal? If God might bring this on all mankind, on occasion of *other* men's sins, for which

* See also Job iv. 7, 8, 9. Chapter xv. 17—35. Chapter xviii. 5—21, xix. 29, and xx. 4—8, and many other places. † Page 117, 8. ‡ Pages 77, 78. § Page 68

they deserved nothing, without a revealed law, what could there be to hinder God's bringing death on men for their *personal* sins, for which their own consciences tell them they do deserve death without a revealed law?

2. If it had been so, that from Adam to Moses there had been no law in being, of any kind, revealed or natural, by which men could be properly exposed to temporal death for personal sin, yet the mention of Moses' law would have been wholly impertinent, and of no signification in the argument, according to our author's understanding of it. He supposes, what the apostle would prove, is, that *temporal* death, or the death we now die, comes by Adam; and not by any law threatening such a punishment for personal sin; because this death prevailed before the law of Moses was in being, which is the only law threatening death for personal sin. And yet he himself supposes, that the law of Moses, *when it was in being*, threatened *no such death* for personal sin. For he abundantly asserts, that the death which the law of Moses threatened for personal sin, was *eternal death*, as has been already noted: and he says in express terms, that eternal death is of a nature, *widely different from the death we nou die;** as was also observed before.

How impertinently therefore does Dr. Taylor make an inspired writer argue, when, according to him, the apostle would prove, that *this kind of death* did not come by any law threatening *this kind of death*, because it came before the existence of a law threatening *another kind of death*, of a nature *widely different!* How is it to the apostle's purpose, to fix on that period, the time of giving Moses' law. as if that had been the period wherein men began to be threatened with *this punishment* for their personal sins, when in truth it was no such thing? And therefore it was no more to his purpose, to fix on that period, from Adam to Moses, than from Adam to David, or any other period whatsoever. Dr Taylor holds, that even now, since the law of Moses has been given, the mortality of mankind, or the death we now die, does not come by that law; but that it always comes only by Adam.† And if it *never comes* by that law, we may be sure it *never was threatened* in that law.

3. If we should allow the argument in Dr Taylor's sense of it, to prove that death does not come by *personal sin*, yet it will be wholly without force to prove the main point, even that it must come by Adam's sin: for it might come by God's sovereign and gracious pleasure; as innumerable other divine benefits do. If it be ordered, agreeably to our author's supposition, not as a punishment, nor as a calamity, but only as a *favor*, what necessity of any settled constitution, or revealed sentence, in order to the bestowing such a favor, more than other favors; and particularly more than that *great benefit*, which he says entered into the world by the sin of the antediluvians, the shortening men's lives so much after the flood? Thus the apostle's arguing, by Dr. Taylor's explanation of it, is turned into mere trifling, and a vain and impertinent use of words, without any real force or significance.

VI. The apostle here speaks of that great benefit which we have by Christ, as the antitype of Adam, under the notion of a fruit of *grace*. I do not mean only that *superabounding* of grace, wherein the benefit we have by Christ, goes beyond the damage sustained by Adam; but that benefit, with regard to which Adam *was the figure of him that was to come*, and which is, as it were, the counterpart of the suffering by Adam, and which repairs the loss we have by him. This is here spoken of as the fruit of the *free grace of God;* as appears by ver. 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21. This, according to our author, is the restoring

* Page 120, *S.* He says to the like purpose in his Note on Rom. v. 17.
† This is plain by what he says, p. 28, 40, 53, 117, *S.*

of mankind to that life which they lost in Adam: and he himself supposes this restoration of life by Christ to be what *grace* does for us, and calls it the *free gift of God*, and *the grace and favor of the lawgiver*.* And speaking of this restoration, he breaks out in admiration of the *unspeakable riches of this grace*.†

But it follows from his doctrine, that there is *no grace at all* in this benefit, and it is no more than a mere act of justice, being only a removing of what mankind suffer, being *innocent*. Death, as it commonly comes on mankind, and even on infants (as has been observed), is an extreme positive calamity; to bring which on the perfectly *innocent*, unremedied, and without any thing to countervail it, we are sufficiently taught, is not consistent with the *righteousness of the Judge of all the earth*. What *grace*, therefore, worthy of being so celebrated, would there be in affording remedy and relief, after there had been brought on innocent mankind that which is (as Dr. Taylor himself represents‡) the dreadful and universal destruction of their nature; being a striking demonstration how infinitely hateful sin is to God! What *grace* in delivering from such shocking ruin, them that did not deserve the least calamity! Our author says, "We could not *justly* lose communion with God by Adam's sin."§ If so, then we could not justly lose our lives, and be annihilated, after a course of extreme pains and agonies of body and mind, without any restoration; which would be an eternal loss of communion with God, and all other good, besides the positive suffering. The apostle, throughout this passage, represents the *death*, which is the consequence of Adam's transgression, as coming in a way of *judgment* and *condemnation* for sin; but deliverance and life through Christ, as by *grace*, and the *free gift* of God. Whereas, on the contrary, by Dr. Taylor's scheme, the death that comes by Adam, comes by *grace*, *great grace*; it being a great benefit, ordered in fatherly love and kindness, and on the foot of a covenant of grace: but in the deliverance and restoration by Christ, there is *no grace at all*. So things are turned *topsy-turvy*, the apostle's scope and scheme entirely inverted and confounded.

VII. Dr. Taylor explains the words, *judgment*, *condemnation*, *justification*, and *righteousness*, as used in this place, in a very unreasonable manner.

I will first consider the sense he puts upon the two former, *judgment* and *condemnation*. He often calls this condemnation a *judicial act*, and a *sentence of condemnation*. But, according to his scheme, it is a judicial sentence of condemnation passed upon them that are perfectly *innocent*, and viewed by the Judge, even in his passing the sentence, and condemning them, as having no guilt of sin, or fault at all chargeable upon them; and a *judicial proceeding*, *passing sentence* arbitrarily, without any law or rule of right before established; for there was no preceding law or rule threatening death, that he, or any one else, ever pretended to have been established, but only this, "In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." And concerning this, he insists, that there is not a word said in it of Adam's posterity. So that the condemnation spoken of, is a sentence of condemnation to death, for, or in consequence of the sin of Adam, without any law, by which that sin could be imputed to bring any such consequence; contrary to the apostle's plain scope. And not only so, but over and above all this, it is a *judicial sentence* of *condemnation* to that which is no calamity, nor is considered as such in the sentence; but it is condemnation to a great favor!

The apostle uses the words *judgment* and *condemnation* in other places, they are no strange and unusual terms with him: but never are they used by

* Pages 39, 70, 148, 27, *S*. See also contents of this paragraph in Rom. v. in his notes on the epistle, and his note on ver. 15, 16, 17. † Page 119, *S*. ‡ Page 60. § Page 148.

aim in this sense, or any like it; nor are they ever used thus anywhere else in the New Testament. This apostle elsewhere in this epistle to the Romans is often speaking of *condemnation*, using the same, or similar terms and phrases as here, but never in the abovesaid sense. Chap. ii. 1, 2, 3, six times in these verses; also ver. 12 and 27, and chap. iii. 7; chap. viii. 1 and 3; chap. xiv. 3, 4, and ver. 10, 13, 22 and 23. This will be plain to every one that casts his eye on these places: and if we look into the former part of this chapter, the apostle's discourse here makes it evident, that he is here speaking of a condemnation, that is no testimony of favor to the innocent; but of God's displeasure towards those that he is not reconciled to, but looks on as offenders, sinners, and enemies, and holds as the objects of his wrath, which we are delivered from by Christ; as may be seen in verses 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.

And viewing this discourse itself, and in the very paragraph we are upon, if we may judge any thing by language and manner of speaking, there is every thing to lead us to suppose, that the apostle uses these words here, as he does elsewhere, properly, and as implying a supposition of sin, chargeable on the subject, and exposing to punishment. He speaks of condemnation with reference to sin, as what comes by sin, and as a condemnation to death, which seems to be a most terrible evil, and capital punishment, even in what is temporal and visible; and this in the way of judgment and execution of justice, in opposition to grace or favor, and gift or a benefit coming by favor. And sin and offence, transgression and disobedience, are over and over again spoken of as the ground of the condemnation, and of the capital suffering condemned to, for ten verses successively, that is, in every verse in the whole paragraph, without missing one.

The words, *justification* and *righteousness*, are explained by Dr. Taylor, in a no less unreasonable manner. He understands *justification*, in ver. 18, and *righteousness*, in ver. 19, in such a sense, as to suppose them to belong to all and actually to be applied to all mankind, good and bad, believers and unbelievers; to the worst enemies of God, remaining such, as well as his peculiar favorites, and many that never had any sin imputed to them; meaning thereby no more than what is fulfilled in a universal resurrection from the dead, at the last day.* Now this is a most arbitrary, forced sense. Though these terms are used everywhere, all over the New Testament, yet nothing like such a use of them is to be found in any one instance, through all the writings of the apostles and evangelists. The words *justify*, *justification*, and *righteousness*, as from God to men, are never used but to signify a privilege belonging only to *some* and that which is peculiar to *distinguished favorites*. This apostle in particular above all the other writers of the New Testament, abounds in the use of these terms; so that we have all imaginable opportunity to understand his language, and know the sense in which he uses these words: but he never elsewhere uses them in the sense supposed here, nor is there any pretence that he does. Above all, does this apostle abound in the use of these terms in this epistle. *Justification* is the subject he had been upon through all the preceding part of the epistle. It was the grand subject of all the foregoing chapters, and the preceding part of this chapter, where these terms are continually repeated And the word, *justification*, is constantly used to signify something peculiar to believers, who had been sinners; implying some reconciliation and forgiveness of sin, and special privilege in nearness to God, above the rest of the world. Yea, the word is constantly used thus, according to Dr. Taylor's own explana-

* So pages 47, 49, 60, 61, 62, and other places

tions, in his paraphrase and notes on this epistle. And there is not the least reason to suppose but that he is still speaking of the same *justification* and *righteousness*, which he had dwelt upon from the beginning to this place. He speaks of *justification* and *righteousness* here, just in the same manner as he had done in the preceding part of the epistle. He had all along spoken of justification as standing in relation to *sin*, disobedience to God, and offence against God, and so he does here: he had before been speaking of justification through free *grace*, and so he does here: he before had been speaking of justification through *righteousness*, as in *Christ Jesus*, and so he does here.

And if we look into the former part of this very chapter, there we shall find *justification* spoken of just in the same sense as in the rest of the epistle; which is also supposed by our author in his exposition: it is still *justification by faith*, *justification* of them that had been *sinners*, *justification* attended with *reconciliation*, *justification* peculiar to them that had *the love of God shed abroad in their hearts*. The apostle's foregoing discourse on justification by grace through faith, and what he had so greatly insisted on as the evidence of the truth of this doctrine, even the universal sinfulness of mankind in their original state, is plainly what introduces this discourse in the latter part of this 5th chapter; where he shows how all mankind came to be sinful and miserable, and so to need this grace of God, and righteousness of Christ. And therefore we cannot, without the most absurd violence, suppose any other than that he is still speaking of the same *justification*.

And as to the universal expression used in the 18th verse, "By the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon *all men* to justification of life;" it is needless here to go into the controversy between the *remonstrants* and *anti-remonstrants*, concerning universal redemption, and their different interpretations of this place. If we take the words even as the Arminians do; yet, in their sense of them, the free gift comes on all men to justification only *conditionally*, i. e. *provided* they believe, repent, &c. But in our author's sense, it *actually* comes on all, whether they believe and repent, or not; which certainly cannot be inferred from the universal expression, as here used. Dr. Taylor himself supposes, the main design of the apostle in this universal phrase, *all men*, is to signify that the benefits of Christ shall come on Gentiles as well as Jews.* And he supposes that *the many*, and *the all*, here signify the same: but it is quite certain, that all the benefits here spoken of, which the apostle says are to *the many*, does not actually come upon all mankind; as particularly the *abounding of grace*, spoken of ver. 15. *The grace of God, and the gift by grace, hath abounded unto the many*, εις τους πολλους.

This abounding of grace our author explains thus: "A rich overplus of grace, in erecting a new dispensation, furnished with a glorious fund of light, means and motives," p. 44. But will any pretend, that all mankind have actually been partakers of this new fund of light, &c.? How were the many millions of Indians, on the American side of the globe, partakers of it, before the Europeans came hither? Yea, Dr. Taylor himself supposes, all that is meant is, that it *is free for all that are willing to accept of it*.† The agreement between Adam, as the type or figure of him that was to come, and Christ as the antitype, appears as full and clear, if we suppose *all* which are *in Christ* (to use the common Scripture phrase) have the benefit of his obedience, as *all* that are *in Adam* have the sorrowful fruit of his disobedience. The Scripture speaks of believers as the seed or posterity of Christ, Gal. iii. 29. They are in Christ

* Pages 60, 61 See also contents of this paragraph, in his notes on the epistle.
† Notes on the epistle, p. 284.

by grace, as Adam's posterity are in him by nature: the one are in the *first Adam naturally*, as the other are in the *second Adam spiritually:* exactly agreeable to the representation this apostle makes of the matter, 1 Cor. xv. 45—49. The spiritual seed are those which this apostle often represents as *Christ's body:* and the *οι πολλοι* here spoken of as made righteous by Christ's obedience are doubtless the same with the *οι πολλοι* which he speaks of in chap. xii. 5: *We, being many, are one body;* or, *we*, the many, *οι πολλοι εν σωμα εσμεν.* And again, 1 Cor. x. 17, *εν σωμα οι πολλοι εσμεν.* And the same which the apostle had spoken of in the preceding chapter, Rom. iv. 18, compared with Gen. xv. 5.

Dr. Taylor much insists on that place, 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, "For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead: for as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive;" to confirm his suppositions, that the apostle here in the 5th of Romans, speaking of the death and condemnation which come by Adam, has respect only to the death *we all die*, when this life ends: and that by the justification and life which come by Christ, he has respect only to the general *resurrection* at the last day. But it is observable, that his argument is wholly built on these two suppositions, viz. *First*, That the resurrection meant by the apostle, in that place in the 1 Cor. xv., is the resurrection of all mankind, both just and unjust. *Secondly*, That the opposite consequences of Adam's sin, and Christ's obedience, spoken of here in Rom. v., are the very same, neither more nor less, than are spoken of there. But there are no grounds for supposing either of these things to be true.

1. There is no evidence, that the *resurrection* there spoken of, is the resurrection both of the *just* and *unjust;* but abundant evidence of the contrary. The resurrection of the wicked is seldom mentioned in the New Testament, and rarely included in the meaning of the word; it being esteemed not worthy to be called a rising to life, being only for a great increase of the misery and darkness of eternal death: and therefore by the *resurrection* is most commonly meant a rising to life and happiness; as may be observed in Matth. xxii. 30—Luke xx. 35, 46—John vi. 39, 40, 54—Philip. iii. 11, and other places. The saints are called *the children of the resurrection*, as Dr. Taylor observes in his note on Rom. viii. 11. And it is exceeding evident, that it is the resurrection to life and happiness, the apostle is speaking of in this 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22. It appears by each of the three foregoing verses, ver. 18, "Then they which are fallen asleep *in Christ* (i. e. the saints) are perished." Ver. 19, "If in this life only *we* (Christians or apostles) have hope in Christ (and have no resurrection and eternal life to hope for), we are of all men most miserable." Ver. 20, "But now is Christ risen from the dead, and is become the *first fruits* of them that slept." He is the forerunner and first fruits only with respect to them that are his; who are to follow him, and partake with him in the glory and happiness of his resurrection: but he is not the first fruits of them that shall come forth to the resurrection of *damnation*. It also appears by the verse immediately following, ver. 23, "But every man in his own order; Christ the first fruits, and afterwards they that are Christ's at his coming." The same is plain by what is said in verses 29, 30, 31 and 32, and by all that is said from the 35th verse to the end of the chapter, for twenty-three verses together. It there expressly appears, that the apostle is speaking only of a rising *to glory*, with a *glorious body*, as the little grain that is sown, being quickened, rises a beautiful flourishing plant. He there speaks of the different degrees of glory among them that shall rise, and compares it to the different degrees of glory among the celestial luminaries. The resurrection which he treats of, is expressly a being *raised in incorruption, in glory, in power, with a spiritual body*, having *the image of the*

second man, the spiritual and heavenly Adam; a resurrection wherein *this corruptible shall put on incorruption, and this mortal put on immortality, and death be swallowed up in victory*, and the saints shall gloriously triumph over that last enemy. Dr. Taylor himself says, that which is in effect owning the resurrection here spoken of is only of the righteous; for it is expressly a resurrection, εν αθανασιαν, and αφθαρσια, ver. 53 and 42. But Dr. Taylor says, "These are never attributed to the wicked in Scripture.* So that when the apostle says here, "As in *Adam* all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive;" it is as much as if he had said, As in *Adam* we all die, and our bodies are sown in corruption, in dishonor, and in weakness; so in Christ we all (we Christians, whom I have all along been speaking of) shall be raised in power, glory, and incorruption, spiritual and heavenly, *conformed to the second Adam.* "For as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly," ver. 49. Which clearly explains and determines his meaning in verses 21, 22.

2. There is no evidence that the benefit by the second Adam, spoken of in Rom. v., is the very same (containing neither more or less) as the resurrection spoken of in 1 Cor. xv. It is no evidence of it, that the benefit is opposed to the death that comes by the first Adam, in like manner in both places. The resurrection to eternal life, though it be not the whole of that salvation and happiness which comes by the second Adam, yet it is that wherein this salvation is principally obtained. The time of the saints' glorious resurrection is often spoken of as the proper time of the saints' salvation, *the day of their redemption*, the time of their *adoption*, glory, and recompense. (As in Luke xiv. 14, and xxi. 28, Rom. viii. 23, Eph. iv. 30, Coloss. iii. 4, 2 Thess. i. 7, 2 Tim. iv. 8, 1 Pet. i. 13, and v. 4, 1 John iii. 2, and other places.) All that salvation and happiness which is given before, is only a prelibation and earnest of their great reward. Well therefore may that consummate salvation bestowed on them, be set in opposition to the death and ruin which comes by the first Adam, in like manner as the whole of their salvation is opposed to the same in Rom. v. Dr. Taylor himself observes,† "That the revival and resurrection of the body, is frequently put for our advancement to eternal life." It being the highest part, it is often put for the whole.

This notion, as if the justification, righteousness, and life spoken of in Rom. v. implied the resurrection to damnation, is not only without ground from Scripture, but contrary to *reason*. For those things are there spoken of as great benefits, by the grace and free gift of God; but this is the contrary, in the highest degree possible, being the most consummate and infinite calamity. To obviate this, our author supposes the resurrection of all to be a great benefit *in itself*, though turned into a calamity by the sin and folly of obstinate sinners, who abuse God's goodness. But the far greater part of mankind, since Adam, have never had opportunity to abuse this goodness, it having never been known to them. Men cannot abuse a kindness, which they never had either in possession, promise, offer, or some intimation; but a resurrection is made known only by divine revelation, which few comparatively have enjoyed. So that as to such wicked men as die in lands of darkness, if their resurrection comes at all by Christ, it comes *from* him, and *to* them, only as a curse, and not as a blessing; for it never comes to them at all by any *conveyance, grant, promise*, or *offer*, or any thing by which they can claim it, or know any thing of it, till it comes as an infinite calamity, past all remedy

VIII. In a peculiar manner is there an unreasonable violence used in our

* Note on Rom. viii. 27. † Note on Rom. viii. 11.

author's explanation of the words *sinners* and *sinned*, in the paragraph before us He says, "These words, *By one man's disobedience many were made sinners*, mean neither more nor less, than that by one man's disobedience, the many were made subject to death by the judicial act of God."* And he says in the same place, "By death most certainly is meant no other than the death and mortality common to all mankind." And those words, verse 12, *For that all have sinned*, he thus explains, "All men became *sinners*, as all mankind are brought into a state of suffering."†

Here I observe:

1. The main thing, by which he justifies such interpretations, is, that *sin*, in various instances, is used for *suffering*, in the Old Testament.‡ To which I reply, though it be true that the word *Chattaah*, signifies both sin, and a sin offering; and this, and some other Hebrew words, which signify sin, iniquity, and wickedness, are sometimes put for the effect or punishment of iniquity, by a metonymy of the cause for the effect; yet it does not appear, that these words are ever used for enduring suffering, where the suffering is not spoken of under any notion of a punishment of sin, or a fruit of God's anger for sin, or of any imputation of guilt, or under any notion of sin's being at all laid to the charge of the sufferer, or the suffering's being at all of the nature of any recompense, compensation, or satisfaction for sin. And therefore none of the instances he mentions, come up to his purpose. When Lot is commanded to leave Sodom, that he might not be consumed *in the iniquity* of the city, meaning in that fire, which was the effect and punishment of the iniquity of the city; this is quite *another* thing, than if that fire came on the city in general, as no punishment at all, nor as any fruit of a charge of iniquity on the city, or of God's displeasure for their sin, but as a token of God's favor to the inhabitants; which is what is supposed with respect to the death of mankind; it being introduced only as a benefit, on the foot of a covenant of grace. And especially is this quite another thing, than if, in the expression used, the iniquity had been ascribed to Lot; and God, instead of saying, Lest thou be consumed in *the iniquity of the city*, had said, Lest thou be consumed *in thine iniquity*, or, Lest *thou sin*, or *be made a sinner* Whereas the expression is such, as does expressly remove the iniquity spoken of from Lot, and fix it on another subject, viz., the city. The place cited by our author in Jer. li. is exactly parallel. And as to what Abimelech says to Abraham, "What have I offended thee, that thou hast brought on me, and on my kingdom, a great *sin?* It is manifest, Abimelech was afraid that God was angry, for what he had done to Sarah; or, would have been angry with him, if he had done what he was about to do, as imputing *sin* to him for it: which is a quite different thing from calling some calamity, *sin*, under no notion of its being any punishment of sin, nor in the least degree from God's displeasure. And so with regard to every place our author cites in the margin, it is plain, that what is meant in each of them, is *the punishment of sin*, and not some suffering which is no punishment at all. And as to the instances he mentions in his *Supplement*, p. 8, the two that look most favorable to his design, are those in Gen. xxxi. 39, and 2 Kings vii. 9. With respect to the former, where Jacob says, *That which was torn of beasts*, Anochi-achattenah, Dr. Taylor is pleased to translate it, *I was the sinner;* but properly rendered, it is, *I expiated it;* the verb in *Pihel* properly signifying to *expiate;* and the plain meaning is, *I bore the blame of it, and was obliged to pay for it*, as being supposed to be lost through my fault or neglect: which is a quite different thing from suffering without any

* Page 30. † Page 84, and elsewhere. ‡ Page 34.

supposition of fault. And as to the latter place, where the lepers say, "This day is a day of good tidings, and we hold our peace: if we tarry till morning some mischief will befall us:" in the Hebrew it is *Umetzaanu gnavon*, "Iniquity will find us," that is, some punishment of our fault will come upon us. Elsewhere such phrases are used, as, *Your iniquity will find you out*, and the like. But certainly this is a different thing from suffering without fault, or supposition of fault. And it does not appear, that the verb in Hiphil, *hirshiang*, is ever put for *condemn*, in any other sense than condemning for sin, or guilt, or supposed guilt belonging to the subject condemned. This word is used in the participle of Hiphil, to signify *condemning*, in Prov. xvii. 15, "He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even both are an abomination to the Lord." This Dr. Taylor observes, as if it were to his purpose, when he is endeavoring to show, that in this place, in the 5th of Romans, the apostle speaks of God himself as *condemning* the *just*, or perfectly innocent, in a parallel signification of terms. Nor is any instance produced, wherein the verb *sin*, which is used by the apostle when he says, *All have sinned*, is anywhere used in our author's sense, for being brought into a state of suffering, and that not as a punishment for sin, or as any thing arising from God's displeasure; much less for being the subject of what comes only as the fruit of divine love, and as a benefit of the *highest nature*.* Nor can any thing like this sense of the verb be found in the whole Bible.

2. If there had been any thing like such a use of the words, *sin* and *sinner*, as our author supposes, in the Old Testament, it is evident that such a use of them is quite alien from the language of the New Testament. Where can an instance be produced of any thing like it, in any one place, besides what is pretended in this? And particularly, where else shall we find these words and phrases used in such a sense in any of this apostle's writings? We have enough of his writings, by which to learn his language and way of speaking about *sin*, *condemnation*, *punishment*, *death*, and *suffering*. He wrote much more of the New Testament than any other person. He very often has occasion to speak of *condemnation*, but where does he express it by *being made sinners?* Especially how far is he elsewhere from using such a phrase, to signify a being condemned without guilt, or any imputation or supposition of guilt. Vastly more still is it remote from his language, so to use the verb *sin*, and to say, man *sinneth*, or *has sinned*, though hereby meaning nothing more nor less, than that he, by a *judicial act*, is *condemned*, on the foot of a dispensation of *grace*, to receive a *great favor!* He abundantly uses the words *sin* and *sinner;* his writings are full of such terms; but where else does he use them in such a sense? He has much occasion in his epistles to speak of *death*, temporal and eternal; he has much occasion to speak of *suffering*, of all kinds, in this world, and the world to come; but where does he call these things *sin*, and denominate innocent men *sinners*, or say, they have *sinned*, meaning that they are brought into a state of suffering? If the apostle, because he was a Jew, was so addicted to the Hebrew idiom, as thus in one paragraph to repeat this particular *Hebraism*, which at most, is comparatively rare even in the Old Testament, it is strange that never any thing like it should appear anywhere else in his writings; and especially that he should never fall into such a way of speaking in his epistle to the Hebrews, written to Jews only, who were most used to the Hebrew idiom. And why does Christ never use such language in any of his speeches, though he was born and brought up amongst the Jews, and delivered

* Page 37, 8.

almost all his speeches only to Jews? And why do none of the rest of the writers of the New Testament ever use it, who were all born and educated Jews (at least all excepting Luke), and some of them wrote especially for the benefit of the Jews?

It is worthy to be observed, what liberty is taken, and boldness used with this apostle; such words as αμαρτολος, αμαρτανω, κριμα, κατακριμα, δικαιοω, δικαιωσις, and words of the same root and signification, are words abundantly used by him elsewhere in this and other epistles, and also when speaking, as he is here, of Christ's redemption and atonement, and of the general sinfulness of mankind, and of the condemnation of sinners, and of justification by Christ, and of death as the consequence of sin, and of life and restoration to life by Christ, as here; yet nowhere are any of these words used, but in a sense very remote from what is supposed here. However, in this place these terms must have a *distinguished, singular* sense found out for them, and annexed to them! A *new* language must be coined for the apostle, which he is evidently quite unused to, and put into his mouth on this occasion, for the sake of evading this clear, precise, and abundant testimony of his, to the doctrine of Original Sin.

3. The putting such a sense on the word *sin*, in this place, is not only to make the apostle greatly to disagree with himself in the language he uses everywhere else, but also to disagree with himself no less in the language he uses in this very passage. He often here uses the word *sin*, and other words plainly of the same design and import, such as *transgression, disobedience, offence.* Nothing can be more evident, than that these are here used as several names of the same thing; for they are used interchangeably, and put one for another, as will be manifest only on the cast of an eye on the place. And these words are used no less than seventeen times in this one paragraph. Perhaps we shall find no place in the whole Bible, in which the word *sin*, and other words synonymous, are used so often in so little compass; and in all the instances, in the proper sense, as signifying *moral evil*, and even so understood by Dr. Taylor himself (as appears by his own exposition) but only in these two places; where in the midst of all, to evade a clear evidence of the doctrine of Original Sin, another meaning must be found out, and it must be supposed that the apostle uses the word in a sense entirely different, signifying something that neither *implies* nor *supposes* any moral evil at all in the subject.

Here it is very remarkable, the gentleman who so greatly insisted upon it, that the word *death* must needs be understood in the *same* sense throughout this paragraph; yea, that it is *evidently, clearly*, and *infallibly* so, inasmuch as the apostle is still discoursing on the same subject; yet can, without the least difficulty, suppose the word *sin*, to be used so differently in the very same passage, wherein the apostle is discoursing on the same thing. Let us take that one instance in verse 12, "Wherefore as by one man *sin* entered into the world, and death by *sin*, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have *sinned*." Here by *sin*, implied in the word *sinned*, in the end of the sentence, our author understands something perfectly and altogether *diverse* from what is meant by the word *sin*, not only in the same discourse on the same subject, but twice in the former part of the very same sentence, of which this latter part is not only the conclusion, but the explication; and also entirely *different* from the use of the word twice in the next sentence, wherein the apostle is still most plainly discoursing on the same subject, as is not denied: and in the next sentence to that (verse 14) the apostle uses the very same verb *sinned*, and as signifying the committing of moral evil, as our author himself understands it. Afterwards (verse 19) the apostle uses the word *sinners*, which our author supposes to be

in somewhat of a different sense still. So that here is the utmost violence of the kind that can be conceived of, to make out a scheme against the plainest evidence, in changing the meaning of a word backward and forward, in one paragraph, all about one thing, and in different parts of the same sentences, coming over and over in quick repetitions, with a variety of other synonymous words to fix its signification; besides the continued use of the word in the former part of this chapter, and in all the preceding part of this epistle, and the continued use of it in the next chapter, and in the next to that, and the 8th chapter following that, and to the end of the epistle; in none of which places it is pretended, but that the word is used in the proper sense, by our author in his paraphrases and notes on the whole epistle.*

But indeed we need go no further than that one, verse 12. What the apostle means by sin, in the latter part of the verse, is evident with the utmost plainness, by comparing it with the former part; one part answering to another, and the last clause exegetical of the former. "Wherefore as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that (or, unto which) all have sinned." Here *sin* and *death* are spoken of in the former part, and *sin* and *death* are spoken of in the latter part; the two parts of the sentence so answering one another, that the same things are apparently meant by *sin* and *death* in both parts.

And besides, to interpret *sinning*, here, of falling under the suffering of *death*, is yet the more violent and unreasonable, because the apostle in this very place does once and again *distinguish* between *sin* and *death*; plainly speaking of one as the effect, and the other the cause. So in the 21st verse, "That as *sin* hath reigned unto *death*;" and in the 12th verse, "*Sin* entered into the world, and *death* by *sin*." And this plain distinction holds through all the discourse, as between *death* and the *offence*, ver. 15, and ver. 17, and between the *offence* and *condemnation*, ver. 18.

4. Though we should omit the consideration of the manner in which the apostle uses the words *sin*, *sinned*, &c., in other places, and in other parts of this discourse, yet Dr. Taylor's interpretation of them would be very absurd.

The case stands thus: according to *his* exposition, we are said to have *sinned* by an *active* verb, as though we had actively sinned; yet this is not spoken truly and properly, but it is put figuratively for our becoming sinners *passively*, our being *made* or *constituted* sinners. Yet again, not that we do truly become sinners *passively*, or are really *made sinners*, by any thing that God does; this also is only a figurative or tropical representation; and the meaning is only, we are *condemned*, and treated *as if* we were *sinners*. Not indeed that we are properly *condemned*, for God never truly condemns the innocent: but this also is only a figurative representation of the thing. It is but *as it were* condemning; because it is appointing to *death*, a terrible evil, *as if it were* a punishment. But then, in reality, here is no appointment to a terrible evil, or any evil at all; but truly to a *benefit*, a *great* benefit: and so, in representing death as a punishment or calamity condemned to, another figure or trope is made use

* Agreeably to this manner, our author, in explaining the 7th chapter of Romans, understands the pronoun *I*, or *me*, used by the apostle in that one continued discourse, in no less than six different senses. He takes it in the 1st verse to signify the Apostle Paul himself. In the 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th verses, for the people of the Jews, through all ages, both before and after Moses, especially the carnal, ungodly part of them. In the 13th verse for an objecting Jew entering into a dialogue with the apostle. In the 15th, 16th, 17th, 20th, and latter part of the 25th verse, it is understood in two different senses, for two *I*'s in the same person; one, a man's reason; and the other, his passions and carnal appetites. And in the seventh and former part of the last verse, for us Christians in general; or, for all that enjoy the word of God, the law and the gospel: and these different senses, the most of them strangely intermixed and interchanged backwards and forwards.

of, and an exceeding bold one; for, as we are appointed to it, it is so far from being an evil or punishment, that it is really a *favor*, and that of the highest nature, appointed by mere grace and love, though it *seems* to be a calamity. Thus we have tropes and figures multiplied, one upon the back of another; and all in that one word, *sinned;* according to the manner, as it is supposed, the apostle uses it. We have a *figurative representation*, not of a reality, but of a *figurative representation*. Neither is this a representation of a reality, but of another thing that still is but a *figurative representation* of something else: yea, even this *something else* is still but a *figure*, and one that is very harsh and far fetched. So that here we have a *figure* to represent a *figure*, even a *figure* of a *figure*, representing some very remote *figure*, which most obscurely represents the thing intended; if the most *terrible evil* can indeed be said at all to *represent* the contrary *good* of the highest kind. And now, what cannot be made of any place of Scripture, in such a way of managing it, as this? And is there any hope of ever deciding any controversy by the Scripture, in the way of using such a license with the Scripture, in order to force it to a compliance with our own schemes? If the apostle indeed uses language after so strange a manner in this place, it is perhaps such an instance, as not only there is not the like of it in all the Bible besides, but perhaps in no writing whatsoever. And this, not in any parabolical, visionary, or prophetic description, in which difficult and obscure representations are wont to be made use of; nor in a dramatic or poetical representation, in which a great license is often taken, and bold figures are commonly to be expected: but it is in a familiar letter, wherein the apostle is delivering gospel instruction, as a minister of the New Testament; and wherein, as he professes, he delivers divine truth without the vail of ancient figures and similitudes, and uses great plainness of speech: and in a discourse that is wholly didactic, narrative, and argumentative; evidently setting himself to explain the doctrine he is upon, in the reason and nature of it, with a great variety of expressions, turning it as it were on every side, to make his meaning plain, and to fix in his readers the exact notion of what he intends. Dr. Taylor himself observes,* "This apostle takes great care to guard and explain every part of his subject: and I may venture to say, he has left no part of it unexplained or unguarded. Never was an author more exact and cautious in this than he. Sometimes he writes notes on a sentence liable to exception, and wanting explanation." Now I think, this care and exactness of the apostle nowhere appears more than in the place we are upon. Nay, I scarcely know another instance equal to this, of the apostle's care to be well understood, by being very particular, explicit, and precise, setting the matter forth in every light, going over and over again with his doctrine, clearly to exhibit, and fully to settle and determine the thing which he aims at.

SECTION II.

Some Observations on the Connection, Scope, and Sense of this remarkable paragraph in Rom. v. With some Reflections on the Evidence which we here have of the Doctrine of ORIGINAL SIN.

THE connection of this remarkable paragraph with the foregoing discourse in this epistle, is not obscure and difficult, nor to be sought for at a distance.

* Preface to Paraph. p. 146, 48.

It may be plainly seen, only by a general glance on things which went before from the beginning of the epistle: and indeed what is said immediately before in the same chapter, leads directly to it. The apostle in the preceding part of this epistle had largely treated of the *sinfulness* and *misery* of all mankind Jews as well as Gentiles. He had particularly spoken of the depravity and ruin of mankind in their natural state, in the foregoing part of this chapter; representing them as being *sinners, ungodly, enemies*, exposed to divine *wrath*, and *without strength*. No wonder now, this leads him to observe, *how* this so great and deplorable an event came to pass; *how* this universal sin and ruin came into the world. And with regard to the Jews in particular, who, though they might allow the doctrine of Original Sin in their own profession, yet were strongly prejudiced against what was implied in it, or evidently followed from it, with regard to themselves: in this respect they were prejudiced against the doctrine of universal sinfulness, and exposedness to wrath by nature, looking on themselves as by nature holy, and favorites of God, because they were the children of Abraham; and with them the apostle had labored most in the foregoing part of the epistle, to convince them of their being by nature as sinful, and as much the children of wrath, as the Gentiles:—I say, with regard to them, it was exceeding proper, and what the apostle's design most naturally led him to, to take off their eyes from their father Abraham, who was their father in distinction from other nations, and direct them to their father Adam, who was the common father of mankind, and equally of Jews and Gentiles. And when he was entered on this doctrine of the derivation of sin and ruin, or death, to all mankind from Adam, no wonder if he thought it needful to be somewhat particular in it, seeing he wrote to Jews and Gentiles; the former of which had been brought up under the prejudices of a proud opinion of themselves, as a holy people by nature, and the latter had been educated in total ignorance of all things of this kind.

Again, the apostle had, from the beginning of the epistle, been endeavoring to evince the absolute dependence of all mankind on the free *grace of God* for salvation, and the greatness of this grace; and particularly in the former part of this chapter. The greatness of this grace he shows especially by two things. (1.) The universal corruption and misery of mankind; as in all the foregoing chapters, and in the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th verses of this chapter. (2.) The greatness of the benefits which believers receive, and the greatness of the glory they have hope of. So especially in verses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 11th of this chapter. And here, in this place we are upon, from verse 12 to the end, he is still on the same design of magnifying the grace of God, in the same thing, viz., the favor, life, and happiness which believers in Christ receive; speaking here of *the grace of God, the gift by grace, the abounding of grace, and the reign of grace*. And he still sets forth the freedom and riches of grace by the same two arguments, viz., the universal sinfulness and ruin of mankind, all having sinned, all being naturally exposed to death, judgment and condemnation; and the exceeding greatness of the benefit received, being far greater than the misery which comes by the first Adam, and abounding beyond it. And it is by no means consistent with the apostle's scope, to suppose, that the benefit which we have by Christ, as the antitype of Adam, here mainly insisted on, is without any grace at all, being only a restoration to life of such as never deserved death.

Another thing observable in the apostle's scope from the beginning of the epistle, is, he endeavors to show the greatness and absoluteness of the dependence of all mankind on the *redemption* and *righteousness* of Christ, for justification and life, that he might *magnify* and *exalt* the Redeemer; which design

his whole heart was swallowed up in, and may be looked upon as the main design of the whole epistle. And this is what he had been upon in the preceding part of this chapter; inferring it from the same argument, the utter sinfulness and ruin of all men. And he is evidently still on the same thing in this place, from the 12th verse to the end; speaking of the *same* justification and righteousness, which he had dwelt on before, and not another totally diverse. No wonder, when the apostle is treating so fully and largely of our restoration, righteousness, and life by Christ, that he is led by it to consider our fall, sin, death and ruin by Adam; and to observe wherein these two opposite heads of mankind agree, and wherein they differ, in the manner of conveyance of opposite influences and communications from each.

Thus, if the place be understood, as it used to be understood by orthodox divines, the whole stands in a natural, easy, and clear connection with the preceding part of the chapter, and all the former part of the epistle; and in a plain agreement with the express design of all that the apostle had been saying; and also in connection with the words last before spoken, as introduced by the two immediately preceding verses, where he is speaking of our justification, reconciliation, and salvation by Christ; which leads the apostle directly to observe, how, on the contrary, we have sin and death by Adam. Taking this discourse of the apostle in its true and plain sense, there is no need of great extent of learning, or depth of criticism, to find out the connection: but if it be understood in Dr. Taylor's sense, the plain scope and connection are wholly lost, and there was truly need of a skill in criticism, and art of discerning, beyond or at least different from that of former divines, and a faculty of seeing something afar off which other men's sight could not reach, in order to find out the connection.

What has been already observed, may suffice to show the apostle's general scope in this place. But yet there seem to be some *other* things, which he has his eye to, in several expressions; some particular things in the then present state, temper and notions of the Jews, which he also had before spoken of or had reference to, in certain places of the foregoing part of the epistle. As particularly, the Jews had a very superstitious and extravagant notion of their law, delivered by Moses; as if it were the prime, grand, and indeed only rule of God's proceeding with mankind as their judge, both in men's justification and condemnation, or from whence all, both sin and righteousness, were imputed; and had no consideration of the law of nature, written in the hearts of the Gentiles, and of all mankind. Herein they ascribed infinitely too much to their particular law, beyond the true design of it. They *made their boast of the law*; as if their being distinguished from all other nations by that great privilege, *the giving of the law*, sufficiently made them a holy people, and God's children. This notion of theirs the apostle evidently refers to, chap. ii. 13, 17, 18, 19, and indeed through that whole chapter. They looked on the law of Moses as intended to be the only rule and means of justification; and as such, trusted in the works of the law, especially circumcision; which appears by the 3d chapter. But as for the Gentiles, they looked on them as by nature sinners, and children of wrath; because born of uncircumcised parents, and aliens from their law, and who themselves did not know, profess and submit to the law of Moses, become proselytes, and receive circumcision. What they esteemed the sum of *their* wickedness and condemnation, was, that they did not turn Jews, and act as Jews.* This notion of theirs the apostle has a plain respect to, and endeavors to convince them of the falseness of, in chapter ii. 12—16. And he has a manifest regard again to

* Here are worthy to be observed the things which Dr. Taylor himself says to the same purpose, Key, § 302, 303, and Preface to Paraph. on Epist. to Rom. p. 144, 43.

the same thing here, in the 12th, 13th, and 14th verses of chapter v. Which may lead us the more clearly to see the true sense of those verses; about the sense of which is the main controversy, and the meaning of which being determined, it will settle the meaning of every other controverted expression through the whole discourse.

Dr. Taylor misrepresents the apostle's argument in these verses. (Which as has been demonstrated, is in his sense altogether vain and impertinent.) He supposes, the thing which the apostle mainly intends to prove, is, that *death* or mortality does not come on mankind by *personal* sin; and that he would prove it by this medium, that *death reigned* when there was *no law* in being which threatened personal sin with death. It is acknowledged, that this is implied, even that death came into the world by Adam's sin: yet this is not the main thing the apostle designs to prove. But his main point evidently is, that *sin* and *guilt*, and *just exposedness to death and ruin*, came into the world by Adam's sin; as *righteousness, justification*, and a *title to eternal life* come by Christ. Which point he confirms by this consideration, that from the very time when Adam sinned, these things, viz., sin, guilt, and desert of ruin, became *universal* in the world, long before the law given by Moses to the Jewish nation had any being

The apostle's remark, that sin entered into the world by *one man*, who was the father of the whole human race, was an observation which afforded proper instruction for the Jews, who looked on themselves as a holy people, because they had the law of Moses, and were the children of Abraham, a holy father; while they looked on other nations as by nature unholy and sinners, because they were not Abraham's children. He leads them up to a higher ancestor than this patriarch, even to Adam, who being equally the father of Jews and Gentiles, both alike come from a sinful father; from whom guilt and pollution were derived alike to all mankind. And this the apostle proves by an argument, which of all that could possibly be invented, tended the most briefly and directly to convince the Jews; even by this reflection, that death had come equally on all mankind from Adam's time, and that the posterity of Abraham were equally subject to it with the rest of the world. This was apparent *in fact*, a thing they all knew. And the Jews had always been taught that *death* (which began in the destruction of the body, and of this present life) was the proper punishment of *sin* This they were taught in Moses' history of Adam, and God's first threatening of punishment for sin, and by the constant doctrine of the law and the prophets, as has been already observed.

And the apostle's observation, that *sin was in the world* long before the law was given, and was as *universal* in the world from the times of Adam, as it had been among the Heathen since the law of Moses, this showed plainly that the Jews were quite mistaken in their notion of *their* particular law, and that the law which is the original and universal rule of righteousness and judgment for all mankind, was another law, of far more ancient date, even the law of nature, which began as early as the human nature began, and was established with the first father of mankind, and in him with the whole race: the positive precept of abstaining from the forbidden fruit, being given for the trial of his compliance with this law of nature; of which the main rule is supreme regard to God and his will. And the apostle proves that it must be thus, because, if the law of Moses had been the highest rule of judgment, and if there had not been a superior, prior, divine rule established, mankind in general would not have been judged and condemned as sinners, *before* that was given (for "sin is not imputed when there is no law"), as it is apparent in fact they were, because *death reigned* before that time, even from the times of Adam.

It may be observed, the apostle in this epistle, and that to the Galatians, endeavors to convince the Jews of these two things, in opposition to the notions and prejudices they had entertained concerning *their law*. 1. That it never was intended to be the *covenant*, or method by which they should actually be *justified*. 2. That it was not the *highest* and *universal* rule or law, by which mankind in general, and particularly the Heathen world, were *condemned*. And he proves both by similar arguments. He proves that the law of Moses was not the *covenant*, by which any of mankind were to obtain *justification*, because that covenant was of older date, being expressly established in the time of Abraham, and Abraham himself was *justified* by it. This argument the apostle particularly handles in the 3d chapter of Galatians, especially in verses 17, 18, 19. And this argument is also made use of in the apostle's reasonings in the 4th chapter of this epistle to the Romans, especially verses 13, 14, 15. He proves also that the law of Moses was not the *prime* rule of judgment, by which mankind in general, and particularly the Heathen world, were *condemned*. And this he proves also the same way, viz., by showing this to be of *older date* than that law, and that it was established with *Adam*. Now these things tended to lead the Jews to right notions of their law, not as the intended method of justification, nor as the original and universal rule of condemnation, but something *superadded* to both, both being of older date, superadded to the *latter*, to illustrate and confirm it, that the offence might *abound*; and superadded to the former, to be as a schoolmaster, to prepare men for the benefits of it, and to magnify divine grace in it, that this might much more *abound*.

The chief occasion of the obscurity and difficulty which seems to attend the scope and connection of the various clauses in the three first verses of this discourse, particularly the 13th and 14th verses, is, that there are *two* things (although things closely connected) which the apostle has in his eye *at once*, in which he aims to enlighten them he writes to; which will not be thought at all strange by them that have been conversant with, and have attended to this apostle's writings. He would illustrate the grand point he had been upon from the beginning, even *justification through Christ's righteousness alone*, by showing how we are originally in a sinful, miserable state, and how we derive this sin and misery from Adam, and how we are delivered and justified by Christ as a second Adam. At the same time he would confute those foolish and corrupt notions of the Jews, about their *nation* and their *law*, that were very inconsistent with these doctrines. And he here endeavors to establish, at once, these two things in opposition to those Jewish notions.

1. That it is our natural relation to Adam, and not to Abraham, which determines our native, moral state; and that therefore the being natural children of Abraham, will not make us by nature holy in the sight of God, since we are the natural seed of sinful Adam; nor does the Gentiles' being not descended from Abraham, denominate them *sinners*, any more than the Jews, seeing both alike are descended from Adam.

2. That the law of Moses is not the prime and general law and rule of judgment for mankind, to *condemn* them, and denominate them *sinners*; but that the state they are in with regard to a higher, more ancient and universal law, determines mankind in general to be sinners in the sight of God, and liable to be condemned as such. Which observation is, in many respects, to the apostle's purpose; particularly in this respect, that if the Jews were convinced, that the law, which was the prime rule of condemnation, was given to *all*, was common to all mankind, and that all fell under condemnation through the violation of that law by the common father of all, both Jews and Gentiles, then

they would be led more easily and naturally to believe, that the method of justification which God had established, also extended equally to *all* mankind; and that the Messiah, by whom we have this justification, is appointed, as Adam was, for a common head to all, both Jews and Gentiles.

The apostle's aiming to confute the Jewish notion, is the principal occasion of those words in the 13th verse: "For until the law, sin was in the world; but sin is not imputed when there is no law."

As to the import of that expression, "Even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression," not only is the thing signified by it, in Dr. Taylor's sense of it, *not true;* or if it had been true, would have been impertinent, as has been shown; but his interpretation is, otherwise, very much *strained* and unnatural. According to him, by "sinning after the similitude of Adam's transgression," is not meant any similitude of the act of sinning, nor of the command sinned against, nor properly any circumstance of the *sin;* but only the similitude of a circumstance of the *command*, viz., the *threatening* it is attended with. A far fetched thing, to be called a *similitude of sinning!* Besides this expression in such a meaning, is only a needless, impertinent, and awkward *repeating* over again the same thing, which it is supposed the apostle had observed in the foregoing verse, even after he had left it, and had proceeded another step in the series of his discourse, or chain of arguing. As thus, in the foregoing verse the apostle had plainly laid down his argument (as our author understands it), by which he would prove, *death* did not come by *personal sin*, viz., that death reigned before any law, *threatening* death for personal sin, was in being; so that the sin then committed was against *no law*, threatening death for personal sin. Having laid this down, the apostle leaves this part of his argument, and proceeds another step, *Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses;* and then returns, in a strange, unnatural manner, and *repeats* that argument or assertion again, but only more obscurely than before, in these words, *Even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression*, i. e., over them that had not sinned against a law threatening death for personal sin. Which is just the same thing as if the apostle had said, "They that sinned *before the law*, did not sin against a law threatening death for personal sin; for there was *no such law* for any to sin against at that time: *nevertheless* death reigned at that time, *even over such as did not sin* against a law threatening death for personal sin." Which latter clause adds nothing to the premises, and tends nothing to illustrate what was said before, but rather to obscure and darken it. The particle *καὶ*, *even*, when prefixed in this manner used to signify something additional, some advance in the sense or argument; implying that the words following express something more, or express the same thing more fully, plainly, or forcibly. But to unite two clauses by such a particle, in such a manner, when there is nothing besides a flat repetition, with no superadded sense or force, but rather a greater uncertainty and obscurity, would be very unusual, and indeed very absurd.

I can see no reason why we should be dissatisfied with that explanation of this clause, which has more commonly been given, viz., that by *them who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression*, are meant *infants;* who, though they have indeed sinned in Adam, yet never sinned as Adam did, by actually transgressing in their own persons; unless it be that this interpretation is too *old*, and too *common*. It was well known by those the apostle wrote to, that vast numbers had died in infancy, within that period which the apostle speaks of, particularly in the time of the deluge; and it would be strange the apostle should not have the case of such infants in his mind; even supposing his scope were

what our author supposes, and he had only intended to prove that death did not come on mankind for their personal sin. How directly would it have served the purpose of proving this, to have mentioned so great a part of mankind that are subject to death, who, all know, never committed any sin in *their own persons*. How much more plain and easy the proof of the point by that, than to go round about, as Dr. Taylor supposes, and bring in a thing so dark and uncertain as this, That God never would bring death on all mankind for *personal* sin (though they had personal sin), without an express, revealed constitution; and then to observe that there was *no* revealed constitution of this nature from Adam to Moses; which also seems a thing without any plain evidence; and then to infer that it must needs be so, that it could come only on *occasion* of Adam's sin, though not *for* his sin, or as any punishment of it; which inference also is very dark and unintelligible.

If the apostle in this place meant those who never sinned by their personal act, it is not strange that he should express this by their *not sinning after the similitude of Adam's transgression*. We read of two ways of men's being like Adam, or in which a similitude to him is ascribed to men: one is a being begotten or born in his *image* or *likeness*, Gen. v. 3. Another is a transgressing God's covenant or law, *like him*, Hos. vi. 7, "They, like Adam (so in the Heb. and Vulg. Lat.), have transgressed the covenant." Infants have the former similitude, but not the latter. And it was very natural, when the apostle would infer that infants become sinners by that one act and offence of Adam, to observe that they had not renewed the act of sin themselves, by any second instance of a like sort. And such might be the state of language among Jews and Christians at that day, that the apostle might have no phrase more aptly to express this meaning. The manner in which the epithets, *personal* and *actual*, are used and applied now in this case, is probably of later date and more modern use.

And then this supposition of the apostle's having the case of infants in view, in this expression, makes it more to his purpose, to mention death reigning before the law of Moses was given. For the Jews looked on all nations, besides themselves, as *sinners*, by virtue of *their law;* being made so especially by the *law of circumcision*, given first to Abraham, and completed by Moses, making the want of circumcision a legal *pollution*, utterly disqualifying for the privileges of the sanctuary. This law, the Jews supposed, made the very infants of the Gentiles sinners, polluted and hateful to God; they being uncircumcised, and born of uncircumcised parents. But the apostle proves against these notions of the Jews, that the nations of the world do not become sinners by nature, and sinners from infancy, by virtue of *their law*, in this manner, but by Adam's sin; inasmuch as infants were treated as sinners long *before* the law of circumcision was given, as well as before they had committed actual sin.

What has been said, may, as I humbly conceive, lead us to that which is the *true* scope and sense of the apostle in these three verses; which I will endeavor more briefly to represent in the following paraphrase.

"The things which I have largely insisted on, viz., the evil that is in the world, the general wickedness, guilt and ruin of mankind, and the opposite good, even justification and life, as only by Christ, lead me to observe the *likeness* of the manner in which they are

12. *Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned.*

each of them *introduced.* For it was by *one man*, that the general corruption and guilt which I have spoken of, came into the world, and condemnation and death by sin: and this dreadful punishment and ruin came on all mankind by the great *law of works*, originally established with mankind in their first father, and by his *one offence*, or breach of that law; *all* thereby becoming *sinners* in God's sight, and exposed to final destruction.

13. *For until the law sin was in the world; but sin is not imputed when there is no law.*

"It is manifest that it was in this way the world became sinful and guilty; and not in that way which the Jews suppose, viz., that their law, given by Moses, is the grand, universal rule of righteousness and judgment for mankind, and that it is by being Gentiles, uncircumcised, and aliens from that law, that the nations of the world are CONSTITUTED *sinners* and unclean. For *before* the law of Moses was given, mankind were all looked upon by the great Judge as sinners, by corruption and guilt derived from Adam's violation of the original law of works; which shows that the original, universal rule of righteousness is not the law of Moses; for if so, there would have been no sin imputed *before* that was given, because sin is not imputed when there is no law

14. *Nevertheless, death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression.*

"But that at that time sin was *imputed*, and men were by their Judge reckoned as sinners, through guilt and corruption derived from Adam, and condemned for sin to *death*, the proper punishment of sin, we have a plain proof; in that it appears in fact, all mankind, during that whole time which preceded the law of Moses, were subjected to that temporal death, which is the visible introduction and image of that utter destruction which sin deserves, not excepting even *infants*, who could be sinners no other way than by virtue of Adam's transgression, having never in their own persons actually sinned as Adam did; nor could at that time be made polluted by the law of Moses, as being uncircumcised, or born of uncircumcised parents."

Now, by way of reflection on the whole, I would observe, that though there are two or three expressions in this paragraph, Rom. v. 12, &c., the design of which is attended with some difficulty and obscurity, as particularly in the 13th and 14th verses, yet the scope and sense of the discourse in general is not obscure, but on the contrary very clear and manifest; and so is the particular doctrine mainly taught in it. The apostle sets himself with great care and pains to make it plain, and precisely to fix and settle the point he is upon. And the discourse is so framed, that one part of it does greatly clear and fix the meaning of other parts; and the whole is determined by the clear connection it stands in with other parts of the epistle, and by the manifest drift of all the preceding part of it.

The doctrine of Original Sin is not only here taught, but most plainly, explicitly, and abundantly taught. This doctrine is asserted, expressly or implicitly, in almost every verse, and in some of the verses several times. It is fully implied in that first expression in the 12th verse, "By one man sin entered into the world." The passage implies, that sin became *universal* in the world; as the apostle had before largely shown it was; and not merely (which would be a trifling, insignificant observation) that one man, who was made first, sinned first, before other men sinned; or, that it did not so happen that many men began to sin just together at the same moment. The latter part of the verse, "And death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that (or, if you will *unto which*) all have sinned," shows, that in the eye of the Judge of the world, in Adam's first sin, *all* sinned; not only *in some sort*, but all sinned *so* as to be exposed to that *death*, and final destruction, which is the proper *wages of sin*. The same doctrine is taught again twice over in the 14th verse. It is there observed, as a proof of this doctrine, that "Death reigned over them which had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression;" i. e., by their personal act; and therefore could be exposed to death, only by deriving guilt and pollution from Adam, in consequence of his sin. And it is taught again in those words, "Who is the figure of him that was to come." The resemblance lies very much in this circumstance, viz., our deriving sin, guilt, and punishment by Adam's sin, as we do righteousness, justification, and the reward of life by Christ's obedience; for so the apostle explains himself. The same doctrine is expressly taught again, verse 15, "Through the offence of one, many be dead." And again twice in the 16th verse, "It was by one that sinned;" i. e., it was by Adam, that guilt and punishment (before spoken of) came on mankind: and in these words, "Judgment was by one to condemnation." It is again plainly and fully laid down in the 17th verse, "By one man's offence, death reigned by one." So again in the 18th verse, "By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation." Again very plainly in the 19th verse, "By one man's disobedience, many were made sinners."

And here is every thing to determine and fix the *meaning* of all important terms, that the apostle makes use of: as, the *abundant* use of them in all parts of the New Testament; and especially in this apostle's writings, which make up a very great part of the New Testament: and his repeated use of them in this epistle in particular, especially in the preceding part of the epistle, which leads to and introduces this discourse, and in the former part of this very chapter; and also the light, that one sentence in this paragraph casts on another which fully settles their meaning: as, with respect to the words *justification*, *righteousness* and *condemnation*; and above all, in regard of the word *sin*, which is the most important of all, with relation to the doctrine and controversy we are upon. Besides the constant use of this term everywhere else through

the New Testament, through the epistles of this apostle, this epistle in particular, and even the former part of this chapter, it is often repeated in this very paragraph, and evidently used in the very sense that is denied to belong to it in the end of verse 12, and verse 19, though owned everywhere else: and its meaning is fully determined by the apostle's varying the term; using together with it, to signify the same thing, such a variety of other synonymous words, such as *offence, transgression, disobedience.* And further, to put the matter out of all controversy, it is particularly and expressly and repeatedly distinguished from that which our opposers would *explain* it by, viz., *condemnation* and *death.* And what is meant by *sin's entering into the world*, in verse 12, is determined by a like phrase of *sin's being in the world*, in the next verse. And that by the *offence of one*, so often spoken of here, as bringing death and condemnation on all, the apostle means the sin of one, derived in its guilt and pollution to mankind in general, is a thing which (over and above all that has been already observed) is settled and determined by those words in the conclusion of this discourse, verse 20, "Moreover, the law entered, that the offence might abound: but where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." These words plainly show, that the *offence* spoken of so often, and evidently spoken of still in these words, which was the offence of *one* man, became the sin of *all.* For when he says, "The law entered, that the offence might abound," his meaning cannot be, that the offence of Adam, merely as *his* personally, should *abound;* but, as it exists in its *derived* guilt, corrupt influence, and evil fruits, in the sin of mankind in general, even as a tree in its root and branches.*

It is a thing that confirms the certainty of the *proof* of the doctrine of Original Sin, which this place affords, that the utmost art *cannot* pervert it to another sense. What a variety of the most artful methods have been used by the *enemies* of this doctrine, to *wrest* and *darken* this paragraph of holy writ, which stands so much in their way, as it were to *force* the Bible to speak a language that is agreeable to their mind! How have expressions been strained, words and phrases racked! What strange figures of speech have been invented, and with violent hands thrust into the apostle's mouth; and then with a bold countenance and magisterial airs obtruded on the world, as from him!—But, blessed be God, we have his words as he delivered them, and the rest of the same epistle, and his other writings to compare with them; by which his meaning stands in too strong and glaring a light to be hid by any of the artificial mists which they labor to throw upon it.

It is really no less than *abusing* the Scripture and its readers, to represent this paragraph as the most *obscure* of all the places of Scripture, that speak of the consequences of Adam's sin; and to treat it as if there was need first to consider other places as more *plain.* Whereas, it is most manifestly a place in which these things are declared, beyond all, the most plainly, particularly, precisely, and of set purpose, by that great apostle, who has most fully explained to us those doctrines in general, which relate to the redemption by Christ, and the sin and misery we are redeemed from. And it must be now left to the reader's judgment, whether the Christian church has not proceeded reasonably, in looking on this as a place of Scripture most clearly and fully treating of these things, and

* The offence, according to Dr. Taylor's explanation, does not abound by the law at all really and truly, in any sense; neither the sin, nor the punishment. For he says, "The meaning is not, that men should be made more wicked; but, that men should be liable to death for every transgression." But after all, they are liable to no more deaths, nor to any worse deaths, if they are not more sinful: for they were to have punishments according to their desert, before. Such as died, and went into another world, before the law of Moses was given, were punished according to their deserts; and the law, when it came, threatened no more.

in using its determinate sense as a help to settle the meaning of many other passages of sacred writ.

As this place in general is very full and plain, so the doctrine of the corruption of nature, as derived from Adam, and also the imputation of his first sin, are *both* clearly taught in it. The *imputation* of Adam's one transgression, is indeed most directly and frequently asserted. We are here assured that *by one man's sin, death passed on all;* all being adjudged to this punishment, as having *sinned* (so it is implied) in that one man's sin. And it is repeated over and over, that *all are condemned, many are dead, many made sinners*, &c., by *one man's offence, by the disobedience of one*, and *by one offence*. And the doctrine of original *depravity* is also here taught, when the apostle says, *By one man sin entered into the world;* having a plain respect (as hath been shown) to that universal corruption and wickedness, as well as guilt, which he had before largely treated of.

PART III.

OBSERVING THE EVIDENCE GIVEN US, RELATIVE TO THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN, IN WHAT THE SCRIPTURES REVEAL CONCERNING THE REDEMPTION BY CHRIST

CHAPTER I.

The evidence of Original Sin, from the Nature of Redemption in the procurement of it.

According to Dr. Taylor's scheme, a very great part of mankind are the subjects of Christ's *redemption*, who live and die perfectly *innocent*, who never have had, and never will have any *sin* charged to their account, and never are either the subjects of, or exposed to any *punishment* whatsoever, viz., all that die in *infancy*. They are the subjects of *Christ's redemption*, as he redeems them from *death*, or as they by his righteousness have *justification*, and by his obedience are *made righteous*, in the *resurrection* of the body, in the sense of Rom. v. 18, 19 And *all* mankind are thus the subjects of Christ's redemption, while they are perfectly guiltless, and exposed to no punishment, as by Christ they are entitled to a *resurrection*. Though, with respect to such persons as have *sinned*, he allows it is *in some sort* by Christ and his death, that they are saved from sin, and the punishment of it.

Now let us see whether such a scheme will consist with the Scripture account of the redemption by Jesus Christ.

I. The representations of the redemption by Christ, everywhere in Scripture, lead us to suppose, that *all* whom he came to redeem, are *sinners;* that his salvation, as to the term *from which* (or the evil to be redeemed from) in *all* is *sin*, and the deserved *punishment* of sin. It is natural to suppose, that when he had his name Jesus, or Saviour, given him by God's special and immediate appointment, the salvation meant by that name should be his salvation in general; and not only a part of his salvation, and with regard only to some of them that he came to save. But this name was given him to signify *his saving his people from their sins*, Matth. i. 21. And the great doctrine of Christ's salva-

tion is, that *he came into the world to save sinners*, 1 Tim. i. 15. And that *Christ hath once suffered, the just for the unjust*, 1 Pet. iii. 18. *In this was manifested the love of God towards us* (towards such in general as have the benefit of God's love in giving Christ), *that God sent his only begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him. Herein is love, that he sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins*, 1 John iv. 9, 10. Many other texts might be mentioned, which seem evidently to suppose, that all who are redeemed by Christ, are saved from *sin*. We are led by what Christ himself said, to suppose, that if any are not *sinners*, they have *no need* of him as a redeemer, any more than a well man of a physician, Mark ii. 17. And that men, in order to being the proper subjects of the mercy of God through Christ, must first be in a state of *sin*, is implied in Gal. iii. 22, "But the Scripture hath concluded all under *sin*, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe." To the same effect is Rom. xi. 32.

These things are greatly confirmed by the Scripture doctrine of *sacrifices*. It is abundantly plain, by both Old and New Testament, that they were types of Christ's death, and were for sin, and supposed sin in those for whom they were offered. The apostle supposes, that in order to any having the benefit of *the internal inheritance* by Christ, *there must of necessity be the death of the testator;* and gives that reason for it, that *without shedding of blood there is no remission*, Heb. ix. 15, &c. And Christ himself, in representing the benefit of his blood, in the institution of the Lord's supper, under the notion of the blood of a *testament*, calls it, *The blood of the New Testament, shed for the remission of sins*, Matth. xxvi. 28. But according to the scheme of our author, many have the eternal inheritance by the death of the testator, who never had any need of remission.

II. The Scripture represents the redemption by Christ as a redemption from *deserved* destruction; and that, not merely as it respects some particulars, but as the fruit of God's love to mankind. John iii. 16, "God so loved the *world*, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him *should not perish*, but have everlasting life:" implying, that otherwise they must perish, or be destroyed: but what necessity of this, if they did not *deserve* to be destroyed? Now, that the destruction here spoken of, is deserved destruction, is manifest, because it is there compared to the perishing of such of the children of Israel as died by the bite of the fiery serpents, which God, in his wrath, for their *rebellion*, sent amongst them. And the same thing clearly appears by the last verse of the same chapter, "He that believeth on the Son, hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him," or, is left remaining on him: implying, that all in general *are found* under the *wrath* of God, and that they only of all mankind, who are interested in Christ, have this wrath *removed* and eternal life bestowed; the rest are *left* with the *wrath of God still remaining on them*. The same is clearly illustrated and confirmed by John v. 24, "He that believeth, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation, but is passed from death to life." In being passed from death to life is implied, that *before*, they were all in a state of death; and they are spoken of as being so by a sentence of *condemnation;* and if it be a *just* condemnation, it is a *deserved* condemnation.

III. It will follow on Dr. Taylor's scheme, that Christ's redemption, with regard to a great part of them who are the subjects of it, is not only a redemption from *no sin*, but from *no calamity*, and so from *no evil* of any kind. For as to *death*, which *infants* are redeemed from, they never were subjected to it as a calamity, but purely as a *benefit*. It came by no threatening or curse denounced

upon or through Adam; the covenant with him being utterly *abolished*, as to all its force and power on mankind (according to our author) before the pronouncing of the sentence of mortality. Therefore trouble and death could be appointed to innocent mankind no other way than on the foot of another covenant, the covenant of *grace;* and in this channel they come only as *favors*, not as evils. Therefore they could need no medicine or remedy, for they had no disease. Even death itself, which it is supposed Christ saves them from, is only a medicine; it is preventing physic, and one of the greatest of benefits. It is ridiculous to talk of persons needing a medicine, or a physician to save them from an excellent medicine; or of a remedy from a happy remedy! If it be said, though death be a benefit, yet it is so because Christ *changes* it, and turns it into a benefit, by procuring a *resurrection:* I would here ask, what can be meant by *turning* or *changing* it into a benefit, when it never *was* otherwise, nor could ever *justly be* otherwise? *Infants* could not be brought under death as a calamity; for they never *deserved* it. And it would be only an abuse (be it far from us, to ascribe such a thing to God) in any being, to make the offer to any poor sufferer, of a redeemer from some calamity, which *he* had brought upon them without the least *desert* of it on their part.

But it is plain, that death or mortality was not at first brought on mankind as a blessing, on the foot of the covenant of grace through Christ; and that Christ and grace do not *bring* mankind under death, but *find* them under it. 2 Cor. v. 14, "We thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead." Luke xix. 10, "The son of man is come to seek and to save that which was lost." The grace which appears in providing a deliverer from any state, supposes the subject to be in that state *prior* to that grace and deliverance; and not that such a state is first introduced by that grace. In our author's scheme, there never could be any sentence of death or condemnation that requires a Saviour from it; because the very sentence itself, according to the true meaning of it, implies and makes sure all that good which is requisite to abolish and make void the seeming evil to the innocent subject. So that the sentence itself is in effect the deliverer, and there is no need of another deliverer to deliver from that sentence. Dr. Taylor insists upon it, that "Nothing comes upon us in consequence of Adam's sin, in any *sense, kind* or *degree*, inconsistent with the *original blessing* pronounced on Adam at his creation; and nothing but what is perfectly consistent with God's blessing, love and goodness, declared to Adam as soon as he came out of his Maker's hands."* If the case be so, it is certain there is no evil or calamity at all for Christ to redeem us from; unless *things agreeable to the divine goodness, love and blessing*, are things which we need redemption from.

IV. It will follow on our author's principles, not only with respect to infants, but even *adult* persons, that redemption is *needless*, and Christ is dead in vain. Not only is there no need of Christ's redemption in order to deliverance from any consequence of Adam's sin, but also in order to perfect freedom from personal sin, and all its evil consequences. For God has made other sufficient provision for that, viz., *a sufficient power and ability, in all mankind, to do all their duty, and wholly to avoid sin.* Yea, this author insists upon it, that "when men have not sufficient *power* to do their duty, they have *no duty* to do. We may safely and assuredly conclude (says he), that mankind in all parts of the world, have *sufficient* power to do the duty which God requires of them; and that he requires of them *no more* than they have *sufficient* powers to do"† And in

* P. 88, 89, 8. † P. 111, 83, 64, 8.

another place,* "God has given powers *equal* to the duty which he expects." And he expresses a great dislike to R. R.'s supposing "that our propensities to evil, and temptations, are too strong to be *effectually and constantly* resisted, or that we are unavoidably sinful in a *degree;* that our appetites and passions will be breaking out, notwithstanding our everlasting watchfulness."† These things fully imply that men have in their own natural ability sufficient means to avoid sin, and to be perfectly free from it; and so, from all the bad consequences of it. And if the means are *sufficient*, then there is no need of *more;* and therefore there is no need of Christ's dying, in order to it. What Dr. Taylor says, in p. 72, *S.*, fully implies that it would be unjust in God to give mankind being in such circumstances, as that they would be more likely to sin, so as to be exposed to final misery, than otherwise. Hence then, without Christ and his redemption, and without any grace at all, *mere justice* makes *sufficient provision* for our being free from sin and misery, by our own power.

If all mankind in all parts of the world, have sufficient power to do their whole duty, without being sinful *in any degree*, then they have sufficient power to obtain righteousness by the law; and then, according to the Apostle Paul, *Christ is dead in vain.* Gal. ii. 21, "If righteousness come by the law, Christ is dead in vain;"—*δια νομου*, without the article, *by law*, or the rule of right action, as our author explains the phrase.‡ And according to the sense in which he explains this very place, "It would have frustrated or rendered useless the grace of God, if Christ died to accomplish what was or *might* have been effected by law itself, without his death."§ So that it most clearly follows from his own doctrine, that *Christ is dead in vain*, and the grace of God is *useless.* The same apostle says, "If there had been a law which *could* have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law," Gal. iii. 21; i. e. (still according to Dr. Taylor's own sense), if there was a law that man, in his present state, had sufficient power perfectly to fulfil. For Dr. Taylor supposes the reason why the law could not give life, to be, "not because it was weak in itself, but through the weakness of our flesh, and the infirmity of the human nature in the present state."‖ But he says, "We are under a mild dispensation of *grace*, making allowance for our infirmities."¶ By *our infirmities*, we may upon good grounds suppose he means that infirmity of human nature which he gives as the reason why the law cannot give life. But what *grace* is there in making that allowance for our infirmities which *justice* itself (according to his doctrine) most absolutely requires, as he supposes divine justice exactly proportions our duty to our ability?

Again, If it be said, that although Christ's redemption was not necessary to preserve men from *beginning* to sin, and getting into a course of sin, because they have sufficient power in themselves to avoid it; yet it may be necessary to deliver men, *after* they have by their own folly brought themselves under the *dominion* of evil appetites and passions.** I answer, if it be so, that men need deliverance from those habits and passions, which are become too strong for them, yet that deliverance, on our author's principles, would be no salvation from *sin.* For the exercise of passions which are too strong for us, and which we cannot overcome, is *necessary*, and he strongly urges that a necessary evil can be no *moral* evil. It is true, it is the *effect* of evil, as it is the *effect* of a bad practice, while the man remained at liberty, and had power to have avoided it. But then, according to Dr. Taylor, that evil *cause* alone is sin; and

* P. 67, S. † P 68, S. ‡ Pref. to Par. on Rom. p. 143, 3d. § Note on Rom. v. 20. p. 297. ‖ Ibid. ¶ Page 92, S. ** See p. 228, and also what he says of the helpless state of the Heathen, in Par. and Notes on Rom. vii. and beginning of Chap. viii.

not so, the necessary *effect;* for he says expressly, "*The cause of* every effect is *alone* chargeable with the effect it produceth, or which proceedeth from it."* And as to that sin which was the *cause*, the man needed no Saviour from *that*, having had *sufficient power* in himself to have avoided it. So that it follows, by our author's scheme, that *none* of mankind, neither infants nor adult persons, neither the more nor less vicious, neither Jews nor Gentiles, neither Heathens nor Christians, ever did or ever could stand in any *need* of a Saviour; and that, with respect to *all*, the truth is, *Christ is dead in vain.*

If any should say, although all mankind in all ages have sufficient ability to do their whole duty, and so may by their own power enjoy perfect freedom from sin, yet God *foresaw* that they *would sin*, and that *after* they had sinned, they would need Christ's death; I answer, it is plain by what the apostle says in those places which were just now mentioned, Gal. ii. 21, and iii. 21, that God would have esteemed it needless to give his Son to die for men, unless there had been a prior impossiblity of their having righteousness by law; and that, if there had been a law which *could* have given life, this other way by the death of Christ would not have been provided. And this appears to be agreeable to our author's own sense of things, by his words which have been cited, wherein he says, "It would have *frustrated* or rendered *useless* the grace of God, if Christ died to accomplish what was or *might have been* effected by law itself, without his death."

V. It will follow on Dr. Taylor's scheme, not only that Christ's redemption is *needless* for the saving from sin, or its consequences, but also that it does *no good* that way, has no tendency to any *diminution* of *sin* in the world For as to any *infusion* of virtue or holiness into the heart, by divine power through Christ or his redemption, it is altogether inconsistent with this author's notions. With him, *inwrought* virtue, if there were any such thing, would be no virtue; not being the effect of our own will, choice and design, but only of a sovereign act of God's power.† And therefore, all that Christ does to increase virtue, is only increasing our talents, our light, advantages, means and motives, as he often explains the matter.‡ But *sin* is not at all diminished. For he says, *Our duty must be measured by our talents;* as, a child that has less talents has less duty, and therefore must be no more exposed to commit sin, than he that has greater talents, because he that has greater talents, has more duty required, in exact proportion.§ If so, he that has but *one* talent, has as much *advantage* to perform that *one* degree of duty which is required of him, as he that has *five* talents, to perform his *five* degrees of duty, and is no more exposed to fail of it. And that man's *guilt*, who sins against *greater* advantages, means and motives, is *greater* in proportion to his talents.‖ And therefore it will follow, on Dr. Taylor's principles, that men stand no better *chance*, have no more eligible or valuable probability of freedom from sin and punishment, or of contracting but little guilt, or of performing required duty, with the great advantages and talents implied in Christ's redemption, than without them; when all things are computed, and put into the balances together, the numbers, degrees and aggravations of sin exposed to, degrees of duty required, &c. So that men have no redemption from sin, and no new means of performing duty, that are valuable or worth any thing at all. And thus the great redemption by Christ in every respect comes to nothing, with regard both to infants and adult persons.

* P 128. † See pages 180, 245, 250. ‡ In p. 44, 50, and innumerable other places
§ See p. 234, 61—70, S. ‖ See Paraph. on Rom. ii. 9, also on verse 12.

CHAPTER II.

The Evidence of the Doctrine of Original Sin from what the Scripture teaches of the Application of Redemption.

The truth of the doctrine of Original Sin is very clearly manifest from what the Scripture says of that *change of state* which it represents as necessary to an actual interest in the spiritual and eternal blessings of the Redeemer's kingdom.

In order to this, it speaks of it as absolutely necessary for every one, that he be regenerated, or *born again*. John iii. 3, "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, except a man γεννηθη ανωθεν, be begotten again, or born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Dr. Taylor, though he will not allow that this signifies any change from a state of *natural propensity* to sin, yet supposes that the new birth here spoken of means a man's being brought to *a divine life, in a right use and application of the natural powers, in a life of true holiness;** and that it is the attainment of *those habits of virtue and religion, which gives us the real character of true Christians, and the children of God;*† and that it is *putting on the new nature of right action.*‡

But in order to proceed in the most sure and safe manner, in our understanding what is meant in Scripture by being *born again*, and so in the inferences we draw from what is said of the necessity of it, let us compare Scripture with Scripture, and consider what *other* terms or phrases are used in other places, where respect is evidently had to the same change.

And here I would observe the following things:

I. If we compare one Scripture with another, it will be sufficiently manifest, that by regeneration, or being *begotten*, or *born again*, the same change in the state of the mind is signified with that which the Scripture speaks of as effected in true *repentance* and *conversion*. I put repentance and conversion together, because the Scripture puts them together, Acts iii. 19, and because they plainly signify much the same thing. The word μετανοια (repentance) signifies a *change of the mind;* as the word *conversion* means a *change* or *turning* from sin to God. And that this is the same change with that which is called *regeneration* (excepting that this latter term especially signifies the change, as the mind is *passive* in it), the following things do show.

In the change which the mind passes under in *repentance* and *conversion*, is attained that character of true Christians, which is necessary to the eternal privileges of such: Acts iii. 19, "*Repent* ye therefore, and be *converted*, that your sins may be blotted out, when the times of refreshing shall come from the presence of the Lord." And so it is with regeneration; as is evident from what Christ says to Nicodemus, and as is allowed by Dr. Taylor.

The change the mind passes under in repentance and conversion, is that in which saving *faith* is attained. Mark i. 15, "The kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and believe the gospel." And so it is with a being born again, or born of God, as appears by John i. 12, 13: "But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that *believe* on his name, which were *born*, not of blood, &c., but *of God*."

* Page 144. † Pages 246, 248. ‡ Page 251.

Just as Christ says concerning conversion, Matth. xviii. 3, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, except ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven;" so does he say concerning being born again, in what he spake to Nicodemus.

By the change men pass under in conversion, they become as *little children*, which appears in the place last cited; and so they do by regeneration, 1 Pet. i. at the end, and chap. ii. at the beginning. *Being born again—Wherefore, as new-born babes, desire*, &c. It is no objection that the disciples, whom God spake to in Matth. xviii. 3, were converted already: this makes it not less proper for Christ to declare the necessity of conversion to them, leaving it with them to try themselves, and to make sure their conversion; in like manner as he declared to them the necessity of *repentance*, in Luke xiii. 3, 5, "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish."

The change that men pass under at their *repentance*, is expressed and exhibited by baptism. Hence it is called the *baptism of repentance*, from time to time, Matth. iii. 11, Luke iii. 3, Acts xiii. 24, and xix. 4. And so is regeneration, or being born again, expressed by baptism; as is evident by such representations of regeneration as those, John iii. 5, "Except a man be born of water, and of the Spirit."—Titus iii. 5, "He saved us by the washing of regeneration." Many other things might be observed, to show that the change men pass under in their repentance and conversion, is the *same* with that which they are the subjects of in regeneration. But these observations may be sufficient.

II. The change which a man passes under when born again, and in his repentance and conversion, is the same that the Scripture calls the *circumcision of the heart*. This may easily appear by considering,

That as regeneration is that in which are attained the habits of true virtue and holiness, as has been shown, and as is confessed; so is *circumcision of heart*. Deut. xxx. 6, "And the Lord thy God will *circumcise thy heart*, and the *heart* of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul."

Regeneration is that whereby men come to have the character of true Christians; as is evident, and as is confessed; and so is *circumcision of heart;* for by this men become Jews *inwardly*, or Jews in the spiritual and *Christian sense* (and that is the same as being *true Christians*), as of old *proselytes* were made Jews by circumcision of the flesh. Rom. ii. 28, 29, "For he is not a *Jew*, which is one outwardly; neither is that *circumcision*, which is outward in the flesh: but he is a *Jew*, which is one inwardly; and *circumcision* is that *of the heart*, in the spirit and not in the letter, whose praise is not of men, but of God."

That *circumcision of the heart* is the same with conversion, or turning from sin to God, is evident by Jer. iv. 1—4, "If thou wilt return, O Israel, *return* (or, convert unto me)—*circumcise* yourselves to the Lord, and put away the foreskins of your *heart*." And Deut. x. 16, "*Circumcise* therefore the foreskin of your *heart*, and be no more stiff-necked."

Circumcision of the heart is the same change of the heart that men pass under in their repentance; as is evident by Levit. xxvi. 41, "If their uncircumcised hearts be humbled, and they accept the punishment of their iniquity."

The change men pass under in regeneration, repentance, and conversion, is signified by baptism, as has been shown; and so is circumcision of the heart signified by the same thing. None will deny that it was this internal circumcision, which of old was signified by external circumcision; nor will any deny now under the New Testament, that inward and spiritual baptism, or the cleansing of the heart, is signified by external washing or baptism. But spiritual cir-

cumcision and spiritual baptism are the same thing; both being *the putting off the body of the sins of the flesh;* as is very plain by Col. ii 11, 12, 13, "In whom also ye are circumcised with the *circumcision* made without hands, in *putting off the body of the sins of the flesh,* by the circumcision of Christ, buried with him in *baptism,* wherein also ye are risen with him," &c.

III. This inward change, called *regeneration* and *circumcision of the heart,* which is wrought in *repentance* and *conversion,* is the same with that spiritual *resurrection* so often spoken of, and represented as a *dying unto sin, and living unto righteousness.*

This appears with great plainness in that last cited place, Col. ii., "In whom also ye are circumcised, with the circumcision made without hands—buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye are *risen with him,* through the faith of the operation of God, &c. And you, being dead in your sins and the uncircumcision of your flesh, hath he *quickened together with him;* having forgiven you all trespasses."

The same appears by Rom. vi. 3, 4, 5, "Know ye not, that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ, were baptized into his death? Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death; that, like as Christ was *raised up from the dead,* by the glory of the Father, *even so we also should walk in newness of life,*" &c. Verse 11, "Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be *dead unto sin, but alive unto God,* through Jesus Christ our Lord."

In which place also it is evident, by the words recited, and by the whole context, that this spiritual resurrection is that change, in which persons are brought to habits of holiness and to the divine life, by which Dr. Taylor describes the thing obtained in being *born again.*

That a *spiritual resurrection* to a new divine life, should be called a being *born again,* is agreeable to the language of Scripture, in which we find a *resurrection* is called a *being born,* or *begotten.* So those words in the 2d Psalm, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee," are applied to Christ's *resurrection,* Acts xiii. 33. So in Col. i. 18, Christ is called the *first born from the dead;* and in Rev. i. 5, *The first begotten of the dead.* The saints in their *conversion* or *spiritual resurrection,* are *risen with Christ,* and are *begotten and born with him.* 1 Pet. i. 3, "Which hath *begotten us again* to a lively hope, *by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead,* to an inheritance incorruptible." This inheritance is the same thing with that *kingdom of heaven,* which men obtain by being *born again,* according to Christ's words to Nicodemus; and that same *inheritance of them that are sanctified,* spoken of as what is obtained in true *conversion.* Acts xxvi. 18, "To turn them (or convert them) from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins, and *inheritance among them that are sanctified,* through faith that is in me." Dr. Taylor's own words, in his note on Rom. i. 4, speaking of that place in the 2d Psalm, just now mentioned, are very worthy to be here recited. He observes how this is applied to Christ's *resurrection* and exaltation, in the New Testament, and then has this remark, "Note, Begetting is conferring a new and happy state: a son is a person put into it. Agreeably to this, good men are said to be the sons of God, as they are the sons of the *resurrection to eternal life,* which is represented as a *παλιγγενεσια,* a being *begotten,* or *born again, regenerated.*"

So that I think it is abundantly plain, that the *spiritual resurrection* spoken of in Scripture, by which the saints are brought to a new divine life, is the same with that being *born again,* which Christ says is *necessary* for every one in order to his seeing the kingdom of God.

IV. This change, which men are the subjects of when they are *born again*, and *circumcised in heart*, when they *repent*, and are *converted*, and spiritually *raised from the dead*, is the same change which is meant when the Scripture speaks of making the *heart* and *spirit new*, or giving a *new heart and spirit*.

It is needless here to stand to observe, how evidently this is spoken of as necessary to salvation, and as the change in which are attained the habits of true virtue and holiness, and the character of a true saint; as has been observed of *regeneration*, *conversion*, &c., and how apparent it is from thence, that the change is the same. For it is as it were self-evident: it is apparent by the phrases themselves, that they are different expressions of the same thing. Thus repentance (μετανοια) or the change of the mind, is the same as being changed to a *new* mind, or a *new* heart and spirit. *Conversion* is the turning of the heart; which is the same thing as changing it so, that there shall be another heart, or a *new* heart, or a new spirit. To be *born again*, is to be *born anew;* which implies a becoming *new*, and is represented as becoming *new born babes:* but none supposes it is the *body*, that is immediately and properly new, but the *mind*, *heart*, or *spirit*. And so a *spiritual resurrection* is the resurrection of the spirit, or rising to begin a *new* existence and life, as to the *mind*, *heart*, or *spirit*. So that all these phrases imply a having a *new heart*, and being *renewed in the spirit*, according to their plain signification.

When Nicodemus expressed his wonder at Christ's declaring it necessary, that a man should be *born again* in order to see the kingdom of God, or enjoy the privileges of the kingdom of the Messiah, Christ says to him, "Art thou a master of Israel, and knowest not these things?" i. e., "Art thou one set to teach others the things written in the law and the prophets, and knowest not a doctrine so plainly taught in your Scriptures, that such a change as I speak of, is necessary to a partaking of the blessings of the kingdom of the Messiah?"—But what can Christ have respect to in this, unless such prophecies as that in Ezek. xxxvi. 25, 26, 27? Where God, by the prophet, speaking of the days of the Messiah's kingdom, says, "Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean—*A new heart* also will I give you, and *a new spirit* will I put within you—and I will put my Spirit within you." Here God speaks of having a *new heart* and *spirit*, by being *washed with water*, and receiving *the Spirit of God*, as the qualification of God's people, that shall enjoy the privileges of the kingdom of the Messiah. How much is this like the doctrine of Christ to Nicodemus, of being *born again of water, and of the spirit?* We have another like prophecy in Ezek. xi. 19.

Add to these things, that regeneration, or a *being born again*, and the *renewing* (or making new) by the Holy Ghost, are spoken of as the same thing. Titus iii. 5, "By the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost."

V. It is abundantly manifest, that being *born again*, a spiritually *rising from the dead* to *newness of life*, receiving a *new heart*, and being *renewed in the spirit of the mind*, these are the same thing with that which is called putting off the *old man*, and putting on the *new man*.

The expressions are equivalent; and the representations are plainly of the same thing. When Christ speaks of being *born again*, two births are supposed; a *first* and a *second;* an *old birth*, and a *new one:* and the thing born is called *man* So what is born in the first birth, is the *old man;* and what is brought forth in the second birth, is the *new man*. That which is born in the first birth (says Christ) is *flesh:* it is the *carnal man*, wherein we have borne the image of the *earthly Adam*, whom the apostle calls the *first man*. That which is born in the new birth, is *spirit*, or the spiritual and heavenly man: wherein we pro-

ceed from Christ the *second man*, the *new man*, who is made a quickening spirit, and is the Lord from heaven, and the head of the *new creation*. In the new birth, men are represented as becoming *new born babes* (as was observed before), which is the same thing as becoming *new men*.

And how apparently is what the Scripture says of the spiritual *resurrection* of the Christian convert, equivalent and of the very same import with putting off the *old man*, and putting on the *new man?* So in Rom. vi. the convert is spoken of as *dying*, and being *buried with Christ;* which is explained, in the 6th verse, by this, that "the *old man* is crucified, that the body of sin might be destroyed." And in the 4th verse, converts in this change are spoken of as rising to *newness* of life. Are not these things plain enough? The apostle does in effect tell us, that when he speaks of that spiritual death and resurrection which is in conversion, he means the same thing as *crucifying and burying the old man*, and rising a *new man*.

And it is most apparent, that spiritual *circumcision*, and spiritual *baptism*, and the spiritual *resurrection*, are all the same with *putting off the old man*, and *putting on the new man*. This appears by Col. ii. 11, 12, "In whom also ye are circumcised with the *circumcision* made without hands, *in putting off* the body of the sins of the flesh, by the circumcision of Christ, buried with him in *baptism;* wherein also ye are *risen* with him." Here it is manifest, that the spiritual circumcision, baptism, and resurrection, all signify that change wherein men *put off the body of the sins of the flesh:* but that is the same thing, in this apostle's language, as *putting off the old man*, as appears by Rom. vi. 6: "Our *old man* is crucified, that the *body of sin* may be destroyed." And that putting off the *old man* is the same with putting off the *body of sins*, appears further by Ephes. iv. 22, 23, 24—and Col. iii. 8, 9, 10.

As Dr. Taylor confesses, that a being *born again* is, "that wherein are obtained the habits of virtue, religion, and true holiness;" so how evidently is the same thing predicated of that change, which is called *putting off the old man*, and *putting on the new man?* Eph. iv. 22, 23, 24, "That ye put off the old man, which is corrupt, &c., and put on the new man, which after God is created *in righteousness and true holiness.*"

And it is most plain, that this putting off the old man, &c., is the very same thing with making the *heart and spirit new*. It is apparent in itself: the spirit is called *the man*, in the language of the apostle; it is called the *inward man*, and the *hidden man*, Rom. vii. 22—2 Cor. iv. 16—1 Pet. iii. 4. And therefore putting off the *old man*, is the same thing with the removal of the *old heart;* and the putting on the *new man*, is the receiving *a new heart and a new spirit*. Yea, putting on the *new man* is expressly spoken of as the same thing with receiving a *new spirit*, or *being renewed in spirit*. Eph. iv. 22, 23, 24, "That ye put off the old man, and be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and that ye put on the new man."

From these things it appears, how unreasonable, and contrary to the utmost degree of Scriptural evidence, is Dr. Taylor's way of explaining the *old man*, and the *new man*,* as though thereby was meant nothing *personal;* but that by the *old man* was meant the *heathen state*, and by the *new man* the *Christian dispensation*, or state of professing Christians, or the whole *collective body of professors* of Christianity, made up of Jews and Gentiles; when all the color he has for it is, that the apostle once calls the Christian church a *new man*, Eph ii. 15. It is very true, in the Scriptures often, both in the Old Testament

* Pages 149—152, S.

and New, collective bodies, nations, peoples, cities, are figuratively represented by persons; particularly the *church* of Christ is represented as *one* holy person, and has the same appellatives as a particular saint or believer; and so is called a *child* and a *son of God*, Exod. iv. 22—Gal. iv. 1, 2; and a *servant of God*, Isa. xli. 8, 9, and xliv. 1. *The daughter of God, and spouse of Christ*, Psalm xlv. 10, 13, 14—Rev. xix. 7. Nevertheless, would it be reasonable to argue from hence, that such appellations, as a *servant of God*, a *child of God*, &c. are always or commonly to be taken as signifying only the church of God in general, or great collective bodies; and not to be understood in a personal sense? But certainly this would not be more unreasonable, than to urge, that by the *old* and the *new man*, as the phrases are mostly used in Scripture, is to be understood nothing but the great collective bodies of Pagans and of Christians, or the Heathen and the Christian world, as to their *outward* profession, and the dispensation they are under. It might have been proper, in this case, to have considered the unreasonableness of that practice which our author charges on others, and finds so much fault with in them:* "That they content themselves with a *few scraps* of Scripture, which, though wrong understood, they make the test of truth, and the ground of their principles, in contradiction to the *whole tenor of revelation*."

VI. I observe once more, it is very apparent, that a being *born again*, and *spiritually raised* from death to a state of new existence and life, having a *new heart created in us, being renewed in the spirit of our mind*, and being the subjects of that change by which we *put off the old man, and put on the new man*, is the same thing with that which, in Scripture, is called a *being created anew*, or made *new creatures*.

Here, to pass over many other evidences of this, which might be mentioned, I would only observe, that the representations are exactly equivalent. These several phrases naturally and most plainly signify the same effect. In the first *birth*, or generation, we are *created*, or brought into existence; it is then the *whole man* first *receives being:* the soul is then *formed*, and then our bodies are *fearfully and wonderfully made, being curiously wrought by our Creator:* so that a new born child is a *new creature*. So, when a man is *born again*, he is *created again;* in that *new birth*, there is a *new creation;* and therein he becomes as a *new born babe*, or a *new creature*. So in a *resurrection*, there is a *new creation*. When a man is *dead*, that which was created or made in the first birth or creation is destroyed: when that which was dead is raised to life, the mighty power of the Creator or Author of life, is exerted the second time, and the subject restored to new existence, and new life, as by a *new creation*. So giving a new heart is called *creating a clean heart*, Psal. li. 10, where the word translated *create*, is the same that is used in the first verse in Genesis. And when we read in Scripture of the *new creature*, the creature that is called *new* is *man;* not angel, or beast, or any other sort of creature; and therefore the phrase, *new man*, is evidently equivalent with *new creature;* and a putting off the *old man*, and putting on the *new man*, is spoken of expressly as brought to pass by a work of *creation*. Col. iii. 9, 10, "Ye have put off the old man, and have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge, after the image of him that *created* him." So Eph. iv. 22, 23, 24, "That ye put off the old man, which is corrupt, &c., and be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and that ye put on the new man, which after God is *created* in righteousness and true holiness." These things absolutely fix the meaning of that in 2 Cor. v. 17 "If

* Page 224.

any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new."

On the whole, the following reflections may be made:

1. That it is a truth of the utmost certainty, with respect to *every* man, born of the race of Adam, by ordinary generation, that *unless he be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.* This is true, not only of the Heathen, but of them that are born of the professing people of God, as Nicodemus, and the Jews, and every man *born of the flesh.* This is most manifest by Christ's discourse in John iii. 3—11. So it is plain by 2 Cor. v. 17, That *every man who is in Christ, is a new creature.*

2. It appears from this, together with what has been proved above, that it is most certain with respect to *every* one of the human race, that he can never have any interest in Christ, or see the kingdom of God, unless he be the subject of that change in the temper and disposition of his heart, which is made in *repentance and conversion, circumcision of heart, spiritual baptism, dying to sin and rising to a new and holy life;* and unless he has the *old heart taken away* and *a new heart and spirit given, and puts off the old man,* and *puts on the new man,* and *old things are passed away, and all things made new.*

3. From what is plainly implied in these things, and from what the Scripture most clearly teaches of the nature of them, it is certain, that *every* man is *born* into the world in a state of *moral pollution:* for *spiritual baptism* is a cleansing from moral filthiness. Ezek. xxxvi. 25, compared with Acts ii. 16, and John iii. 5. So the washing of regeneration, or the *new birth,* is a change from a state of wickedness. Tit. iii. 3, 4, 5. Men are spoken of as purified in their regeneration. 1 Pet. i. 22, 23. See also 1 John ii. 29, and iii. 1, 2. And it appears that every man, in his first or natural state, is a *sinner;* for otherwise he would then need no *repentance,* no *conversion,* no turning from sin to God. And it appears, that every man in his original state has a *heart of stone;* for thus the Scripture calls that *old heart,* which is taken away, when a *new heart* and *new spirit* is given. Ezek. xi. 19, and xxxvi. 26. And it appears, that man's nature, as in his native state, is *corrupt according to the deceitful lusts,* and of its own motion exerts itself in nothing but *wicked deeds.* For thus the Scripture characterizes the *old man,* which is put off, when men are renewed in the spirit of their minds, and put on the *new man,* Eph. iv. 22, 23, 24—Col. iii. 8, 9, 10. In a word, it appears, that man's nature, as in its native state, is a *body of sin,* which must *be destroyed,* must *die, be buried,* and *never rise more.* For thus the *old man* is represented, which is *crucified,* when men are the subjects of a spiritual *resurrection,* Rom. vi. 4, 5, 6. Such a nature, such a body of sin as this, is put off in the spiritual *renovation,* wherein we put on the *new man,* and are the subjects of the spiritual *circumcision.* Eph. iv. 21, 22, 23.

It must now be left with the reader to judge for himself, whether what the Scripture teaches of the *application* of Christ's redemption, and the *change* of state and nature necessary to true and final happiness, does not afford clear and abundant evidence to the truth of the doctrine of Original Sin.

PART IV.

CONTAINING ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS.

CHAPTER I.

Concerning that Objection, That to suppose men's being born in sin, without their choice, or any previous act of their own, is to suppose what is inconsistent with the nature of sin.

Some of the objections made against the doctrine of Original Sin, which have reference to particular arguments used in defence of it, have been already considered in the handling of those arguments. What I shall therefore now consider, are such objections as I have not yet had occasion to take any special notice of.

There is no argument Dr. Taylor insists more upon, than that which is taken from the Arminian and Pelagian notion of freedom of will, consisting in the will's *self-determination*, as necessary to the being of moral good or evil. He often urges, that if we come into the world infected with sinful and depraved dispositions, then *sin* must be *natural* to us; and if natural then *necessary*; and if necessary, then *no* sin, nor any thing we are blamable for, or that can in any respect be our fault, being what we cannot help: and he urges, that sin must proceed from our own *choice*, &c.*

Here I would observe in general, that the forementioned notion of Freedom of Will, as essential to moral agency, and necessary to the very existence of virtue and sin, seems to be a grand favorite point with Pelagians and Arminians, and all divines of such characters, in their controversies with the orthodox. There is no one thing more fundamental in their schemes of religion; on the determination of this one leading point depends the issue of almost all controversies we have with such divines. Nevertheless, it seems a *needless* task for me particularly to consider that matter in this place; having already largely discussed it, with all the main grounds of this notion, and the arguments used to defend it, in a late book on this subject, to which I ask leave to refer the reader. It is very necessary, that the modern prevailing doctrine concerning this point, should be well understood, and therefore thoroughly considered and examined: for without it there is no hope of putting an end to the controversy about Original Sin, and innumerable other controversies that subsist, about many of the main points of religion. I stand ready to confess to the forementioned modern divines, if they can maintain their peculiar notion of *freedom*, consisting in the *self-determining power of the will*, as necessary to *moral agency*, and can thoroughly establish it in opposition to the arguments lying against it, then they have an impregnable castle, to which they may repair, and remain invincible, in all the controversies they have with the reformed divines, concerning Original Sin, the sovereignty of grace, election, redemption, conversion, the efficacious operation of the Holy Spirit, the nature of saving faith, per-

* Pages 125, 128, 129, 130, 166, 18[illegible] 88, 190, 200, 245, 246, 253, 259, 63, 64, 161, *S.*, and other places.

severance of the saints, and other principles of the like kind. However, at the same time I think this same thing will be as strong a fortress for the *deists*, in common with them, as the great doctrines, subverted by their notion of *freedom*, are so plainly and abundantly taught in the Scripture. But I am under no apprehension of any danger, the cause of Christianity, or the religion of the reformed is in, from any possibility of *that notion's* being ever established, or of its being ever evinced that there is not proper, perfect, and manifold *demonstration* lying against it. But as I said, it would be needless for me to enter into a particular disquisition of this point here; from which I shall easily be excused by any reader who is willing to give himself the trouble of consulting what I have already written: and as to others, probably they will scarce be at the pains of reading the present discourse; or at least would not, if it should be enlarged by a full consideration of that controversy.

I shall at this time therefore only take notice of some gross *inconsistencies* that Dr. Taylor has been guilty of, in his handling this objection against the doctrine or Original Sin.

In places which have been cited, he says, that "Sin must proceed from our own choice: and that if it does not, it being necessary to us, it cannot be sin, it cannot be our fault, or what we are to blame for:" and therefore all our sin must be chargeable on our choice, which is the *cause* of sin: for he says, "The cause of every effect is alone chargeable with the effect it produceth, and which proceedeth from it."* Now here are implied several gross contradictions. He greatly insists that nothing can be *sinful*, or have the nature of sin, but what proceeds from our *choice*. Nevertheless he says, "Not the *effect*, but the *cause* alone is chargeable with *blame*." Therefore the *choice*, which is the *cause*, is *alone* blamable, or has the nature of sin; and not the *effect* of that choice. Thus nothing can be sinful, but the effect of choice; and yet the effect of choice never can be sinful, but only the *cause*, which alone is chargeable with all the blame.

Again, the choice which chooses and produces sin, or from which sin proceeds, is itself sinful. Not only is this implied in his saying, "the *cause* alone is chargeable with all the *blame*," but he expressly speaks of the choice as *faulty*,† and calls that choice *wicked*, from which depravity and corruption *proceeds*.‡ Now if the choice itself be *sin*, and there be no sin but what proceeds from a sinful choice, then the sinful choice must proceed from another antecedent choice; it must be chosen by a foregoing act of will, determining itself to that sinful choice, that so it may have that which he speaks of as absolutely essential to the nature of *sin*, namely, *that it proceeds from our choice*, and does not happen to us necessarily. But if the sinful choice itself proceeds from a foregoing choice, then also that foregoing choice must be sinful; it being the *cause of sin*, and so alone chargeable with the *blame*. Yet if that foregoing choice be sinful, then neither must *that* happen to us necessarily, but must likewise proceed from choice, another act of choice preceding that: for we must remember, that "nothing is sinful but what proceeds from our *choice*." And then, for the same reason, even this prior choice, last mentioned, must also be sinful, being chargeable with all the blame of that consequent evil choice, which was its effect. And so we must go back till we come to the very *first* volition, the prime or original act of choice in the whole chain. And *this*, to be sure, must be a *sinful* choice, because this is the *origin* or primitive *cause* of all the train of evils which follow; and according to our author, must therefore be "alone

* Page 128. † Page 190. ‡ Page 200. See also page 216.

chargeable with all the blame." And yet so it is, according to him, *this* "cannot be sinful," because it does not "proceed from our own choice," or any foregoing act of our will; it being, by the supposition, the very *first* act of will in the case. And therefore it must be *necessary*, as to us, having no choice of ours to be the cause of it.

In page 232, he says, "Adam's sin was from his own *disobedient will;* and so must every man's sin, and all the sin in the world be, as well as his." By this, it seems, he must have a "disobedient will" before he sins; for the cause must be before the effect: and yet that disobedient will itself is *sinful;* otherwise it could not be called *disobedient*. But the question is, How do men come by the *disobedient will*, this cause of all the sin in the world? It must not come *necessarily*, without men's choice; for if so, it is *not* sin, nor is there any *disobedience* in it. Therefore that disobedient will must also come from a *disobedient* will; and so on, *in infinitum*. Otherwise it must be supposed, that there is some *sin* in the world, which does not come from a *disobedient will;* contrary to our author's dogmatical assertions.

In page 166, *S.*, he says, "*Adam could not sin without a sinful inclination.*" Here he calls that inclination itself *sinful*, which is the principle from whence sinful acts proceed; as elsewhere he speaks of the *disobedient will* from whence all sin comes; and he allows,* that "the *law* reaches to all the *latent principles* of sin;" meaning plainly, that it *forbids*, and *threatens punishment* for, those latent principles. Now these latent principles of sin, these sinful inclinations, without which, according to our author, there can be no sinful act, cannot all proceed from a *sinful choice;* because that would imply great contradiction. For, by the supposition, they are the principles from whence a sinful choice comes, and whence all sinful acts of will proceed; and there can be no sinful act without them. So that the *first* latent principles and inclinations, from whence all sinful acts proceed, are *sinful;* and yet they are *not sinful*, because they do not proceed from a *wicked choice*, without which, according to him, "nothing can be sinful."

Dr. Taylor, speaking of that proposition of the Assembly of Divines, wherein they assert, that *Man is by nature utterly corrupt*, &c.,† thinks himself well warranted by the supposed great evidence of these his contradictory notions, to say, "Therefore sin is not natural to us; and therefore I shall not scruple to say, this proposition in the Assembly of Divines is *false*." But it may be worthy to be considered, whether it would not have greatly become him, before he had clothed himself with so much assurance, and proceeded, on the foundation of these his notions, so magisterially to charge the Assembly's proposition with *falsehood*, to have taken care that his own propositions, which he has set in opposition to them, should be a little more *consistent;* that he might not have contradicted *himself*, while contradicting them; lest some impartial judges, observing his inconsistence, should think they had warrant to declare with equal assurance, that "They shall not scruple to say, Dr. Taylor's doctrine is *false*."

* Contents of Rom. chap. viii., in Notes on the Epistle. † Page 125.

CHAPTER II.

Concerning that objection against the doctrine of native corruption, That to suppose men receive their first existence in sin, is to make him who is the author of their being, the author of their depravity.

One argument against men's being supposed to be born with sinful depravity, which Dr. Taylor greatly insists upon, is, "That this does in effect charge him, who is *the author of our nature, who formed us in the womb*, with being the *author of a sinful corruption of nature;* and that it is *highly injurious* to the God of our nature, *whose hands have formed and fashioned us*, to believe *our nature* to be *originally corrupted*, and *that in the* worst *sense of corruption*."*

With respect to this, I would observe in the first place, that this writer, in his handling this grand objection, supposes something to *belong* to the doctrine objected against, as maintained by the divines whom he is opposing, which does *not* belong to it, nor does follow from it: as particularly, he supposes the doctrine of Original Sin to imply, that nature must be corrupted by some *positive influence;* "something, by some means or other, *infused* into the human nature; some *quality* or other, not from the *choice* of our minds, but like a *taint, tincture*, or *infection*, altering the natural constitution, faculties, and dispositions of our souls.† That sin and evil dispositions are *implanted* in the fœtus in the womb."‡ Whereas truly our doctrine neither implies nor infers any such thing. In order to account for a sinful corruption of nature, yea, a total native depravity of the heart of man, there is not the least need of supposing any evil quality, *infused, implanted*, or *wrought* into the nature of man, by any *positive* cause, or influence whatsoever, either from God, or the creature; or of supposing, that man is conceived and born with a *fountain of evil* in his heart, such as is any thing properly *positive*. I think, a little attention to the nature of things will be sufficient to satisfy any impartial, considerate inquirer, that the absence of positive good principles, and so the withholding of a special divine influence to impart and maintain those good principles, leaving the common natural principles of self-love, natural appetite, &c. (which were in man in innocence), leaving these, I say to themselves, without the government of superior divine principles, will certainly be followed with the corruption, yea, the total corruption of the heart, without occasion for any positive influence at all: and, that it was thus indeed that corruption of nature came on Adam, immediately on his fall, and comes on all his posterity, as sinning in him, and falling with him.

The case with man was plainly this: when God made man at first, he implanted in him two kinds of principles There was an *inferior* kind, which may be called *natural*, being the principles of mere human nature; such as self-love, with those natural appetites and passions, which belong to the *nature of man*, in which his love to his own liberty, honor, and pleasure, were exercised: these, when alone, and left to themselves, are what the Scriptures sometimes call *flesh*. Besides these, there were *superior* principles, that were spiritual, holy, and divine, summarily comprehended in divine love; wherein con-

* Pages 137, 187, 188, 189, 256, 258, 260, 143, S., and other places. † Page 187. ‡ Pages 146 148 149, S., and the like in many other places.

sisted the spiritual image of God, and man's righteousness and true holiness; which are called in Scripture the *divine nature*. These principles may, in some sense, be called *supernatural*,* being (however concreated or connate, yet) such as are above those principles that are essentially implied in, or necessarily resulting from, and inseparably connected with, *mere human nature*; and being such as immediately depend on man's union and communion with God, or divine communications and influences of God's Spirit: which, though withdrawn, and man's nature forsaken of these principles, human nature would be human nature still; man's nature, as such, being entire, without these divine *principles*, which the Scripture sometimes calls *spirit*, in contradistinction to *flesh*. These superior principles were given to possess the throne, and maintain an absolute dominion in the heart: the other to be wholly subordinate and subservient. And while things continued thus, all things were in excellent order, peace, and beautiful harmony, and in their proper and perfect state.

These divine principles thus reigning, were the dignity, life, happiness, and glory of man's nature. When man sinned, and broke God's covenant, and fell under his curse, these superior principles left his heart: for indeed God then left him; that communion with God, on which these principles depended, entirely ceased; the Holy Spirit, that divine inhabitant, forsook the house. Because it would have been utterly improper in itself, and inconsistent with the covenant and constitution God had established, that God should still maintain communion with man, and continue, by his friendly, gracious, vital influences, to dwell with him and in him, after he was become a rebel, and had incurred God's wrath and curse. Therefore immediately the superior divine principles wholly ceased; so light ceases in a room when the candle is withdrawn; and thus man was left in a state of darkness, woful corruption and ruin; nothing but flesh without spirit. The inferior principles of self-love, and natural appetite, which were given only to serve, being alone, and left to themselves, *of course* became reigning principles; having no superior principles to regulate or control them, they became absolute masters of the heart. The immediate consequence of which was a *fatal catastrophe*, a turning of all things upside down, and the succession of a state of the most odious and dreadful confusion. Man did immediately set up *himself*, and the objects of his private affections and appetites, as supreme; and so they took the place of *God*. These inferior principles are like *fire* in a house; which we say is a good servant, but a bad master; very useful while kept in its place, but if left to take possession of the whole house, soon brings all to destruction. Man's love to his own honor, separate interest, and private pleasure, which before was wholly subordinate unto love to God, and regard to his authority and glory, now disposes and impels him to pursue those objects, without regard to God's honor or law; because there is no true regard to these divine things left in him. In consequence of which, he seeks those objects as much when against God's honor and law, as when agreeable to them. And God, still continuing strictly to require supreme regard to himself, and forbidding all gratifications of these inferior passions, but only in

* To prevent all cavils, the reader is desired particularly to observe, in what sense I here use the words *natural* and *supernatural*: not as epithets of distinction between that which is concreated or connate, and that which is extraordinarily introduced afterwards, besides the first state of things, or the order established originally, beginning when man's nature began; but as distinguishing between what belongs to, or flows from, that nature which man has, merely as man, and those things which are above this, by which one is denominated, not only a man, but a truly virtuous, holy, and spiritual man; which, though they began in Adam, as soon as humanity began, and are necessary to the perfection and well being of the human nature, yet are not essential to the constitution of it, or necessary to its being: inasmuch as one may have every thing needful to his being man, exclusively of them. If in thus using the words, *natural* and *supernatural*, I use them in an uncommon sense, it is not from any affectation of singularity but for want of other terms more aptly to express my meaning.

perfect subordination to the ends, and agreeableness to the rules and limits, which his holiness, honor, and law prescribe, hence immediately arises *enmity* in the heart, now wholly under the power of self-love; and nothing but *war* ensues, in a constant course, against God. As, when a subject has once renounced his lawful sovereign, and set up a pretender in his stead, a state of enmity and war against his rightful king necessarily ensues. It were easy to show, how every lust, and depraved disposition of man's heart would naturally arise from this *privative* original, if here were room for it. Thus it is easy to give an account, how total corruption of heart should follow on man's eating the forbidden fruit, though that was but one act of sin, *without God's putting* any evil into his heart, or *implanting* any bad principle, or *infusing* any corrupt taint, and so becoming the *author* of depravity. Only God's *withdrawing*, as it was highly proper and necessary that he should, from rebel man, being as it were driven away by his abominable wickedness, and men's *natural* principles being *left to themselves*, this is sufficient to account for his becoming entirely corrupt, and bent on sinning against God.

And as Adam's nature became corrupt without God's implanting or infusing any evil thing into his nature; so does the nature of his posterity. God dealing with Adam as the head of his posterity (as has been shown) and treating them as one, he deals with his posterity as having *all sinned in him*. And therefore, as God withdrew spiritual communion, and his vital, gracious influence from the common head, so he withholds the same from all the members, as they come into existence; whereby they come into the world mere *flesh*, and entirely under the government of natural and inferior principles; and so become wholly corrupt, as Adam did.

Now, for God so far to have the disposal of this affair, as to *withhold* those influences without which *nature* will be *corrupt*, is not to be the *author of sin*. But, concerning this, I must refer the reader to what I have said of it in my discourse on the *freedom of the will*.* Though, besides what I have there said, I may here observe, that if for God so far to order and dispose the being of sin, as to *permit* it, by withholding the gracious influences necessary to prevent it, is for him to be the author of sin, then some things which Dr. Taylor himself lays down, will equally be attended with this very consequence. For, from time to time, he speaks of God's giving men up to the vilest lusts and affections by permitting, or leaving them.† Now, if the *continuance of sin*, and its increase and prevalence, may be in consequence of God's disposal, by his withholding that grace that is needful, under such circumstances, to prevent it, without God's being the author of that *continuance* and prevalence of sin; then, by parity of reason, may the *being of sin*, in the race of Adam, be in consequence of God's disposal, by his withholding that grace, that is needful to prevent it, without his being the author of that *being of sin*.

If it here should be said, that God is not the author of sin, in giving men up to sin, who have already made themselves sinful, because when men have once made themselves sinful, their continuing so, and sin's prevailing in them, and becoming more and more habitual, will follow *in a course of nature*: I answer, Let that be remembered, which this writer so greatly urges in opposition to them that suppose original corruption comes in a course of nature, viz., *That the course of nature is nothing without God*. He utterly rejects the notion of the "*course of nature's* being a proper active cause, which will work, and go on by itself, *without God*, if he lets or permits it." But affirms,‡ "That the course of nature,

* Part iv § 9, p. 354, &c. † Key, § 398, Note; and Paraph. on Rom. i. 24, 26. ‡ Page 134, S. See also with what vehemence this is urged in p. 137, S.

separate from the agency of God, is *no cause*, or *nothing ;* and that the course of nature should continue itself, or go on to operate by itself, any more than at first produce itself, is *absolutely impossible.*" These strong expressions are his. Therefore, to explain the continuance of the habits of sin in the same person, when once introduced, yea, to explain the very being of any such habits, in consequence of repeated acts, our author must have recourse to those same principles, which he rejects as absurd to the utmost degree, when alleged to explain the corruption of nature in the posterity of Adam. For, that habits, either good or bad, should *continue*, after being once established, or that habits should be settled and have existence in consequence of repeated acts, can be owing only to a *course of nature*, and those *laws of nature* which God has established.

That the posterity of Adam should be born without holiness, and so with a depraved nature, comes to pass as much by the *established course of nature*, as the continuance of a corrupt disposition in a particular person, after he once has it; or as much as Adam's continuing unholy and corrupt, after he had once lost his holiness. For Adam's posterity are from him, and as it were in him, and belonging to him, according to an *established course of nature*, as much as the branches of a tree are, according to a *course of nature*, from the tree, in the tree, and belonging to the tree; or (to make use of the comparison which Dr Taylor himself chooses and makes use of from time to time, as proper to illustrate the matter*) *just as the acorn is derived from the oak.* And I think the acorn is as much derived from the oak, according to the *course of nature*, as the buds and branches. It is true, that God, by his own almighty power creates the *soul* of the infant; and it is also true, as Dr. Taylor often insists, that God, by his immediate power, forms and fashions the *body* of the infant in the womb; yet he does both according to that *course of nature*, which he has been pleased to establish. The course of nature is demonstrated, by late improvements in philosophy, to be indeed what our author himself says it is, viz., nothing but the established order of the agency and operation of the author of nature. And though there be the immediate agency of God in bringing the soul into existence in generation, yet it is done according to the method and order established by the author of nature, as much as his producing the bud, or the acorn of the oak; and as much as his continuing a particular person in being, after he once has existence. God's immediate agency in bringing the soul of a child into being, is as much according to an *established* order, as his immediate agency in any of the works of nature whatsoever. It is agreeable to the established order of nature, that the good qualities wanting in the *tree*, should also be wanting in the *branches* and *fruit*. It is agreeable to the order of nature, that when a particular person is without good moral qualities in his heart, he should continue without them till some new cause or efficiency produces them; and it is as much agreeable to an established course and order of nature, that since Adam, the head of the race of mankind, the root of that great tree with many branches springing from it, was deprived of original righteousness, the branches should come forth without it. Or if any dislike the word *nature*, as used in this last case, and instead of it choose to call it a *constitution* or *established order* of successive events, the alteration of the name will not in the least alter the state of the present argument. Where the name, *nature*, is allowed without dispute, no more is meant than an established method and order of events, settled and limited by divine wisdom.

If any should object to this, that if the want of original righteousness be thus

* Pages 146, 187.

according to an established course of *nature*, then why are not principles of holiness, when restored by divine *grace*, also communicated to *posterity?* I answer, the divine laws and establishments of the author of *nature*, are precisely settled by him as he pleaseth, and limited by his wisdom. *Grace* is introduced among the race of mankind by a *new* establishment; not on the foot of the original establishment of God, as the head of the natural world, and author of the first creation; but by a constitution of a vastly higher kind; wherein Christ is made the *root* of the tree, whose branches are his spiritual *seed*, and he is the *head* of the new creation; of which I need not stand now to speak particularly

But here I desire it may be noted, that I do not suppose the natural depravity of the posterity of Adam is owing to the course of nature only; it is also owing to the just *judgment* of God. But yet, I think it is as truly and in the same manner owing to the course of *nature*, that Adam's posterity come into the world without original righteousness, as that Adam continued without it, after he had once lost is That Adam continued destitute of holiness, when he had lost it, and would always have so continued, had it not been restored by a Redeemer, was not only a *natural* consequence, according to the course of things established by God as the Author of Nature; but it was also a *penal* consequence, or a punishment of his sin. God, in righteous *judgment*, continued to absent himself from Adam after he became a rebel; and withheld from him now those influences of the Holy Spirit, which he before had. And just thus I suppose it to be with every natural branch of mankind: all are looked upon as *sinning* in and with their common root; and God righteously withholds special influences and spiritual communications from all, for this sin. But of the manner and order of these things, more may be said in the next chapter.

On the whole, this grand objection against the doctrine of men's being born corrupt, that it makes him who *gave us our being*, to be the cause of the *being of corruption*, can have no more force in it, than a like argument has to prove, that if men, by a course of nature, *continue* wicked, or remain without goodness, after they have by vicious acts contracted vicious habits, and so made themselves wicked, it makes him, who is the cause of their continuance in being, and the cause of the continuance of the course of nature, to be the cause of their continued wickedness. Dr. Taylor says,* "God would not *make* any thing that is *hateful* to him; because, by the very terms, he would *hate to make* such a thing." But if this be good arguing in the case to which it is applied, may I not as well say, God *would not* continue a thing in being, that is *hateful* to him, because, by the very *terms*, he would *hate to continue* such a thing in being? I think the very terms do as much (and no more) infer one of these propositions, as the other. In like manner the rest that he says on that head may be shown to be unreasonable, by only substituting the word, *continue*, in the place of *make* and *propagate*. I may fairly imitate his way of reasoning thus: "To say, God *continues* us according to his own original decree, or law of *continuation*, which obliges him to *continue* us in a manner he abhors, is really to make bad worse: for it is supposing him to be defective in wisdom, or by his own decree or law to lay such a constraint upon his own actions, that he cannot do what he would, but is continually doing what he would not, what he hates to do, and what he condemns in *us*, viz., *continuing* us sinful, when he condemns us for *continuing* ourselves sinful." If the reasoning be *weak* in the one case, it is no less so in the other.

If any shall still insist, that there is a *difference* between God's so disposing

* Page 136, 5.

things as that depravity of heart shall be *continued*, according to the settled course of nature, in the same person, who has by his own fault introduced it; and his so disposing as that men, according to a course of nature, should be *born* with depravity, in consequence of Adam's introducing sin, by his act which we had no concern in, and cannot be justly charged with. On this I would observe, that it is quite going off the objection, which we have been upon, from God's agency, and flying to another. It is then no longer insisted on, that *simply* for him, from whose agency the course of nature and our existence derive, so to dispose things, as that we should have existence in a corrupt state, is for him to be the author of sin; but the plea now advanced is, that it is not proper and just for such an agent so to dispose, *in this case*, and only in consequence of Adam's sin; it not being just to charge Adam's sin to his posterity. And this matter shall be particularly considered, in answer to the next objection, to which I now proceed.

CHAPTER III.

That great Objection against the Imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, considered, that such Imputation is unjust and unreasonable, inasmuch as Adam and his posterity are not one and the same. With a brief reflection subjoined of what some have supposed, of God's imputing the guilt of Adam's sin to his Posterity, but in an infinitely less degree, than to Adam himself.

That we may proceed with the greater clearness in considering the main objections against supposing the guilt of Adam's sin to be imputed to his posterity; I would premise some observations with a view to the right *stating* of the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's first sin, and then show the *reasonableness* of this doctrine, in opposition to the great clamor raised against it on this head.

I think it would go far towards directing us to the more clear and distinct conceiving and right stating of this affair, were we steadily to bear this in mind: that God, in each step of his proceeding with Adam, in relation to the covenant or constitution established with him, looked on his posterity as being *one with him*. (The propriety of his looking upon them so, I shall speak to afterwards.) And though he dealt more immediately with Adam, yet it was as the *head* of the whole body, and the *root* of the whole tree; and in his proceedings with him, he dealt with all the branches, as if they had been then existing in their root.

From which it will follow, that both guilt, or exposedness to punishment, and also depravity of heart, came upon Adam's posterity just as they came upon him, as much as if he and they had all coexisted, like a tree with many branches; allowing only for the difference necessarily resulting from the place Adam stood in, as head or root of the whole, and being first and most immediately dealt with, and most immediately acting and suffering. Otherwise, it is as if, in every step of proceeding, every alteration in the root had been attended, at the same instant, with the same steps and alterations throughout the whole tree, in each individual branch. I think this will naturally follow on the supposition of there being a constituted *oneness* or *identity* of Adam and his posterity in this affair.

Therefore I am humbly of opinion, that if any have supposed the children of Adam to come into the world with a *double guilt*, one the guilt of Adam's sin, another the guilt arising from their having a corrupt heart, they have not so

well conceived of the matter. The *guilt* a man has upon his soul at his first existence, is one and simple, viz., the guilt of the original apostasy, the guilt of the sin by which the species first rebelled against God. This, and the guilt arising from the first corruption or depraved disposition of the heart, are not to be looked upon as *two* things, *distinctly* imputed and charged upon men in the sight of God. Indeed the guilt that arises from the corruption of the heart, as it remains a confirmed principle, and appears in its consequent operations, is a *distinct*, and *additional* guilt: but the guilt arising from the first existing of a depraved disposition in Adam's posterity, I apprehend, is *not* distinct from their guilt of Adam's first sin. For so it was not in Adam himself. The first evil disposition or inclination of the heart of Adam to sin, was not properly distinct from his first act of sin, but was included in it. The external act he committed was no otherwise his, than as his heart was in it, or as that action proceeded from the wicked inclination of his heart. Nor was the guilt he had *double*, as for two distinct sins: one, the wickedness of his heart and will in that affair; another, the wickedness of the external act, caused by his heart. His guilt was all truly from the act of his inward man; exclusive of which the motions of his body were no more than the motions of any lifeless instrument. His sin consisted in wickedness of heart, fully sufficient *for*, and entirely amounting *to*, all that appeared in the act he committed.

The depraved disposition of Adam's heart is to be considered two ways. (1.) As the first rising of an evil inclination in his heart, exerted in his first act of sin, and the ground of the complete transgression. (2.) An evil disposition of heart continuing afterwards, as a confirmed principle that came by God's forsaking him; which was a *punishment* of his first transgression. This confirmed corruption, by its remaining and continued operation, brought additional guilt on his soul.

And in like manner, depravity of heart is to be considered two ways in Adam's posterity. The *first existing* of a corrupt disposition in their hearts, is not to be looked upon as sin belonging to them, *distinct* from their participation of Adam's first sin: it is as it were the *extended pollution* of that sin, through the whole tree, by virtue of the constituted *union* of the branches with the root; or the *inherence* of the sin of that head of the species in the members, in the consent and concurrence of the hearts of the members with the head in that first act. (Which may be, without God's being the author of sin, about which I have spoken in the former chapter.) But the depravity of nature remaining an *established principle* in the heart of a child of Adam, and as exhibited in after operations, is a *consequence* and *punishment* of the first apostasy thus participated, and brings new guilt. The first being of an evil disposition in the heart of a child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to *approve* of the sin of his first father, as fully as he himself approved of it when he committed it, or so far as to imply a full and perfect *consent* of heart to it, I think, is not to be looked upon as a consequence of the imputation of that first sin, any more than the full consent of Adam's own heart, in the act of sinning; which was not consequent on the imputation of his sin to himself, but rather *prior* to it in the order of nature. Indeed the derivation of the evil disposition to the hearts of Adam's posterity, or rather the *coexistence* of the evil disposition, implied in Adam's first rebellion, in the *root* and *branches*, is a consequence of the *union* that the wise author of the world has established between Adam and his posterity; but not properly a *consequence* of the *imputation* of his sin; nay, rather *antecedent* to it, as it was in Adam himself. The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both the consequences of that established union; but yet in such order, that the evil dis-

position is *first*, and the charge of guilt *consequent*, as it was in the case of Adam himself.*

The first existence of an evil disposition of heart, amounting to a full consent to Adam's sin, no more infers God's being the author of that evil disposition in the *child*, than in the *father*. The first arising or existing of that evil disposition in the heart of Adam, was by God's *permission;* who could have prevented it, if he had pleased, by *giving* such influences of his Spirit, as would have been absolutely effectual to hinder it; which, it is plain in fact, he did *withhold:* and whatever mystery may be supposed in the affair, yet no Christian will presume to say, it was not in perfect consistence with God's *holiness* and *righteousness*, notwithstanding Adam had been guilty of no offence before. So root and branches being one, according to God's wise constitution, the case in fact is, that by virtue of this oneness answerable changes or effects through all the *branches* coexist with the changes in the *root:* consequently an evil disposition exists in the hearts of Adam's posterity, equivalent to that which was exerted in his own heart, when he ate the forbidden fruit. Which God has no hand in, any otherwise, than in not exerting such an influence, as might be effectual to prevent it; as appears by what was observed in the former chapter.

But now the grand objection is against the *reasonableness* of such a *constitution*, by which Adam and his posterity should be looked upon as *one*, and dealt with accordingly, in an affair of such infinite consequence; so that if Adam sinned, they must necessarily be made *sinners* by his disobedience, and come into existence with the same *depravity* of disposition, and be looked upon and treated as though they were partakers with Adam in his act of sin. I have not room here to rehearse all Dr. Taylor's vehement exclamations against the reasonableness and justice of this. The reader may at his leisure consult his book,

* My meaning, in the whole of what has been here said, may be illustrated thus: let us suppose, that Adam and all his posterity had coexisted, and that his posterity had been, through a law of nature established by the Creator, united to him, something as the branches of a tree are united to the root, or the members of the body to the head, so as to constitute as it were one complex person, or one moral whole: so that by the law of union, there should have been a communion and coexistence in acts and affections; all jointly participating, and all concurring, as one whole, in the disposition and action of the head; as we see in the body natural, the whole body is affected as the head is affected; and the whole body concurs when the head acts. Now, in this case, the hearts of all the branches of mankind, by the constitution of nature and law of union, would have been affected just as the heart of Adam, their common root, was affected. When the heart of the root, by a full disposition, committed the first sin, the hearts of all the branches would have concurred; and when the root, in consequence of this, became guilty, so would all the branches; and when the heart of the root, as a punishment of the sin committed, was forsaken of God, in like manner would it have fared with all the branches; and when the heart of the root, in consequence of this, was confirmed in permanent depravity, the case would have been the same with all the branches; and as new guilt on the soul of Adam would have been consequent on this, so also would it have been with his moral branches. And thus all things, with relation to evil disposition, guilt, pollution and depravity, would exist, in the same order and dependence, in each branch, as in the root. Now, difference of the time of existence does not at all hinder things succeeding in the same order, any more than difference of place in a coexistence of time.

Here may be worthy to be observed, as in several respects to the present purpose, some things that are said by Stapferus, an eminent divine of Zurich, in Switzerland, in his Theologia Polemica, published about fourteen years ago; in English as follows. "Seeing all Adam's posterity are derived from their first parent, as their root, the whole of the human kind, with its root, may be considered as constituting but one whole, or one mass; so as not to be properly a thing distinct from its root; the posterity not differing from it, any otherwise than the branches from the tree. From which it easily appears, how that when the root sinned, all that which is derived from it, and with it constitutes but one whole, may be looked upon as also sinning; seeing it is not distinct from the root, but is one with it."—Tom. i. cap. 3, § 856, 57.

"It is objected against the imputation of Adam's sin, that we never committed the same sin with Adam, neither in number nor in kind. I answer, we should distinguish here between the physical act itself, which Adam committed, and the morality of the action, and consent to it. If we have respect only to the external act, to be sure it must be confessed, that Adam's posterity did not put forth their hands to the forbidden fruit: in which sense, that act of transgression, and that fall of Adam cannot be physically one with the sin of his posterity. But if we consider the morality of the action, and what consent there is to it, it is altogether to be maintained, that his posterity committed the same sin, both in number and in kind, inasmuch as they are to be looked upon as consenting to it. For where there is consent to a sin, there the same sin is committed. Seeing therefore that Adam, with all his posterity, constitute but one moral

and see them in the places referred to below.* Whatever black colors and frightful representations are employed on this occasion, all may be summed up in this, That Adam and his posterity are *not one*, but entirely *distinct agents*. But with respect to this mighty outcry made against the *reasonableness* of any such *constitution*, by which God is supposed to treat Adam and his posterity as *one*, I would make the following observations.

I. It signifies nothing to exclaim against plain *fact*. Such is the *fact*, most evident and acknowledged *fact*, with respect to the state of all mankind, without exception of one individual among all the natural descendants of Adam, as makes it apparent, that God actually deals with Adam and his posterity as *one*, in the affair of his apostasy, and its infinitely terrible consequences. It has been demonstrated, and shown to be in effect plainly acknowledged, that every individual of mankind comes into the world in such circumstances, as that there is no hope or possibility of any other than their violating God's holy law (if they ever live to act at all as moral agents), and being thereby justly exposed to eternal ruin.† And it is thus by God's ordering and disposing of things. And God either thus deals with mankind, because he looks upon them as *one* with their first father, and so treats them as *sinful* and *guilty* by his apostasy; or (which will not mend the matter) he, *without* viewing them as at all concerned in that affair, but as in every respect perfectly *innocent*, does nevertheless subject them to this infinitely dreadful calamity. Adam, by his sin, was exposed to the *calamities and sorrows of this life*, to *temporal death and eternal ruin*; as is confessed. And it is also in effect confessed, that all his posterity come into the world in such a state, as that the certain consequence is their being *exposed*, and *justly* so, to the *sorrows of this life*, to *temporal death and eternal ruin*, unless saved by grace. So that we see, God in fact deals with them together, or as *one*. If God orders the consequences of Adam's

person, and are united in the same covenant, and are transgressors of the same law, they are also to be looked upon as having, in a moral estimation, committed the same transgression of the law, both in number and in kind. Therefore this reasoning avails nothing against the righteous imputation of the sin of Adam to all mankind, or to the whole moral person that is consenting to it. And for the reason mentioned, we may rather argue thus: the sin of the posterity, on account of their consent, and the moral view in which they are to be taken, is the same with the sin of Adam, not only in kind, but in number; therefore the sin of Adam is rightfully imputed to his posterity."—Id. Tom. iv cap. 16, § 60, 61.

"The imputation of Adam's first sin consists in nothing else than this, that his posterity are viewed as in the same place with their father, and are like him. But seeing, agreeable to what we have already proved, God might, according to his own righteous judgment, which was founded on his most righteous law, give Adam a posterity that were *like himself*; and indeed it could not be otherwise, according to the very laws of nature; therefore he might also in righteous judgment impute Adam's sin to them; inasmuch as to give Adam a posterity *like himself*, and to *impute* his sin to them, is one and the same thing. And therefore if the former be not contrary to the divine perfections, so neither is the latter. Our adversaries contend with us chiefly on this account. That according to our doctrine of Original Sin, such an *imputation* of the first sin is maintained, whereby God, without any regard to universal native *corruption*, esteems all Adam's posterity as *guilty*, and holds them as liable to condemnation, *purely* on account of that sinful act of their first parent; so that they, without any respect had to *their own sin*, and so, as *innocent* in themselves, are destined to eternal punishment. I have therefore ever been careful to show, that they so injuriously suppose those things to be *separated*, in our doctrine, which are *by no means* to be separate! The whole of the controversy they have with us about this matter, evidently arises from this. That they suppose the *mediate* and the *immediate* imputation are distinguished one from the other, not only in the manner of conception, but in reality. And so indeed they consider imputation only as *immediate*; and abstractly from the *mediate*; when yet our divines suppose, that neither ought to be considered *separately* from the other. Therefore I choose not to use any such distinction, or to suppose any such thing, in what I have said on the subject; but only have endeavored to explain the thing itself, and to reconcile it with the divine attributes. And therefore I have everywhere conjoined both these conceptions concerning the imputation of the first sin, as inseparable; and judged, that one ought never to be considered without the other. While I have been writing this note, I consulted all the systems of divinity, which I have by me, that I might see what was the true and genuine opinion of our chief divines in this affair; and I found that they were of the same mind with me; namely, That these two kinds of imputation are by no means to be separated, or to be considered abstractly one from the other, but that one does involve the other."—He there particularly cites those two famous reformed divines, Vitringa and Lampius.—Tom iv Cap. 17, § 78.

* Pages 13, 150, 151, 156, 201, 108, 109, 111, 8. † Part 1, Chap. 1, the three first Sections.

sin, with regard to his posterity's welfare, even in those things which are most important, and which do in the highest degree concern their eternal interest, to be the *same* with the consequences to Adam himself, then he treats Adam and his posterity as *one* in that affair. Hence, however the matter be attended with difficulty, *fact* obliges us to *get over* the difficulty, either by finding out some solution, or by shutting our mouths, and acknowledging the weakness and scantiness of our understandings; as we must in innumerable other cases, where apparent and undeniable *fact*, in God's works of creation and providence, is attended with events and circumstances, the *manner* and *reason* of which are difficult to our understandings. But to proceed:

II. We will consider the *difficulties* themselves, insisted on in the objections of our opposers. They may be reduced to these two: *First*, That such a constitution is *injurious* to Adam's posterity. *Secondly*, That it is altogether *improper*, as it implies *falsehood*, viewing and treating those as one which indeed are not one, but entirely *distinct*.

First Difficulty. That the appointing Adam to stand, in this great affair, as the moral *head* of his posterity, and so treating them as one with him, as standing or falling with him, is *injurious* to them, and tends to their hurt. To which I answer, it is demonstrably *otherwise*; that such a constitution was so far from being *injurious* and hurtful to Adam's posterity, or tending to their calamity, any more than if every one had been appointed to stand for himself personally, that it was, in itself considered, very much of a *contrary* tendency, and was attended with a more eligible *probability* of a *happy* issue than the latter would have been: and so is a constitution truly expressing the *goodness* of its author. For, here the following things are to be considered.

1. It is reasonable to suppose, that Adam was *as likely*, on account of his capacity and natural talents, to *persevere* in obedience, as his posterity (taking one with another), if they had all been put on the trial singly for themselves. And supposing that there was a constituted union or oneness of him and his posterity, and that he stood as a public person, or common head, all by this constitution would have been as sure to partake of the benefit of his obedience, as of the ill consequence of his disobedience, in case of his fall.

2. There was a *greater tendency* to a happy issue, in such an appointment, than if every one had been appointed to stand for himself; especially on two accounts. (1.) That Adam had *stronger motives to watchfulness* than his posterity, would have had; in that not only his own eternal welfare lay at stake, but also that of all his posterity. (2.) Adam was in a state of complete manhood, when his trial began. It was a constitution very agreeable to the goodness of God, considering the state of mankind, which was to be propagated in the way of generation, that their *first father* should be appointed to stand for all. For by reason of the manner of their coming into existence in a state of *infancy*, and their coming so gradually to mature state, and so remaining for a great while in a state of childhood and comparative imperfection, after they were become moral agents, they would be less fit to stand for themselves, than their first father to stand for them.

If any man, notwithstanding these things, shall say, that for his own part, if the affair had been proposed to him, *he* should have *chosen* to have had his eternal interest trusted in *his own* hands; it is sufficient to answer, that no man's vain opinion of himself, as *more fit* to be trusted than others, alters the true nature and tendency of things, as they demonstrably are in themselves. Nor is it a just objection, that this constitution has in *event* proved for the *hurt* of mankind. For it does not follow that no advantage was given for a *happy*

event, in such an establishment, because it was not such as to make it utterly impossible there should be any other event.

3. The *goodness* of God in such a constitution with *Adam* appears in this: That if there had been no *sovereign, gracious* establishment at all, but God had proceeded only on the foot of mere *justice*, and had gone no further than this required, he might have demanded of Adam and all his posterity, that they should perform *perfect, perpetual obedience*, without ever failing in the least instance, on pain of *eternal death*, and might have made this demand *without* the *promise* of any positive *reward* for their obedience. For perfect obedience is a *debt*, that every one owes to his Creator, and therefore is what his Creator was not obliged to pay him for. None is obliged to pay his debtor, only for discharging his just debt. But such was evidently the constitution with Adam, that an eternal happy life was to be the consequence of his persevering fidelity, to all such as were included within that constitution (of which the *tree of life* was a sign), as well as eternal death to be the consequence of his disobedience.

I come now to consider the

SECOND DIFFICULTY. It being thus manifest that this constitution, by which Adam and his posterity are dealt with as *one*, is not unreasonable upon account of its being *injurious* and *hurtful* to the interest of mankind, the only thing remaining in the objection against such a constitution, is the *impropriety* of it, as implying *falsehood*, and contradiction to the true nature of things; as hereby they are viewed and treated *as one*, who are *not* one, but wholly distinct; and no arbitrary constitution can ever make that to be true, which in itself considered is not true.

This objection, however specious, is really founded on a false hypothesis, and wrong notion of what we call *sameness* or *oneness*, among created things; and the seeming force of the objection arises from ignorance or inconsideration of the *degree*, in which created identity or oneness with past existence, in general, depends on the sovereign constitution and law of the Supreme Author and Disposer of the Universe.

Some things, being most simply considered, are *entirely distinct*, and *very diverse*, which yet are so united by the established law of the Creator, in some respects, and with regard to some purposes and effects, that by virtue of that establishment it is with them as if they were *one*. Thus a *tree*, grown great, and a hundred years old, is *one* plant with the little *sprout*, that first came out of the ground, from whence it grew, and has been continued in constant succession, though it is now so exceeding *diverse*, many thousand times bigger, and of a very different form, and perhaps not one atom the very same; yet God according to an established law of nature, has in a constant succession communicated to it many of the same qualities and most important properties, as if it were *one*. It has been his pleasure to constitute a union in these respects, and for these purposes, naturally leading us to look upon all as *one*. So the *body* of *man* at forty years of age, is *one* with the *infant body* which first came into the world from whence it grew; though now constituted of different substance, and the greater part of the substance probably changed scores (if not hundreds) of times; and though it be now in so many respects exceeding diverse, yet God, according to the course of nature, which he has been pleased to establish, has caused that in a certain method it should communicate with that *infantile* body, in the same life, the same senses, the same features, and many of the same qualities, and in union with the same soul, and so, with regard to these purposes, it is dealt with by him as *one* body. Again, the *body* and *soul* of a man are *one*, in a very different manner, and for different purposes. Considered in

themselves, they are exceeding different beings, of a nature as diverse as can be conceived; and yet by a very peculiar divine constitution or law of nature, which God has been pleased to establish, they are strongly united, and become *one*, in most important respects; a wonderful mutual communication is established; so that both become different parts of the *same man*. But the union and mutual communication they have, has existence, and is entirely regulated and limited, according to the sovereign pleasure of God, and the constitution he has been pleased to establish.

And if we come even to the *personal identity* of created intelligent beings, though this be not allowed to consist wholly in that which Mr. Locke places it in, i. e. *same consciousness;* yet I think it cannot be denied, that this is one thing essential to it. But it is evident that the communication or continuance of the same consciousness and memory to any subject, through successive parts of duration, depends wholly on a divine establishment. There would be no necessity that the remembrance and ideas of what is past should continue to exist, but by an arbitrary constitution of the Creator. If any should here insist that there is no need of having recourse to such a *constitution*, in order to account for the continuance of the *same consciousness*, and should say, that the very *nature* of the soul is such as will sufficiently account for it; and that the soul will retain the ideas and consciousness it once had, according to the *course of nature;* then let it be remembered, who it is gives the soul this nature; and let that be remembered which Dr. Taylor says of the course of nature, before observed; denying, that "the course of nature is a proper active cause, which will work and go on by itself without God, if he lets and permits it;" saying that "the course of nature, separate from the agency of God, is no cause, or nothing;" and affirming that "it is absolutely impossible the course of nature should continue itself, or go on to operate by itself, any more than produce itself;"* and that "God, the Original of all Being, is the *Only Cause* of all natural effects."† Here is worthy also to be observed, what Dr. Turnbull says of the *laws of nature*, in words which he cites from Sir Isaac Newton.‡ "It is the will of the mind that is the *first cause*, that gives subsistence and efficacy to all those *laws*, who is the *efficient cause* that produces the *phenomena* which appear in analogy, harmony and agreement, according to these *laws*." And he says, "the same principles must take place in things pertaining to *moral* as well as natural philosophy."§

From these things it will clearly follow, that identity of *consciousness* depends wholly on a law of *nature*, and so, on the sovereign *will* and *agency* of God; and therefore, that personal identity, and so the derivation of the pollution and guilt of past sins in the same person, depends on an arbitrary divine *constitution;* and this, even though we should allow the same consciousness not to be the only thing which constitutes oneness of person, but should, besides that, suppose sameness of substance requisite. For if same consciousness be *one thing* necessary to personal identity, and this depends on God's sovereign *constitution*, it will still follow that personal identity depends on God's sovereign *constitution*.

And with respect to the identity of created substance itself, in the different moments of its duration, I think we shall greatly mistake, if we imagine it to be like that absolute, independent identity of the FIRST BEING, whereby he is *the same, yesterday, to-day, and forever*. Nay, on the contrary, it may be demonstrated that even this oneness of created substance, existing at different

* Page 134, S. † Page 140, S. ‡ Mor. Phil., p. 7. § Ibid., p. 8.

times, is a merely *dependent* identity, dependent on the pleasure and sovereign constitution of Him who *worketh all in all.* This will follow from what is generally allowed, and is certainly true, that God not only created all things, and gave them being at first, but continually preserves them, and upholds them in being. This being a matter of considerable importance, it may be worthy here to be considered with a little attention. Let us inquire, therefore, in the first place, whether it be not evident that God does continually, by his immediate power *uphold* every created substance in being; and then let us see the *consequence.*

That God does, by his immediate power, *uphold* every created substance in being, will be manifest, if we consider that their present existence is a *dependent* existence, and therefore is an *effect*, and must have some *cause ;* and the cause must be one of these two: either the *antecedent existence* of the same substance, or the *power* of the Creator. But it cannot be the *antecedent existence* of the same substance. For instance, the existence of the body of the *moon* at this present moment, cannot be the *effect* of its existence at the last foregoing moment. For not only was what existed the last moment no active cause, but wholly a passive thing; but this is also to be considered, that no cause can produce effects in a *time* and *place* in which itself is *not.* It is plain, nothing can exert itself, or operate, when and where it is not existing. But the moon's past existence was neither *where* nor *when* its present existence is. In point of time, what is *past*, entirely ceases, when *present* existence begins; otherwise it would not be *past.* The past moment is ceased and gone, when the present moment takes place; and does no more *coexist* with it, than does any other moment that had ceased twenty years ago. Nor could the past existence of the particles of this *moving body* produce effects in any *other place* than where it then was. But its existence at the present moment, in every point of it, is in a different *place* from where its existence was at the last preceding moment. From these things I suppose it will certainly follow that the present existence, either of this, or any other created substance, cannot be an effect of its past existence. The existences (so to speak) of an effect, or thing dependent, in different parts of space or duration, though ever so *near* one to another, do not at all *coexist* one with the other; and therefore are as truly different effects, as if those parts of space and duration were ever so far asunder; and the prior existence can no more be the proper cause of the new existence, in the next moment, or next part of space, than if it had been in an age before, or at a thousand miles distance, without any existence to fill up the intermediate time or space. Therefore the existence of created substances, in each successive moment, must be the effect of the *immediate* agency, will, and power of God.

If any shall say this reasoning is not good, and shall insist upon it, that there is no *need* of any immediate *divine* power to produce the present existence of created substances, but that their present existence is the effect or consequence of past existence, according to the *nature* of things; that the established *course of nature* is sufficient to *continue* existence, where existence is once given; I allow it: but then it should be remembered *what* nature is in created things; and *what* the established *course* of nature is; that, as has been observed already, *it is nothing separate from the agency of God;* and that, as Dr. Taylor says, GOD, *the Original* of all being, is the ONLY *cause of all natural effects.* A father, according to the course of nature, begets a child; an oak, according to the course of nature, produces an acorn, or a bud; so, according to the course of nature, the former existence of the trunk of the tree is followed

by its new or present existence. In the one case and the other, the new effect is consequent on the former, only by the *established laws* and *settled course* of nature, which is allowed to be nothing but the continued immediate efficiency of God, according to a *constitution* that he has been pleased to establish. Therefore, according to what our author urges, as the child and the acorn, which come into existence according to the *course of nature*, in consequence of the prior existence and state of the parent and the oak, are truly, *immediately* created or made by God, so must the existence of each created person and thing, at each moment of it, be from the immediate *continued* creation of God. It will certainly follow from these things, that God's *preserving* created things in being is perfectly equivalent to a *continued creation*, or to his creating those things out of nothing at *each moment* of their existence If the continued existence of created things be wholly dependent on God's preservation, then those things would drop into nothing, upon the ceasing of the present moment, without a new exertion of the divine power to cause them to exist in the following moment. If there be any who own that God preserves things in being, and yet hold that they would continue in being without any further help from him, after they once have existence; I think it is hard to know what they mean. To what purpose can it be to talk of God's *preserving* things in being, when there is no *need* of his preserving them? Or to talk of their being *dependent* on God for continued existence, when they would of themselves continue to exist without his help; nay, though he should wholly withdraw his sustaining power and influence?

It will follow from what has been observed, that God's upholding created substance, or causing its existence in each successive moment, is altogether equivalent to an *immediate production out of nothing*, at each moment. Because its existence at this moment is not merely in part from *God*, but wholly from him, and not in any part or degree, from its *antecedent existence*. For the supposing that its antecedent existence *concurs* with God in *efficiency*, to produce some *part* of the effect, is attended with all the very same absurdities, which have been shown to attend the supposition of its producing it *wholly*. Therefore the antecedent existence is nothing, as to any proper influence or assistance in the affair; and consequently *God* produces the effect as much from *nothing*, as if there had been nothing *before*. So that this effect differs not at all from the first creation, but only *circumstantially*; as in *first* creation there had been no such act and effect of God's power *before*; whereas, his giving existence afterwards, *follows* preceding acts and effects of the same kind, in an established order.

Now, in the next place, let us see how the *consequence* of these things is to my present purpose. If the existence of created *substance*, in each successive moment, be wholly the effect of God's immediate power, in *that* moment, without any dependence on prior existence, as much as the first creation out of *nothing*, then what exists at this moment, by this power, is a *new effect*, and simply and absolutely considered, not the same with any past existence, though it be like it, and follows it according to a certain established method.* And

* When I suppose that an effect which is produced every moment, by a new action or exertion of power, must be a *new* effect in each moment, and not absolutely and numerically the same with that which existed in preceding moments, the thing that I intend, may be illustrated by this example. The lucid color or brightness of the *moon*, as we look steadfastly upon it, seems to be a *permanent* thing, as though it were perfectly the same brightness continued. But indeed it is an effect produced every moment. It ceases, and is renewed, in each successive point of time; and so becomes altogether a *new effect* at each instant; and no one thing that belongs to it is numerically the same that existed in the preceding moment. The rays of the sun, impressed on that body, and reflected from it, which cause the

there is no identity or oneness in the case, but what depends on the *arbitrary* constitution of the Creator; who by his wise sovereign establishment so unites these successive new effects, that he *treats them as one*, by communicating to them like properties, relations and circumstances; and so leads *us* to regard and treat them as *one*. When I call this an *arbitrary constitution*, I mean, it is a constitution which depends on nothing but the *divine will*; which divine will depends on nothing but the *divine wisdom*. In this sense, the whole *course of nature*, with all that belongs to it, all its laws and methods, and constancy and regularity, continuance and proceeding, is an *arbitrary constitution*. In this sense, the continuance of the very being of the world and all its parts, as well as the manner of continued being, depends entirely on an *arbitrary constitution* For it does not at all necessarily follow, that because there was sound, or light, or color, or resistance, or gravity, or thought, or consciousness, or any other dependent thing the last moment, that therefore there shall be the like at the next. All dependent existence whatsoever is in a constant flux, ever passing and returning; renewed every moment, as the colors of bodies are every moment renewed by the light that shines upon them; and all is constantly proceeding from *God*, as light from the sun. *In him we live, and move, and have our being*.

Thus it appears, if we consider matters strictly, there is no such thing as any identity or oneness in created objects, existing at different times, but what depends on *God's sovereign constitution*. And so it appears that the *objection* we are upon, made against a supposed divine constitution, whereby Adam and his posterity are viewed and treated as *one*, in the manner and for the purposes supposed, as if it were *not consistent with truth*, because no constitution can make those to be *one*, which are *not* one: I say, it appears that this objection is built on a false hypothesis: for it appears, that a *divine constitution* is the thing which *makes truth*, in affairs of this nature. The objection supposes, there is a oneness in created beings, whence qualities and relations are derived down from past existence, *distinct* from, and *prior* to any oneness that can be supposed to be founded on divine *constitution*. Which is demonstrably false.

effect, are none of them the same. The impression, made in each moment on our sensory, is by the stroke of *new* rays; and the sensation, excited by the stroke, is a new effect, an effect of a *new* impulse. Therefore the brightness or lucid whiteness of this body is no more numerically the same thing with that which existed in the preceding moment, than the *sound* of the wind that blows now, is individually the same with the sound of the wind that blew just before, which, though it be like it, is not the same, any more than the agitated *air*, that makes the sound, is the same; or than the *water*, flowing in a river, that now passes by, is individually the same with that which passed a little before. And if it be thus with the brightness or color of the moon, so it must be with its *solidity*, and every thing else belonging to its substance, if all be, each moment, as much the immediate effect of a *new* exertion or application of power.

The matter may perhaps be in some respects still more clearly illustrated by this. The *images* of things in a *glass*, as we keep our eye upon them, seem to remain precisely the same, with a continuing, perfect identity. But it is known to be otherwise. Philosophers well know that these images are constantly *renewed*, by the impression and reflection of *new* rays of light; so that the image impressed by the former rays is constantly vanishing, and a *new* image impressed by *new* rays every moment, both on the glass and on the eye. The image constantly renewed, by new successive rays, is no more numerically the same, than if it were by some artist put on anew with a pencil, and the colors constantly vanishing as fast as put on. And the new images being put on *immediately* or *instantly*, do not make them the same, any more than if it were done with the intermission of an *hour* or a *day*. The image that exists this moment, is not at all *derived* from the image which existed the last preceding moment; as may be seen, because if the succession of new *rays* be intercepted, by something interposed between the object and the glass, the image immediately ceases; the *past existence* of the image has no influence to uphold it, so much as for one moment. Which shows that the image is altogether new made every moment; and strictly speaking, is in no part numerically the same with that which existed the moment preceding. And truly so the matter must be with the *bodies* themselves, as well as their images. They also cannot be the same, with an absolute identity, but must be wholly renewed every moment, if the case be as has been proved, that their present existence is not, strictly speaking, at all the effect of their past existence; but is wholly, every instant, the effect of a new agency, or exertion of the power, of the cause of their existence. If so, the existence caused is every instant a new effect, whether the cause be *light*, or immediate *divine power*, or whatever it be.

and sufficiently appears so from things conceded by the adversaries themselves: and therefore the objection wholly falls to the ground.

There are *various kinds* of identity and oneness, found among created things, by which they become one in *different manners, respects,* and *degrees,* and to *various purposes;* several of which differences have been observed; and every kind is ordered, regulated, and limited, in every respect, by *divine constitution.* Some things, existing in different times and places, are treated by their Creator as one in *one respect,* and others in *another;* some are united for *this communication,* and others for *that;* but all according to the *sovereign pleasure* of the fountain of all being and operation.

It appears particularly, from what has been said, that all oneness, by virtue whereof *pollution* and *guilt* from *past* wickedness are derived, depends entirely on a *divine establishment.* It is this, and this only, that must account for guilt and an evil taint on any individual soul, in consequence of a crime committed twenty or forty years ago, remaining still, and even to the end of the world, and forever. It is this that must account for the continuance of any such thing, anywhere, as *consciousness* of acts that are past; and for the continuance of all *habits,* either good or bad: and on this depends every thing that can belong to *personal identity.* And all communications, derivations, or continuation of qualities, properties or relations, natural or moral, from what is *past,* as if the subject were *one,* depends on no other foundation.

And I am persuaded, no solid reason can be given, why God, who constitutes all other created union or oneness, according to his pleasure, and for what purposes, communications, and effects, he pleases, may not establish a constitution whereby the natural posterity of Adam, proceeding from him, much as the buds and branches from the stock or root of a tree, should be treated as *one* with him, for the derivation, either of righteousness, and communion in rewards, or of the loss of righteousness, and consequent corruption and guilt.*

As I said before, all oneness in created things, whence qualities and relations are derived, depends on a divine constitution that is *arbitrary,* in every other respect, excepting that it is regulated by divine wisdom. The wisdom, which is exercised in these constitutions, appears in these two things. *First,* in a beautiful *analogy* and *harmony* with *other* laws or constitutions, especially relating to the same subject; and *secondly,* in the good *ends* obtained, or useful *consequences* of such a constitution. If therefore there be any objection still

* I appeal to such as are not wont to content themselves with judging by a superficial appearance and view of things, but are habituated to examine things strictly and closely, that they may judge righteous judgment, whether on supposition that all mankind had *coexisted,* in the manner mentioned before, any good reason can be given, why their Creator might not, if he had pleased, have established such a *union* between Adam and the rest of mankind, as was in the case supposed. Particularly, if it had been the case, that Adam's posterity had actually, according to a law of nature, somehow *grown out of him,* and yet remained *contiguous* and literally *united to him,* as the branches to a tree, or the members of the body to the head; and had all, before the fall, existed together at the *same time,* though in *different places,* as the head and members are in different places: in this case, who can determine, that the author of nature might not, if it had pleased him, have established such a *union* between the root and branches of this complex being, as that all should constitute *one* moral whole: so that by the law of union, there should be a communion in each *moral alteration,* and that the heart of every *branch* should at the same moment participate with the heart of the *root,* be conformed to it, and concurring with it in all its affections and acts, and so jointly partaking in its state, as a *part* of the *same thing?* Why might not God, if he had pleased, have fixed such a kind of union as this, a union of the various parts of such a *moral whole,* as well as many other unions, which he has actually fixed, according to his sovereign pleasure? And if he might, by his sovereign constitution, have established such a union of the various branches of mankind, when existing in different *places,* I do not see why he might not also do the same, though they exist in different times. I know not why succession, or diversity of *time,* should make any such constituted union more unreasonable, than diversity of *place.* The only reason, why diversity of *time* can seem to make it unreasonable, is, that difference of time shows, there is no absolute identity of the things existing in those different times: but it shows this, I think, not at all more than the difference of the *place of* existence.

lying against this constitution with Adam and his posterity, it must be, that it is not sufficiently *wise* in these respects. But what extreme *arrogance* would it be in us, to take upon us to act as judges of the beauty and wisdom of the laws and established constitutions of the supreme Lord and Creator of the universe! And not only so, but if this constitution, in particular, be well considered, its *wisdom*, in the two forementioned respects, may easily be made evident. There is an apparent manifold *analogy* to other constitutions and laws, established and maintained through the whole system of vital nature in this lower world; all parts of which, in all successions, are derived from the *first of the kind*, as from their root or fountain; each deriving from thence all properties and qualities, that are proper to the nature and capacity of the kind, or species: no *derivative* having any one perfection (unless it be what is merely circumstantial) but what was in its *primitive*. And that Adam's posterity should be without that *original righteousness*, which Adam had lost, is also *analogous* to other laws and establishments, relating to the nature of mankind; according to which, Adam's posterity have no one perfection of nature, in any kind, superior to what was in him, when the human race began to be propagated from him.

And as such a constitution was *fit* and *wise* in other respects, so it was in this that follows. Seeing the divine constitution concerning the *manner* of mankind's coming into existence in their propagation, was such as did so naturally *unite* them, and made them in so many respects *one*, naturally leading them to a close union in society, and manifold intercourse, and mutual dependence. Things were wisely so established, that all should naturally be in one and the same *moral state;* and not in such exceeding different states, as that some should be perfectly *innocent* and holy, but others *corrupt* and wicked; some needing a Saviour, but others needing none; some in a confirmed state of perfect *happiness*, but others in a state of public condemnation to perfect and eternal *misery;* some justly exposed to great calamities in this world, but others by their innocence raised above all suffering. Such a vast diversity of state would by no means have agreed with the natural and necessary constitution and unavoidable situation and circumstances of the world of mankind; *all made of one blood, to dwell on all the face of the earth*, to be united and blended in society, and to partake together in the natural and common goods and evils of this lower world.

Dr. Taylor urges,* that *sorrow* and *shame* are only for *personal* sin: and it has often been urged, that *repentance* can be for no other sin. To which I would say, that the use of *words* is very arbitrary: but that men's *hearts* should be deeply affected with grief and humiliation before God, for the pollution and guilt which they bring into the world with them, I think, is not in the least *unreasonable*. Nor is it a thing strange and unheard of, that men should be *ashamed* of things done by *others*, whom they are nearly concerned in. I am sure, it is not *unscriptural;* especially when they are justly looked upon in the sight of God, who sees the disposition of their hearts, as fully *consenting* and *concurring*.

From what has been observed it may appear, there is no sure ground to conclude, that it must be an absurd and impossible thing, for the race of mankind truly to partake of the *sin* of the first apostasy, so as that this, in reality and propriety, shall become *their* sin; by virtue of a *real union* between the root and branches of the world of mankind (truly and properly availing to such a consequence), established by the Author of the whole system of the universe;

* Page 14.

to whose establishments are owing all propriety and reality of *union*, in any part of that system; and by virtue of the full *consent* of the hearts of Adam's posterity to that first apostasy. And therefore the sin of the apostasy is not theirs, merely because God *imputes* it to them; but it is *truly* and *properly* theirs, and on that *ground*, God imputes it to them.

By reason of the established *union* between Adam and his posterity, the case is far otherwise between him and them, than it is between distinct parts or individuals of Adam's race; betwixt whom is no such constituted *union;* as between children and other ancestors. Concerning whom is apparently to be understood that place, Ezek. xviii. 1—20;* where God reproves the Jews for the use they made of that proverb, *The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge;* and tells them, that hereafter they shall no more have occasion to use this proverb; and that if a *son* sees the wickedness of his *father*, and sincerely *disapproves* it and *avoids* it, and he himself is righteous, *he shall not die for the iniquity of his father;* that *all souls, both the soul of the father and the son, are his;* and that *therefore the son shall not bear the iniquity of his father, nor the father bear the iniquity of the son; but the soul that sinneth, it shall die;* that *the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him*, and *the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him.* The thing *denied*, is communion in the guilt and punishment of the sins of others, that are distinct parts of Adam's race; and expressly, in that case, where there is *no consent* and *concurrence*, but a sincere disapprobation of the wickedness of ancestors. It is declared, that *children* who are *adult* and come to act for themselves, who are *righteous*, and do not approve of, but sincerely condemn the wickedness of their *fathers*, shall not be punished for *their* disapproved and avoided iniquities. The *occasion* of what is here said, as well as the *design* and plain *sense*, shows, that nothing is here intended in the least degree *inconsistent* with what has been supposed concerning Adam's posterity's sinning and falling in *his apostasy.* The occasion is, the people's murmuring at God's methods under the Mosaic dispensation; agreeable to that in Levit. xxvi. 39, "And they that are left of you, shall pine away in their iniquity in your enemies' lands; and also in the iniquities of their fathers shall they pine away with them:" and other parallel places, respecting external judgments, which were the punishments most plainly threatened, and chiefly insisted on, under that dispensation (which was, as it were, an *external* and *carnal* covenant), and particularly the people's suffering such terrible judgments at that day, even in Ezekiel's time, for the sins of Manasseh; according to what God says by Jeremiah (Jer. xv. 4), and agreeable to what is said in that confession, Lam. v. 7, "Our fathers have sinned and are not, and we have borne their iniquities."

In what is said here, there is a special respect to the introducing of the gospel dispensation; as is greatly confirmed by comparing this place with Jer. xxxi. 29, 30, 31. Under which dispensation, the righteousness of God's dealings with mankind would be more fully manifested, in the clear revelation then to be made of the method of the *judgment* of God, by which the *final state* of wicked men is determined; which is not according to the behavior of their particular *ancestors;* but every one is dealt with according to the sin of *his own* wicked heart, or sinful nature and practice. The affair of *derivation* of the natural corruption of mankind in general, and of their consent *to*, and participation *of*, the *primitive* and *common* apostasy, is not in the least intermeddled with, or touched, by any thing meant or aimed at in the true scope and design of this place in Ezekiel.

* Which Dr. Taylor alleges, p. 10, 11, 8.

On the whole, if any do not like the *philosophy*, or the *metaphysics* (as some perhaps may choose to call it) made use of in the foregoing reasonings; yet I cannot doubt, but that a proper consideration of what is apparent and undeniable in *fact*, with respect to the *dependence* of the state and course of things in this universe on the sovereign *constitutions* of the supreme Author and Lord of all, who *gives none account of any of his matters*, and *whose ways are past finding out*, will be sufficient, with persons of common modesty and sobriety, to stop their mouths from making peremptory decisions against the *justice* of God, respecting what is so plainly and fully taught in *his holy word*, concerning the *derivation* of a depravity and guilt from Adam to his posterity; a thing so abundantly confirmed by what is found in the *experience* of all mankind in all ages.

This is enough, one would think, forever to silence such bold expressions as these—"If this be *just*—if the *Scriptures* teach such doctrine, &c., then the Scriptures are of *no use*—understanding is *no* understanding—and, *What* a God must *he* be, that can thus *curse* innocent creatures!—Is *this* thy God, O *Christian!*"

It may not be improper here to add something (by way of supplement to this chapter, in which we have had occasion to say so much about the *imputation* of Adam's sin) concerning the opinions of *two divines*, of no inconsiderable note among the dissenters in England, relating to a *partial imputation* of Adam's first sin.

One of them supposes that this sin, though truly *imputed* to INFANTS, so that thereby they are exposed to a proper *punishment*, yet is not imputed to them in such a *degree*, as that upon this account they should be liable to *eternal* punishment, as Adam himself was, but only to *temporal death*, or *annihilation*, Adam himself, the immediate actor, being made infinitely *more guilty* by it, than his posterity. On which I would observe, that to suppose, God imputes not *all* the guilt of Adam's sin, but only some *little part* of it, relieves nothing but one's *imagination*. To think of poor little *infants* bearing such torments for Adam's sin, as they sometimes do in this world, and these torments ending in death and annihilation, may sit easier on the imagination, than to conceive of their suffering eternal misery for it. But it does not at all relieve one's *reason*. There is no rule of reason that can be supposed to lie against imputing a sin in the *whole* of it, which was committed by one, to another who did not personally commit it, but what will also lie against its being so imputed and punished in *part*. For all the reasons (if there are any) lie against the *imputation*; not the *quantity* or *degree of what is imputed*. If there be any rule of reason, that is strong and good, lying against a proper derivation or communication of guilt, from one that acted, to another that did not act; then it lies against *all* that is of this nature. The force of the reasons brought against imputing Adam's sin to his posterity (if there be any force in them) lies in this, that Adam and his posterity are not *one*. But this lies as properly against charging a *part* of the guilt, as the whole. For Adam's posterity, by not being the same with him, had no more hand in a *little* of what was done, than in the whole. They were as absolutely free from being concerned in that act *partly*, as they were *wholly*. And there is no reason to be brought, why one man's sin cannot be justly reckoned to another's account, who was not then in being, in the *whole* of it; but what will as properly lie against its being reckoned to him in any *part*, so as that he should be subject to any condemnation or punishment on that account. If those reasons are good, all the *difference* there can be is this; that to bring a *great* punishment on infants for Adam's sin, is a

great act of injustice, and to bring a comparatively *small* punishment, is a *smaller* act of injustice, but not, that this is not *as truly and demonstrably* an act of injustice, as the other.

To illustrate this by an instance something parallel. It is used as an argument why I may not exact from one of my neighbors, what was due to me from *another*, that *he* and my *debtor* are *not* the same; and that their concerns, interests and properties are entirely distinct. Now if this argument be good, it lies as truly against my demanding from him a *part* of the debt, as the whole. Indeed it is a *greater* act of injustice for me to take from him the *whole* of it, than a part, but not *more truly* and *certainly* an act of injustice.

The *other* divine thinks there is truly an imputation of Adam's sin, so that *infants* cannot be looked upon as *innocent* creatures; yet seems to think it *not agreeable* to the perfections of God, to make the state of infants in another world *worse* than a state of *nonexistence*. But this to me appears plainly a *giving up* that grand point of the *imputation* of Adam's sin, both in whole and in part. For it supposes it to be not right, for God to bring any *evil* on a child of Adam, which is innocent as to personal sin, without *paying for it*, or balancing it with *good;* so that still the state of the child shall be as *good*, as could be demanded in *justice*, in a case of mere *innocence*. Which plainly supposes that the child is not exposed to any proper *punishment* at all, or is not at all in *debt* to divine justice, on the account of Adam's sin. For if the child were truly in debt, then surely justice might take something from him *without paying for it*, or without *giving* that which makes its state as *good*, as mere *innocence* could in justice require. If he owes the suffering of some *punishment*, then there is no need that justice should *requite* the infant for suffering that punishment; or *make up for it*, by conferring some *good*, that shall countervail it, and in effect remove and disannul it; so that, on the whole, *good* and *evil* shall be at an even *balance*, yea, so that the scale of *good* shall preponderate. If it is unjust in a judge to order any quantity of money to be taken from another without paying him again, and fully making it up to him, it must be because he had justly forfeited none at all.

It seems to me pretty manifest that none can, in good consistence with themselves, own a real *imputation* of the guilt of Adam's first sin to his posterity, without owning that they are *justly* viewed and treated as *sinners*, truly guilty and *children of wrath* on that account; nor unless they allow a just imputation of the whole of the evil of that transgression; at least all that pertains to the essence of that act, as a full and complete violation of the *covenant* which God had established; even as much as if each one of mankind had the like covenant established with him singly, and had by the like direct and full act of rebellion, violated it for himself.

CHAPTER IV.

Wherein several other Objections are considered.

Dr. Taylor objects against Adam's posterity's being supposed to come into the world under a *forfeiture* of God's *blessing*, and subject to his *curse* through his sin:—That at the restoration of the world after the flood, God pronounced equivalent or greater blessings on Noah and his sons, than he did on Adam at

his creation, when he said, "Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and have dominion over the fish of the sea," &c.*

To this I answer, in the following remarks.

1. As it has been already shown, that in the *threatening*, denounced for Adam's sin, there was nothing which appears *inconsistent* with the *continuance* of this *present* life for a season, or with the *propagating* his kind; so for the like reason, there appears nothing in that threatening, upon the supposition that it reached Adam's posterity, *inconsistent* with their enjoying the *temporal blessings* of the present life, as long as this is continued; even those temporal blessings which God pronounced on Adam at his first creation. For it must be observed, that the blessings which God pronounced on Adam, when he first created him, and *before the trial of his obedience*, were not the same with the blessings which were *suspended on his obedience*. The blessings thus suspended, were the blessings of *eternal life;* which, if he had maintained his integrity through his trial, would have been pronounced upon him *afterwards;* when God, as his judge, should have given him his reward. God might, indeed, if he had pleased, *immediately* have deprived him of *life*, and of all *temporal blessings* given him before. But those blessings pronounced on him beforehand, were not the things, for the obtaining of which his *trial* was appointed. These were *reserved*, till the *issue* of his trial should be seen, and *then* to be pronounced in the blessed sentence, which would have been passed upon him by his judge, when God came to decree to him his reward for his approved fidelity. The pronouncing these latter blessings on a degenerate race, that had fallen under the *threatening* denounced, would indeed (without a redemption) have been inconsistent with the *constitution* which had been established. But the giving them the *former* kind of blessings, which were not the things suspended on the trial, or dependent on his fidelity (and these to be continued for a season), was not at all inconsistent therewith.

2. It is no more an evidence of Adam's posterity's being not included in the threatening, denounced for his eating the forbidden fruit, that they still have the *temporal* blessings of fruitfulness and a dominion over the creatures *continued* to them, than it is an evidence of Adam's being not included in that threatening himself, that he had these blessings continued to him, was fruitful, and had dominion over the creatures *after* his fall, equally with his posterity.

3. There is good evidence, that there were blessings implied in the benedictions God pronounced on Noah and his posterity, which were granted on a *new foundation;* on the foot of a dispensation *diverse* from any grant, promise or revelation which God gave to Adam, antecedently to his fall, even on the foundation of the covenant of grace, established in Jesus Christ; a dispensation, the design of which is to deliver men from the curse that came upon them by Adam's sin, and to bring them to greater blessings than ever he had. These blessings were pronounced on Noah and his seed, on the same foundation whereon afterwards the blessing was pronounced on Abraham and his seed, which included both spiritual and temporal benefits. Noah had his name prophetically given him by his father *Lamech*, because by him and his seed, deliverance should be obtained from the curse which came by Adam's fall. Gen. v. 29, "And he called his name *Noah* (i. e. Rest), saying, This same shall comfort us concerning our work, and toil of our hands, because of the ground which the Lord hath cursed." Pursuant to the scope and intent of this prophecy (which seed seems to respect the same thing with the prophecy in Gen. iii. 15) are

* See p. 82, &c., 8.

the blessings pronounced on Noah after the flood. There is this evidence of these blessings being conveyed through the channel of the covenant of grace, and by the redemption through Jesus Christ, that they were obtained by sacrafice; or were bestowed as the effect of God's favor to mankind, which was in consequence of God's *smelling a sweet savor* in the sacrifice which Noah offered. And it is very evident by the epistle to the Hebrews, that the ancient sacrifices never obtained the favor of God, but only by virtue of the relation they had to the sacrifice of Christ. Now that Noah and his family had been so wonderfully saved from the wrath of God, which had destroyed the rest of the world, and the world was as it were restored from a ruined state, there was a proper occasion to point to the great salvation to come by Christ: as it was a common thing for God, on occasion of some great *temporal* salvation of his people, or restoration from a low and miserable state, to renew the intimations of the great spiritual restoration of the world by Christ's redemption.* God deals with the generality of mankind, in their present state, far differently, on occasion of the redemption by Jesus Christ, from what he otherwise would do; for, being capable subjects of saving mercy, they have a day of patience and grace, and innumerable temporal blessings bestowed on them; which, as the apostle signifies (Acts xiv. 17), are testimonies of God's reconcilableness to sinful men, to put them upon *seeking after God.*

But besides the sense in which the posterity of Noah in general partake of these blessings of *dominion over the creatures*, &c.; Noah himself, and all such of his posterity as have obtained like precious faith with that exercised by him in offering his sacrifice which made it a *sweet savor*, and by which it procured these blessings, have dominion over the creatures, through Christ, in a more excellent sense than Adam in innocency; as they are made kings and priests unto God, and reign with Christ, and all things are theirs, by a covenant of grace. They partake with Christ in that dominion "over the beasts of the earth, the fowls of the air, and fishes of the sea," spoken of in the 8th Psalm; which is by the apostle interpreted of Christ's dominion over the world. 1 Cor. xv. 27, and Heb. ii. 7. And the time is coming when the greater part of the posterity of Noah, and each of his sons, shall partake of this more honorable and excellent dominion over the creatures, through him "in whom all the families of the earth shall be blessed." Neither is there any need of supposing that these blessings have their most complete accomplishment until many ages after they were granted, any more than the blessing on Japhet, expressed in those words, "God shall enlarge Japhet, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem."

But that Noah's posterity have such *blessings* given them through the great *Redeemer*, who suspends and removes the *curse* which came through Adam's sin, surely is no argument that they originally, and as they be in their natural state, are not under the *curse.* That men have blessings *through grace*, is no evidence of their being not justly exposed to the curse *by nature*, but it rather argues the contrary: for if they did not deserve the curse, they would not depend on grace and redemption for the removal of it, and for bringing them into a state of favor with God.

Another *objection* which our author strenuously urges against the doctrine of Original Sin, is, that it *disparages* the divine *goodness* in giving us our *being*, which we ought to receive with *thankfulness*, as a great gift of God's beneficence, and look upon as the first, original, and fundamental fruit of the divine liberality.†

* It may be noted that Dr. Taylor himself signifies it as his mind, that these blessings on Noah were on the foot of the covenant of grace, p. 84, 90, 91, 92, 8. † Pages 256, 257, 260, 71—74. S

To this I answer, in the following observations.

1. This argument is built on the supposed *truth* of a thing in *dispute*, and so is a *begging the question*. It is built on this supposition, that we are not properly looked upon as *one* with our *first father*, in the state wherein God at first created him, and in his fall from that state. If we *are* so, it becomes the whole race to acknowledge God's great *goodness* to them, in the state wherein mankind was made *at first*; in the *happy* state they were then in, and the fair opportunity they then had of obtaining *confirmed* and *eternal* happiness, and to acknowledge it as an aggravation of their apostasy, and to humble themselves, that they were so ungrateful as to rebel against their good Creator. Certainly, we may all do this with as much reason, as (yea, much more than) the people of Israel in Daniel's and Nehemiah's times, did with thankfulness acknowledge God's great goodness to *their fathers*, many ages before, and in their confessions bewailed, and took shame to themselves, for the sins committed by their *fathers*, notwithstanding such great goodness. See the ixth chapter of Daniel, and ixth of Nehemiah.

2. If Dr. Taylor would imply in his objection, that it doth not consist with the *goodness* of God, to give mankind being in a state of misery, whatever was done before by Adam, whether he sinned, or did not sin; I reply, if it be justly so ordered, that there should be a posterity of Adam, which must be looked upon as *one with him*, then it is no more contrary to *God's* attribute of goodness to give being to his posterity in a state of punishment, than to *continue* the being of the *same* wicked and guilty person, who has made himself guilty, in a state of punishment. The giving being, and the continuing being are both alike the work of God's power and will, and both are alike fundamental to all blessings of man's present and future existence. And if it be said, it cannot be justly so ordered, that there should be a posterity of Adam, which should be looked upon as *one* with him, this is *begging the question*.

3. If our author would have us suppose that it is contrary to the attribute of goodness for God, in *any case*, by an immediate act of his power, to cause existence, and to cause new existence, which shall be an exceeding miserable existence, by reason of exposedness to eternal ruin; then *his own* scheme must be supposed *contrary* to the attribute of God's goodness; for he supposes that God will raise multitudes from the dead at the last day (which will be giving new existence to their bodies, and to bodily life and sense) in order only to their suffering eternal destruction.

4. Notwithstanding we are so sinful and miserable, as we are by nature, yet we may have great reason to bless God, that he has given us our being under so glorious a dispensation of *grace* through Jesus Christ; by which we have a happy opportunity to be *delivered* from this sin and misery, and to obtain unspeakable, eternal *happiness*. And because, through our own wicked inclinations, we are disposed so to neglect and abuse this mercy, as to fail of final benefit by it, this is no reason why we ought not to be *thankful* for it, even according to our author's own sentiments. "What (says he*) if *the whole world lies in wickedness*, and few therefore shall be saved, have men no *reason* to be *thankful*, because they are wicked and ungrateful, and abuse their being and God's bounty? Suppose our own *evil inclinations* do withhold us" [viz., from seeking after happiness, which under the light of the gospel we are placed within the nearer and easier reach of]; "suppose the whole Christian world should lie in wickedness, and but few Christians should be saved; is it

* Pages 72, 73. &.

therefore certainly true, that we cannot reasonably *thank* God for the gospel?" Well, and though the *evil inclinations*, which hinder our seeking and obtaining happiness by so glorious an advantage, are what we are *born* with, yet if those inclinations are *our fault* or *sin*, that alters not the case; and to say, they are *not* our sin, is still *begging the question*. Yea, it will follow from several things asserted by our author, put together, that notwithstanding men are *born* in such circumstances, as that they are under a very great *improbability* of ever becoming *righteous*, yet they may have *reason* to be *thankful* for their being. Thus, particularly, those that were born and lived among the *Heathen*, before Christ came. For Dr. Taylor asserts, that all men have reason of thankfulness for their being; and yet he supposes, that the *Heathen* world, taken as a collective body, were *dead in sin*, and could not deliver or help themselves, and therefore stood in necessity of the Christian dispensation. And not only so, but he supposes, that the *Christian* world is now at length brought to the *like* deplorable and helpless circumstances, and needs a *new* dispensation for its relief; as I observed before. According to these things, the world in general, not only formerly, but even at this day, are *dead in sin*, and helpless as to their salvation; and therefore the generality of them that are born into it, are much more *likely* to perish, than otherwise, till the *new* dispensation comes: and yet he supposes, we all have reason to be thankful for our being. Yea, further still, I think, according to our author's doctrine, men may have great reason to be *thankful* to God for bringing them into a state, which yet, as the case is, is attended with *misery*, as its *certain* consequence. As, with respect to God's *raising* the wicked to life, at the last day; which, he supposes, is in itself a great *benefit*, procured by Christ, and the wonderful *grace* of God through him: and if it be the fruit of God's wonderful grace, surely men ought to be *thankful* for that grace, and praise God for it. Our doctrine of Original Sin, therefore, no more disparages God's goodness in man's *formation* in the womb, than *his* doctrine disparages God's goodness in their *resurrection* from the grave.

Another argument which Dr. Taylor makes use of, against the doctrine of Original Sin, is what the Scripture reveals of the process of the day of *judgment*; which represents the judge as dealing with men *singly* and *separately*, rendering to *every* man according to *his* deeds, and according to the improvement he has made of the particular powers and talents God has given *him* personally.*

But this objection will vanish, if we consider what is the *end* or *design* of that public judgment. Now this will not be, that God may *find out* what men are, or what punishment or reward is proper for them, or in order to the passing a right judgment of these things within himself, which is the end of human trials; but it is to *manifest* what men are, to their own consciences, and to the world. As the day of judgment is called *the day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God*; in order to this, God will make use of *evidences* or *proofs*. But the proper evidences of the wickedness of men's *hearts* (the true seat of all wickedness), both as to corruption of nature, and additional pollution and guilt, are men's *works*.

The special end of God's public judgment will be, to make a proper, perfect, open *distinction* among men, rightly to state and manifest their *difference* one from another, in order to that separation and difference in the eternal retribution, that is to follow: and this difference will be made to appear, by their *personal works*.

* Pages 65, 66, 11, 8.

There are two things, with regard to which men will be tried, and openly *distinguished* by the perfect judgment of God at the last day; according to the twofold *real distinction* subsisting among mankind, viz., (1.) The *difference of state;* that *primary* and grand distinction, whereby all mankind are divided into two sorts, the righteous and the wicked. (2.) That *secondary distinction*, whereby both sorts differ from others in the *same* general state, in *degrees* of additional fruits of righteousness and wickedness. Now the judge, in order to manifest both these, will judge men *according to their* personal *works*. But to inquire at the day of judgment, whether Adam sinned or no, or whether men are to be looked upon as one with him, and so partakers in his sin, is what in no respect tends to manifest either of these distinctions.

1. The *first* thing to be manifested, will be the *state*, that each man is in, with respect to the *grand distinction* of the whole world of mankind into *righteous* and *wicked;* or, in metaphorical language, *wheat* and *tares;* or, the *children of the kingdom* of Christ, and the *children of the wicked one;* the latter, the head of the apostasy; but the former, the head of the restoration and recovery. The judge, in manifesting this, will prove men's hearts by *their works*, in such as have had opportunity to perform any works in the body. The *evil works* of the children of the *wicked one* will be the proper *manifestation* and evidence or proof of whatever belongs to the general state of such; and particularly they will prove, that they belong to the kingdom of the great deceiver and head of the apostasy, as they will demonstrate the exceeding corruption of their nature, and full consent of their hearts to the common apostasy; and also that their hearts never relinquished the apostasy, by a cordial adherence to Christ, the great restorer. The judge will also make use of the *good works* of the righteous to show their interest in the redemption of Christ; as thereby will be manifested the sincerity of their hearts in the acceptance of, and adherence to the Redeemer and his righteousness. And in thus proving the state of men's hearts by their actions, the *circumstances* of those actions must necessarily come into consideration, to manifest the true *quality* of their actions; as, each one's talents, opportunities, advantages, light, motives, &c.

2. The other thing to be manifested, will be that *secondary distinction*, wherein particular persons, both righteous and wicked, differ from one another, in the *degree* of secondary good or evil, that is, something besides what is common to all in the *same* general state: the *degree* of evil fruit, which is additional to the guilt and corruption of the whole body of apostates and enemies; and the *degree* of personal goodness and good fruit, which is a secondary goodness, with respect to the righteousness and merits of Christ, which belong to all by that sincere faith manifested in all. Of this also each one's *works*, with their circumstances, opportunities, talents, &c., will be the proper evidence.

As to the nature and aggravations of the general apostasy by Adam's sin, and also the nature and sufficiency of the redemption by Jesus Christ, the great restorer, though both these will have vast *influence* on the eternal state, which men will be adjudged to, yet neither of them will properly belong to the *trial* men will be the subjects of at that day, in order to the *manifestation* of their *state*, wherein they are *distinguished one from another*. They will belong to the business of that day no otherwise, than the manifestation of the great *truths* of religion in general; as the nature and perfections of God, the dependence of mankind on God, as their creator and preserver, &c. Such truths as these will also have great influence on the eternal state, which men will then be adjudged to, as they aggravate the guilt of man's wickedness, and must be considered in order to a due estimate of Christ's righteousness, and men's personal virtue;

yet, being of general and equal concernment, will not properly belong to the trial of particular persons.

Another thing urged by our author particularly against the *imputation* of Adam's sin, is this: "Though, in Scripture, action is frequently said to be *imputed, reckoned, accounted* to a person, it is no other than *his own* act and deed!"* In the same place he cites a number of places of Scripture, where these words are used, which he says are all that he can find in the Bible.

But we are no way concerned with this argument at present, any further than it relates to *imputation of sin*, or *sinful action*. Therefore all that is in the argument, which relates to the present purpose, is this: that the word is so often applied in Scripture to signify God's imputing personal sin, but never once to his imputing Adam's sin.—*So often!*—How often?—But *twice*. There are but two of all those places which he reckons up, that speak of, or so much as have any reference to, God's *imputing* sin to any person, where there is any evidence that only personal sin is meant; and they are Levit. xvii. 3, 4, and 2 Tim. iv. 16. All therefore the argument comes to, is this: that the word, *impute*, is applied in Scripture, *two* times, to the case of God's imputing sin, and neither of those times to signify the imputing of Adam's sin, but both times it has reference to personal sin; therefore Adam's sin is not imputed to his posterity. And this is to be noted, that one of these two places, even that in Levit. xvii. 3, 4, does not speak of imputing the act committed, but another *not* committed. The words are, "What man soever there be of the house of Israel, that killeth an ox or lamb or goat in the camp, or that killeth it out of the camp, and bringeth it not unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, to offer an offering unto the Lord, before the tabernacle of the Lord, blood shall be *imputed* unto that man; he hath shed blood; that man shall be cut off from among his people, i. e. plainly, *murder* shall be imputed to him: he shall be put to death for it, and therein punished with the same severity as if he had *slain a man*. It is plain by Isai. lxvi. 3, that in some cases, a shedding the blood of *beasts*, in an unlawful manner, was *imputed* to them, *as if they slew a man*.

But whether it be so or not, although in both these places the word, *impute*, be applied to personal sin, and to the very act done by the person spoken of, and in ten more places; or although this could be said of all the places, which our author reckons up; yet that the word, *impute*, is never expressly applied to Adam's sin, does no more argue, that it is not imputed to his posterity, than it argues, that pride, unbelief, lying, theft, oppression, persecution, fornication, adultery, sodomy, perjury, idolatry, and innumerable other particular moral evils, are never imputed to the persons that committed them, or in whom they are; because the word, *impute*, though so often used in Scripture, is never applied to any of these kinds of wickedness.

I know not what can be said here, except one of these two things: that though these sins are not expressly said to be *imputed*, yet *other* words are used that do as plainly and certainly *imply* that they are imputed, as if it were said so expressly. Very well, and so I say with respect to the imputation of Adam's sin. The thing meant by the word, *impute*, may be as plainly and certainly expressed by using other words, as if *that* word were expressly used; and *more certainly*, because the words used instead of it, may amount to an *explanation* of this word. And this, I think, is the very case here. Though the word, *impute*, is not used with respect to Adam's sin, yet it is said, *All have sinned;* which, re-

* Page 3, &c. No. 8.

specting infants, can be true only of their sinning by his sin. And it is said, *By his disobedience many were made sinners;* and, *Judgment and condemnation came upon all by that sin;* and that, by this means, *death* [the wages of sin] *passed on all men*, &c. Which phrases amount to full and precise explanations of the word, *impute;* and therefore do more certainly determine the point really insisted on.

Or, perhaps it will be said, With respect to those personal sins forementioned, *pride*, *unbelief*, &c., it is no argument, they are not *imputed* to those who are guilty of them, that the very word, *impute*, is not applied to them; for the *word* itself is *rarely* used; not one time in a hundred, and perhaps five hundred, of those wherein the *thing* meant is plainly implied, or may be certainly inferred. Well, and the same also may be replied likewise, with respect to Adam's sin.

It is probable Dr. Taylor intends an argument against Original Sin, by that which he says in opposition to what R. R. suggests of *children's discovering the principles of iniquity, and seeds of sin, before they are capable of moral action*,* viz., that *little children are made* patterns *of humility, meekness and innocence*, in Matth. xvii. 3—1 Cor. xiv. 20, and Psal. cxxxi. 2.

But when the utmost is made of this, there can be no shadow of reason, to understand more by these texts, than that little children are recommended as patterns in regard of a *negative* virtue, innocence with respect to the *exercises* and *fruits* of sin, *harmlessness* as to the hurtful effects of it; and that *image* of meekness and humility arising from this, in conjunction with a natural tenderness of mind, fear, self-diffidence, yieldableness, and confidence in parents and others older than themselves. And so, they are recommended as patterns of virtue no more than *doves*, which are a harmless sort of creature, and have an *image* of the virtues of meekness and love. Even according to Dr. Taylor's own doctrine, no more can be made of it than this: for *his scheme* will not admit of any such thing as *positive* virtue, or virtuous disposition, in infants; he insisting (as was observed before) that virtue must be the fruit of *thought* and *reflection*. But there can be no thought and reflection, that produces positive virtue, in children, not yet capable of *moral action;* and it is *such* children he speaks of. And that little children have a *negative* virtue, or innocence, in relation to the *positive* acts and hurtful effects of vice, is no argument that they have not a *corrupt nature* within them: for let their nature be ever so corrupt, yet surely it is no wonder that they be not guilty of *positive* wicked action, before they are capable of any *moral* action at all. A young viper has a malignant *nature*, though incapable of doing a malignant action, and at present appearing a harmless creature.

Another objection, which Dr. Taylor and some others offer against this doctrine, is, That *it pours contempt upon the human nature.*†

But their declaiming on this topic is like addressing the affections and conceits of *children*, rather than rational arguing with *men*. It seems, this doctrine is not *complaisant* enough. I am sensible, it is not suited to the taste of some, who are so very *delicate* (to say no worse) that they can bear nothing but compliment and flattery. No *contempt* is by this doctrine cast upon the noble faculties and capacities of *man's nature*, or the exalted business, and divine and immortal happiness he is made capable of. And as to speaking ill of man's present *moral state*, I presume, 't will not be denied, that *shame* belongs to them that are truly *sinful;* and to suppose, that this is not the *native* character of

* Pages 77, 78, S. † Pages 74, 75, S.

mankind, is still but meanly *begging the question*. If we, as we come into the world, are truly sinful, and consequently miserable, he acts but a *friendly* part to us, who endeavors fully to discover and manifest our disease. Whereas, on the contrary, he acts an unfriendly part, who to his utmost hides it from us; and so, in effect, does what in him lies to prevent our seeking a remedy from that, which, if not remedied in time, must bring us finally to shame and *everlasting contempt*, and end in perfect and remediless destruction hereafter.

Another *objection*, which some have made against this doctrine, much like the former, is, That it tends to *beget in us an ill opinion of our fellow creatures and so to promote* ill nature and mutual hatred.

To which I would say, If it be truly so, that we all come *sinful* into the world then our heartily *acknowledging* it, tends to promote *humility*: but our *disowning* that sin and guilt, which truly belongs to us, and endeavoring to persuade ourselves that we are vastly *better* than in truth we are, tends to a foolish *self-exaltation* and *pride*. And it is manifest, by reason, experience, and the word of God, that *pride* is the chief source of all the *contention*, mutual *hatred* and *ill will*, which are so prevalent in the world; and that nothing so effectually promotes the *contrary* tempers and deportments, as *humility*. This doctrine teaches us to think no worse of others, than of ourselves: it teaches us, that we are *all*, as we are by nature, *companions* in a miserable, helpless condition; which, under a revelation of the divine mercy, tends to promote mutual *compassion*. And nothing has a greater tendency to promote those amiable dispositions of mercy, forbearance, long-suffering, gentleness and forgiveness, than a sense of our own extreme unworthiness and misery, and the infinite need we have of the divine pity, forbearance and forgiveness, together with a hope of obtaining mercy. If the doctrine, which teaches that mankind are corrupt by nature, tends to promote *ill will*, why should not Dr. Taylor's doctrine tend to it as much? For he teaches us, that the generality of mankind are *very wicked*, having *made themselves so* by their own free choice, without any necessity; which is a way of becoming wicked, that renders men truly *worthy* of *resentment*; but the other *not at all*, even according to his own doctrine.

Another *exclamation* against this doctrine, is, That it tends to *hinder comfort* and *joy* and to *promote melancholy* and *gloominess* of mind.

To which I shall briefly say, Doubtless, supposing men are really become sinful, and so exposed to the displeasure of God, *by whatever means*, if they once come to have their eyes opened, and are not very stupid, the reflection on their case will tend to make them *sorrowful*; and it is *fit*, it should. Men, with whom this is the case, may well be filled with sorrow, till they are sincerely willing to forsake their sins, and turn to God. But there is nothing in this doctrine, that in the least stands in the way of comfort and exceeding joy, to such as find in their hearts a sincere willingness, wholly to forsake all sin, and give their hearts and whole selves to Christ, and comply with the gospel method of salvation in him.

Another thing *objected* is, that to make men believe that wickedness belongs to their very *nature*, tends to *encourage* them in *sin*, and plainly to *lead* them to all manner of iniquity; because they are taught that sin is *natural*, and therefore *necessary* and *unavoidable*.*

But if this doctrine, which teaches that *sin* is natural to us, does also at the same time teach us, that it is *never the better*, or *less to be condemned*, for its being natural, then it does not at all encourage sin, any more than Dr. Tay-

* Page 281, and some other pages.

lor's doctrine encourages wickedness, when it is become *inveterate* who teaches, that such as by custom have contracted strong habits of sin, are *unable to help themselves.** And is it reasonable to represent it as encouraging a man's boldly neglecting and wilfully continuing in his *disease*, without seeking a *cure*, to tell him of his disease, to show him that his disease is real and very fatal, and what *he* can never cure himself of; yet withal directing him to a great *physician*, who is sufficient for his restoration? But for a more particular answer to what is objected against the doctrine of our natural *impotence* and *inability*, as being an encouragement to go on in sin, and a discouragement to the use of all means for our help, I must for brevity refer the reader to what has been largely written on this head in my discourse on the Freedom of the Will.

Our author is pleased to advance another notion, among others, by way of *objection* against the doctrine of Original Sin; that if this doctrine be true, *it would be unlawful to beget children.* He says,† "If natural *generation* be the means of unavoidably *conveying* all sin and wickedness into the world, it must *itself* be a *sinful* and *unlawful* thing." Now, if there be any force of argument here, it lies in this proposition, "Whatsoever is a means, or occasion of the certain, infallible existence of sin and wickedness, must *itself* be sinful." But I imagine Dr. Taylor had not thoroughly weighed this proposition, nor considered where it would carry him. For God's *continuing in being* the devil, and others that are finally given up to wickedness, will be attended, most certainly and infallibly, with an eternal series of the most hateful and horrid wickedness. But will any be guilty of such vile blasphemy, as to say, therefore God's upholding them in being is itself a *sinful* thing? In the same place our author says, "So far as we are *generated in sin*, it must be a *sin* to generate." But there is no appearance of evidence in that position, any more than in this: "So far as any is *upheld* in existence in sin, it is a *sin* to uphold them in existence." Yea, if there were any reason in the case, it would be strongest in the latter position; for parents, as Dr. Taylor himself observes, are not the *authors* of the *beginning* of existence; whereas, God is truly the author of the *continuance* of existence. As it is the known will of God, to continue Satan and millions of others *in being*, though the most sure consequence is the continuance of a vast infernal world, full of everlasting hellish *wickedness*; so it is part of the revealed will of God, that this world of mankind should be *continued*, and the species *propagated*, for his own wise and holy purposes; which will is complied with by the parents joined in lawful *marriage*; whose children, though they come into the world in sin, yet are capable subjects of eternal holiness and happiness; which infinite benefits for their children, parents have great reason to encourage a hope of, in the way of giving up their children to God in faith, through a Redeemer, and bringing them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. I think, this may be answer enough to such a cavil.

Another *objection* is, that the doctrine of Original Sin is no *oftener*, and no more *plainly* spoken of in Scripture; it being, if true, a very *important* doctrine. Dr. Taylor, in many parts of his book suggests to his readers, that there are very *few texts*, in the whole Bible, wherein there is the least appearance of their teaching any such doctrine.

Of this I took notice before, but would here say further, that the reader who has perused the preceding defence of this doctrine, must now be left to judge for himself, whether there be any *ground* for such an allegation; whether there be not texts in *sufficient* number, both in the Old Testament and New, that exhibit

* See his exposition of Rom. vii. p. 215—220. But especially in his *Paraphrase and Notes* on the Epistle.

† Page 145.

undeniable *evidence* of this great article of Christian divinity; and whether it be not a doctrine taught in the Scripture with great *plainness*. I think there are few, if any, doctrines of revelation, taught more plainly and expressly. Indeed, it is taught in an explicit manner more in the New Testament, than in the Old; which is not to be wondered at; it being thus with respect to all the most important doctrines of revealed religion.

But if it had been so, that this doctrine were *rarely* taught in Scripture; yet if we find that it is *indeed* a thing declared to us by God, if there be good evidence of its being held forth to us by *any* word of his, then what belongs to us is, to *believe* his word, and *receive* the doctrine which he teaches us, and not, instead of this, to prescribe to him how *often* he shall speak of it, and to insist upon knowing what *reasons* he has for speaking of it *no oftener*, before we will receive what he teaches us, or to pretend that he should give us an account, why he did not speak of it so plainly as we think he ought to have done, *sooner* than he did. In this way of proceeding, if it be reasonable, the Sadducees of old, who denied any resurrection or future state, might have maintained their cause against Christ, when he blamed them for "not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God;" and for not understanding by the Scripture that there would be a resurrection to spiritual enjoyment, and not to animal life, and sensual gratifications; and they might have insisted that these doctrines, if true, were very *important*, and therefore ought to have been spoken of in the Scriptures *oftener* and more *explicitly*, and not that the church of God should be left, till that time, with only a *few, obscure* intimations of that which so infinitely concerned them. And they might with disdain have rejected Christ's argument by way of *inference*, from God's calling himself, in the Books of Moses, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. For answer they might have said, that Moses was sent on purpose to teach the people the mind and will of God; and therefore, if these doctrines were true, he *ought in reason and in truth* to have taught them plainly and frequently, and not have left the people to spell out so important a doctrine, only from God's saying, that he was the God of Abraham, &c.

One great *end* of the Scripture is to teach the world what *manner of being* God is; about which the world, without revelation, has been so wofully in the dark; and that *God is an infinite being*, is a doctrine of great *importance*, and a doctrine sufficiently taught in the Scripture. But yet it appears to me, this doctrine is not taught there, in any measure, with such *explicitness* and *precision*, as the doctrine of Original Sin; and the *Socinians*, who deny God's omnipresence and omniscience, have as much room left them for cavil, as the *Pelagians*, who deny Original Sin.

Dr. Taylor particularly urges, that Christ says *not one* word of this doctrine throughout the *four gospels;* which doctrine, if true, being so important, and what so nearly concerned the great work of redemption, which he came to work out (as is supposed), one would think, *it should have been emphatically spoken of in every page of the gospels.*[*]

In reply to this it may be observed, that by the account given in the four gospels, Christ was continually saying *those things* which plainly *implied*, that all men in their original state are sinful and miserable. As, when he declared that "they which are whole, need not a physician, but they which are sick;[†] that "he came to seek and to save that which was lost;"[‡] that it was necessary for all to be *born again*, and to be *converted*, and that otherwise they could not *enter into the kingdom of heaven;*[§] and that all were *sinners*, as well as

* Pages 342, 343. † Matt. ix. 12. ‡ Matt. xviii. 11, Luke xix. 10. § Matt. xviii. 3.

those whose blood Pilate mingled with their sacrifices, &c., and that *every one who did not repent should perish*;* withal directing every one to *pray* to God for *forgiveness of sin*;† using our necessity of forgiveness from God, as an argument with all to forgive the injuries of their neighbors;‡ teaching that earthly parents, though kind to their children, are in themselves *evil*;§ and signifying, that things *carnal* and *corrupt*, are properly the *things of men*;‖ warning his disciples rather to beware of *men*, than of wild beasts;¶ often representing the world as *evil*, as *wicked* in its works, at enmity with *truth* and *holiness*, and *hating him*;** yea, and teaching plainly, that all men are extremely and inexpressibly sinful, owing *ten thousand talents* to their divine creditor.††

And whether Christ did not plainly teach *Nicodemus* the doctrine of original total depravity, when he came to him to know what his doctrine was, must be left to the reader to judge, from what has been already observed on John iii. 1—11. And besides, Christ, in the course of his preaching, took the most proper method to convince men of the corruption of their nature, and to give them an effectual and practical knowledge of it, in application to themselves, in particular, by teaching and urging the holy and strict *law* of God, in its extent and spirituality and dreadful threatenings. Which, above all things, tends to search the hearts of men, and to teach them their inbred, exceeding depravity; not merely as a matter of speculation, but by proper conviction of conscience; which is the only knowledge of Original Sin, that can avail to prepare the mind for receiving Christ's redemption; as a man's sense of his own sickness prepares him to apply in good earnest to the physician.

And as to Christ's being no more frequent and particular in mentioning and inculcating this point in a *doctrinal* manner, it is probable one reason to be given for it, is the same that is to be given for his speaking no oftener of God's *creating the world*: which, though so important a doctrine, is scarce ever spoken of in any of Christ's discourses; and no wonder, seeing this was a matter which the Jews, to whom he confined his personal ministry, had all been instructed in from their forefathers, and never was called in question among them. And there is a great deal of reason, from the ancient Jewish writers, to suppose that the doctrine of Original Sin had ever been allowed in the open profession of that people;‡‡ though they were generally, in that corrupt time, very far from a prac-

* Luke xiii. 1—5. † Matt vi. 12, Luke xi. 4. ‡ Matt. vi. 14, 15, and xviii. 35. § Matt. vii. 11. ‖ Matt. xvi. 23. ¶ Matt. x. 16, 17. ** John vii. 7, viii. 23, xiv. 17, xv. 18, 19. †† Matt. xviii. 21, to the end.

‡‡ What is found in the more ancient of the Jewish Rabbies, who have wrote since the coming of Christ, is an argument of this. Many things of this sort are taken notice of by Stapferus, in his *Theologia Polemica* before mentioned. Some of these things which are there cited by him in Latin, I shall here faithfully give in English for the sake of the English reader.

"—So Manasseh, concerning Human Frailty, page 129. Gen. viii. 21, "*I will not any more curse the earth for man's sake; for the appetite of man is evil from his youth*;" that is, from the time when he comes forth *from his mother's womb*. For at the same time that he sucks the breasts, he follows his *lust*; and while he is yet an infant, he is under the dominion of anger, envy, hatred, and other vices to which that tender age is obnoxious. Prov. xxii. 15, Solomon says, "*Foolishness is bound to the mind of a child*." Concerning which place, *R. Levi Ben Gersom* observes thus: "*Foolishness, as it were, grows to him in his very beginning*." Concerning this sin, which is common and original to all men, David said, Psalm li. 5, "*Behold, I was begotten in iniquity, and in sin did my mother warm me*." Upon which place *Eben Ezra* says thus: "Behold, because of the concupiscence which is *innate* in the heart of man, it is said, *I am begotten in iniquity*." And the sense is, that there is implanted in the heart of man, *Tetzer harang*, an evil figment, from his nativity.

"And Manasseh Ben Israel, de Fragil, page 2, "*Behold, I was formed in iniquity, and in sin hath my mother warmed me*." But whether this be understood concerning the common mother, which was Eve, or whether David spake only of his own mother, he would signify, that sin is as it were *natural*, and *inseparable* in this life. For it is to be observed, that Eve conceived after the transgression was committed; and as many as were begotten afterwards, were not brought forth in a conformity to the rule of right reason, but in conformity to disorderly and lustful affections." He adds, "One of the wise men of the Jews, namely, *R Aba*, rightly observed, David would signify that it is impossible, even for pious men who excel

tical conviction of it; and many notions were then prevalent, especially among the Pharisees, which were indeed inconsistent with it. And though on account of these prejudices they might need to have this doctrine explained and applied to them, yet it is well known, by all acquainted with their Bibles, that Christ, for wise reasons, spake more sparingly and obscurely of several of the most important doctrines of revealed religion, relating to the necessity, grounds, nature, and way of his redemption, and the method of the justification of sinners, while he lived here in the flesh, and left these doctrines to be more plainly and fully opened and inculcated by the Holy Spirit, after his ascension.

But if after all, Christ did not speak of this doctrine often enough to suit Dr. Taylor, he might be asked, Why he supposes Christ did no *oftener*, and no more *plainly* teach some of *his* (Dr. Taylor's) doctrines, which he so much insists on? As, that temporal *death* comes on all mankind by Adam; and, that it comes on them by him, not as a punishment or calamity, but as a great favor, being made a rich benefit, and a fruit of God's abundant grace, by Christ's *redemption*, who came into the world as a second Adam for this end. Surely, if this were so, it was of vast *importance*, that it should be *known* to the church of God in all ages, who saw *death* reigning over *infants*, as well as others. If infants were indeed perfectly *innocent*, was it not needful, that the *design* of that which was such a melancholy and awful dispensation towards so many millions of innocent creatures, should be *known*, in order to prevent the worst thoughts of God from

in virtue, never to commit any sin." Job also asserts the same thing with David, chap. xiv. 4, saying, "*Who will give a clean thing from an unclean? Truly not one.*" Concerning which words *Aben Ezra* says thus: "The sense is the same with that, *I was begotten in iniquity*, because man is made out of an unclean thing." *Stapferus*, Theolog. Polem. Tom. iii. p. 36, 37.

Id. *Ibid.* p. 132, &c. "So *Sal Jarchi ad Gemaram, Cod. Schabbath*, fol. 142, p. 2, "And this is not only to be referred to *sinners*, because *all* the posterity of the *first man* are in like manner subjected to all the *curses* pronounced on him." And Manasseh Ben Israel, in his Preface to *Human Fruitly*, says, "I had a mind to show by what means it came to pass, that when the *first father* of all had *lost his righteousness*, his posterity are begotten liable to the *same punishment* with him." And *Munsterus*, on the gospel of Matthew, cites the following words from the book called *The Bundle of Myrrh*: "The blessed Lord said to the *first man*, when he cursed him, *Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field.* The thing which he means, is, that because of *his* sin, *all who should descend from him* should be wicked and perverse, like *thorns and thistles*, according to that word of the Lord, speaking to the Prophet: *Thorns and irritators are with thee, and thou dwellest among scorpions.* And all this is from the *serpent*, who was the Devil, *Sam-mael*, who emitted a mortiferous and corruptive poison into Eve, and became the cause of death to Adam himself, when he ate the fruit. Remarkable is the place quoted in *Joseph de Voisin*, against *Martin Raymund*, p. 471, of Master *Menachem Rakanatensis*, Sect. *Bereschit*, from *Midrasch Tehillim*, which is cited by *Hornbekius*, against the Jews, in these words: "It is no wonder that the sin of Adam and Eve is written and sealed with the king's ring, and to be propagated to all following generations; because on the day that Adam was created, all things were finished; so that he stood forth the perfection and completion of the whole workmanship of the world; so when *he* sinned, the *whole world* sinned, whose sin we bear and suffer. But the matter is not thus with respect to the sins of his posterity." Thus far Stapferus.

Besides these, as *Ainsworth* on Gen. viii. 21, observes, "In *Bereshith Rabba* (a Hebrew commentary on this place), a Rabbin is said to be asked, *When is the evil imagination put into man?* And he answered, *From the hour that he is formed.*" And in Pool's Synopsis it is added from *Grotius*, "So *Rabbi Solomon* interprets Gen. viii. 21, *The imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth*, of its being evil from the time that he is taken out of his mother's bowels." *Aben Ezra* thus interprets Psalm li. 5. *I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me*; that evil concupiscence is implanted in the heart from *childhood*, as if he were *formed* in it; and by *my mother*, he understands Eve, who did not bear children till she had sinned. And so *Kaferenah* says, *How shall I avoid sinning?* My original *is corrupt, and from thence are those sins.* So *Manasseh Ben Israel*, from this place (Psalm li. 5) concludes that not only David, but all mankind, ever since sin was introduced into the world, do sin from their *original*. To this purpose is the answer of *Rabbi Hakkadosch*, which there is an account of in the *Talmud*. *From what time does concupiscence rule over man? From the very moment of his first formation, or from his nativity?* Answ. *From his formation.*" Pool's *Synops.* in Loc.

On these things I observe, there is the greatest reason to suppose that these old Rabbies of the Jewish nation, who gave such heed to the *Tradition of the Elders*, would never have received this doctrine of *Original Sin*, had it not been delivered down to them from their *forefathers*. For it is a doctrine very disagreeable to those practical principles and notions wherein the religion of the unbelieving Jews most fundamentally *differs* from the religion maintained among Christians; particularly their notion of *justification* by their own righteousness and privileges as the children of Abraham, &c., without standing in need of any satisfaction by the suffering of the Messiah. On which account the modern Jews do now universally reject the doctrine of Original Sin and corruption of nature, as *Stapferus* observes. And it is

arising in the minds of the constant spectators of so mysterious and gloomy a dispensation? But why then such a *total silence* about it, for four thousand years together, and not one word of it in all the *Old Testament;* nor one word of it in all the *four gospels;* and indeed not one word of it in the *whole Bible*, but only as forced and wrung out by Dr. Taylor's arts of criticism and deduction, against the plainest and strongest evidence!

As to the arguments, made use of by many late writers, from the universal *moral sense*, and the reasons they offer from experience, and observation of the *nature* of mankind, to show that we are *born* into the world with principles of *virtue;* with a natural prevailing relish, approbation, and love of righteousness, truth, and goodness, and of whatever tends to the public welfare; with a prevailing natural disposition to dislike, to resent and condemn what is selfish, unjust and immoral; and a native bent in mankind to mutual benevolence, tender compassion, &c., those who have had such objections against the doctrine of Original Sin, thrown in their way, and desire to see them particularly considered, I ask leave to refer them to a *Treatise on the Nature of true Virtue*, lying by me prepared for the press, which may erelong be exhibited to public view.

not at all likely that the ancient Jews, if no such doctrine had been received by *tradition* from the fathers, would have taken it up from the *Christians*, whom they had in such great contempt and enmity; especially as it is a doctrine so peculiarly agreeable to the Christian notion of the *spiritual* salvation of Jesus, and so contrary to their *carnal* notions of the Messiah, and of his salvation and kingdom, and so contrary to their opinion of themselves, and a doctrine, which men in general are so apt to be prejudiced against. And besides, these *Rabbies* do expressly refer to the opinion of their *forefathers;* as *R. Manasseh* says, "According to the opinion of the *ancients*, none are subject to *death*, but those which have *sinned:* for where there is *no sin*, there is *no death*."—Stapfer. *Tom.* iii. p. 37, 38.

But we have more direct evidence, that the doctrine of Original Sin was truly a *received* doctrine among the ancient Jews, even before the coming of Christ. This appears by ancient Jewish writings, which were written before Christ; as, in the apocrypha, 2 Esdras, iii. 21, "For the first Adam, bearing a wicked heart, transgressed, and was overcome; and so be *all* they that are *born of him*. The *infirmity* was made permanent; and the law also in the heart of the people, with the *malignity* of the root; so that the *good* departed away, and the *evil* abode still."—2 Esdras iv. 30, "For the grain of *evil seed* hath been sown in the heart of Adam, from the beginning; and how much ungodliness hath it brought up unto this time! And how much shall it yet bring forth, till the time of threshing shall come!" And chap. vii. 46, "It had been better, not to have given the earth unto Adam; or else, when it was given him, to have restrained him from sinning; for what profit is it, for men now in this present time, to live in heaviness, and after death to look for punishment? O thou Adam, what hast thou done! For though it was thou that sinned, *thou art not fallen alone*, but *we all that come of thee*." And we read, Eccl. xxv. 24, "Of the woman came the *beginning of sin*, and *through her we all die*."

As this doctrine of *original corruption* was constantly maintained in the church of God from the beginning; so from thence, in all probability, as well as from the evidence of it in universal experience, it was, that the wiser *Heathen* maintained the like doctrine. Particularly *Plato*, that great philosopher, so distinguished for his veneration of ancient traditions, and diligent inquiries after them. *Gale*, in his *Court of the Gentiles*, observes as follows: "*Plato* says (Gorg. fol. 493), *I have heard from the wise men, that we are now* dead, *and that the body is but our sepulchre*. And in his *Timæus Locrus* (fol. 103) he says, *The cause of vitiosity is from our* parents, *and first principles, rather than from ourselves. So that we never relinquish those actions, which lead us to follow these primitive blemishes of our* FIRST PARENTS. *Plato* mentions the corruption of the *will*, and seems to disown any *free will* to *true* good; albeit he allows some ἀφυΐα, or natural dispositions, to *civil* good, in some great heroes. *Socrates* asserted the corruption of human nature, or κακὸν ἔμφυτον. *Grotius* affirms, that the philosophers acknowledged, it was *connatural* to men, to *sin*."

Seneca (Benef. v. 14) says, "Wickedness has not its first beginning in wicked *practice;* though by that it is first exercised and made manifest." And *Plutarch* (de Sera vindicta) says, "Man does not first become wicked, when he first *manifests himself so:* but he hath wickedness *from the beginning;* and he shows it as soon as he finds opportunity and ability. As men rightly judge, that the sting is not first engendered in *scorpions* when they strike, or the poison in *vipers* when they bite."—Pool's *Synops.* on Gen. viii. 21.

To which may be subjoined what *Juvenal* says:

—*Ad mores* natura *recurrit.*
Damnatos, fixa et maturi nescia.

Englished thus, in prose:

Nature a thing fixed and not knowing how to change, returns to its wicked manners.

WATTS' *Ruin and Recovery.*

CONCLUSION.

On the whole, I observe, there are some *other* things, besides arguments, in Dr. Taylor's book, which are calculated to influence the minds, and bias the judgments of some sorts of readers. Here, not to insist on taking the profession he makes, in many places, of *sincerity, humility, meekness, modesty, charity,* &c., in his searching after truth; and freely proposing his thoughts, with the *reasons* of them, to others;* nor on his magisterial *assurance*, appearing on many occasions, and the high *contempt* he sometimes expresses of the opinions and arguments of very excellent divines and fathers in the church of God, who have thought *differently* from him:† *both* of which things, it is not unlikely, may have a degree of influence on some of his readers. (However, that they may have only their *just* influence, these things might properly be compared together, and set in *contrast*, one with the other.)—I say, not to dwell on these matters, I would take some notice of another thing, observable in the writings of Dr. Taylor, and many of the late opposers of the more peculiar doctrines of Christianity, tending (especially with *juvenile* and *unwary* readers) not a little to abate the force, and prevent the due effect, of the clearest *Scripture evidences*, in favor of those important doctrines; and particularly to make void the arguments taken from the writings of the Apostle Paul, in which those doctrines are more plainly and fully revealed, than in any other part of the Bible. What I mean is this: these gentlemen express a high opinion of this apostle, and that very justly, for his eminent genius, his admirable sagacity, strong powers of reasoning, acquired learning, &c. They speak of him as a writer—of masterly address, of extensive reach, and deep design, everywhere in his epistles, almost in every word he says. This looks exceeding *specious*: it carries a plausible appearance of *Christian zeal*, and attachment to the *Holy Scriptures*, in such a testimony of high veneration for that great apostle, who was not only the principal instrument of propagating Christianity, but with his own hand wrote so considerable a part of the New Testament. And I am far from determining, with respect at least to some of these writers, that they are *not sincere* in their declarations, or that all is mere *artifice*, only to make way for the reception of *their own* peculiar sentiments. However, it tends greatly to subserve such a purpose; as much as if it were designedly contrived, with the utmost subtlety, for that end. Hereby their incautious readers are prepared the more easily to be drawn into a belief, that they, and others in their way of thinking, have not *rightly understood* many of those things in this apostle's writings, which before seemed very *plain* to them; and they are also prepared, by a prepossession in *favor* of these *new writers*, to entertain a favorable thought of the *interpretations* put by them upon the words and phrases of this apostle; and to admit in many passages a meaning which before lay entirely out of sight; quite foreign to all that in the view of a common reader seems to be their obvious sense; and most remote from the expositions agreed in, by those which used to be esteemed the greatest divines, and best commentators. For they must know, that this apostle, being a man of no *vulgar* understanding, it is nothing strange if his meaning lies very *deep*; and no wonder then, if the superficial discerning and observation of vulgar Christians, or indeed of the herd of common divines, such as the *Westminster Assembly*, &c., falls vastly short of the apostle's reach, and frequently does not enter into the true spirit and design of Paul's epistles. They

* See his Preface, and pages 6, 237, 265, 267, 175, &c.

† Pages 110, 128, 150, 151, 158, 161 183 188, 77, &c.

must understand, that the *first reformers*, and preachers and expositors in general, both before and since the reformation, for fifteen or sixteen hundred years past, were too *unlearned* and *shortsighted*, to be capable of penetrating into the sense, or fit to undertake the making comments on the writings of so great a man as this apostle; or else had dwelt in a cave of *bigotry* and *superstition*, too gloomy to allow them to use their own understandings with freedom, in reading the Scripture. But at the same time, it must be understood, that there is risen up, now at length in this happy age of light and liberty, a set of men, of a more free and generous turn of mind, a more inquisitive genius, and better discernment. By such insinuations they seek advantage to their cause; and thus the most unreasonable and extravagant interpretations of Scripture are palliated and recommended: so that, if the simple reader is not very much on his guard, if he does not clearly see with his own eyes, or has too much indolence, or too little leisure, thoroughly to examine for himself (as few, alas, are willing to be at the pains of acquainting themselves thoroughly with the apostle's writings, and of comparing one part of them with another, so as to be fully able to judge of these gentlemen's glosses and pretences); in this case, he is in danger of being imposed on with delusive appearances; as he is prepared by this fair pretext of exalting the sagacity of the apostle, and by a parade of learning, criticism, exact version, penetration into the new scope, and discerning of wonderful connections, together with the airs these writers assume of dictatorial peremptoriness, and contempt of old opinions and old expositions; I say, such a one is by these things prepared to swallow strange doctrine, as trusting to the superior abilities of these modern interpreters.

But I humbly conceive, their interpretations, particularly of the Apostle Paul's writings, though in some things ingenious, yet in many things concerning these great articles of religion, are extremely absurd, and demonstrably disagreeable, in the highest degree, to *his* real design, to the language he commonly uses, and to the doctrines currently taught in his epistles. Their *criticisms*, when examined, appear far more subtle, than solid; and it seems as if nothing can possibly be strong enough, nothing perspicuous enough, in any composure whatever, to stand before such *liberties* as these writers indulge: the plainest and most nervous discourse is analyzed and criticised, till it dissolves into nothing, or till it becomes a thing of little significance: the holy Scripture is subtilized into a mere mist; or made to evaporate into a thin cloud, that easily puts on any shape, and is moved in any direction. with a puff of wind, just as the manager pleases. It is not in the nature and power of language, to afford sufficient defence against such an art, so abused; as, I imagine, a due consideration of some things I have had occasion in the preceding discourse to observe, may abundantly convince us.

But this, with the rest of what I have offered on this subject of Original Sin, must be left to every candid reader to judge of, for himself; and the *success* of the whole must now be left with *God*, who knows what is agreeable to his own mind, and is able to make his own truths prevail; however mysterious they may seem to the poor, partial, narrow, and extremely imperfect views of mortals, while looking through a cloudy and delusory medium; and however disagreeable they may be to the innumerable prejudices of men's hearts: and who has promised, that the gospel of *Christ*, such as is really *his*, shall finally be victorious; and has assured us, that the *word* which goeth out of his mouth, *shall not return to him void, but shall accomplish that which he pleaseth, and shall prosper in the thing whereto he sends it.* Let *God* arise, and plead his own cause, and glorify his own great name. AMEN.

MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS

CONCERNING

THE DIVINE DECREES IN GENERAL,

AND

ELECTION IN PARTICULAR.

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CONCERNING THE DIVINE DECREES IN GENERAL, AND ELECTION IN PARTICULAR.

§ 1. WHETHER God has decreed all things that ever came to pass or not, all that own the being of a God, own that he knows all things beforehand Now, it is self-evident, that if he knows all things beforehand, he either doth approve of them, or he doth not approve of them; that is, he either is willing they should be, or he is not willing they should be. But to will that they should be, is to decree them.

§ 2. The Arminians ridicule the distinction between the secret and revealed will of God, or, more properly expressed, the distinction between the decree and law of God; because we say he may decree one thing, and command another. And so they argue, we hold a contrariety in God, as if one will of his contradicted another. However, if they will call this a contradiction of wills, we know that there is such a thing; so that it is the greatest absurdity to dispute about it. We and they know it was God's secret will that Abraham should not sacrifice his son Isaac; but yet his command was, that he should do it. We know that God willed, that Pharaoh's heart should be hardened; and yet, that the hardness of his heart was sin. We know that God willed the Egyptians should hate God's people: Psal. cv. 25, "He turned their heart to hate his people, and deal subtilly with his servants." We know that it was God's will, that Absalom should lie with David's wives; 2 Sam. xii. 11, "Thus saith the Lord, I will raise up this evil against thee, out of thine own house; and I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbor; and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this sun. For thou didst it secretly; but I will do this thing before all Israel, and before the sun." We know that God willed that Jeroboam and the ten tribes should rebel. The same may be said of the plunder of the Babylonians; and other instances might be given. The Scripture plainly tells us, that God wills to harden some men, Rom. ix. 18. That he willed that Christ should be killed by men, &c.

§ 3. It is most certain, that if there are any things so contingent, that there is an equal possibility of their being or not being, so that they may be, or they may not be; God foreknows from all eternity that they may be, and also that they may not be. All will grant that we need no revelation to teach us this. And furthermore, if God knows all things that are to come to pass, he also foreknows whether those contingent things are to come to pass or no, at the same time that they are contingent, and that they may or may not come to pass. But what a contradiction is it to say that God knows a thing will come to pass, and yet at the same time knows that it is contingent whether it will come to pass or no; that is, he certainly knows that it will come to pass, and yet certainly knows it may not come to pass! What a contradiction is it to say, that God certainly

foreknew that Judas would betray his master, or Peter deny him, and yet certainly knew that it might be otherwise, or certainly knew that he might be deceived! I suppose it will be acknowledged by all, that for God certainly to know a thing will be, and yet certainly to know that it may not be, is the same thing as certainly to know that he may be deceived. I suppose it will also be acknowledged, that certainly to know a thing, and also at the same time to know that we may be deceived in it, is the same thing as certainly to know it and certainly to know that we are uncertain of it, or that we do not certainly know it; and that is the same thing as certainly to know it, and not certainly to know it at the same time; which we leave to be considered, whether it be not a contradiction.

§ 4. The meaning of the word *absolute*, when used about the decrees, wants to be stated. It is commonly said that God decrees nothing upon a foresight of any thing in the creature; as this, they say, argues imperfection in God; and so it does, taken in the sense that they commonly intend it. But nobody, I believe, will deny but that God decrees many things that he would not have decreed, if he had not foreknown and foredetermined such and such other things. What we mean, we completely express thus—That God decrees all things harmoniously, and in excellent order, one thing harmonizes with another, and there is such a relation between all the decrees, as makes the most excellent order. Thus God decrees rain in drought, because he decrees the earnest prayers of his people; or thus, he decrees the prayers of his people, because he decrees rain. I acknowledge, to say, *God decrees a thing because*, is an improper way of speaking; but not more improper than all our other ways of speaking about God. God decrees the latter event, because of the former, no more than he decrees the former, because of the latter. But this is what we mean—When God decrees to give the blessing of rain, he decrees the prayers of his people; and when he decrees the prayers of his people for rain, he very commonly decrees rain; and thereby there is a harmony between these two decrees, of rain, and the prayers of God's people. Thus also, when he decrees diligence and industry, he decrees riches and prosperity; when he decrees prudence, he often decrees success; when he decrees striving, then he often decrees the obtaining the kingdom of heaven; when he decrees the preaching of the gospel, then he decrees the bringing home of souls to Christ; when he decrees good natural faculties, diligence and good advantages, then he decrees learning; when he decrees summer, then he decrees the growing of plants; when he decrees conformity to His Son, then he decrees calling; when he decrees calling, then he decrees justification; and when he decrees justification, then he decrees everlasting glory. Thus, all the decrees of God are harmonious; and this is all that can be said for or against absolute or conditional decrees. But this I say, it is as improper to make one decree a condition of another, as to make the other a condition of that: but there is a harmony between both.

§ 5. It cannot be any injustice in God to determine who is certainly to sin, and so certainly to be damned. For, if we suppose this impossibility, that God had not determined any thing, things would happen as fatally as they do now. For, as to such an absolute contingency, which they attribute to man's will, calling it the sovereignty of the will; if they mean, by this sovereignty of will, that a man can will as he wills, it is perfect nonsense, and the same as if they should spend abundance of time and pains, and be very hot at proving, that a man can will when he doth will; that is, that it is possible for that to be, which is. But if they mean, that there is a perfect contingency in the will of man, that is, that it happens merely by chance that a man wills such a thing,

and not another, it is an impossibility and contradiction, that a thing should be without any cause or reason, and when there was every way as much cause why it should not have been. Wherefore, seeing things do unavoidably go fatally and necessarily, what injustice is it in the Supreme Being, seeing it is a contradiction that it should be otherwise, to decree that they should be as they are?

§ 6. Contingency, as it is holden by some, is at the same time contradicted by themselves, if they hold foreknowledge. This is all that follows from an absolute, unconditional, irreversible decree, that it is impossible but that the things decreed should be. The same exactly follows from foreknowledge, that it is absolutely impossible but that the thing certainly foreknown should precisely come to pass.

If it will universally hold, that none can have absolutely perfect and complete happiness, at the same time that any thing is otherwise than he desires at that time it should be; or thus, if it be true, that he has not absolute, perfect, infinite and all possible happiness now, who has not now all that he wills to have now: then God, if any thing is now otherwise than he wills to have it now, is not now absolutely, perfectly and infinitely happy. If God is infinitely happy now, then every thing is now, as God would have it to be now; if every thing, then those things that are contrary to his commands If so, it is not ridiculous to say, that things which are contrary to God's commands, are yet in a sense agreeable to his will. Again, let it be considered whether it be not certainly true, that every one that can with infinite ease have a thing done, and yet will not have it done, wills it not; that is, whether or no he that wills not to have a thing done, properly wills not to have a thing done. For example, let the thing be this, that Judas should be faithful to his Lord; whether it be not true, that if God could with infinite ease have it done as he would, but would not have it done as he could, if he would, it be not proper to say, that God would not have it be, that Judas should be faithful to his Lord.

§ 7. They say, to what purpose are praying and striving, and attending on means, if all was irreversibly determined by God before? But, to say that all was determined before these prayers and strivings, is a very wrong way of speaking, and begets those ideas in the mind, which correspond with no realities with respect to God. The decrees of our everlasting state were not before our prayers and strivings; for these are as much present with God from all eternity, as they are the moment they are present with us. They are present as part of his decrees, or rather as the same; and they did as really exist in eternity, with respect to God, as they exist in time, and as much at one time as another. Therefore, we can no more fairly argue, that these will be in vain, because God has foredetermined all things, than we can, that they would be in vain if they existed as soon as the decree, for so they do, inasmuch as they are a part of it.

§ 8. That we should say, that God has decreed every action of men, yea, every action that is sinful, and every circumstance of those actions; that he predetermines that they shall be in every respect as they afterwards are; that he determines that there shall be such actions, and just so sinful as they are; and yet that God does not decree the actions that are sinful, as sin, but decrees them as good, is really consistent. For we do not mean, by decreeing an action *as sinful*, the same as decreeing an action so that it shall be sinful; but by decreeing an action *as sinful*, I mean decreeing it for the sake of the sinfulness of the action. God decrees that they shall be sinful, for the sake of the good that he causes to arise from the sinfulness thereof; whereas man decrees them for the sake of the evil that is in them.

§ 9. When a distinction is made between God's revealed will and his secret will, or his will of command and decree, will is certainly in that distinction taken in two senses. His will of decree, is not his will in the same sense as his will of command is. Therefore, it is no difficulty at all to suppose, that the one may be otherwise than the other: his will in both senses is his inclination. But when we say he wills virtue, or loves virtue, or the happiness of his creature: thereby is intended, that virtue, or the creature's happiness, absolutely and simply considered, is agreeable to the inclination of his nature. His will of decree, is his inclination to a thing, not as to that thing absolutely and simply, but with respect to the universality of things, that have been, are, or shall be. So God, though he hates a thing as it is simply, may incline to it with reference to the universality of things. Though he hates sin in itself, yet he may will to permit it, for the greater promotion of holiness in this universality, including all things, and at all times. So, though he has no inclination to a creature's misery, considered absolutely, yet he may will it, for the greater promotion of happiness in this universality. God inclines to excellency, which is harmony, but yet he may incline to suffer that which is unharmonious in itself, for the promotion of universal harmony, or for the promoting of the harmony that there is in the universality, and making it shine the brighter. And thus it must needs be, and no hypothesis whatsoever will relieve a man, but that he must own these two wills of God. For all must own, that God sometimes wills not to hinder the breach of his own commands, because he does not in fact hinder it. He wills to permit sin, it is evident, because he *does* permit it. None will say that God himself does what he does not *will* to do. But you will say, God wills to permit sin, as he wills the creature should be left to his freedom; and if he should hinder it, he would offer violence to the nature of his own creature. I answer, this comes nevertheless to the very thing that I say. You say, God does not will sin absolutely; but rather than alter the law of nature and the nature of free agents, he wills it. He wills what is contrary to excellency in some particulars, for the sake of a more general excellency and order. So that this scheme of the Arminians does not help the matter.

§ 10. It is a proper and excellent thing for infinite glory to shine forth; and for the same reason, it is proper that the shining forth of God's glory should be complete; that is, that all parts of his glory should shine forth, that every beauty should be proportionably effulgent, that the beholder may have a proper notion of God. It is not proper that one glory should be exceedingly manifested, and another not at all; for then the effulgence would not answer the reality. For the same reason it is not proper that one should be manifested exceedingly, and another but very little. It is highly proper that the effulgent glory of God should answer his real excellency; that the splendor should be answerable to the real and essential glory, for the same reason that it is proper and excellent for God to glorify himself at all. Thus it is necessary, that God's awful majesty, his authority and dreadful greatness, justice and holiness, should be manifested. But this could not be, unless sin and punishment had been decreed; so that the shining forth of God's glory would be very imperfect, both because these parts of divine glory would not shine forth as the others do, and also the glory of his goodness, love and holiness would be faint without them; nay, they could scarcely shine forth at all. If it were not right that God should decree and permit and punish sin, there could be no manifestation of God's holiness in hatred of sin, or in showing any preference, in his providence, of godliness before it. There would be no manifestation of God's grace or true goodness, if there was no sin to be pardoned, no misery to be saved from. How much happiness soever he

bestowed, his goodness would not be so much prized and admired, and the sense of it not so great, as we have elsewhere shown. We little consider how much the sense of good is heightened by the sense of evil, both moral and natural. And as it is necessary that there should be evil, because the display of the glory of God could not but be imperfect and incomplete without it, so evil is necessary, in order to the highest happiness of the creature, and the completeness of that communication of God, for which he made the world; because the creature's happiness consists in the knowledge of God and sense of his love. And if the knowledge of him be imperfect, the happiness of the creature must be proportionably imperfect; and the happiness of the creature would be imperfect upon another account also; for, as we have said, the sense of good is comparatively dull and flat, without the knowledge of evil.

§ 11. It is owned, that God did choose men to eternal life, upon a foresight of their faith. But then, here is the question, whether God decreed that faith, and chose them that they should believe.

§ 12. The sin of crucifying Christ being foreordained of God in his decree, and ordered in his providence, of which we have abundant evidence from the nature of the thing, and from the great ends God had to accomplish by means of this wicked act of crucifying Christ; it being, as it were, the cause of all the decrees, the greatest of all decreed events, and that on which all other decreed events depend as their main foundation; being the main thing in that greatest work of God, the work of redemption, which is the end of all other works; and it being so much prophesied of, and so plainly spoken of, as being done according to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God; I say, seeing we have such evidence that this sin is foreordained in God's decrees, and ordered in providence, and it being, as it were, the head sin, and representative of the sin of men in general; hence is a clear argument, that all the sins of men are foreordained and ordered by a wise providence.

§ 13. It is objected against the absolute decrees respecting the future actions of men, and especially the unbelief of sinners, and their rejection of the gospel, that this does not consist with the sincerity of God's calls and invitations to such sinners; as he has willed, in his eternal secret decree, that they should never accept of those invitations. To which I answer, that there is that in God, respecting the acceptance and compliance of sinners, which God knows will never be, and which he has decreed never to cause to be, in which, though it be not just the same with our desiring and wishing for that which will never come to pass, yet there is nothing wanting but what would imply imperfection in the case. There is all in God that is good, and perfect, and excellent in our desires and wishes for the conversion and salvation of wicked men. As, for instance, there is a love to holiness, absolutely considered, or an agreeableness of holiness to his nature and will; or, in other words, to his natural inclination. The holiness and happiness of the creature, absolutely considered, are things that he loves. These things are infinitely more agreeable to his nature than to ours. There is all in God that belongs to our desire of the holiness and happiness of unconverted men and reprobates, excepting what implies imperfection. All that is consistent with infinite knowledge, wisdom, power, self-sufficience, infinite happiness and immutability. Therefore, there is no reason that his absolute prescience, or his wise determination and ordering what is future, should hinder his expressing this disposition of his nature, in like manner as we are wont to express such a disposition in ourselves, viz., by calls and invitations, and the like.

The disagreeableness of the wickedness and misery of the creature, absolutely

considered, to the nature of God, is all that is good in pious and holy men's lamenting the past misery and wickedness of men. Their lamenting these, is good no farther than it proceeds from the disagreeableness of those things to their holy and good nature. This is also all that is good in wishing for the future holiness and happiness of men. And there is nothing wanting in God, in order to his having such desires and such lamentings, but imperfection; and nothing is in the way of his having them, but infinite perfection; and therefore it properly, naturally, and necessarily came to pass, that when God, in the manner of his existence, came down from his infinite perfection, and accommodated himself to our nature and manner, by being made man, as he was, in the person of Jesus Christ, he really desired the conversion and salvation of reprobates, and lamented their obstinacy and misery; as when he beheld the city Jerusalem, and wept over it, saying, "O Jerusalem," &c. In the like manner, when he comes down from his infinite perfection, though not in the manner of being, but in the manner of manifestation, and accommodates himself to our nature and manner, in the manner of expression, it is equally natural and proper that he should express himself as though he desired the conversion and salvation of reprobates, and lamented their obstinacy and misery.

§ 14. Maxim 1. There is no such thing *truly* as any pain or grief, or trouble in God.

Maxim 2. Hence it follows that there is no such thing as any real disappointment in God, or his being really crossed in his will, or things going contrary to his will; because, according to the notion of *will*, to have one's will is agreeable and pleasing; for it is the notion of being pleased or suited, to have things as we will them to be; and so, on the other hand, to have things contrary to one's will, is disagreeable, troublesome, or uncomfortable. Job xxiii. 13, "He is in one mind, who can turn him? And what his soul desireth, that he doth."

In the first place, I lay this down, which I suppose none will deny, that as to God's own actions, God decrees them, or purposes them beforehand. For none will be so absurd as to say that God acts without intentions, or without designing to act, or that he forbears to act without intending to forbear. 2dly. That whatsoever God intends or purposes, he intends and purposes from all eternity, and that there are no new purposes or intentions in God. For, if God sometimes begins to intend what he did not intend before, then two things will follow.

1. That God is not omniscient. If God sometimes begins to design what he did not design before, it must of necessity be for want of knowledge, or for want of knowing things before as he knows them now, for want of having exactly the same views of things. If God begins to intend what he did not before intend, it must be because he now sees reasons to intend it, that he did not see before; or that he has something new objected to his understanding, to influence him.

2. If God begins to intend or purpose things that he did not intend before, then God is certainly mutable, and then he must in his own mind and will, be liable to succession and change; for wherever there are new things, there is succession and change. Therefore, I shall take these two things for positions granted and supposed in this controversy, viz., that as to God's own actions and forbearings to act, he decrees and purposes them beforehand; and that whatsoever God designs or purposes, he purposes from all eternity, and thus decrees from all eternity all his own actions and forbearings to act.

Corolr. Hence God decrees from all eternity, to permit all the evil that

ever he does permit; because God's permitting is God's forbearing to act or to prevent.

§ 15. It can be made evident by reason, that nothing can come to pass, but what it is the will and pleasure of God should come to pass. This may be argued from the infinite happiness of God. For every being had rather things should go according to his will, than not; because, if he had not rather, then it is not his will. It is a contradiction to say, he wills it, and yet does not choose it, or had not rather it should be so than not. But if God had rather things should be according to his will than not, then, if a thing fall out otherwise than he hath willed, he meets with a cross; because, on this supposition, he had rather it should have been otherwise, and therefore he would have been better pleased if the thing had been otherwise. It is contrary to what he chose, and therefore it is of necessity that he must be displeased. It is of necessity that every being should be pleased, when a thing is as he chooses, or had rather it should be. It is a contradiction to suppose otherwise. For it is the very notion of being pleased, to have things agreeable to one's pleasure. For the very same reason, every being is crossed, or it is unpleasing to him, when a thing is, that he chose, and had rather should not have been. For it is the very notion of a thing's being cross or unpleasing to any, that it is contrary to his pleasure.

But if God can meet with crosses and things unpleasing to him, then he is not perfectly and unchangeably happy. For wherever there is any unpleasedness or unpleasantness, it must, of necessity, in a degree, diminish the happiness of the subject. Where there is any cross to a being's choice, there is something contrary to happiness. Wherever there is any unpleasedness, there is something contrary to pleasure, and which consequently diminishes pleasure. It is impossible any thing should be plainer than this.

§ 16. The commands and prohibitions of God are only significations of our duty and of his nature. It is acknowledged that sin is, in itself considered, infinitely contrary to God's nature; but it does not follow, but that it may be the pleasure of God to permit it, for the sake of the good that he will bring out of it. God can bring such good out of that, which in itself is contrary to his nature, and which, in itself considered, he abhors, as may be very agreeable to his nature, and when sin is spoken of as contrary to the will of God, it is contrary to his will, considered only as in itself. As man commits it, it is contrary to God's will; for men act in committing it with a view to that which is evil. But as God permits it, it is not contrary to God's will; for God in permitting it has respect to the great good that he will make it an occasion of. If God respected sin as man respects it in committing it, it would be exceedingly contrary to his will; but considered as God decrees to permit it, it is not contrary to God's will. To give an instance: the crucifying of Christ was a great sin; and as men committed it, it was exceedingly hateful, and highly provoking to God. Yet upon many great considerations it was the will of God that it should be done. Will any body say that it was not the will of God that Christ should be crucified? Acts iv. 28, "For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done."

§ 17. Sin is an evil, yet the futurition of sin, or that sin should be future, is not an evil thing. Evil is an evil thing, and yet it may be a good thing that evil should be in the world. There is certainly a difference between the thing itself existing, and its being an evil thing that ever it came into existence. As, for instance, it might be an evil thing to crucify Christ, but yet it was a good thing that the crucifying of Christ came to pass. As men's act, it was evil.

but as God ordered it, it was good. Who will deny but that it may be so that evil's coming to pass may be an occasion of a greater good than that is an evil. and so of there being more good in the whole, than if that evil had not come to pass? And if so, then it is a good thing that that evil comes to pass. When we say the thing is an evil thing in itself, then we mean that it is evil, considering it only within its own bounds. But when we say that it is a good thing that ever it came to pass, then we consider the thing as a thing among events, or as one thing belonging to the series of events, and as related to the rest of the series. If a man should say that it was a good thing that ever it happened that Joseph's brethren sold him into Egypt, or that it was a good thing that ever it came to pass that Pope Leo X. sent out indulgencies for the commission of future sins, nobody would understand a man thus expressing himself, as justifying these acts.

It implies no contradiction to suppose that an act may be an evil act, and yet that it is a good thing that such an act should come to pass. A man may have been a bad man, and yet it may be a good thing that there has been such a man. This implies no contradiction; because it implies no contradiction to suppose that there being such a man may be an occasion of there being more good in the whole, than there would have been otherwise. So it no more implies a contradiction to suppose that an action may be a bad action, and yet that it may be a good thing that there has been such an action. God's commands, and calls, and counsels, do imply another thing, viz., that it is our duty to do these things; and though they may be our duty, yet it may be certain beforehand that we shall not do them.

And if there be any difficulty in this, the same difficulty will attend the scheme of the Arminians; for they allow that God permits sin. Therefore, as he permits it, it cannot be contrary to his will. For if it were contrary to his will as he permits it, then it would be contrary to his will to permit it; for that is the same thing. But nobody will say that God permits sin, when it is against his will to permit it; for this would be to make him act involuntarily, or against his own will.

§ 18. "The wrath of man shall praise thee, and the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain." Psal. lxxvi. 10. If God restrains sin when he pleases; and when he permits it, permits it for the sake of some good that it will be an occasion of, and does actually restrain it in all other cases; it is evident that when he permits it, it is his will that it should come to pass for the sake of the good that it will be an occasion of. If he permits it for the sake of that good, then he does not permit it merely because he would infringe on the creature's liberty in restraining it; as is further evident because he does restrain it when that good is not in view. If it be his will to permit it to come to pass, for the sake of the good that its coming to pass will be an occasion of; then it is his will to permit it, that by its coming to pass he may obtain that good; and therefore, it must necessarily be his will that it should come to pass, that he may obtain that good. If he permits it, that, by its coming to pass, he may obtain a certain good, then his proximate end in permitting it, is that it may come to pass. And if he wills the means for the sake of the end, he therein wills the end. If God wills to permit a thing that it may come to pass, then he wills that it should come to pass. This is self-evident. But if he wills to permit it to come to pass, that by its coming to pass he may obtain some end, then he wills to permit it that it should come to pass. For to will to permit a thing to come to pass, that by its coming to pass good may be obtained, is exactly the same thing as to will to permit it to come to pass, that it may come to pass, and so

the end may be attained. To will to permit a thing to come to pass, that he may obtain some end by its coming to pass, and yet to be unwilling that it should come to pass, certainly implies a contradiction.

If the foundation of that distinction that there is between one man and another, whereby one is a good man, and another a wicked man, be God's pleasure and his causation; then God has absolutely elected the particular persons that are to be godly. For, by supposition, it is owing to his determination. Matth xi. 25, 26, 27, "At that time Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight. All things are delivered unto me of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him."

§ 19. It may be argued, from the infinite power and wisdom of God, that nothing can come to pass, but that it must be agreeable to the will and pleasure of God that it should come to pass. For, as was observed before, every being had rather things should be according to his will, than not. Therefore, if things be not according to his will, it must be for want of power. It cannot be for want of will, by supposition. It must therefore be for want of sufficiency. It must be either because he cannot have it so, or cannot have it so without some difficulty, or some inconvenience; or all may be expressed in a word, viz., that he wants sufficiency to have things as he wishes. But this cannot be the case of a being of infinite power and infinite wisdom. If he has infinite power and wisdom, he can order all things to be just as he wills: and he can order it with perfect and infinite ease, or without the least difficulty or inconveniency. Two things lie before him, both equally within his power, either to order the matter to be, or not to order it to be; and both of them are equally easy to him. One is as little trouble to him as the other; as to easiness or trouble, they are perfectly equal. It is as easy for him to order it, as not to order it. Therefore, his determination, whether it be ordering it, or not ordering it, must be a certain sign of his will in the case. If he does order it to be, this is a sign that his will is that it should be. And if he does not order it to be, but suffers it not to be, that is as sure a sign that he wills that it should not be. So that, however the thing is, it is a sure sign that it is the will of God that it should be as it is.

To this nothing can be objected, unless that it is not for want of will, nor want of power in God, that things be not as he would have them, but because the nature of the subject will not allow of it. But how can this be to the purpose, when the nature of the subject itself is of God, and is wholly within his power, is altogether the fruit of his mere will? And cannot a God of infinite wisdom and infinite power cause the natures of things to be such, and order them so after they are caused, as to have things as he chooses, or without his will's being crossed, and things so coming to pass that he had rather have them otherwise? As, for instance, God foresaw who would comply with the terms of salvation, and who would not: and he could have forborne to give being to such as he foresaw would not comply, if, upon some consideration, it was not his pleasure that there should be some who should not comply with the terms of salvation. Objectors may say, God cannot always prevent men's sins, unless he act contrary to the free nature of the subject, or without destroying men's liberty. But will they deny, that an omnipotent and infinitely wise God could not possibly invent and set before men such strong motives to obedience, and have kept them before them in such a manner, as should have influenced all mankind to continue in their obedience, as the elect angels have done, without

destroying their liberty? God will order it so, that the saints and angels in heaven never will sin: and does it therefore follow, that their liberty is destroyed, and that they are not free, but forced in their actions? Does it follow, that they are turned into blocks, as the Arminians say the Calvinist doctrines turn men?

§ 20. God decrees all the good that ever comes to pass; and therefore there certainly will come to pass no more good, than he has absolutely decreed to cause; and there certainly and infallibly will no more believe, no more be godly, and no more be saved, than God has decreed that he will cause to believe, and cause to be godly, and will save.

§ 21. The foreknowledge of God will necessarily infer a decree: for God could not foreknow that things would be, unless he had decreed they should be; and that because things would not be future, unless he had decreed they should be. If God, from all eternity, knew that such and such things were future, then hey were future; and consequently the proposition was from all eternity true, hat such a thing, at such a time, would be. And it is as much impossible that a thing should be future, without some reason of its being future, as that it should actually be, without some reason why it is. It is as perfectly unreasonable to suppose, that this proposition should be true, viz., such a thing will be, or is to be, without a reason why it is true; as it is that this proposition should be true, such a thing actually is, or has been, without some reason why that is true, or why that thing exists. For, as the being of the thing is not in its own nature necessary, so that proposition that was true before, viz., that it shall be, is not in its own nature a necessary truth. And therefore I draw this consequence, that if there must be some reason of the futurition of the thing, or why the thing is future; this can be no other than God's decree; or the truth of the proposition, that such a thing will be, has been determined by God. For the truth of the proposition is determined by the supposition. My meaning is, that it does not remain a question; but the matter is decided, whether the proposition shall be true or not. The thing, in its own nature, is not necessary, but only possible; and therefore, it is not of itself that it is future; it is not of itself in a state of futurition, if I may so speak, but only in a state of possibility; and there must be some cause to bring it out of a state of mere possibility, into a state of futurition. This must be God only; for there was no other being by supposition existing. And though other things are future, yet it will not be sufficient to say, that the futurition of other things is the cause of the futurition of this. And it is owing only to him, that is the first being, and that exists necessarily, and of himself, that all other things, that are not in their own nature necessary, or necessarily future, but merely possible, are brought out of that state of mere possibility, into a state of futurition, to be certainly future. Here is an effect already lone, viz., the rendering that which in its own nature is only possible, to be certainly future, so that it can be certainly known to be future; and there must be something already existing, that must have caused this effect. Whatsoever is not of itself or by the necessity of its own nature, is an effect of something else. But that such a thing should be future by supposition, is not of itself or by necessity of its own nature. If things that appertain to the creature, or things that come to pass in time, be not future of themselves and of their own nature, then they are future, because God makes them to be future. This is exceedingly evident; for there is nothing else at all besides God and things that come to pass in time. And therefore, if things that come to pass in time have not the reason of their own futurition in themselves, it must be in God.

But if you say, that the ground or reason of their futurition is in the things

themselves, then things are future, prior to any decree, or their futurition is antecedent in nature of any decree of God. And then, to what purpose is any decree of God? For, according to this supposition, God's decreeing does not make any thing future, or not future; because it was future, prior to his decree. His decreeing or appointing that any thing shall be, or shall not be, does not alter the case. It is not about to be, or about not to be, any thing the more for God's decreeing it. According to this supposition, God has no freedom or choice in decreeing or appointing any thing. It is not at his choice what shall be future, and what not; no, not in one thing. For the futurition of things is by this supposition antecedent in nature to his choice; so that his choosing or refusing does not alter the case. The things in themselves are future, and his decreeing cannot make them not future; for they cannot be future and not future at the same time; neither can it make them future, because they are future already; so that they who thus plead for man's liberty, advance principles which destroy the freedom of God himself. It is allowed that things are future before they come to pass; because God foreknows them. Either things are future antecedently to God's decree and independently of it, or they are not. If they are not future antecedently to, and independently of God's decree, then they are made so by his decree; there is no medium. But if they are so antecedently to his decree, then the above-mentioned absurdity will follow, viz., that God has no power by his decree to make any thing future or not future. He has no choice in the case. And if it be already decided, something must have decided it; for, as has been already shown, it is not true without a reason why it is true. And if something has determined or decided the truth of it, it must be God that has decided it, or something else. It cannot be chance or mere accident: that is contrary to every rational supposition. For it is to be supposed, that there is some reason for it, and that something does decide it. If there be any thing that comes to pass by mere accident, that comes to pass of itself without any reason. If it be not chance therefore that has decided it, it must be God or the creature. It cannot be the creature as actually existing: for, by supposition, it is determined from all eternity before any creature exists. Therefore, if it be any thing in the creature that decides it in any way, it must be only the futurition of that thing in the creature. But this brings us to the absurdity and contradiction, that the same thing is both the cause and the effect of itself. The very effect, the cause of which we are seeking, is the futurition of the thing; and if this futurition be the cause of that effect, it is the cause of itself.

§ 22. The first objection of the Arminians is, that the divine decree infringes on the creature's liberty. In answer to this objection, we may observe some things to show what is the true notion of liberty, and the absurdity of their notion of liberty. Their notion of liberty is, that there is a sovereignty in the will, and that the will determines itself, so that its determination to choose or refuse this or that, is primarily within itself; which description of liberty implies a self-contradiction. For it supposes the will, in its first act, choosing or refusing to be determined by itself; which implies that there is an antecedent act of the will to that first act, determining that act. For, if the will determines its own first act, then there must be an act of the will before that first act (for that determining is acting), which is a contradiction. There can be no fallacy in this; for we know that if the will determines its own act, it does not determine it without acting. Therefore, here is this contradiction, viz., that there is an act of the will before the first act. There is an act of the will determining what it shall choose, before the first act of choice; which is as much as to say, that there is an act of volition before the first act of volition. For the

will's determining what it will choose, is choosing. The will's determining what it will will, is willing. So that according to this notion of liberty, the will must choose before it chooses, in order to determine what it will choose If the will determines itself, it is certain that one act must determine another. If the will determines its own choice, then it must determine by a foregoing act what it will choose. If the will determines its own act, then an antecedent act determines the consequent; for that determining is acting. The will cannot determine without acting. Therefore I inquire what determines that first act of the will, viz., its determination of its own act? It must be answered, according to their scheme, that it is the will by a foregoing act. Here, again, we have the same contradiction, viz., that the first act of the will is determined by an act that is before that first act. If the will determines itself, or determines is own choice, the meaning of it must be, if there be any meaning belonging to it, that the will determines how it will choose; and that it chooses, according to that, its own determination how to choose, or is directed in choosing by that its own determination. But then I would inquire, whether that first determination, that directs the choice, be not itself an act or a volition; and if so, I would inquire what determines that act. Is it another determination still prior to that in the order of nature? Then I would inquire, what determines the first act or determination of all? If the will, in its acts of willing or choosing, determines or directs itself how to choose, then there is something done by the will prior to its act of choosing that is determined, viz., its determining or directing itself how to choose. This act determining or directing, must be something besides or distinct from the choice determined or directed, and must be prior in order of nature to it. Here are two acts of the will, one the cause of the other, viz., the act of the will directing and determining, and the act or choice directed or determined. Now, I inquire, what determines that first act of the will determining or directing, to determine and direct as it does? If it be said, the will determines itself in that; then that supposes there is another act of the will prior to that, directing and determining that act, which is contrary to the supposition. And if it was not, still the question would recur, what determines that first determining act of the will? If the will determines itself, one of these three things must be meant, viz., 1. That that very same act of the will determines itself. But this is as absurd as to say that something makes itself; and it supposes it to be before it is. For the act of determining is as much prior to the thing determined, as the act making is before the thing made. Or, 2. The meaning must be, that the will determines its own act, by some other act that is prior to it in order of nature; which implies that the will acts before its first act. Or, 3. The meaning must be, that the faculty, considered at the same time as perfectly without act, determines its own consequent act; which is to talk without a meaning, and is a great absurdity. To suppose that the faculty, remaining at the same time perfectly without act, can determine any thing, is a plain contradiction; for determining is acting. And besides, if the will does determine itself, that power of determining itself does not argue any freedom, unless it be by an act of the will, or unless that determination be itself an act of choice. For what freedom or liberty is there in the will's determining itself, without an act of choice in determining, whereby it may choose which way it will determine itself? So that those that suppose the will has a power of self-determination, must suppose that that very determination is an act of the will, or an act of choice, or else it does not at all help them out in what they would, viz., the liberty of the will. But if that very determination how to act, be itself an act of choice, then the question returns, what determines this act of choice?

Also, the foreknowledge of God contradicts their notion of liberty as much and in every respect in the same manner as a decree. For they do not pretend that decree contradicts liberty any otherwise, than as it infers that it is beforehand certain that the thing will come to pass, and that it is impossible but that it should be, as the decree makes an indissoluble connection beforehand between the subject and predicate of the proposition, that such a thing shall be. A decree infers no other necessity than that. And God's foreknowledge does infer the same to all intents and purposes. For if from all eternity God foreknew that such a thing would be, then the event was infallibly certain beforehand, and that proposition was true from all eternity, that such a thing would be; and therefore there was an indissoluble connection beforehand between the subject and predicate of that proposition. If the proposition was true beforehand, the subject and predicate of it were connected beforehand. And therefore it follows from hence, that it is utterly impossible that it should not prove true, and that, for this reason, that it is utterly impossible that a thing should be true, and not true, at the same time.

§ 23. The same kind of infallible certainty, that the thing will come to pass or impossibility but that it should come to pass, that they object against, must necessarily be inferred another way, whether we hold the thing to be any way decreed or not. For it has been shown before, and I suppose none will deny, that God from all eternity decrees his own actions. Therefore he from all eternity decrees every punishment that he ever has inflicted, or will inflict. So that it is impossible, by their own reasoning, but that the punishment should come to pass. And if it be impossible but that the punishment should come to pass, then it is equally impossible but that the sin should come to pass. For if it be possible that the sin should not come to pass, and yet impossible but that the punishment should come to pass, then it is impossible but that God should punish that sin which may never be.

§ 24. For God certainly to know that a thing will be, that possibly may be, and possibly may not be, implies a contradiction. If possibly it may be otherwise, then how can God know certainly that it will be? If it possibly may be otherwise, then he knows it possibly may be otherwise; and that is inconsistent with his certainly knowing that it will not be otherwise. If God certainly knows it will be, and yet it may possibly be otherwise, then it may possibly happen to be otherwise than God certainly knows it will be. If so, then it may possibly happen that God may be mistaken in his judgment, when he certainly knows, for it is supposed that it is possible that it should be otherwise than he judges. For that it should be otherwise than he judges, and that he should be mistaken, are the same thing. How unfair therefore is it in those that hold the foreknowledge of God, to insist upon this objection from human liberty, against the decrees, when their scheme is attended with the same difficulty, exactly in the same manner!

§ 25. Their other objection is, that God's decrees make God the author of sin. I answer, that there is no more necessity of supposing God the author of sin, on this scheme, than on the other. For if we suppose, according to my doctrine, that God has determined, from all eternity, the number and persons of those that shall perform the condition of the covenant of grace; in order to support this doctrine, there is no need of maintaining any more concerning God's decreeing sin, than this, viz., that God has decreed that he will permit all the sin that ever comes to pass, and that upon his permitting it, it will certainly come to pass. And they hold the same thing; for they hold that God does determine beforehand to permit all the sin that does come to pass; and that he

certainly knows that if he does permit it, it will come to pass. I say, they in their scheme allow both these; they allow that God does permit all the sin to come to pass, that ever does come to pass; and those that allow the foreknowledge of God, do also allow the other thing, viz., that he knows concerning all the sin that ever does really come to pass, that it will come to pass upon his permitting it. So that if this be making God the author of sin, they make him so in the very same way that they charge us with doing it.

§ 26. One objection of theirs against God's decreeing or ordering, in any sense, that sin should come to pass, is, that man cannot do this without making himself sinful, and in some measure guilty of the sin, and that therefore God cannot. To this I answer, that the same objection lies against their own scheme two ways: 1. Because they own that God does permit sin, and that he determines to permit it beforehand, and that he knows, with respect to all sin that ever is committed, that upon his permitting it, it will come to pass; and we hold no other. 2. Their objection is, that what is a sin in men, is a sin in God; and therefore, in any sense to decree sin, would be a sin. But if this objection be good, it is as strong against God's permission of sin, which they allow; for it would be a sin in men to permit sin. We ought not to permit or suffer it where we have opportunity to hinder it; and we cannot permit it without making ourselves in some measure guilty. Yet they allow that God does permit sin: and that his permitting it does not make him guilty of it. Why must the argument from men to God be stronger in the other case than in this?

§ 27. They say, that we ought to begin in religion, with the perfections of God, and make these a rule to interpret Scripture. Ans. 1. If this be the best rule, I ask, why is it not as good a rule to argue from these perfections of God, his omniscience, infinite happiness, infinite wisdom and power, as his othe attributes that they argue from? If it be not as good a rule to argue from thes as those, it must be because they are not so certain, or because it is not so certain that he is possessed of these perfections. But this they will not maintain; for his moral perfections are proved no otherwise than by arguing from his natural perfections; and therefore the latter must be equally certain with the former. What we prove another thing by, must at least be as certain as it makes the thing proved by it. If an absolute and universal decree does infer a seeming inconsistence with some of God's moral perfections, they must confess the contrary to have a seeming inconsistence with the natural perfections of God.

Again, 2dly. They lay it down for a rule to embrace no doctrine which they by their own reason cannot reconcile with the moral perfections of God. But I would show the unreasonableness of this rule. For, 1. If this be a good rule, then it always was so. Let us then see what will follow. We shall then, 2dly, have reason to conclude every thing to be really inconsistent with God's moral perfections, that we cannot reconcile with his moral perfections; for if we have not reason to conclude that it is inconsistent, then we have no reason to conclude that it is not true. But if this be true that we have reason to conclude every thing is inconsistent with God's moral perfections which we cannot reconcile with those perfections, then David had reason to conclude that some things that he saw take place, in fact were inconsistent with God's moral perfections, for he could not reconcile them with those perfections, Psalm lxxiii. And Job had cause to come to the same conclusion concerning some events in his day. 3. If it be a good rule that we must conclude that to be inconsistent with the divine perfections, that we cannot reconcile with, or, which is the same thing, that we cannot see how it is consistent with those perfections, then it must be because we have reason to conclude that it cannot happen that our reason

cannot see how it can be, and then it will follow that we must reject the doctrine of the Trinity, the incarnation of the Son of God, &c.

The Scripture itself supposes that there are some things in the Scripture that men may not be able to reconcile with God's moral perfections. See Rom. ix. 19, "Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will?" And the apostle does not answer the objection, by showing us how to reconcile it with the moral perfections of God, but by representing the arrogancy of quarrelling with revealed doctrines under such a pretence, and not considering the infinite distance between God and us. "Nay, but who art thou, O man, that repliest against God?" And God answered Job after the same manner. God rebuked him for darkening counsel by words without knowledge, and answered him, only by declaring and manifesting to him the infinite distance between God and him; so letting him know, that it became him humbly to submit to God, and acknowledge his justice even in those things that were difficult to his reason; and that without solving his difficulties any other way than by making him sensible of the weakness of his own understanding.

§ 28. If there be no election, then it is not God that makes men to differ, expressly contrary to Scripture. No man ought to praise God for that happiness that he has above other men, or for that distinction that is between him and other men, that he is holy and that he is saved; when they are not holy and not saved. The saints in heaven, when they look on the devils in hell, have no occasion to praise God on account of the difference between them. Some of the ill consequences of the Arminian doctrines are, that it robs God of the greater part of the glory of his grace, and takes away a principal motive to love and praise him, and exalts man to God's room, and ascribes the glory to self, that belongs to God alone. Rom. xi. 7, "The election hath obtained, and the rest were blinded." That by the *election* here is not meant the Gentiles, but the elect part of the Jews, is most apparent by the context. Such Arminians who allow, that some only are elected, and not all that are saved, but that none are reprobated, overthrow hereby their own main objection against reprobation, viz., that God offers salvation to all, and encourages them to seek it, which, say they, would be inconsistent with God's truth, if he had absolutely determined not to save them; for they will not deny that those that are elected whilst ungodly, are warned of God to beware of eternal damnation, and to avoid such and such things, lest they should be damned. But for God to warn men to beware of damnation, though he has absolutely determined that they shall not be damned, is exactly parallel with his exhorting men to seek salvation, though he has actually determined that they shall not be saved.

§ 29. That election is not from a foresight of works, or conditional, as depending on the condition of man's will, is evident by 2 Tim. i. 9, "Who hath saved us, and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began." Philip. ii. 13, "For it is God that worketh in you, both to will and to do of his own good pleasure." Rom. ix. 15, 16, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. So then, it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." Men's labors and endeavors themselves are from God. 1 Cor. xv. 10, "But by the grace of God, I am what I am, and his grace which was bestowed upon me, was not in vain; but I labored more abundantly than they all. Yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me."

§ 30. God decrees all things, and even all sins. Acts ii. 23, "Him, being

delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken and by wicked hands have crucified and slain;" iv. 28, "For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done." If the thing meant, be only that Christ's sufferings should come to pass by some means or other; I answer, they could not come to pass but by sin. For contempt and disgrace was one thing he was to suffer. Even the free actions of men are subject to God's disposal. Prov. xxi. 1, "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord; he turneth it as the rivers of water, whithersoever it pleaseth him." See Jer. lii. 3, "For through the anger of the Lord it came to pass in Jerusalem and Judah, till he had cast them out from his presence, that Zedekiah rebelled against the king of Babylon." The not complying with the terms of the covenant of grace is decreed: 1 Pet. ii. 8, "A stone of stumbling and a rock of offence to them that stumble at the word, being disobedient, whereunto also they were appointed." What man determines, never comes to pass, unless God determines it: Lam. iii. 37, "Who is he that saith, and it cometh to pass, and the Lord commandeth it not?" By commanding is here meant willing; and God is elsewhere said to speak, and it was done; to command, and it stood fast. God determines the limits of men's lives. This is exceeding evident. Job vii 1, "Is there not an appointed time to man upon earth? Are not his days also like the days of an hireling?" *Days of an hireling* signifying an appointed, certain, limited time; as Isa. xvi. 14, and Isa. xxi. 16. If the limits of men's lives are determined, men's free actions must be determined, and even their sins; for their lives often depend on such acts. See also Job xiv. 5.

§ 31. If God does not know all things, then his knowledge may increase, he may gain, and may grow wiser as he grows older. He may discover new things, and may draw consequences from them. And he may be mistaken: if he does not know, he may guess wrong: if he does not know, he has no infallible judgment; for an infallible judgment is knowledge. And if he may be mistaken, he may order matters wrong; he may be frustrated; his measures may be broken. For doubtless, in things that are uncertain, he orders things according to what appears most probable, or else he fails in prudence. But in so ordering things, his measures may be broken. And then the greater part of the great events, viz., events among rational creatures, would be uncertain to him. For the greater part of them depend on men's free actions. That he does foreknow, is evident by his predicting and foretelling events, and even the sins of men, as Judas's sin. If he did not foreknow, he might change his will as he altered his views. Now, it is especially with respect to God's will and purposes, that he is said in Scripture not to be changeable. Having thus proved the foreknowledge of God, and the greater part of Arminians not denying it, I shall hereafter take it for granted, and shall argue against those only that allow it. If he did not foreknow and might be disappointed, he might repent.

§ 32. They say, as God's power extends only to all things possible, so God's knowledge only extends to all things knowable.

Ans. Things impossible, or contradictions, are not things; but events that come to pass, are things. God's power does extend to all things, otherwise it would not be infinite. So neither is the knowledge of God infinite, unless God knows all things. To suppose that God cannot do things impossible, does not suppose that God's power can be increased. But to suppose that God does not know men's free actions, does suppose that God's knowledge may be increased. To suppose that God's decrees are conditional, in the sense of the Arminians, or that they depend, as they suppose, on a foresight of something that shall come

to pass in time, is to suppose that something that first begins to be in time, is the cause of something that has been from all eternity, which is absurd; for nothing can be a cause of that existence, which is before the existence of that cause. What an absurdity is it, to suppose that that existence which is an effect, is effected by a cause, when that cause that effects it, is not, or has no being? If it be answered, that it is not the actual existence of the thing, that is the reason or cause of the decree, but the foresight of the existence; and the foresight of the existence may be at the same time with the decree, and before it, in the order of nature, though the existence itself is not; and that it is not properly the actual existence of the thing foreseen, that is the cause of the decree, but the existence of it in the divine foreknowledge: I reply, that this does not help the difficulty at all, but only puts it a step farther off; for still, by their scheme, the foreknowledge depends on the future actual existence; so that the actual existence is the cause of the divine foreknowledge, which is infinite ages before it. And it is a great absurdity to suppose this effect to flow from this cause, before the existence of the cause. And whatever is said, the absurdity will occur, unless we suppose that the divine decree is the ground of the futurition of the event, and also the ground of the foreknowledge of it. Then the cause is before the effect; but otherwise the effect is before the cause.

§ 33. If God absolutely determined that Christ's death should have success in gathering a church to him, it will follow that there was a number absolutely elected, or that God had determined some should surely be saved. If God determined that some should surely be saved, that implies that he had determined that he would see to it, that some should perform the conditions of salvation and be saved; or, which is the same thing, that he would cause that they should be surely saved. But this cannot be, without fixing on the persons beforehand. For the cause is before the effect. There is no such thing as God's resolving absolutely beforehand that he would save some, and yet not determining who they should be, before they were actually saved: or that he should see to it, that there should be in a number the requisites of salvation, and yet not determine who, till they actually have the requisites of salvation. But God had absolutely determined that some should be saved, yea a great number, after Christ's death; and had determined it beforehand. Because he had absolutely promised it; Isa. xlix. 6, and liii. 10. See in Psal. lxxii., and other places in the Psalms, and Tit. ii. 14. God, having absolutely purposed this before Christ's death, must either have then determined the persons, or resolved that he would hereafter determine the persons; at least if he saw there was need of it, and saw that they did not come in of themselves. But this latter supposition, if we allow it, overthrows the Arminian scheme. It shows, that such a predetermination, or absolute election, is not inconsistent with God's perfections, or the nature of the gospel constitution, or God's government of the world, and his promise of reward to the believing and obedient, and the design of gospel offers and commands, as the Arminians suppose. If God has absolutely determined to save some certain persons, then, doubtless, he has in like manner determined concerning all that are to be saved. God's promising, supposes not only that the thing is future, but that God will do it. If it be left to chance, or man's contingent will, and the event happen right, God is never the truer. He performs not his promise; he takes no effectual care about it: it is not he that promised, that performs. That thing, or, rather nothing, called fortune, orders all.—Concerning the absurdity of supposing that it was not absolutely determined beforehand, what success there should be of Christ's death; see *Polhill's Spec. Theolog. in Christo*, p. 165—171.

It is pretended, that the antecedent certainty of any sin's being committed, seeing that it is attended with necessity, takes away all liberty, and makes warnings and exhortations to avoid sin, a mere illusion. To this I would bring the instance of Peter. Christ told him, that he should surely deny him thrice that night, before the cock should crow twice. And yet, after that, Christ exhorted all his disciples to watch and pray, that they might not fall into temptation; and directs, that he who had no sword, should sell his garment and buy one.

§ 34. How evident is it, that God sets up that to be sought after as a reward of virtue, and the fruit of our endeavors, which yet he has determined shall never come to pass? As 1 Sam. xiii. 13, "And Samuel said unto Saul, Thou hast done foolishly; thou hast not kept the commandment of the Lord thy God, which he commanded thee. For now would the Lord have established thy kingdom upon Israel for ever." It is evident that God had long before decreed, that the kingdom of Israel should be established in the tribe of Judah.—Luke xxii. 22, "The son of man goeth as it was determined [Matth. xxvi. 24, and Mark xiv. 21, as it is written of him]; but wo unto that man by whom the son of man is betrayed." *As it was determined:* as this passage is not liable to the ambiguities which some have apprehended in Acts ii. 23, and iv. 28 (which yet seem on the whole to be parallel to it in their most natural construction), I look upon it as an evident proof, that those things are in the language of Scripture said to be determined or decreed (or exactly bounded and marked out by God, as the word ωριζω most naturally signifies), which he sees will in fact happen in consequence of his volitions, without any necessitating agency, as well as those events of which he is properly the author; and, as Beza expresses it, "*Qui sequitur deum emendate sane loquitur*, we need not fear falling into any impropriety of speech when we use the language which God has taught." *Doddridge in loc.*

§ 35. As to the decrees of election, see Psal. lxv. 4, "Blessed is the man whom thou choosest, and causest to approach unto thee, that he may dwell in thy courts: we shall be satisfied with the goodness of thy house, even of thy holy temple." Isa. xli. 9, "Thou whom I have taken from the ends of the earth, and called thee from the chief men thereof, and said unto thee, thou art my servant; I have chosen thee, and not cast thee away." Matth. xx. 16, "So the last shall be first, and the first last: for many be called, but few chosen." Chap. xxii. 14, "For many are called, but few are chosen." Chap. xxiv. 24, "For there shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders; in so much that, if it were possible, they shall deceive the very *elect*." John vi. 37—46, "All that the Father giveth me, shall come to me; and him that cometh to me, I will in no wise cast out," &c. Chap. x. 3, 4, and verse 11, and 14—17, v. 26—30, "To him the porter openeth, and the sheep hear his voice; and he calleth his own sheep by name, and leadeth them out. And when he putteth forth his own sheep, he goeth before them, and the sheep follow him, for they know his voice. I am the good Shepherd; and know my sheep, and am known of mine. Therefore doth my Father love me; because I lay down my life, that I might take it again. But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you," &c. Chap. xvii. 6—20, "I have manifested thy name unto the men thou gavest me out of the world: thine they were, and thou gavest them me; and they have kept thy word, &c. Neither pray I for these alone; but for them also which shall believe on me through their word." Acts xviii. 10, "For I am with thee, and no man shall set on thee, to hurt thee: for I have much people in this city." As to reprobation, see Matth. xi. 20—27, "Then began he to upbraid the cities wherein most of

his mighty works were done, because they repented not, &c. Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight. All things are delivered unto me of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him." John vi. 44—46, "No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him; and I will raise him up at the last day, &c. Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he which is of God, he hath seen the Father." Chap. viii. 47, "He that is of God, heareth God's words: ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God." Chap. x. 26, "But ye believe not, because you are not of my sheep, as I said unto you." Chap. xvii. 9—13, "I pray for them: I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me; for they are thine," &c. 1 Thes. v. 9, "For God has not appointed us to wrath, but to obtain salvation by our Lord Jesus Christ." 1 Pet. ii. 8, "And a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence, even to them which stumble at the word, being disobedient: whereunto also they were appointed." Jude i. 4, "For there are certain men crept in unawares, who were before of old ordained to this condemnation, turning the grace of God into lasciviousness." 1 John iv. 6, "We are of God. He that knoweth God, heareth us; he that is not of God, heareth not us. Hereby know we the spirit of truth, and the spirit of error." Rev. iii. 8, "I know thy works: behold, I have set before thee an open door, and no man can shut it: for thou hast a little strength, and hast kept my word, and hast not denied my name." Chap. xx. 12, 15, "And I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God; and the books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the book of life; and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books, according to their works. And whosoever was not found written in the book of life, was cast into the lake of fire." John xii. 37—41. "But though he had done so many miracles before them, yet they believed not on him. Because that Esaias said, he hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart, that they should not see with their eyes, &c. These things said Esaias, when he saw his glory, and spake of him." Rom. ix. 6, 7, 8, 11—14, 16—19, v. 21—24, v. 27, 29, 33, "Not as though the word of God hath taken none effect. For they are not all Israel, which are of Israel: neither because they are the seed of Abraham, are they all children: but, in Isaac shall thy seed be called." That is, they which are the children of the flesh, these are not the children of God; but the children of the promise are counted for the seed. For the children, being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God, according to election, might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said, "The elder shall serve the younger, &c. What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid. So then, it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy, &c. Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another to dishonor? &c. Even us whom he hath called, not of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles. Esaias also crieth concerning Israel, though the number of the children of Israel be as the sand of the sea, a remnant shall be saved: and as Esaias said before, except the Lord of Sabaoth had left us a seed, we had been as Sodoma, and been made like unto Gomorrha. As it is written, Behold, I lay in Sion a stumbling stone, and a rock of offence: and whosoever believeth on him shall not be ashamed." And chap. xi. 1—6, v. 7—11, v. 15, 17, 19—23, v. 32, 36, "I say then, Hath God cast away his people? God forbid. For I also am an Israelite, of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Benjamin, &c

Even so then at this present time also there is a remnant according to the election of grace. And if by grace, then is it no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then is it no more grace: otherwise, work is no more work. What then? Israel hath not obtained that which he seeketh for; but the election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded. God hath given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear, unto this day. Let their table be made a snare, and a trap, and a stumbling block, and a recompense unto them, &c. And if some of the branches be broken off, and thou, being a wild olive tree, wert grafted in among them, and with them partakest of the root and fatness of the olive tree; thou wilt say then, The branches were broken off, that I might be grafted in, &c. And they also, if they abide not in unbelief, shall be grafted in: for God is able to graft them in again. For God hath concluded them all in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all. For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen."

§ 36. All that is intended when we say that God decrees all that comes to pass, is, that all events are subject to the disposals of providence, or that God orders all things in his providence; and that he intended from eternity to order all things in providence, and intended to order them as he does. Election does not signify only something common to professing Christians: Matth. xx. 16, "Many are called, but few are chosen," Matth. xxiv. 31, "He shall send forth his angels, and gather together his elect."

§ 37. God's foreknowledge appears from this, that God has foretold that there should be some good men, as the Arminians themselves allow. *Stebbing* in his Treatise concerning the Operations of the Holy Spirit, p. 237, second edition, says as follows: "So long as a man may be certain that those things will come to pass which God hath foretold, he may be certain, that God's grace will prevail in multitudes of men before the end of all things. For, by divers predictions in holy writ we are assured, that when Christ shall come to judgment, there will be some who shall be changed, and put on immortality."

§ 38. The Scriptures, in teaching us this doctrine, are guilty of no hard imposition on our understanding of a doctrine contrary to reason. If they had taught the contrary doctrine, it would have been much more contrary to reason, and a much greater temptation to persons of diligent and thorough consideration, to doubt of the divinity of the Scripture.

§ 39. Concerning the decreeing of sin, see Acts iii. 17, 18, with Acts xiii. 27: "And now, brethren, I wot that through ignorance ye did it, as did also your rulers. But those things which God before had showed by the mouth of all his prophets, that Christ should suffer, he hath so fulfilled."– "For they that dwell at Jerusalem, and their rulers, because they knew him not, nor yet the voices of the prophets which are read every Sabbath day, they have fulfilled them in condemning him."

§ 40. It is objected, that this is a speculative point. So might they say, Jesus's being the Messiah, is a speculative point.

§ 41. If God's inviting or commanding a person to do a thing, when he, in his decree, has ordained that it shall be otherwise, argues insincerity in the command or invitation, the insincerity must be in this, viz., that he commands a thing to be done, when his end in commanding is not, that the thing may be done; which cannot be his end; because he knows certainly, at the time that he commands it, that it will not be. But it is certain that God's commanding a thing to be done, which he certainly knows at the time will not be done, is no evidence of insincerity in God in commanding. For thus God commanded

Pharaoh to let the people go: and yet he knew he would not obey, as he says at the same time that he orders the command to be given him, Exod. iii. 18, 19, "And thou shalt come, thou and the elders of Israel, unto the king of Egypt, and you shall say unto him, The Lord God of the Hebrews hath met with us; and now let us go, we beseech thee, three days' journey into the wilderness, that we may sacrifice to the Lord our God: and I am sure that the king of Egypt will not let you go; no, not by a mighty hand." See also chap. iv. 21, 22, 23, and chap. vii. 1—7; see also chap. ix. 16, compared with Rom. ix. 17.

§ 42. It is impossible for an infinitely wise and good being to do otherwise than to choose what he sees on the whole to be best. And certainly reason requires us to suppose, that of all possible events with respect to sin, and the conversion and salvation of particular persons, it is better that one of those possible and opposite events should come to pass than another; and therefore, an infinitely wise and good being must choose accordingly. What God permits, he decrees to permit. If it is no blemish to God to permit sin, then it is no blemish to him to purpose or intend to permit it. And if he be omniscient, and does designedly permit that sin which actually comes to pass, then he designedly permits that sin, knowing, if he permits it, it will actually come to pass. And this is an effectual permission, and all that we plead for. What, then, do our adversaries quarrel with us for? And why do they pretend that we charge God with being the author of sin? There is a way of drawing consequences from Scripture, that begs the question. As the Arminians say, there are many more texts plainly against election, than seem to be for it, viz., those texts that represent, that general offers of salvation are made, as though it was left to men's choice, whether they will be saved or no. But that is begging the question. For the question very much consists in these things, whether an absolute decree be inconsistent with man's liberty, and so with a general offer of salvation, &c.

§ 43. Concerning the Arminian notion of election, that when the apostles speak of election, they only mean that by which the professing Christians in those days were distinguished from others, as the nation of Israel of old was; this is unreasonable, according to their own principles. For if they were elected, and that was the reason why they so far embraced the gospel, as to become Christians rather than others, then, on Arminian principles, no thanks were due to them for embracing the gospel; neither were others, who continued openly to reject the gospel, to blame; and it was in vain to use any means to persuade any to join with the Christian church; nor were any to blame for not doing it, or to be praised for doing it, &c. Besides, their principles render vain all endeavors to spread the gospel. For the gospel will certainly be spread to all nations that are elected; and all such shall have the offers of the gospel, whether they take any care of the matter or no.

§ 44. Dr. Whitby, to make out his scheme, makes the word election signify two entirely different things; one, election to a common faith of Christianity; another, a conditional election to salvation. But every one must be sensible of the unreasonableness of such shifting and varying, and turning into all shapes, to evade the force of Scripture.

§ 45. It is evident the apostle, in Rom. ix., has not only respect to God's sovereignty in the election and preterition of nations, because he illustrates his meaning by the instance of a particular person, viz. Pharaoh. The exercise of the sovereignty that he speaks of, appears by the express words of the apostle about vessels of mercy and vessels of wrath, vessels of honor and vessels of dishonor But the vessels of mercy, he speaks of as prepared to glory. They,

it is plain, are those that shall be saved, and the vessels of wrath are those that perish. He speaks of those that shall be saved, v. 27, "A remnant shall be saved." What is there that God does decree according to the scheme of the Arminians so as to make it in any measure consistent with itself? He does not decree any of the great events of the world of mankind (which are the principal events, and those to which all others are subordinated), because these depend on men's free will. He does not absolutely decree any events wherein the welfare of men is concerned; for if he does, then these things according to their scheme cannot be the subject of prayer. For according to them, it is absurd to seek or pray for things, which we do not know but that God has absolutely decreed and fixed before. We do not know but that he has determined absolutely and unfrustrably from eternity, that they shall not be; and then, by their scheme, we cannot pray in faith for them. See Whitby, p. 177, &c. And if God does not decree and order those events beforehand, then what becomes of the providence of God; and what room is there for prayer, if there be no providence? Prayer is shut out this way also. According to them, we cannot reasonably pray for the accomplishment of things that are already fixed, before our prayers; for then our prayers alter nothing, and what, say they, signifies it for us to pray?

Dr. Whitby insists upon it, that we cannot pray in faith for the salvation of others, if we do not know that Christ died intentionally for their salvation.

§ 46. To Dr. Whitby's observation, that the apostle speaks of churches, as though they were all elect, I answer, he speaks from a judgment of charity, as Dr. Whitby himself observes, p. 460. God foreknows the elect, as God is said to know those that are his own sheep from strangers; as Christ is said not to know the workers of iniquity, that is, he owns them not. In the same sense, God is said to know the elect from all eternity; that is, he knew them as a man knows his own things. He acknowledged them from eternity. He owns them as his children. Reprobates he did not know; they were strangers to God from all eternity. If God ever determined, in the general, that some of mankind should certainly be saved, and did not leave it altogether undetermined whether ever so much as one soul of all mankind should believe in Christ; it must be that he determined that some particular persons should certainly believe in him. For it is certain, that if he has left it undetermined concerning this and that and the other person, whether ever he should believe or not, and so of every particular person in the world; then there is no necessity at all, that this or that, or any particular person in the world, should ever be saved by Christ, for the matter of any determination of God's. So that, though God sent his Son into the world, yet the matter was left altogether undetermined by God, whether ever any person should be saved by him, and there was all this ado about Christ's birth, death, resurrection, ascension, and sitting at God's right hand, when it was not as yet determined whether he should ever save one soul, or have any mediatorial kingdom at all.

§ 47. It is most absurd to call such a conditional election as they talk of, by the name of election, seeing there is a necessary connection between faith in Jesus Christ and eternal life. Those that believe in Christ, must be saved, according to God's inviolable constitution of things. What nonsense is it, therefore, to talk of choosing such to life from all eternity out of the rest of mankind? A predestination of such to life is altogether useless and needless. By faith in one that has satisfied for sin, the soul necessarily becomes free from sin. By faith in one that has bought eternal life for them, they have, of unavoidable consequence, a right to eternal life. Now, what sense is it to say, that God from all

eternity, of his free grace, chose out those that he foresaw would have no guilt of sin, that they should not be punished for their guilt, as others were, when it is a contradiction to suppose that they can be punished for their guilt when they have none? For who can lay any thing to their charge, when it is Christ that has died? And what do they mean by an election of men to that which is, in its own nature, impossible that it should not be, whether they are elected to it or no; or by God's choosing them that had a right to eternal life, that they should possess it? What sense is it to say that a creditor chooses out those among his debtors to be free from debt, that owe him nothing? But if they say that election is only God's determination, in the general, that all that believe shall be saved, in what sense can this be called election? They are not *persons* that are here chosen, but mankind is divided into two sorts, the one believing, and the other unbelieving, and God chooses the believing sort. It is not election of persons, but of qualifications. God does from all eternity choose to bestow eternal life upon those that have a right to it, rather than upon those who have a right to damnation. Is this all the election we have an account of in God's word? Such a thing as election may well be allowed; for that there is such a thing as sovereign love is certain; that is, love, not for any excellency, but merely God's good pleasure. For whether it is proper to say that God from all eternity loved the elect or no, it is proper to say that God loved men after the fall, while sinners and enemies; for God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son to die. This was not for any goodness or excellency, but merely God's good pleasure; for he would not love the fallen angels.

§ 48. Christ is often spoken of in Scripture as being, by way of eminency, the Elect or Chosen of God. Isa. xlii. 1, "Behold my Servant, whom I uphold, mine Elect in whom my soul delighteth." Luke xxiii. 35, "If he be the Christ, the Chosen of God." 1 Pet. ii. 4, "A living stone, chosen of God, and precious." Psal. lxxxix. 3, "I have made a covenant with my Chosen:" v. 19 "I have exalted one chosen out of the people." Hence those persons in the Old Testament, that were the most remarkable types of Christ, were the subjects of a very remarkable election of God, by which they were designed to some peculiar honor of the prophetical, priestly, or kingly office. So Moses was called God's chosen, in that wherein he was eminently a type of Christ, viz., as a prophet and ruler, and mediator for his people; Psal. cvi. 23, "Had not Moses, his chosen, stood before him in the breach." So Aaron was constituted high priest by a remarkable election of God, as in Numb. xvi. 5, and xvii. 5, Deut. xxi. 5. So David the king was the subject of a remarkable election; Psal. lxxviii. 67—72, "Moreover, he refused the tabernacle of Joseph, and chose not the tribe of Ephraim, but chose the tribe of Judah, the mount Sion which he loved; and he built his sanctuary like high palaces; like the earth which he hath established for ever. He chose David also his servant, and took him from the sheepfolds, from following the ewes great with young; he brought him to feed Jacob his people, and Israel his inheritance." 1 Sam. xvi. 7—10, "The Lord hath not chosen this, neither hath the Lord chosen this; the Lord hath not chosen these." Christ is the chosen of God, both as to his divine and human nature. As to his divine nature, he was chosen of God, though not to any addition to his essential glory or real happiness, which is infinite, yet to great declarative glory. As he is man, he is chosen of God to the highest degree of real glory and happiness of all creatures. As to both, he is chosen of God to the office and glory of the mediator between God and men, and the head of all the elect creation. His election, as it respects his divine nature,

was for his worthiness and excellency and infinite amiableness in the sight of God, and perfect fitness for that which God chose him to, and his worthiness was the ground of his election. But his election, as it respects his human nature, was free and sovereign, not being for any worthiness, but his election was the foundation of his worthiness. His election, as he is God, is a manifestation of God's infinite wisdom. The wisdom of any being is discovered by the wise choice he makes, so the infinite wisdom of God is manifest in the wisdom of his choice when he chose his eternal Son, one so fit upon all accounts, for the office of a mediator, when he only was fit, and when he was perfectly and infinitely fit; and yet his fitness was so difficult to be discerned, that none but one of infinite wisdom could discover it. His election, as he was man, was a manifestation of God's sovereignty and grace. God had determined to exalt one of the creatures so high, that he should be one person with God, and should have communion with God, and should have glory in all respects answerable; and so should be the head of all other elect creatures, that they might be united to God and glorified in him. And his sovereignty appears in the election of the man Jesus, various ways. It appears in choosing the species of creatures of which he should be, viz., the race of mankind, and not the angels, the superior species. God's sovereignty also appears in choosing this creature of the seed of fallen creatures that were become enemies and rebels, abominable, miserable creatures. It appears in choosing that he should be of such a branch of mankind, in selecting the posterity of David, a mean person originally, and the youngest of the family. And as he was the seed of the woman, so his sovereignty appears in his being the seed of such particular women; as of Leah, the uncomely wife of Jacob, whom her husband had not chosen; and Tamar, a Canaanitess, and a harlot; and Rahab a harlot; and Ruth a Moabitess; and of Bathsheba, one that had committed adultery, and as he was the seed of many a mean person. And his sovereignty appears in the choice of that individual female of whom Christ was born.

It was owing to this election of God, that the man Jesus was not one of the corrupt race of mankind, so that his freedom from sin and damnation is owing to the free, sovereign, electing love of God in him, as well as in the rest of elect men. All holiness, all obedience and good works, and perseverance in him, was owing to the electing love of God, as well as in his elect members. And so his freedom from eternal damnation was owing to the free, electing love of God another way, viz., as it was owing to God's electing love to him and his members, but to him in the first place, that he did not fail in that great and difficult work that he undertook; that he did not fail under his extreme sufferings, and so eternally continue under them. For if he had failed; if his courage, resolution and love had been conquered by his sufferings, he never could have been delivered from them; for then he would have failed in his obedience to God, and his love to God failing, and being overcome by sufferings, these sufferings would have failed of the nature of an acceptable sacrifice to God, and the infinite value of his sufferings would have failed, and so must be made up in infinite duration, to atone for his own deficiency. But God having chosen Christ, he could not fail in this work, and so was delivered from his sufferings, from the eternity of them, by the electing love of God. Justification and glorification were fruits of God's foreknowledge and predestination in him, as well as in his elect members.

So that the man Christ Jesus has the eternal, electing love of God to him, to contemplate and admire, and to delight and rejoice his heart, as all his elect members have. He has it before him as others have, eternally to praise God for his

free and sovereign election of him, and to ascribe the praise of his freedom from eternal damnation (which he, with his elect members, beholds, and has had a sense of, far beyond all the rest, and so has more cause of joy and praise for his deliverance from it), and the praise of the glory he possesses, to that election. This election is not for Christ's works or worthiness, for all his works and worthiness are the fruits of it. God had power over this seed of the woman, to make it either a vessel to honor or dishonor, as he had over the rest.

Christ is, by way of eminency, called THE ELECT of God. For though other elect men are by election distinguished from the greater part of mankind, yet they, in their election, have that which is common to thousands and millions; and though the elect angels are distinguished by election from the angels that fell, yet they are chosen among myriads of others; but this man, by his election, is vastly distinguished from all other creatures in heaven or earth; and Christ, in his election, is the head of election, and the pattern of all other election. Christ is the head of all elect creatures; and both angels and men are chosen in him in some sense, i. e., chosen to be in him. All elect men are said to be chosen in Christ, Eph. i. 4. Election contains two things, viz., foreknowledge and predestination, which are distinguished in the 8th chapter of Romans. The one is choosing persons to be God's, which is a foreknowing of them; and the other, a destining them to be conformed to the image of his Son, both in holiness and blessedness. The elect are chosen in him, with respect to those two, in senses somewhat diverse. With respect to foreknowledge or foreknowing, we are chosen in him as God chose us, to be actually his in this way, viz., by being in Christ, or being members of his Son. This is the way that God determined we should actually become his. God chose Christ, and gave his elect people to him; and so, looking on them as his, owned them for his own. But by predestination, which is consequent on his foreknowledge, we are elected in Christ, as we are elected in his election. For God having in foreknowledge given us to Christ, he thenceforward beheld us as members and parts of him; and so ordaining the head to glory, he therein ordained the members to glory. In destining Christ to eternal life, he destined all parts of Christ to it also. So that we are appointed to eternal life in Christ, being in Christ, his members from eternity. In his being appointed to life, we are appointed to life. So Christ's election is the foundation of ours, as much as his justification and glorification are the foundation of ours. By election in Scripture is sometimes meant this latter part, viz., destination to conformity to Christ in life and glory, as 2 Thess. ii. 13, "God from the beginning hath chosen you to salvation." And it seems to be spoken of in this sense chiefly, in Eph. i. 3, 4, 5, "Who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ, according as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love; having predestinated us to the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will."

§ 49. 2 Thess. ii. 13, "But we are bound to give thanks always to God for you, brethren, beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth." Concerning this Scripture I observe the following things: 1. The word translated *chosen* is a word that signifies to choose or pick out from many others. 2. That this choosing is given as a reason why those differ from others that believe not the truth, but have pleasure in unrighteousness, as an instance of the distinguishing grace of God; and therefore the apostle mentions their being chosen, their election, as the ground of their sanctification by the Spirit and belief of the truth. 3. The apostle speaks of their being chosen to salvation, as a ground

of their perseverance, or the reason why they never shall fall away, as others spoken of before, whereby they failed of salvation. See the preceding verses. Compare Heb. vi. 9. 4. They are spoken of as thus chosen from the beginning

That place, Matth. xx. 21—23, "Grant that these my two sons may sit, one on thy right hand, and the other on thy left, in thy kingdom;—it shall be given to them for whom it is prepared of my Father," affords an invincible argument for particular, personal predestination.

It is an evidence that the apostle, in chap. ix. of Romans, has not respect solely to an election and dereliction of nations or public societies, that one instance which he produces to illustrate and confirm what he says, is the dereliction of a particular person, even Pharaoh, Rom. ix. 17. So it is an instance of God's mercy to a particular person, even Moses. When he says to Moses, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and will have compassion on whom I will have compassion," &c., the words cited were used by God on occasion of, and with relation to his mercy to, a particular person, even Moses; see Exod. xxxiii. 19. And the language in that verse and the next, is suited to particular persons; as, verses 16 and 18, and verses 22, 24. And the apostle shows plainly, verses 27, 29, that it is not an election of nations or public societies, but a distinction of some particular persons from others of the same society; as it was a distinction of particular persons, in preserving some, when others were detroyed by Nebuchadnezzar's armies; and in returning some from captivity, and leaving others. This was not a showing of mercy to one public society in distinction from another. So in chap. x. 4, 5, where the apostle plainly continues to speak of the same election, it was not by a national election, or election of any public society, that God distinguished the seven thousand that he had reserved, who had not bowed the knee to Baal.

John vi. 27, "All that the Father hath given me shall come to me. And this is the Father's will which sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day."—"What is this being given to Christ to be raised up again to everlasting life, but the election of particular persons to salvation? And since it is the Father's will, that of all that he has given to Christ, he should lose nothing; this election must be so absolute as to insure their salvation." *Green's Friendly Conferences.*

It is plainly and abundantly taught in Scripture, that election is not of works; Rom. ix. 11, "That the purpose of God according to election might stand, *not of works*, but of him that calleth." Verse 11, "Neither of them *having done either good or evil.*" And Rom. xi. 5, 6, "Even so at this present time also, there is a remnant according to the *election of grace.* And if by grace, then it is no more *of works:* otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then it is no more grace: otherwise work is no more work." 2 Tim. i. 9, "Who hath saved us, and called us with a holy calling, *not according to our works*, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began."

How invincible a proof of the Calvinistical doctrine of election is that place in Rom. xi. 5, "Even so then at this present time also, there is a remnant according to the election of grace." Dr. Doddridge observes upon it, that some explain this of having chosen grace, i. e., the gospel. But that turn is very unnatural, and neither suits the phrase, nor the connection with the former clause, or with the next verse, where the apostle comments on his own words.

§ 50. If God does not some way in his providence, and so in his predeterminations, order what the volitions of men shall be, he would be as dependent in governing the world, as a skilful mariner is in governing his ship, in passing

over a turbulent, tempestuous ocean, where he meets constantly, and through the whole voyage, with things that agitate the ship, have great influence on the motions of it, and are so cross and grievous to him, that he is obliged to accommodate himself in the best manner that he can. He meets with cross winds, violent tempests, strong currents, and great opposition from enemies; none of which things he has the disposal of, but is forced to suffer. He only guides the ship, and, by his skill, turns that hither and thither, and steers it in such a manner as to avoid dangers, as well as the case will allow.

§ 51. As to that objection against the election which the apostle speaks of in his epistles, as an election by which such should be distinguished as should certainly be saved at last, viz., that many of those whom the apostle calls elect, chosen in Christ, &c., actually turned apostates: what Dr. Doddridge observes in his note on Eph. i. 4, may be a sufficient answer. "The apostle speaks of whole societies in general as consisting of saints and believers, because this was the predominant character; and he had reason, in the judgment of charity, to believe the greater part were such. Compare Phil. i. 7. Nor did he always judge it necessary to make exceptions in reference to a few hypocrites who had crept in among them, any more than Christ judged it so, to speak of Judas as excluded, when he mentions the twelve thrones of judgment on which the apostles should sit." Matth. xix. 28.

§ 52. Many have a notion concerning some things in religion, and, in particular, concerning predestination, that if they be the truth, yet it is not best that they should be known. But many reasons may be offered against this notion.

§ 53. What the devil did to afflict Job, was the exercise and fruit of his devilish disposition, and his acts therein were devilish. And yet it is most apparent, that those acts and effects of the devil towards Job, were appointed by infinite wisdom for holy ends; but not accomplished by God any otherwise than by permission.

§ 54. There were many absolute promises of old, that salvation should actually be accomplished, and that it should be of great extent, or extending to great multitudes of mankind; as, that "the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head." "In thee, and in thy seed, shall all the families of the earth be blessed." Psalm xxii. 30, "A seed shall serve him, and it shall be accounted to the Lord for a generation." Isa. liii. 10, "He shall see his seed." Psalm ii. 6, "Ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance," &c. Psalm cx., "Sit thou at my right hand, till I make thine enemies thy footstool." "Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power;" and innumerable others. And if there were absolute promises of this, then there were absolute purposes of it; for that which is sincerely, absolutely promised, is with an absolute purpose of fulfilling the promise. But how can it be devised, that there should be an absolute, determinate, infallible, unchangeable purpose, that Christ should actually save vast multitudes of mankind; and yet it be not absolutely purposed that he should save any one single person, but that with regard to every individual soul, this was left undetermined by God, to be determined by man's contingent will, which might determine for salvation, or against it, there being nothing to render it impossible concerning any one, that his will would not finally determine against it? Observe, these prophecies are not merely predictions, but are of the nature of promises, and are often so called:—"Which he hath promised by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began," &c. God takes care to fulfil his own promises; but, according to this scheme, it is not God that fulfils these promises; but men, left to themselves, to their

contingent wills, fulfil them. Man's will, which God does not determine, determines itself in exclusion of God.

All the promises of God are yea and amen, and God himself makes them so to be; he takes care of that matter.

§ 55. Concerning that grand objection, that this doctrine supposes partiality in God, and is very dishonorable to him, being quite contrary to God's extensive and universal benevolence to his creatures; it may be shown that the Arminian notions and principles in this matter, lead directly to Deism; and that on these principles, it is utterly impossible to answer Tindal's objections against revealed religion, especially in his 14th chapter. Besides unjustifiable partiality is not imputable to a sovereign distributing his favors, though ever so unequally, unless it be done unwisely, and so as to infringe the common good.

§ 56. God has regard to conditions in his decrees, as he has regard to a wise order and connection of things. Such is his wisdom in his decrees, and all his acts and operations, that if it were not for wise connection that is regarded, many things would not be decreed. One part of the wise system of events would not have been decreed, unless the other parts had been decreed, &c.

§ 57. God in the decree of election is justly to be considered as decreeing the creature's eternal happiness, antecedently to any foresight of good works, in a sense wherein he does not in reprobation decree the creature's eternal misery, antecedently to any foresight of sin; because the being of sin is supposed in the first place in order to the decree of reprobation, which is, that God will glorify his vindictive justice; and the very notion of revenging justice, simply considered, supposes a fault to be revenged. But faith and good works are not supposed in the first place in order to the decree of election. The first things in order in this decree are, that God will communicate his happiness, and glorify his grace (for these two seem to be co-ordinate); but in neither of these are faith and good works supposed. For when God decrees, and seeks to communicate his own happiness in the creature's happiness, the notion of this, simply considered, supposes or implies nothing of faith or good works; nor does the notion of grace, in itself, suppose any such thing. It does not necessarily follow from the very nature of grace, or God's communicativeness of his own happiness, that there must be faith and good works. This is only a certain way of the appointment of God's wisdom, wherein he will bring men to partake of his grace. But yet God is far from having decreed damnation from a foresight of evil works, in the sense of the Arminians, as if God in this decree did properly depend on the creature's sinful act, as an event, the coming to pass of which primarily depends on the creature's determination; so that the creature's determination in this decree may properly be looked upon as antecedent to God's determination, and on which his determination is consequent and dependent.

§ 58. What divines intend by *prior* and *posterior* in the affair of God's decrees, is not that one is before another in the order of time, for all are from eternity; but that we must conceive the view or consideration of one decree to be before another, inasmuch as God decrees one thing out of respect to another decree that he has made; so that one decree must be conceived of as in some sort to be the ground of another, or that God decrees one because of another; or that he would not have decreed one, had he not decreed that other. Now there are two ways in which divine decrees may be said to be in this sense prior one to another. 1. When one thing decreed is the end of another, this must in some respect be conceived of as prior to that other. The good to be obtained is in some respect prior, in the consideration of him who decrees and disposes,

to the means of obtaining it. 2. When one thing decreed is the ground on which the disposer goes, in seeking such an end by another thing decreed, as being the foundation of the capableness or fitness that there is in that other thing decreed to obtain such an end. Thus the sinfulness of the reprobate is the ground on which God goes in determining to glorify his justice in the punishment of his sinfulness; because his sinfulness is the foundation of the possibility of obtaining that end by such means. His having sin is the foundation of both the fitness and possibility of justice being glorified in the punishment of his sin, and therefore the consideration of the being of sin in the subject, must in some respect be prior in the mind of the disposer, to the determination to glorify his justice in the punishment of sin. For the disposer must first consider the capableness and aptness of such means for such an end, before he determines them to such an end.

Thus God must be conceived of, as first considering Adonibezek's cruelty in cutting off the thumbs and great toes of threescore and ten kings, as that which was to be before he decreed to glorify his justice in punishing that cruelty by the cutting off his thumbs and great toes. For God, in this last decree, has respect to the fitness and aptness of his thumbs and great toes being cut off to glorify his justice. But this aptness depends on the nature of that sin that was punished. Therefore the disposer, in fixing on those means for this end, must be conceived of as having that sin in view. Not only must God be conceived of as having some end in consideration, before he determines the means in order to that end, but he must also be conceived of as having a consideration of the capableness or aptness of the means to obtain the end before he fixes on the means. Both these, in different respects, may be said to be prior to the means decreed to such an end in the mind of the disposer. Both, in different respects, are the ground or reason of appointment of the means. The end is the ground or reason of the appointment of the means; and also the capacity and fitness of the means to the end, is the ground or reason of this appointment to such an end. So both the sin of the reprobate, and also the glory of divine justice, may properly be said to be before the decree of damning the reprobate. The decree of damnation may properly be said, in different respects, to be because of both these; and that God would not have decreed the damnation of the sinner, had it not been for the respect he had both to the one and the other. Both may properly be considered as the ground of the decree of damnation. The view of the sinfulness of the reprobate must be in some respect prior in the decree, to God's decree to glorify his justice in punishing their sinfulness. Because sinfulness is necessarily supposed as already existing in the decree of punishing sinfulness, and the decree of damnation being posterior to the consideration of the sin of men in this latter respect, clears God of any injustice in such a decree. That which stands in the place of the ultimate end in a decree, i. e., that which is a mere end, and not a means to any thing further or higher, viz., the shining forth of God's glory, and the communication of his goodness, must indeed be considered as prior, in the consideration of the Supreme Disposer, to every thing excepting the mere possibility of it. But this must in some respects be conceived of as prior to that, because possibility is necessarily supposed in his decree. But if we descend lower than the highest end; if we come down to other events decreed, that be not mere ends, but means to obtain that end, then we must necessarily bring in more things, as in some respect prior, in the same manner as mere possibility is in this highest decree. Because more things must necessarily be supposed or considered as existing in the decree, in order that those things which are decreed may reach the end for

which they are decreed. More things must be supposed in order to a possibility of these things taking place as subordinate to their end; and therefore they stand in the same place, in these lower decrees, as absolute possibility does in the decree of the highest end. The vindictive justice of God is not to be considered as a mere or ultimate end, but as a means to that end. Indeed, God's glorifying his justice, or rather his glorifying his holiness and greatness, has the place of a mere and ultimate end. But his glorifying his justice in punishing sin (or in exercising vindictive justice, which is the same), is not to be considered as a mere end, but a certain way or means of obtaining an end. Vindictive justice is not to be considered as a certain, distinct attribute to be glorified, but as a certain way and means for the glorifying an attribute. Every distinct way of God's glorifying or exercising an attribute, might as well be called a distinct attribute as this. It is but giving a distinct name to it, and so we might multiply attributes without end. The considering of the glorifying of vindictive justice as a mere end, has led to great misrepresentations, and undue and unhappy expressions about the decree of reprobation. Hence the glorifying of God's vindictive justice on such particular persons, has been considered as altogether prior in the decree to their sinfulness, yea, to their very beings. Whereas it being only a means to an end, those things that are necessarily presupposed, in order to the fitness and possibility of this means of obtaining the end, must be conceived of as prior to it.

Hence God's decree of the eternal damnation of the reprobate is not to be conceived of as prior to the fall, yea, and to the very being of the persons, as the decree of the eternal glory of the elect is. For God's glorifying his love, and communicating his goodness, stands in the place of a mere or ultimate end, and therefore is prior in the mind of the eternal disposer to the very being of the subject, and to every thing but mere possibility. The goodness of God gives the being as well as the happiness of the creature, and does not presuppose it. Indeed, the glorifying of God's mercy, as it presupposes the subject to be miserable, and the glorifying his grace, as it presupposes the subject to be sinful, unworthy and ill-deserving, are not to be conceived of as ultimate ends, but only as certain ways and means for the glorifying the exceeding abundance and overflowing fulness of God's goodness and love; therefore these decrees are not to be considered as prior to the decree of the being and permission of the fall of the subject. And the decree of election, as it implies a decree of glorifying God's mercy and grace, considers men as being cursed and fallen; because the very notion of such a decree supposes sin and misery. Hence we may learn, how much in the decree of predestination is to be considered as prior to the creation and fall of man, and how much as posterior; viz., that God's decree to glorify his love and communicate his goodness, and to glorify his greatness and holiness, is to be considered as prior to creation and the fall of man. And because the glory of God's love, and the communication of his goodness necessarily imply the happiness of the creature, and give both their being and happiness; hence the design to communicate and glorify his goodness and love eternally to a certain number, is to be considered as prior, in both those mentioned respects, to their being and fall. For such a design, in the notion of it, presupposes neither. But nothing in the decree of reprobation is to be looked upon as antecedent in one of those respects to man's being and fall; but only that general decree that God will glorify his justice, or rather his holiness and greatness, which supposes neither their being nor sinfulness. But whatsoever there is in this decree of evil to particular subjects, it is to be considered as consequent on the decree of their creation, and permission of their fall. And

indeed, although all that is in the decree of election, all that respects good to the subjects, be not posterior to the being and fall of men, yet both the decree of election and rejection or reprobation, as so styled, must be considered as consequent on the decrees concerning the creation and fall. For both these decrees have respect to that distinction or discrimination that is afterwards actually made amongst men in pursuance of these decrees. Hence effectual calling, being the proper execution of election, is sometimes in Scripture called election; and the rejection of men in time is called reprobation. Therefore the decrees of election and reprobation must be looked upon as beginning there, where the actual distinction begins, because distinction is implied in the notion of those decrees. And therefore, whatsoever is prior to this actual distinction, the foresight of it, and decree concerning it, or that state that was common, or wherein they were undistinguished, the foresight of that, or decree concerning it, must be considered, in some respect, as prior to the decree concerning the distinction. Because all that is before is supposed or looked upon as already put in the decree. For that is the decree, viz., to make such a distinction between those that were before in such a common state. And this is agreeable to the Scripture representations of those decrees, John xv. 19: "Ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you." See also Ezek. xvi. 1—8.

The decrees of God must be conceived of in the same order, and as antecedent to, and consequent on one another, in the same manner, as God's acts in the execution of those decrees. If this will not hold, with regard to those things that are the effects of those acts, yet certainly it will hold with respect to the acts themselves. They depend on one another, and are grounded on one another, in the same manner as the decrees that these are the execution of, and in no other. For, on the one hand, the decrees of God are no other than his eternal doing what is done, acted or executed by him in time. On the one hand, God's acts themselves, in executing, can be conceived of no otherwise, than as decrees for a present effect. They are acts of God's will. God brings things to pass only by acts of his will. He speaks, and it is done. His will says, let it be, and it is. And this act of his will that now is, cannot be looked upon as really different from that act of will that was in him before, and from eternity, in decreeing that this thing should be at this time. It differs only relatively. Here is no new act of the will in God, but only the same acts of God's will, which before, because the time was not come, respected future time; and so were called decrees. But now the time being come, they respect present time, and so are not called by us decrees, but acts executing decrees. Yet they are evidently the same acts in God. Therefore those acts, in executing, must certainly be conceived of in the same order, and with the same dependence, as the decrees themselves. It may be in some measure illustrated by this;—The decree of God or the will of God decreeing events, may be represented as a straight line of infinite length, that runs through all past eternity, and terminates in the event. The last point in the line, is the act of God's will in bringing the event to pass, and does not at all differ from all the other points throughout the infinite length of the line, in any other respect but this, that this last point is next to the event. This line may be represented as in motion, but yet always kept parallel to itself. The hither end of the line, by its motion, describes events in the order in which they come to pass; or at least represents God's acts in bringing the events to pass, in their order and mutual dependence, antecedence and consequence. By the motion of all the other points of the line, before the event or end of the line, in the whole infinite length of it, are represented the

decrees in their order; which, because the line in all its motions is kept parallel to itself, is exactly the same with the order of the motions of the last point. For the motion of every point of the whole line, is in all respects, just like the motion of that last point wherein the line terminates in the event; and the different parts of the motion of every point, are in every respect precisely in the same order. And the maxim, that what is first in intention, is last in execution, does not in the least concern this matter. For, by last in execution, is meant only last in order of time, without any respect to the priority or posteriority that we are speaking of; and it does not at all hinder, but that in God's acts, in executing his decrees, one act is the ground or reason of another act, in the same manner precisely as the decree that related to it was the ground or reason of the other decree. The absolute independence of God, no more argues against some of God's decrees being grounded on decrees of some other things that should first come to pass, than it does against some of God's acts in time, being grounded on some other antecedent acts of his. It is just the same with God's acts in executing, as has been said already of his decreeing In one respect, the end that is afterwards to be accomplished, is the ground of God's acting; in another respect, something that is already accomplished, is the ground of his acting, as it is the ground of the fitness or capableness of the act to obtain the end. There is nothing but the ultimate end of all things, viz. God's glory, and the communication of his goodness, that is prior to all first acts in creating the world, in one respect and mere possibility in another. But, with respect to after acts, other ends are prior in one respect, and other preceding acts are prior in another, just as I have shown it to be with respect to God's decrees. Now, this being established, it may help more clearly to illustrate, and fully to evince, what we have insisted on concerning the order of the decrees, and that God's decrees of some things that are accomplished first in order of time, are also prior in the order, so as to be the proper ground and reason of other decrees. For, let us see how it is in God's acts in executing his decrees. Will any deny, that God's act in rewarding righteousness, is grounded on a foregoing act of his in giving righteousness? And that he rewards righteousness in such a person, because he hath given righteousness to such a person; and that because this latter act necessarily supposes the former act foregoing? So, in like manner, God's decree, in determining to reward righteousness, is grounded on an antecedent decree to give righteousness, because the former decree necessarily supposes the latter decree, and implies it in the very notion of it. So, who will deny, but that God's act in punishing sin, is grounded on what God hath antecedently done in permitting sin, or suffering it to be, because the former necessarily supposes the latter, and therefore that the actual permission of sin is prior, in the order of nature, to the punishment of it? So that whatever foregoing act of God is in any respect a ground and reason of another succeeding act, so far is both the act, and decree of the act, prior to both that other act and decree.

It may be objected to this, that if so, the decree of bestowing salvation on an elect soul, is founded on the decree of bestowing faith on him; for God actually bestows salvation in some respect, because he has bestowed faith; and this would be to make the decree of election succedaneous to the decree of giving faith, as well as that of reprobation consequent on the decree of permitting sin. To this I answer, that both God's act, and also his decree of bestowing salvation on such a fallen creature, is in some respects, grounded on God's act and decree of giving faith, but in no wise as the decree or act of eternal punishing is grounded on sin, because punishment necessarily presupposes sin, so

that it could not be without it. But the decreeing and giving the happiness of the elect, is not so founded on faith. The case is very different. For with respect to eternal punishment, it may be said that God would not, yea, could not, have decreed or executed it, had he not decreed and permitted sin; but it cannot be said, either that God could not, or would not, have decreed or bestowed the eternal happiness of the elect, unless he had decreed and given faith. Indeed, the salvation of an elect soul is, in this respect, grounded on the decree giving faith as God's decree of bestowing happiness on the elect in this parular way, as a fallen creature, and by the righteousness of Christ made his own, by being heartily received and closed with, is grounded on the decree of bestowing faith in Christ, because it presupposes it, as the act that answers to this decree does. But the decree of bestowing happiness in general, which we conceive of as antecedent to this act, presupposes no such thing; nor does just so much without any more in execution presuppose faith, or indeed the righteousness of Christ, or any act or suffering of a mediator, or even the fall of man. And the decree of God's communicating his goodness to such a subject, does not so much as presuppose the being of the subject, because it gives being. But there is no decree of evil to such a subject which can be conceived of as antecedent to a decree of punishment. For the first decree of evil or suffering, implies that in it. For there is no evil decreed for any other end, but the glory of God's justice. Therefore the decree of the permission of sin is prior to all other things in the decree of reprobation. Due distinctions seem not to have been observed, in asserting that all the decrees of God are unconditional; which has occasioned difficulties in controversies about the decrees. There are no conditional decrees in this sense, viz., that decrees should depend on things as conditions of them, which in this decree, that depends on them as conditions, must be considered, like themselves, as yet undecreed. But yet decrees may, in some sort, be conditions of decrees; so that it may be said, that God would not have decreed some things, had he not decreed others.

§ 59 The objection to the divine decrees will be, that according to this doctrine, God may do evil, that good may come of it.

Ans. I do not argue that God may commit evil, that good may come of it; but that he may will that evil should come to pass, and permit that it may come to pass, that good may come of it. It is in itself absolutely evil, for any being to commit evil that good may come of it; but it would be no evil, but good, even in a creature, to will that evil should come to pass, if he had wisdom sufficient to see certainly that good would come of it, or that more good would come to pass in that way than in any other. And the only reason why it would not be lawful for a creature to permit evil to come to pass, and that it would not be wise, or good and virtuous in him so to do, is, that he has not perfect wisdom and sufficiency, so as to render it fit that such an affair should be trusted with him. In so doing he goes beyond his line; he goes out of his province; he meddles with things too high for him. It is every one's duty to do things fit for him in his sphere, and commensurate to his power. God never intrusted this providence in the hands of creatures of finite understandings, nor is it proper that he should.

If a prince were of perfect and all-comprehensive wisdom and foresight, and he should see that an act of treason would be for the great advancement of the welfare of his kingdom, it might be wise and virtuous in him to will that such an act of treason should come to pass; yea, it would be foolish and wrong if he did not; and it would be prudent and wise in him not to restrain the traitor, but to let him alone to go on in the way he chose. And yet he might hate the reason at the same

time, and he might properly also give forth laws at the same time, forbidding upon pain of death, and might hold these laws in force against this traitor.

The Arminians themselves allow that God permits sin, and that if he permits it, it will come to pass. So that the only difficulty about the act of the will that is in it, is that God should will evil to be, that good may come of it. But it is demonstrably true, that if God sees that good will come of it, and more good than otherwise, so that when the whole series of events is viewed by God, and all things balanced, the sum total of good with the evil, is more than without it, all being subtracted that needs be subtracted, and added that is to be added; if the sum total of good thus considered, be greatest, greater than the sum in any other case, then it will follow that God, if he be a wise and holy being, must will it.

For if this sum total that has evil in it, when what the evil subtracts is subtracted, has yet the greatest good in it, then it is the best sum total, better than the other sum total that has no evil in it. But if, all things considered, it be really the best, how can it be otherwise than that it should be chosen by an infinitely wise and good being, whose holiness and goodness consists in always choosing what is best? Which does it argue most, wisdom or folly, a good disposition or an evil one, when two things are set before a being, the one better and the other worse, to choose the worse and refuse the better?

§ 60. There is no inconsistency or contrariety between the decretive and receptive will of God. It is very consistent to suppose that God may hate the thing itself, and yet will that it should come to pass. Yea, I do not fear to assert that the thing itself may be contrary to God's will, and yet that it may be agreeable to his will that it should come to pass, because his will, in the one case, has not the same object with his will in the other case. To suppose God to have contrary wills towards the same object, is a contradiction; but it is not so, to suppose him to have contrary wills about different objects. The thing itself, and that the thing should come to pass, are different, as is evident; because it is possible that the one may be good and the other may be evil. The thing itself may be evil, and yet it may be a good thing that it should come to pass. It may be a good thing that an evil thing should come to pass; and oftentimes it most certainly and undeniably is so, and proves so.

§ 61. Objectors to the doctrine of election may say, God cannot always preserve men from sinning, unless he destroys their liberty. But will they deny that an omnipotent, an infinitely wise God, could possibly invent and set before men such strong motives to obedience, and keep them before them in such a manner as should influence them to continue in their obedience, as the elect angels have done, without destroying their liberty? God will order it so that the saints and angels in heaven never will sin, and does it therefore follow that their liberty is destroyed, and that they are not free, but forced in their actions? Does it follow that they are turned into machines and blocks, as the Arminians say the Calvinistic doctrines turn men?

§ 62. To conclude this discourse; I wish the reader to consider the unreasonableness of rejecting plain revelations, because they are puzzling to our reason. There is no greater difficulty attending this doctrine than the contrary, nor so great. So that though the doctrine of the decrees be mysterious, and attended with difficulties, yet the opposite doctrine is in itself more mysterious, and attended with greater difficulties, and with contradictions to reason more evident, to one who thoroughly considers things; so that, even if the Scripture had made no revelation of it, we should have had reason to believe it. But since the Scripture is so abundant in declaring it, the unreasonableness of rejecting it appears the more glaring.

CONCERNING EFFICACIOUS GRACE.

§ 1. It is manifest that the Scripture supposes, that if ever men are turned from sin, God must undertake it, and he must be the doer of it; that it is his doing that must determine the matter; that all that others can do, will avail nothing, without his agency. This is manifest by such texts as these: Jer. xxxi. 18, 19, "Turn thou me, and I shall be turned; thou art the Lord my God. Surely after that I was turned, I repented; and after that I was instructed, I smote upon my thigh," &c. Lam. v. 21, "Turn thou us unto thee, O Lord, and we shall be turned."

§ 2. According to Dr. Whitby's notion of the assistance of the Spirit, the Spirit of God does nothing in the hearts or minds of men beyond the power of the devil; nothing but what the devil can do; and nothing showing any greater power in any respect, than the devil shows and exercises in his temptations. For he supposes that all that the Spirit of God does, is to bring moral motives and inducements to mind, and set them before the understanding, &c. It is possible that God may infuse grace, in some instances, into the minds of such persons as are striving to obtain it in the other way, though they may not observe it, and may not know that it is not obtained by gradual acquisition. But if a man has indeed sought it only in that way, and with as much dependence on himself, and with as much neglect of God in his endeavors and prayers, as such a doctrine naturally leads to, it is not very likely that he should obtain saving grace by the efficacious, mighty power of God. It is most likely that God should bestow this gift in a way of earnest attention to divine truth, and the use of the means of grace, with reflection on one's own sinfulness, and in a way of being more and more convinced of sinfulness, and total corruption and need of the divine power to restore the heart, to infuse goodness, and of becoming more and more sensible of one's own impotence, and helplessness and inability to obtain goodness by his own strength. And if a man has obtained no other virtue, than what seems to have been wholly in that gradual and insensible way that might be expected from use and custom, in the exercise of his own strength, he has reason to think, however bright his attainments may seem to be, that he has no saving virtue.

§ 3. Great part of the gospel is denied by those who deny pure efficacious grace. They deny that wherein actual salvation and the application of redemption mainly consists; and how unlikely are such to be successful in their endeavors after actual salvation?

§ 4. Turnbull's explanation of Philip. ii. 12, 13, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of his own good pleasure," is this (*Christian Philosophy*, p. 96, 97): "Give all diligence to work out your salvation; for it is God, the Creator of all things, who, by giving you, of his good pleasure, the power of willing and doing, with a sense of right and wrong, and reason to guide and direct you, hath visibly made it your end so to do. Your frame shows, that to prepare yourselves for great moral happiness, arising from a well cultivated and improved mind suitably placed, is your end appointed to you by your Creator

Consider, therefore, that by neglecting this your duty, this your interest, you contemn and oppose the *good will of God towards you, and his design in creating you.*"

§ 5. If we look through all the examples we have of conversion in Scripture, the conversion of the Apostle Paul, and the Corinthians ("such were some of you, but ye are washed," &c.), and all others that the apostles write to, how far were they from this gradual way of conversion, by contracted habits and by such culture as Turnbull speaks of? Turnbull, in his *Christian Philosophy*, p. 470, seems to think, that the sudden conversions that were in the apostles' days, were instances of their miraculous power, as in these words: "They appealed to the works they wrought, to the samples they gave of their power to foretell future events; their power to cure instantaneously all diseases of the body; their power to cure, in the same extraordinary manner, all diseases of the mind, or to convert bad into good dispositions; their power to bestow gifts and blessings of all sorts, bodily and spiritual." See again, to the like purpose, p. 472.

Now I would inquire, whether those who thus had the diseases of their minds cured, and their bad converted into good dispositions, had any virtue; or whether those good dispositions of theirs were virtues, or any thing praiseworthy; and whether, when they were thus converted, they became good men, and the heirs of salvation? As Turnbull himself allows, all that are not good men, were called the children of the devil in Scripture; and he asserts that nothing is virtue, but what is obtained by our own culture; that no habit is virtuous, but a contracted one, one that is owing to ourselves, our own diligence, &c, and also holds, that none are good men but the virtuous; none others are the heirs of future happiness.

§ 6. What God wrought for the Apostle Paul and other primitive Christians, was intended for a pattern to all future ages, for their instruction and excitement; Eph. ii. 7, 1 Tim. i. 16. It is natural to expect, that the first fruits of the church specially recorded in history, and in that book which is the steady rule of the church in all things pertaining to salvation, should be a pattern to after ages in those things, those privileges, which equally concern all. Or if it be said, that as soon as men take up a strong resolution, they are accepted and looked upon by God as penitents and converts; it may be inquired, is there a good man without good habits, or principles of virtue and goodness in his heart?

§ 7. Turnbull speaks of good men as born again; i. e. changed by culture, *Christian Philosophy*, p. 282. Is there a good man without such principles as love to God and men, or charity, humility, &c.? How comes that resolution to be so good, if no principle of virtue be exercised in it?

If it be said, Paul was a good man before he was converted, it may be answered, he did not believe in Christ, and therefore was in a state of condemnation. Besides, he speaks of himself as being then a wicked man.

§ 8. Concerning the supposition advanced by Bishop Butler, and by Turnbull in his *Christian Philosophy*, that all that God does, even miracles themselves, are wrought according to general laws, such as are called the laws of nature, though unknown to us; and the supposition of Turnbull, that all may be done by angels acting by general laws, I observe, this seems to be unreasonable. If angels effect these works, acting only by general laws, then they must do them without any immediate, special interposition at all, even without the smallest intimation of the divine mind, what to do, or upon what occasion God would have any thing to be done. And what will this doctrine bring in-

spiration to, which is one kind of miracle? According to this, all significations of the divine mind, even to the prophets and apostles, must be according to general laws, without any special interposition at all of the divine agency.

§ 9. Acts xii. 23, God was so angry with Herod for not giving him the glory of his eloquence, that the angel of the Lord smote him immediately, and he died a miserable death; he was eaten of worms, and gave up the ghost. But if it be very sinful for a man to take to himself the glory of such a qualification as eloquence, how much more a man's taking to himself the glory of divine grace, God's own image, and that which is infinitely God's most excellent, precious and glorious gift, and man's highest honor, excellency and happiness, whereby he is partaker of the divine nature, and becomes a godlike creature? If God was so jealous for the glory of so small a gift, how much more for so high an endowment, this being that alone, of all other things, by which man becomes like God? If man takes the glory of it to himself he thereby will be in the greatest danger of taking the glory to himself that is due to God, and of setting up himself as standing in competition with God, as vying with the Most High, and making himself a god and not a man. If not giving God the glory of that which is least honorable, provokes God's jealousy; much more must not giving God the glory of that which is infinitely the most honorable. It is allowed, the apostle insists upon it, that the primitive Christians should be sensible that the glory of their gifts belonged to God, and that they made not themselves to differ. But how small a matter is this, if they make themselves to differ in that, which the apostle says is so much more excellent than all gifts?

§ 10. How much more careful has God shown himself, that men should not be proud of their virtue, than of any other gift? See Deut. ix. 4, Luke xviii. 9, and innumerable other places. And the apostle plainly teaches us to ascribe to God the glory, not only of our redemption, but of our wisdom, righteousness and sanctification; and that no flesh should glory in themselves in these things, 1 Cor. i. 29, 30, 31. Again, the apostle plainly directs, that all that glory in their virtue, should glory in the Lord, 2 Cor. x. 17. It is glorying in virtue and virtuous deeds he is there speaking of; and it is plain that the apostle uses the expression of glorying in the Lord, in such a sense, as to imply ascribing the glory of our virtue to God.

§ 11. The doctrine of men's being the determining causes of their own virtue, teaches them, not to do so much, as even the proud Pharisee did, who thanked God for making him to differ from other men in virtue, Luke xviii.

See Gen. xli. 15, 16. Job xi. 12. Dan. ii. 25, &c. 2 Cor. iii. 5, 6. 2 Cor. iv. 7. 2 Cor. x. 16.

Proverbs xx. 12, "The hearing ear, and the seeing eye, the Lord hath made even both of them;" compared with many parallel places that speak about God's giving eyes to see, and ears to hear, and hearts to understand, &c.

§ 12. The Arminian doctrine, and the doctrine of our new philosophers, concerning habits of virtue being only by custom, discipline, and gradual culture, joined with the other doctrine, that the obtaining of these habits in those that have time for it, is in every man's power, according to their doctrine of the freedom of will, tends exceedingly to cherish presumption in sinners, while in health and vigor, and tends to their utter despair, in sensible approaches of death by sickness or old age.

§ 13. Observe that the question with some is, whether the Spirit of God does any thing at all in these days, since the Scriptures have been completed. With those that allow that he does any thing, the question cannot be, whether

his influence be immediate; for, if he does any thing at all, his influence must be immediate. Nor can the question be, whether his influence, with regard to what he intends to do, be efficacious.

The questions relating to efficacious grace, controverted between us and the Arminians, are two: 1. Whether the grace of God, in giving us saving virtue, be determining and decisive. 2. Whether saving virtue be decisively given by a supernatural and sovereign operation of the Spirit of God; or, whether it be only by such a divine influence or assistance, as is imparted in the course of common providence, either according to established laws of nature, or established laws of God's universal providence towards mankind; i. e., either, 1. Assistance which is given in all natural actions, wherein men do merely exercise and improve the principles of nature and laws of nature, and come to such attainments as are connected with such exercises by the mere laws of nature. For there is an assistance in all such natural actions; because it is by a divine influence that the laws of nature are upheld; and a constant concurrence of divine power is necessary in order to our living, moving, or having a being. This we may call a natural assistance. Or, 2. That assistance, which, though it be something besides the upholding of the laws of nature (which take place in all affairs of life), is yet, by a divine, universal constitution in this particular affair of religion, so connected with those voluntary exercises which result from this mere natural assistance, that by this constitution it indiscriminately extends to all mankind, and is certainly connected with such exercises and improvements, as those just mentioned, by a certain, established, known rule, as much as any of the laws of nature. This kind of assistance, though many Arminians call it a supernatural assistance, differs little or nothing from that natural assistance that is established by a law of nature. The law so established, is only a particular law of nature; as some of the laws of nature are more general, others more particular: but this establishment, which they suppose to be by divine promise, differs nothing at all from many other particular laws of nature, except only in this circumstance, of the established constitutions, being revealed in the word of God, while others are left to be discovered only by experience.

The Calvinists suppose otherwise; they suppose that divine influence and operation, by which saving virtue is obtained, is entirely different from, and above common assistance, or that which is given in a course of ordinary providence, according to universally established laws of nature. They suppose a principle of saving virtue is immediately imparted and implanted by that operation, which is sovereign and efficacious in this respect, that its effect proceeds not from any established laws of nature. I mention this as an entirely different question from the other, viz., whether the grace of God, by which we obtain saving virtue, is determining or decisive. For that it may be, if it be given wholly in a course of nature, or by such an operation as is limited and regulated perfectly according to established, invariable laws. For none will dispute that many things are brought to pass by God in this manner, that are decisively ordered by him, and are brought to pass by his determining providence.

The controversy, as it relates to efficacious grace, in this sense, includes in it these four questions.

1. Whether saving virtue differs from common virtue, or such virtue as those have that are not in a state of salvation, in nature and kind, or only in degree and circumstances?

2. Whether a holy disposition of heart, as an internal, governing principle of life and practice, be immediately implanted or infused in the soul, or only be c acted by repeated acts, and obtained by human culture and improvement?

3. Whether conversion, or the change of a person from being a vicious or wicked man, to a truly virtuous character, be instantaneous or gradual?

4. Whether the divine assistance or influence, by which men obtain true and saving virtue, be sovereign and arbitrary, or, whether God, in giving this assistance and its effects, limits himself to certain exact and stated rules, revealed in his word, and established by his promises?

§ 14. Eph. i. 19, 20, "What is the exceeding greatness of his power to usward, according to the working of his mighty power," or the effectual working, as the word signifies.—These words, *according to the effectual working of his power*, we shall find applied to conversion, to growth in grace, and to rising up at last. You have them applied to conversion, Eph. iii. 7: "Whereof I was made a minister, according to the gift of the grace of God, given to me, by the *effectual working of his power*."—So likewise to growth in grace, Eph. iv. 10: "The whole body increaseth with the increase of God, by the *effectual working* in the measure of every part."—And to the resurrection to glory at the last day, Philip. iii. 21: "He will change our vile bodies, according to the *effectual working* of his mighty power, whereby he is able to subdue all things to himself."

And that the power of God in conversion, or in giving faith and the spiritual blessings that attend it, is here meant, may be argued from the apostle's change of phrase, that whereas in the foregoing verse, he spoke of the riches of the glory of Christ's inheritance in the saints, he does not go on to say, "and what is the exceeding greatness of his power towards them" (i. e., the saints), which surely would have been most natural, if he still had respect only to the power of God in bestowing the inheritance of future glory. But, instead of that, we see he changes the phrase; "and what is the exceeding greatness of his power *to usward who believe*;" plainly intimating some kind of change of the subject, or a respect to the subject of salvation with regard to something diverse; that whereas before he spoke of saints in their future state only, now he speaks of something that the saints, we that dwell in this world, that believe, are the subjects of. And as the apostle includes himself, so it is the more likely he should have the mighty power of God in conversion in his thought; his conversion having been so visible and remarkable an instance of God's marvellous power.

Again, the apostle, in praying that they "knowing the exceeding greatness of God's power," &c., prays for such a knowledge and conviction of the power of God to bring them to life and glory, which was a most special remedy against such doubts as the church in the then present state was most exposed to, viz., that of their being preserved to glory and salvation through all their trials, persecutions, and the great opposition that was made by the enemies of Christ and their souls. Therefore, after mentioning the glory of their inheritance, he, for their comfort and establishment, mentions the power of God to bring them to the possession of this inheritance, as the apostle Peter does, 1 Peter i. 4, 5: "To an inheritance incorruptible—who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation." He speaks to their hearts, for here was their difficulty and temptation to doubting. But if the keeping them in faith showed such great power, much more did the first bringing them from heathenism and the power of sin, darkness and spiritual death and ruin, into a state of faith and salvation, quickening them when dead in trespasses and sins; as it is a greater instance of divine power to raise the dead, than to maintain life that is exposed to danger; a greater work to reconcile us being enemies, than to keep us friends being reconciled. It was natural for the apostle to put them in mind of the power of God manifested in their conversion, as he would strengthen their faith in his power to raise them at the last day, and glorify them to eternity. Dr. Goodwin says, he finds most of the

Greek fathers ran this way in interpreting the place. He mentions Theophylact and Chrysostom, and cites these words of Chrysostom: "The apostle's scope is to demonstrate by what already was manifested in them, viz., the power of God in working faith, and to raise up their hearts to believe what was not manifested, viz., the raising of them from death to life. It being (saith he) a far more wonderful work to persuade a soul to believe in Christ, than to raise up a dead man, a far more admirable work of the two." Besides, what the apostle says in the continuation of his discourse, explains his meaning, and puts the matter of his intending to include the power of God manifested in their conversion, out of all doubt, as, in the very next sentence, "and you hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins:" and every word that follows, to the end of the second chapter, confirms the same thing. I shall mention a few of them: verse 2, "Wherein in time past ye walked—according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now worketh effectually in the children of disobedience." This shows the exceeding greatness of power in their being delivered from such a state, wherein they were held by the great power of so strong an enemy. Verses 5 and 6, "Even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ, and hath raised us up together, and made us sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus." These things tend to show how the power of God in their conversion, and the happy, honorable, and glorious change of their state by it, was according to the power that wrought in Christ when he was quickened, raised up, and made to sit in heavenly places, as chap. i. 19, 20, 21. Now, to back this with a parallel place, as here in this place the apostle speaks of the greatness of God's power in working faith, and parallels it with the power that raised up Christ from the dead; so we find he says the very same thing in Colossians ii. 12, 13: "Ye are buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with him through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him from the dead." In that text in Ephesians the apostle speaks of faith, *the power that works in us that believe.* So in this text in Colossians, *ye are risen through faith.* Again, 2dly, in Ephesians, together with what there follows, chap. ii., he compareth believing to a rising from the dead. So here in Colossians, *ye are risen with him through faith.* Thirdly, as in Ephesians the apostle speaks of the work of God in giving faith, as parallel with his work in raising Christ, so he does here in Colossians: "Ye are risen with him, through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him from the dead." Fourthly, as we in Ephesians are said to believe, according to the efficacious working of God, the word ενεργεια is also used here in Colossians. It is called faith of the operation, or effectual working of God, and as there God is said to be the author, the same that raised up Christ, and to work faith in them; so here it is the faith of the operation of God who raised Christ from the dead, so that, every way, one place is parallel with the other.

Some pretend, that in that expression, *through the faith of the operation of God*, there is no respect to God's operation as the efficient cause of faith, but only to the operation of God that raised Christ as the object of faith, which believes that power and operation as it was manifested in raising Christ, and which is believed to be sufficient to raise us up also. But that the apostle means the operation of God in giving faith, appears by verse 11, which introduces these words, where the apostle says—"In whom ye are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ." This phrase, *made without hands*, in Scripture, always denotes God's immediate power, above the course of nature, and above second causes. Thus, when he speaks of heaven, 2 Cor. v. 1, he calls it "a house not

made with hands," and in Heb. ix. 11, the human nature of Christ, which was framed by so wonderful and supernatural a power of the Holy Ghost, is said to be a "tabernacle made without hands."

NOTE. The foregoing remarks concerning the texts in Eph. i. 19, 20, and in Coloss. ii. 11, 12, 13, are taken chiefly from Dr. Goodwin's Works, Vol. I p. 298, &c.

§ 15. It is a doctrine mightily in vogue, that God has promised his saving grace to men's sincere endeavors in praying for it, and using proper means to obtain it; and so that it is not God's mere will that determines the matter, whether we shall have saving grace or not; but that the matter is left with us, to be determined by the sincerity of our endeavors.

But there is vast confusion in all talk of this kind, for want of its being well explained what is meant by sincerity of endeavor, and through men's deceiving themselves by using words without a meaning. I think the Scripture knows of but one sort of sincerity in religion, and that is a truly pious or holy sincerity. The Bible suggests no notion of any other sort of sincere obedience, or any other sincerity of endeavors, or any doings whatsoever in religion, than doing from love to God and true love to our duty. As to those that endeavor and take pains (let them do ever so much), that yet do nothing freely, or from any true love to, or delight in God, or free inclination to virtue, but wholly for by-ends, and from sinister and mercenary views, as being driven and forced against their inclination, or induced by regard to things foreign; I say, respecting such as these, I find nothing in Scripture that should lead us to call them honest and sincere in their endeavors. I doubt not but that the Scripture promises supernatural, truly divine and saving blessings, to such a sincerity of endeavor as arises from true love to our duty. But then, as I apprehend, this is only to promise more saving grace to him that seeks it in the exercise of saving grace, agreeably to that repeated saying of our Saviour, "to him that hath shall be given, and he shall have more abundance." Persons, in seeking grace with this sincerity, ask in faith; they seek these blessings in the exercise of a saving faith, the great condition of the covenant of grace. And I suppose, promises are made to no sincerity, but what implies this. And whoever supposes that divine promises are made to any other sincerity than this, I imagine he never will be able to make out his scheme, and that for two reasons:

1. On such a supposition, the promises must be supposed to be made to an undetermined condition. And,

2. Even on the supposition that the promises are made to some other sincerity than truly pious sincerity, the sovereign grace and will of God must determine the existence of the condition of the promises; and so the whole must still depend on God's determining grace.

1. On the supposition that the promises of saving grace are made to some other sincerity of endeavor than that which implies true and saving piety of heart, they must be made to an undetermined condition, and so be in effect no promises at all.

If there be any thing else worthy to be called sincerity in endeavors after holiness, but a free, pious inclination, or true regard and love to holiness, nothing better can be mentioned than this, viz., endeavors after holiness, from a real willingness of heart to put forth those endeavors for the agent's own sake, yet for such ends as prudence and self-love would propose; such as his own eternal interest, salvation from everlasting misery, &c.

So that by sincerity here, is not meant any holy freedom or virtuous disposition or desire; but in it signifies no more than reality of disposition and will

to endeavor for some end, only provided the end be subsrvient to self-preservation. But the thing that truly in this case denominates the endeavor sincere, is the reality of the will or disposition of heart to endeavor, and not the goodness of the will or disposition. Now if this be the sincerity of endeavor which is meant, when men talk of its being the condition of peremptory and decisive promises of saving grace, then it never has (as I know of) yet been told, and I suppose, never will or can be told, what the condition of the promise is.

The thing that needs to be determined, in order to know this condition, is, how great a degree of this sort of sincerity, or real willingness of heart to endeavor, a man must have, to be entitled to the promise. For there can be no question, but that multitudes that live in gross wickedness, and are men of a very debauched, flagitious behavior, have some degree of it; and there are none, even of those that are the most strict and painful in their endeavor, but have it in a very imperfect degree, and, in many things, fail of this sincerity of endeavor. For it must be kept in mind, that the sincerity of heart we are speaking of, attending religious duties, is only a reality of willingness to use endeavors. And every man whatsoever, that uses any endeavor at all for his salvation, or ever performs any religious duty, to the end that he may go to heaven and not to hell, has this sincerity. For whatever men do voluntarily for this end, they do from a real willingness and disposition of heart to do it; for if they were not willing to do it, they would not do it. There surely are no voluntary actions performed without men's being willing to perform them. And is there any man that will assert that God has absolutely or peremptorily promised his saving grace to any man that ever stirs hand or foot, or thinks one thought in order to his salvation?

And on the other hand, as to those that go farthest in their endeavors, still they fail in numberless instances, of exercising this kind of sincerity, consisting in reality of will. For such are guilty of innumerable sins; and every man that commits sin, by so doing, instead of being sincerely willing to do his duty, sincerely wills the contrary. For so far as any actions of his are his sin, so far his will is in what he does. No action is imputed to us any farther than it is voluntary, and involves the real disposition of the heart. The man, in this painful endeavor, fails continually of his duty, or (which is the same thing) of perfect obedience. And so far as he does so, he fails of sincerity of endeavor. No man is any farther defective in his obedience, than as he is defective in sincerity; for there the defect lies, viz., in his will, and the disposition of his heart. If men were perfect in these, that would be the same thing as to be perfect in obedience, or complete in holiness. Nothing, either of omission or commission, is sin any farther than it includes the real disposition and will; and therefore, no men are any farther sinful, than as they are sincere in sinning; and so far as they are sincere in sinning, so far they are deficient of sincerely endeavoring their duty. Now, therefore, where are the bounds to which men must come in order to be entitled to the promise? Some have a faint sincerity of endeavor, who none do suppose are entitled to the promise. And those that have most sincerity of endeavor, do greatly fail of that degree of sincerity that they ought to have, or fall short of that which God requires. And there are infinite degrees between these two classes. And if every degree of strength of endeavor is not sufficient, and yet some certain degree of it, greatly short of that which God requires, is sufficient, then let it be determined what that degree is.

Some have determined thus, that if men sincerely endeavor to do what they can, God has promised to help them to do more, &c. But this question remains to be resolved, whether the condition of the promise be, that he shall sin-

cerely endeavor to do what he can constantly, or only sometimes. For there is no man that sincerely endeavors to do his duty to the utmost constantly, with this sort of sincerity consisting in reality of will so to do. If he did, he would perfectly do his duty at all times. For, as was observed before, nothing else is required but the will; and men never fail of their duty, or commit sin, but when their real will is to sin.

But if the condition of the promise, be sincerely doing what they can sometimes, then it should be declared how often, or how great a part of the time of man's life, he must exercise this sincerity. It is manifest that men fail of their duty every day, yea continually; and therefore, that there is a continual defect of sincerity of endeavor in the practice of duty.

If it should be said that the condition of the promise of saving grace is, that, take one time with another, and one duty with another, the sincerity of their will should be chiefly in favor of their duty; or, in other words, that they should be sincere in endeavors to do more than half their duty, though they sincerely neglect the rest; I would inquire, where they find such promises as these in the Bible? Besides, I think it can be demonstrated, that there is not a man on earth, that ever comes up half way to what the law of God requires of him; and consequently that there is in all more want of sincerity, than any actual possession of it. But whether it be so or no, how does it appear, that if men are sincere in endeavoring with respect to more than half their duty, God has promised them saving mercy and grace, though, through a defect of their sincerity, the rest be neglected?

But if we suppose the sincerity to which divine promises are made, implies a true freedom of the heart in religious endeavors and performances, consisting in love to God and holiness, inclining our hearts to our duty for its own sake, here is something determinate and precise; as a title to the benefit promised, does not depend on any particular degree of sincerity to be found out by difficult and unsearchable rules of mathematical calculation, but on the nature of it; this sincerity being a thing of an entirely distinct nature and kind from any thing that is to be found in those men who have no interest in the promises. If men know they have this sincerity, they may know the promises are theirs, though they may be sensible they have very much of a contrary principle in their hearts, the operations of which are as real as of this. This is the only sincerity in religion that the Scripture makes any account of. According to the word of God, then, and then only, is there a sincere, universal obedience, when persons love all God's commands, and love all those things wherein holiness consists, and endeavor after obedience to every divine precept, from love and of free choice. Otherwise, in Scripture account, there is nothing but sincere disobedience and rebellion, without any sincerity of the contrary. For their disobedience is of free choice, from sincere love to sin, and delight in wickedness. But their refraining from some sins, and performing some external duties, is without the least degree of free choice or sincere love.

If here it should be said, that men who have no piety of heart in a saving degree, yet may have some degree of love to virtue; and it should be insisted that mankind are born with a moral sense, which implies a natural approbation of, and love to virtue; and therefore, men that have not the principle of love to God and virtue established to that degree as to be truly pious men, and entitled to heaven, yet may have such degrees of them as to engage them, with a degree of ingenuous sincerity and free inclination, to seek after farther degrees of virtue, and so with a sincerity above that which has been mentioned, viz., a real willingness to use endeavors from fear and self-interest; it may be

replied, If this be allowed, it will not at all help the matter. For still the same question returns, viz., what degree of this sincerity is it that constitutes the precise condition of the promise? It is supposed that all mankind have this moral sense; but yet it is not supposed that all mankind are entitled to the promises of saving mercy. Therefore the promises depend, as above noticed, on the degree of sincerity, under the same difficulties, and with the same intricacies, and all the forementioned unfixedness and uncertainty. And other things concerning this sincerity, besides the degree of it, are undetermined, viz., how constant this degree of sincerity of endeavor must be; how long it must be continued; and how early it must be begun.

Thus, it appears that, on the supposition of God's having made any promises of saving grace to the sincere endeavors of ungodly men, it will follow, that such promises are made to an undetermined condition.

But a supposed promise to an undetermined condition, is truly no promise at all. It is absurd to talk of positive determinate promises made to something not determined, or to a condition that is not fixed in the promise. If the condition be not decided, there is nothing decisive in the affair.

If the master of a family should give forth such a pretended promise as this to his servants, "I promise, that if any of you will do something, though I tell you not what, that I will surely give him an inheritance among my children:" would this be truly any promise at all?

I proceed now to observe,

II. On the supposition that the promises of saving grace are made to some other sincerity of endeavor, than that which implies truly pious sincerity, the sovereign grace and will of God must determine the existence of the condition of the promises; and so the whole must still depend on God's determining grace; and that of whatever kind this sincerity, short of truly pious and saving sincerity, is supposed to be; whether it consists only in a reality of will, arising from foreign motives, for a certain degree of endeavors or use of means; or whether it be a certain sincerity or reality of willingness to use endeavors, arising from a natural love of virtue. For all suppose the sincerity, to which the promises are made, to be that in which some are distinguished from others; none supposing that all mankind, without exception, have this sincerity which is the condition of the promises. Therefore, this sincerity must be a distinguishing attainment. And how it that some attain to it, and not others? It must be in one of these two ways; either by the sovereign gift of God's will, or by their endeavors. To say the former, is to give up the point, and to own that the sovereign grace of God determines the existence of the condition of the promises. But if it be said, that this distinguishing sincerity of endeavor is obtained by men's own endeavor, then I ask, what sort of endeavor is it attained by? Sincere endeavor, or insincere? None will be so absurd, as to say, that this great condition of saving promises is attained to by insincere endeavors. For what tendency, either natural or moral, can the exercise of insincerity have, to produce, or attain to sincerity? But if it be said, that distinguishing sincerity of endeavor is attained to by distinguishing sincere endeavor, this is to run round in a ridiculous circle; and still the difficulty remains, and the question returns, how the distinguishing sincerity that first of all took place in the affair came to have existence, otherwise than by the determining grace of God?

And if it be said, that there is no need of supposing any such thing as any previous, habitual sincerity, or any such sincerity going before, as shall be an established principle, but that it is sufficient that the free will does sincerely determine itself to endeavor after holiness; I answer, whether we suppose the

sincerity that first entitles to the promises, to be a settled habit, or established principle or not, it does not in the least remove the difficulty, as long as it is something, in which some men are distinguished from others, that precedes the distinguishing endeavor which entitles to the promises, and is the source and spring of those endeavors. This first, distinguishing sincerity, which is the spring of the whole affair, must have existence by some means or other; and it must proceed either from some previous, sincere endeavor of the man's own, which is a contradiction; or from God, which is the point required; or it must be the effect of chance, in other words, of nothing.

If we suppose that distinguishing sincerity of endeavor by which some men are interested in the promises of saving grace, and not others, to be some certain degree of love to virtue, or any thing else in the disposition or exercise of the heart; yet it must be owned, that all men either are alike by nature, as to love to virtue, or they are not. If they are not, but some have naturally a greater love to virtue than others, and this determines some, rather than others, to the requisite sincerity of endeavor after saving grace; then God determines the affair by his sovereign will; for he, and not men themselves, determines all distinguishing qualifications or advantages that men are born with. Or if there be no difference naturally, but one man is born with the same love to virtue as another; then, how do some men first attain to more of this love to virtue than others, and so possess that distinguishing sincerity of endeavor which consists in it? To say it arises from a previous distinguishing sincerity of endeavor, attempt, desire, or will, is a contradiction. Therefore, it must proceed from the determining grace of God; which being allowed, the great point in dispute is allowed.

§ 16. Ephesians ii. 8, "By grace are ye saved, through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God." Mr. Beach observes, "this text does not mean that their faith is so God's gift, as not to be of themselves, as is most evident to any one who reads the original." This is certainly a great mistake. What I suppose he means, is, that the relative *that*, being of the neuter gender, and the word πιστις of the feminine, they do not agree together. But if he would translate the Greek relative *that thing*, viz., the thing last spoken of, all the difficulty vanishes. *Vid. Beza in Loc.* Such Scriptures as these, 1 Cor. xv. 10, "Not I, but the grace of God that was with me;" Gal. ii. 20, "Not I, but Christ liveth in me;" prove efficacious grace. The virtuous actions of men that are rewardable, are not left to men's indifference, without divine ordering and efficacy, so as to be possible to fail. They are often in the Scripture the matter of God's promises. How often does God promise reformations? How often does God promise that great revival of religion in the latter days? Dr. Whitby seems to deny any physical influence at all of the Spirit of God on the will; and allows an influence by moral suasion and moral causes only, p. 344. This is to deny that the Spirit of God does any thing at all, except inspiring the prophets, and giving the means of grace, with God's ordination of this in his providence. If God do any thing physically, what he does must be efficacious and irresistible.

Such an assistance Dr. Whitby maintains, and, concerning it, says the following things, p. 221, 222:

"1st. Then I say it must be granted, that in raising an idea in my brain by the Holy Spirit, and the impression made upon it there, the action is truly physical. 2d. That in those actions I am wholly passive; that is, I myself do nothing formally to produce those ideas; but the good Spirit, without my operation, doth produce them in me. 3d. That these operations must be irresistible

in their production, because they are immediately produced in us without our knowledge of them, and without our will, and so without those faculties by which we are enabled to act."

Though it should be allowed that God assists man with a physical assistance, and yet by an obliged and promised assistance only; then God does not do, or effects or give the thing assisted to, any more than if he operated and assisted men only according to the established laws of nature; and men may as properly be said to do it of themselves, and of their own power. The doing of the thing, is in the same manner in their power. The assistance by which God assists a drunkard that goes to the tavern, and there drinks excessively, or by which he assists an adulterer or pirate in their actions, is, that he upholds the laws of nature, the laws of the nature of the human soul, whereby it is able to perform such and such acts in such order and dependence; and the laws of the union of soul and body; and moves the body in such a stated manner in consequence of such acts of the soul, and upholds the laws of motion, and causes that there shall be such and such effects in corporeal things, and also of men's minds in consequence of such motions. All the difference is, that the assistance which he grants in the duties of religion, is according to a newer establishment than the other, according to a method established a little later; and also, that the method of assistance, in the one case, is written and revealed by way of promise or covenant, and not in the other.

But if it be said, that though God has promised assistance, yet he has not promised the exact degree, as, notwithstanding his promise, he has left himself at liberty to assist some, much more than others, in consequence of the very same endeavor; I answer, that this will prove a giving up of their whole scheme, and will infallibly bring in the Calvinistical notion of sovereign and arbitrary grace; whereby some, with the very same sincerity of endeavor, with the same degree of endeavor, and the same use of means, nay, although all things are exactly equal in both cases, both as to their persons and behavior; yet one has that success by sovereign grace and God's arbitrary pleasure, that is denied another. If God has left himself no liberty of sovereign grace in giving success to man's endeavors, but his consequent assistance be always tied to such endeavors precisely, then man's success is just as much in his own power, and is in the same way the fruit of his own doings, as the effect and fulfilment of his endeavors to commit adultery or murder; and indeed much more. For his success in those endeavors, is not tied to such endeavors, but may be providentially disappointed. Although particular motions follow such and such acts of will, in such a state of body, exactly according to certain laws of nature; yet a man's success in such wickedness, is not at all tied to his endeavors by any divine establishment, as the Arminians suppose success is to man's endeavors after conversion.

For the Spirit of God, by assisting in the alleged manner, becomes not the efficient cause of those things, as the Scriptures do certainly represent him. If God be not the proper bestower, author, and efficient cause of virtue, then the greatest benefits flow not from him; are not owing to his goodness; nor have we him to thank for them.

"Christ upbraids the cities wherein most of his mighty works were done, that they were worse than Sodom, &c., and the Jews of that generation, that they were worse than the men of Nineveh; and the Pharisees, that the publicans and harlots went into the kingdom of God before them. But why did he do this, if the only reason was, that the one was brought to repent by effectual grace, and the other not?" (See *Whitby*, p. 169, 170, 171.) I answer, the

unbelief and impenitence of those cities, of that generation, and of those Pharisees, when, on the contrary, the publicans and Nineveh repented, and the men of Sodom would have repented, was an argument that they were worse, more perverse and hardhearted than they. Because, though repentance is owing to special, efficacious assistance, yet, in his ordinary methods of proceeding with men, God is wont much more rarely to bestow it on those that are more perverse, hardhearted, and rooted in evil, than others. So much the more as their hearts are hardened, so much the less likely are they to be brought to repentance. And though there be oftentimes exceptions of particular persons, yet it still holds good as a general rule; and especially with regard to societies, nations, cities and ranks of men: so that Christ might well, from the fact that he mentions, draw an argument of the greater perverseness and stubbornness of those societies and ranks of men that he spoke of

§ 17. A command and a manifestation of will are not the same thing. A command does not always imply a true desire that the thing commanded should be done. So much at least is manifest by the instance of Abraham commanded to offer up Isaac. That command was not such an effect of the divine will, as the commands to believe and repent, &c.

§ 18. Either the stronger the habitual inclination to good is, the more virtuous; and the stronger the disposition to evil, the more vicious; or, if it be otherwise, then indifference or want of inclination, is essential to both virtue and vice.

§ 19. Dr. Whitby's inconsistence appears in that one while, when he is disputing against the decree of election, he maintains that the epistles, where the apostle speaks to the elect, are not written to the converted only; because then it suits his turn that the persons addressed should not be converted. But afterwards, when disputing against efficacious grace, he maintains that where the apostle says, "God worketh in you both to will and to do," &c., Philip. ii. 13, he speaks only to them that are converted, p. 288. Again, when it suits the Doctor's turn, when writing about perseverance, then all whom the apostles write to are true saints. As particularly those the apostle Peter writes to, that had *precious faith*, p. 399. And the Galatians addressed in Paul's epistle, p. 401, 402.

§ 20. When the Psalmist prays, "Make me to go in the way of thy statutes;" is it indeed his meaning, that God would give him the general grace which he gives to all, and which is sufficient for all if they will but improve it? And is this all?

§ 21. Arminians argue that God has obliged himself to bestow a holy and saving disposition, on certain conditions, and that what is given in regeneration, is given either for natural men's asking, or for the diligent improvement of common grace; because, otherwise, it would not be our fault that we are without it, nor our virtue that we have it. But if this reasoning is just, the holy qualities obtained by the regenerate, are only the fruits of virtue, not virtues themselves. All the virtue lies in asking, and in the diligent improvement of common grace.

§ 22. Prov. xxi. 1, "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water; he turneth it whithersoever he will." This shows that the Arminian notion of liberty of will, is inconsistent with the Scripture notion of God's providence and government of the world. See also Jer. xxxi. 18, "Turn me and I shall be turned." Matth. vii. 18, "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit; neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." Let us understand this how we will, it destroys the Arminian notion of liberty, and virtue

and vice. For, if it means only a great difficulty; then so much the less liberty, and therefore so much the less virtue or vice. And the preceding verse would be false, which says, "every good tree bringeth forth good fruit," &c. Rom. viii. 6, 7, 8, 9, "For to be carnally minded is death; but to be spiritually minded is life and peace: because the carnal mind is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So then they that are in the flesh cannot please God. But we are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now, if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his." The design of the apostle in this place, overthrows Arminian notions of liberty, virtue and vice. It appears from Scripture, that God gives such assistance to virtue and virtuous acts, as to be properly a determining assistance, so as to determine the effect; which is inconsistent with the Arminian notion of liberty. The Scripture shows that God's influence in the case is such, that he is the cause of the effect; he causes it to be: which shows that his influence determines the matter, whether it shall be or not. Otherwise innumerable expressions of Scripture are exceedingly improper, and altogether without a meaning.

§ 23. Dr. Whitby's notion of the assistance of the Spirit, is of the same sort with inspiration. Whereas that which I suppose is the true notion, is entirely different. Consequently their notion is much more enthusiastical, does much better agree with, and much more expose to pernicious enthusiasm, than ours. Hence we find that the grossest enthusiasts, such as Quakers and others, are generally Arminians in the doctrines of free will, &c.

§ 24. Scripture expressions are everywhere contrary to the Arminian scheme, according to all use of language in the world in these days. But then they have their refuge here. They say the ancient figures of speech are exceedingly diverse from ours; and that we in this distant age cannot judge at all of the true sense of expression used so long ago, but by a skill in antiquity, and being versed in ancient history, and critically skilled in the ancient languages; not considering, that the Scriptures were written for us in these ages on whom the ends of the world are come; yea, were designed chiefly for the latter age of the world, in which they shall have their chief, and, comparatively, almost all their effect. They were written for God's people in those ages, of whom at least ninety-nine in a hundred must be supposed incapable of such knowledge by their circumstances and education; and nine hundred and ninety-nine in a thousand of God's people, that hitherto have been saved by the Scriptures. It is easy, by certain methods of interpretation, to refine and criticise any book to a sense most foreign to the mind of the author.

§ 25. If God be truly unwilling that there should be any moral evil in the world, why does not he cause less moral evil to exist than really does? If it be answered, as is usual to such kind of objections, that though God is unwilling there should be moral evil, yet he will not infringe on man's liberty, or destroy his moral agency to prevent it; then I ask, if this be all, why does God cause so much less to exist at some certain times; on the contrary, causes virtue gloriously to prevail? Other times are spoken of and promised, wherein it shall prevail yet vastly more. And this is spoken of as of God's effecting, and is abundantly so spoken of and promised, as what God would do, and none should hinder, &c.

The Arminian principles, denying the efficacious, determining grace of God, as the cause of men's virtue and piety, are wholly inconsistent with the promises and prophecies of the future flourishing of religion and virtue in the world, and never can be made consistent therewith. This flourishing of religion is

spoken of as what God will effect; and is made the matter of his abundant promise; is spoken of as his glorious work, the work of his almighty power; what he will effect, and none shall hinder; what he will effect against all opposition, removing and overcoming the wickedness of men, &c.

§ 26. Dr. Stebbing says, page 104, "So much grace as is necessary to lead us to that obedience which is indispensably required in order to salvation, God will give to every one, who humbly and devoutly prays to him for it; for this is the condition, and the only condition prescribed by our Saviour, Luke xi. 9—13, "And I say unto you, ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you. For every one that asketh, receiveth; and he that seeketh, findeth; and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened. If then, ye, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children; how much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him?"—where the promise of the Spirit is made. Here humility and devotion are mentioned as the condition of that obedience which is indispensably required in order to salvation. By that obedience which is required in order to salvation must be meant, either, 1. That sort of virtue and obedience that is requisite, or, 2. Perseverance in it. If he means that sort of virtue which is requisite in order to salvation; then I would ask, what sort of humility and devotion is that, to which God has promised the grace which is necessary to their obtaining that virtue which is the condition of salvation? Must it not be real, sincere humility and devotion? Surely if God has promised so great a gift to any humility and devotion, it must be to that which is sincere and upright. Because that which is not sincere, is nothing; it is hypocritical; a mere show of that which is really wanting. And it would be very unreasonable to suppose that God promises such infinite rewards to hypocrisy, which he has often declared to be abominable to him, and which only provokes him the more. But if it be true, sincere, upright humility and devotion, it is unreasonable to suppose that God makes this the condition of that grace which is necessary to his obtaining that kind of virtue which is requisite to salvation. Because he, who has this humility and devotion, has that kind of virtue already. The Scripture everywhere speaks of uprightness and sincerity of heart, as that virtue that is saving. He that sincerely asks for grace to obey, has that sincerity and uprightness of heart that is exercised in sincere obedience; for he that sincerely asks this, is sincerely willing to obey, or sincerely desirous of obeying. Or 2. If the Doctor, by that obedience that is indispensably required in order to salvation, means perseverance in sincere virtue, and this be promised to devoutly and sincerely asking it; then hereby must be meant, either devoutly and sincerely asking it once, or final perseverance in this sincere asking, or a certain limited continuance in that asking. If a final perseverance in asking be the condition of grace to lead us to persevere, saving virtue is, as said before, the condition of itself. For persevering sincerity is the condition of obtaining persevering sincerity. If it be only once asking, or asking a limited number of times, or a limited continuance in asking, this is contrary to the Arminian doctrine about perseverance. For it supposes a person in this life, on a past condition, to be already, before the end of the day of his probation, so confirmed in obedience that it is impossible for him to fall away.

§ 27. One danger of these Arminian notions is, that they strongly tend to prevent conviction of sin.

§ 28. The vast pretences of Arminians to an accurate and clear view of the scope and design of the sacred penmen, and a critical knowledge of the original, will prove forever vain and insufficient to help them against such clear evidence

as the Scripture exhibits concerning efficacious grace. I desire it may be shown, if it can be, that ever any terms, that are fuller and stronger, are used more frequently, or in greater variety, to signify God's being the author, efficient and bestower of any kind of benefit, than as to the bestowment of true virtue or goodness of heart; whether concerning the deliverance out of Egypt, or the manna that was rained down from heaven, or the bestowment of the blessings of Canaan, or saving Noah and his family in the ark; or the raising any from the dead, or Christ's giving health to the sick, or sight to the blind, or bread to the hungry in the wilderness, or any thing else whatsoever; or the giving being to mankind in their creation; the giving reason to them, with their other natural faculties; the giving them life and breath; the giving them the beautiful form of their bodies; the giving them life at the general resurrection; the giving them their glory and happiness in heaven; the giving prophets, and the word of God by the prophets and others; the giving the means of grace and salvation; the giving Christ, and providing means of salvation in him. Yea, I know of no one thing in Scripture wherein such significant, strong expressions are used, in so great variety, or one half so often, as the bestowment of this benefit of true goodness and piety of heart. But after all, we must be faced down in it with vast confidence, that the Scriptures do not imply any more than only exhibiting means of instruction, leaving the determining and proper causing of the effect wholly with man, as the only proper, efficient and determining cause; and that the current of Scripture is all against us; and that it is because we do not understand language, and are bigots and fools for imagining any such thing as that the Scriptures say any thing of that nature, and because the divines on our side do not understand Greek, and do not lay the Scripture before them. nor mind the scope of Scripture, nor consider the connection, &c. &c. Perhaps it will be said, that every one of those Scriptures, which are brought to prove efficacious grace, may have another interpretation, found out by careful and critical examination. But, alas! Is that the way of the Most High's instructing mankind, to use such a multitude of expressions, in different languages, and various different ages, all which, in their natural and most common acceptation in all languages, nations and ages, must undoubtedly be understood in a particular sense; yea, the whole thread and current of all that God says, according to the use of speech among mankind, tends to lead to such an understanding, and so unavoidably leads his people in all ages into such an understanding; but yet, that he means no such thing; intending only that the true meaning should not be found out, but by the means of acute criticism, which might possibly hit upon the strange, unusual, and surprising meaning?

§ 29. Instead of persons' being the determining and efficient causes of their own virtue and piety, after all the moral means God uses with man, let us suppose some third person between God and the subject of this gift of virtue, to be in the very same manner the sovereignly determining cause and efficient of virtue; that he had power to bestow it on us, or cause us to be the subjects of it, just in the same manner as the Arminians suppose we ourselves have power to be the causes of our being the subjects of virtue; and that it depended on this third person's free will, just in the same manner as now they suppose our having virtue depends on our own free will; and that God used moral means with that third person to bestow virtue on us, just in the same manner that he uses moral means to persuade us to cause virtue in ourselves, and the moral means had the like tendency to operate on his will as on ours; but finally, it was left entirely to his free will to be the sole determining cause whether we should have virtue without any such influence on his will as is at least to ensure his sovereignty

and arbitrary disposal, and perfectly free self-determination; and it should be left contingent, whether he would bestow it or not; and, in these circumstances, this third person should happen to determine in our favor, and bestow virtue: now I ask, Would it be proper to ascribe the matter so wholly to God, in such strong terms, and in such a great variety; to ascribe it so entirely to him as his gift; to pray to him beforehand for it; to give him thanks, to give him all the glory, &c.? On the contrary, would not this determining cause, whose arbitrary, self-determined, self-possessed, sovereign will, decides the matter, be properly looked upon as the main cause, vastly the most proper cause, the truest author and bestower of the benefit? Would not he be, as it were, all in the cause? Would not the glory properly belong to him, on whose pleasure the determination of the matter properly depended?

§ 29. By regeneration, being new creatures, raised from death in sin, in the New Testament, is not meant merely persons' being brought into the state and privileges of professing Christians, according to Dr. Taylor. When Christ says unto Nicodemus, John iii. 3, "Verily, verily, I say unto thee, except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God;" he does not mean merely, that unless a man be brought to a participation of the new state and privileges of the Christian church, he cannot enter on the possession and privileges of the Christian church; for that would be nonsense, and only to say, unless a man be born again, he cannot be born again; or, unless a man enter into the new state of things, as erected by the Messiah, he cannot enter on the new state of things as erected by the Messiah. Nor can he mean, that unless a man be a professing Christian, he cannot see the future and eternal privileges of the kingdom of heaven, for he supposes many heathens will see the kingdom of God in that sense.

And how unreasonable would it be to suppose that Christ would teach this doctrine of the necessity of being instated in his new-modelled church, as such a great, important and main doctrine of his!

Taylor to make out his scheme, is forced to suppose, that by being born of God is meant two things in the New Testament (see p. 127, of his *Key*, and on *Original Sin*, p. 144, &c.). So he is forced to suppose, that by the kingdom of God is meant two things (p. 125, marginal note, and other places), and so he supposes two senses of our being of the truth, our *being of, or in God*, and *knowing God* (see p. 127, marginal note). He is forced to suppose that many of the expressions, signifying antecedent blessings, are to be taken in a double sense (p. 138, No. 243, &c.). See how evidently being born of God signifies something else than a being brought into the state of professing Christians: 1 John ii. 29, "If he know that he is righteous, ye know that every one that doth righteousness is born of him." Chap. iii. 8, "Whosoever is born of God, doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God." Chap. iv. 3, "Every one that loveth, is born of God, and knoweth God." Chap. v. 4, "Whatsoever is born of God, overcometh the world." Verse 18, "We know that whosoever is born of God, sinneth not; but he that is begotten of God, keepeth himself; and that wicked one toucheth him not."

So it is exceeding apparent, that knowing God, and being of God, and in God, having this hope in him, &c., mean something besides our Christian profession, and principles, and privileges. 1 John ii. 3, &c., "Hereby do we know that we know him, if we keep his commandments. Whoso keepeth his word, in him verily is the love of God perfected. Hereby know we that we are in him." Chap. iii. 3. "Every one that hath this hope in him, purifieth himself, even as he is pure." Chap. iii. 14, "We know that we have passed from death

unto life, because we love the brethren." Chap. iv. 12, "If we love one another, God dwelleth in us." Taylor supposes that this same apostle, by being born of God, means being received to the privileges of professing Christians. John i. 12 (p. 49). 1 John v. 1, and v. 18 (p. 48). 1 John iii. 1 (p. 48).

§ 31. Why does the apostle say, concerning apostates, "they were not of us: if they had been of us, they would no doubt have continued with us; but they went out, that they might be made manifest that they were not all of us;" if it be, as Dr. Taylor supposes, that professing Christians are indeed of the society of Christians to all intents and purposes, have all their privileges, are truly the children of God, members of Christ, of the household of God, saints, believers that have obtained like precious faith, are all one body, have one spirit, one faith, one inheritance, have their hearts purified and sanctified, are all the children of light, are all of the household of God, fellow citizens with the saints, have all fellowship with Christ, &c.?

§ 32. It is true, the nation of the Jews are in the Old Testament said to be elected, called, created, made, formed, redeemed, delivered, saved, bought, purchased, begotten. But particular Jews are nowhere so spoken of, at least with reference to the same thing, viz., their national redemption, when they were brought out of Egypt, &c.

David, in the book of Psalms, though he is so abundant there in giving thanks to God for his mercies, and is also so frequent in praising God for God's redeeming his people out of Egypt, and the salvation God wrought for the nation and church of Israel at that time; yet he never once blesses God (having respect to that salvation) that God had chosen him and redeemed him, bought him, regenerated him; never (having reference to that affair) speaks in the language of the apostle, "He loved me, and gave himself for me;" though he often speaks of the blessedness of those men God had chose, and caused to come nigh unto him, agreeably to the language of the New Testament, and often blesses God for redeeming and saving him in particular; but never, in any of these things, has he respect to those national privileges, nor indeed any other of the penmen of the Psalms; which is very strange, if the privilege of being bought, made, created, &c., as applied to the nation of the Jews, be that which the apostle in the New Testament applies to himself in particular, and which this and the other apostles applied to many other particular persons.

§ 33. That professing Christians are said to be sanctified, washed &c., does not argue, that all professing Christians are so in fact. For Taylor himself says, "it should be carefully observed, that it is very common in the sacred writings, to express not only our Christian privileges, but also the duty to which they oblige, in the present or preterperfect tense; or to speak of that as done, which only ought to be done, and which, in fact, may possibly never be done: as in Matth. v. 13, "Ye are the salt of the earth," that is, ye ought to be. Rom. ii. 4, "The goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance;" that is, ought to lead thee: chap. vi. 2. chap viii. 9. Col. iii. 3. 1 Pet. i. 6, "Wherein ye greatly rejoice;" i. e. ought to rejoice. 2 Cor. iii. 18, "We all with open face (enjoying the means of) beholding, as in a glass, the glory of the Lord, are (ought to be, enjoy the means of being) changed into the same image from glory to glory." 1 Cor. v. 7, "Ye are unleavened," i. e. obliged by the Christian profession to be. Heb. xiii. 14, "We seek (i. e. we ought to seek, or, according to our profession, we seek) a city to come." 1 John ii. 12—15, iii. 9. v. 4—18, and in other places. See *Taylor's Key*, p. 139. No. 244, and p. 144, No. 246. This overthrows all his supposed proofs, that those which he calls antecedent blessings, do really belong to all professing Christians

§ 34. The case was quite otherwise in the Christian church with regard to election, redemption, creation, &c., from what it was with the Jews. With the Jews, election, their redemption out of Egypt, their creation, was a national thing; it began with them as a nation, and descended, as it were, from the nation, to particular persons. Particular persons were first of the nation and church of the Jews; so, by that means, had an interest in their election, redemption, &c., that God wrought of old. The being of the nation and church of Israel, was the ground of a participation in these privileges.* But it is evident, it is contrariwise in Christians. With regard to them, the election, redemption, creation, regeneration, &c., are personal things. They begin with particular persons, and ascend to public societies. Men are first redeemed, bought, created, regenerated, and by that means become members of the Christian church; and this is the ground of their membership. Paul's regeneration, and Christ's loving him, and giving himself for him, was the foundation of his being of the Christian church, that holy nation, peculiar people, &c., whereas, David's being one of the nation of Israel, is the proper ground of his participation in Israel's redemption out of Egypt, and of that birth and formation of the people that were at that time. It is apparent the case was thus. It cannot be otherwise. It is evident that the new creation, regeneration, calling, and justification, are personal things, because they are by personal influences; influences of God's Spirit on particular persons, and personal qualifications.

Their regeneration was a personal thing, and therefore, it is not called simply an entering into the new creation, or obtaining a part in the new world or new Jerusalem, &c., but a putting off the *old man*, and putting on the *new man*. They are first raised from the dead, and by that means come to belong to the church of Christ. They are first lively or living stones, and by that means come to belong to the spiritual house, and the holy temple: by being lively stones, they come to be parts of the living temple, and capable of it. So that their being alive, is prior to their belonging to the Christian church. The Christian calling, is represented as being the ground of their belonging to the church. They are called into the church, called into the fellowship of Jesus Christ. Their spiritual baptism or washing, is prior to their being in the church. They are by one spirit baptized into one body. They put on Christ, and so become interested in Christ, and sharers with those that had a part in him. By such a personal work of the Spirit of God, they were first made meet to be partakers with the saints in light, before they were partakers.

§ 35. It will follow from Taylor's scheme, that Simon the sorcerer had an interest in all the antecedent blessings. Yet the apostle tells him he was at that time in the gall of bitterness and bond of iniquity. If he was really justified, washed, cleansed, sanctified; how was he at that time in the bond of iniquity? Justification, forgiveness, &c., is a release from the bond of iniquity. If the heart be purified by faith, it does not remain in the gall of bitterness.

§ 36. Saving grace differs from common grace, in nature and kind. To suppose only a gradual difference, would not only be to suppose, that some in a state of damnation are within an infinitely little as good as some in a state of salvation (which greatly disagrees with the Arminian notion of men's being saved by their own virtue and goodness), but this, taken with the Arminian notion of men's falling from grace, will naturally lead us to determine, that many that are once in a state of salvation, may be in such a state, and out of it, scores of

* It is much to be doubted whether our author is correct in the material distinction he here makes between the Jewish and Christian dispensations. The reader will consider whether privileges and blessings were not personal as much under the one as the other.

times in a very short space. For though a person is in a state of salvation, he may be but just in it, and may be infinitely near the limits between a state of salvation and damnation; and as the habits of grace are, according to that scheme only contracted and raised by consideration and exercise, and the exertion of the strength of the mind, and are lost when a man falls from grace by the intermission or cessation of these, and by contrary acts and exercises; and as the habits and principles of virtue are raised and sunk, brought into being and abolished by those things, and both the degree of them and the being of them wholly depend on them; the consequence will naturally be, that when a man is first raised to that degree of a virtuous disposition, as to be in a state of salvation, and the degree of virtue is almost infinitely near the dividing line, it will naturally be liable to be a little raised or sunk every hour, according as the thoughts and exercises of the mind are; as the mercury in the thermometer or barometer is never perfectly at rest, but is always rising or subsiding, according to the weight of the atmosphere, or the degree of heat.

§ 37. The dispute about grace's being resistible or irresistible, is perfect nonsense. For the effect of grace is upon the will; so that it is nonsense, except it be proper to say that a man with his will can resist his own will, or except it be possible for him to desire to resist his own will; that is, except it be possible for a man to will a thing and not will it at the same time, and so far as he does will it. Or if you speak of enlightening grace, and say this grace is upon the understanding; it is nothing but the same nonsense in other words. For then the sense runs thus, that a man, after he has seen so plainly that a thing is best for him that he wills it, yet he can at the same time nill it. If you say he can will any thing he pleases, this is most certainly true; for who can deny, that a man can will any thing he doth already will? That a man can will any thing that he pleases, is just as certain, as what is, is. Wherefore it is nonsense to say, that after a man has seen so plainly a thing to be so much the best for him that he wills it, he could not have willed it if he had pleased; that is to say, if he had not willed it, he could not have willed it. It is certain, that a man never doth any thing but what he can do. But to say, after a man has willed a thing, that he could have not willed it if he had pleased, is to suppose two wills in a man; the one to will which goes first; the other to please or choose to will. And so with the same reason we may say, there is another will to please; to please to will; and so on to a thousand. Wherefore, to say that the man could have willed otherwise if he had pleased, is just all one as to say, that if he had willed otherwise, then we might be sure he could will otherwise.

§ 38. Those that deny infusion of grace by the Holy Spirit, must, of necessity, deny the Spirit to do any thing at all. By the Spirit's infusing, let be meant what it will, those who say there is no infusion, contradict themselves. For they say the Spirit doth something in the soul; that is, he causeth some motion, or affection, or apprehension to arise in the soul, that, at the same time, would not be there without him. Now, God's Spirit doeth what he doeth; he doth as much as he doth: or he causeth in the soul as much as he causeth, let that be how little soever. So much as is purely the effect of his immediate motion, that is the effect of his immediate motion, let that be what it will; and so much is infused, how little soever that be. This is self-evident. For suppose the Spirit of God only to assist the natural powers, then there is something done betwixt them. Men's own powers do something, and God's Spirit doth something; only they work together. Now, that part that the Spirit doth, how little soever it be, is infused. So that they that deny infused habits, own that

part of the habit is infused. For they say, the Holy Spirit assists the man in acquiring the habit; so that it is acquired rather sooner than it would be otherwise. So that part of the habit is owing to the Spirit; some of the strength of the habit was infused, and another part is owing to the natural powers of the man. Or if you say not so, but that it is all owing to the natural power assisted; how do you mean assisted? To act more lively and vigorously than otherwise? Then that liveliness and vigorousness must be infused; which is a habit, and therefore an infused habit. It is grace, and therefore infused grace. Grace consists very much in a principle that causes vigorousness and activity in action. This is infusion, even in the sense of the opposite party. So that, if any operation of the Holy Spirit at all is allowed, the dispute is only, How much is infused? The one says, a great deal, the other says, but little.

§ 39. 1st. The main thing meant by the word efficacious, is this, it being decisive. This seems to be the main question. 2d. Its being immediate and arbitrary in that sense, as not to be limited to the laws of nature. 3d. That the principles of grace are supernatural in that sense, that they are entirely different from all that is in the heart before conversion. 4th. That they are infused, and not *contracted* by custom and exercise. 5th. That the change is instantaneous, and not gradual. These four last heads may be subdivisions of a second general head: so that the divisions may be thus: 1st. The main thing meant, is, that it is decisive. 2d. That it is immediate and supernatural. The four last of the heads mentioned above, may be subdivisions of this last.

So that there are two things relating to the doctrine of efficacious grace, wherein lies the main difference between the Calvinists and Arminians as to this doctrine. *First*, That the grace of God is determining and decisive as to the conversion of a sinner, or a man's becoming a good man, and having those virtuous qualifications that entitle to an interest in Christ and his salvation. *Secondly*, That the power and grace and operation of the Holy Spirit, in or towards the conversion of a sinner, is immediate: that the habit of true virtue or holiness is immediately implanted or infused; that the operation goes so far, that a man has habitual holiness given him instantly, wholly by the operation of the Spirit of God, and not gradually, by assistance concurring with our endeavors, so as gradually to advance virtue into a prevailing habit. And besides these, *Thirdly*, It is held by many, of late, that there is no immediate interposition of God; but that all is done by general laws.

The former is that which is of greatest importance or consequence in the controversy with Arminians (though the others are also very important), and this, only, is what I shall consider in this place; perhaps the others may be considered, God willing, in some other discourse.

§ 40. Concerning what the Arminians say, that these are speculative points; all devotion greatly depends on a sense and acknowledgment of our dependence on God. But this is one of the very chief things belonging to our dependence on God. How much stress do the Scriptures lay on our dependence on God! All assistance of the Spirit of God whatsoever, that is, by any present influence or effect of the Spirit; any thing at all that a person that is converted from sin to God, is the subject of, through any immediate influence of the Spirit of God upon him, or any thing done by the Spirit, since the completing and confirming the canon of the Scriptures, must be done by a physical operation, either on the soul or body.

The Holy Spirit of God does something to promote virtue in men's hearts, and to make them good, beyond what the angels can do. But the angels can present motives; can excite ideas of the words of promises and threatenings,

&c., and can persuade in this way by moral means; as is evident, because the devils in this way promote vice.

§ 41. There is no objection made to God's producing any effects, or causing any events, by any immediate interposition, producing effects arbitrarily, or by the immediate efforts of his will, but what lies equally against his ordering it so, that any effects should be produced by the immediate interposition of men's will, to produce effects otherwise than the established laws of nature would have produced without men's arbitrary interposition.

I beg the reader's attention to the following quotations: "That otherwise, the world cannot be the object of inquiry and science, and far less of imitation by arts: since imitation necessarily presupposes a certain determinate object, or fixed, ascertainable relations and connections of things; and that, upon the contrary supposition, the world must be absolutely unintelligible. Nature, in order to be understood by us, must always speak the same language to us. It must therefore steadfastly observe the same general laws in its operations, or work uniformly, and according to stated, invariable methods and rules. Those terms, order, beauty, general good, &c., plainly include, in their meaning, analogy; and constancy, uniformity amidst variety; or, in other words, the regular observance of general, settled laws, in the make and economy, production, and operations or effects, of any object to which they are ascribed. Wherever order, fixed connections, or general laws and unity of design take place, there is certainty in the nature of such objects, and so knowledge may be acquired. But where these do not obtain, there can be nothing but unconnected, independent parts. All must be disorder and confusion; and consequently, such a loose, disjointed heap of things, must be an inexplicable chaos. In one word, science, prudence, government, imitation and art, necessarily suppose the prevalence of general laws throughout all the objects in nature to which they reach. No being can know itself, project or pursue any scheme, or lay down any maxims for its conduct, but so far as its own constitution is certain, and the connection of things relative to it are fixed and constant. For so far only are things ascertainable; and therefore, so far only can rules be drawn from them." *Turnbull's Mor. Phil.* Part I. *Introd.*

"The exercise of all moral powers, dispositions and affections of mind, as necessarily presuppose an established order of nature, or general laws settled by the author of nature with respect to them, as the exercise of our bodily senses about qualities and effects of corporeal beings do with regard to them. We could neither acquire knowledge of any kind, contract habits, or attain to any moral perfection whatsoever, unless the author of our nature had appointed and fixed certain laws relating to our moral powers, and their exercises and acquisitions." *Ibid.* p. 13, 14. Yet this Turnbull strenuously holds a self-determining power in the will of man. Such like arguments, if they are valid against any interposition at all, will prevail against all interposition of God or man, and against the interposition of God ever to bring the world to an end, or amend it, and prove that all shall be according to general laws. And they might as well argue, that the making of the world too was by general laws. If it be said that it is of great importance and absolute necessity, that God should at last interpose and rectify the course of nature; I answer, this is yielding the point, that, in cases of great importance, it is reasonable to suppose there may be an interposition that may be arbitrary, and not by general laws.

§ 42. It is not necessary that men should be able, by the connections of things, to know all future events; nor was this ever in the Creator's designs. If it had been so, he could have enabled them to know the future volitions of

men, and those events that depend upon them, which are by far the most important.

§ 43. The nature of virtue being a positive thing, can proceed from nothing but God's immediate influence, and must take its rise from creation or infusion by God. For it must be either from that, or from our own choice and production, either at once, or gradually, by diligent culture. But it cannot begin, or take its rise from the latter, viz., our choice, or voluntary diligence. For if there exist nothing at all of the nature of virtue before, it cannot come from cultivation; for by the supposition there is nothing of the nature of virtue to cultivate, it cannot be by repeated and multiplied acts of virtuous choice, till it becomes a habit. For there can be no one virtuous choice, unless God immediately gives it. The first virtuous choice, or a disposition to it, must be immediately given, or it must proceed from a preceding choice. If the first virtuous act of will or choice be from a preceding act of will or choice, that preceding act of choice must be a virtuous act of choice, which is contrary to the supposition For then there would be a preceding act of choice before the first virtuous act of choice. And if it be said the first virtuous act of choice is from a preceding act of will which is not virtuous, this is absurd. For an act of will not virtuous, cannot produce another act of will of a nature entirely above itself, having something positive in it which the cause has nothing of, and more excellent than it is; any more than motion can produce thought or understanding; or the collision of two bodies can produce thought; or stones and lead can produce a spirit; or nothing can produce something.

§ 44. As to man's inability to convert himself.—In them that are totally corrupt, there can be no tendency towards their making their hearts better, till they begin to repent of the badness of their hearts. For if they do not repent, they still approve of it; and that tends to maintain their badness, and confirm it. But they cannot begin sincerely to repent of the badness of their hearts, till their hearts begin to be better, for repentance consists in a change of the mind and heart. So that it is not men's repentance that first gives rise to their having a better heart; and therefore it cannot be any tendency in them to make their hearts better, that gives rise to it. The heart can have no tendency to make itself better, till it begins to have a better tendency; for therein consists its badness, viz., its having no good tendency or inclination. And to begin to have a good tendency, or, which is the same thing, a tendency and inclination to be better, is the same thing as to begin already to be better. And therefore the heart's inclination to be good, cannot be the thing that first gives rise to its being made good. For its inclination to be better, is the same thing with its becoming better.

§ 45. If there be any immediate influence or action of the Spirit of God at all on any created beings, in any part of the universe, since the days of the apostles, it is physical. If it be in exciting ideas of motives, or in any respect assisting or promoting any effect, still it is physical; and every whit as much so, as if we suppose the temper and nature of the heart is immediately changed. And it is as near akin to a miracle. If the latter be miraculous, so is the former.

§ 46. Who ever supposed that the term *irresistible* was properly used with respect to that power by which an infant is brought into being; meaning, irresistible by the infant? Or who ever speaks of a man's waking out of a sound sleep *irresistibly*, meaning, that he cannot resist awaking? Or who says, that Adam was formed out of the dust of the earth irresistibly? See what I have said of the use of such terms as *irresistible*, *unfrustrable*, &c., in my Inquiry about Liberty.

§ 47. The opponents of efficacious grace and physical operation, may be challenged to show that it is possible that any creature should become righteous without a physical operation, either a being created with the habit of righteousness, or its being immediately infused. See what I have written in my book of *Original Sin*, in those sections wherein I vindicate the doctrine of original righteousness, and argue, that if Adam was not created righteous, no way can be invented how he could ever become righteous.

§ 48. As to that, Matthew vii. 7, "Seek and ye shall find;" it is explained by such places as that, Deut. iv. 29, "But if from thence thou shalt seek the Lord thy God, thou shalt find him, if thou seek him with all thy heart and with all thy soul." And by Deut. xxx. 2—6, "If thou shalt return unto the Lord thy God, and shalt obey his voice with all thy heart and with all thy soul; the Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul;" which is very parallel with that, "to him that hath shall be given."

§ 49. The Scripture teacheth that holiness, both in principle and fruit, is from God. "It is God who worketh in you, both to will and to do of his good pleasure." And Prov. xvi. 1, "The preparation of the heart in man, and the answer of the tongue is from the Lord." Comparing this with other parts of the book of Proverbs, evinces that it is a moral preparation, and the answer of the tongue in moral regards, that is meant.

§ 50. Reason shows that the first existence of a principle of virtue cannot be from man himself, nor in any created being whatsoever; but must be immediately given from God; or that otherwise it never can be obtained, whatever this principle be, whether love to God, or love to men. It must either be from God, or be a habit contracted by repeated acts. But it is most absurd to suppose that the first existence of the principle of holy action, should be preceded by a course of holy actions. Because there can be no holy action without a principle of holy inclination. There can be no act done from love, that shall be the cause of first introducing the very existence of love.

§ 51. God is said to give true virtue and piety of heart to man; to work it in him, to create it, to form it, and with regard to it we are said to be his workmanship. Yea, that there may be no room to understand it in some improper sense, it is often declared as the peculiar character of God, that he assumes it as his character to be the author and giver of true virtue, in his being called the Sanctifier; he that sanctifieth us. "I am he that sanctifieth you." This is spoken of as the great prerogative of God, Levit. xx. 8, and other parallel places. He declares expressly that this effect shall be connected with his act, or with what he shall do in order to it. "I will sprinkle clean water, and you shall be clean." What God does is often spoken of as thoroughly effectual; the effect is infallibly consequent. "Turn us, and we shall be turned." Jesus Christ has the great character of a Saviour on this account, that "he saves his people from their sins." See Rom. xi. 26, 27, "And so all Israel shall be saved; as it is written, there shall come out of Zion a deliverer, and shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob. For this is my covenant unto them, when I shall take away their sins." God says, "I will put my law into their hearts; I will write my law in their inward parts, and they shall not depart away from me; I will take away the heart of stone, and give them a heart of flesh; I will give them a heart to know me; I will circumcise their hearts to love me; oh, that there were such a heart in them!" And it is spoken of as his work, to give, to cause, to create such a heart, to put it in them. God is said to incline their hearts, not only to give statutes, but to incline their hearts to his statutes.

Moses speaks of the great moral means that God had used with the children of Israel to enlighten them, and convince and persuade them; but of their being yet unpersuaded and unconverted, and gives this as a reason, that God had not given them a heart to perceive: as Deut. xxix. 4, "Yet the Lord hath not given you a heart to perceive, and eyes to see, and ears to hear, unto this day." The Scripture plainly makes a distinction between exhibiting light, or means of instruction and persuasion, and giving eyes to see, circumcising the heart, &c.

§ 52. Why should Christ teach us to pray in the Lord's prayer, "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven," if it is not God's work to bring that effect to pass, and it is left to man's free will, and cannot be otherwise, because otherwise it is no virtue, and none of their obedience, or doing of God's will; and God does what he can oftentimes consistently with man's liberty, and those that enjoy the means he uses, do generally neglect and refuse to do his will? He does so much, that he can well say, what could I have done more? And yet almost all are at the greatest distance from doing his will. See Colos. i. 9, 10.

§ 53. If it be as the Arminians suppose, that all men's virtue is of the determination of their own free will, independent on any prior determining, deciding, and disposing of the event; that it is no part of the ordering of God, whether there be many virtuous or few in the world, whether there shall be much virtue or little, or where it shall be, in what nation, country, or when, or in what generation or age; or whether there shall be any at all: then none of these things belong to God's disposal, and therefore, surely it does not belong to him to promise them. For it does not belong to him to promise in an affair, concerning which he has not the disposal.

And how can God promise, as he oftentimes does in his word, glorious times, when righteousness shall generally prevail, and his will shall generally be done; and yet that it is not an effect which belongs to him to determine; it is not left to his determination, but to the sovereign, arbitrary determination of others, independently on any determination of him; and therefore surely they ought to be the promisers? For him to promise who has it not in his hands to dispose and determine, is a great absurdity; and yet God oftentimes in promising, speaks of himself as the sovereign disposer of the matter, using such expressions as abundantly imply it. Isaiah lx. 22, "I the Lord do hasten it in its time." Surely this is the language of a promiser, and not merely a predictor. God promises Abraham, that "all the families of the earth shall be blessed in him." God swears, "every knee shall bow, and every tongue confess." And it is said to be given to Christ, that every nation, &c., should serve and obey him, Dan. vii. After what manner they shall serve and obey him, is abundantly declared in other prophecies, as in Isaiah xi. and innumerable others. These are spoken of in the next chapter, as the excellent things that God does.

§ 54. If God is not the disposing author of virtue, then he is not the giver of it. The very notion of a giver implies a disposing cause of the possession of the benefit. 1 John iv. 4, "Ye are of God, little children, and have overcome them (i. e. have overcome your spiritual enemies), because greater is he that is in you, than he that is in the world;" that is, plainly, he is stronger, and his strength overcomes. But how can this be a reason, if God does not put forth any overcoming, effectual strength in the case, but leaves it to free will to get the victory, to determine the point in the conflict?

§ 55. There are no sort of benefits that are so much the subject of the promises of Scripture, as this sort, the bestowment of virtue, or benefits which imply it. How often is the faith of the Gentiles, or their coming into the Chris-

tian Church promised to Christ in the Old Testament, Isaiah xlix. 6, and many other places; and he has promised it to his church, chap. xlix. 18—21, and innumerable other places. See Rom. xv. 12, 13. What a promise have we, Isaiah lx. 21, "Thy people also shall be all righteous, they shall inherit the land forever, the branch of my planting, the work of my hand, that I may be glorified,"—compared with the next chapter, 3d verse, "That they may be called the trees of righteousness, the planting of the Lord, that he might be glorified." See also verse 8th of the same chapter. Likewise chap. lx. 17, 18, "I will make thy officers peace, and thy exactors righteousness; violence shall no more be heard in thy land, wasting nor destruction within thy border, but thou shalt call thy walls salvation, and thy gates praise." Here it is promised that the rulers shall be righteous; and then, in the 21st verse following, it is promised that the people shall be so. The change of men to be of a peaceable disposition is promised, as in places innumerable, so in Isaiah xi. 6—11, "The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid," &c. Isaiah lv. 5, "Behold, thou shalt call a nation that thou knowest not, and nations that knew not thee shall run unto thee, because of the Lord thy God, and for the Holy One of Israel, for he hath glorified thee." Jer. iii. 15, "And I will give you pastors according to mine heart, which shall feed you with knowledge and understanding." This implies a promise that there should be such pastors in being, and that they should be faithful to feed the people with knowledge and understanding. Jer. x. 23, "The way of man is not in himself." Stebbing owns, that on Arminian principles, conversion depending on the determination of free will, it is possible, in its own nature, that none should ever be converted; p. 235. Then all the promises of virtue, of the revival of religion, &c., are nothing. Jer. xxxi. 18, "Turn thou me, and I shall be turned," —compared with Jer. xvii. 14, "Heal me, O Lord, and I shall be healed; save me, and I shall be saved, for thou art my praise." Which shows the force and meaning of such a phraseology to be, that God alone can be the doer of it; and that if he undertakes it, it will be effectually done. Jer. xxxi. 32—35, "Not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers, in the day that I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt (which my covenant they brake, although I was a husband unto them, saith the Lord): but this shall be the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel; After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And they shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord; for they shall all know me, from the least of them, unto the greatest of them, saith the Lord; for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more." The prophet elsewhere tells what is connected with knowing God, viz., doing judgment and justice, and showing mercy, &c. Chap. xxii. 16, Jer. xxxii. 39, 40, "And I will give them one heart and one way, that they may fear me forever, for the good of them and their children after them; and I will make an everlasting covenant with them, that I will not turn away from them to do them good. But I will put my fear in their hearts, and they shall not depart from me." Jer. xxxiii. 2, "Thus saith the Lord, the maker thereof, the maker that formed it." Verse 8, "And I wil cleanse them from all their iniquity, whereby they have sinned against me." Ezek. xi. 18—20, "And they shall come thither, and they shall take away all the detestable things thereof, and all the abominations thereof from thence. And I will give them one heart, and I will put a new spirit within you; and I will take the stony heart out of their flesh, and I will give them a heart of flesh; that they

may walk in my statutes, and keep mine ordinances, and do them; and they shall be my people, and I will be their God."

Zech. xii. 10, to the end, "And I will pour upon the house of David, and upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the spirit of grace and of supplication; and they shall look upon me whom they have pierced," &c.

So in the next chapter at the beginning, "I will cut off the names of idols out of the land, and they shall be no more remembered;" and also, "I will cause the prophets, and also the unclean spirits to pass out of the land."

Mal. iii. 3, 4, "And he shall sit as a refiner and purifier of silver; and he shall purify the sons of Levi, and purge them as gold and silver, that they may offer unto the Lord an offering in righteousness. Then shall the offering of Judah and Jerusalem be pleasant unto the Lord, as in the days of old, and as in the former years."

§ 56. We are told, Job xxviii. 28, that "the fear of the Lord is wisdom, and to depart from evil is understanding." The same is also abundantly declared in other places. But it is equally declared, that God is the author and giver of wisdom, and that he is the author wholly and only; which is denied of other things. It is also abundantly declared in this 28th chapter of Job, that it cannot be obtained of any creature by any means; and it is implied in the end of the chapter, that it is God that gives wisdom, as is asserted, Prov. ii. 6: "For the Lord giveth wisdom, out of his mouth cometh knowledge and understanding." It is the promise of God the Father, Psalm cx. 2, "Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power," Psalm cxix. 35, "Make me to go in the way of thy commandments." Verse 36, "Incline my heart unto thy testimonies."

§ 57. We are directed earnestly to pray and cry unto God for wisdom, and the fear of the Lord; for this reason, that it is he that giveth wisdom. Prov. ii. at the beginning: compare Job. xxviii. with Prov. xxi. 1, "The king's heart is in the hands of the Lord, as the rivers of water; he turneth it whithersoever he will." Here it is represented that the will of God determines the wills of men, and that when God pleases to interpose, he even directs them according to his pleasure, without failure in any instance. This shows that God has not left men's hearts so in their own hands, as to be determined by themselves alone, independently on any antecedent determination.

Prov. xxviii. 26, "He that trusteth in his own heart is a fool." A man is to be commended for making a wise improvement of his outward possessions, for his own comfort; yet this is the gift of God. Eccles. ii. 24—26, "There is nothing better for a man, than that he should eat and drink, and that he should make his soul enjoy good in his labor. This also I saw, that it was from the hand of God."

John i. 12, 13, "As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God; which were born, not of the will of man, but of God." Thus also we read, Luke iii. 8, "God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham." John iii. 3, "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Verse 5, "Except a man be born of water, and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." Verse 8, "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit." Jam. i. 18, "Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth, that we should be a kind of first fruits of his creatures."

What Christ meant by being born again, we may learn by the abundant use of the like phrase by the same disciple that wrote this gospel, in his first

epistle, who doubtless learned his language from his master; and particularly from those sayings of his concerning the new birth, which he took more special notice of, and which left the deepest impressions on his mind, which we may suppose are those he records, when he writes the history of his life. Matth. iv. 19, "I will make you fishers of men." So Mark i. 16, 20, together with Luke v. 10, "From henceforth thou shalt catch men;" compared with the foregoing story of Christ's giving them so great a draught of fishes, which was wholly his doing, and ascribed to him. Matth. vi. 10, "Thy kingdom come; thy will be done." Matth. xi. 25—27, "At that time Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight. All things are delivered unto me of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him." So Luke x. 21, 22. John vi. 37, "All that the Father giveth me, shall come unto me." Verse 44, "No man can come unto me, except the Father which hath sent me, draw him."

John x. 16, "Other sheep I have which are not of this fold; them also I must bring; and there shall be one fold and one shepherd." Verses 26—29, "But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you; my sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me; and I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hands. My Father which gave them me," &c.

Acts xv. 3, 4, "Declaring the conversion of the Gentiles, and they declared all things that God had done with them." Verse 9, "And put no difference between us and them, purifying their hearts by faith." Therefore it is not probable, that the heart is first purified, to fit it for faith. John xiv. 12, "Greater works than these shall he do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son." The meaning of it is confirmed from John xii. 23, 24, 28—32, and John xvii. 1, 2, 3, Isa. xlix. 3, 5, and xxvi. 15, and Isa. xvi. 14, Isa. xvii. 3, 4, 5, and 16, 17, and 22, 24 (especially Isa. lv. 4, 5), Jer. xxx. 19. Rom. ix. 15, "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." By such an expression in the apostle's phraseology, from time to time, is meant the use of endeavors, whereby they seek the benefit they would obtain. So what he here says, is agreeable to what he says in chap. xi. 4, 5, 6, 7, where he particularly shows, that it is God that preserves the remnant, and that it is of the election of his grace and free kindness, and not of their works; but in such a way of freedom, as is utterly inconsistent with its being of their works. And in verse 7, that it is not determined by their seeking, but by God's election. The apostle here, as Dr. *Taylor* says, has respect to bodies of men, to the posterity of Esau and Jacob, &c. Yet this he applies to a distinction made in those days of the gospel, and that distinction made between those that were in the Christian church, and those that were not, and particularly some of the Jews that were in the Christian church, and others of the same nation that were not; which is made by some believing and accepting Christ, and others rejecting him; by that faith which they professed to exercise with all their hearts; that faith which was a mercy and virtue, and the want of which was a fault; as appears by the objection the apostle supposes, verse 19, "Why doth he yet find fault?" The want of which faith argued hardness of heart, verse 18, exposed them to wrath and destruction, as a punishment of sin, verse 22, and exposes persons to be like the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, verse 29.

Rom. xi. 4. 5, 6, 7, "But what saith the answer of God unto him? I have

reserved to myself seven thousand men, who have not bowed the knee to the image of Baal. Even so at this present time, there is a remnant according to the election of grace. And if by grace, then it is no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then it is no more grace; otherwise work is no more work." 2 Tim. ii. 9. Eph. ii. 9. Tit. iii. 5, "What then? Israel hath not obtained that which he seeketh for; but the election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded." Rom. xi. 17, 18, "If some of the branches are broken off, and thou, being a wild olive tree, wert grafted in among them, and with them partakest of the root and fatness of the olive tree; boast not against the branches."

Rom. xi. 25, 26, 27, "Blindness in part is happened to Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in; and so all Israel shall be saved. As it is written, There shall come out of Zion the deliverer, and shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob. For this is my covenant unto them, when I shall take away their sins." Together with verses 35, 36, "Who hath first given unto him, and it shall be recompensed to him again? For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things, to whom be glory for ever and ever."

§ 58. That expression, Rom. i. 7, and 1 Cor. i. 2, and elsewhere, *called to be saints*, implies, that God makes the distinction. Compare this with what Christ says, John x. 27, "My sheep hear my voice." Verse 16, "Other sheep have I which are not of this fold; them also must I bring; and they shall hear my voice; and there shall be one fold and one shepherd." 1 Cor. i. 26, 27, 28, to the end; "For ye see your calling, brethren, how that not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called: but God hath chosen the foolish things of, &c. That no flesh should glory in his presence. But of him are ye in Christ Jesus," &c. Rom. xi. latter end. Heb. xiii. 20, 21. 1 Cor. iii. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, "Who then is Paul, or who is Apollos, but ministers by whom ye believed, even as the Lord gave to every man. I have planted, and Apollos watered; but God gave the increase. So neither is he that planteth any thing, neither he that watereth; but God that giveth the increase --We are laborers together with God; ye are God's husbandry; ye are God's building." According to the Arminian scheme, it ought to have been; I have planted, and Apollos watered, and God hath planted and watered more especially. For we have done it only as his servants. But you yourselves have given the increase; the fruit has been left to your free will: agreeably to what the Arminians from time to time insist on, in what they say upon the parable of the vineyard which God planted in a fruitful hill, &c., and looked that it should bring forth grapes, and says, what could I have done more unto my vineyard?

1 Cor. iii. 3, "Ye are manifestly declared to be the epistle of Christ, ministered by us, written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not on tables of stone, but on the fleshly tables of the heart." They were the epistle of Christ, as the effect of the Spirit of God in their hearts held forth the light of truth; of gospel truth with its evidence to the world; as the church is compared to a candlestick, and called the pillar and ground of the truth. This is agreeable to those Scriptures in the Old Testament, that speak of writing God's law in their hearts, &c. Add to this, chap. iv. 6, "For God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." 2 Cor. v. 14—18, "If one died for all, then were all dead; that they which live, should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto him which died for them, and rose again. Therefore, if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away: behold, all things are become new; and all things are of God."

2 Cor. viii. 16, 17, "Thanks be to God, who put the same earnest care into the heart of Titus for you. For indeed he accepted the exhortation. But being more forward, of his own accord he went unto you." So the next chapter speaks of the Corinthians' forwardness and readiness in their bounty to the poor saints, not as of necessity, but with freedom and cheerfulness, according to the purpose of their own hearts or wills; but yet speaks of their charity as just cause of much thanksgiving to God; and speaks expressly of thanksgiving to him for such a subjection of them to the gospel, and liberal distribution to them.

Gal. i. 15, 16, "But when it pleased God, who separated me from my mother's womb, and called me by his grace, to reveal his Son in me, that I might preach him among the Gentiles," compared with 2 Cor. iv. 6, 7, and the account which he gives himself of his conversion, Acts xxvi. 16—18.

Gal. ii. 19, 20, "I through the law am dead to the law, that I might live unto God. I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me."

Gal. v. 22, 23, &c., "The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance."

§ 59. The apostle, in Eph. i. 18—20, speaks of some exceeding great work of power by which they that believe are distinguished. But a bodily resurrection is no such distinguishing work of power. See the words: "The eyes of your understanding being enlightened, that ye may know what is the hope of his calling, and what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints, and what is the exceeding greatness of his power to us-ward who believe, according to the working of his mighty power, which he wrought in Christ Jesus, when he raised him from the dead, and set him at his own right hand in heavenly places." The apostle repeats the same thing in substance again in chapter iii. 14, and following verses, and tells us what sort of knowledge he desired, and so earnestly prayed that they might receive, and what is the *power* that he speaks of: "That they may be able to comprehend with all saints, what is the breadth and length, and depth and height; and to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, that ye might be filled with all the fulness of God." And tells by what means God would dwell in their hearts by faith, &c., verses 16, 17. And he tells us in verse 20, what is the power of God he speaks of. See Rom. xv. 13. 1 Pet. i. 3—5, and 2 Thess. i. 11, 12. See also what the apostle speaks of as an effect of God's glorious power, Col. i. 11.

Eph. i. 18—20, is to be taken in connection with the words which follow in the beginning of the next chapter; which is a continuation of the same discourse, where the apostle abundantly explains himself. In those words, there is an explanation of what had before been more figuratively represented. He here observes, that those that believe, are the subjects of a like exceeding greatness of power that Christ was, when he was raised from the dead, and set at God's own right hand in heavenly places. And then in the prosecution of this discourse he shows how, viz., in our being raised from the dead, being dead ourselves in trespasses and sins, and raised as Christ was, and made to sit together with him in heavenly places; and this he speaks of, not only as the fruit of the exceeding greatness of his power, but of the riches of his mercy, and exceeding riches of his grace; by grace in opposition to works; that it is by faith which is the gift of God. The apostle repeats it over and over, that it is by grace, and then explains how; not of works; and that our faith itself, by which it is, is not of ourselves, but is God's gift; and that we are wholly God's workmanship; and that all is owing to God's foreordaining that we should walk in good works. I know not what the apostle could have said more. See Eph. ii. 1—10

§ 60. In Eph. iii. it is spoken of as a glorious mystery of God's will, contrived of old, and determined from the foundation of the world, and his eternal purpose, &c., that God would bring in the Gentiles as fellow heirs, and of the same body, and partakers of his promise in Christ by the gospel. Which confirms the promises of the Old Testament; shows that they were not foretold only as foreseen, but foredetermined, as what God would bring to pass. This is also spoken of elsewhere, as the fruit of God's eternal purpose, his election, &c., as our adversaries acknowledge.

§ 61. Sincerity itself is spoken of as coming from God, Phil. i. 10: "That ye may approve the things that are excellent; that ye may be sincere and without offence in the day of Christ." And elsewhere God is represented as "creating a clean heart, renewing a right spirit, giving a heart of flesh," &c. The apostle "gives thanks for the faith and love of the Colossians, their being delivered from the power of darkness, &c., and prays that they may be filled with the knowledge of his will in all wisdom and might, agreeable to their knowledge, being fruitful in every good work; and for their perseverance, and that they might be made meet for the reward of the saints." Col i. 3, 4, 9—13. This argues all to flow from God as the giver. Their first faith, and their love that their faith was attended with, and their knowledge and spiritual wisdom and prudence, and walking worthy of the Lord, and universal obedience, and doing every good work, and increasing in grace, and being strengthened in it, and their perseverance and cheerfulness in their obedience, and being made meet for their reward, all are from God. They are from God as the determining cause; else, why does the apostle pray that God would bestow or effect these things, if they be not at his determination whether they shall have them or not? He speaks of God's glorious power as manifested in the bestowment of these things.

Col. ii. 13, "And you, being dead in your sins and the uncircumcision of your flesh, hath he quickened together with him."

Col. iii. 10, "Have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him."

See how many things the apostle gives thanks to God for in the Thessalonians, and prays for them. 2 Thess. i. 3, 4, 11, 12, and ii. 17, 18, and iii. 3, 4, 5. 1 Thess. i. verse 2, to the end, and chap. ii. verses 13, 14, and chap. iii. 9, 10, 12, 13, chap. v. 23, 24. 1 Thess. iii. 12, "The Lord made you to increase and abound in love," &c. 1 Thess. iv. 10, "But as touching brotherly love, ye need not that I should write unto you: for ye yourselves are taught of God to love one another. And indeed ye do it towards all the brethren. 1 Thess. v. 23, 24, "And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly; and I pray God your whole spirit, and soul and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is he that hath called you, who also will do it."

2 Thess. i. 3, 4, "We are bound to thank God always for you, because your faith groweth exceedingly, and the charity of every one of you all towards each other abounded; so that we glory in you, for your faith and patience in all your persecutions and tribulations."

The apostle thanks God for his own prayers, and for others; 2 Tim. i. 3, "If they are from God, then doubtless also our prayers for ourselves, our very prayers for the Spirit, are from him.

The prophet ascribes persons' prayers to their having the spirit of grace and supplication. True acceptable prayer is spoken of, Rom. viii., as being the language of the Spirit; not that I suppose that the very words are indited, but

the disposition is given. 2 Tim. i. 7, "God hath not us given the spirit of fear but of power and of love, and of a sound mind."

2 Tim. ii. 9, "Who hath saved us and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began."

Heb. xiii. 20, 21, "Now the God of peace, who brought again from the dead our Lord Jesus, that great shepherd of the sheep, through the blood of the everlasting covenant, make you perfect in every good work, and to do his will, working in you that which is well pleasing in his sight, through Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for ever and ever, Amen." See Eph. i. 19, 20, and 1 Cor. i. latter end. Heb. xii. 2, "Jesus, the author and finisher of our faith," compared with Philip. i. 5. James i. 5—8, "If any man lack wisdom, let him ask it of God, that giveth to all liberally and upbraideth not, and it shall be given him. But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering; for he that wavereth is like a wave of the sea, driven of the wind and tossed. For let not that man think he shall obtain any thing of the Lord. A double-minded man is unstable in all his ways." So that, in order to a man's having any reason to expect to be heard, he must first have faith, and a sincere, single heart. And what that is which the apostle calls wisdom, may be learnt from chap. iii. 17, 18: "The wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy. And the fruit of righteousness is sown in peace of them that make peace." In chap. i. 5, &c., above cited, God is spoken of as the giver of this wisdom; and in the following part of the chapter, he is spoken of as the giver of this and every benefit of that kind; every thing that contains any thing of the nature of light or wisdom, or moral good: and this is represented as the fruit of his mere will and pleasure. Verses 16, 17, 18, "Do not err, my beloved brethren. Every good gift, and every perfect gift, is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness nor shadow of turning. Of his own will begat he us by the word of truth, that we should be a kind of first fruits of his creatures." See John i. 13, and iii. 8.

The scope of the apostle, and connection of his discourse, plainly show that the apostle means to assert that all moral good is from God. In the preceding verses, he was warning those he wrote to, not to lay their sins, or pride, or lusts to the charge of God, and on that occasion he would have them be sensible that every good gift is from God, and no evil; that God is the Father of *light*, and only of light; and that no darkness is from him, because there is no darkness in him; no change from light to darkness; no, not the least shadow. What he says is plainly parallel to what the Apostle John says, when he would signify God's perfect holiness without any sin; 1 John i. 5, 6, "This, then, is the message which we have heard of him, and declare unto you, that God is light, and in him is no darkness at all. If we say that we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth." But if all moral good is from God, cometh down from him, and is his gift; then the very first good determination of the will, and every good improvement of assistance, is so.

1 Pet. i. 2—5, "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God, through sanctification of the Spirit unto obedience. Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who, according to his abundant mercy, hath begotten us again unto a lively hope" (or a living hope, i. e., from the dead; to be begotten from the dead, in the phrase of the New Testament, is the same as to be raised from the dead, see Coloss. i. 18, Rev. i. 5), "by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, to an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled, reserved in

heaven for you, who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation." See Eph. i. 18—20, and ii. at the beginning.

Phil. ii. 13, "It is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure." The plain meaning of this text is, that it is God by his operation and efficiency who gives the will, and also enables us to put that will in execution; or that he by his efficiency gives both the will and the deed. And this will remain the plain meaning of this text, after this sort of gentlemen have worked upon it a thousand years longer, if any of them shall remain on earth so long. It will be the indisputable meaning of it, notwithstanding their criticisms on the word ενεργων, &c. I question whether any word can be found, in all the Greek language, more expressive and significant of an actual operation. Wherever the words *effectual* and *effectually* are used in our translation of the Bible, this is the word used in the original. See the English Concordance.

§ 62. By the disposing or determining cause of a benefit I mean, a cause that disposes, orders or determines, whether we shall be actually possessed of the benefit or not; and the same cause may be said to be an efficacious or effectual cause. That cause only can be said to be an efficacious cause, whose efficiency determines, reaches, and produces the effect.

A being may be the determiner and disposer of an event, and not properly an efficient or efficacious cause. Because, though he determines the futurity of the event, yet there is no positive efficiency or power of the cause that reaches and produces the effect; but merely a withholding or withdrawing of efficiency or power.

Concerning the giver's being a disposer or determiner, let us consider that objection, that when a man gives to a beggar, he does but offer, and leaves it with the determination of the beggar's will, whether he will be possessed of the thing offered. In answer to this I observe, that in the instance before us, the very thing given is the fruit of the bounty of the giver. The thing given is virtue, and this consists in the determination of the inclination and will. Therefore the determination of the will is the gift of God; otherwise virtue is not his gift, and it is an inconsistence to pray to God to give it to us. Why should we pray to God to give us such a determination of will, when that proceeds not from him but ourselves?

§ 63. Every thing in the Christian scheme argues, that man's title to, and fitness for heaven, depends on some great divine influence, at once causing a vast change, and not any such gradual change as is supposed to be brought to pass by men themselves in the exercise of their own power. The exceeding diversity of the states of men in another world, argues it.

§ 64. Arminians make a great ado about the phrase *irresistible grace*. But the grand point of controversy really is, what is it that determines, disposes, and decides the matter, whether there shall be saving virtue in the heart or not; and much more properly, whether the grace of God in the affair be determining grace, than whether it be irresistible.

Our case is indeed extremely unhappy, if we have such a book to be our grand and only rule, our light and directory, that is so exceeding perplexed, dark, paradoxical and hidden everywhere in the manner of expression, as the Scriptures must be, to make them consistent with Arminian opinions, by whatever means this has come to pass, whether through the distance of ages, diversity of customs, or by any other cause. It is to be considered that this is given for the rule of all ages; and not only of the most learned, and accurate, and penetrating critics, and men of vast inquiry and skill in antiquity, but for all sorts of persons, of every age and nation, learned and unlearned. If this be true,

how unequal and unfit is the provision that is made! How improper to answer the end designed! If men will take subterfuge in pretences of a vast alteration of phrase, through diversity of ages and nations, what may not men hide themselves from under such a pretence! No words will hold and secure them. It is not in the nature of words to do it. At this rate, language in its nature has no sufficiency to communicate ideas.

§ 65. In efficacious grace we are not merely passive, nor yet does God do some, and we do the rest. But God does all, and we do all. God produces all, and we act all. For that is what he produces, viz., our own acts. God is the only proper author and fountain; we only are the proper actors. We are, in different respects, wholly passive, and wholly active.

In the Scriptures the same things are represented as from God and from us. God is said to convert, and men are said to convert and turn. God makes a new heart, and we are commanded to make us a new heart. God circumcises the heart, and we are commanded to circumcise our own hearts; not merely because we must use the means in order to the effect, but the effect itself is our act and our duty. These things are agreeable to that text, "God worketh in you both to will and to do."

§ 66. Christ says, that no other than those whom "the Father draws, will come to him;" and *Stebbing* supposes none but those whom the Father draws in this sense, viz., by first giving them a teachable spirit, &c. But this was false in fact in the Apostle Paul and others; at least he did not give it in answer to prayer, as their scheme supposes, and must suppose; else efficacious grace is established, and the liberty of the will, in their sense of it, is overthrown.

§ 67. When Christ says, John x., "Other sheep have I which are not of this fold;" it is unreasonable to suppose he meant all in the world, that were then of a teachable disposition. Many of them would be dead before the gospel could be spread among the Gentiles; and many of the Gentiles were doubtless brought in, that at that time were not of a teachable disposition. And unless God's decrees and efficacious grace made a difference, it is unreasonable to suppose any other, than that multitudes, in countries where the apostles never preached, were as teachable as in those countries where they did go, and so they never were brought in according to the words of Christ, "Those whom the Father hath given me, shall come unto me." Christ speaks of the Father's giving them as a thing past, John x. 29, "My Father which *gave* them me."

When Christ speaks of men's being drawn to him, he does not mean any preparation of disposition antecedent to their having the gospel, but a being converted to Christ by faith in the gospel, revealing Christ crucified, as appears by John xii. 32, "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." Acts xv. 9, "Purifying their hearts by faith." Therefore we are not to suppose God first purifies the heart with the most excellent virtues, to fit it for faith.

The apostle says, "without faith it is impossible to please God." Therefore it is not possible that persons should have, before faith, those virtues that are peculiarly amiable to God, as Stebbing supposes.

§ 68. The Apostle James tells us, that if we do not pray in faith, we have no reason to expect to receive any thing, and particularly not to receive divine wisdom. And therefore it is unreasonable to suppose with Stebbing, that persons first pray, even before they have a spirit of meekness, and teachableness, and humility, faith or repentance, and that God has promised to answer these prayers. Christian virtues being everywhere spoken of as the special effect of grace, and often called by the name of grace, by reason of its being the peculiar

fruit of grace, does not well consist with the Arminian notion of assistance, viz. that God is obliged to give us assistance sufficient for salvation from hell, because, forsooth, it is not just to damn us for the want of that which we have not sufficient means to escape; and then, after God has given these sufficient means, our improving them well is wholly from ourselves, our own will, and not from God; and the thing wherein Christian virtue consists, is wholly and entirely from ourselves.

§ 69. Efficacious grace is not inconsistent with freedom. This appears by 2 Cor. viii. 16, 17: "Thanks be to God, which put the same earnest care into the heart of Titus for you; for indeed he accepted the invitation; but being more forward, of his own accord he went unto you." So that his forwardness being put into his heart by God, and his being forward of his own accord, are not inconsistent, one with the other.

§ 70. According to Arminian principles, men have a good and honest heart, the very thing that is the grand requisite in order to God's acceptance, and so the proper grand condition of salvation, and which is often spoken of in the Scriptures as such, before they have the proper condition of salvation.

See Stebbing, page 48—This good and honest, meek and humble, sincere heart, they suppose they have before they have faith, repentance or obedience. Yea, they themselves hold this previous qualification to be the grand and essential requisite in order to God's acceptance and salvation by Christ; so that they greatly insist that if men have it, they shall be surely saved, though they live and die in ignorance of the gospel, and without faith, and repentance, and holiness, which are necessary in order for salvation, according to them.—*Stebbing*, p. 13.

§ 71. I would ask, how it is possible for us to come by virtue at first, according to Arminian principles, or how we come by our first virtue? Is it natural? Is there some virtuous disposition with which we come into the world? But how is that virtue? That which men bring into the world is necessary, and what men had no opportunity to prevent, and it is not at all from our free will. How then can there be any virtue in it according to their principles? Or is our first virtue wholly from the influence of the Spirit of God, without any endeavor or effort of ours to be partly the cause of it? This, to be sure, cannot be, by their principles; for, according to them, that which is not at all from us, or that we are not the cause of, is no virtue of ours. Is it wholly from our endeavors, without any assistance at all of the Spirit? This is contrary to what they pretend to hold; for they assert, that without divine assistance there can be no virtue. *Stebbing*, pages 27, 28, and pages 20, 21, and other places. If they say it is partly from the influence of the Spirit of God, and partly from our own endeavors, I would inquire whether those endeavors that our first virtue partly arises from, be good endeavors, and at all virtuous. If the answer be in the affirmative, this contradicts the supposition. For I am now inquiring what the first virtue is. The first virtue we have, certainly does not arise from virtuous endeavors preceding that first virtue; for that is to suppose virtue before the first virtue. If the answer be, that they are no good endeavors, they have nothing at all of the nature of the exercise of any good disposition, or any good aim and intention, or any virtuous sincerity; I ask, what tendency can such efforts of the mind, as are wholly empty of all goodness, have to produce true moral goodness in the heart?

Can an action, that in principles and ends has no degree of moral good, have a tendency to beget a habit of acting from good principles and for good ends? For instance, can a man's doing something purely to satisfy some sensitive appetite of his own, or to increase his own worldly profit, have any kind

of tendency to beget a habit of doing something from true, disinterested benevolence, or to excite to any act from such a principle? Certainly an act perfectly void of benevolence, has no more tendency to produce either a habit or act of benevolence, than nothing has a tendency to produce something.

§ 72. Stebbing supposes the assistance God gives, or the operation of the Spirit in order to faith, is to give a good and honest heart, prepared to receive and well improve the word; as particularly, meekness, humility, teachableness, &c. And supposes that these effects of the Spirit are to be obtained by prayer; but yet allows, that the prayer must be acceptably made, page 106, which supposes that some degree or virtue must be exercised in prayer. For surely they do not suppose any thing else, besides virtue in prayer, or in any other part of religion, is acceptable to God. I suppose they will not deny, that there must be at least some virtuous respect to the divine being, as well as some virtuous concern for the good of their own souls, to make any external act of religion in them at all acceptable to God, who is a spirit, and the searcher of hearts. And it may be also presumed that they will allow, that there are multitudes of men, who at present are so wicked, so destitute of virtue, that they have not virtue enough for acceptable prayer to God. They have not now so much respect to God or their own souls, as to incline them to pray at all. But they live in a total neglect of that duty. Now, I would inquire, how these men shall come by virtue, in order to acceptably praying to God? Or how is it within their reach by virtue of God's promises? Or how can they come by it, save by God's sovereign, arbitrary grace? Shall they pray to God for it, and so obtain it? But this is contrary to the supposition. For it is supposed, that they now have not virtue enough to pray acceptably, and this is the very thing inquired, how they come by the virtue necessary in order to their making acceptable prayer? Or shall they work the virtue in themselves wholly without God's assistance? But this is contrary to what they pretend, viz., that all virtue is from God, or by the grace and assistance of God, which they allow to be evident by that Scripture, "*without me ye can do nothing.*" Or, is God obliged to give it, or to assist them to obtain it, without their praying for it, or having virtue enough to ask it of him? That they do not pretend. For they suppose the condition of our obtaining the heavenly Spirit is our seeking, &c., asking, &c.; and besides, if God gives it without their first seeking it, that will make God the first determining efficient, yea, the mere and sole author of it, without their doing any thing toward it, without their so much as seeking or asking for it; which would be entirely to overthrow their whole scheme, and would, by their principles, make this virtue no virtue at all, because not at all owing to them, or any endeavors of theirs.

If they reply, they must in the first place *consider:* they are capable of consideration; and if they would consider as they ought and may, they would doubtless pray to God, and ask his help; and every man naturally has some virtue in him, which proper consideration would put into exercise so far as to cause him to pray in some measure acceptably, without any new gift from God —I answer, this is inconsistent with many of their principles. It is so, that men should naturally have some virtue in them. For what is natural is necessary; is not from themselves and their own endeavors and free acts; but prevents them all, and therefore cannot be their virtue. If they say, no; consideration will not stir up any virtue that is naturally in them, to cause them to pray virtuously; but God has obliged himself to give virtue enough to enable them to pray and seek acceptably, if they will consider: I answer, this is more than they pretend. They do not pretend that God has promised any new grace to

any man, on any lower condition than asking, seeking, knowing, &c., and if they should think best at last to pretend any promise on lower terms, they had best produce the promises, and tell us what, and where they are. If they say serious consideration itself is some degree of seeking their own good, and there is an implicit prayer in it to the Supreme Being to guide them into the way to their happiness: I answer, if it be supposed that there is an implicit prayer in their consideration, still they allow that prayer must be in some measure acceptable prayer, in order to its being entitled to an answer; and consequently must have some degree of virtuous respect to God, &c., and if so, then the same question returns with all the aforementioned difficulties over again, viz., How came the profane, thoughtless, vain, inconsiderate person by this new virtue, this new respect to God, that he ever exercises in this serious consideration and implicit prayer?

If they say, there is no necessity of supposing any implicit prayer in the first consideration; and yet, if the wicked, profane, careless person, makes a good improvement of what grace he has, in proper consideration or otherwise, God has obliged himself to give him more, in that general promise, "to him that hath shall be given, and he shall have more abundance:" then I answer, here is new virtue in his making a good improvement of what common assistance he has, which before he neglected, and made no good improvement of How came he by this new virtue? Here, again, all the aforementioned difficulties return. Was it wholly from himself? This is contrary to what they pretend. Or is God obliged to give new assistance in order to this new virtue by any promise? If he be, what is the condition of the promise? It is absurd to say, making a good improvement of what assistance they have; for that is the thing we are inquiring after, viz., How comes he by that new virtue, making a good improvement of what he has, when before he had not virtue enough to make such an improvement?

Of whatever kind this assistance is, whether it be some afflictive dispensation of Providence, or some other outward dispensation or inward influence, the difficulty is the same. How becomes God obliged to give this assistance; and what is the condition of the promise?

The answer must be, that this new virtue is without any new assistance given, and is from God no otherwise than as the former neglected assistance or grace subserves it. But the question is, whence comes the virtue of not neglecting, but improving that former assistance? Is it proper to say that a man is assisted to improve assistance by the assistance improved? Suppose a number of men were in the water in danger of drowning, and a friend on shore throws out a cord amongst them, but all of them for a while neglect it; at length one of them takes hold of it, and makes improvement of it; and any should inquire how that man came by the prudence and virtue of improving the cord, when others did not, and he before had neglected it; would it be a proper answer to say, that he that threw out the rope, assisted him wisely to improve the rope, by throwing out the rope to him? This would be an absurd answer. The question is not, how he came by his opportunity, but how he came by the virtue and disposition of improvement. His friend on shore gave him the opportunity, and this is all. The man's virtue in improving it was not at all from him.

Would it not be exceedingly impertinent, in such a case, to set forth from time to time, how this man's discretion, and virtue, and prudence, was the gift of his friend on the shore, his mere gift, the fruit of his purpose and mere good pleasure, and of his power; and yet that it was of his own will?

Man's virtue, according to Arminian principles, must consist wholly and entirely in improving assistance: for in that only consists the exercise of their free will in the affair, and not in their having the assistance, although their virtue must be by their principles entirely from themselves, and God has no hand in it. From the latter part of the above discourse, it appears that, according to Arminian principles, men's virtue is altogether of themselves, and God has no hand at all in it.

§ 73. When I say that the acts and influences of the Spirit determine the effects, it is not meant that man has nothing to do to determine in the affair. The soul of man undoubtedly, in every instance, does voluntarily determine with respect to his own consequent actions. But this determination of the will of man, or voluntary determination of the soul of man, is the effect determined. This determining act of the soul is not denied, but supposed, as it is the effect we are speaking of, that the influence of God's Spirit determines.

§ 74. The Scripture speaks of this as the reason that good men have virtue, *that God hath given it to them;* and the reason why bad men have it not, that *God hath not given it to them.* These two together clearly prove that God is the determining or disposing cause of virtue or goodness in men.

§ 75. Dr. Stebbing insists upon it, that conversion is the effect of God's word; and supposes that therefore it is demonstratively evident, that it must needs be the effect of men's free will, and not the necessary effect of the Spirit of God. But I say, that by their doctrine of self-determination, it cannot be the effect of the word of God in any proper sense at all. That it should be the effect of the word, is as inconsistent with their scheme, as they suppose it to be with ours. Self-determination is utterly inconsistent with conversion's being at all the effect of either the word or Spirit.

§ 76. They say that commands, threatenings, promises, invitations, counsels, &c., are to no purpose in our scheme. But indeed they can have no place in their scheme: for their scheme excludes all motive.

§ 77. In many particulars their scheme contradicts common sense. It is contrary to common sense, that a being should continually meet with millions of millions of real, proper disappointments and crosses to his proper desires, and not continually lead a distressed and unhappy life. It is contrary to common sense, that God should know that an event will certainly come to pass, whose nonexistence he at the same time knows is not impossible. It is contrary to common sense that a thing should be the cause of itself; and that a thing not necessary in its own nature should come to pass without any cause: that the more indifferent a man is in any moral action, the more virtuous he is, &c.

§ 78. If the grace of God is not disposing and determining, then a gracious man's differing in this respect from another, is not owing to the goodness of God. He owes no thanks to God for it; and so owes no thanks to God, that he is saved, and not others.

But how contrary is this to Scripture! Seeing the Scripture speaks of the gift of virtue, and of the possession of it, as a fruit of God's bounty.

§ 79. A man's conformity to the rule of duty, is partly owing to assistance or motive; if his conformity be to ten degrees, and it is in some measure, *v. g.*, to the amount of five degrees, owing to sovereign assistance; then only the remaining five degrees are to be ascribed to the man himself, and therefore there are but five degrees of virtue.

§ 80. Dr. *Stebbing* says, "that a man is indeed both passive and active in his own conversion," and he represents God as partly the cause of man's conversion, and man himself as partly the cause, p. 208.

Again, *Stebbing* says, p. 254, "Faith and regeneration are our works, as well as his gifts, i. e., they arise partly from God and partly from ourselves." But if so, on this scheme, they imply virtue so far only as they are our works.

Men's salvation is attributed wholly and entirely to men in their scheme, and none of the praise of it is due to God, as will most evidently appear, if the matter be considered with a little attention. For, 1. They hold that man's salvation is given as a reward of man's virtue; so is pardon of sin, deliverance from hell, and eternal life and glory in heaven; all is for man's virtue. 2. Rewardable virtue wholly consists in the exercise of a man's own free will. They hold that a man's actions are no farther virtuous nor rewardable, than as they are from man himself. If they are partly from some foreign cause, so far they are not rewardable. It being so, that that virtue which is rewardable in man, is entirely from man himself; hence it is to himself wholly that he is to ascribe his obtaining the reward. If the virtue, which is that thing, and that thing only, which obtains the reward, be wholly from man himself, then it will surely follow, that his obtaining the reward is wholly from himself.

All their arguments suppose, that men's actions are no farther virtuous and rewardable, than as they are from themselves, the fruits of their own free will and self-determination. And men's own virtue, they say, is the only condition of salvation, and so must be the only thing by which salvation is obtained. And this being of themselves only, it surely follows, that their obtaining salvation is of themselves only.

They say, their scheme gives *almost all* the glory to God. That matter, I suppose, may easily be determined, and it may be made to appear beyond all contest, how much they do ascribe to the man, and how much they do not.

By them salvation is so far from God, that it is God that gives opportunity to obtain salvation; it is God that gives the offer and makes the promise: but the obtaining of the promise is of men. The being of the promise is of God; but their interest in it is wholly of themselves, of their own free will. And furthermore, it is to be observed, that even God's making the offer, and giving the opportunity to obtain salvation, at least that which consists in salvation from eternal misery, is not of God, so as to be owing to any proper grace or goodness of his. For they suppose he was obliged to make the offer, and it would have been a reproach to his justice, if he had not given an opportunity to obtain salvation. For they hold, it is unjust for God to make men miserable for Adam's sin; and that it is unjust to punish them for that sin that they cannot avoid; and that therefore, it is unjust for God not to preserve or save all men that do what they can, or use their sincere endeavors to do their duty; and therefore it certainly follows, that it is unjust in God not to give all opportunity to be saved or preserved from misery; and consequently, it is no fruit at all of any grace or kindness in him to give such opportunity, or to make the offer of it. So that, all that is the fruit of God's kindness in man's salvation, is the positive happiness that belongs to salvation. But neither of these two things are in any respect whatsoever the fruit of God's kindness, neither his deliverance from sin, nor from misery in his virtue and holiness; and when hereafter he shall see the misery of the damned, he will have it to consider, that it is owing in no respect to God that he is delivered from that misery. And that good men differ from others, that shall burn in hell to all eternity, is wholly owing to themselves. When they, at the day of judgment, shall behold some set on the left hand of the Judge, while they are on his right hand, and shall see how they differ, they may, and, as they would act according to truth, hey ought to take all the glory of it unto themselves; and therefore the glory

of their salvation belongs to them. For it is evident that a man's making himself to differ with regard to any great spiritual benefit, and his not receiving it from another, but his having it in distinction from others, being from himself, is ground or a man's boasting and glorying in himself, with respect to that benefit, and of boasting of it: I say, it is evident by the apostle's words, "Who maketh thee to differ? Why boastest thou, as though thou hadst not received it?" These words plainly imply it.

It is evident, that it is God's design to exclude man's boasting in the affair of his salvation. Now, let us consider what does give ground for boasting in the apostle's account, and what it is that in his account excludes boasting, or cuts off occasion for it. It is evident by what the apostle says, 1 Cor. i., latter end, that the entireness and universality of our dependence on God, is that which cuts off occasion of boasting; as, our receiving our wisdom, our holiness, and redemption through Christ, and not through ourselves; that Christ is made to us wisdom, justification, holiness and redemption; and not only so, but that it is of God that we have any part in Christ; *of him are ye in Christ Jesus:* nay, further, that it is from God we receive those benefits of wisdom, holiness, &c., through the Saviour that we are interested in.

The import of all these things, if we may trust to Scripture representations, is, that God has contrived to exclude our glorying; that we should be wholly and every way dependent on God, for the moral and natural good that belongs to salvation; and that we have all from the hand of God, by his power and grace. And certainly this is wholly inconsistent with the idea that our holiness is wholly from ourselves; and, that we are interested in the benefits of Christ rather than others, is wholly of our own decision. And that such a universal dependence is what takes away occasion of taking glory to ourselves, and is a proper ground of an ascription of all the glory of the things belonging to man's salvation to God, is manifest from Rom. xi. 35, 36, "Or who hath first given unto him, and it shall be recompensed to him again? For of him, and to him, and through him, are all things; to whom be glory for ever and ever, Amen."

The words are remarkable, and very significant. If we look into all the foregoing discourse, from the beginning of chapter ix., of which this is the conclusion, by not giving to God, but having all this wholly *from*, *through*, and *in God*, is intended that these things, these great benefits forementioned, are thus from God, without being from or through ourselves. That some of the Jews were distinguished from others in enjoying the privileges of Christians, was not of themselves; not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy. It is of him who has mercy on whom he will have mercy. It is of God, who makes of the same lump a vessel of honor and a vessel unto dishonor. It is not of us, nor our works, but of the calling of God, or of him that calleth, chap. ix. 11, and 23, 34. Not first of our own choice, but of God's election, chap. ix. 11—27, and chap. xi. 5. It is all of the grace of God in such a manner, as not to be of our works at all; yea, and so as to be utterly inconsistent with its being of our works; chap. xi. 5, 6, 7. In such a manner as not first to be of their seeking; their seeking does not determine, but God's election; chap. xi. 7. It is of God, and not of man, that some were grafted in, that were wild olive branches in themselves, and were more unlikely as to any thing in themselves to be branches, than others, verse 17. Their being grafted in, is owing to God's distinguishing goodness, while he was pleased to use severity towards others, v. 22. Yea, God has so ordered it on purpose that all should be shut up in unbelief; be left to be so sinful, that he might have mercy on all; so as more visibly to show the salvation of all to be merely dependent

on mercy. Then the apostle fitly concludes all this discourse, Rom. xi. 35, 36, "Or who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed to him again? For of him, and to him, and through him, are all things; to whom be glory for ever. Amen."

Again in the apostle's account, a benefit's being of our works, gives occasion for boasting, and therefore God has contrived that our salvation shall not be of our works, but of mere grace, Rom. iii. 27, Eph. ii. 9. And that neither the salvation, nor the condition of it, shall be of our works, but that, with regard to all, we are God's workmanship and his creation antecedently to our works; and his grace and power in producing this workmanship, and his determination or purpose with regard to them, are all prior to our works, and the cause of them. See also Rom. xi. 4, 5, 6.

And it is evident, that man's having virtue from himself, and not receiving it from another, and making himself to differ with regard to great spiritual benefits, does give ground for boasting, by the words of the apostle in Rom. iii. 27. And this is allowed by those men in spiritual gifts. And if so in them more so in greater things; more so in that which in itself is a thousand times more excellent, and of ten thousand times greater importance and benefit.

By the Arminian scheme, that which is infinitely the most excellent thing, viz., virtue and holiness, which the apostle sets forth as being infinitely the most honorable, and will bring the subjects of it to infinitely the greatest and highest honor, that which is infinitely the highest dignity of man's nature of all things that belong to man's salvation; in comparison of which, all things belonging to that salvation are nothing; that which does infinitely more than any thing else constitute the difference between them and others, as more excellent, more worthy, more honorable and happy; this is from themselves. With regard to this, they have not received of another. With regard to this great thing, they, and they only, make themselves to differ from others; and this difference proceeds not at all from the power or grace of God.

Again, in the apostle's account, this scheme will give occasion to have a great benefit, that appertains to salvation, not of grace, but of works.

Virtue is not only the most honorable attainment, but it is that which men, on the supposition of their being possessed of it, are more apt to glory in, than in any thing else whatsoever. For what are men so apt to glory in as their own supposed excellency, as in their supposed virtue? And what sort of glorying is that, which, it is evident in fact, the Scriptures do chiefly guard against? It is glorying in their own righteousness, their own holiness, their own good works.

It is manifest, that in the apostle's account it is a proper consideration to prevent our boasting, that our distinction from others, is not of ourselves, not only in being distinguished in having better gifts and better principles, but in our being made partakers of the great privileges of Christians, such as being engrafted into Christ, and partaking of the fatness of that olive tree. Rom. xi. 17, 18, "And if some of the branches be broken off, and thou, being a wild olive tree, wert grafted in among them, and with them partakest of the root and fatness of the olive tree, boast not against the branches."

Here it is manifest, it is the distinction that was made between some and others, that is the thing insisted on; and the apostle, verse 22, calls upon them to consider this great distinction, and to ascribe it to the distinguishing goodness of God only. "Behold therefore the goodness and severity of God; on them which fell, severity; but toward thee, goodness." And its being owing not to them, but to God and his distinguishing goodness, is the thing the

apostle urges as a reason why they should not boast, but magnify God's grace or distinguishing goodness And if it be a good reason, and the scheme of our salvation be every way so contrived (as the apostle elsewhere signifies) that all occasion of boasting should be precluded, and all reasons given to ascribe all to God's grace; then it is doubtless so ordered, that the greatest privileges, excellency, honor and happiness of Christians, should be that wherein they do not distinguish themselves, but the difference is owing to God's distinguishing goodness.

Stebbing strongly asserts, God is not the author of that difference that is between some and others, that some are good and others bad.

§ 81. The Arminians differ among themselves. Dr. Whitby supposes what God does, is only proposing moral motives; but that in attending, adverting and considering, we exercise our liberty. But Stebbing supposes, that the attention and consideration is itself the thing owing to the Spirit of God; p. 217.

§ 82. Stebbing changes the question, pages 223, 224. He was considering who has the chief glory of our conversion, or of our virtue; and there, answering objections, endeavors to prove the affirmative of another question, viz., whether God is the author of that pardon and salvation, of which conversion and virtue are the condition.

§ 83. Stebbing supposes that one thing wherein the assistance of the Spirit consists, is the giving of a meek, teachable, disinterested temper of mind, to prepare men for faith in Christ, pages 217, 259; and that herein consists that drawing of the Father, John vi. 44, viz., in giving such a temper of mind.

This he calls the preventing grace of God, that goes before conversion. He often speaks of a part that we do, and a part that God does. And he speaks of this as a part which God does. Therefore this, if it be the part which God does, in distinction from the part which we do (for so he speaks of it), is wholly done by God. And consequently, here is virtue wholly from God, and not at all from the exercise of our own free will; which is inconsistent with his own, and all other Arminian principles. Stebbing speaks of these preparatory dispositions as virtue, p. 30, 31, 32, yea, as that wherein virtue does in a peculiar manner consist, p. 31. And he there also, viz. page 259, talks inconsistently with himself; for he supposes that this meek and teachable temper is given by God, by his preventing grace; and also supposes, that all that have this, shall surely come to the Father. He says, page 256, "It is certainly true of the meek, disinterested man, that as he will not reject the gospel at first; so he will not be prevailed on by any worldly considerations to forsake it afterwards."

"He who is under no evil bias of mind, by which he may be prejudiced against the truth (which is the notion of a meek and disinterested man), such a one, I say, cannot possibly fail of being wrought upon by the preaching of the word, which carries in it all that evidence of truth, which reason requires," &c., and his words, page 259, are, John vi. 37, 39, "All that the Father giveth me, shall come unto me;" for to be given of the Father signifies the same thing with being drawn of the Father, as has been already shown. And to be drawn of the Father, signifies to be prepared or fitted for the reception of the gospel, by the preventing grace of God, as has also been proved. Now, this preparedness consisting, as has likewise been shown, in being endued with a meek and disinterested temper of mind; those who are given of the Father, will be the same with Christ's sheep. And the sense of the place is the same with the preceding, where our Saviour says that his sheep hear his voice and follow him,

i. e., become his obedient disciples. This text, therefore, being no more than a declaration of what will be certain, and (morally speaking) the necessary effect of that disposition, upon the account of which men are said to be given of the Father (to wit, that it will lead them to embrace the gospel, when once proposed to them)." By these things, the preventing grace of God, the part that God does, in distinction from the part that we do, and that which prevents or goes before what we do, thoroughly decides and determines the case as to our conversion, or our faith and repentance and obedience, notwithstanding all the hand our free will is supposed to have in the case; and which he supposes is what determines man's conversion; and insists upon it most strenuously and magisterially through his whole book. Stebbing supposes the influence of the Spirit necessary to prepare men's hearts, pages 15—18. He (pages 17, 18) speaks of this as what the Spirit does, and as being his preventing grace; and speaks of it as always effectual; so that all such, and only such as have it, will believe. See also pages 28—30.

That these dispositions must be effectual: see pages 46—48.

This teachable, humble, meek spirit, is what Stebbing speaks of everywhere as what the Spirit of God gives antecedent to obedience. He insists upon it, that God's assistance is necessary in order to obedience. In pages 20, 21, he plainly asserts that it is necessary in order to our obedience, and declares that our Saviour has asserted it in express terms in these words, John xv. 5, "Without me ye can do nothing; i. e., as he says, no good thing. Hence it follows, that this teachable, humble, meek disposition, this good and honest heart, is not the fruit of any good thing we do in the exercise of our free will; but is merely the fruit of divine operation. Here observe well what Stebbing says concerning God's giving grace sufficient for obedience, in answer to prayer. Pages 103—106.

§ 84. No reason in the world can be given, why a meek, humble spirit, and sense of the importance of Christian things, should not be as requisite in order to acceptable prayer, as in order to acceptable hearing and believing the word. It is as much so spoken of. A praying without a good spirit in these and other respects, is represented as no prayer, as ineffectual, and what we have no reason to expect will be answered.

§ 85. If that meekness, &c., depends on some antecedent, self-determined act of theirs, and they be determined by that; then their being Christ's, being his sheep, and therein distinguished from others that are not his sheep, is not properly owing to the Father's gift, but to their own gift. The Father's pleasure is not the thing it is to be ascribed to at all: for the Father does nothing in the case decisively; he acts not at all freely in the case, but acts on an antecedent, firm obligation to the persons themselves: but their own pleasure, undetermined by God, is that which disposes and decides in the matter. How impertinent would it be to insist on the gift of the Father in this case, when the thing he speaks of is not from thence?

§ 86. He supposes that the assistance that God gives in order to obedience is giving this good and honest heart; see p. 46. 47. together with p. 40, 45; and therefore, this good and honest heart is not the fruit of our own obedience, but must be the fruit of assistance that precedes our good works, as he often calls it the preventing grace of God. And therefore, if this grace determines the matter, and will certainly be followed with faith and obedience, then all Arminianism, and his own scheme, comes to the ground.

§ 87. Stebbing interprets that passage. Luke xix. 16, 17, which speaks of our being little children, and receiving the kingdom of God as little children, of that meekness and humility, &c., that is antecedent to conversion, which

it is apparent Christ elsewhere speaks of as consequent on conversion, as Matth. xviii.

§ 88. It is manifest the power of God overcomes resistance, and great resistance of some sort; otherwise there would be no peculiar greatness of power, as distinguishing it from the power of creatures, manifested in bringing men to be willing to be virtuous; which it is apparent there is, by Matth. xix. 26: "But Jesus beheld them, and said unto them, With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible."

§ 89. The Arminian scheme naturally, and by necessary consequence leads men to take all the glory of all spiritual good (which is immensely the chief, most important and excellent thing in the whole creation) to ourselves; as much as if we, with regard to those effects, were the supreme, the first cause, self-existent, and independent, and absolutely sovereign disposers. We leave the glory of only the meaner part of creation to God, and take to ourselves all the glory of that which is properly the life, beauty and glory of the creation, and without which it is all worse than nothing. So that there is nothing left for the great First and Last; no glory for either the Father, Son, or Holy Ghost, in the affair. This is not carrying things too far, but is a consequence truly and certainly to be ascribed to their scheme of things.

§ 90. He may be said to be the giver of money that offers it to us, without being the proper determiner of our acceptance of it. But if the acceptance of an offer itself be the thing which is supposed to be given, he cannot, in any proper sense whatsoever, be properly said to be the giver of this, who is not the determiner of it. But it is the acceptance of offers, and the proper improvement of opportunities, wherein consists virtue. He may be said to be the giver of money or goods that does not determine the wise choice; but if the wise and good choice itself be said to be the thing given, it supposes that the giver determines the existing of such a wise choice. But now, this is the thing that God is represented as the giver of, when he is spoken of as the giver of virtue, holiness, &c., for virtue and holiness (as all our opponents in these controversies allow and maintain) is the thing wherein a wise and good choice consists.

§ 91. It is the common way of the Arminians, in their discourses and doctrines, which they pretend are so much more consistent with reason and common sense, than the doctrines of the Calvinists, to give no account at all, and make no proper answer to the inquiries made; and they do as Mr. Locke says of the Indian philosopher, who, when asked what the world stood upon, answered, it stood upon an elephant; and, when asked what the elephant stood upon, he replied, on a broadbacked turtle, &c. None of their accounts will bear to be traced. The first link of the chain, and the fountain of the whole stream, must not be inquired after. If it be, it brings all to a gross absurdity and self-contradiction. And yet, when they have done, they look upon others as stupid bigots, and void of common sense, or at least going directly counter to common sense, and worthy of contempt and indignation, because they will not agree with them.

§ 92. I suppose it will not be denied by any party of Christians, that the happiness of the saints in the other world consists much in perfect holiness and the exalted exercises of it; that the souls of the saints shall enter upon it at once at death; or (if any deny that) at least at the resurrection; that the saint is made perfectly holy as soon as ever he enters into heaven. I suppose none will say, that perfection is obtained by repeated acts of holiness; but all will grant, that it is wrought in the saint immediately by the power of God; and yet that it is virtue notwithstanding. And why are not the beginnings of holiness wrought

in the same manner? Why should not the beginnings of a holy nature be wrought immediately by God in a soul that is wholly of a contrary nature, as well as holiness be perfected in a soul that has already a prevailing holiness? And if it be so, why is not the beginning, thus wrought, as much virtue as the perfection thus wrought?

§ 95. Saving grace differs, not only in degree, but in nature and kind, from common grace, or any thing that is ever found in natural men. This seems evident by the following things. 1. Because conversion is a work that is done at once, and not gradually. If saving grace differed only in degree from what went before, then the making a man a good man would be a gradual work; it would be the increasing of the grace that he has, till it comes to such a degree as to be saving, at least it would be frequently so. But that the conversion of the heart is not a work that is thus gradually wrought, but that it is wrought at once, appears by Christ's converting the soul being represented by his calling of it; Rom. viii. 28, 29, 30, "And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son; that he might be the first born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also *called;* and whom he called, them he also justified; and whom he justified, them he also glorified." Acts ii. 37—39, "Men and brethren, what shall we do? Then Peter said unto them, Repent, and be baptized every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. For the promise is unto you, and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall *call.*" Heb. ix. 15, "That they which are *called* might receive the promise of eternal inheritance." 1 Thess v. 23, 24, "And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly: and I pray God, your whole spirit, soul and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Faithful is he that *calleth* you, who also will do it." Nothing else can be meant in these places *by calling*, but what Christ does in a sinner's saving conversion; by which it seems evident, that this is done at once, and not gradually. Hereby Christ shows his great power. He does but speak the powerful word, and it is done. He does but call, and the heart of the sinner immediately cometh, as was represented by his calling his disciples, and their immediately following him. So, when he called Peter and Andrew, James and John, they were minding other things, and had no thought of following Christ. But at his call they immediately followed him, Matth. iv. 18—22. Peter and Andrew were casting a net into the sea. Christ says unto them, as he passed by, Follow me; and it is said, they straightway left their nets and followed him. So James and John were in the ship with Zebedee their father, mending their nets: and he called them; and immediately they left the ship, and their father, and followed him. So when Matthew was called; Matth. ix. 9, "And as Jesus passed forth from thence, he saw a man, named Matthew, sitting at the receipt of custom; and he saith unto him, Follow me: And he arose and followed him." The same circumstances are observed by other evangelists. Which, doubtless, is to represent the manner in which Christ effectually calls his disciples in all ages. There is something immediately put into their hearts, at that call, that is new, that there was nothing of there before, which makes them so immediately act in a manner altogether new, and so alien from what they were before.

That the work of conversion is wrought at once, is further evident, by its being compared to a work of creation. When God created the world, he did what he did immediately; he spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it

stood fast. He said, let there be light, and there was light. Also by its being compared to a raising from the dead. Raising from the dead is not a gradual work, but it is done at once. God calls, and the dead come forth immediately. The change in conversion is in the twinkling of an eye; as that 1 Cor. xv. 51, 52, "We shall be changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump. For the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed."

It appears by the manner in which Christ wrought all those works that he wrought when on earth, that they were types of his great work of converting sinners. Thus, when he healed the leper, he put forth his hand and touched him, and said, "I will, be thou clean; and immediately his leprosy was cleansed." Matth. viii. 3. Mark i. 42 Luke v. 13. So, in the opening the eyes of the blind men, Matth. xx. 30, &c., he touched their eyes, and immediately their eyes received sight, and they followed him. And so Mark x. 52. Luke xviii. 43. So, when he healed the sick, particularly Simon's wife's mother, he took her by her hand, and lifted her up; and immediately the fever left her. and she ministered unto him. So when the woman that had the issue of blood, touched the hem of Christ's garment, immediately her issue of blood stanched; Luke viii. 44. So the woman that was bowed together with the spirit of infirmity, when Christ laid his hands on her, immediately she was made straight, and glorified God; Luke xiii. 12, 13. So the man at the pool of Bethesda, when Christ bade him rise and take up his bed and walk, was immediately made whole; John v. 8, 9. After the same manner Christ raised the dead, and cast out devils, and stilled the winds and seas.

1. There seems to be a specific difference between saving grace or virtue and all that was in the heart before, by the things that conversion is represented by in Scripture: particularly by its being represented as a work of creation. When God creates, he does not merely establish and perfect the things that were made before, but makes them wholly and immediately. The things that are seen, are not made of things that do appear. Saving grace in the heart is said to be the new man, a new creature; and corruption the old man. If that virtue that is in the heart of a holy man, be not different in its nature and kind, then the man might possibly have had the same seventy years before, and from time to time, from the beginning of his life, and has it no otherwise now, but only in a greater degree: and how then is he a new creature?

Again, it is evident also from its being compared to a resurrection. Natural men are said to be dead: but when they are converted, they are by God's mighty and effectual power raised from the dead. Now, there is no medium between being dead and alive. He that is dead, has no degree of life. He that has the least degree of life in him, is alive. When a man is raised from the dead, life is not only in a greater degree, but it is all new. And this is further evident by that representation that is made of Christ's converting sinners, in John v. 25: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, the hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that hear shall live." This shows conversion to be an immediate and instantaneous work, like to the change made in Lazarus when Christ called him from the grave. there went life with the call, and Lazarus was immediately alive. That immediately before the call they are dead, and therefore wholly destitute of any life, is evident by that expression, "the dead shall hear the voice;" and immediately after the call, they are alive; yea, there goes life with the voice, as is evident not only because it is said they shall live, but also because it is said, they shall hear his voice. It is evident, that the first moment they have any life, is the moment

when Christ calls; and when Christ calls, or as soon as they are called, they are converted; as is evident from what is said in the first argument, wherein it is shown, that to be called, and converted, is the same thing.

3. Those that go farthest in religion, that are in a natural condition, have no charity, as is plainly implied in the beginning of the 13th chapter of the first of Corinthians; by which we must understand, that they have none of that kind of grace, or disposition or affection, that is so called. So Christ elsewhere reproves the Pharisees, those high pretenders to religion among the Jews, that they had not the love of God in them.

4. In conversion, stones are raised up to be children unto Abraham. While stones, they are wholly destitute of all those qualities that afterward render them the living children of Abraham; and not possessing them, though in a less degree.

Agreeably to this, conversion is represented by the taking away the heart of stone, and giving a heart of flesh. The man, while unconverted, has a heart of stone, which has no degree of that life or sense in it that the heart of flesh has; because it yet remains a stone; than which, nothing is farther from life and sense.

5. A wicked man has none of that principle of nature that a godly man has, as is evident by 1 John iii. 9, "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him; and he cannot sin, because he is born of God."

The natural import of the metaphor shows, that by a seed is meant a principle of action: it may be small as a grain of mustard seed. A seed is a small thing; it may be buried up and lie hid, as the seed sown in the earth; it may seem to be dead, as seeds for a while do, till quickened by the sun and rain. But any degree of such a principle, or a principle of such a nature, is what is called the seed; it need not be to such a degree, or have such a prevalency, in order to be called a seed. And it is further evident that this seed, or this inward principle of nature, is peculiar to the saints; for he that has that seed, cannot sin; and therefore he that sins, or is a wicked man, has it not.

6. Natural men, or those that are not savingly converted, have no degree of that principle from whence all gracious actings flow, viz., the Spirit of God or of Christ; as is evident, because it is asserted both ways in Scripture, that those who have not the Spirit of Christ, are not his, Rom. viii. 9, and also that those who have the Spirit of Christ, are his; 1 John iii. 24, "Hereby we know that he abideth in us, by the Spirit which he hath given us." And the Spirit of God is called the earnest of the future inheritance, 1 Cor. i. 22, and v. 5, Eph. i. 14. Yea, that a natural man has nothing of the Spirit in him, no part nor portion in it, is still more evident, because the *having of the Spirit* is given as a sure sign of being in Christ. 1 John iv. 13, "Hereby know we that we dwell in him, because he hath given us of his Spirit." By which it is evident, that they have none of that holy principle that the godly have. And if they have nothing of the Spirit, they have nothing of those things that are the fruits of the Spirit, such as those mentioned in Gal. v. 22, "But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance." These fruits are here mentioned with the very design, that we may know whether we have the Spirit or no. In the 18th verse, the apostle tells the Galatians, that if they are led by the Spirit, they are not under the law; and then directly proceeds, first, to mention what are the fruits or works of the flesh, and then, nextly, what are the fruits of the Spirit, that we may judge whether we are led by the Spirit or no.

7 That natural men, or those that are not born again, have nothing of that grace that is in godly men, is evident by John iii. 6, where Christ, speaking of regeneration, says, "That which is born of the flesh, is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit, is spirit." By flesh is here meant nature, and by spirit is meant grace, as is evident by Gal. v. 16, 17. Gal. vi. 8. 1 Cor. iii. 1. Rom. viii. 7. That is Christ's very argument; by this it is that Christ in those words would show Nicodemus the necessity of regeneration, that by the first birth we have nothing but nature, and can have nothing else without being born again; by which it is exceeding evident, that they that are not born again, have nothing else. And that natural men have not the Spirit is evident, since by this text with the context it is most evident that those who have the Spirit, have it by regeneration. It is born in them; it comes into them no otherwise than by birth, and that birth is in regeneration, as is most evident by the preceding and following verses. In godly men there are two opposite principles: the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; as Gal. v. 25. But it is not so with natural men. Rebekah, in having Esau and Jacob struggle together in her womb, was a type only of the true *Church*.

8. Natural men have nothing of that nature in them which true Christians have; and that appears, because the nature they have is divine nature. The saints alone have it. Not only they alone partake of such degrees of it, but they alone are partakers of it. To be a partaker of the divine nature is mentioned as peculiar to the saints, in 2 Pet. i. 4. It is evident it is the true saints the apostle is there speaking of. The words in this verse and the foregoing, run thus: 'According as his divine power hath given us all things that pertain unto life and godliness, through the knowledge of him that hath called us to glory and virtue; whereby are given unto us exceeding great and precious promises, that by these ye might be partakers of the divine nature; having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust." Divine nature and lust are evidently here spoken of as two opposite principles in men. Those that are of the world, or that are the men of the world, have only the latter principle. But to be partakers of the divine nature, is spoken of as peculiar to them that are distinguished and separated from the world, by the free and sovereign grace of God giving them all things that pertain to life and godliness; by giving the knowledge of Christ, and calling them to glory and virtue; and giving them the exceeding great and precious promises of the gospel, and enabling them to escape the corruption of the world of wicked men. It is spoken of, not only as peculiar to the saints, but as the highest privilege of saints.

9. A natural man has no degree of that relish and sense of spiritual things, or things of the Spirit, and of their divine truth and excellency, which a godly man has; as is evident by 1 Cor. ii. 14, "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." Here a natural man is represented, as perfectly destitute of any sense, perception, or discerning of those things. For by the words, he neither does, nor can know them or discern them. So far from it, that they are foolishness unto him. He is such a stranger to them, that he knows not what the talk of such things means; they are words without a meaning to him: he knows nothing of the matter, any more than a blind man of colors. Hence it will follow, that the sense of things of religion that a natural man has, is not only not to the same degree, but is not of the same nature with what a godly man has. Besides, if a natural person has that fruit of the Spirit, which is of the same kind with what a spiritual person has, then he experiences within himself the things of

the Spirit of God. How then can he be said to be such a stranger to them, and have no perception or discerning of them? The reason why natural men have no knowledge of spiritual things, is, that they have nothing of the Spirit of God dwelling in them. This is evident by the context. For there we are told it is by the Spirit these things are taught, verses 10—12. Godly persons, in the text we are upon, are called spiritual, evidently on this account, that they have the Spirit; and unregenerate men are called natural men, because they have nothing but nature. Hereby the 6th argument is continued. For natural men are in no degree spiritual; they have only nature, and no Spirit. If they had any thing of the Spirit, though not in so great a degree as the godly, yet they would be taught spiritual things, or the things of the Spirit in proportion; the Spirit, that searcheth all things, would teach them in some measure. There would not be so great a difference, that the one could perceive nothing of them, and that they should be foolishness to them, while, to the other, they appear divinely and unspeakably wise and excellent, as they are spoken of in the context, verses 6—9, and as such, the apostle speaks here of discerning them. The reason why natural men have no knowledge or perception of spiritual things, is, that they have none of that anointing spoken of, 1 John ii. 27, "But the anointing, which ye have received of him, abideth in you, and ye need not that any man should teach you; but as the same anointing teacheth you of all things, and is truth, and is no lie, and even as it hath taught you, ye shall abide in him."

This anointing is evidently here spoken of, as a thing peculiar to true saints. Sinners never had any of that oil poured upon them; and because ungodly men have none of it, therefore they have no discerning of spiritual things. If they had any degree of it, they would discern in some measure. Therefore, none of that sense that natural men have of spiritual things, is of the same nature with what the godly have. And that natural men are wholly destitute of this knowledge, is further evident, because conversion is represented in Scripture by opening the eyes of the blind. But this would be very improperly represented, if a man might have some sight, though not so clear and full, time after time, for scores of years before his conversion.

10. The grace of God's Spirit is not only a precious oil with which Christ anoints the believer by giving it to him, but the believer anoints Christ with it, by exercising it towards him; which seems to be represented by the precious ointment Mary poured on Christ's head. Herein it seems to me, that Mary is a type of Christ's church, and of every believing soul. And if so, doubtless the thing in which she typifies the church, has in it something peculiar to the church. There would not be a type ordered on purpose to represent the church, that shall represent only something that is common to the church and others. Therefore unbelievers pour none of that sweet and precious ointment on Christ.

11. That unbelievers have no degree of that grace that the saints have, is evident, because they have no communion with Christ. If unbelievers partook of any of that Spirit, those holy inclinations, affections and actings that the godly have from the Spirit of Christ, then they would have communion with Christ. The communion of saints with Christ, does certainly consist in receiving of his fulness, and partaking of his grace, which is spoken of, John i. 16: "Of his fulness have we all received, and grace for grace." And the partaking of that Spirit which God gives not by measure unto him, the partaking of Christ's holiness and grace, his nature, inclinations, tendencies, affections, love, desires, must be a part of communion with him. Yea, a believer's communion with God and Christ, does mainly consist in partaking of the Holy Spirit, as is evident by 2 Cor. xiii. 14. But that unbelievers have no communion or fellowship with

Christ, appears, 1st. Because they are not united to Christ, they are not in Christ. Those that are not in Christ, or are not united to him, can have no degree of communion with him; for union with Christ, or a being in Christ, is the foundation of all communion with him. The union of the members with the head, is the foundation of all their communion or partaking with the head; and so the union of the branch with the vine, is the foundation of all the communion it has with the vine, of partaking of any degree of its sap or life, or influence. So the union of the wife to the husband, is the foundation of her communion in his goods. But no natural man is united to Christ; because all that are in Christ shall be saved; 1 Cor. xv. 22, "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive;" i. e. all that are in Christ; for this speaks only of the glorious resurrection and eternal life. Phil. iii. 8, 9, "Yea, doubtless, I count all things but loss, for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus, my Lord; for whom I have suffered the loss of all things, and do count them but dung, that I may win Christ, and be found *in him*, not having on my own righteousness," &c. 2 Cor. v. 17, "Now, if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature; old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new." 1 John ii. 5, "Hereby know we that we are in him." Chap. iii. 24, "And he that keepeth his commandments, *dwelleth in him, and he in him*, and hereby we know *that he abideth in us*," &c., and iv. 13, "Hereby know we that *we dwell in him, and he in us*."

2d. The Scripture does more directly teach, that it is only true saints that have communion with Christ; as, particularly, this is most evidently spoken of as what belongs to the saints, and to them only, in 1 John i. 3—7: "That which we have seen and heard, declare we unto you, that ye also may have fellowship with us; and truly our fellowship is with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ. If we say we have fellowship with him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth. But if we walk in light, as he is in the light, we have fellowship one with another; and the blood of Jesus Christ, his Son, cleanseth us from all sin." And 1 Cor. i. 8, 9, "Who shall also confirm you unto the end, that ye may be blameless in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ. God is faithful, by whom ye were called unto the fellowship of his Son, Jesus Christ our Lord." By this it appears that those who have fellowship with Christ, are those that cannot fall away, whom God's faithfulness is bound to confirm to the end, that they may be blameless in the day of Jesus Christ.

§ 94. Ezekiel's vision of the dry bones is a confirmation, that however natural men may be the subjects of great and wonderful influences and operations of God's great power and Spirit; yet they do not properly partake at all of the Spirit before conversion. In all that is wrought in them, in every respect fitting and preparing them for grace, so that nothing shall be wanting but divine life; yet as long as they are without this, they have nothing of the Spirit. Which confirms the distinctions I have elsewhere made, of the Spirit of God influencing the minds of natural men under common illuminations and convictions, and yet not communicating himself in his own proper nature to them, before conversion; and that saving grace differs from common grace, not only in degree, but also in nature and kind. It is said, Rev. iii. 8, of the church at Philadelphia, which is commended above all other churches, *Thou hast a little strength*—certainly implying, that ungodly men have none at all.

§ 95. That there is no good work before conversion and actual union with Christ, is manifest from that, Rom. vii. 4, "Wherefore, my brethren, ye also are become dead to the law, by the body of Christ, that ye should be married unto another, even to him who is raised from the dead; that we should bring

forth fruit unto God." Hence we may argue, that there is no lawful child brought forth before that marriage. Seeming virtues and good works before, are not so indeed. They are a spurious brood, being bastards, and not children.

§ 96. That those that prove apostates, never have the same kind of faith with true saints, is confirmed by what Christ said of Judas, before his apostasy, John vi. 64: "But there are some of you, who believe not. For Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that believed not, and who should betray him." By this it is evident, that Judas, who afterwards proved an apostate (and is doubtless set forth as an example for all apostates), though he had a kind of faith in Christ, yet did not believe in Christ with a true faith, and was at that time, before his apostasy, destitute of that kind of faith which the true disciples had; and that he had all along, even from the beginning, been destitute of that faith. And by the 70th and 71st verses of the same chapter, it is evident that he was not only destitute of that degree of goodness that the rest had, but totally destitute of Christian piety, and wholly under the dominion of wickedness; being in this respect like a devil, notwithstanding all the faith and temporary regard to Christ that he had. "Jesus answered them, Have I not chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil? He spake of Judas Iscariot, the son of Simon. For he it was that should betray him, being one of the twelve"

OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING FAITH.

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§ 1. Faith is a belief of a testimony; 2 Thess. i. 10, "When he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe (because our testimony among you was believed) in that day." It is an assent to truth, as appears by the 11th of Hebrews; and it is saving faith that is there spoken of, as appears by the last verses of the foregoing chapter: "And these all, having obtained a good report through faith, received not the promise: God having provided some better thing for us, that they, without us, should not be made perfect." Mark i. 15, "Saying, The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and believe the gospel." John xx. 31, "But these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that, believing, ye might have life through his name." 2 Thess. ii. 13, "But we are bound to give thanks always to God for you, brethren, beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth."

§ 2. It is the proper act of the soul towards God as faithful. Rom. iii. 3, 4, "For what if some did not believe? Shall their unbelief make the faith of God without effect? God forbid: yea, let God be true, but every man a liar; as it is written, that thou mightest be justified in thy sayings, and mightest overcome when thou art judged."

§ 3. It is a belief of truth from a sense of glory and excellency, or at least *with* such a sense. John xx. 29, "Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed: blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed." Matth. ix. 21, "She said within herself, If I may but touch his garment, I shall be whole." 1 Cor. xii. 3, "Wherefore I give you to understand, that no man, speaking by the Spirit of God, calleth Jesus accursed: and that no man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost."

§ 4. It is a belief of the truth, from a spiritual taste and relish of what is excellent and divine. Luke xii. 57, "Yea, and why, even of yourselves, judge ye not what is right?" Believers receive the truth in the love of it, and speak the truth in love. Eph. iv. 15, "But speaking the truth in love, may grow up into him in all things, which is the head, even Christ."

§ 5. The object of faith is the gospel, as well as Jesus Christ. Mark i. 15, "And saying, The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and believe the gospel." John xvii. 8, "For I have given unto them the words which thou gavest me; and they received them, and have known surely that I came out from thee, and they have believed that thou didst send me." Rom. x. 16, 17, "But they have not obeyed the gospel. For Esaias saith, Lord, who hath believed our report?—So then, faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God."

§ 6. Faith includes a knowledge of God and Christ. 2 Pet. i. 2, 3, "Grace and peace be multiplied unto you through the knowledge of God, and of Jesus our Lord; according as his divine power hath given unto us all things that pertain unto life and godliness, through the knowledge of him that hath called us to glory and virtue." John xvii. 3, "And this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent."

§ 7. A belief of promises is faith, or a great part of faith. Heb. xi., "Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen," &c. 2 Chron. xx. 20, "And they rose early in the morning, and went forth into the wilderness of Tekoa; and as they went forth, Jehoshaphat stood and said, Hear me, O Judah, and ye inhabitants of Jerusalem; believe in the Lord your God, so shall ye be established; believe his prophets, so shall ye prosper." A depending on promises is an act of faith. Gal. v. 5, "For we through the Spirit wait for the hope of righteousness by faith."

§ 8. Faith is a receiving of Christ. John i. 12, "But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name."

§ 9. It is receiving Christ into the heart. Rom. x. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, "But the righteousness which is of faith, speaketh on this wise, Say not in thy heart, Who shall ascend into heaven? (that is, to bring Christ down from above;) or, Who shall descend into the deep? (that is, to bring up Christ from the dead.) But what saith it? The word is nigh thee, even in thy mouth, and in thy heart (that is, the word of faith, which we preach): that if thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine heart, that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved. For with the heart man believeth unto righteousness; and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation."

§ 10. A true faith includes more than a mere belief; it is accepting the gospel, and includes all acceptation. 1 Tim. i. 14, 15, "And the grace of our Lord was exceeding abundant with faith and love which is in Christ Jesus. This is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, of whom I am chief." 2 Cor. xi. 4, "For if he that cometh preacheth another Jesus, whom we have not preached; or if you receive another Spirit, which ye have not received; or another gospel, which ye have not accepted, ye might well bear with him."

§ 11. It is something more than merely the assent of the understanding, because it is called an obeying the gospel. Rom. x. 16, "But they have not all obeyed the gospel. For Esaias saith, Lord, who hath believed our report?" 1 Pet. iv. 17, "For the time is come that judgment must begin at the house of God: and if it first begin at us, what shall the end be of them that obey not the gospel of God?"

It is obeying the doctrine from the heart: Rom. vi. 17, 18, "But God be thanked, that ye were the servants of sin; but ye have obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine which was delivered you. Being then made free from sin, ye became the servants of righteousness," &c.

§ 12. This expression of obeying the gospel, seems to denote the heart's yielding to the gospel in what it proposes to us in its calls: it is something more than merely what may be called a believing the truth of the gospel. John xii. 42, "Nevertheless, among the chief rulers also, many believed on him; but, because of the Pharisees, they did not confess him, lest they should be put out of the synagogue." And Philip asked the eunuch, whether he believed with all his heart?—It is a fully believing, or a being fully persuaded: this passage evidences that it is so much at least.

§ 13. There are different sorts of faith that are not true and saving, as is evident by what the Apostle James says: "Show me thy faith without thy works, and I will show thee my faith by my works." Where it is supposed that there may be a faith without works, which is not the right faith: when he says, "I will show thee my faith by my works," nothing else can be meant, than that I will show thee that my faith is right.

§ 14. It is a trusting in Christ. Psal. ii. 12, "Kiss the Son, lest he be angry, and ye perish from the way, when his wrath is kindled but a little: blessed are all they that put their trust in him.' Eph. i. 12, 13, "That we should be to the praise of his glory, who first trusted in Christ: in whom ye also trusted, after that ye heard the word of truth, the gospel of your salvation; in whom also, after that ye believed, ye were sealed with that Holy Spirit of promise." 2 Tim. i. 12, "For the which cause I also suffer these things: nevertheless I am not ashamed; for I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him against that day."

Many places in the Old Testament speak of trusting in God as the condition of his favor and salvation; especially Psal. lxxviii. 21, 22, "Therefore the Lord heard this, and was wroth: so a fire was kindled against Jacob, and anger also came up against Israel; because they believed not in God, and trusted not in his salvation." It implies submission: Rom. xv. 12, "And again, Esaias saith, There shall be a root of Jesse; and he that shall rise to reign over the Gentiles, in him shall the Gentiles trust." 1 Tim. iv. 10, "For therefore we both labor and suffer reproach, because we trust in the living God, who is the Saviour of all men, especially of those that believe." 2 Tim. i. 12, "For which cause I also suffer these things; nevertheless I am not ashamed; for I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him against that day." Matth. viii. 26, "Why are ye fearful, O ye of little faith?" Matth. xvi. 8, "Which Jesus, when he perceived, he said unto them, O ye of little faith, why reason ye among yourselves, because ye have brought no bread?" 1 John v. 13, 14, "These things have I written unto you that believe on the name of the Son of God; that ye may know that ye have eternal life; and that ye may believe on the name of the Son of God. And this is the confidence that we have in him, that if we ask any thing according to his will, he heareth us." Believing in Christ in one verse, is called confidence in the next.

§ 15. It is a committing ourselves to Christ: 2 Tim. i. 12, "For the which cause I also suffer these things: nevertheless I am not ashamed; for I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have *committed* unto him against that day." This is a Scripture sense of the word *believe*, as is evident by John ii. 24, "Jesus did not commit himself to them." In the original it is *οὐκ ἐπίστευεν ἑαυτὸν αὐτοῖς*.

§ 16. It is a gladly receiving the gospel: Acts ii. 41, "Then they that gladly received his word, were baptized; and the same day there were added unto them about three thousand souls." It is approving the gospel: Luke vii. 30, 35, "But the Pharisees and lawyers rejected the counsel of God against themselves, being not baptized of him. But wisdom is justified of all her children." It is obeying the doctrine: Rom. vi. 17, "But God be thanked, that ye were the servants of sin; but ye have obeyed from the heart, that form of doctrine which was delivered you." It is what may be well understood by those expressions of coming to Christ, of looking to him, of opening the door to let him in. This is very evident by Scripture. It is a coming and taking the waters

of life, eating and drinking Christ's flesh and blood, hearing Christ's voice, and following him. John x. 26, 27, "But ye believe not: because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you. My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me." John viii. 12, "Then spake Jesus again unto them, saying, I am the light of the world; he that followeth me, shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life." Isaiah xiv. 22, "Look unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth: for I am God, and there is none else."

§ 17. Faith consists in two things, viz., in being persuaded of, and in embracing the promises: Heb. xi. 13, "These all died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off, and were persuaded of them, and embraced them, and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth." 1 Cor. xiii. 7, "Charity believeth all things, hopeth all things." If that faith, hope and charity, spoken of in this verse, be the same with those that are compared together in the last verse, then faith arises from a charitable disposition of heart, or from a principle of divine love. John v. 42, "But I know you, that ye have not the love of God in you," with the context. Deut. xiii. 3, "Thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams: for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul." 1 John v. 1, "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God: and every one that loveth him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of him."

§ 18. It is a being reconciled unto God, revealing himself by Christ in the gospel, or our minds being reconciled. 2 Cor. v. 18, 19, 20, 21, "And all things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation; to wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them; and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation. Now then we are ambassadors for Christ; as though God did beseech you by us, we pray you in Christ's stead be ye reconciled to God. For he hath made him to be sin for us who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him." Col. i. 21, "And you that were sometimes alienated, and enemies in your mind by wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled." It is the according of the whole soul, and not merely of the understanding. Matth. xi. 6, "Blessed is he whosoever shall not be offended in me."

§ 19. There is contained in the nature of faith a sense of our own unworthiness. Matth. xv. 27, 28, "Truth, Lord, yet the dogs eat of the crumbs which fall from their master's table. Then Jesus answered and said unto her, O woman, great is thy faith." See concerning the centurion, Luke vii. 6—9; this woman which was a sinner, ib. v. 37, 38, and especially 50; the prodigal son, Luke xv., the penitent thief, Luke xxiii. 41. Consult also Hab. ii. 4, "Behold, his soul which is lifted up, is not upright in him; but the just shall live by his faith. Prov. xxviii. 25; Psal. xi. 4, and Psal. cxxxi.

§ 20. It is a being drawn to Christ. None can come unto Christ, but whom the Father draws. The freeness of the covenant of grace is represented thus, that the condition of finding is only seeking; and the condition of receiving, asking; and the condition of having the door opened, is knocking. From whence I infer that faith is a hearty applying unto God by Christ for salvation, or the heart's seeking it of God through him. See also John iv. 10, "If thou knewest the gift of God, and who it is that saith unto thee, Give me to drink, thou wouldst have asked of him, and he would have given thee living water." And Luke xxiii. 42; it is calling on Christ; it is the opposite unto disallowing and

rejecting Christ Jesus. John xii. 46, 47, 48, "I am come a light into the world, that whosoever believeth on me should not abide in darkness. And if any man hear my words, and believe not, I judge him not; for I came not to judge the world, but to save the world. He that rejecteth me, and receiveth not my words, hath one that judgeth him; the word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him in the last day." 1 Pet. ii. 7, "Unto you therefore which believe, he is precious; but unto them which be disobedient, the stone which the builders disallowed, the same is made the head of the corner."

§ 21. Love either is what faith arises from, or is included in faith, by John iii. 18, 19, "He that believeth not, is condemned already; and this is their condemnation, that men loved darkness rather than light." 2 Thess. ii. 10, 12, "And with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish; because they received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved. That they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness."

§ 22. The being athirst for the waters of life is faith, Rev. xxi. 6. It is a true cordial seeking of salvation by Christ. Believing in Christ is heartily joining ourselves to Christ and his party, as is said of the followers of Theudas, Acts v. 36. And we are justified freely through faith, i. e., we are saved by Christ only on joining ourselves to him. It is a being persuaded to join ourselves to him, and to be of his party. John viii. 12, "Then spake Jesus again unto them, saying, I am the light of the world: he that followeth me, shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life." To believe in Christ, is to hearken to him as a prophet; to yield ourselves subjects to him as a king; and to depend upon him as a priest. Desiring Christ, is an act of faith in Christ, because he is called the desire of all nations, Hagg. ii. 7: that is, he that is to be the desire of all nations, when all nations shall believe in him and subject themselves to him, according to the frequent promises and prophecies of God's word; though there are other things included in the sense, yet this seems to be principally intended. There belongs to faith a sense of the ability and sufficiency of Christ to save, and of his fitness for the work of salvation; Matth. ix. 2, and 28, 29, and 21. Rom. iv. 21, "And being fully persuaded, that what he had promised, he is able to perform." Of his fidelity: Matth. xiv. 30, 31, "But when he saw the wind boisterous, he was afraid: and beginning to sink, he cried, saying, Lord, save me. And immediately Jesus stretched forth his hand, and caught him, and said unto him, O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt?" Of his readiness to save, Matth. xv. 22, &c. 2 Tim. i. 5, 12, "Now the end of the commandment is charity, out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of faith unfeigned: and I thank Christ Jesus our Lord, who hath enabled me, for that he counted me faithful, putting me into the ministry." Of his ability: Matth. viii. 2, "And behold, there came a leper, and worshipped him, saying, Lord if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean." Matth. viii. 26, "The centurion answered and said, Lord, I am not worthy that thou shouldst come under my roof: but speak the word only, and my servant shall be healed.

§ 23. It is submitting to the righteousness of God. Rom. x. 3, "For they, being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God." It is what may be well represented by flying for refuge, by the type of flying to the city of refuge. Heb. vi. 18, "That by two immutable things, in which it was impossible for God to lie, we might have a strong consolation, who have fled for refuge, to lay hold upon the hope set before us." It is a sense of the sufficiency and the reality of Christ's righteousness, and of his power and grace

to save. John xvi. 8, "He shall convince the world of sin, of righteousness and of judgment." It is a receiving the truth with a love to it. It is receiving the love of the truth. 2 Thess. ii. 10, 12, "And with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish; because they received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved. That they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness." The heart must close with the new covenant by dependence upon it, and by love and desire. 2 Sam. xxiii. 5, "Although my house be not so with God, yet he hath made with me an everlasting covenant, ordered in all things, and sure. This is all my salvation and all my desire, although he make it not to grow."

§ 24. Upon the whole, the best and clearest, and most perfect definition of justifying faith, and most according to the Scripture, that I can think of, is this, faith is the soul's entirely embracing the revelation of Jesus Christ as our Saviour. The word *embrace* is a metaphorical expression; but I think it much clearer than any proper expression whatsoever: it is called believing; because believing is the first act of the soul in embracing a narration or revelation; and embracing, when conversant about a revelation or thing declared, is more properly called believing, than loving or choosing. If it were conversant about a person only, it would be more properly called *loving*. If it were only conversant about a gift, an inheritance or reward, it would more properly be called receiving or accepting, &c.

The definition might have been expressed in these words, faith is the soul's entirely adhering and acquiescing in the revelation of Jesus Christ as our Saviour.—Or thus, faith is the soul's embracing that truth of God, that reveals Jesus Christ as our Saviour.—Or thus, faith is the soul's entirely acquiescing in, and depending upon the truth of God, revealing Christ as our Saviour.

It is the whole soul according and assenting to the truth, and embracing of it. There is an entire yielding of the mind and heart to the revelation, and a closing with it, and adhering to it, with the belief, and with the inclination and affection. It is admitting and receiving it with entire credit and respect. The soul receives it as true, as worthy and excellent. It may be more perfectly described than defined by a short definition, by reason of the penury of words; a great many words express it better than one or two. I here use the same metaphorical expressions; but it is because they are much clearer, than any proper expressions that I know of.

It is the soul's entirely acquiescing in this revelation, from a sense of the sufficiency, dignity, glory and excellency of the author of the revelation.

Faith is the whole soul's active agreeing, according and symphonizing with this truth; all opposition in judgment and inclination, so far as he believes, being taken away. It is called believing, because fully believing this revelation, is the first and principal exercise and manifestation of this accordance and agreement of soul.

§ 25. The adhering to the truth, and acquiescing in it with the judgment, is from a sense of the glory of the revealer, and the sufficiency and excellency of the performer of the facts. The adhering to it, and acquiescing in it with the inclination and affection, is from the goodness and excellency of the thing revealed, and of the performer. If a person be pursued by an enemy, and commit himself to a king or a captain, to defend him, it implies his quitting other endeavors, and applying to him for defence, and putting himself under him, and hoping that he will defend him. If we consider it as a mere act of the mind, a transaction between spiritual beings, considered as abstracted from any external action, then it is the mind's quitting all other endeavors, and seeking and

applying itself to the Saviour for salvation, fully choosing salvation by him, and delivering itself to him, or a being willing to be his, with a hope that he will save him. Therefore, for a person to commit himself to Christ as a Saviour, is quitting all other endeavors and hopes, and heartily applying himself to Christ for salvation, fully choosing salvation by him, and acquiescing in his way of salvation, and a hearty consent of the soul to be his entirely, hoping in his sufficiency and willingness to save.

§ 26. The first act cannot be hoping in a promise, that is, as belonging to the essence of the act. For there must be the essence of the act performed, before any promise belongs to the subject. But the essence of the act, as it is exercised in justifying faith, is a quitting other hopes, and applying to him for salvation, choosing, and with the inclination closing with salvation by him in his way, with a sense of his absolute, glorious sufficiency and mercy. Hope in the promises may immediately follow in a moment; but it is impossible that there be a foundation for it, before the essence of faith be performed; though it is the same disposition that leads the soul to lay hold on the promise afterwards. It is impossible that a man should be encouraged by a conditional promise, to trust in Christ, if you mean by trusting in Christ, a depending upon his promises to the person trusting; for that is to suppose a dependence upon the promise antecedent to the first dependence upon it; and that the first time a man depends upon the promise, he is encouraged to do it by a dependence upon the promise. The conditional promise is this, that if you will trust in Christ, you shall be saved: and you suppose the essence of this trust is depending upon this promise; and yet that the soul is encouraged to trust in Christ by a dependence thereupon; which is to say, that the first time the soul depends upon Christ's promises, it is encouraged to do it by a dependence on his promises.

§ 27. Faith is the soul's entirely adhering to, and acquiescing in the revelation of Jesus Christ as our Saviour, from a sense of the excellent dignity and sufficiency of the revealer of the doctrine, and of the Saviour. God is the revealer, and Christ is also the revealer. Christ's excellency and sufficiency include the excellency of his person, and the excellency of the salvation he has revealed, and his adequateness to the performance, &c.,—and the excellency of his manner of salvation, &c. From the excellency and sufficiency of the revealer and performer, we believe what is said is true, fully believe it; and from the glorious excellency of the Saviour and his salvation, all our inclination closes with the revelation. To depend upon the word of another person, imports two things: First, to be sensible how greatly it concerns us, and how much our interest and happiness really depend upon the truth of it; and, secondly, to depend upon the word of another, is so to believe it, as to dare to act upon it, as if it were really true. I do not say, that I think these words are the only true definition of faith. I have used words that most naturally expressed it, of any I could think of. There might have been other words used, that are much of the same sense.

§ 28. Though hope does not enter into the essential nature of faith, yet it is so essential to it, that it is the natural and necessary, and next immediate fruit of true faith. In the first act of faith, the soul is enlightened with a sense of the merciful nature of God and of Christ, and believes the declarations that are made in God's word of it; and it humbly and heartily applies and seeks to Christ; and it sees such a congruity between the declared mercy of God, and the disposition he then feels towards him, that he cannot but hope, that that declared mercy will be exercised towards him. Yea, he sees that it would be incongruous, for God to give him such inclination and motions of heart towards Christ as a Saviour if he were n to be saved by him.

§ 29. Any thing that may be called a receiving the revelation of the gospel is not faith, but such a sort of receiving it, as is suitable to the nature of the gospel, and the respect it has to us. The act of reception suitable to truth, is believing it. The suitable reception of that which is excellent, is choosing it and loving it. The proper act of reception of a revelation of deliverance from evil, and the conferring of happiness, is, acquiescing in it and depending upon it. The proper reception of a Saviour, is, committing ourselves to him and trusting in him. The proper act of reception of the favor of God, is, believing and esteeming it, and rejoicing in it. He that suitably receives forgiveness of his fault, does with a humble sense of his fault rejoice in the pardon.

Thus, for instance, he that reads a truth that no way concerns his interest, if he believes it, it is proper to say he receives it. But if there be a declaration of some glorious and excellent truth, that does nearly concern him, he that only believes it, cannot be said to receive it. And if a captain offers to deliver a distressed people; they that only believe what he says, without committing themselves to him, and putting themselves under him, cannot be said to receive him. So, if a prince offers one his favor, he that does not esteem his favor, cannot be said heartily to accept thereof. Again, if one offended offers pardon to another, he cannot be said to receive it, if he be not sensible of his fault, and does care for the displeasure of the offended.

The whole act of reception suitable to the nature of the gospel, and its relation to us, and our circumstances with respect to it, is best expressed (if it be expressed in one word) by the word πιστις or *fides*.

He that offers any of these things mentioned, and offers them only for these proper acts of reception, may be said to offer them freely, nay, perfectly so.

§ 30. For a man to trust in his own righteousness, is to hope that God's anger will be appeased or abated, or that he will be inclined to accept him into favor, upon the sight of some excellency that belongs to him; or to have such a view of things, that it should appear no other than a suitable and right thing for God's anger to be abated, and for him to be inclined to take him into favor, upon the sight of, or out of respect to some excellency belonging to him.

§ 31. The word πιστις, *faith*, seems to be the most proper word to express the cordial reception of Christ and of the truth, for these reasons. First, this revelation is of things spiritual, unseen, strange, and wonderful, exceedingly remote from all the objects of sense, and those things which we commonly converse with in this world, and also exceedingly alien from our fallen nature; so that it is the first and principal manifestation of the symphony between the soul and these divine things, that it believes them, and acquiesces in them as true. And, secondly, the Lord Jesus Christ, in the gospel, appears principally under the character of a Saviour, and not so much of a person absolutely excellent; and therefore, the proper act of reception of him, consists principally in the exercise of a sense of our need of him, and of his sufficiency, his ability, his mercy and love, his faithfulness, the sufficiency of his method of salvation, the sufficiency and completeness of the salvation itself, of the deliverance and of the happiness, and an answerable application of the soul to him for salvation; which can be expressed so well by no other word but faith, or affiance, or confidence, or trust, and others of the same signification; of which, πιστις, or faith, is much the best, the most significant; because the rest, in their common significations imply something, that is not of the absolute essence of faith. Thirdly, we have these things exhibited to us, to be received by us, only by a divine testimony. We have nothing else to hold them forth to us.

§ 32. Justifying faith is the soul's sense and conviction of the reality and

sufficiency of Jesus Christ as a Saviour, implying a cordial inclination of soul to him as a Saviour. It is the soul's conviction and acknowledgment of God's power in the difficult things, of his mercy in the wonderful things, of his truth in the mysterious and unseen things, of the excellency of other holy things, of the salvation of Christ Jesus. Faith prepares the way for the removal of guilt of conscience. Guilt of conscience is the sense of the connection between the sin of the subject and punishment; 1st, by God's law; and 2d, by God's nature and the propriety of the thing. The mind is under the weight of guilt, as long as it has a sense of its being bound to punishment, according to the reason and nature of things, and the requirements of the divine government.

Faith prepares the way for the removal of this. Therefore there must be in faith, 1. A belief that the law is answered and satisfied by Jesus Christ; and 2. Such a sense of the way of salvation by Christ, that it shall appear proper, and be dutiful, and according to the reason of things, that sin should not be punished in us, but that we nevertheless should be accepted through Christ. When the mind sees a way that this can be done, and there is nothing in the law, nor in the divine nature, nor nature of things to hinder it; that of itself lightens the burden, and creates hope. It causes the mind to see that it is not for ever bound by the reason of things to suffer; though the mind does not know that it has performed the condition of pardon. This is to have a sense of the sufficiency of this way of salvation. When a man commits sin and is sensible of it, his soul has a natural sense of the propriety of punishment in such a case, a sense that punishment, according to the reason of things, belongs to him; for the same reasons as all nations have a sense of the propriety of punishing men for crimes.

The blood of bulls, and goats, and calves, could never make them that offered them perfect as to the conscience, because the mind never could have a sense of the propriety and beauty, and fitness in reason, of being delivered from punishment upon their account. This kind of sense of the sufficiency of Christ's mediation, depends upon a sense of the gloriousness and excellency of gospel things in general; as, the greatness of God's mercy; the greatness of Christ's excellency and dignity, and dearness to the Father; the greatness of Christ's love to sinners, &c. That easiness of mind which persons often have, before they have comfort from a sense of their being converted, arises from a sense they have of God's sovereignty. They see nothing either in the nature of God, or of things, that will necessarily bind them to punishment; but that God may damn them if he pleases; and may save them if he pleases. When persons are brought to that, then they are fit to be comforted; then their comfort is like to have a true and immovable foundation, when their dependence is no way upon themselves, but wholly upon God. In order to such a sense of the sufficiency of this way of salvation, it must be seen, that God has no disposition, and no need to punish us. The sinner, when he considers how he has affronted and provoked God, looks upon it, that the case is such, and the affront is such, that there is need, in order that the majesty, and honor and authority of God may be vindicated, that he should be punished, and that God's nature is such, that he must be disposed to punish him.

COROLL. Hence we learn, that our experience of the sufficiency of the doctrine of the gospel, to give peace of conscience, is a rational inward witness to the truth of the gospel. When the mind sees such a fitness in this way of salvation, that it takes off the burthen, that arises from the sense of its being necessarily bound to punishment, through proper desert, and from the demands of reason and nature; it is a strong argument, that it is not a thing of mere bu-

man imagination. When we experience its fitness to answer its end, this is the third of the three that bear witness on earth. The Spirit bears witness by discovering the divine glory, and those stamps of divinity that are in the gospel The water bears witness; that is, the experience of the power of the gospel to purify and sanctify the heart, witnesses the truth of it; and the blood bears witness by delivering the conscience from guilt. Any other sort of faith than this sense of the sufficiency of Christ's salvation, does not give such immediate glory and honor to Christ, and does not so necessarily and immediately infer the necessity of Christ's being known. Nothing besides makes all Christianity so to hang upon an actual respect to Christ, and centre in him. Surely, the more the sinner has an inward, an immediate and sole and explicit dependence upon Christ, the more Christ has the glory of his salvation from him.

In order to this sort of sense of the congruity of our sins being forgiven, and of punishment's being removed, by the satisfaction of Christ, there must of necessity be a sense of our guiltiness. For it is impossible any congruity should be seen, without comparison of the satisfaction with the guilt. And they cannot be compared, except there be a sense of them both. There must not only be such a sense of God's being very angry, and his anger being very dreadful, without any sense of the reasonableness of that anger; but there must be a proper sense of the desert of wrath, such as there is in repentance. Indeed it is possible there may be such a sense of the glory of the Saviour and his salvation, that if we had more of a sense of guilt than we have, we should see a congruity.

§ 33. Sinners, under conviction of their guilt, are generally afraid that God is so angry with them, that he never will give them faith in Christ. They think the majesty and jealousy of God will not allow of it. Therefore, there goes with a sense of the sufficiency of Christ, a sense of God's sovereignty with respect to mercy and judgment, that he will and may have mercy in Christ, on whom he will have mercy, and leave to hardness whom he will. This eases of that burden.

§ 34. For a man to trust in his own righteousness, is to conceive hopes of some favor of God, or some freedom from his displeasure, from a false notion of his own goodness or excellency, and the proportion it bears to that favor; and of his own badness, and the relation it bears to his displeasure. It is to conceive hopes of some favor of God, from a false notion of the relation which our own goodness or excellency bears to that favor; whether this mistaken relation be supposed to imply an obligation in natural justice, or propriety and decency, or an obligation in point of wisdom and honor; or if he thinks that, without it, God will not do excellently or according to some one at least of his declared attributes, or whether it be any obligation by virtue of his promise; whether this favorable respect be the pardon of sin, or the bestowment of heaven, or the abating of punishment, or answering of prayers, or mitigation of punishment, or converting grace, or God's delighting in us, prizing of us, or the bestowing of any temporal or spiritual blessing. This excellency we speak of, is either real or supposed; either negative, in not being so bad as others, and the like, or positive. Whether it be natural or moral excellency, is immaterial: also, whether the sinner himself looks upon it as an excellency, or supposes God looks upon it as such. For men to trust in their own righteousness, is to entertain hope of escaping any displeasure, or obtaining any positive favor from God, from too high a notion of our own moral excellency, or too light a notion of our badness, as compared with or related to that favor or displeasure.

§ 35. This is to be observed concerning the Scriptures that I have cited re-

specting faith, that they sometimes affix salvation to the natural and immediate effects of faith, as well as to faith itself. Such as, asking, knocking, &c., Rom. x. 12, 13, 14. In the 14th verse, faith is distinguished from calling upon him.

§ 36. All trusting to our own righteousness indeed, is expecting justification for our own excellency. But they that expect that God will convert them for their excellency, or do any thing else towards their salvation upon that account, do trust in their own righteousness. Because, the supposing that God will be the more inclined to convert a man, or enable him to come to Christ for his excellency, is to suppose, that he is justified already, at least in part. It supposes, that God's anger for sin is at least partly appeased, and that God is more favorably inclined to him for his excellency's sake, in that he is disposed to give him converting grace, or do something else towards his conversion upon that account.

§ 37. The difficulty in giving a definition of faith is, that we have no word that clearly and adequately expresses the whole act of acceptance, or closing of the soul or heart with Christ. Inclination expresses it but partially; conviction expresses it also but in part; the sense of the soul does not do it fully. And if we use metaphorical expressions, such as embrace, and love, &c., they are obscure, and will not carry the same idea with them to the minds of all. All words that are used to express such acts of the mind, are of a very indeterminate signification. It is a difficult thing to find words to exhibit our own ideas. Another difficulty is to find a word, that shall clearly express the whole goodness or righteousness of the Saviour and of the gospel. To be true, is one part of the goodness of the gospel. For the Saviour to be sufficient, is one part of his goodness. To be suitable, is another part. To be bountiful and glorious, is another part. To be necessary, is another part. The idea of a real good or lovely object, that is conceived to be real, possesses the heart after another manner, than a very lovely idea that is only imaginary. So that there is need of both a sense of goodness and reality, to unite the heart to the Saviour.

Faith is the soul's embracing and acquiescing in the revelation which the word of God gives us of Jesus Christ as our Saviour, in a sense and conviction of his goodness and reality as such. I do not consider the sense of the goodness and reality of Christ as a Saviour, as a distinct thing from the embracing of him, but only explain the nature of the embracing by it. But it is implied in it; it is the first and principal thing in it. And all that belongs to embracing the revelation, an approbation of it, a love to it, adherence to it, acquiescence in it, is in a manner implied in a sense of Christ's goodness and reality and relation to us, or our concern in him. I say, as our Saviour; for there is implied in believing in Christ, not only and merely that exercise of mind, which arises from a sense of his excellency and reality as a Saviour; but also that which arises from the consideration of his relation to us, and of our concern in him, his being a Saviour, for such as we are; for sinful men; and a Saviour that is offered with his benefits to us. The angels have a sense of the reality and goodness of Christ as a Saviour, and may be said with joy to embrace the discovery of it. They cannot be said to believe in Christ. The spirit that they receive, the notice that they have of Christ the Saviour is the same; but there is a difference in the act, by reason of the different relation that Christ as a Saviour, stands in to us, from what he doth to them.

§ 38. Objection 1. It may be objected, that this seems to make the revelation more the object of the essential act of faith than Christ. I answer, no; for the revelation is no otherwise the object by this definition, than as it brings and exhibits Christ to us. It is embracing the revelation in a sense and con-

viction of the goodness and reality of the Saviour it exhibits. We do not embrace Christ by faith any otherwise, than as brought to us in a revelation: when we come to embrace him as exhibited otherwise, that will not be faith. A man is saved by that faith, which is a reception of Christ in all his offices; but he is justified by his receiving Christ in his priestly office.

§ 39. To believe, is to have a sense and a realizing belief of what the gospel reveals of the mediation of Christ, and particularly as it concerns ourselves. There is in faith a conviction, that redemption by that mediation of Christ which the gospel reveals, exists, and a sense how it does so, and how it may with respect to us in particular. There is a trusting to Christ that belongs to the essence of true faith. That quiet and ease of mind that arises from a sense of the sufficiency of Christ, may well be called a trusting in that sufficiency. It gives a quietness to the mind, to see that there is a way wherein it may be saved, to see a good and sufficient way, wherein its salvation is very possible, and the attributes of God cannot be opposite to it. This gives ease, though it be not yet certain that he shall be saved. But to believe Christ's sufficiency, so as to be thus far easy, may be called a trusting in Christ, though it cannot be trusting in him that he will save us. To be easy in any degree, on a belief or persuasion of the sufficiency of any thing for our good, is a degree of trusting. There is in faith not only a belief of what the gospel declares, that Christ has satisfied for our sins, and merited eternal life; but there is also a sense of it; a sense that Christ's sufferings do satisfy, and that he did merit, or was worthy that we should be accepted for his sake. There is a difference between being convinced that it is so, and having a sense that it is so. There is in the essence of justifying faith, included a receiving of Christ as a Saviour from sin. For we embrace him as the author of life, as well as Saviour from misery. But the sum of that eternal life which Christ purchased is holiness; it is a holy happiness. And there is in faith a liking of the happiness that Christ has procured and offers. The Jews despising the pleasant land, is mentioned as part of their unbelief. It must be as the gospel reveals Christ, or in the gospel notion of him, the soul must close with Christ. For whosoever is offended in Christ, in the view that the gospel gives us of him, cannot be said to believe in him; for he is one that is excluded from blessedness, by that saying of Christ, Matth. xi. 6, "Blessed is he whosoever is not offended in me."

§ 40. There is implied in faith, not only a believing of Christ to be a real, sufficient, and excellent Saviour for me, and having a complacency in him as such; but in a complete act of faith, there is an act of the soul in this view of him, and disposition towards him, seeking to him, that he would be my Saviour; as is evident, because otherwise prayer would not be the expression of faith. But prayer is only the voice of faith to God through Christ: and this is further evident, as faith is expressed by a coming to Christ, and a looking to him to be saved.

§ 41. There is hope implied in the essence of justifying faith. Thus there is hope, that I may obtain justification by Christ, though there is not contained in its essence a hope that I have obtained it. And so there is a trust in Christ contained in the essence of faith. There is a trust implied in seeking to Christ to be my Saviour, in an apprehension that he is a sufficient Saviour; though not a trust in him, as one that has promised to save me, as having already performed the condition of the promise. If a city was besieged and distressed by a potent enemy, and should hear of some great champion at a distance, and should be induced by what they hear of his valor and goodness, to seek and send to him for relief believing what they have heard of his sufficiency, and

thence conceiving hope that they may be delivered; the people, in rending, may be said to trust in such a champion; as of old the children of Israel, when they sent into Egypt for help, were said to trust in Egypt. It has by many been said, that the soul's immediately applying Christ to itself as its Saviour, was essential to faith; and so that one should believe him to be his Saviour. Doubtless, an immediate application is necessary. But that which is essential, is not the soul's immediately applying Christ to itself so properly, as its applying itself to Christ.

§ 42. Good works are in some sort implied in the very nature of faith, as is implied in 1 Tim. v. 8, where the apostle, speaking of them that do not provide for their parents, says, "If any provide not for his own, and especially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith."

§ 43. Faith is that inward sense and act, of which prayer is the expression; as is evident, 1. Because in the same manner as the freedom of grace, according to the gospel covenant, is often set forth by this, that he that believes, receives; so it also oftentimes is by this, that he that asks, or prays, or calls upon God, receives; Matth. vii. 7, 8, 9, 10; Luke xi. 9, "Ask and it shall be given you; seek and ye shall find; knock and it shall be opened unto you. For every one that asketh, receiveth; and he that seeketh, findeth; and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened. And all things whatsoever ye shall *ask in prayer, believing*, ye shall receive." Mark xi. 23, 24. To the same purpose with that last mentioned place in Matthew. John xv. 7, "If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what you will, and it shall be done unto you." Psalm cxlv. 18, "The Lord is nigh unto all that call upon him, to all that call upon him in truth." Joel ii. 32. The prophet, speaking there of gospel times, says, "And it shall come to pass, that whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be delivered; for in mount Zion and in Jerusalem shall be deliverance, as the Lord hath said, and in the remnant whom the Lord shall call." Rom. x. 12, 13, "For there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek: for the same Lord over all, is rich unto all that call upon him. For whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved;" quoting the forementioned place in Joel.

2. The same expressions that are used in Scripture for faith, may be well used for prayer also; such as coming to God or Christ, and looking to him. Eph. iii. 12, "In whom we have boldness and access with confidence by the faith of him."

3. Prayer is often plainly spoken of as the expression of faith. As it very certainly is in Rom. x. 11, 12, 13, 14, "For the Scripture saith, Whosoever believeth on him, shall not be ashamed. For there is no difference between the Jew and the Greek: for the same Lord over all, is rich unto all that call upon him; for whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved. How then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed?" Christian prayer is called the prayer of faith, James v. 15. And believing is often mentioned as the life and soul of true prayer, as in the forementioned place. Matth. xxi. 21, 22. 1 Tim. ii. 8, "I will that men everywhere lift up holy hands, without wrath and doubting." And Heb. x. 19, 22, "Draw near in full assurance of faith." James i. 5, 6, "If any of you lack wisdom, let him ask it of God, that giveth to all men liberally and upbraideth not; and it shall be given him. But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering."

Faith in God, is expressed in praying to God. Faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, is expressed in praying to Christ, and praying in the name of Christ; John xiv. 13, 14. And the promises are made to asking in Christ's name, in the same

manner as they are to believing in Christ. John xiv. 13, 14, "And whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, that will I do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son. If ye shall ask any thing in my name, I will do it." Chap. xvi 23, 24, "Verily I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my name, he will give it you. Hitherto you have asked nothing in my name: ask, and receive, that your joy may be full."

§ 44. Trusting in Christ, is implied in the nature of faith; as is evident by Rom. ix. 33: "As it is written, Behold, I lay in Sion a stumbling stone, and rock of offence; and whosoever believeth on him, shall not be ashamed." The apostle there in the context is speaking of justifying faith; and it is evident, that trusting in Christ is implied in the import of the word *believeth*. For being ashamed, as the word is used in Scripture, is the passion that arises upon the frustration of truth or confidence. There is implied in justifying faith, a trusting to Christ's truth and faithfulness, or a believing what he declares and promises; as is evident, in that it is called not only believing in Christ, and believing on Christ, but believing Christ; John iii. 36, "He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life." Trusting in Christ is often implied in faith, according to the representations of Scripture; Isa. xxvii. 5, "Or let him take hold of my strength, that he may make peace with me, and he shall make peace with me."

§ 45. Why is this reception or unition of the soul properly expressed by faith? *Answer.* Not so much, merely from the nature of the act, more abstractedly considered, which is unition, reception, or closing; but from the nature of the act, conjunctly with the state of the agent and the object of the act, which qualifies and specifies the act, and adds certain qualifications to the abstract idea of unition, closing, or reception. Consider the state of the receiver; guilty, miserable, undone, impotent, helpless, unworthy; and the nature and worth of the received, he being a divine, invisible Saviour: the end for which he is received, the benefits invisible: the ground on which he is received or closed with, the word of God, and his invitations and promises: the circumstances of those things that are received, supernatural, incomprehensible, wonderful, difficult, unsearchable: the proper act of unition or reception in such a case, is most aptly expressed by the word *faith*. Fearfulness is opposite to faith: Mark iv. 40, "Why are ye so fearful? How is it that ye have no faith?" And Rev. xxi. 8, "But the fearful and the unbelieving." Justifying faith is sometimes called hope in Scripture.

§ 46. The condition both of the first and second covenant, is a receiving, compliance with, or yielding to, a signification or declaration from God; or to a revelation made from God. A receiving or yielding to a signification of the will of God, as our sovereign Lord and lawgiver, is most properly called obedience. The receiving and yielding to a strange mysterious revelation and offer which God makes of mercy to sinners, being a revelation of things spiritual, supernatural, invisible, and mysterious, through an infinite power, wisdom and grace of God, is properly called *faith*. There is indeed obedience in the condition of both covenants, and there is faith or believing God in both. But the different name arises from the remarkably different nature of the revelation or manifestations made. The one is a law; the other a testimony and offer. The one is a signification of what God expects that we should do towards him, and what he expects to receive from us: the other a revelation of what he has done for us, and an offer of what we may receive from him. The one is an expression of God's great authority over us, in order to a yielding to the authority; the other is a revelation of God's mysterious and wonderful mercy, and wisdom, and power for us, in order to a reception answerable to such a revelation.

The reason why this was not so fully insisted upon under the Old Testa-

ment, under the denomination of faith, was, that the revelation itself of this great salvation, was not thus explicitly and fully made.

It must most naturally be called faith, 1. Because the word that is the object of it, is a revelation, which most nearly concerns our interest and good; and that a revelation not of a work to be done by us, but an offer made to us only to be received by us.

If it were a manifestation otherwise than by testimony, a receiving of it, and yielding to it, would not so naturally be called faith; and if a mere manifestation of something not nearly concerning us, it would not naturally be called faith. For idle stories, that do not concern us, are not the object of trust or dependence. If it were a manifestation in order to something expected from us; some work to be done by us; a yielding to it would not so properly be called faith. For yielding, then, would imply something more than just receiving the testimony.

2. Because the person that is the object of it is revealed in the character of a wonderful Saviour. A receiving of a person in the character of a Saviour, is a proper act of trust and affiance. And a receiving a divine invisible Saviour, that offers to save us by infinite power, wisdom, and mercy, and by very mysterious supernatural works, is properly faith.

3. The benefits that are revealed, which are the objects of faith, are things spiritual, invisible, wonderful and future; and therefore, embracing and depending on these, is properly faith.

§ 47. Faith implies a cleaving to Christ, so as to be disposed to sell and suffer all for him. See John xii. 42, 43, "Nevertheless, among the chief rulers also, many believed on him; but because of the Pharisees they did not confess him, lest they should be put out of the synagogue; for they loved the praise of men more than the praise of God." John v. 44, "How can ye believe, which receive honor one of another, and seek not the honor that cometh from God only?"

§ 48. Faith is not all kind of assent to the word of God as true and divine. For so the Jews in Christ's time assented to the books of Moses, and therefore Christ tells them, that they trusted in Moses; John v. 45, "There is one that accuseth you, even Moses, in whom ye trust." Yet the very thing that Moses accuses them for, was not believing in him, i. e., believing so as to yield to his sayings, and comply with him, or obey him, as the phrase in the New Testament is concerning Christ. And therefore Christ says in the next verse, "For had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me; for he wrote of me." There may be a strong belief of divine things in the understanding, and yet no saving faith; as is manifest by 1 Cor. xiii. 2, "Though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing." Not only trusting in Christ, as one that has undertaken to save us, and as believing that he is our Saviour, is faith; but applying to him, or seeking to him, that he would become our Saviour, with a sense of his reality and goodness as a Saviour, is faith; as is evident by Rom. xv. 12, "In him shall the Gentiles trust," compared with the place whence it is cited, Heb. xi. 10, "To it shall the Gentiles seek;" together with Psalm ix. 10, "And they that know thy name, will put their trust in thee: for thou, Lord, hast not forsaken them that seek thee." Which agrees well with faith's being called a looking to Christ, or coming to him for life, a flying for refuge to him, or flying to him for safety. And this is the first act of saving faith. And prayer's being the expression of faith, confirms this. This is further confirmed by Isaiah xxxi. 2, "Wo to them that go down to Egypt for help, and stay on horses, and trust in chariots, because they are many; and in horsemen, because they are very strong: but they look not unto the Holy One of Israel, neither *seek* the Lord." When it is said, Psalm lxix. 6.

"Let not them that wait on thee, O Lord, be ashamed for my sake: let not those that seek thee be confounded for my sake." It is equivalent to that Scripture, "He that believeth shall never be confounded." And when it is said, verse 32, "And your heart shall live that seek the Lord;" it is equivalent to that Scripture, "The just shall live by faith." So Psalm xxii. 26, and Psalm lxx. 4. And so Amos v. 4, "For thus saith the Lord unto the house of Israel, Seek ye me, and ye shall live." And verse 6, "Seek the Lord, and ye shall live." And verse 8, "Seek him that made the seven stars and Orion, and turneth the shadow of death into the morning." Cant. iv. 8, "Look from the top of Amana." Isaiah xvii. 7, 8, "At that day shall a man look to his Maker, and his eyes shall have respect to the Holy One of Israel, and he shall not look to the altars, the work of his hands; neither shall respect that which his fingers have made, either the groves or the images." Isaiah lxv. 22, "Look unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth." Jonah ii. 4, "I will look again toward thine holy temple." Mich. vii. 7, "Therefore I will look unto the Lord; I will wait for the God of my salvation: my God will hear me." Psalm xxxiv. 5, "They looked unto him, and were lightened; their faces were not ashamed."

§ 49. Faith is a taking hold of God's strength; Isaiah xxvii. 5, "O let him take hold of my strength, that he may make peace with me, and he shall make peace with me." Faith is expressed by stretching out the hand to Christ; Psal. lxviii. 31, "Ethiopia shall soon stretch out her hands to God." So Christ said to the man that had the withered hand, "Stretch forth thine hand." Promises of mercy and help are often in Scripture made to rolling our burden, and rolling ourselves, or rolling our way on the Lord. Prov. xvi. 3, "Commit thy works unto the Lord, and thy thoughts shall be established." Psal. xxii. 8, and xxxvii. 5, "He trusted on the Lord that he would deliver him: let him deliver him, seeing he delighted in him." "Commit thy way unto the Lord; trust also in him, and he shall bring it to pass."

§ 50. That there are different sorts of faith, and that all believing that Christ is the Son of God, and Saviour of the world, &c., is not true and saving faith, or that faith which most commonly has the name of faith appropriated to it in the New Testament, is exceedingly evident by John vi. 64; "But there are some of you that believe not. For Jesus knew from the beginning, who they were that believed not, and who should betray him." Here all false disciples, that had but a temporary faith, that thought him to be the Messiah, but would fall away, as Judas and others, are said to be those that believed not, making an essential difference between their belief, and that grace that has the term faith, or believing, appropriated to it. Faith is a receiving of Christ into the heart, in such a sense as to believe that he is what he declares himself to be, and to have such a high esteem of him as an excellent Lord and Saviour, and so to prize him, and so to depend upon him, as not to be ashamed nor afraid to profess him, and openly and constantly to appear on his side. See Rom. x. 8—13.

§ 51. Trusting in riches, as Christ uses the expression concerning the rich young man, and as the expression is used elsewhere, is an extensive expression, comprehending many dispositions, affections, and exercises of heart towards riches; so faith in Christ, or trusting in Christ, is as extensive. The soul's active closing or uniting with Christ, is faith. But the act of the soul, in its uniting or closing, must be agreeable to the kind and nature of the union that is to be established between Christ and the saints, and that subsists between them, and is the foundation of the saints' communion with Christ. Such is the nature of it, that it is not merely like the various parts of a building, that are cemented

and cleave fast together; or as marbles and precious stones may be joined, so as to become one: but it is such a kind of union as subsists between the head and living members, between stock and branches; between which, and the head or stock, there is such a kind of union, that there is an entire, immediate, perpetual dependence for, and derivation of, nourishment, refreshment, beauty, fruitfulness, and all supplies; yea, life and being. And the union is wholly for this purpose: this derivation is the end of it; and it is the most essential thing in the union. Now, such a union as this, when turned into act (if I may so say), or an active union of an intelligent rational being, that is agreeable to this kind of union, and is a recognition and expression, and as it were the active band of it, is something else besides mere love. It is an act most properly expressed by the name of faith, according to the proper meaning of the word so translated, as it was used in the days when the Scriptures were written.

§ 52. Trusting in a prince or ruler, as the phrase was understood among the Jews, implied in it faithful adherence and entire subjection, submission and obedience. So much the phrase plainly implies; Judges ix. 15, "And the bramble said unto the trees, If in truth ye anoint me king over you, then come and put your trust in my shadow; and, if not, let fire come out of the bramble, and devour the cedars of Lebanon." We have an account of the fulfilment of this parable in the sequel.—How the men of Shechem did not prove faithful subjects to Abimelech, according to their covenant or agreement with him, but dealt treacherously with him. Verse 23. And how accordingly Abimelech proved the occasion of their destruction. The like figure of speech is used to signify the nation's obedience to the king of Assyria; Ezek. xxxi. 6, "All the fowls of heaven made their nests in his boughs, and under his branches did all the beasts of the field bring forth their young, and under his shadow dwelt all great nations." So also it signifies the subjection of the nations to Nebuchadnezzar; Dan. iv. 11, "The tree grew, and was strong: the beasts of the field had shadow under it, and the fowls of the heaven dwelt in the boughs thereof, and all flesh fed of it." The benefit that those who are the true subjects of Christ have by him, is expressed by the very same things; Ezek. xvii. 23, "In the mountain of the height of Israel will I plant it: and it shall bring forth boughs, and bear fruit, and be a goodly cedar; and under it shall dwell all fowl of every wing; in the shadow of the branches thereof shall they dwell." Our trusting in God and Christ, is often expressed by our trusting in his shadow, and under the shadow of his wings, and the like; Psal. xvii. 8, and xxxvi. 7, and lvii. 1, and lxiii. 7, and xci. 1, Cant. ii. 3, Isaiah iv. 6, and xxv. 4. Here see Ruth ii. 12, compared with chap. i. 16, John iii. 36, "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life: he that believeth not the Son, απειθων." The force of the word may in some measure be learned from Acts v. 36, 37, and Acts v. 40, "And to him they agreed or *obeyed*;" the word is the same in the Greek And Acts xxiii. 21, "But do not thou *yield* unto them;" the word is the same in the Greek. Acts xxvi. 19, "I was not disobedient (απειθης) to the heavenly vision;" Rom. xxvi. 19, "Disobedient to parents, απειθεις." See also Acts xvii. 4, "Some of them believed (in the Greek επεισθησαν), and consorted with Paul and Silas" Acts xiv. 2, "The unbelieving Jews, απειθουντες." Eph. ii. 2, "The spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience, απειθειας." We may judge something of the force of the word πειθομαι, by the signification of the word whence it comes; πειθομαι is the passive of πειθω, which signifies, to counsel, to move or entice, draw or persuade unto.

§ 53 That a saving belief of truth arises from love, or a holy disposition and relish of heart, appears by Phil. i. 9, 10, "And this I pray, that your love

may abound yet more and more in knowledge, and in all judgment, that ye may approve things that are excellent." That this approving of the things that are excellent, is mentioned as an instance of the exercise of that knowledge and judgment that is spoken of as the fruit of love, appears more plainly in the original, as the connection is evident, *εις το δοκιμαζειν*, unto the approving. The same thing appears by 2 Thess. ii. 12, "That they all might be damned, who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness."

It is fit that, seeing we depend so entirely and universally, visibly and remarkably, on God, in our fallen state, for happiness, and seeing the special design of God was to bring us into such a great and most evident dependence; that the act of the soul, by which it is interested in this benefit, bestowed in this way should correspond; viz., a looking and seeking to, and depending on God for it; that the unition of heart, that is the proper term, should imply such an application of the soul to God, and seeking his benefits only and entirely, and with full sense of dependence on him, that as the condition before was obedience, or rendering to God, so now it should be seeking and looking to him, drawing and deriving from him, and with the whole heart depending on him, on his power and free grace, &c. Faith is the proper active union of the soul with Christ as our Saviour, as revealed to us in the gospel. But the proper active union of the soul with Christ as our Saviour, as revealed to us in the gospel, is the soul's active agreeing, and suiting or adapting itself in its act, to the exhibition God gives us of Christ and his redemption; to the nature of the exhibition, being pure revelation, and a revelation of things perfectly above our senses and reason; and to Christ himself in his person as revealed, and in the character under which he is revealed to us; and to our state with regard to him in that character; and to our need of him, and concern with him, and his relation to us, and to the benefits to us, with which he is exhibited and offered to us in that revelation; and to the great design of God in that method and divine contrivance of salvation revealed. But the most proper name for such an active union or unition of the soul to Christ, as this, of any that language affords, is *faith*.

§ 55. The revelation or exhibition that God first made of himself, was of his authority, demanding and requiring of us that we should render something to him that nature and reason required. The act of the soul that is suitable to such an exhibition, may be expressed by submitting, doing, obeying, and rendering to God. The exhibition which God makes of himself, since our fall, in the gospel, is not of his power and authority, as demanding of us, but of his sufficiency for us, as needy, empty, helpless; and of his grace and mercy to us, as unworthy and miserable. And the exhibition is by pure revelation of things quite above all our senses and reason, or the reach of any created faculties, being of the mere good pleasure of God. The act in us, that is proper and suitable to, and well according to such an exhibition as this, may be expressed by such names as believing, seeking, looking, depending, acquiescing, or in one word, *faith*.

§ 56. That believing in the New Testament, is much the same as trusting, in the Old, is confirmed by comparing Jer. xvii. 5, "Cursed is the man that trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm, and whose heart departeth from the Lord;" ver 7, "Blessed is the man that trusteth in the Lord, whose hope the Lord is,"—with Heb. iii. 12, "Take heed, brethren, lest there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief, in departing from the living God." It also is confirmed by this, that trusting in God, and hoping in him, are used in the Old Testament as expressions of the same import. So hope is often in the New Testament

used to signify the same thing that, in other places is signified by faith. Rom. xv. 12, 13, "And again, Esaias saith, There shall be a root of Jesse, and he that shall rise to reign over the Gentiles, in him shall the Gentiles trust."—"Now the God of peace fill you with all joy and peace in believing, that ye may abound in hope through the power of the Holy Ghost." Compare Dan. iii. 38, with Dan. vi. 23, and Heb. xi. 33, 34.

It is manifest that trusting in God is a phrase of the same import with believing in him, by comparing Isaiah xlix. 23, "They shall not be ashamed that wait for me;" with Isaiah xxviii. 16, and Rom. ix. 33, and x. 11; 1 Pet. vi. 6, 7, 8. These places show, that waiting for God, signifies the same as believing on him. And it is evident, by various passages of Scripture, that waiting on God, or for God, signifies the same as trusting in him.

§ 57. That saving faith implies in its nature divine love, is manifest by 1 John v. 1, "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God; and every one that loveth him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of him." The apostle's design in this verse seems to be, to show the connection there is between a true and sincere respect to God, and a respect to and union with Christ; so that he who is united to the Son, is so to the Father, and *vice versa*. As he believes in Christ, and so loves him, it is evident that he is a child of God, and *vice versa*. He, whose heart is united to the Father, is so to the Son too. He that loveth him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of him. (Compare chap. ii. 22, 23, 24, and chap. iv. 15, with John xiv. 1, and John xv. 23, 24.) The same is further manifest again by the following verses of this chapter, 3, 4, 5, "This is the love of God, that we keep his commandments; and his commandments are not grievous;" i. e., this is a good evidence that we have true love to God, that we are enabled to triumph over the difficulties we meet with in this evil world, and not to esteem the yoke of denial of our worldly lusts a grievous and heavy yoke, and on that account be unwilling to take it upon us. "For whosoever is born of God, overcometh the world; and this is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith." This is explaining what he had said before, that our love to God enables us to overcome the difficulties that attend keeping God's commands; which shows that love is the main thing in saving faith, the life and power of it, by which it produces great effects; agreeably to what the Apostle Paul says, when he calls saving faith, *faith effectual by love*."

§ 58. Seeking God is from time to time spoken of as the condition of God's favor and salvation, and in like manner as trusting in him; Psal. xxiv. 5, 6, "He shall receive the blessing from the Lord, and righteousness from the God of his salvation. This is the generation of them that seek him; that seek thy face, O Jacob." 1 Chron. xvi. 10, "Glory ye in his holy name. Let the heart of them rejoice that seek the Lord." See the same words in Psal. cv. 3. Psal. xxii. 26, "The meek shall eat and be satisfied. They shall praise the Lord, that seek him. Your heart shall live for ever." Psal. xxxiv. 10, "The young lions do lack and suffer hunger; but they that seek the Lord shall not want any good thing."

They that seek God are spoken of as those that love God's salvation. Psal. lxx. 4, "Let all those that seek thee, rejoice and be glad in thee; and let such as love thy salvation, say continually, Let the Lord be magnified." We have the same words again, Psal. xl. 16. The expression seems to be in some measure parallel with trusting in God's salvation; Psal. lxxviii. 22, "Because they believed not in God, and trusted not in his salvation." And hoping in God's salvation; Psal. cxix. 166, "I have hoped for thy salvation." And waiting for

God's salvation; Gen xlix. 18, "I have waited for thy salvation, O God." Lam. iii. 25, 26, "The Lord is good unto them that wait for him; to the soul that seeketh him. It is good that a man should both hope and quietly wait for the salvation of the Lord." Mic. vii. 7, "I will wait for the God of my salvation." Agreeably to this, despising the pleasant land, is spoken of as an exercise of the spirit of unbelief; Psal. cxvi. 24, "Yea, they despised the pleasant land: they believed not his word."

§ 59. Flying, resorting or running to, as to a refuge, are terms used as being equivalent to trusting; Psal. lxii. 7, 8, "My refuge is in God. Trust in him at all times. God is a refuge for us." Psal. xci. 2. Prov. xviii. 10, "The name of the Lord is a strong tower; the righteous runneth into it, and is safe." Psal. lxxi. 1, 3, "In thee, O Lord, do I put my trust."—"Be thou my strong habitation, whereunto I may continually resort. Thou hast given commandment to save me; for thou art my rock and my fortress." Heb. vi. 18, "Who have fled for refuge to lay hold on the hope set before us."

Waiting on the Lord, waiting for his salvation, and the like, are terms used as being equivalent to trusting God in the Scripture. Psal xxv. 2, "O my God, I trust in thee; let me not be ashamed." Verse 5, "On thee do I wait all the day." Verse 21, "Let integrity and uprightness preserve me, for on thee do I wait." Psal. xxxvii. 3, "Trust in the Lord." Ver. 5, "Trust also in him." Verse 7, "Rest on the Lord, and wait patiently for him." Psal. xxvii. 13, 14, "I had fainted, unless I had believed to see the goodness of the Lord in the land of the living. Wait on the Lord: be of good courage, and he shall strengthen thine heart: wait, I say, on the Lord."

§ 61. Hoping in God, hoping in his mercy, &c., are used as terms equivalent to trusting in God. Psal. lxxviii. 7, "That they might set their hope in God." Psal. cxlvi. 5, "Happy is that man that hath the God of Jacob for his aid; whose hope is in the Lord his God." Jer. xiv. 8, "O the hope of Israel, and the Saviour thereof in time of trouble." Jer. xvii. 7, "Blessed is the man that trusteth in the Lord; whose hope the Lord is." Verse 13, "O Lord, the hope of Israel, all that forsake thee, shall be ashamed." Verse 17, "Thou art my hope in the day of evil." 1 Pet. i. 3, 4, 5, &c, "Hath begotten us again unto a lively hope, by the resurrection of Christ from the dead; to an inheritance incorruptible, &c., who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation, wherein ye greatly rejoice; that the trial of your faith being much more precious—whom having not seen, ye love; in whom, though now ye see him not, yet believing ye rejoice, &c., receiving the end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls." Verse 13, "Be ye sober, and hope to the end, for the grace that is to be brought unto you at the revelation of Jesus Christ." Verses 21, 22, "Who by him do believe in God, who raised him up from the dead, and gave him glory, that your faith and hope might be in God: seeing ye have purified your souls in obeying the truth through the Spirit." Chap. iii. 15, "And be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh you a reason of the hope that is in you." Heb. xi. 1, "Faith is the substance of things hoped for." Matth. xii. 21, "In his name shall the Gentiles trust:" in the original, ἐλπιοῦσι, hope.

§ 62. Looking to, or looking for, are used as phrases equivalent to trusting, seeking, hoping, waiting, believing on, &c. Num. xxi. 9, "And it came to pass, that if a serpent had bitten any man, when he beheld the serpent of brass, he lived;" together with John iii. 14, 15, "And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up; that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life." Isa. xlv. 22, "Look

unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth." Psal. cxxiii. 1, 2, "Unto thee lift I up mine eyes, O thou that dwellest in the heavens. Behold, as the eyes of servants look unto the hand of their masters, and as the eyes of a maiden unto the hand of her mistress; so our eyes wait upon the Lord our God, until that he have mercy upon us."

§ 63. Rolling one's self, or burden on the Lord, is an expression used as equivalent to trusting. Psal. xxii. 8, "He trusted in the Lord, that he would deliver him:" in the original, "He rolled himself on the Lord." Psal. xxxvii. 5, "Commit thy way unto the Lord; trust also in him, and he shall bring it to pass:" in the Hebrew, *Roll thy way upon the Lord.* Prov. xvi. 3, "Commit thy works unto the Lord, and thy thoughts shall be established:" in the Hebrew, *Roll thy works.*

§ 64. Leaning on the Lord, and staying ourselves on him, are of the same force. Micah iii. 11, "Yet will they lean on the Lord." Cant. viii. 5, "Who is this that cometh up out of the wilderness, leaning on her beloved?"

§ 65. Relying on God, 2 Chron. xiii. 18, "Thus the children of Israel were brought under at that time, and the children of Judah prevailed; because they relied upon the Lord God of their fathers;" compared with verses 14, 15, wherein it is said, "And when Judah looked back, behold the battle was before and behind; and they cried unto the Lord, and the priests sounded with the trumpets. Then the men of Judah gave a shout; and as the men of Judah shouted, it came to pass that God smote Jeroboam and all Israel, before Abijah and Judah."

§ 66. Committing ourselves, our cause, &c., unto God, is of the same force: Job v. 8, "I would seek unto God, and unto God would I commit my cause, who doth great things, and unsearchable, marvellous things without number."

§ 67. The distinction of the several constituent parts or acts of faith, into assent, consent, and affiance, if strictly considered and examined, will appear not to be proper and just, or strictly according to the truth and nature of things; because the parts are not all entirely distinct one from another, and so are in some measure confounded one with another: for the last, viz., affiance, implies the other two, assent and consent; and is nothing else but a man's assent and consent, with particular relation or application to himself and his own case, together with the effect of all in his own quietness and comfort of mind, and boldness in venturing on this foundation, in conduct and practice.

Affiance consists in these five things: 1. Consent to something proposed, to be obtained by another person, as good, eligible or desirable, and so for him. 2. Assent of the judgment to the reality of the good, as to be obtained by him; that he is sufficient, faithful, &c. 3. The mind's applying itself to him for it, which has no other than the soul's desiring him to possess us of this good consented to, expressing these desires before him, that he may see and take notice of them, i. e., expressing these desires with an apprehension that he sees our hearts, and designedly spreading them before him, to the end that they might be observed by him and gratified. 4. Hoping that the good will be obtained in this way; which hope consists in two things, viz., expectation of the good in this way; and in some ease, quietness, or comfort of mind arising from this expectation. 5. Adventuring some interest on this hope in practice; which consists either in doing something that implies trouble, or brings expense or suffering, or in omitting something that we should otherwise do; by which omission some good is foregone, or some evil is brought on.

If these acts cannot in strictness all take place at the same moment of time, though they follow one another in the order of nature, yet they are all implied

in the act that is exercised the first moment, so far as that act is of such a nature as implies a necessary tendency to what follows. In these three last especially consists man's *committing himself to Christ as a Saviour.* In the third and fourth especially consists the soul's *looking to Christ as a Saviour.*

§ 68. In that consent to the way or method of salvation, which there is in saving faith, the heart has especially respect to two things in that method, that are the peculiar glory of it, and whereby it is peculiarly contrary to corrupt nature: 1. Its being a way wherein God is so exalted and set so high, and man so debased and set so low. God is made all in all, and man nothing. God is magnified as self-sufficient and all-sufficient, and as being all in all to us; his power and grace, and Christ's satisfaction and merits being all: and man is annihilated; his power, his righteousness, his dignity, his works are made nothing of.

2. Its being so holy a way; a way of mere mercy, yet of holy mercy; mercy in saving the sinner, but showing no favor or countenance to sin; a way of free grace, yet of holy grace; not grace exercised to the prejudice of God's holiness, but in such a way as peculiarly to manifest God's hatred of sin and opposition to it, and strict justice in punishing it, and that he will by no means clear the guilty; every way manifesting the infinite evil and odiousness of sin, much more than if there had been no salvation offered. Therefore humiliation and holiness are the chief ingredients in the act of consent to this way of salvation.

In these things I have spoken only of a consent to the way or method of salvation. But in saving faith is included also a consent to the salvation itself, or the benefits procured. What is peculiarly contrary to this in corrupt nature, is a worldly spirit; and therefore in order to this act of consent, there must be mortification to, or weanedness from the world, and a selling of all for the pearl of great price.

Lastly, Besides all these, there is in saving faith consent to Christ himself, or a closing of the heart or inclination with the person of Christ. This implies each of the three things forementioned, viz., humiliation, holiness, and renouncing the world. It implies humiliation; for as long as men deify themselves, they will not adore Jesus Christ. It implies sanctification; for Christ's beauty, for which his person is delighted in and chosen, is especially his holiness. It implies forsaking the world; for as long as men set their hearts on the world as their chief good, and have that as the chief object of the relish and complaisance of their minds, they will not relish and take complaisance in Christ, and set their hearts on him as their best good. The heart of a true believer consents to three things exhibited in the gospel of salvation. 1. The person who is the author of the salvation. 2. The benefit, or the salvation itself. 3. The way or method in which this person is the author of this benefit.

§ 69. Faith implies a cleaving of the heart to Christ; because a trusting in others is spoken of as a departing of the heart from the Lord. Jer. xvii. 5 "Cursed is the man that trusteth in man, whose heart departeth from the Lord." So a heart of unbelief is a heart that departeth from the Lord. Heb. iii. 12, "Lest there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief, in departing from the living God." Faith has a double office. It accepts Christ from God, and presents Christ to God. It accepts Christ in the word, and makes use of him in prayer. In the word, God offereth him to you, as Lord and Saviour, to give you repentance and remission of sins. Now, when you consent to God's terms this is to believe in him.—Faith presents Christ to God; Eph. iii. 12 "In whom we have boldness and access with confidence, by the faith of him." All

religion lieth in coming to God by him. Heb. vii. 25, "Wherefore he is able also to save them unto the uttermost, that come unto God through him; seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them." *Dr. Manton*, vol. v. p. 382.

§ 70. We often read in the New Testament of the calling of Christians, of their high calling; and that effect of God's word and Spirit, by which they are brought to a saving faith, is called their calling; and true believers are spoken of as the called of God, called saints, &c. And this call is often represented as an invitation, an invitation to come to Christ, to come and join themselves to him, to come to follow him, to continue with him, to be of his party, his society, seeking his interest, &c. To come to him for his benefits, to come for deliverance from calamity and misery, to come for safety, to come for rest, to come to eat and drink; an invitation to come into his house, to a feast. And faith is often called by the name of *υπακοη*, hearing, hearkening, yielding to, and obeying the gospel, obeying Christ, being obedient to the faith, obeying the form of doctrine, &c.

Hence we may learn the nature of saving faith; that it is an accepting, yielding to, and complying with, the gospel, as such a call and invitation; which implies the hearing of the mind, i. e., the mind's apprehending or understanding the call; a believing of the voice, and the offer and promises contained in it; and accepting, esteeming, prizing the person and benefits invited to, a falling in of the inclination, the choice, the affection, &c.

§ 71. Faith, as the word is used in Scripture, does not only signify dependence, as it appears in venturing in practice, but also as it appears in the rest of the mind, in opposition to anxiety; as appears by Matth. vi. 25—34, "Take no thought—shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?" So Luke xii. 22—32, "Take no thought—how much more will he clothe you, O ye of little faith! Fear not, little flock, it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom," compared with Philip. iv. 6, 7, and, Peter v. 7. This is agreeable to that phrase used in the Old Testament for trusting, "Roll thy burden on the Lord." Matth. xiv. 30, 31, "But when he saw the wind boisterous, he was afraid; and beginning to sink, he cried, saying, Lord save me. And immediately Jesus stretched forth his hand and caught him, and said unto him, O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt?"

§ 72. The following inquiries concerning saving faith, are proper and important.

1. Whether justifying faith, in its proper essence, implies, besides the act of the judgment, also an act of the inclination and will?

2. Whether it properly implies love in its essence?

3. What are the Scripture descriptions, characters, and representations of justifying faith?

4. What is the true definition of justifying faith, a definition which agrees with the Scripture representation of faith, and takes all in?

5. Whether the word *faith*, as used in the gospel, has a signification diverse from what it has in common speech?

6. Why the word faith, is used to signify this complex act of the mind?

7. How far trusting in Christ is of the nature and essence of faith?

8. Whether assent, consent and affiance, be a proper distribution of the various and distinct acts of faith?

9. Whether hope, as the word is used in the New Testament, be properly distinct from saving faith?

10. What does the word *trust* imply in common speech?

11. What it implies as used in Scripture?

12. In what sense faith implies obedience?

13. What is the nature of self-righteousness?

14. How self-righteousness is peculiarly opposite to the nature of faith?

15. In what sense there must be a particular application in the act of saving faith?

16. Whether the first act of faith is certainly more lively and sensible, than some of the weakest of the consequent acts of saving faith?

17. In what sense, perseverance in faith is necessary to salvation?

18. What sort of evidence is it which is the principal immediate ground of that assent of the judgment which is implied in saving faith?

§ 73. Calling on the name of Christ, is often spoken of as the proper expression of saving faith in Christ. Acts ii. 21; Rom. x. 13, 14; 1 Cor. i. 2; Acts ix. 14, 21, 22, 16. Faith is trusting in Christ. *See Doddridge's* note on Acts xvi. 31.

What in that prophecy of the Messiah in Isa. xlii. 4, is expressed thus, "The Isles shall wait for his law," is, as cited in Matth. xviii. 21, "In his name shall the Gentiles trust."

Coming to Christ, and believing in him, are evidently used as equipollent expressions, in John vi. 29, 30, 35, 37, 40, 44, 45, 47, 64, 65. This coming, wherein consists believing, implies an attraction of the heart, as is manifest by verses 44, 45.

Christ, by eating his flesh and drinking his blood, evidently means the same thing that he intends in the same chapter, by believing in him, and coming to him. Compare John vi. 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, with verses 29, 30, 35, 36, 37, 40, 44, 45, 47, 64, 65.

Saving faith is called in Heb. iii. 6. παρρησια και το καυχημα της ελπιδος, "The confidence and the rejoicing of the hope." Well expressing the act of the whole soul that is implied in saving faith, the judgment, the will and affections. So in Heb. x. 23, "Let us hold fast the profession of our faith." In the original it is ελπιδος, hope.

Justifying faith is nothing else, but true virtue in its proper and genuine breathings adapted to the case, to the revelation made, the state we are in, the benefit to be received and the way and means of it, and our relation to these things.

Faith is a sincere seeking rightousness and salvation, of Christ, and in Christ. Rom. ix. 31, 32, "Hath not attained to the law of righteousness. Wherefore? Because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the works of the law." See also the promises made, both in the Old Testament and New, to them that seek the Lord. To saving faith in Christ belongs adoration, submission, and subjection, as appears by Isa. xlv., "Unto me every knee shall bow," with the foregoing and following verses.

The general description of justifying faith is a proper reception of Christ and his salvation, or a proper active union of the soul to Christ as a Saviour. I say, a proper reception, which implies that it is a receiving him in a manner agreeable to his office and character and relation to us, in which he is exhibited and offered to us, and with regard to those ends and effects for which he is given to mankind, was sent into the world, and is appointed to be preached: and in a manner agreeable to the way in which he is exhibited, made known, and offered, i. e., by divine revelation, without being exhibited to the view of ourselves; and the nature of his person, character, offices and benefits; and the way of salvation, as related to our faculties, mysterious and incomprehensible; and in a manner agreeable to our circumstances, and our particular necessities, and

mmediate and infinite personal concern with the revelation and offer of the Saviour. A union of soul to this Saviour, and a reception of him and his salvation, which is proper in these respects, is most aptly called by the name of faith.

§ 74. That love belongs to the essence of saving faith, is manifest by comparing Isaiah lxiv. 4: "Men have not heard nor perceived by the ear, &c., what he hath prepared for him that waiteth for him," as cited by the apostle, 1 Cor. ii 9, "It is for them that love him." Now it is evident that waiting for God, in the Old Testament, signifies the same with faith in God, or trusting in God.

Dr. Goodwin, in Vol. I. of his Works, p. 286, says, "The Papists say, wickedly and wretchedly, that love is the form and soul of faith." But how does the truth of this charge of wickedness appear?

It was of old the coming to the sacrifice, as one consenting to the offering, active in choosing and constituting that as his offering, and looking to it as the means of atonement for his sins, that interested him in the sacrifice; as appears by Heb. x. 1, 2; "Could never make the comers thereunto perfect. For then, the worshippers once purged should have had no more conscience of sins." Compare chap. ix. 9.

Believing in one for any benefit, as sufficient for the benefit, and disposed to procure it, and accordingly leaving our interest with him, with regard to that benefit, is implied in trusting in him; Job xxxix. 11, "Wilt thou trust him, because his strength is great? Or wilt thou leave thy labor with him? Wilt thou believe him, that he will bring home thy seed, and gather it into thy barn?"

As the whole soul in all its faculties is the proper subject and agent of faith, so undoubtedly there are two things in saving faith, viz., belief of the truth and an answerable disposition of heart. And therefore faith may be defined, a thorough believing of what the gospel reveals of a Saviour of sinners, as true and perfectly good, with the exercise of an answerable disposition towards him. That true faith, in the Scripture sense of it, implies not only the exercise of the understanding, but of the heart or disposition, is very manifest. Many important things pertaining to saving religion, which the Scripture speaks of under the name of some exercise of the understanding, imply the disposition and exercise of the heart also. Such as, knowing God—understanding the word of God—having eyes to see, and a heart to understand. And piety is called wisdom. So men's wickedness is called ignorance, folly, &c. A being wise in one's own eyes, implies a high opinion of himself, with an agreeable or answerable disposition.

It is evident that trust in Christ implies the disposition or will, the receiving and embracing of the heart. For we do not trust in any person or thing for any thing but good, or what is agreeable to us; what we choose, incline to, and desire. Yea, trusting commonly is used with respect to great good; good that we choose, as what we depend upon for support, satisfaction, happiness, &c.

§ 75. The following things concerning the nature of faith, are extracted from Dr. Sherlock's *several discourses, preached at Temple Church;* discourse 14, page 257, &c.

"Faith, as some think, is no proper subject for exhortation. For if faith is a mere act of the mind judging upon motives of credibility, it is as reasonable to exhort a man to see with his eyes, as to judge with his understanding. But then, if this be the true notion of faith, how comes it that in every page we find the praises of it in the gospel? What is there in this to deserve the blessings promised to the faithful? Or whence is it that the whole of our salvation is put upon this foot? How come all these prerogatives to belong to faith, if faith be

nothing else but believing things in themselves credible? Why are we not said to be justified by light as well as by faith? For is there not the same virtue in seeing things visible, as in believing things credible? Tell me then, what is faith, that it should raise men above the level of mortality, and make men become like the angels of heaven?—But further, if it be only an act of the understanding formed upon due reasons, how comes it to be described in Scripture, as having its seat in the heart? The apostle in the text (Heb. iii. 12), cautions against an evil heart of unbelief; and the same notion prevails throughout the books of Scripture, and is as early as our Saviour's first preaching. Faith, which is the principle of the gospel, respects the promises and declaration of God, and includes a sure trust and reliance on him for the performance. Beyond this, there is no further act of faith. We are not taught to believe this, in order to our believing something else; but here, faith has its full completion, and leads immediately to the practice of virtue and holiness. For this end was the Son of God revealed, to make known the mind and will of the Father, to declare his mercy and pardon, and to confirm the promises of eternal life to mankind. He that believes and accepts this deliverance from the bondage of sin, and through patience and perseverance in well doing, waits for the blessed hope of immortality; who passes through the world as a stranger and pilgrim, looking for another country, and a city whose builder is God; this is he whose faith shall receive the promise, whose confidence shall have great recompense of reward."

Here Dr. Sherlock speaks of that true Christian faith, which is the principle of the gospel, as including a sure trust and reliance on God. The same author elsewhere in the same book, page 251, speaks of reliance or dependence on God, as arising from a principle of love to God, in the words following: "The duties we owe to God, are founded in the relation between God and us. I observe likewise to you, that love naturally transforms itself into all relative duties, which arise from the circumstances of the person related. Thus, in the present case, if we love God, and consider him as Lord and Governor of the world, our love will soon become obedience. If we consider him as wise, and good, and gracious, our love will become honor and adoration. If we add to these our own natural weakness and infirmity, love will teach us dependence, and prompt us in all our wants to fly for refuge to our Great Protector."

§ 76. That expression in Psalm l. 5, "Gather my saints, that have made covenant with me by sacrifice," seems to show that such is the nature of true faith in Christ, that believers do therein, by the sincere, full act of their minds and hearts, appoint Christ to be their sacrifice; as such, bring him an offering to God; i. e., they entirely concur with what was done in his offering himself a sacrifice for sinners, as a real sacrifice sufficient and proper for them, trusting in this sacrifice. Faith is the believer's coming to God, and giving himself up to God, hoping for acceptance by this sacrifice, and taking God for his God, hoping for an interest in him as such by this sacrifice, that so God may be his God, and he one of his people.

§ 77. It does not seem congruous, and in itself it is not proper for God quite to pass over sin, rebellion and treachery, and receive the offender into his entire favor, either without a repentance and sorrow, and detestation of his fault, adequate to the aggravation of it (which can never be), or, if there be another that appears in his stead, and has done and suffered so much as fully to satisfy and pay the debt, it will not be proper to forgive him, whatever is done for him by his representative for his expiation, unless there be an accepting of it by the offender for that end, a sense of its being adequate to the offence, and an apply

ing of the mind to him, and a recumbence upon him for satisfaction. This now seems to me evident from the very light of nature.

§ 78. Justifying faith is more properly called faith than acceptance, because the things received are spiritual and unseen, and because they are received as future, and entirely the free gift of God.

§ 79. Even the being of a God can be made most rationally and demonstratively evident, by divine revelation, and by gracious spiritual illumination; after the same manner as we have shown the Christian religion, the superstructure built upon that foundation, is evident. Suppose all the world had otherwise been ignorant of the being of a God before, yet they might know it, because God has revealed himself; he has shown himself; he has said a great deal to us, and conversed much with us. And this is every whit as rational a way of being convinced of the being of God, as it is of being convinced of the being of a man who comes from an unknown region, and shows himself to us, and converses with us for a long time. We have no other reason to be convinced of his being, than only that we see a long series of external concordant signs of an understanding, will and design, and various affections. The same way God makes known himself to us in his word. And if we have a full and comprehensive knowledge of the revelation made, of the things revealed, and of the various relations and respects of the various parts, their harmonies, congruities, and mutual concordances, there appear most indubitable signs and expressions of a very high and transcendent understanding, together with a great and mighty design, an exceeding wisdom, or most magnificent power and authority, a marvellous purity, holiness and goodness. So that if we never knew there was any such being before, yet we might be certain that this must be such a one.

§ 80. One that is well acquainted with the gospel, and sees the beauties, the harmonies, the majesty, the power, and the glorious wisdom of it and the like, may, only by viewing it, be as certain that it is no human work, as a man that is well acquainted with mankind and their works, may, by contemplating the sun, know it is not a human work; or, when he goes upon an island, and sees the various trees, and the manner of their growing, and blossoming, and bearing fruit, may know that they are not the work of man.

§ 81. Faith is very often in the Scripture called *trust*, especially in the Old Testament. Now, trusting is something more than mere believing. Believing is the assent to any truth testified; trusting, always respects truth that nearly concerns ourselves, in regard of some benefit of our own that it reveals to us, and some benefit that the revealer is the author of. It is the acquiescence of the mind in a belief of any person, that by his word reveals or represents himself to us as the author of some good that concerns us. If the benefit be a deliverance or preservation from misery, it is a being easy in a belief that he will do it. So, if we say, a man trusts in a castle to save him from his enemies, we mean, his mind is easy, and rests in a persuasion that it will keep him safe. If the benefit be the bestowment of happiness, it is the mind's acquiescing in it, that he will accomplish it; that is, he is persuaded he will do it; he has such a persuasion, that he rejoices in confidence of it.

Thus, if a man has promised a child to make him his heir, if we say he trusts in him to make him his heir, we mean he has such a belief of what he promises, that his mind acquiesces and rejoices in it, so as not to be disturbed by doubts and questions whether he will perform it. These things all the world means by trust. The first fruit of trust is being willing to do and undergo in the expectation of some thing. He that does not expect the benefit, so much as to make him ready to do or undergo, dares not trust it: he dares not run the

venture of it. Therefore, they may be said to trust in Christ, and they only, that are ready to do and undergo all that he desires, in expectation of his redemption. And the faith of those that dare not do so, is unsound. Therefore, such trials are called the trials of faith.

But this is to be considered, that Christ does not promise that he will be the author of our redemption, but upon condition; and we have not performed that condition, until we have believed. Therefore, we have no grounds, until we have once believed, to acquiesce in it that Christ will save us. Therefore, the first act of faith is no more than this, the acquiescence of the mind in him in what he does declare absolutely. It is the soul's resting in him, and adhering to him, so far as his word does reveal him to all as a Saviour for sinners, as one that has wrought out redemption, as a sufficient Saviour, as a Saviour suited to their case, as a willing Saviour, as the author of an excellent salvation, &c., so as to be encouraged heartily to seek salvation of him, to come to him, to love, desire, and thirst after him as a Saviour, and fly for refuge to him. This is the very same thing in substance, as that trust we spoke of before, and is the very essence of it. This is all the difference, that it was attended with this additional belief, viz., that the subject had performed the condition, which does not belong to the essence of faith. That definition which we gave of trust before, holds, viz., the acquiescence of the mind in the word of any person who reveals himself to us as the author of some good that nearly concerns us. Trusting is not only believing that a person will accomplish the good he promises: the thing that he promises may be very good, and the person promising or offering may be believed, and yet not properly trusted in; for the person to whom the offer is made, may not be sensible that the thing is good, and he may not desire it. If he offers to deliver him from something that is his misery, perhaps he is not sensible that it is misery; or, he may offer to bestow that which is his happiness, but he may not be sensible that it is happiness. If so, though he believes him, he does not properly trust in him for it; for he does not seek or desire what he offers; and there can be no adherence or acquiescence of mind. If a man offers another to rescue him from captivity, and carry him to his own country; if the latter believes the former will do it, and yet does not desire it, he cannot be said to trust in him for it. And if the thing be accounted good, and be believed, yet if the person to whom it is offered, does not like the person that does it, or the way of accomplishment of it, there cannot be an entire trust, because there is not a full adherence and acquiescence of mind.

§ 82. There are these two ways in which the mind may be said to be sensible that any thing is good or excellent: 1. When the mind judges that any thing is such as, by the agreement of mankind, is called good or excellent, viz., that which is most to general advantage, and that between which and reward there is a suitableness; or that which is agreeable to the law of God. It is a being merely convinced in judgment, that a thing is according to the meaning of the word good, as the word is generally applied. 2. The mind is sensible of good in another sense, when it is so sensible of the beauty and amiableness of the thing, that it is sensible of pleasure and delight in the presence of the idea of it This kind of sensibleness of good, carries in it an act of the will, or inclination or spirit of the mind, as well as of the understanding.

§ 83. The conditions of justification are, repentance and faith; and the freedom of grace appears in the forgiving of sin upon repentance, or only for our being willing to part with it, after the same manner as the bestowment of eternal life, only for accepting of it. For to make us an offer of freedom from a thing only for quitting of it, is equivalent to the offering the possession of a

thing for the receiving of it. God makes us this offer, that if we will in our hearts quit sin, we shall be freed from it, and all the evil that belongs to it, and flows from it; which is the same thing as the offering us freedom only for accepting it. Accepting, in this case, is quitting and parting with, in our wills and inclination. So that repentance is implied in faith; it is a part of our willing reception of the salvation of Jesus Christ; though faith with respect to sin, implies something more in it, viz., a respect to Christ, as him by whom we have deliverance. Thus by faith we destroy sin, Gal. ii. 18.

§ 84. As to that question, Whether closing with Christ in his kingly office be of the essence of justifying faith? I would say: 1. That accepting Christ in his kingly office, is doubtless the proper condition of having an interest in Christ's kingly office, and so the condition of that salvation which he bestows in the execution of that office; as much as accepting the forgiveness of sins, is the proper condition of the forgiveness of sin. Christ, in his kingly office, bestows salvation; and therefore, accepting him in his kingly office, by a disposition to sell all and suffer all in duty to Christ, and giving proper respect and honor to him, is the proper condition of salvation. This is manifest by Heb. v. 9, "And being made perfect, he became the author of eternal salvation to all them that obey him;" and by Rom. x. 10, "For with the heart man believeth unto righteousness, and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation." The apostle speaks of such a confessing of Christ, or outward and open testifying our respect to him, and adhering to our duty to him, as exposed to suffering, reproach and persecution. And that such a disposition and practice is of the essence of saving faith, is manifest by John xii. 42, 43: "Nevertheless, among the chief rulers also, many believed on him; but because of the Pharisees they did not confess him, lest they should be put out of the synagogue: for they loved the praise of men more than the praise of God;"—compared with John v. 44, "How can ye believe, which receive honor one of another, and seek not the honor that cometh from God only?"

2. Accepting Christ as a priest and king, cannot be separated. They not only cannot be separated, or be asunder in their subject, but they cannot be considered as separate things in their natures; for they are implied one in another. Accepting Christ as a king, is implied in accepting him as a priest: for, as a priest, he procures a title to the benefits of his kingly office; and therefore, to accept him as a priest, implies an accepting him in his kingly office: for we cannot accept the purchase of his priesthood, but by accepting the benefits purchased. If faith is supposed to contain no more immediately, than only an accepting of Christ as a Mediator for our justification; yet that justification implies a giving a title to the benefits of his kingly office, viz., salvation from sin, and conformity to his nature and will, and actual salvation by actual deliverance from our enemies, and the bestowment of glory.

§ 85. Faith divine, is a spiritual conviction of the truth of the things of religion. Some have objected against a spiritual sight of divine things in their glorious, excellent and divine form, as being the foundation of a conviction of the truth or real existence of them; because, say they, the existence of things is in the order of nature before forms or qualities of them as excellent or odious; and so the knowledge of their existence must go before the sight of their form or quality; they must be known to be, before they are seen to be excellent. I answer, it is true, things must be known to be, before they are known to be excellent, if by this proposition it be understood, that things must be known to exist, before they can be known really to exist excellent, or really to exist with such and such beauty. And all the force of the objection depends on such a

meaning of this assertion. But if thereby be intended, that a thing must be known to have a real existence before the person has a clear understanding, idea or apprehension of the thing proposed or objected to his view, as it is in its qualities either odious or beautiful, then the assertion is not true; for his having a clear idea of something proposed to his understanding or view, as very beautiful or very odious, as is proposed, does not suppose its reality; that is, it does not presuppose it, though its real existence may perhaps follow from it. But in our way of understanding things in general of all kinds, we first have some understanding or view of the thing in its qualities, before we know its existence. Thus it is in things that we know by our external senses, by our bodily sight for instance. We first see them, or have a clear idea of them by sight, before we know their existence by our sight. We first see the sun, and have a strong, lively and clear idea of it in its qualities, its shape, its brightness, &c., before we know there actually exists such a body.

§ 86. Faith in Christ is the condition of salvation. It is observable, that as trusting in God, hoping in him, waiting for him, &c., are abundantly insisted on in the Old Testament, as the main condition of God's favor, protection, deliverance and salvation, in the book of Psalms and elsewhere; so, in most of those places where these graces of trust and hope are so insisted upon, the subjects of them are represented as being in a state of trial, trouble, difficulty, danger, opposition and oppression of enemies, and the like. And the clearer revelation, and more abundant light of the New Testament, bring into clearer view the state that all mankind are in with regard to those things that are invisible, the invisible God, an invisible world, and invisible enemies, and so show men's lost, miserable, captivated, dangerous and helpless state, and reveal the infinite mercy of God, and his glorious all-sufficiency to such wretched, helpless creatures, and also exhibit Christ in the character of the Saviour of the miserable, the great Redeemer of captives, &c. Hence faith, trust and hope, are most fitly insisted on as the duty and qualification peculiarly proper for all mankind, and the virtue proper to be exercised in their circumstances towards God and Christ, as they reveal themselves in the gospel, as belonging to them in their character and relation to us, and concern with us, in which they are there exhibited; and as the grand condition of our salvation, or our receiving those benefits, which we, as sinful, miserable and helpless creatures, need from them, and which Christ, as a Redeemer, appears ready to bestow.

§ 87. Dr. Manton reconciles the Apostle James and the Apostle Paul in the following manner, in his 5th volume of Sermons, p. 374: "Justification hath respect to some accusation: now, as there is a twofold law, there is a twofold accusation and justification; the law of works, and the law of grace. Now when we are accused as breakers of the law of works, that is, as sinners obnoxious to the wrath of God, we plead Christ's satisfaction as our righteousness, no works of our own. But when we are accused as nonperformers of the conditions of the covenant of grace, as being neglecters and rejecters of Christ the Mediator, we are justified by producing our faith or sincere obedience; so that our righteousness by the new covenant is subordinate to our universal righteousness, with respect to the great law of God; and that we have only by Christ. If we are charged that we have broken the first covenant, the covenant of works, we allege Christ's satisfaction and merit If charged not to have performed the conditions of the law of grace, we answer it by producing our faith, repentance and new obedience, and so show it to be a false charge. Our first and supreme righteousness consists in the pardon of our sins, and our acceptance in the beloved, and our right to impunity and glory. Our second and subordinate

righteousness, in having the true condition of pardon and life. In the first sense, Christ's righteousness alone is our justification and righteousness. Faith and repentance, or new obedience, is not the least part of it. But, in the second, believing, repenting, and obeying, is our righteousness in their several respective ways, viz., that the righteousness of Christ may be ours, and continue ours." See also *Dr. Manton on James*, p. 310, 311, 312, and p. 331, &c.

Faith is connected with obedience. The very acceptance of Christ in his priestly office, making atonement for sin by his blood, and fulfilling the law of God by his perfect obedience unto death; and so the very approbation of the attribute of God, as it is there exhibited, an infinitely holy mercy: I say, merely the soul's acceptance and approbation of these things, do thoroughly secure holiness of heart and life in the redeemed of Jesus Christ. They will secure their conformity to the law of God, though, by this very mercy, and this very Saviour, they are set at liberty from the law, and are no longer under the law, as a law with its sanctions immediately taking hold of them, and binding them by its sanctions or threatenings, connecting and binding together its fulfilment and life, and its violation and death. Our hearts approving of that holy mercy of God that appears in his showing mercy to sinners, in a way of perfectly satisfying the law, suffering all the penalty of it, and of perfectly fulfilling and answering the precepts of it, implies a heart fully approving the law itself, as most worthy to be fulfilled and satisfied, approving the authority that established the law, and so its infinite worthiness of being obeyed; in that we approve of it, that so great a person should submit to that authority, and do honor to it, by becoming a servant to obey God, and a sacrifice to satisfy for the contempt done his authority, and that we approve the holy law itself as worthy of such great honor to be done it. It implies a heart entirely detesting sin, and in some sort, sensible of the infinite detestableness of it, that we approve of God's making such a manifestation of his detestation of it, and approve of the declared fitness and necessity of its being punished with so great a punishment as the sufferings of Christ. Our accepting such sufferings as an atonement for our sin, implies a heart fully repenting of and renouncing sin; for it implies not only a conviction that we deserve so great a punishment, and not only a mere conviction of conscience, but an approbation of heart of the connection of such sin with such punishment, which implies a hatred of the sin punished: and the heart's entire approbation of such methods perfectly to fulfil the obedience of the law, by so great a person, and by his doing so great things, and denying himself so much, implies a very high approbation of this law, and the authority of the lawgiver. Therefore this acceptance of Christ as a Saviour, by his obedience and atonement, and an acceptance of God's holy mercy, forgiving sin, and giving life in this way, does well secure universal obedience to the law of God as a law of liberty, and with a free and ingenuous spirit, by the obedience of children, and not of slaves. Thus, the faith that justifies the sinner, destroys sin; and the heart is purified by faith. So far as this evangelical spirit prevails, so far fear, or a legal spirit will be needless to restrain from sin, and so far will such a legal spirit cease and be driven away.

Coroll. What has been observed, is a confirmation that this is the true nature of justifying faith, and that the essence of it lies very much in the approbation and acceptance of the heart.

§ 88. 1 John v. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God; and every one that loveth him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of him. By this we know that we love the children of God, when we love God, and keep his commandments. For this is the love of God, that

we keep his commandments: and his commandments are not grievous. For whatsoever is born of God, overcometh the world: and this is the victory tha overcometh the world, even our faith." It is a doctrine taught in this text, tha saving faith differs from all common faith in its nature, kind and essence. This doctrine is inferred from the text, thus: it is said, "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God;" by which it is manifest, that there was some great virtue that the apostles and Christians in those days used to call by the name of faith or believing, believing that Jesus is Christ, and the like; which was a thing very peculiar and distinguishing, and belonging only to those that were born of God. Thereby cannot be meant, therefore, only a mere assent to the doctrines of the gospel, because that is common to saints and sinners, as is very evident. The Apostle James plainly teaches in chapter ii. that this faith may be in those that are not in a state of salvation. And we read in the Evangelists, of many that in this sense believe, to whom Christ did not commit himself, because he knew what was in them: John ii. at the latter end, and many other places. When it is said, "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God;" thereby cannot be meant, whosoever has such an assent as is perfect, so as to exclude all remaining unbelief; for it is evident, that the faith of good men does not do this. Thus a true believer said, Mark ix. 24, "Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief;" and Christ is often reproving his true disciples, that they have so little faith. He often says to them, "O ye of little faith;" and speaks sometimes as if their faith were less than a grain of mustard seed. Nor can the apostle, when he says, "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God," mean, that whosoever has a predominant assent, or an assent that prevails above his dissent, or whose judgment preponderates that way, and has more weight in that scale than the other; because it is plain that it is not true that every one that believes in this sense, is born of God. Many natural, unregenerate men, have such a preponderating judgment of the truth of the doctrines of the gospel; without it, there is no belief of it at all. For believing. in the lowest sense, implies a preponderating judgment; but it is evident, as just now was observed, that many natural men do believe: they do judge that the doctrine is true, as the devils do.

And again, when the apostle says, "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God;" all that he intends, cannot be only, that whosoever is come to a certain particular intermediate degree of assent, between the lowest degree of preponderating assent and a perfect assent, excluding all remains of unbelief; he cannot mean any certain particular intermediate degree of assent, still meaning nothing but mere assent by believing. For he does not say, he that believes or assents that Jesus is the Christ to such a certain degree, is born of God; but whosoever believes that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God; by which must be understood, that whosoever at all performs that act which the apostle calls by that name, or whosoever has any thing at all of that kind of virtue which the apostle calls believing, is born of God; and that he that is not born of God, has not that virtue that he meant, but is wholly without it. And besides, it would be unreasonable to suppose, that by this believing, which the apostle there and elsewhere lays down as such a grand note of distinction between those that are born of God, and those that are not, is meant only a certain degree of assent, which such have, that differs less from what those may have, that are not born of God, than nine hundred and ninety and nine from a thousand; yea, that differs from it an infinitely little. For this is the case, if the difference be only gradual, and it be only a certain degree of faith that is the mark of being born of God. If this was the apostle's meaning, he would use

words in a manner not consistent with the use of language, as he would call things infinitely nearly alike by such distant and contrary names; and would represent the subjects in whom they are, as of such different and contrary characters, calling one believer, and the other unbeliever, one the children of God, and those that are born of God, and the other the children of the devil, as this apostle calls all that are not born of God, in this epistle (see chapter iii. 9, 10), and would represent one as setting to his seal that God is true, and the other as making him a liar, as in the 10th verse of the context. And besides, if this were the case, if believers in this sense only, with such an infinitely small, gradual difference, was all that he meant, it would be no such notable distinction between those that are born of God and those that are not, as the apostle represents, and as this apostle, and other apostles, do everywhere signify. Nay, it would not be fit to be used as a sign or characteristic for men to distinguish themselves by; for such minute, gradual differences, which in this case would be alone certainly distinguishing, are altogether undiscernible, or at least with great difficulty determined; therefore, are not fit to be given as distinguishing notes of the Christian character. If words are everywhere used after this manner in the Bible, and, by faith in Christ, as the word is generally used there, is meant only the assent of the understanding, and that not merely a predominant assent, nor yet a perfect assent, excluding all remaining unbelief, but only a certain degree of assent between these two, rising up just to such a precise height, so that he that has this shall everywhere be called a believer; and he whose assent, though it predominates also, and rises up as high as the other within an infinitely little, shall be called an unbeliever, one that wickedly makes God a liar, &c., this is in effect to use words without any determinate meaning at all, or, which is the same thing, any meaning proportioned to our understandings; therefore, there is undoubtedly some great and notable difference between the faith of those who are in a state of salvation, and that of those who are not: insomuch that, without that very faith, according to the common use of language in these days, those who were not in a state of salvation, may be said not to believe at all. And besides, that virtue that the apostle here speaks of as such a great and distinguishing note of a child of God, he plainly speaks of as a supernatural thing, as something not in natural men, and given only in regeneration or being born of God, which is the great change of men from that which is natural to that which is supernatural. Men may have what is natural, by their being born, born in a natural way; but they have what is supernatural, by being born again, and born of God. But, says the apostle, "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God." The same faith is plainly spoken of as a supernatural thing in the foregoing chapter, verse 15: "Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God dwelleth in him, and he in God."

But common faith is not a supernatural thing, any more than a belief of any history. It is obtained by the same means. If one be natural, and the other supernatural, then undoubtedly the difference is not only such a gradual difference, differing but an infinitely little. If all lies in the degree of assent, let us suppose that a thousand degrees of assent be required to salvation, and that there is no difference in kind in the faith of others; how unreasonable is it to say, that when a man can naturally raise his assent to nine hundred and ninety-nine degrees, yet he cannot reach the other degree, by any improvement, but there must be a new birth in order to the other degree! And as it is thus evident, that the faith or believing that Jesus is the Christ, which the apostle speaks of in the text, is some virtue intended by the apostle, differing not only in degree, but in nature and kind, from any faith that unregenerate men have; so I would

observe, that it is evident that this special faith, of which the apostle speaks, that so differs from common faith, is not only a faith that some Christians only have obtained, but that all have it that are in a state of salvation; because the same faith is often spoken of as that which first brings men into a state of salvation, and not merely as that which Christians attain to afterwards, after they have performed the condition of salvation.

How often are we taught, that it is by faith in Christ we are justified; and that he that believes not, is in a state of condemnation; and that it is by this, men pass from a state of condemnation to a state of salvation. Compare John v. 21: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that heareth my words, and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation, but is passed from death unto life;" with chapter iii. 18, "He that believeth on him is not condemned; but he that believeth not, is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God." And this faith that thus brings into a state of life, is expressed in the same words as it is in the text, in John xx. 31: "But these things are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing, ye might have life through his name." Thus it is manifest that the faith spoken of in the text, is the faith that all men have that are in a state of salvation, and the faith by which they first come into salvation, and that it is a faith especially differing in nature and kind from all common faith.

In the further prosecution of this discourse, I shall, 1. Bring some further arguments to prove, that saving faith differs from common faith in nature and essence. 2. Show wherein the essential difference lies, confirming the same from the Scriptures, which will further prove the truth of the doctrine.

First. I am to bring some further arguments to prove the doctrine: and here I would observe, that there is some kind of difference or other, is most apparent from the vast distinction made in Scripture, insomuch, that those who have faith, are all from time to time spoken of as justified, and in a state of salvation, having a title to eternal life, &c. Rom. i. 16, 17, "The gospel is the power of God to salvation to every one that believeth." And chap. iii. 22, "Even the righteousness of God, which is by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all, and upon all that believe." Rom. x. 4, "Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth." Acts xiii. 39, "And by him all that believe are justified." In these and other places, a state of salvation is predicated of every one that believeth or hath faith. It is not said of every one that believeth and walks answerably, or of every one that believeth and takes up an answerable resolution to obey; which would be to limit the proposition, and make an exception, and be as much as to say, not every one that is a believer, but to such believers only as not only believe, but obey. But this does not consist with these universal expressions: "The gospel is the power of God to salvation to every one that believeth." "The righteousness of God is unto all, and upon all them that believe." "Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth." And by the supposition, they that have not saving faith are in a state of damnation; as it is also expressly said in Scripture, "He that believeth not shall be damned," and the like. So that it is evident that there is a great difference between the virtue that the Scripture calls by the name *faith*, and speaks of as saving faith, let it be what it will, and all that is or can be in others. But here I would observe particularly: the difference must either be only in the degree of faith, and in the effects of it, or it is the nature of the faith itself. And I would,

I. Show that it is not merely a difference in degree.

1. There are other Scriptures besides the text, that speak of saving faith as a supernatural thing. Matt. xvi. 15, 16, 17, "He saith unto them, But whom say ye that I am? And Simon Peter answered and said, Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God. And Jesus answered and said unto him, Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona; for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven." This must evidently be understood of a supernatural way of coming by this belief or faith; such a way as is greatly distinguished from instruction or judgment in other matters, such as the wise and prudent in temporal things had. So Luke x. 21, 22, "In that hour Jesus rejoiced in spirit, and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes: even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight. No man knoweth who the Son is but the Father; and who the Father is, but the Son, and he to whom the Son will reveal him." So, to the same purpose is John vi. 44, 45, "No man can come to me, except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him: and I will raise him up at the last day. It is written in the prophets, And they all shall be taught of God: every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me." And what is meant, is not merely that God gives it in his providence; for so he gives the knowledge of those wise and prudent men mentioned in the forecited passage. It is said that he gives it by the teachings of his Spirit, as appears by 1 Cor. xii. 2: "No man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost." And the common influences of the Spirit, such as natural men, or men that are unregenerated may have, are not meant, as appears by what the same apostle says in the same epistle, chap. ii. 14: "But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." The things of the Spirit of God to which the apostle has a special respect, are the doctrine of Christ crucified, as appears by the beginning of the chapter, and by the foregoing chapter, which he says is to the Jews a *stumbling* block, and to the Greeks foolishness. And that the influence of the Spirit, in which this saving faith is given, is not any common influence, or any thing like it, but is that influence by which men are God's workmanship, made over again, or made new creatures, is evident, by Ephesians ii. 8, 9, 10: "For by grace are ye saved, through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God: not of works, lest any man should boast. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them." And so, it is manifest by the text, that this influence by which this faith is given, is no common influence, but a regenerating influence, 1 John v. 1—5: "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God; and every one that loveth him that begat, loveth him also that is begotten of him. By this we know that we love the children of God, when we love God and keep his commandments," &c. It is spoken of as a great work, so wrought by God, as remarkably to show his power, 2 Thess. i. 11: "Wherefore also, we pray always for you, that our God would count you worthy of this calling, and fulfil all the good pleasure of his goodness, and the work of faith with power." And that which makes the argument yet more clear and demonstrative is, that it is mentioned as one of the distinguishing characters of saving faith, that it is the faith of the operation of God; Col. ii. 12, "You are risen with him through the faith of the operation of God, who hath raised him from the dead." Now, would this faith be any distinguishing character of the true Christian, if it were not a faith of a different kind from that which others may have? And besides, it is evident-

ly suggested in the words, that it is by a like wonderful operation as the raising of Christ from the dead; especially taken with the following verse. The words taken together are thus, verses 12, 13: "Buried with him in baptism, wherein also you are risen with him through the faith of the operation of God, who raised him from the dead. And you, being dead in your sins, and the uncircumcision of your flesh, hath he quickened together with him, having forgiven you all trespasses." Let this be compared with Eph. i. 18, 19: "The eyes of your understanding being enlightened; that ye may know what is the hope of his calling, and what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints, and what is the exceeding greatness of his power to us ward who believe, according to the working of his mighty power." Now, is it reasonable to suppose, that such distinctions as these would be taught, as taking place betweeen saving faith and common faith, if there were no essential difference, but only a gradual difference and they approached infinitely near to each other?

2. The distinguishing epithets and characters ascribed to saving faith in Scripture, are such as denote the difference to be in nature and kind, and not in degree only. One distinguishing epithet is *precious*, 2 Peter i. 1: "Like precious faith with us." Now, preciousness is what signifies more properly something of the quality, than of the degree. As preciousness in gold is more properly a designation of the quality of that kind of substance, than the quantity. And therefore, when gold is tried in the fire to see whether it be true gold or not, it is not the quantity of the substance that is tried by the fire, but the precious nature of the substance. So it is when faith is tried to see whether it be saving faith or not. 1 Peter i. 7, "That the trial of your faith being much more precious than of gold that perisheth, though it be tried with fire, might be found unto praise, and honor, and glory, at the appearing of Jesus Christ." If the trial was not of the nature and kind, but only of the quantity of faith; how exceedingly improper would be the comparison between the trial of faith and the trial of gold? Another distinguishing Scripture note of saving faith is, that it is the faith of Abraham. Rom. iv. 16, "Therefore it is of faith, that it might be by grace; to the end the promise might be sure to all the seed, not to that only which is of the law, but to that also which is of the faith of Abraham, who is the father of us all." Now, the faith of Abraham cannot be faith of that degree of which Abraham's was; for undoubtedly multitudes are in a state of salvation, that have not that eminency of faith. Therefore, nothing can be meant by the faith of Abraham, but faith of the same nature and kind. Again, another distinguishing Scripture note of saving faith is, that it is faith *unfeigned*. 1 Tim. i. 5, "Now the end of the commandment is charity, out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of faith unfeigned." 2 Tim. i. 5, "When I call to remembrance the unfeigned faith that is in thee, which dwelt first in thy grandmother Lois, and thy mother Eunice; and I am persuaded that in thee also." Now this is an epithet that denotes the nature of a thing, and not the degree of it. A thing may be unfeigned, and yet be but to a small degree. To be unfeigned, is to be really a thing of that nature and kind which it pretends to be; and not a false appearance, or mere resemblance of it. Again, another note of distinction between saving faith and common faith, plainly implied in Scripture, is, that it differs from the faith of devils. It is implied in James ii. 18, 19: "Yea, a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have works: show me thy faith without thy works, and I will show thee my faith by my works. Thou believest that there is one God; thou dost well: the devils also believe and tremble." Here it is first implied, that there is a difference between saving faith and common, that may be shown by works; a differ-

ence in the cause, that may be shown by the effects; and then it is implied this difference lies in something wherein it differs from the faith of devils; otherwise there is no force in the apostle's reasoning. But this difference cannot lie in the degree of the assent of the understanding; for the devils have as high a degree of assent as the real Christian. The difference then must lie in the peculiar nature of the faith.

3. That the difference between common faith and saving faith does not lie in the degree only, but in the nature and essence of it, appears by this; that those who are in a state of damnation are spoken of as being wholly destitute of it, as wholly without that sort of faith that the saints have. They are spoken of as those that believe not, and having the gospel hid from them, being blind with regard to this light; as 2 Cor. iv. 3, 4: "But if our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost: in whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them." Now, can these things be said with any propriety, of such as are lost in general, if many of them as well as the saved, have the same sort of faith of the same gospel, but only in a less degree, and some of them falling short in degree, but very little, perhaps one degree in a million? How can it be proper to speak of the others, so little excelling them in the degree of the same light, as having the light of the knowledge of the glory of God shining unto them, and beholding as with open face the glory of the Lord, as is said of all true believers in the context? While those are spoken of as having the gospel hid from them, their minds blinded, lest the light of the glorious gospel should shine unto them, and so as being lost, or in a state of damnation? Such interpretations of Scripture are unreasonable.

4. That the difference between saving faith and common faith is not in degree, but in nature and kind, appears from this, that, in the Scripture, saving faith, when weakest, and attended with very great doubts, yet is said never to fail. Luke xxii. 31, 32, "And the Lord said, Simon, Simon, behold, Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat: but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not; and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren." The faith of Peter was attended with very great doubts concerning Christ and his cause. Now, if the distinction between saving faith and other faith be only in the degree of assent, whereby a man was brought fully to assent to the truth, and to cease greatly to question it; then Peter's faith would have failed. He would have been without any saving faith. For he greatly questioned the truth concerning Christ and his kingdom, especially when he denied him. Other disciples did so too; for they all forsook him and fled. Therefore it follows, that there is something peculiar in the very nature of saving faith, that remains in times even of greatest doubt, and even at those times distinguishes it from all common faith.

I now proceed, II. To show that it does not consist only in the difference of effects. The supposition that I would disprove is this, That there is no difference between saving faith and common faith as to their nature: all the difference lies in this, that in him that is in a state of salvation, faith produces another effect; it works another way; it produces a settled determination of mind, to walk in a way of universal and persevering obedience. In the unregenerate, although his faith be the same with that of the regenerate, and he has the same assent of his understanding to the truths of the gospel, yet it does not prove effectual to bring him to such a resolution and answerable practice. In opposition to this notion, I would observe,

1. That it is contrary to the reason of mankind, to suppose different effects, without any difference in the cause. It has ever been counted to be good reasoning from the effect to the cause; and it is a way of reasoning that common sense leads mankind to. But if, from a different effect, there is no arguing any difference in the cause, this way of reasoning must be given up. If there be a difference in the effect, that does not arise from some difference in the cause, then there is something in the effect that proceeds not from its cause, viz., that diversity; because there is no diversity in the cause to answer it: therefore, that diversity must arise from nothing, and consequently there is no effect of any thing; which is contrary to the supposition. So this hypothesis is at once reduced to a contradiction. If there be a difference in the effect, that difference must arise from something; and that which it arises from, let it be what it will, must be the cause of it. And if faith be the cause of this diversity in the effect, as is supposed, then I would ask, what is there in faith, that can be the cause of this diversity, seeing there is no diversity in the faith to answer it? To say that the diversity of the effect arises from likeness or sameness in the cause, is a gross and palpable absurdity; and is as much as to say, that difference is produced by no difference: which is the same thing as to say, that nothing produces something.

2. If there were a difference in the effects of faith, but no difference in the faith itself, then no difference of faith could be showed by the effects. But that is contrary to Scripture, and particularly to James ii. 18: "Yea a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have works: show me thy faith without thy works, and I will show thee my faith by my works." The apostle can mean nothing else by this, than that I will show thee by my works that I have a right sort of faith. I will show thee that my faith is a better faith than that of those who have no works. I will show thee the difference of the causes, by the difference of the effect. This the apostle thought good arguing. Christ thought it was good arguing to argue the difference of the tree from the difference of the fruits, Matt. xii. 33, "A tree is known by its fruit." How can this be, when there is no difference in the tree? When the nature of the tree is the same, and when, indeed, though there be a difference of the effects, there is no difference at all in the faith that is the cause? An if there is no difference in the faith that is the cause, then certainly no difference can be shown by the effects. When we see two human bodies, and see actions performed and works produced by the one, and not by the other, we determine that there is an internal difference in the bodies themselves: we conclude that one is alive, and the other dead; that one has an operative nature, an active spirit in it, and that the other has none; which is a very essential difference in the causes themselves. Just so we argue an essential difference between a saving and common faith, by the works or effects produced; as the apostle in that context observes, in the last verse of the chapter: "For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead also."

I come now, in the second place, to show wherein saving faith differs essentially from common faith: and shall endeavor to prove what I lay down from the Scripture, which will give further evidence to the truth of the doctrine.

There is in the nature and essence of saving faith, a receiving of the object of faith, not only in the assent of the judgment, but with the heart, or with the inclination and will of the soul. There is in saving faith, a receiving of the truth, not only with the assent of the mind, but with the consent of the heart; as is evident by 2 Thess. ii. 10: "Received not the love of the truth that they might be saved." And the apostle, describing the nature of saving faith, from

the example of the ancient patriarchs, Heb. xi., describes their faith thus, verse 13: "These all died in faith, not having received the promises; but, having seen them afar off, were persuaded of them, and embraced them." And so the Evangelist John calls faith a receiving of Christ; John i. 12, "But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believed on his name." Here the apostle expressly declares, that he whom he means by a receiver, was the same with a believer on Christ, or one that has saving faith. And what else can be meant by receiving Christ, or accepting him, than an accepting him in heart? It is not a taking him with the hand, or any external taking or accepting him, but the acceptance of the mind. The acceptance of the mind is the act of the mind towards an object as acceptable, but that in a special manner, as the act of the inclination or will. And it is farther evident, that saving faith has its seat not only in the speculative understanding or judgment, but in the heart or will; because otherwise, it is not properly of the nature of a virtue, or any part of the moral goodness of the mind: for virtue has its special and immediate seat in the will; and that qualification, that is not at all seated there, though it be a cause of virtue, or an effect of it, yet is not properly any virtue of the mind, nor can properly be in itself a moral qualification, or any fulfilment of a moral rule. But it is evident, that saving faith is one of the chief virtues of a saint, one of the greatest virtues prescribed in the moral law of God. Matth. xxiii. 23, "Wo unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites; for ye pay tithe of mint, and anise, and cummin, and have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith: these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone." It is a principal duty that God required: John vi. 28, 29, "Then said they unto him, What shall we do that we may work the works of God? Jesus answered and said unto them, This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom God hath sent." 1 John iii. 23, "And this is his commandment, that ye believe on the name of his Son Jesus Christ, and love one another, as he gave us commandment." And therefore it is called most holy faith, Jude 20. But if it be not seated in the will, it is no more a holy faith, than the faith of devils. That it is most holy, implies, that it is one thing wherein Christian holiness does principally consist.

An objection may be raised against this last particular, viz., that the words faith and believing, in common language, signify no more than the assent of the understanding.

Answer 1. It is not at all strange, that in matters of divinity and of the gospel of Christ, which are so exceedingly diverse from the common concerns of life, and so much above them, some words should be used in somewhat of a peculiar sense. The languages used among the nations of the world, were not first framed to express the spiritual and supernatural things of the gospel of Christ, but the common concernments of human life. Hence it comes to pass, that language in its common use, is not exactly adapted to express things of this nature; so that there is a necessity, that when the phrases of common speech are adopted into the gospel of Christ, they should some of them be used in a sense somewhat diverse from the most ordinary use of them in temporal concerns. Words were first devised to signify the more ordinary concerns of life: hence, men find a necessity, even in order to express many things in human arts and sciences, to use words in something of a peculiar sense; the sense being somewhat varied from their more ordinary use; and the very same words, as terms of art, do not signify exactly the same thing that they do in common speech. This is well known to be the case in innumerable instances;

because the concerns of the arts and sciences are so diverse from the common concerns of life, that unless some phrases were adopted out of common language, and their signification something varied, there would be no words at all to be found to signify such and such things pertaining to those arts. But the things of the gospel of Christ are vastly more diverse from the common concerns of life, than the things of human arts and sciences: those things being heavenly things, and of the most spiritual and sublime nature possible, and most diverse from earthly things. Hence the use of words in common language, must not be looked upon as a universal rule to determine the signification of words in the gospel: but the rule is the use of words in Scripture language. What is found in fact to be the use of words in the Bible, by comparing one place with another, that must determine the sense in which we must understand them.

Answer 2. The words in the original, translated faith and believing, such as πιστις, πιστευω. πειθω, and πεποιθησις, as often used in common language, implied more than the mere assent of the understanding: they were often used to signify affiance or trusting; which implies an act of the will, as well as of the understanding: it implies, that the thing believed is received as good and agreeable, as well as true. For trusting always relates to some good sought and aimed at in our trust; and therefore evermore implies the acceptance of the heart, and the embracing of the inclination, and desire of the soul. And therefore, trusting in Christ for salvation implies, that he and his redemption, and those things wherein his salvation consists, are agreeable and acceptable to us.

Answer 3. Supposing saving faith to be what Calvinistical divines have ordinarily supposed it to be, there seems to be no one word in common language, so fit to express it, as faith, πιστις, as it most commonly is in the original. Orthodox divines, in the definitions of faith, do not all use exactly the same terms, but they generally come to the same thing. Their distinctions generally signify as much as a person's receiving Christ and his salvation as revealed in the gospel, with his whole soul; acquiescing in what is exhibited as true, excellent and sufficient for him. And to express this complex act of the mind, I apprehend no word can be found more significant than faith, which signifies both assenting and consenting: because the object of the act is wholly supernatural, and above the reach of mere reason, and therefore exhibited only by revelation and divine testimony: and the person to be believed in, is exhibited and offered in that revelation, especially under the character of a Saviour, and so, as an object of trust: and the benefits are all spiritual, invisible, wonderful and future. If this be the true account of faith, beware how you entertain any such doctrine, as that there is no essential difference between common and saving faith; and that both consist in a mere assent of the understanding to the doctrines of religion. That this doctrine is false, appears by what has been said; and if it be false, it must needs be exceedingly dangerous. Saving faith, as you well know, is abundantly insisted on in the Bible, as in a peculiar manner the condition of salvation; being the thing by which we are justified. How much is that doctrine insisted on in the New Testament! We are said to be "justified by faith, and by faith alone: By faith we are saved; and this is the work of God, that we believe on him whom he hath sent: The just shall live by faith: We are all the children of God by faith in Jesus Christ: He that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned." Therefore, doubtless, saving faith, whatsoever that be, is the grand condition of interest in Christ, and his great salvation. And if it be so, of what vast importance is it, that we should have right notions of what it is? For certainly no one thing whatever, nothing in religion is of greater importance, than that which teaches us how we may be saved If

salvation itself be of infinite importance, then it is of equal importance that we do not mistake the terms of it; and if this be of infinite importance, then that doctrine that teaches that to be the term, that is not so, but very diverse, is infinitely dangerous. What we want a revelation from God for chiefly, is, to teach us the terms of his favor, and the way of salvation. And that which the revelation God has given us in the Bible teaches to be the way, is faith in Christ Therefore, that doctrine that teaches something else to be saving faith, that is essentially another thing, teaches entirely another way of salvation: and therefore such doctrine does in effect make void the revelation we have in the Bible; as it makes void the special end of it, which is to teach us the true way of salvation. The gospel is the revelation of the way of life by faith in Christ. Therefore, he who teaches something else to be that faith, which is essentially diverse from what the gospel of Christ teaches, he teaches another gospel; and he does in effect teach another religion than the religion of Christ. For what is religion, but that way of exercising our respect to God, which is the term of his favor and acceptance to a title to eternal rewards? The Scripture teaches this, in a special manner, to be saving faith in Jesus Christ. Therefore, he that teaches another faith instead of this, teaches another religion. Such doctrine as I have opposed, must be destructive and damning, i. e., directly tending to man's damnation; leading such as embrace it, to rest in something essentially different from the grand condition of salvation. And therefore, I would advise you, as you would have any regard to your own soul's salvation, and to the salvation of your posterity, to beware of such doctrine as this.

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